doi:10.1111/disa.12130

Understanding communication and coordination among government and service organisations after a disaster Christopher A. Curtis Assistant Professor, Graduate School of Social Service, Fordham University, New York, United States

The purpose of this study is to discover how coordination and communication between the government and service organisations responsible for the relief effort following Hurricane Katrina contributed to the poor outcomes for the communities impacted by the storm. Two hypotheses were tested in this study: communication was positively correlated with the degree of coordination immediately following Katrina; and miscommunication was negatively correlated with the degree of coordination after the storm. Quantitative content analysis of media reports was used to analyse the data and test the hypotheses. Both communication and miscommunication were found to be positively correlated with coordination. The results of this study suggest that increasing interorganisational communication and establishing clearly defined roles for organisations must be a high priority in revamping organisational protocol on disaster response if any new approach is to be successful. Keywords: communication, coordination, disaster, mitigation, preparedness, response

Introduction Disaster preparedness and mitigation depend on how well governments and service organisations communicate and coordinate with one another. However, it is not uncommon for natural disasters to overwhelm existing infrastructures in affected areas (Hendersen, 2004; Katoch, 2006). This often severely hinders responding organisations’ capacity to act and disproportionately impacts the impoverished (particularly racial minorities) and other vulnerable populations, such as the elderly (Phillips et al., 2011; Twigg and Steiner, 2002). A number of studies have concluded or inferred that inadequate communication and coordination are a major source of problems for relief efforts (Funabashi and Kitazawa, 2012; Hossain and Kuti, 2010; Kahn and Barondess, 2008; Phillips et al., 2011; Supe and Satoskar, 2008). Yet the recommendations that are made as a result of these observations do not seem to reach their intended audience as response efforts around the world continue to fail.   What makes this observation particularly alarming is that each disaster that happens seems more unprecedented than those that preceded it, and the results of the response and relief efforts repeatedly expose the limitations of the entities responsible for the mitigation of their impact. Events such as Hurricane Katrina in 2005, the earthquake in Haiti in 2010 and the nuclear crisis in Japan as recently as 2011 are all Disasters, 2015, 39(4): 611−625. © 2015 The Author(s). Disasters © Overseas Development Institute, 2015 Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford, OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA

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examples of where lack of preparedness and poor communication and coordination hindered the effectiveness of relief efforts. Although each of these events received global media coverage and an outpouring of support from the international community, history continued to repeat itself as one response effort after another suffered from unfortunate missteps (Funabashi and Kitazawa, 2012; Kahn and Barondess, 2008; Piotrowsky, 2010).   Evidence that poor disaster response and mitigation is a global problem can be found in the literature. Some of the issues that plague relief efforts are outdated or inadequate protocols (Funabashi and Kitazawa, 2012), nonexistent emergency plans and inadequate warning systems (Tolentino, 2007). Other problems include territorialism among agencies, the poorly defined roles of the organisations on hand to assist in the relief effort (Phillips et al., 2011), and the inability of response agencies to quickly adjust to the operational realities of the organisational networks being formed to respond to the disaster (Palttala et al., 2012). All of these issues point to the fact that many response efforts suffer from a lack of adequate communication and coordination (Hossain and Kuti, 2010).   Poor communication and coordination has been at the root of a number of mismanaged relief efforts. To illustrate this point, and to show that little has been learned over time, one could draw parallels between two disasters that occurred in different places at different times. For example, if one were to look at Hurricane Katrina, which took place in the United States in 2005, and compared it to the nuclear crisis that was preceded by the earthquake and tsunami that struck Japan in 2011, it seems evident that similar problems were present in each response. Responses to both disasters suffered from a lack of communication and coordination and weak preparedness and mitigation policies (Funabashi and Kitazawa, 2012; Kahn and Barondess, 2008). Both relief efforts were hampered by having people in key positions who were not fully qualified to make decisions about the best course of action to take to reduce the impact of the catastrophic event (Funabashi and Kitazawa, 2012; Kahn and Barondess, 2008). Both disasters were mired in political wrangling that lowered the public’s opinion of the responding entities (Funabashi and Kitazawa, 2012; US House of Representatives, 2006). Many of the mistakes that were made while responding to each of these disasters could have been avoided had the responding governmental agencies and other responding organisations been able to better communicate their intentions and coordinate their efforts more efficiently (Kahn and Barondess, 2008).   Given the number of parallels between the events following Hurricane Katrina and subsequent disasters, it seems that much can be gained by examining different aspects of the response effort immediately following the storm. Therefore, the purpose of this study is to discover whether the coordination and communication between government agencies and service organisations responsible for the relief effort following Hurricane Katrina might have contributed to the dismal outcomes suffered by the communities impacted by the storm.

