Voluntarism in early psychology: the case of Hermann von Helmholtz.

History of Psychology 2014, Vol. 17. No. 2, 105-128

© 2014 American Psychological Association 1093-4510/14/$12.00 hup://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0035978

VOLUNTARISM IN EARLY PSYCHOLOGY: The Case of Hermann von Helmholtz Liesbet De Kock Ghent University The failure to recognize the programmatic similarity between (post-)Kantian German philosophy and early psychology has impoverished psychology's historical selfunderstanding to a great extent. This article aims to contribute to recent efforts to overcome the gaps in the historiography of contemporary psychology, which are the result of an empiricist bias. To this end, we present an analysis of the way in which Hermann von Helmholtz's theory of perception resonates with Johann Gottlieb Fichte's Ego-doctrine. It will be argued that this indebtedness is particularly clear when focusing on the foundation of the differential awareness of subject and object in perception. In doing so, the widespread reception of Helmholtz's work as proto-positivist or strictly empiricist is challenged, in favor of the claim that important elements of his theorizing can only he understood properly against the background of Fichte's Ego-doctrine. Keywords: Hermann von Helmholtz, Johann Gottlieb Fichte, perception, voluntarism, transcendental philosophy

As Araujo' points out in a recent article, considerable efforts have been made in the past decades to correct prevailing "[...] misconceptions and distortions [. ..] in the contemporary historiography of psychology."^ The flaw Araujo brings to our attention pertains to a fundamental bias in the historical self-understanding of contemporary empirical psychology, which is described in Robinson's An Intellectual History of Psychology as follows^: [. . .] it is not uncommon to find histories of psychology uncritically accepting the thing contemporary psychologists happen to be engaged in and, from these ventures, working back in time to discover their precedents. Such datings are often of use [. . . ] , but as historical contributions they are incomplete and misleading.

Both authors argue that the continuity of philosophical and early psychological thought seems to have largely fallen into oblivion, or that it has been reconstructed in a strikingly selective and impartial way. More precisely, the history of empirical psychology—of which the

Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Liesbet De Kock, Centre for Critical Philosophy, Department of Philosophy and Moral Sciences, Ghent University, Blandijnberg 2, 9000 Ghent, Belgium. E-mail: Liesbet [email protected]

onset is commonly dated back to Wilhelm Wundt's instauration of the "Psychologisches Institut" in Leipzig in 1879—is all too often reconstructed by means of an exclusive focus on its precedents in empiricist philosophy, and as a consequence^ [t]he aspiring psychologist might be expected to know something about "Mill's methods" and [.. .] the general features of Darwinian biology and the sensoryphysiological theories of Helmholtz. But no one is asked any longer to pour over the works of Bain and Spencer, Fichte or Schelling, Kant or Hegel.

The present exposition takes as a general point of departure this criticism of the empiricist bias in the contemporary historiography of psychology, and it aims to contribute to the ongoing efforts to overcome important gaps in psychology's historical self-understanding. More particularly, an analysis will be presented of the way in which nineteenth-century scientist, philosopher and proto-psychologist Hermann von Helmholtz's theory of perception resonates with central aspects of J. G. Fichte's analysis of experience. In doing so, the widespread reception of Helmholtz's work as proto-positivist or strict empiricist is challenged, in favor of the claim that important elements of the latter's theorizing can only be understood properly against the background of Fichte's Fgodoctrine.^ 105

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By reverting to the figure of Helmholtz, we return to the cradle of scientific psychology in Germany; that is, the moment when it emancipates itself from philosophical speculation and is established as an autonomous, empirically informed discipline. The term "empirical" in this context refers to the introduction of methodological naturalism with regard to the study of the mind; that is, the attempt to decompose mental phenomena into their most basic elements, and subsequently to reconstruct them theoretically by means of a minimal set of (mental) laws, thus endorsing a methodology inspired by the "[.. .] modes of explanation in natural science."^ With regard to his theory of perception, Helmholtz uses the term specifically to delineate his psychological methodology from physiological nativism, which assumes that "[...] complete ideas of objects are produced by organic mechanisms."^ In contrast to nativist accounts of perception, Helmholtz's empirical approach starts out with the basic assumption that the perceptual process is crucially mediated by psychological activity, and as such, is an "[...] act of our power of realization [Vorstellungsvermögen], rather than the mere effect of anatomo-physiological mechanisms."^ However, unlike strict empiricist philosophers such as J. S. Mill, who explicitly juxtaposed his psychological (empirical) method to the a priori method of philosophizing, Helmholtz was never hostile to the German transcendental tradition as such (as instigated by Kant).^ His general allegiance to Kant's critical philosophy is well documented and still subject to philosophical debate at present.'" Consequently, Helmholtz's overall philosophical position has been described by some as an attempt to reconcile empiricism and transcendentalism, or as a form of "dovetailing" between both. ' ' With regard to the theory of perception, this entails that Helmholtz's theorizing comprises two levels of analysis. On the one hand, the perceptual process is treated as an a posteriori, constructive mental act. On the other hand, however, Helmholtz's theorizing interrogates the a priori subjective conditions in which the very possibility of empirical construction is founded.'2 While Helmholtz's indebtedness to Kant's critical philosophy—especially with regard to the latter's appropriation of Kant's a priori view

of causality—is the subject of ongoing debate, minimal scholarly attention has been given to the continuity between important aspects of his thought and Fichte's (post-Kantian) voluntaristic account of consciousness. The term "voluntarism" denotes Fichte's firm conviction that in order to account for the possibility of objective experience, one should conceptualize the epistemic subject as an inherently active, striving being (see "Fichte and the Striving Subject"). With respect to Helmholtz's theorizing, this voluntaristic element is most clearly articulated in his claim that "human actions, [...] posited by the will, form an indispensible part of our sources of knowledge."'^ Among the few who have pointed out a certain allegiance of Helmholtz's psychological theory of perception to Fichte's ego-doctrine are Scheerer, Turner, Schulz, Meulders and especially Heidelberger.'^ With the exception of Heidelberger, however, the suggested interpretations of the Helmholtz-Fichte relationship remain fragmentary and vague, with comments on the matter being restricted to no more than a few tentative statements, made in the context of discussions pertaining to other aspects of Helmholtz's work. Of the authors mentioned, Heidelberger is to be credited for putting the matter of Helmholtz's allegiance to Fichte's Ego-doctrine on the agenda as an area of interest in its own right, as he convincingly argues that the failure of taking this indebtedness into account has led to a considerable misunderstanding of the scientist's overall philosophical position.'^ In contrast to Heidelberger's analysis, however, the present exposition does not take Helmholtz's philosophy of science as a focal point, but investigates the systematic place of the Fichtean "moment" in Helmholtz's psychological approach to the problem of perceptual experience. Consequently, the main focus will be on the way in which Helmholtz's appeal to Fichte was motivated by his attempt to solve a particular problem within his perceptual theory, l'or which he found no help in Kant's critical philosophy. Not only is the angle different from which the Helmholtz-Fichte relation is studied, the main thesis defended in this analysis also significantly differs from Heidelberger's. To be precise, it will be argued that Helmholtz's Fichteanism was restricted to those aspects of the post-Kantian's philosophy that can be interpreted as pertaining to a philosophy of mind.

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and that it can (and should) be dissociated from "Fichte the metaphysician," who was the main focus of Heidelberger's analysis.'^ Finally, the present exposition includes an in-depth analysis of those (systematic and doctrinal) aspects of Fichte's work that are most relevant with regard to the problem of (perceptual) experience, which is minimally present in Heidelberger's analysis as a consequence of his more general focus. This article is structured as follows: after presenting a sketch of Helmholtz's attitude toward German philosophy in general ("Helmholtz and (German) Philosophy: General Introduction"), and Fichte's Ego-doctrine in particular ("Helmholtz's Fichte"), Helmholtz's conceptualization of the psychological problem of perception will be discussed ("Helmholtz and the Problem of Perceptual Understanding"). More, in particular, it will be argued that Helmholtz's (Kantian-inspired) antiobjectivist ("Helmholtz's Antiobjectivism"), and nonreductionist ("Helmholtz's Nonreductionism") perspective on human perception gave rise to two (different, but interrelated) problems for a psychology of perception, which prompted Helmholtz to go beyond the limits of a purely empirical approach. These problems will be denoted as the problem of reference and difference ("The Psychological Problem of Perception"). The latter problem (the main focus of this exposition) is articulated by Helmholtz as an explanation of how the "[. . .] separation of thought and reality [. . .]" [Scheidung von Gedachtem und Wirklichem], or the difference between the world of self-consciousness [Welt des Selbstbewusstseins] and that of external objects, first arises in perceptual consciousness.'^ While Helmholtz relies on the transcendental tradition in philosophy to account for both problems, the solution he offers for the first reveals a commitment to Kant's critical analysis of experience ("Helmholtz and the Problem of Perceptual Understanding"), whereas his analysis of the second tallies with important aspects of Fichte's Ego-doctrine. To demonstrate this, an overview of the central tenets of Fichte's philosophy will be presented ("Fichte's Metacritical Project"), and subsequently related to Helmholtz's theorizing ("Voluntarism in Helmholtz's Psychology of the Object"). In doing so, it will be pointed out that Helmholtz's account of differential consciousness resonates with Fichte's

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philosophy to the extent that it considers the genesis of the subject-object distinction in perceptual consciousness to be founded on (a) the general scheme of volition (or striving) versus resistance (or check), (b) the a priori assumption of an essentially free and active (or agentive) subject, which is considered to be (c) the constitutive pole of experience by virtue of a prereflective and centrally generated self-relation of the form [I = activity]. In conclusion, it is claimed that an in-depth understanding of Helmhohz's work does indeed require at least some understanding of Fichte's post-Kantian voluntarist project. Helmholtz and (German) Philosophy: General Introduction For the larger part of the 19th century, and well into the first half the 20th century, the history of science in Europe can be described as a history of crises.'^ Crises, in plural, spreading out across the domains of metaphysics, epistemology, and methodology. If we restrict ourselves to the German situation at the time of Helmholtz's academic career, the majority of contemporary debates are to be understood against the backdrop of the gradual crumbling of the hegemony of romanticism and absolute idealism.'^ From his (auto-)biographical notes, we learn that Helmholtz first came into contact with (post-)Kantian philosophy through his father Ferdinand, a teacher at the Potsdam Gymnasium who strongly adhered to Fichte's philosophical system. Furthermore, Johann Gottlieb Fichte's son, Immanuel Hermann, was one of the closest friends of Ferdinand and the younger Helmholtz's godfather and namesake. ' In his Autobiographical Sketch, Helmholtz testifies^'^: The interest for questions of the theory of cognition, had been implanted in me in my youth, when I had often heard my father, who had retained a strong impression from Fichte's idealism, dispute with his colleagues who believed in Kant or Hegel.

However, soon after entering university in Berlin in the late 1830s to study medicine, the younger Helmholtz became impassioned with the empiricist ideal of science, and developed quite an outspoken antimetaphysical attitude, which he would keep until his death in 1894.^^ This is well illustrated in a 1862 lecture, in

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which Helmholtz attacks Hegel's metaphysical system on the grounds that it assumed the whole of physical reality to be "[...] the result of an act of thought on the part of a creative mind," and hence implied that it was "[...] competent for the human mind, even without the guidance of external experience, to think over again the thoughts of the Creator, and to rediscover them by its own inner activity."^"* As a consequence, Helmholtz conceived of the deductive method common to the rationalist schools of thought as a great hindrance to scientific progress.^^ In the first as well as the second (revised) version of his Treatise, Helmholtz extends his criticism to the metaphysical doctrines of Schelling and Fichte, writing ^* [. . .] J.G. Fichte, Schelling and Hegel all emphasized [. . .] that representations are essentially dependent upon the nature of the mind, thus neglecting the influence of the thing causing the effect [das Wirkende] on the effect [die Wirkung]. Consequently, they have had little influence on the theory of sense-perceptions.

Discussions on the devastating influence of absolute idealism on scientific progress were fierce, but philosophical debates intensified even more when the bankruptcy of Hegel's Absolute Spirit was immediately followed by a reawakening of metaphysical materialism, which Helmholtz likewise rejected.^^ In a letter to his father, he explicitly distanced himself from the vulgar materialism of Karl Vogt and Jacob IVIoleschott, claiming that their works came down to nothing more than "trivial tirades," not representative for the general views of the scientific community.^* In a lecture later on in his career, Helmholtz warns his audience that his "[...] generation has had to suffer under the tyranny of spiritualistic metaphysics," but that "[. ..] the newer generation will probably have to guard against that of the materialistic hypotheses."^^ In defending his antimetaphysical attitude, Helmholtz was a self-professed Kantian: he considered all "claims of pure thought" to be inherently problematic and praised the Critique of Pure Reason's "[. . .] continual sermon against the use of the category of thought beyond the limits of possible experience."''" Furthermore, he explicitly subscribed to Kant's conception of philosophy as critical epistemology, or "a true criticism of the sources of cognition."^' Helmholtz maintained that the only

way to put metaphysical transgressions to an end, is by means of philosophy, defined as the critical inquiry into "the sources of knowledge and their degree of justification [.. .]."^^ But although Helmholtz rejected metaphysics in general (including the metaphysical dimension in Fichte's thought), he deplored that many of his fellow scientists "[...] went so far as to condemn philosophy altogether [.. .]"^^ and argued, on the contrary, that "[. ..] philosophy, if it gives up metaphysics, still possesses a wide and important field."'''* Helmholtz's aversion to rationalist deductive metaphysics never prevented him from interrogating the aims and scope of philosophical inquiry on the one hand, and the relationship between philosophy and the natural sciences on the other. Especially regarding his own main research interest, human perception, Helmholtz deemed philosophical reflection to be indispensible, as he considered questions regarding the nature of perception to constitute a "border land" [Grenzgebiet] between natural science and philosophy.''^ IVIore particularly, he argued that^^ Philosophy [. . .] considers the intellectual side, seeks to exclude from our knowledge and ideas that which originates from the influences of the corporeal world in order to be able to state that which belongs to the mind's own activity. Natural science, by contrast, [. . .] seeks to divide off that which is deflnition, designation, form of representation, and hypothesis in order to retain as pure residue that which belongs to the world of reality, whose laws its seeks.

As mentioned in the Introduction, the influence of Kant's critical philosophy has received considerable attention in recent years, in contrast to the common disregard for the continuity between his thought and Fichte's Ego-doctrine. At least two obvious reasons for this state of affairs come to mind. For one thing, the conceptual intertwinement of subjectivity and freedom in Fichte's work might seem to thwart the very idea of psychology as a science of the subject from the very start. Fichte's work could even be considered as inherently antipsychologistic, that is, as a theory of subjectivity that is the complete opposite of the scientific viewpoint, understood in a restricted (physicalist and deterministic) sense.^^ As will be made clear in the course of my analysis, this first objection can be easily dismissed, as Helmholtz explicitly conceptualized the psychological subject as a free and agentive being, irreducible to the (de-


terministic) physico-physiological level. Helmholtz's theorizing thus resists scientific reductionism from the very beginning, and his conception of psychology is therefore not hostile to a nondeterministic notion of subjectivity such as is presented in Fichte's work. A more compelling argument against the present analysis, however, could be that Helmholtz's antimetaphysical attitude is apparently irreconcilable with the quite robust metaphysical and speculative character of post-Kantian philosophy in general, and Fichte's system in particular. This objection cannot be dismissed, but, as Turner points out, Helmholtz apparently distinguished between "[...] two aspects of Fichte's thought," and accepted Fichte's philosophy to the extent that it "[...] represented a phenomenology of consciousness," although it can hardly be denied that he "[...] resolutely rejected Fichte's [...] attempts to build an idealist metaphysics on that basis."-'^ As will be demonstrated in the next section, Helmholtz's own statements with regard to the matter support this hypothesis of a restricted indebtedness to Fichte's philosophy. Furthermore, this perspective provides a good explanation for Helmholtz's seemingly ambivalent (or one might even say inconsistent) statements with respect to the Fichtean system: while the scientist despised "Fichte the metaphysician," the same does not hold for his attitude toward "Fichte the philosopher of mind." Helmholtz's Fichte For some of the most valuable clues regarding Helmholtz's appreciation of J. G. Fichte's work, his lifelong correspondence with his father Ferdinand forms an excellent starting point. In these letters, it is clear that Helmholtz's aversion to the metaphysical dimension of Fichte's philosophy does not amount to a generalized rejection of the latter's transcendental system. In contrast to Hegel, Helmholtz states, Fichte's philosophy "[...] does not [...] contradict the natural sciences, but rather [...] corresponds precisely to [...] the conclusions [...] of physiology.".39" Furthermore, he confides to his father,''^ It seems to me a favorable moment for voices of the old school of Kant and [. . .] Fichte to obtain a hearing once more. [. . .] Philosophy finds its great significance among the sciences as the theory of the source and functions of knowledge, in the sense in which Kant, and, so far as I have understood him, the elder Fichte, took it.

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When writing to his father on the topic of his 1855 lecture Ueber das Sehen des Menschen [On Human Vision], Helmholtz reiterates this claim"* ^: Last Tuesday [.. .] I gave another lecture upon Human Vision, in which I tried to put forward the correspondence between the empirical facts of the physiology of the sense-organs and the philosophical attitude of Kant, and also of Fichte, although I was somewhat hindered in my philosophical exposition by the need of making it popular.

So although Helmholtz rejected Fichte's system as a metaphysical program, he put it on a par with Kant's as a critical analysis of experience, and he even felt that the Ego-doctrine anticipated his own theory to a certain degree. In yet another letter (written in September 1852), Helmholtz even goes so far as to claim that his theory can be read as "[.. .] an empirical statement of Fichte's fundamental views of sense-perception.'"*^ As will become clear later on, Helmholtz also articulated certain elements of his theory of perception in a Fichtean terminology (see "Fichte's Metacritical Project"), and, in doing so, explicitly refers to the latter. Especially when reading his 1878 lecture The Facts of Perception [Die Thatsachen in der Wahrnehmung], as well as the revised version of his Treatise from 1896, it becomes apparent that a certain allegiance to Fichte's philosophy cannot be denied, although this intellectual indebtedness remains somewhat ambivalent, and is less prominent in comparison with his Kantianism. In itself, the fact that minimal scholarly attention has been given to Helmholtz's reference to Fichte in the context of his physiological optics should not come as a surprise, given the ambivalent nature of the statements Helmholtz made on this topic. Moreover, it is not improbable that Helmholtz was not too keen on publicly expressing his sympathy toward (certain aspects) of Fichtean philosophy, given the strong antimetaphysical climate of his time.'*'' Furthermore, it is not entirely clear what exactly Helmholtz had read from Fichte. In a 1841 letter to Immanuel Fichte, the young Helmholtz, a student in medicine at that time, states that he has "[...] recently studied some works of your great father [ihres Großen Vaters]," but does not specify which works exactly he had examined. "* A footnote in the second, revised version of his Treatise reveals that Helmholtz had been

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impressed by Fichte's 1817 Facts of Consciousness [Die Thatsachen des Bewusstseins], which, according to him, contains many "[...] correct and sharp insights" on the nature of sense perception."*^ It is also reasonable to assume, as Turner does, that Helmholtz must have had some degree of familiarity with the Science of Knowledge [Wissenschaftslehre], which is Fichte's most famous work, but Helmholtz's available writings and correspondence do not provide decisive evidence on that matter."*^ Among the few who have granted a certain significance to the Fichtean dimension in Helmholtz's work (see "Introduction"), opinions differ on the precise manner in which it should be interpreted, without violating Helmholtz's antimetaphysical stance. Schiemann (2009), for example, suggests that there might be a way in wbich Helmholtz's theory resonates with the Ego-doctrine, but only to the extent that Fichte's work "[...] reveals pragmatic aspects that Helmholtz felt were important for explaining life's everyday mechanism of perception and achievements in scientific experimental action.""*' In contrast to Schiemann, who puts the whole matter forward as an altogether rather trivial one, Meulders feels that Fichte's shadow (together with that of Kant) is "omnipresent" in Helmholtz work, "[...] because both philosophers were at the very roots of his [that is, Helmholtz's] own concept of perception."'*^ However, Meulders does not further elaborate on this point."*^ Heidelberger, in tum, claims that the "[...] inner core of Helmholtz's philosophy [...] had its roots in Fichte's philosophy," and therefore maintains that " [ . . .] the essential key to understanding Helmholtz's philosophy of science lies in appreciating the influence of Fichte's idealism." In his interpretation, Helmholtz's thought develops from within an "[. . .] idealistic metaphysical framework [. . .]" similar to the one put forward by Fichte.^' Given the ambivalent nature of Helmholtz's own statements with regard to Fichte's philosophy. Turner's suggestion (see "Helmholtz and (German) Philosophy: General Introduction") seems to be more viable. Because this article argues for the nontrivial nature of the Fichtean dimension in Helmholtz's thought, and subscribes to the claim that some familiarity with the Ego-doctrine is required to gain an in-depth understanding of the latter's thought, the suggestion concerning Helmholtz's covert idealist

metaphysical stance (as raised by Heidelberger) is suspended in favor of Turner's more modest take on the matter.^^ In the following section, a systematic analysis will be presented of tbe philosophical matters at stake in Helmholtz's theorizing, and the way in which he appeals to the transcendental tradition in philosophy in attempting to address them. First of all, it will be argued that Helmholtz's (Kantian-inspired) antiobjectivism, as well as his nonreductionist perspective on the perceptual process, prompted him to articulate the problem of perception as an explicitly psychological one, that is, a problem of mental apprehension. Second, it will be demonstrated that two further problems can be discerned in bis theorizing, which pertain not so much to the structure of perceptual apprehension as such, but to its a priori grounds of possibility in tbe subject. The problems at hand can be referred to as tbe problem of reference and that of dijference. While Helmholtz's treatment of the former reveals a commitment to Kant's philosophy, the latter problem is accounted for in a way that tallies with important aspects of Fichte's philosophy and correlates with a move beyond Kant's critical analysis of experience. Helmholtz and the Problem of Perceptual Understanding Helmholtz's psychological analysis of perception, which is the subject matter of the third volume of his Treatise, starts out with the question of "[...] how mental apprehensions are produced by tbe changes which take place in the optic nerve."^^ The theoretical foundation of this psychological project is subsequently formulated as follows^'*: As perceptions [. . .] belong to the realm of representations, and as representations are always acts of our mental activity [Acte unserer psychischen Thätigkeit], [. . .] Therefore, the theory of perception belongs [.. .] to the domain of psychology.

The mere definition of perception as a psychological act of apprehension prompts us to consider two assumptions that are both foundational to Helmholtz's epistemological stance, namely (a) his (Kantian-inspired) antiobjectivism, and (b) his nonreductionism.


Helmholtz's Antiohjectivism

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welches gewirkt wird]."*" This antiobjectivist perspective on the nature of human perception has been a sufficient argument for some to interpret his work as explicitly neo-Kantian in spirit. 61

As the basis of his theory of perception, Helmholtz accepts the thesis that "[...] the quality of [...] sensation is dependent principally on the condition of the nervous system, and only in second place on the condition of the Helmholtz's Nonreductionism object perceived."^"^ Accordingly, sensation is conceptualized as a sign or symbol for external The psychological dimension of Helmholtz's objects, that is, no more than a "[...] changed theorizing is revealed by his rejection of nativist condition of the nervous fibers which we call (or naturalist) approaches to perception, such as the state of excitation or functional activity," put forward in the works of Ewald Hering, devoid of any intrinsic similarity with "[. ..] the Helmholtz's contemporary and most important agent inducing it."^^ In the end, Helmholtz con- adversary.*^ In general, the latter assigned a cludes, "[...] representation and that which is more prominent role to inborn organic strucrepresented [Vorstellung und Vorgestelltes], tures and physiological processes in perception [...] belong to [...] entirely different worlds, in comparison to Helmholtz, who emphasized which have as httle in common [...] as the the psychological nature of the perceptual proletters of a book with the sound of the words cess. During his entire career, Helmholtz mainwhich they signify."^^ tained that the nativist hypothesis is unnecesHelmholtz's theorizing thus proceeds from a sary, and even "audacious and dubious."^'^ In denial of the "givenness" of the object through contrast with strictly naturalistic approaches to sensitivity, or a fundamental discontinuity be- perception, he argued, his psychological theory tween subject and object, and a consequent em- does not assume that "[...] complete ideas of phasis on the indispensible role of subjective objects are produced [. ..] by readymade anaacts of interpretation and apprehension. Inter- tomical mechanisms," but instead takes the laws estingly enough, he repeatedly points out that of thought as its starting point.^'* From this this (antiobjectivist) starting point of his theo- perspective, the appearance of a perceptual obrizing is in complete agreement with the basic ject cannot be reduced to a physical-physiologtenets of Kant's critical analysis of experience. ical event, but is on the contrary conceived of as As early as 1855 he claims for example that^^ being largely dependent on nonreducible mental acts regulated by general laws that should be Contemporary sense physiology has demonstrated examined and systematized by autonomous what Kant sought to prove earlier [. . .] when he pointed out [. . .] the role of [.. .] inborn mental laws psychological investigation. [Gesetze des Geistes] and [. . .] mental organization However, it is of utmost importance to add [Organisation des Geistes] in the formation of our representations. that Helmholtz emphasized that the realm of psychological activity cannot be fully grasped Later on in his career, Helmholtz maintained by means of strict laws either, as he conceived that this particular conception of the (semiotic) of the subject as an inherently free and agentive relation between sensations and objects is "[...] being, which hence resists a strict deterministic an empirical statement of Kant's theoretical ac- explanation. We might say that it is exactly at count of the nature of the human faculty of the point where Hehmholtz assumes freedom to knowledge."^*^ More particulariy, Helmholtz be one of the core characteristics of the subject, appropriated Kant's view that the possibility of that we encounter the boundaries of what we perception is conditioned necessarily by our have called his methodological naturalism with (physiological and cognitive) organization. In regard to the mind (see "Introduction"). In his Treatise, Helmholtz therefore credited Kant 1862, for example, Helmholtz states''^: for providing one of the most important insights in the nature of human perception, namely the [. ..] in ascribing to ourselves free-will, that is, full power to act as we please, without being subject to a fact that perceptual experience is "[...] an efstern inevitable law of causality, we deny in toto the fect [Wirkung] [...] determined just as much by possibility of referring at least one of the ways in that which affects [dem Wirkenden], as by the which our mental activity expresses itself to a rigorous nature of that which is affected [dessen, auf law.