Understanding communication and coordination among government and service organisations after a disaster

Communication and coordination in the context of disaster Palttala et al. (2012) wrote about the nature of communication in times of crisis. They note that the uniqueness of each individual crisis affects the context in which organisations communicate when responding to a catastrophic event. Since large-scale disasters require large response networks to facilitate adequate mitigation, they are susceptible to complications due to conflicting organisational goals, cultures and language. Communication among organisations during and after a disaster must account for this reality in order to be sufficient. Garnett and Kouzmin (2007) highlight this when they discuss how effective information sharing and negotiation between organisations requires stable interorganisational networks when responding to a disaster. This stability is established when multiple organisations form relevant networks that allow a constant flow of information between and within those networks, which is critical for coordination to be as efficient as possible (Garnett and Kouzmin, 2007).   Zakour (n.d.) conceptually defined interorganisational coordination as the deliberate actions of interdependent autonomous units for a common purpose. However, coordination following a catastrophic event is frequently discussed in the literature within the context of preparedness (Edwards, 2009; Kahn and Barondess, 2008; Katoch, 2006; Hossain and Kuti, 2010; Schaafstal et al., 2001; Tolentino, 2007). According to Bissell et al. (2004), preparedness is having the right people with appropriate training at the right place at the right time with adequate supplies and the means necessary to save lives. This definition could be applied to effective coordination in that the right organisations or organisational representatives need to be positioned in the right place at the right time with the adequate skills and resources to contribute to the relief effort. Hurricane Katrina and other disasters around the world have shown that this ideal has been difficult to attain. As Clark and Short (1993) note, ‘[d]epending on organisations for rescue creates something of a paradox: organisations are built on predictability, but accidents [and natural disasters] by definition involve unpredictability’ (Clark and Short, 1993, p. 392).   Harrald (2006) acknowledges and addresses this issue by stressing the need for organisations to be structured enough to provide stability in uncertain times, but flexible enough to adapt to the unpredictable nature of disasters. This approach makes it possible for organisations to determine and clearly define their role in the process of mitigation. If organisations are too rigid to adjust to the circumstances that arise in times of crisis, they may find that they are performing tasks that are unnecessary or underutilising the resources they have. What this suggests is that to be effective in mitigation, organisations must be nimble and act in a more ad-hoc and decentralised way to adapt appropriately to the unpredictable and changing situations that disasters present (Harrald, 2006). This may be challenging when disaster mitigation is dependent upon centralised government, which relies on a complicated channel of information flow. As Sobel and Leeson (2007) posit, the government’s ability to respond is often crippled by bureaucratic red tape before anything can be done. Manoj and Baker (2007) echo this when they note that organisational challenges occur during disasters when agencies accustomed to working within a hierarchy are forced to work in a more ad-hoc system of decision making.