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Helmholtz's antireductionist stance therefore pertains not only to his skepticism with regard to the possibility of an exclusively naturalistic (physico-physiological) approach to perception, but likewise to his unwillingness to reduce psychological functioning to a form of mental mechanics. The Psychological Problem of Perception Helmholtz's general epistemological starting point, as sketched in the two preceding sections, determines his conception of psychology in general, and his understanding of the psychological problem of perception in particular. "To see," Helmholtz states in 1855, is "[...] to understand sensation."^^ Accordingly, the psychology of perception aims at accounting for the general nature and structure of perceptual understanding. As already mentioned, two levels of analysis can be discerned in Helmholtz's treatment of perceptual understanding. At the empirical level of analysis, Helmholtz conceptualizes the perceptual process as the acquired ability to interpret sign-sensations and relegate them to their appropriate meaning (external objects and events),67. A peculiar intellectual activity is required to pass from a nervous sensation to the conception of an external object, which the sensation has aroused. The sensations of our nerves of sense are mere symbols indicating certain external objects, and it is [.. .] only after considerable practice that we acquire the power of drawing correct conclusions [. . .]

Most generally, Helmholtz argues that perceptual understanding is an unconscious, quasilogical process inference in which sensations (effects) are linked to external objects or events (causes), mediated by previous experience.*** The perceptual process, in this sense, seems to be nothing more than an a posteriori constructive activity, mediated by invariable psychological laws. In addition to his inquiry into the empirical structure of perceptual comprehension, Helmholtz questions what we might call "the principles of comprehensibility"; that is, the principles that are assumed a priori in his empirical account of perceptual understanding, but that are not empirically demonstrable themselves. If we say that Helmholtz is dovetailing between, or trying to reconcile, empiricism and transcendentalism, what we are in fact implying is no

more than that his psychological analysis of mental comprehension is embedded in a more fundamental analysis pertaining to the principles of comprehensibility. With regard to the a priori foundation of perceptual comprehension, two different problems appear time and again in Helmholtz's work. First of all, there is the question concerning the foundation of sensation qua sign, or, in other words, how can the physiologically neutral event of sensation form the basis of grasping something (internal or external) that is not sensation itself? It is true, Helmholtz states, that we "[...] have learned to see"; that is, "[. . .] that we have learned to link certain representations to certain sensations" and that from this (empirical) perspective, perception is "[. . .] nothing but a mechanically acquired association of ideas."^^ But we need to take "one more step [einen letzten Schritt]," he immediately adds, because the empirical analysis should necessarily be accompanied by an account of "[...] what first enables us to pass from the world of nervous sensations into the world of actuality [Welt der Wirklichkeit]?"''" In other words, how did we first come to grasp sensations as signs, given their fundamentally underdetermined nature with regard to external objects (see "Helmholtz's Antiobjectivism")? This problem pertains to the conditions underlying the signaling function of the sensation-sign itself, and will be referred to as the problem of reference in what follows. Second, Helmholtz addresses the question of how one can differentiate between those signs referring to external objects or events, and those that are endogenous in origin. "What is it," he asks, that "[...] first makes the distinction between thought and reality possible [Scheidung von Gedachtem und Wirklichem erst möglich wird]?"^' At this point we touch upon the important problem concerning the foundation of perceptual consciousness, defined at its most basic level as differential consciousness of a Self and a Not-Self. The latter issue, in which we are especially interested in the scope of this paper, will be referred to as the problem of difference. In addressing both matters, Helmholtz to some extent relies on the transcendental tradition, but whereas his answer to the first reveals a (further) indebtedness to Kant's critical analysis of experience, his treatment of the second


matter starts out with a criticism from Kant, and further develops along the lines set out by Fichte's Ego doctrine. Helmholtz and the Problem of Reference: The Aprioricity of the Causal Law When focusing on what we have called the problem of reference, it soon becomes clear that Helmholtz's commitment to Kantianism is not restricted to his conceptualization of the (psychophysiological) subject as the constitutive pole for (perceptual) experience. What founds the apprehension of sensation qua sign, according to him, is the a priori causal structure of perceptual understanding. More particularly, the causal law is conceived of as "[...] the condition of conceivabihty" and a "[...] regulative principle of our understanding."^^ Sensation relates (or refers) to its origin as effect to cause, and every sensory event is necessarily subsumed under the law of causality. Without the assumption that "there is no effect without a cause [keine Wirkung ohne Ursache]," sensation would refer to nothing but itself, and, hence, perception would be utterly impossible.'^ In arguing for the a priori nature of the causal structure of understanding, Helmholtz resists the empiricist "regularity view," as defended for example by his contemporary John Stuart P* Is it [that is, the causal law] a law of experience [Erfahrungssatz]? According to some, it is. But [. . .] we need the law to arrive [. . .] at the insight that there are objects in space in the flrst place [. . .]. Can it be derived from the internal experience of our selfconsciousness? No; since we conceive of selfconscious acts of volition and thought as being free; that is, we deny that they are the necessary effects of sufficient causes. Hence, the inquiry into the nature of sense perception leads us to the insight that Kant had already revealed: that the law [. . .] is a law of thought, given prior to experience.

Later on in his career, Helmholtz maintained that "[. ..] the causal law is really an a priori given, a transcendental law. It is not possible to prove it by experience [.. .]."'^ The signaling function of sensation thus derives from the Kantian-inspired notion of causality as the a priori form of (perceptual) understanding.^^ By itself, however, the aprioricity of causality does not explain how internal and external causes are differentiated in perception, or does not answer the question of the foundation of

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differential consciousness. This is a problem for which, according to Helmholtz, even Kant's system is of "virtually no help."'' The Criticism of the Kantian Concept of Intuition Interestingly enough, Helmholtz was just as much a defender of (physiological) neoKantianism, as he was a critic of certain aspects of Kant's philosophy. For one thing, Helmholtz famously argued for the empirical nature of the Euclidian axioms of geometry, claiming that the Euclidian structure of space is not an "[...] a priori transcendental form of intuition, as Kant thought."'^ Helmholtz's refutation of this part of Kant's Transcendental Aesthetics, as put forward among others in his 1870 lecture "On the Origin and Significance of the Geometrical Axioms [Ueber den Ursprung und die Bedeutung der geometrischen Axiome]," was soon received by many as providing a final blow to the very idea of the synthetic a priori, and as such, as a fatal injury to the entire critical system.'^ Helmholtz himself, however, did not believe that his claim affected the core of Kant's aesthetics, but claimed that he was correcting "Kant where he had not been critical enough." As his 1892 lecture makes clear, Helmholtz did not so much intend to refute the critical system, but rather to rethink it, by redrawing the border between the a priori and the a posteriori, or the formal and material aspects of experience^': [. . .] the physiological investigation of the sense organs and their activity [. ..] agree with Kant; indeed, already in the physiological field there are the clearest analogies to Kant's transcendental aesthetic. However, an objection [. . .] had to be raised against the borderline that Kant had drawn between the facts of experience and the forms of intuition given a priori. And with the required redrawing of the border [. . .] the fundamental principles of spatial theory are subsumed under the facts of experience.

In Helmholtz's thought, the problem of space is directly related to that of differential consciousness, as he articulated the structure of perceptual consciousness primarily in terms of a geometrical opposition, and writes for example that "[...] we understand as the external world precisely what we perceive as spatially determined. That which has no perceptible spatial relation, we conceive as the world of inner intuition, as the world of self-consciousness."^^

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The question of the possibility of spatial perception thus coincides with the problem of explaining how the difference between the external world and the world of self-consciousness first arises in perception. Indeed, Helmholtz's thorough concern with the Kantian conception of space seemed to derive from a much more profound preoccupation with the problem of the dual structure of perceptual consciousness, as Heyfelder points out*^: [. . .] his [that is, Helmholtz's] research interest [. . .] pertained primarily to the genesis of our consciousness of an external world, [. . .] opposed to the inside world [...]. But as the external world is a spatial world in his conception, his second concern was to establish how we come to know objective space.

In emphasizing the empirical nature of space, Helmholtz does not so much deny that 'space' is in fact the form of external intuition, but rather that this form is itself an a posteriori element of perceptual experience; that is, constructed through a series of subjective acts.^'* The argument for the empirical nature of the spatial character of perception thus correlates with the introduction of the internal-external structure of perceptual experience as a problem for the psychological theory of perception. An in-depth analysis of Helmholtz's work reveals that his criticism is not restricted to the Kantian conception of the spatial form of intuition, but that it affects the very notion of 'intuition' itself. It soon becomes clear that his so-called "redrawing" of the Kantian borderlines amounted to much more than simply relocating them. The Kantian system is improved above all, Helmholtz states, through "[. ..] the resolution of the concept of intuition into the elementary processes of thought."^^ At this point, the problem in question shifts from a problem of demarcation to a critical examination of the concept of intuition itself, defined by Kant as that by virtue of which "[...] an object is given [. . . ] , provided that this object affects the mind in a certain way."^* In 1892, Helmholtz formulated his criticism of Kant's concept of intuition as follows*^: [. . .] Kant [. . .] condensed into one act, which he named intuition, all the connecting links between pure sense perception and the formation of ideas of the perceived, spatially extended object. This plays a role for him [. ..] as if it were merely the result of a nattiral mechanism that could not be an object of further philosophical and psychological investigations.

In an earlier lecture, Helmholtz had likewise expressed his skepticism over the seemingly "effortless" way in which the object is given in Kant's intuition, as if it were a case of mere receptivity.^^ For Helmholtz, by contrast, 'intuiting' implies an act of judgment, pertaining exactly to the subjective positing of a difference between "thought and reality." A critical analysis of (perceptual) experience should therefore account for the foundation of this very act, instead of accepting the difference between both as given. With this criticism, we finally arrive at the juncture in Helmholtz's theorizing where his line of reasoning departs from Kant's and starts to resonate with Fichte's post-Kantian analysis of experience. As Friedman argues, most neo-Kantians (among which he counts Helmholtz) rejected post-Kantian philosophy to the extent that it represented "[...] an attempt to forge a metaphysical unity of nature and spirit," but this does not prevent a certain agreement between both in their rejection of "[...] Kant's original opposition between sensible and intellectual faculties."^^ Although Kant had once claimed that both intuition and understanding "[...] probably spring from a common, but to us unknown root [Wurzel],"'° he did not further elaborate on this point. Consequently, the apparent dualism inherent to his philosophical system was soon scrutinized, as its foundational distinctions themselves were perceived to be unfounded; a last dogmatic residue that made the whole critical system vulnerable to skeptical attacks. The very essence of the post-Kantian project was later described by some as an attempt to overcome this dogmatic dualism at the core of the Kantian system." As Sturma puts The Kantian doctrine of transcendental idealism, [. ..] is specifically characterized by a fundamental dualist structure with regard to the distinction between the 'given' and the 'constituted.' It was precisely this dualism that represented the skandalon of philosophy for the post-Kantian idealists, one that had at all costs to be overcome.

Accordingly, the concept of "intuition" came under scrutiny, and, not unlike Helmholtz, Schopenhauer for example contended that the Kantian system lacks an account "of the genesis of intuition," or of the idea of "[...] the being of an actual object [dasein eines Wirklichen Gegenstandes]." The "givenness" of the object


through intuition in Kant's aesthetics seems to arise "[. . .j as if it were by virtue of a miracle, a matter of receptivity, coinciding with sensation."^^ To demonstrate the possibility of empirical intuition, in which the subject is aware of itself as related to, but also distinguished from the object, Schopenhauer claimed that a degree of understanding must be present at the level of intuition itself. Although there is more than one way in which Helmholtz's theorizing relates to Schopenhauer's system, it reverberates with the Fichtean modification and extension of the transcendental project in particular. What is at stake in Fichte's theorizing seems to be exactly the problem of difference, or the foundation of the distinctions at work in the critical project, and therefore the Fichtean project can be aptly described as a metacritique. Fichte's Metacritical Project Although Fichte always considered his philosophical system to be in complete accordance with the spirit of Kant's doctrine, the foundationalist aspirations of his work mark a definite move beyond the critical project.^"* In accordance with the objections raised against Kant's dualism, Fichte steadily became convinced of the fact that transcendental philosophy requires a foundational 'first principle' from which the critical distinctions can be derived, in order to "[...] demonstrate what Kant had only postulated."^^ More in particular, Fichte believed that the deduction of the whole of critical philosophy from one unitary principle was the necessary systematic completion of the "fragments [Bruchstücke] and results" of Kant's critical philosophy, a completion that would furthermore make the latter intelligible and consistent, and tbereby transform transcendental pbilosophy into an airtight System of knowledge, properly so called.^^ In Fichte's conception, the ultimate task of philosophy is to articulate the (transcendental) basis of experience, defined as "[...] tbe system of representations accompanied by tbe feeling of necessity."'''^ Consequently, he articulated the central question of his transcendental project as follows: "How do we arrive at the assumption of being [ein Sein]? [...] How is a being for us [Sein für uns] possible? [...] The proposed question asks for the ground of the predicate of ^^ By specifying his main question as

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pertaining to being-for-us, Fichte at once excludes the metaphysical matter of the status of being-in-itself, in favor of the problem of being in and for consciousness; tbat is, a problem of experience. Subsequently, the question to be answered is further determined as pertaining to the transcendental ground (as opposed to the empirical genesis) of being-for-us : The ground [Grund] [. ..] is beyond the grounded [Begründeten]; [. . .] the grounded and the ground, are [. . .] opposed to one another and yet related, as the former is derived from the latter. Philosophy has to account for the ground of all experience; therefore, its object necessarily lies beyond experience.

Wbat needs to be explained, according to Fichte, is what grounds the fact [Tatsache] of determined or differentiated consciousness. What Fichte seeks to articulate, in other words, is the transcendental ground of consciousness qua consciousness of something [Etwas]; that is, consciousness that accepts a being-for-us and affirms with necessity that the thing is [das Ding ist], simultaneously with its self-affirmation.' As it is Kant's dualism itself that becomes the object of critical inquiry, Fichte's system can be conceived of as a critical analysis of the Kantian Critiques, or a metacritical investigation; that is, an examination of the transcendental conditions underlying Kant's critique of experience.'°' To be more precise, Fichte derives the critical distinctions at work in the Kantian analysis (intuition vs. understanding, theoretical vs. practical philosophy, etc.) from one foundational principle, namely that of the pure Ego, thought of as ideal activity [Tathandlung].'°^ Therefore, his project can be read as an extension of Kant's attempt to account for the conditions of possibility for objective representation, in which the scope is shifted from the a priori formal features of representation, to those of the / that does the representing. Pinkard, for example, summarizes this important aspect of Fichtean philosophy as follows"*^: The core insight at the root of Fichte's attempt to complete the Kantian system [. . .] had to do with what he saw as the basic dichotomy at the root of the Kantian system. [. . .] Fichte concluded, that dichotomy itself—that core distinction between subjects and objects—was itself subjectively established; it was a normative distinction that subjects themselves institute.

This aligns with Ameriks' claim that the crucial question raised by Fichte's metacritical per-

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spective is concerned with exactly that which we have called the problem of difference:'°'' Fichte has a story to tell about the active/passive distinction, a story to the effect that this distinction needs not be simply assumed, as it is by Kant, but it can be argued to be a condition of the self's certain self-awareness

Inversely proportional to this rather straightforward interpretation of his work as a metacritical expansion and completion of the Kantian project, is the notorious complexity that characterizes Fichte's writings, and once lead F.K. Forberg to complain that if "Kantian philosophy has been criticized for obscurity, Fichte's must be faulted for pitch darkness."'"^ Within the framework of this analysis, it suffices to explore the Fichtean treatment of three interdependent themes that were later to resurge in Helmholtz's psychological theory of perception, namely (a) his conceptualization of the problem of consciousness as the central problem of transcendental philosophy, (b) the constitutive role of volitional processes in experience, and (c) the necessary assumption of freedom in a critical analysis of experience. By entering into these three topics, the nature and significance of the Fichtean project with regard to the problem of experience in general, and its relevance to what we have called the problem of difference in particular, will be clarified further. Fichte and the Prohlem of Consciousness Fichte's metacritical project was very much influenced by Karl Leonard Reinhold, who was the first to hold the Jena chair in critical philosophy and his reading of Kant's system as a philosophy of consciousness.'°^ In his Elementarphilosophie, Reinhold had diagnosed Kant's dualism as one of the greatest weaknesses of the critical system, and set out to ground transcendental philosophy on a metacritical foundation; that is, a first principle from which the critical distinctions could be derived.'"^ As a first principle. Reinhold put forward his Satz des Bewusstseins [the principle of consciousness], stating that "[...] in consciousness the subject distinguishes the representation from the subject and object and relates it to both."'°* The principle of consciousness is thus presented as the ultimate foundation of the critical project, as it is the synthetic unity of subject and object, and transcends Kantian dualism.'"^

Although Fichte accepted "consciousness" as the ultimate principle of philosophy, he was not convinced by Reinhold's first principle, for the simple reason that "[. ..] if the subject were not able to relate itself to, and to distinguish itself from, the object and the state of representing, then it could not have a representation at all." ° The basic problem of transcendental philosophy is subsequently formulated as that of explaining the transcendental ground of (phenomenologically experienced) differentiality'": [. ..] I make a distinction within myself between a knowing subject and a real force [reelle Kraft], which, as such, does not know, but is [. . .] How do I come to make this distinction? how do I arrive at precisely this determination of what is being distinguished? [. . .] I do not know, without knowing something; [. . .] or [. . .] without separating something subjective in me from something objective. As soon as consciousness is posited, this separation is posited; without the latter no consciousness whatsoever possible. [. ..] Knowing and being are not separated outside consciousness, and independent of it; instead, they are separated only within consciousness, since this separation is a condition for the possibility of all consciousness [. . .].

Reinhold's (unconditioned) first principle is thus transformed into a (conditioned) first problem for critical philosophy in Fichte's work, which can therefore be read as an attempt to critically found the fact of the duality of consciousness."^ As is clear from the quote, consciousness qua differentiated consciousness in Fichte's philosophy is consciousness that is determined through its relation with an object, and the problem in question can therefore be reformulated as the transcendental foundation of determined [bestimmte] activity"^: Now what does a determinate activity [bestimmte Thätigkeit] mean, and how does an activity become determinate or determined? Merely by having some resistance [Widerstand] posited in opposition to it— posited in opposition [entgegengesetzt]: that is to say, a resistance that is thought of by means of ideal activity and imagined to be standing over against the latter. Wherever and whenever you see activity, you necessarily see resistance as well, for otherwise you see no activity.

The possibility of consciousness is thus made dependent on the principle of resistance, which is in turn only intelligible by virtue of an (ideal) activity on the part of the subject, or more precisely: a preconceptual self-relation of the form [I = activity].""* Therefore, the problem of consciousness automatically brings us to a discussion of Fichte's articulation of the self-


positing subject (or the pure subject thought of as a fact-act [Tathandlung]) as the first principle and the foundation of critical philosophy."^ Fichte and the Striving Subject

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Hence, according to Kant, the possibility of all consciousness is determined by the possibility of the I [Ich] or pure self-consciousness [...] I know that he has by no means demonstrated that the categories are a condition of self-consciousness, but has simply asserted them to be so. [. . .] I am equally certain [. . .] that Kant has entertained the thought of such a system; that everything which he actually presented, are fragments and results of this System, and that his assertions are sensible and coherent only on this assumption.

At the basis of his philosophical system, Fichte establishes the self, not as a fact [Tatsache], but as an act [Tathandlung]: the I posits It is true, Fichte grants, that Kant's pure apitself, absolutely and infinitely. It is only l'or an perception (the I think) is a condition of possiI thus conceived, that an object can be posited bility for experience, but "what is the I Kant as a Gegenstand or resistance: "The object is [...] posited, only to the extent that the activity talks about? [Von welchem Ich ist hier die of the I is opposed [...]; if there is no such Rede]?"'^° In other words, whereas Kant asactivity of the I, there is no object." And further: sumed (or 'postulated') that pure apperception "[...] no object can be posited without the is a necessary condition of possibility for reppresence of an activity [Tätigkeit] of the I, that resentation, Fichte, in his turn, aimed at deteris opposed to the activity of the object."' '* The mining the conditions of possibility for this Tathandlung; that is, the act of the I in which it implicit self-relation (or self-understanding) posits itself, is therefore the first principle of that necessarily accompanies all acts of reprecritical philosophy. Consciousness is consti- sentation. The "common root" of both the object and the subject of consciousness, according tuted as a dual structure through the reciprocal to Fichte, lies exactly in the ideal structure of determination of I and Not-I, dialectically rethe I, that grasps itself qua ^^^ lated to each other as reality and negation, and posited by the active self through the awareness I find myself to be acting efficaciously in the world of sense. All consciousness arises from this discovery. of limitation or resistance. Without this consciousness of my own efficacy [WirkAt this point it becomes clear why Neuhouser samkeit], there is no self-consciousness; without selfsummarizes the main aspiration of Fichte's sysconsciousness, there is no consciousness of something else that is not supposed to be I myself. tem as "[...] as an attempt to construct a "theory of subjectivity," or "[. . .] an explanation of The I that accompanies all representation is what it is to be an I.""^ Fichte's work can conceptualized in Fichte's work as an act of indeed be read as a presentation of a transcen- self-positing, which relates to itself as [I = dental examination of the structure of the self, activity] through "intellectual intuition," dewhich underlies the possibility of action and fined as'^^ cognition. The post-Kantian's discussion of the [...] the immediate consciousness; that I act [...]. unitary transcendental ground of experience [. . .] I can take no step, cannot move a hand or foot, takes as its point of departure the further develwithout the intellectual intuition of my self-consciousopment of Kant's concept of pure appercepness in these acts; it is only by virtue of this intuition, that I know, that / am doing this, it is only by virtue of tion—"The / think should be able to accompany this [intellectual intuition] that I distinguish my act all my representations"—as a condition of pos[. ..] from the [. . ,] object of my act. sibility for representation"**: In other words, the intellectual intuition deHe [Kant] says: "The most fundamental principle of notes the prereflective grasp that the subject has the possibility of intuition [Anschauung] in its relation of itself as agentive, and as such, it is a constito understanding is this: that the manifold is subjected to the conditions of the original unity of apperception." tutive act of self-relation with respect to the [. ..] as such, all consciousness is conditioned by the possibility of consciousness. Fichte conoriginal unity of apperception [...]. [...] What is this condition of the original unity of apperception? [. . .] [T]hat my representations should be capable of being accompanied by the I think [.. .], that is. / am the thinking [Ich bin das Denkende] in this thinking. [.. .]

And he continues"':

[. . .] intellectual intuition is the only solid standpoint for all philosophy. Everything that occurs within consciousness can be explained on that basis [. . .]. Without self-consciousness, there is no consciousness whatsoever. [. . .] [T]he concept of 'acting,' which only

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becomes possible by means of the intellectual intuition of the self-active I [selbsttätigen Ich] [...] is the only concept that unites [. . .] the sensible and the intelligible world. That which opposes my acting [. . .] is the sensible [world], and that which ought to originate in my action is the intelligible world.