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  Media coverage during the days following Hurricane Katrina documented the city’s rapid decent into chaos, and it is believed that the city of New Orleans could have been spared had sufficient measures been taken to ensure the city’s preparedness (Brouwer, 2003). Academic literature and news reports consistently show that all levels of government suffered a breakdown in communication following the storm. And they are replete with examples of organisations that were unsure of their particular role in the relief effort, lapses in command and control (US House of Representatives, 2006) and reports of organisations distracted from providing assistance by bureaucratic red tape (Sobel and Leeson, 2007).   One of the most conspicuous aspects of the disaster response was the lack of communication and coordination between the governmental and non-governmental organisations responsible for mitigation after the levees broke (Walters and Kettl, 2005).   The poor communication and coordination that occurred after the storm indicates how interdependent these constructs are. If coordination is to be effective, communication between organisations, which is arguably the most important factor in disaster response, must be efficient. Wray et al. (2004) note that effective communication is a critical element of preparedness, making or breaking the success of relief efforts. Conversely, Garnett and Kouzmin (2007) note that crisis communication could be improved through effective interorganisational networks. This becomes possible when ‘multiple organisational actors can serve as checks and balances within the crisis management process, both in terms of performance and accountability/transparency’ (Garnett and Kouzmin, 2007, p. 181). Thus, in the context of a disaster, coordination should involve organisations that communicate clearly with each other within a defined and transparent accountability structure.   Unfortunately, after the levees broke, the entire infrastructure of New Orleans was severely damaged. This meant that communication was almost impossible between the responding organisations trying to establish order and any organisation outside of the city attempting to assist (Kahn and Barondess, 2008). The severe damage to the infrastructure that occurred due to the levee breach in New Orleans the week following Katrina showed just how unprepared the federal, state and local governments and other responding organisations were for such a catastrophe (Walters and Kettl, 2005), and suggests that a breakdown in coordination and communication may have been the root cause of the failed relief effort.

The study The purpose of this study is to describe the communication, miscommunication and coordination of the major entities involved in the response to Hurricane Katrina. Communication occurs when two or more organisations correspond directly with one another or through an intermediary and provide appropriate and helpful information. Miscommunication occurs when two or more organisations exchange false information, spread rumours or exaggerate scenarios either directly or through a third party.

Understanding communication and coordination among government and service organisations after a disaster

Coordination takes place when organisations work together toward a common purpose and each entity involved is aware of its own role and the role of others.   This study was guided by social network analysis in that it examines and attempts to illustrate the relationships that formed between various organisations in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. Nightingale (2004) states that: [The] theory behind network analysis is that one can identify the patterns of linkages between and among individuals, institutions, or agencies using systematic constructs about the connections between pairs of organisations, allowing one to define the scope of the network, the actors within it, and the key hubs (primary actors) (Nightingale, 2004, p. 217).   Thus, in this study, the constructs of communication, miscommunication and coordination can be seen as the constructs used to recognise the connection patterns between the various organisations involved in the relief effort.   Total interactions for each organisation were also observed in this study in order to measure the number and strength of ties that these organisations had with other organisations during the response effort. Total interaction was evaluated to help understand the observed organisational relationships within the context of social network analysis. Organisations with a high number of interactions among responding organisations have more options for acquiring resources and are not as dependent on any one actor for meeting their needs because they are linked to many actors in a network. Therefore, central organisations tend to have more power over less central organisations (Gillespie et al., 1993).

Hypotheses There are two hypotheses tested in this study. The first hypothesis is that the degree of communication will be positively correlated with degree of coordination immediately following the storm’s landfall. When multiple organisations are working toward a common purpose, they have to communicate with other organisations involved in order to understand what role they will play in the effort.   The second hypothesis is that miscommunication will be negatively correlated with coordination immediately following the storm’s landfall. False information is a hindrance to coordination whether it’s shared intentionally or not. Miscommunication invites role confusion among organisations. Therefore, a negative relationship is expected between miscommunication and coordination.