To summarize, Fichte's metacritical project amounts to an account of differential consciousness as constituted through the dynamics of activity and resistance, founded in the I as a self-positing act, and ultimately dependent on the intellectual intuition of [I = activity]. Experience as such, in this analysis, is only possible by virtue of the self-positing I, that is therefore established as the absolute and first principle of critical philosophy. The object, or Not-I, first becomes intelligible as a negation of the I's unconditioned centrifugality; that is, as resistance. For this reason. Beck suggests that Fichte's philosophy is in fact "an extension of Kant's Transcendental Deduction from the I think to the I will. "^^'^ Freedom as a Constitutive Factor of Experience Some have argued that Fichte's work should be read as an expansion (and systematic completion) of the Kantian project from an inquiry into the transcendental basis of Isnowledge, to one of action, and that the latter finally comes to function as the basis of the former.'^^ Kant, Fichte writes, never "[. ..] established the foundation of the whole of philosophy"; that is, the foundation of practical as well as theoretical knowledge, although in the latter's perspective, knowing and acting form the opposite angles from which we should analyze the same fundamental structure, that is, consciousness determined by the object.'^^ In establishing "I-hood: [Ichheit] (thought of as the act of self-positing) as the point of unity between practical and theoretical philosophy, the practical subject comes to function as the basis of the knowing subject. Or, as Fichte captures it, "From the necessity of action proceeds the consciousness of the external world, and not the reverse way [...] [W]e do not act because we know, but we know because we are destined to act; practical reason is the root of all reason."'^' The possibility of the cognitive self (the self of the 'I know') is fully dependent on unconditioned self-affection; that is, on the immediate self-relating ac-

tivity of the Fs self-positing and the intellectual intuition of [I = activity]. Fichte's system thus accepts "pure willing" as the (volitional) core of subjecüiood and the ultimate fotmdation of the transcendental analysis of experience.'^^ The a priori assumption of the free subject is considered to be the constitutive foundation of differentiated consciousness, or, put differently, experience cannot be accounted for except through the posttilate of the I as a volitional agent. Consequently, Fichte claims that freedom is not just a practical law [Praktisches Gesetz], but, moreover, "a theoretical principle [Theoretisches Princip]" for the determination of our world [Weltbestimmung].'^' It is in the following sense that the metacritical project finally amounts to an explicitly voluntaristic transcendental philosophy: cognition is intimately intertwined with volition, and the latter is even established as the condition of possibility of the former. The experience of the self as a spontaneous and free activity is considered to be constitutive for the phenomenon itself, which appears only as the negation of subjectively experienced agency. In his 1817 work The Facts of Consciousness (the only work we know Helmholtz read), Fichte integrates all the basic insights of his doctrine and relates them to the topic of external perception. Again, the author takes the (phenomenological) description of perceptual consciousness qua determined consciousness as a point of departure; perceptual consciousness is the consciousness of an Etwas, or the affirmation that "[...] the thing is [das Ding ist]."'^° Subsequently, the perceptual process is conceptualized as a form of thinking, and, more particularly, as a form of externalizing thought [herausgehen], which is in turn defined as the positing of the image of resistance.'^' This image, Fichte continues, can only be made intelligible in contrast to activity. To see an object, Fichte concludes, is to say: "[...] the positing of resistance is complete, and I am limited by this positing."'^^ The subject-object opposition in perceptual consciousness is again founded in the more general scheme of volition versus resistance. The primordial self-relation and selfpositing described in the sections above, functions as an a priori in this account: "[...] the I must appear [...] a priori. We do not know by experience that we act; this is not perceived as if it were a passive state. [...] [O]ur possible


activity [Wirksamkeit] is intuited internally [...] even before the actual execution."'''^ Voluntarism in Heimholtz's Psychology of the Object If we now return to Helmholtz's theory of perception and to his approach to the problem of difference in particular, it soon becomes apparent that his account tallies with the central tenets of Fichte's system, as sketched in the previous sections. The programmatic similarity to the Ego-doctrine is clear in his treatment of differential consciousness as (a) constructed according to the general scheme of volition (or striving) versus resistance (or check), (b) dependent on the a priori assumption of an essentially free and active (or agentive) subject, which is considered to be (iii) the constitutive pole of experience by virtue of a prereflective and centrally generated self-relation of the form [I = activity]. As such, these conditions underlie the very possibility of the empirical construction of the perceptual object in perception by means of unconscious inference, as they first enable the differentiation of sensation-signs according to their origin (internal-external). As mentioned in "Helmholtz and the Problem of Perceptual Understanding," Helmholtz formulates the problem of differentiation by means of a geometrical opposition. Although he grants that "[. ..] space would be [...] a form of intuition prior to all experience," this can only be the case "[...] insofar as its perception would be tied to the possibility of the will's motoric impulses."''*'* More specifically, Helmholtz argues that spatial perception is fundamentally regulated by the ability to differentiate between those sensory modifications that are the result of voluntary acts, and those that are not'^^: If we [. ..] make such types of impulses [. . .] we find that the sensations belonging [. . .] to spatial objects— can be changed; while other mental states [. . .]— memories, intentions, whishes, moods—cannot at all. A decisive distinction between the former and the latter is thus posited [...]

Helmholtz's account of the possibility of differential consciousness thus takes the constitutive nature of the "will's impulse" as a point of departure.''"' The possibility of a geometrical opposition between the spatial and the nonspatial supervenes on the possibility of a dynamical opposition between the I and the Not-I, consti-

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tuted through voluntary movement. It is only by means of the latter, that we can distinguish between "those changes which we can bring forth and annul by conscious impulses of wiU," and those "[.. .] which are not consequences of the will's impulse." And, Helmholtz adds, "the latter finding is negative. Fichte's appropriate expression for it is that a Nonego forces recognition of itself vis-à-vis the Ego."'-'^ Heidelberger emphasizes the Fichtean pedigree of this dimension of Helmholtz's theorizing. "From Fichte," the latter hypothesizes, "Helmholtz appropriated the view that our consciousness comes to shape its conception of the outer world through the limitations we experience [.. .]."'^^ Indeed, the genesis of the perceptual object in Helmholtz's theorizing is completely dependent on the negation of the F s own voluntary activity, and the perceptual object relates to the subject as a limiting force, or an "uns entgegentretende Macht,"'''^ a "[. ..] force that equals the force of our volition."'*" Reality, in short, is constituted through the negation of volition. A necessary presupposition with regard to this dynamics, according to Helmholtz, is that the will's impulse is directly given (a priori), unconditioned and autonomous:''" [.. .] [A]n essential assumption is [.. .] that our will's impulse has neither already been influenced by physical causes, which simultaneously determine the physical process, nor itself psychically influenced the succeeding perceptions. [. . .] [T]he will's impulse is a psychical act.

Furthermore, he adds that "[...] the impulse to movement is something directly perceivable. We feel that we do something [...] [but] we do not know directly what we do."'"*^ In other words, in perception, the subject relates directly to itself as [I = activity], and it is only through this particular structure of subjectivity that perceptual appearance first becomes possible, as a negation of the wiU. The self-relation of the form [I = activity] is not given to the subject physiologically, but is a psychological act, that necessarily precedes physical activity as such. Thus, the object-subject distinction is not selfevidently given, but constituted as a consequence of a frustrated centrifugal impulse of the self-relating I. The possibility of perceptual consciousness is indeed fundamentally dependent on the "the acting I's ability to experience

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itself in its productivity [sich in seiner Produktivität erfahrenkönnende handelnden Ich]," as Schulz (2004) points out, and, in this sense, it can be related directly to the central insights of Fichte's Ego-doctrine.''*^ According to Helmholtz, it follows from this account that "[...] efforts [...] to establish belief in external reality, [...] must remain unsuccessful so long as they proceed only from passive observation." And he goes on to explain that'^

of the effort of wiU, no distinction is possible between active and passive experience; tbat is, between internally and externally generated sensory modifications. The sensation of "the intensity of the effort of the will [Intensität unserer Willensanstrengung]" in Helmholtz's theorizing forms part of a complex of sensations referred to as the "muscular feeling [Muskelgefühl]," which also includes awareness of (a) the tension of the muscles, and (b) the result of the effort.'^^ While the last two sensations denote afferent (or centripetal) indications of ac[. ..] human actions, [. . .] posited by the will, form an tion, the intensity of the effort of the will is a indispensible part or our sources of knowledge. We centrifugal, efferent signal that precedes the achave seen that our sense impressions are only a sign language [. . . ] . [. . .] We humans must first learn to tion as such, as it refers to the sensation of effort understand this sign system, and that happens when we "[...] by means of which we attempt to put the [. . .] learn to distinguish which changes in our sense muscles into action."'"** By distinguishing beimpressions follow from our acts of will, and which tween the two, Helmholtz implies that the acothers enter independently of will. tions are known by the subject "[.. .] otherwise Voluntary action or active experimentation than by their effect," as Jeannerod puts it; that form a generalized epistemological strategy in is, the feeling of activity or spontaneity is genHelmholtz's theorizing, as McDonald argues, erated centrally, preceding the actual muscle or, to quote Heidelberger, an ars inveniendi, movement.'"'^ Although Helmholtz calls the rather than an ars demonstrandi.^'*^ The phe- awareness of Willensanstrengung a sensation, nomenal world is constituted in reference to the strictly speaking, the intensity of the effort of will's impulse, and as such, this suggests a the will is not sensed in the same way as other theory of cognition that is dependent on the sensible events; that is, it is not produced by possiiîility of action. muscle contraction, nor by tbe action of a stimWith this theory, Helmholtz concludes, we ulus on the senses, but rather it denotes the still rely on the foundation of Kant's system, consciousness of agency, as given prior to any although it has been improved by resolving form of physical activity. "[...] the concept of intuition into the elemenAlthough Helmholtz himself conceives of his tary processes of thought."'"^^ The spatial object theorizing as an empirical reformulation of is not given, but constituted by virtue of its Fichte's Ego-doctrine (see "Helmholtz's opposition to the impulse of the will. The as- Fichte"), and although one could say that the sumption of a "striving subject" forms a condi- immediate self-relating centrifugal impulses of tion of possibility for experience, and in this the subject are partially operationalized through sense, Helmholtz's theory of perception is em- his concept of "muscular feeling," Helmholtz's bedded in a form of voluntarism that is quite emphasis on the role of voluntary action cannot similar to the one presented by Fichte. Just as be fully grasped in a strict empiricist framewas the case in Fichte's metacritical examina- work. To be more precise, although physical tion of experience, the possibility of differenti- action of the body is empirically observable (as ation in Helmholtz's theorizing is fundamen- muscle contraction), the assumption of free tally dependent on the a priori assumption of a will, which, according to Helmholtz, marks the free, centrifugal activity and an immediate self- decisive difference between the science of the relation of the form [I = activity]. subject and tbe natural sciences, escapes empirHelmholtz operationalized this voluntaristic ical determination as such, and it has to be aspect of his theorizing; that is, the assumption assumed as an a priori condition for empirical of a constitutive spontaneity on the part of the determination. Helmholtz does claim that the subject, through the concept of "the effort of felt opposition between Self and not-Self is will" [Willensanstrengung], which must accom- constructed through voluntary movement, but pany every single act, precisely as a marker of tbe very possibility of this empirical construcagency. Without the immediate consciousness tion is in turn dependent on the assumption that


the epistemic subject is a free being and a selfrelating activity. In short, the ground of voluntary action is by no means empirically (physiologically or otherwise) determinable, but it lies in the assumption that the will's impulse, which is irreducible to physiological processes, is the condition of possibility for object constitution. Conclusion

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sciousness. As such, the analysis presented above challenges the impoverished received view of his work as a mere empiricist, or protopositivist perspective on perception. By placing it against the background of a broader philosophical narrative, this renewed appreciation of the historical continuity between Helmholtz's and Fichte's thought not only allows for a more in-depth understanding of Helmholtz's theorizing, but it also proves to be a revealing perspective in regard to the problem of the selective historiography of empirical psychology.

In this article, I have presented an analysis of two central problems in Helmholtz's theory of perception, referred to, respectively, as the problem of reference and that of difference. Both arise from Helmholtz's antiobjectivist and Endnotes nonreductionist approach to human perception, 1. All translations in this article are mine, except which is crystallized in his conception of' sensation as a sign, and both are accounted for by for those borrowed frotn David Cahan's Science and relying, to a certain extent, on the transcenden- Culture (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), and when indicated otherwise. When refertal tradition in philosophy. While Helmholtz ence is made to the Cahan translation of Helmholtz's developed a Kantian-inspired notion of causal- public lectures, the English title of the relevant lecity as the necessary structure of perceptual un- ture is indicated. derstanding and the condition of possibility for 2. Saulo de Freitas Araujo, "Why Did Wundt the signaling function of the sensation-sign, his Abandon His Early Theory of the Unconscious?" approach to the problem of differentiality in History of Psychology 15, no. 1 (2012): 33. perception exceeds the Kantian framework and 3. Daniel N. Robinson, An Intellectual History of reveals an indebtedness to Fichte's Ego- Psychology (Madison: University of Wisconsin doctrine. In line with Kant's idea of pure apper- Press, 1981 [1976]), 3. 4. Robinson, Intellectual History, 395. ception, the I is conceived of as the constitutive 5. A proto-positivist reading of Helmholtz is prepole for the possibility of experience, but the necessary structure of epistemic subjectivity is sented for example in Edwin Boring's seminal work further determined as essentially volitional, ac- A History of Experimental Psychology (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1957), which almost comtive, and self-relating. The dualism between the pletely discards the way in which Helmholtz's work I and its objects is not postulated, but derived is indebted to German (idealist) philosophy, and exfrom the dynamical nature of the self, that posits clusively focuses on its roots in empiricist philosophy differentiality in accordance to the scheme of (e.g., as presented by Mill). A predominandy empirwill and resistance. The voluntaristic element in icist approach is offered amongst others by Gregor Helmholtz's theorizing can thus be specified as Schiemann, Hermann von Helmholtz.'s Mechanism: pertaining to the assumption of the epistemic the Loss of Certainty (New York: Springer Verlag, subject's self-relating activity as a constitutive 2009). 6. The term "methodological naturalism" is used element of experience. Because Helmholtz considers the assumption of free will in general by Hatfield to denote the nonmaterialistic variety of (i.e.an unconditioned, autonomous, spontane- psychological naturalism, as prototypically repreous activity) and of self-relating activity in par- sented in the works of David Hume and John Stuart ticular, to be one of the constitutive aspects of Mill, and further developed in the nineteenth and twentieth century. More specifically, it refers to experience, important aspects of his thought are "[. . .] the attempt to discover "natural" laws [e.g. the indeed better understood against the back- laws of association] of the mind, where "natural" is ground of Fichte's Ego-doctrine. More specifi- cashed out through an analogy with the methods and cally, both Helmholtz's and Fichte's epistemol- modes of explanation in natural science, instead of by ogies are founded in the immediate awareness an appeal to ontology." As such it is opposed to what of activity (or the prereflective understanding of Hatfield calls "metaphysical naturalism"—the matethe self as [I = activity]) as a conditio sine qua rialistic version of psychological naturalism—which non for object awareness and differential con- attempts to reduce the mind to "[...] a material or physical system." See Gary Hatfield, The Natural

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and the Normative. Theories of Spatial Perception from Kant to Helmholtz (London: MIT Press, 1990), 16-17. 7. Hermann von Helmholtz, "The Facts in Perception," in Science and Culture, trans. David Cahan (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995 [1878]), 357. 8. Hermann von Helmholtz, "The Recent Progress of the Theory of Vision," in Science and Culture, trans. David Cahan (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995 [1868]), 127, 193. For a further discussion of Helmholtz's opposition to nativism, see "Helmholtz's Nonreductionism." 9. As Scarre observed, J.S. Mill seemed to be engaged in a "[...] a Manichean struggle between two schools of thought [. . .]" (Ceoffrey Scarre, Logic and Reality in the Philosophy of John Stuart Mill (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1989), 204. When engaging in questions pertaining to the mind. Mill stated, he found himself to be entering into the "arena of initial confiict" between "[...] two modes of philosophizing": "[. ..] the a priori philosophers cataloguing some things as facts, which the others contend are inferences. The fundamental difference relates, however, not to the facts themselves, but to their origin. [.. .] [O]ne theory considers the more complex phenomena of the mind to be products of experience, the other believes them to be original." (John Stuart Mill, Dissertations and Discussions, London: Longmans, Green, Reader, and Dyer, 1867), 102. 10. For nineteenth-century discussions on the indebtedness of Helmholtz's theorizing to Kant's critical system, see Ludwig Goldschmidt, Kant und Helmholtz (Hamburg: Leopold Voss, 1898): Albrecht Krause, Kant und Helmholtz (Lahr: Moritz Schauenburg, 1878): Joseph Schwertschlager, Kant und Helmholtz (Freiburg: Herder'sehe Verlagshandlung, 1883). For more recent accounts, see amongst others David Cahan, Hermann von Helmholtz and the Foundations of Nineteenth-Century Science (Berkeley, California: University Press, 1993); Hatfield, The Natural and the Normative; Andrew Brook, "Kant, Cognitive Science and Contemporary neo-Kantianism," Journal of Consciousness Studies 11, no. 10-11 (2004): 1-25; Michael Friedman, The Kantian Legacy in Nineteenth-Century Science (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2006). 11. Hamner refers specifically to Helmholtz's (Kantian-inspired) notion of causality (see "Helmholtz and the Problem of Reference: The Aprioricity of the Causal Law"): "Through these manipulations of the notion of causality, Helmholtz and Peirce both assert an exquisite dovetailing of Kantian transcendentalism with practical empiricism." Westheimer, in his turn, describes Helmholtz's theory as an attempt to "[...] reconcile [...] German idealist notions [. ..] with scientists' quests for the laws of nature." See Gail Hamner, American Pragmatism: A Religious

Genealogy (Oxford: University Press, 2003), 30; Gerald Westheimer, "Was Helmholtz a Bayesian?" Perception 37, no. 5 (2007): 542. 12. For a full discussion of these two levels of analysis in Helmholtz, see "The Psychological Problem of Perception." 13. Hermann von Helmholtz, "Goethe's Presentiments of Coming Scientific Ideas," in Science and Culture, trans. David Cahan (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1995 [1892]), 410. This "epistemological" voluntarism, which emphasizes the constitutive role of volitional processes in experience, and the primacy of practical reason, is to be distinguished from Schopenhauer's metaphysical voluntarism; that is, his claim that "All appearances in inorganic nature are expressions of universal forces of nature, i.e. levels of the will's objectivation [. . . ] . " See: Arthur Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation, vol. I, trans. Judith Norman, Alistair Welchman and Christopher Janaway (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 157. 14. Michael Heidelberger, "Force, Law and Experiment. The Evolution of Helmholtz's Philosophy of Science," in Hermann von Helmholtz and the Foundations of Nineteenth-Century Science, ed. D. Cahan (Berkeley, California: University Press, 1993), 461-497; Michael Heidelberger, "Helmholtz' Erkenntnis- und Wissenschaftstheorie im Kontext der Philosophie und Naturwissenschaft des 19. Jahrhunderts," in Universalgenie Helmholtz, ed. L. Krüger (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1994): 168-185; Michel Meulders, Helmholtz. From Enlightenment to Neuroscience (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2010); Reinhard Schulz, Naturwissenschaftshermeneutik (Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2004); Eckhart Scheerer, "On the Will: A Historical Perspective," Advances in Psychology 62 (1989): 39-60. 15. More particularly, Heidelberger argues that "[. ..] the essential key to understanding Helmholtz's philosophy of science lies in appreciating the influence of Fichte's idealism on Helmholtz" (Heidelberger, "Force, Law and Experiment," 495). 16. See Heidelberger, "Helmholtz' Erkenntnisund Wissenschaftstheorie," 168: "I believe [. ..] that he [Helmholtz] proceeded from a metaphysical position in his philosophy of science [. . .] During his entire life, his thought remained embedded in an idealist and metaphysical framework." The perspective taken in this article, which distinguishes between the metaphysical tenets of Eichte's philosophy and his theory of mind, aligns with a suggestion made by Turner in this respect (see "Helmholtz and (German) Philosophy: General Introduction"). The latter, however, did not elaborate further on this matter. 17. Hermann von Helmholtz, "Die Thatsachen in der Wahrnehmung, " in Vorträge und Reden, Zweiter Band, Hermann von Helmholtz (Braunschweig: Holzstiche, 1896 [1878]), 227, 242.

VOLUNTEERISM IN EARLY PSYCHOLOGY 18. Herbert Schnädelbach, Philosophy in Germany. 1831-1933 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 76. 19. Wundt described the situation as follows: "[.. .] our learned education seems in fact to have passed, in conformity with August Comte's stages of the development of knowledge, from the metaphysical to the positive stage" (Wilhelm Wundt, "Philosophy in Germany," Mind 2, no. 8 [1877]: 499). 20. Hermann von Helmholtz, "Hermann von Helmholtz. An Autobiographical Sketch," in Science and Culture, trans. David Cahan (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995 [1891]), 381-392; Leo Koenigsberger, Hermann von Helmholtz, trans. Frances A. Welby (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1906 [1902/ 1903]). 21. Helmholtz, "Autobiographical Sketch"; Koenigsberger, Hermann von Helmholtz', Benjamin Steege, Helmholtz and the Modern Listener (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012). 22. Helmholtz, "Autobiographical Sketch," 390. 23. See for example Richard M. Warren and Roslyn P. Warren, Helmholtz on Perception: its Physiology and Development (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1968), 4: "At [the Friedrich-Wilhelm Institute in] Berlin he [Hermann von Helmholtz] found that his father's teaching was, for the most part, in conflict with the attitudes of his professors and fellow students. Ferdinand Helmholtz was of the strict metaphysical school, and he believed in a purely deductive approach to knowledge. On the other hand, the science faculties were trying to rid themselves of the yoke of metaphysical speculation [...]." 24. Hermann von Helmholtz, "On the Relation of Natural Science to Science in General," in Science and Culture, trans. David Cahan (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995 [1862]), 79. 25. In his autobiographical notes, it is clear that at the time when Helmholtz entered university, the scientific climate was still very much in development, struggling between the old metaphysical and the new empiricist philosophy of science. When Helmholtz ("Autobiographical Sketch," 319) looks back at the conditions under which he studied medicine, he writes for example: "The medical education of that time was based mainly on the study of books; there were still lectures, which were restricted to mere dictation; [. . .]; there were no physiological and physical laboratories. [. . .] Microscopic demonstrations were isolated and infrequent in the lectures. Microscopic instruments were costly and scarce. [. . .] Any of my fellow-students who wished to make experiments had to do so at the cost of his pocketmoney. [.. .] We had, it is true, an almost uncultivated field before us, in which almost every stroke of the spade might produce remunerative results." The whole science of medicine as he found it upon his arrival in Berlin, Helmholtz adds, unfolded from cen-

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tral dogmas—in themselves nothing more than rationally construed fallible hypotheses—that were either presumed to be "guaranteed by authority," or "wished" to be true (Helmholtz, "Autobiographical Sketch," 316). In short, scientific practice exhibited all the attributes of the metaphysical climate in which it was embedded; that is, medical knowledge was based on the deductive method and founded in pure reason. 26. Helmholtz, Handbuch, vol. Ill (first edition), 456; Helmholtz, Handbuch, vol. Ill (second edition), 612. 27. See for example Hermann von Helmholtz, "On Academic Freedom in German Universities," in Science and Culture, trans. David Cahan (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995 [1877a]), 328342. 28. Koenigsberger, Hermann von Helmholtz, 160. 29. Hermann von Helmholtz, "On Thought in Medicine," in Science and Culture, trans. David Cahan (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995 [1877b]), 323. It is interesting that at first sight, Helmholtz's membership of the Berlin Physical Society—whose members allegedly pledged to prove that "[...] there are no other forces in the organism except the physicochemical forces" —might seem to contradict his antimetaphysical stance, or even worse, the very possibility of any voluntarist tendencies in his psychological theory of perception. Helmholtz's adherence to the aspirations of the Physical Society are, however, by no means indicative for metaphysical materialism, and even less so for ontological reductionism with regard to the mind; quite the contrary. First of all, it is important to make clear that the Berlin Society arose as a consequence of the joint efforts of its member to actively exterminate the metaphysical, vitalist concept of "Lebenskraft" from the science of physiology, in favor of what one might call methodological reductionism or naturalism with regard to the study of organic processes. The society itself, however, was antimetaphysically oriented, and their pledge pertained to a method of scientific explanation (metaphysical versus natural), whereas the metaphysical question pertaining to the essence of life (or the organic) in itself was put aside. Second, the pledge pertained exclusively to the appropriate method to be used in physiological science, and as such, it has nothing to do with Helmholtz's psychological position, or with his take on what the mind is, or how it should be studied. As will be argued, Helmholtz's work can even be said to be based on quite a strong antireductionism with regard to mental phenomena (see "Helmholtz's Nonreductionism"). Helmholtz's membership of the Berlin Society therefore does not in any way contradict the hypothesis of voluntarist tendencies in his psychological approach to perception.