Methodology Sampling This study is exploratory in nature. All of the data utilised in this study came from media reports and government documents relating to Hurricane Katrina and the

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relief effort. Sources of the data analysed in this study include archives from news organisations including Cable News Network (CNN), The Times-Picayune, The New York Times, The Washington Post and the Houston Chronicle. The data used in this study consists of all stories reported between 30 August and 12 September 2005 in order to focus on the first days of the critical incident and the initial overall response to the event.   The government documents that were analysed are The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned (White House, 2006) and A Failure of Initiative: The Final Report of the Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparations for and the Response to Hurricane Katrina (US House of Representatives, 2006). Variables and total interaction The variables that were investigated in this study were communication, miscommunication and coordination. Communication and coordination were operationalised in a way that would allow them to be observed independently. Communication is simply two or more organisations interacting and sharing information. For example, communication was noted in the data if the document stated that at least two organisations were corresponding directly or through an intermediary. The Houston Chronicle gives an example of this when it was reported that, ‘Gov. Rick Perry’s office said Saturday that Texas has notified the Federal Emergency Management Agency [FEMA] and the state of Louisiana that the state is almost filled to capacity’ (Stiles et al., 2005, p. A1). The article describes the governor of Texas communicating with FEMA and the governor of Louisiana.   As with communication, coordination requires organisations to interact and share information, but coordination also entails two or more organisations actually working towards a common purpose while communication does not. Coordination was recognised in the data when two or more organisations were described as working toward a common purpose. An article in The Times-Picayune reported that ‘[t]he slowmotion reality of the collapsing canal wall has the state Department of Transportation and Development and the Army Corps of Engineers working into the night to plug the breach and try to stem the flooding’ (Schleifstein, 2005, p. 1). The article described the Army Corps of Engineers and the Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development working together to repair the breach in the levee.   Miscommunication was indicated in the data by any type of misinformation (for example, false information, rumours or exaggerations) that was shared between two or more organisations. An example of miscommunication being present in the data is demonstrated in an article from The New York Times, which stated that, ‘Mayor Nagin said the root of the breakdown was the failure of the federal government to deliver relief supplies and personnel quickly’ even though ‘[t]hey kept promising and saying things would happen . . .’ (Shane et al., 2005, p. 25). This example indicates miscommunication between the city of New Orleans, represented by Mayor Ray Nagin, and the federal government. This is so because the mayor was reassured multiple times that aid was coming when supplies where not arriving in a timely manner.

Understanding communication and coordination among government and service organisations after a disaster

  Additional variables were created by adding these three primary variables for the organisations found in the data in different ways. Communication and coordination scores added together make up the communication/coordination sum. Summing communication, coordination and miscommunication scores for each organisation make up the total interaction variable. Finally, total interaction was estimated by the number of links between organisations documented in the media reports and government documents. Each time two or more organisations were observed to be interacting in the media reports, it was counted as a link. Data analysis Quantitative content analysis was used to analyse the data. Riffe et al. (1998) defined quantitative content analysis as: [. . .] the systematic and replicable examination of symbols of communication, which have been assigned numeric values according to valid measurement rules, and the analysis of relationships involving those values using statistical methods, in order to describe the communication, [and] draw inferences about its meaning (Riffe et al., 1998, p. 20).   For each organisation found in the data, the number of times that any of the variables appeared in the media reports was categorised and totalled according to the three variables. For instance, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is one of the organisations involved in the response to the storm. The investigator made note of every time FEMA appeared in the data interacting with another organisation in terms of communication, coordination or miscommunication. When the analysis was completed, FEMA had a total number of occurrences, or links, for each variable. The resulting tally showed the total interaction for each organisation involved in the relief effort. The total number of occurrences, or links, for miscommunication, communication and coordination for each organisation were then correlated through a Pearson correlation to test the hypotheses of this study.