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30. Helmholtz, "Thought in Medicine," 324; Immanuel Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft (Stuttgart: Suhrkamp, 2011 [1781/1787]). 31. Helmholtz, 'Thought in Medicine," 310. 32. Hermann von Helmholtz, "Ueber das Sehen des Menschen," in Vorträge und Reden, vol. I (Braunschweig: Holzstiche, 1896 [1855]), 88. 33. Helmholtz, "On the Relation of Natural Science," 80. 34. More specifically, Helmholtz states: "From the entire chain of my argument it follows that what I have said against metaphysics is not intended against philosophy. But metaphysicians have always tried to plume themselves on being philosophers, and philosophical amateurs have mostly taken an interest in the high-flying speculations of the metaphysicians, by which they hope in a short time, and at no great trouble, to learn the whole of what is worth knowing. [. . .] I compared the relationship of metaphysics to philosophy with that of astrology to astronomy. [...] philosophy, if it gives up metaphysics, still possesses a wide and important field, the knowledge of mental and spiritual processes and their laws" (Helmholtz, "Thought in Medicine," 325). 35. Hermann von Helmholtz, "Die neueren Fortschritte in der Theorie des Sehens," in Vorträge und Reden, vol. I (Braunschweig: Holzstiche, 1896 [1868]), 323. 36. Helmholtz, "The Facts in Perception," 344. 37. On this topic, Robinson (Intellectual History, 348) writes for example: "For Fichte, [. ..] the very freedom of the human will, in contrast to the deterministic character of purely physical processes, settle once and for all the question of a scientific psychology: there could be none. If there is to be a psychology, it must be a deductive, philosophical discipline that accepts as its subject the will and intentions of the Self (Ego)." Also see David E. Leary, "German Idealism and the Development of Psychology in the Nineteenth Century," Journal of the History of Philosophy 18 (1980): 299-317. 38. R. Steven Turner, "Hermann von Helmholtz and the Empiricist Vision," Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences 13 (1977): 57. 39. Helmholtz, "Ueber das Sehen," 89. 40. Koenigsberger, Hermann von Helmholtz, 159. 41. Ibid., 138. It is important to make clear that Helmholtz considered his psychological theory of perception to be the third and last part of his physiological investigation: "We use sensations [. . .] to construct representations concerning the existence, form and position of external objects. We call these representations perceptions. In this third part of the physiological optics, we need to address [...] the conditions underlying the genesis of perception. With this investigation, we necessarily enter [. . .] into the field of psychology." (Helmholtz, Handbuch, vol. Ill

(first edition), 576). When investigating later references to Fichte in Helmholtz's work, it soon becomes clear that the "correspondence" between his theorizing and the former's pertains to his psychological, rather than his strictly physiological research. Therefore, it seems reasonable to assume that the term "physiology" as it appears in the letters to his father, should be interpreted in a broad sense; that is, as including psychology, which at the time was not considered to be an autonomous discipline. 42. Letter from Helmholtz (September 1852) as quoted in Koenigsberger, Hermann von Helmholtz, 92. 43. Ibid. 44. Unpublished letter from Helmholtz to Immanuel Hermann Fichte, 2 January 1841. Württembergische Landesbibliothek, Stuttgart, Cod.Hist.4° 593, I.e., Nr. 197. 45. Helmholtz, Handbuch, vol. II (second edition), 248; Johann Gottlieb Fichte, "Die Thatsachen des Bewusstseins," in J.G. Fichte. Nachgelassene Schriften 1810-1812, ed. R. Lauth et al. (Stuttgart: Friedrich Fromman, 1999 [1817]), 9-136. 46. Turner, "Hermann von Helmholtz," 56. 47. Schiemann, Hermann von Helmholtz 's Mechanism, 70. 48. Meulders, Helmholtz, 106. 49. Surely, Meulders is one of the few to situate Helmholtz's thought within the context of German philosophy, and to put forward that post-Kantian idealist philosophy was an important ingredient of the general intellectual climate in which Helmholtz lived and worked. This interesting discussion, however, does not lead to a full-blown analysis of the way in which Helmholtz's work resonates with Fichte's. 50. Heidelberger, "Force, Law and Experiment," 494; also see endnote 14. 51. Heidelberger, "Helmholtz' Erkenntnis- und Wissenschaftstheorie," 169. 52. Heidelberger, "Helmholtz' Erkenntnis- und Wissenschaftstheorie." 53. In Helmholtz's work the psychological investigation of human perception is set apart from the study of "[. . .] the physical characters of the eye as an optical instrument," as well as the analysis of "[. . .] the physiological processes of excitation and conduction in the [...] nervous system." The three volumes of the Treatise subsequently dive into to these respective layers of the problem of perception, i.e. the physical, physiological and psychological dimension. Helmholtz, "Recent Progress," 128. 54. Helmholtz, Handbuch, vol. Ill (first edition), 427. This passage is slightly modified in the second revised version of the Treatise, in which it is stated that the study of sense-perception "[...] necessarily enters the field of psychology," because it involves the study of "[...] the origin and the coming into

VOLUNTEERISM IN EARLY PSYCHOLOGY consciousness of representations [...]" (Helmholtz, Handbuch, vol. Ill (second edition), 576). 55. Helmholtz, Handbuch, vol. II (second edition), 234. 56. Helmholtz, "Recent Progress," 149. Helmholtz's conception of sensation is derived from the law of specific nerve energies, as formulated by his teacher Johannes Müller. Müller formulates his law as follows: "That which through the medium of our senses is actually perceived by the sensorium, is indeed merely a property or change of condition of our nerves; [. ..] peculiar sensations of the nerves perceived by the sensorium are excited as frequently by internal as by external causes, [. . .] the feeling [.. .] is a condition of the nerves, and not a property of the things which excite it." (Johannes Müller, Elements of Physiology, trans. William Baly. (Philadelphia: Lea and Blanchard, 1843 [1833/1840]), 707). For excellent discussions of the indebtedness of Helmholtz to Müller's law, see amongst others Stanley Finger and Nicholas J. Wade, "The Neuroscience of Helmholtz and the Theories of Johannes Müller. Part I : Nerve Cell Structure, Vitalism and the Nerve Impulse," Journal of the History of the Neurosciences 11, no. 2 (2002a): 136-155; Stanley Fingerand Nicholas J. Wade, "The Neuroscience of Helmholtz and the Theories of Johannes Müller. Part 2: Sensation and Perception," Joumal of the History of the Neurosciences 11, 3 (2002b): 234-254. 57. Helmholtz, Handbuch, vol. Ill (first edition), 443. Helmholtz opposes his "sign" conception of sensation to the idea of sensation as a (copy-like) "image" [Abbild] of the object: "Our sensations are [. . .] effects produced by external causes in our organs, and the manner in which one such effect expresses itself depends, of course, essentially on the type of apparatus which is affected. Insofar as the quality of our sensation gives us information about the peculiarity of the external influence stimulating it, it can pass for a sign—but not for an image. For one requires from an image some sort of similarity with the object [. . . ] . A sign, however, need not have any type of similarity with what it is a sign for." (Helmholtz, "Facts in Perception," 347). It should be noted that already at this point, Heidelberger ("Force, Law and Experiment," 493) claims an indebtedness to Fichte: "The evil for Helmholtz was the mingling of the science of the necessary processes in nature with insights into the free, spontaneous self-activity of the mind. Between the not-I and the I there was a sharp difference. In this, Helmholtz [. ..] followed Fichte, who held that "intelligence [. ..] and object are therefore directly opposed to each other: they lie in two different worlds between which there is no bridge." See Johann Gottlieb Fichte, Versuch einer neuen Darstellung der Wissenschaflslehre (Hamburg: Felix Meiner (1984 [1797/98]), 19. Helmholtz himself, however, relates his antiobjectivism explicitly to

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Kant's critical project, although it might indeed be argued that it is likewise a grounding assumption in Fichte's philosophical system. By itself, the assumption of antiobjectivism does not allow for a differentiation between Kantian and Fichtean philosophy, so although Helmholtz might indeed be related to Fichte at this point, we are more interested in the way in which Helmholtz's theory resonates with those aspects of Fichtean philosophy that clearly go beyond the Kantian framework. 58. Helmholtz, "Ueber das Sehen," 98-99. 59. Helmholtz, Handbuch, vol. II (second edition), 249. 60. Helmholtz, Handbuch, vol. Ill (second edition), 612. 61. For Helmholtz's role in the development of neo-Kantianism, see for example Schnädelbach, Philosophy in Germany; Heinz Schmitz, Physiologischer Neukantianismus und Evolutionäre Erkenntnistheorie (Berliti: Peter Lang, 1995); Massimo Ferrari, Retours à Kant (Paris: Editions du Cerf, 1997); HansLudwig Ollig, Der Neukantiani,'imus, (Stuttgart: J.B. Metzlersche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1979); Michael Friedman, Dynamics of Reason: The 1999 Kant Lectures at Stanford University (Stanford: CSLI Publications, 2001). 62. For an in-depth analysis of the disagreement between Helmholtz and Hering, see Steven Turner, In the Eye's Mind, Vision and the Helmholtz-Hering Controversy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994). 63. Helmholtz, "Facts in Perception," 357; also see Helmholtz, Handbuch, vol. Ill (first and second edition), §26. 64. Helmholtz, "Facts in Perception," 357. 65. Helmholtz, "On the Relation of Natural Science," 85. 66. Helmholtz, "Ueber das Sehen," 100. 67. Hermann von Helmholtz, "On the Physiological Causes of Harmony in Music," in Science and Culture, trans. David Cahan (Chicago; University of Chicago Press, 1995 [1857]), 66. 68. For a complete exposition of Helmholtz's theory of perception as unconscious inference, see for example Helmholtz, "Facts in Perception." 69. Ibid., 114-115. 70. Ibid., 115-116 [my emphasis]. 71. Helmholtz, "Facts in Perception," 242 [my emphasis]. 72. Ibid., 363. 73. Helmholtz, "Ueber das Sehen," 116. 74. Ibid.; also see Helmholtz, Handbuch, vol. Ill (first edition), 454. For Mill's account of causation, see John Stuart Mill, System of Logic (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1882 [1843]), 398-401: "The validity of all the Inductive Methods depends on the assumption that every event, or the beginning of every phenomenon, must have some cause; some

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antecedent, on the existence of which it is invariably and unconditionally consequent [. ..] [T]he belief we entertain in the universality [.. .] of the law of cause and effect, is itself an instance of induction. [.. .] We arrive at this universal law, by generalization from many laws of inferior generality." 75. Helmholtz, "Facts in Perception," 363. 76. It should be noted that there is considerable discussion about the sense in which Helmholtz's conception of the causal law is genuinely Kantian. Most important, Helmholtz has quite an outspoken psychological understanding of the apriodcity of the causal law; that is, it functions more as a causal 'instinct' than as a mere formal (logical) category of experience. At one point, Helmholtz {Handbuch, vol. Ill (first edition), 455) specifies that the law is nothing more than an "[...] urge [Trieb] of our thought [Verstandes]." Thereby, the Kantian a priori apparently ceases to be a mere formal (logical) condition of experience, and instead expresses a necessary presupposition regarding the perceiver's psychological hardware. As an exhaustive discussion of this matter would lead us too far away from the primary topic of this article, the subject of the idiosyncratic way in which Helmholtz interpreted the Kantian a priori will not be pursued further. For some interesting discussions, see for example: Robert DiSalle, "Helmholtz's Empiricist Philosophy of Mathematics: Between Laws of Perception and Laws of Nature," in Hermann von Helmholtz and the Foundations of Nineteenth-Century Science, ed. D. Cahan (California: University Press, 1993), 498-521; Schiemann, Hermann von Helmholtz's Mechanism. 77. Helmholtz, "Goethe's Presentiments," 394. 78. Hermann von Helmholtz, "On the Origin and Significance of Geometrical Axioms." in Science and Culture, trans. David Cahan (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1995 [1870]), 239. Kant's views on space are articulated in the Transcendental Aesthetics [die Transzendentale Ästhetik] of his KrV, where it is stated that "Space is a necessary a priori representation [Vorstellung], that founds all external intuitions [Anschauungen]. [. . .] Hence, space is considered to be the condition of possibility of appearances [. . .]" [A24/B39]. A bit further he writes: "Geometry is a science that determines the characteristics of space [.. .] a priori" [B40], and "[. . .] the axioms [of Euclidian geometry] express the conditions of [. . .] intuition a priori" [B204]. For an extensive inquiry into the nature of Kant's conception of space as an a priori form of intuition, compared to Helmholtz's empirical theory, see Hatfield, The Natural and the Normative. It is important to note that this article is not as much about the soundness of Helmholtz's criticism of Kant's transcendental analysis of space, but rather it highlights the way in which the former's construction of the Kantian problem lead him to establish the problem of differentiation as a central

issue in the critical examination of experience. Therefore, in our discussion of Helmholtz's objections to the Kantian system, we will focus exclusively on the way it relates to this problem. For example. Prof. J.P.N. Land's famous criticism, (and the subsequent dispute between Helmholtz and the latter) that Helmholtz's rejection of Kant's conception of space is based upon a misunderstanding, will not be pursued further. See Jan Pieter Nicolaas Land, "Kant's Space and Modem Mathematics," Mind 2, no. 5 (1877): 38-46; David Hyder, "Kant, Helmholtz and the Determinacy of Physical Theory," in Interactions: Mathematics, Physics and Philosophy from I860 to 1930, ed. V. Hendricks et al. (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2007): 1-42; DiSalle, "Helmholtz's Empiricist Philosophy." 79. Hermann von Helmholtz, "On the Origin and Significance of Geometrical Axioms," in Science and Culture, trans. David Cahan (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995 [1870]), 66. 80. Helmholtz, "Facts in Perception," 380. 81. Helmholtz, "Goethe's Presentiments," 407. 82. Helmholtz, "Facts in Perception," 349. 83. Victor Heyfelder, Über den Begriff der Erfahrung bei Helmholtz (Berlin: Inaugural dissertation, 1897), 19; Also see Michael Heidelberger, "Innen und Aussen in der Wahrnehmung," in Video ergo sum, ed. Breidbach & Clausberg (Hamburg: HansBredow-Institut, 1999), 147-157. 84. "A posteriori" in the sense that it is mediated through voluntary movement (Helmholtz, "Facts in Perception," 349). See "Fichte's Metacritical Project." 85. Helmholtz, "Facts in Perception," 364. 86. Kant, KrV, [A19/B33]. 87. Helmholtz, "Goethe's Presentiments," 394. 88. More specifically, Helmboltz claims that "the older concept of intuition [...] which only recognizes that as given by intuition whose representation comes to consciousness immediately with the sense impression and without recollection and effort" (Helmholtz, "Facts in Perception," 354). 89. Michael Friedman, A Parting of the Ways (Chicago: Open Court, 2000), 146. 90. Kant, KrV, [B 29]. 91. See amongst others Sally Sedgwick, The Reception of Kant's Critical Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 1: "An adequate form of idealism, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel agree, is an idealism that provides a genuine alternative to subject-object dualism. It is in fact in order to challenge dualism, according to these thinkers, that philosophy comes into existence at all. The central task of philosophy or of idealism in particular is to achieve harmony or reconciliation, to replace dichotomy with 'identity'." 92. Dieter Sturma, "The Nature of Subjectivity: The Critical and Systematic Function of Schelling's


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Philosophy of Nature," in The Reception of Kant's 98. Ibid., 36. Critical Philosophy, ed. S. Sedgwick (Cambridge: 99. Ibid., neuen Darstellung, 1. Cambridge University Press, 2000), 216. 100. Eichte, "Thatsachen," 24, 30. 93. Arthur Schopenhauer, "Über die Vierfache 101. Zöller, "Erom Critique to Metacritique." Wurzel des Satzes vom Zureichenden Grunde," in 102. Eichte {neuen Darstellung, 48) defines the Kleinere Schriften (Stuttgart: Suhrkamp, 1986 'Tathandlung' as follows: "[. . .] pure activity [Tätig[1847]): 102-103. It is no coincidence that we bring keit] that does not presuppose an object, but produces up Schopenhauer in this context, as Helmholtz's the- it." ory shows some striking similarities with his thinking 103. Terry Pinkard, German Philosophy (Cam(Nicolas Pastore, "The 'Inside-Outside Problem' and bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002): 108Wolfgang Köhler," Advances in Psychology 99 109. (1993): 221-230). Although Schopenhauer allegedly 104. Ameriks, "The Practical Foundation of Phieven accused Helmholtz of plagiary at one point in losophy," 121. time (see the introduction to Hermann von Helm105. Friedrich Karl Eorberg as quoted in La holtz, Philosophische Vorträge und Aufsätze, ed. H. Vopa, Fichte, 372. Hörz, & S. Wollgast, [Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 106. Neuhouser, Fichte's Theory; Pinkard, Ger1971]). From Koenigsberger {Hermann von Helm- man Philosophy; Erederick C. Beiser, German Ideholtz, 161), it is clear, however, that Helmholtz did alism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002). not at all appreciate this association with Schopen107. Karl Leonhard Reinhold, Beiträge zur hauer. Nevertheless, the similarity between both Berichtigung bisheriger Missverständnisse der Phithinkers with respect to certain elements of their losophen, Erster Band (Hamburg: Eelix Meiner, theorizing can hardly be overlooked, and explains 2003 [1790]): Erederick C. Beiser, The Fate of Reawhy they are frequently mentioned together as de- son. German Philosophy from Kant to Fichte (Camfending of the same kind of (physiological) neo- bridge: Harvard University Press, 1987). Kantianism (see for example Schnädelbach, Philos108. Karl Leonhard Reinhold, Über das Fundaophy in Germany; Ferrari, Retours à Kant; Pastore, ment des Philosophischen Wissens (Hamburg: Felix "Inside-Outside Problem." Meiner, 1978), 78 as quoted in Pinkard, German 94. Eichte, neuen Darstellung, 49. In the context Philosophy, 99. of this discussion, the following accounts of Eichte's 109. Leary, "German Idealism." overall philosophical approach are especially helpful: 110. Beiser, Fate of Reason, 228. Eor Eichte's Karl Ameriks, "The Practical Foundation of Philos- reception of Reinhold's philosophy, also see Johann ophy in Kant, Eichte, and After," in The Reception of Gottlieb Eichte, "Aenesidemus Rezension," in J.G. Kant's Critical Philosophy, ed. S. Sedgwick (Cam- Fichte-Gesamtausgabe der Bayerischen Akademie bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 109- der Wissenschaften, ed. R. Lauth and H. Gliwitzky, 128; Anthony J. La Vopa, Fichte. The Self and the bd. 1.2. (Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: ErommannCalling of Philosophy, 1762-1799 (Cambridge: Holzboog, 1968), 14-69. Cambridge University Press, 2001); Wayne Martin, 111. Johann Gottlieb Eichte, The System of EthIdealism and Objectivity. Understanding Fichte's ics, trans. Daniel Breazeale & Günter Zöller (CamJena Project (Stanford: Statiford University Press, bridge: University Press, 2005 [1798]), 10-11. 1997); Erederick Neuhouser, Fichte's Theory of Sub112. Neuhouser, Fichte's Theory, 79. jectivity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 113. ¥ic)Mt, System of Ethics, \1. 1990); Joan Steigerwald, "The Dynamics of Reason 114. Eor a discussion on the eentrality of the and its elusive Object in Kant, Fichte and Schelling," principle of resistance for Eichte's theory of objecin Studies in the History of Philosophy of Science, 34 tivity, also see Wayne M. Martin, Idealism and Ob(2003): 111-134; Günter Zöller, "Erom Critique to jectivity. Understanding Fichte's Jena Project (StanMetacritique: Eichte's Transformation of Kant's ford: Stanford University Press, 1997). Transcendental idealism," in The Reception of Kant's 115. Johann Gottlieb Fichte, Grundlage der gesaCritical Philosophy, ed. S. Sedgwick (Cambridge: mten Wissenschaftslehre (Hamburg: Eelix Meiner, Cambridge University Press, 2000), 129-146. 1997 [1794]), §1. 95. Eichte, neuen Darstellung, 58; Allen W. 116. Ibid., 177; also see Simon Lumsden, Wood, "The T as Principle of Practical Philosophy," "Eichte's Striving Subject," Inquiry 47 (2004): 123in The Reception of Kant's Critical Philosophy, ed. 142. S. Sedgwick (Cambridge: Cambridge University 117. Neuhouser, Fichte's Theory, 1. This aligns Press, 2000), 98. with Manfred Frank's reading of Eichte as an account 96. Eichte, neuen Darstellung, 58; also see Neu- of non-objectal subjectivity, i.e. an "[. . .] irreducible houser, Fichte's Theory; Steigerwald, "Dynamics of subjectivity, [. ..] that cannot be reduced to a relation Reason"; Wood, "The "I" as Principle," 93-108. whereby a subject grasps itself as an object, [. ..] a 97. Eichte, neuen Darstellung, 6. core of subjectivity always already familiar with it-

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self before reflection." Manfred Frank, "Non-objectal Subjectivity," Journal of Consciousness Studies 14, no. 5-6 (2007): 152. 118. Fichte, neuen Darstellung, 55 [my emphasis]; Kant, KrV, [B132]; also see Charies E. DeBord, "Kant, Fichte, and the Act of the I," Philosophy Study 2, no. 1 (2012): 9-18. 119. Ibid., 56-57. 120. Fichte, neuen Darstellung, 56. 121. Fichte, System of Ethics, 9. 122. Fichte, neuen Darstellung, 43. 123. Ibid., 47. 124. Gunnar Beck, "From Kant to Hegel— Johann Gottlieb Fichte's Theory of Self-Consciousness," in History of European ¡deas 22, no. 4 (1996): 277. Manfred Frank suggests that Fichte's attempt to found an irreducible subjectivity is actually a response to the difficulty Kant has with accounting for the way in which the "I" grasps itself as a subject, in a non-objectal manner. An objectai representation of the Self would be one that is the result of a reflection through which the subject is actually objectified. The problem with these so-called reflection models of self-consciousness, according to Frank, is that they (1) are circular (since they presuppose that which they want to explain, and (2) cannot differentiate between the consciousness of an object and selfconsciousness (Frank, "Non-objectal Subjectivity.") 125. See for example Neuhouser, Fichte's Theory; Steigerwald, "Dynamics of Reason"; Wood, "The "I" as Principle." 126. Fichte, Neuen Darstellung, 53; also see Fichte, System of Ethics, 8. 127. Fichte, The Destination of Man, 81. 128. Günter Zöller, Eichte's Transcendental Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Johann Gottlieb Fichte, Wissen-

schaftslehre Nova Methodo (Hamburg: Meiner, 1994 [1798]). 129. ¥\c\ile.. System of Ethics, IQ. 130. Fichte, "Thatsachen," 24. 131. Ibid., 57. 132. Ibid., 57. 133. Ibid., 62. 134. Helmholtz, "Facts in Perception," 349. 135. Ibid. 136. Ibid., 349. 137. Ibid., 351. 138. Heidelberger, "Force, Law and Experiment," 463. 139. Helmholtz, Handbuch, vol. III (second edition), 592-593. 140. Ibid., 592. 141. Helmholtz, "Facts in Perception," 358-359. 142. Ibid., 348. 143. Schulz, Naturwissenschaftshermeneutik, 49. 144. Helmholtz, "Goethe's Presentiments," 410. 145. Patrick J. McDonald, "Demonstration by Simulation: The Philosophical Significance of Experiment in Helmholtz's Theory of Perception," Perspectives on Science 11, no. 2 (2003): 170; Heidelberger, "Force, Law and Experiment," 483. 146. Helmholtz, "Facts in Perception," 364. 147. Helmholtz, Handbuch, vol. Ill (first edition), 599. 148. Ibid. 149. Marc Jeannerod, et al., "Corollary Discharge: its Possible Implications in Visual and Oculomotor Interactions," Neuropsychologia 17 (1979): 241. Received May 13,2013 Revision received December 16, 2013 Accepted January 6, 2014 •

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