Results This study found that 91 organisations and departments were indicated as playing a part in the relief effort at some point during the two weeks following Hurricane Katrina. Analyses revealed a positive correlation between the summed interactions of all three primary variables (see Table 1). As shown in Table 1, the coordination sum was positively correlated with the communication sum at r = .331, p < .001 and the miscommunication sum at r = .414, p < .001. The communication sum was positively correlated with the miscommunication sum at r = .827, p < .001. This finding suggests that coordination, communication and miscommunication were frequently occurring together during the relief effort.

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Table 1. Correlations of primary variables

Communication sum

Communication sum

Miscommunication sum

Coordination sum



.827**

.331**



.414**

Miscommunication sum Coordination sum



Notes: ** Correlation is significant at the .001 level (2-tailed). Source: author.

  As can be seen in Table 2, total interaction matrices showed that the organisations most central to the relief effort were: FEMA with a total interaction score of 79; the Louisiana state government, with a total interaction score of 51; the White House (which, in this study, represents the office of the president or any general reference to the federal government found in the data), with a score of 49; and the city of New Orleans local government, with a score of 48. All other interaction scores, which were available for the remaining 81 observed organisations, were considerably lower, with total interaction scores ranging from 1 to 25. This finding suggests that FEMA, the city of New Orleans local government, the Louisiana state government and the federal government were collectively the central organisations that had the most access to, and the greatest capacity to share, both information and resources.  Table 3 demonstrates that when coordination and communication were considered apart from miscommunication, the New Orleans Police Department (NOPD), Table 2. Total interaction table Organisation

Coordination sum

Miscommunication sum

Communication sum

Total interaction

FEMA

15

41

23

79

Louisiana

6

32

13

51

White House

9

30

10

49

New Orleans

6

25

17

48

New Orleans Police Department

21

1

2

24

Department of Homeland Security

4

6

9

19

Department of Defense

10

5

4

19

National Guard

13

2

1

16

Red Cross

14

0

2

16

Texas

1

2

12

15

Notes: the remaining 81 organisations had a total interaction score ranging from 1 to 10. Source: author.

Understanding communication and coordination among government and service organisations after a disaster

Table 3. Coordination/communication scores Organisation

Coordination sum

Communication sum

Coordination/ communication sum

FEMA

15

23

38

New Orleans Police Department

21

2

23

New Orleans

6

17

23

Louisiana

6

13

19

White House

9

10

19

Red Cross

14

2

16

National Guard

13

1

14

Department of Defense

10

4

14

Department of Homeland Security

4

9

13

Texas

1

12

13

Note: the remaining 81 organisations had coordination/communication scores ranging from 0 to 10. Source: author.

with a communication/coordination sum of 23, was prominent along with the four central organisations: FEMA (with a combined score of 38), the city of New Orleans local government (23), the White House (19) and the Louisiana state government (19). Other organisations scored closer to the leading organisations when miscommunication was not considered. The Red Cross (16), the National Guard (14), the Department of Defense (14), Texas state government (13) and the Department of Homeland Security (13) all scored moderately. The remaining organisations had scores ranging from 0 to 10 with just the coordination and communication scores combined. This finding suggests that miscommunication had a notable impact on the communication and coordination of the more central organisations because Table 4. Miscommunication/total interaction ratio Organisation

Miscommunication sum

Total interaction

Miscommunication/ total interaction ratio

Louisiana

32

52

.62

White House

30

49

.61

FEMA

41

79

.52

New Orleans

25

48

.52

Note: miscommunication sums were divided by total interaction for each organisation to yield miscommunication/total interaction ratios. All other organisations in the data with ratios higher than 50 per cent had total interaction scores of less than 5. Source: author.

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for those entities, miscommunication made up a considerable portion of the total interaction.   Each of the four organisations that were most central to the response effort in New Orleans (FEMA, the White House, Louisiana state government and the city of New Orleans) had high occurrences of miscommunication, which can be seen in Table 4. Fifty-two per cent of the total interaction score for both FEMA and the city of New Orleans were instances of miscommunication. The White House had a total interaction score that contained 61 per cent miscommunication. The state government of Louisiana had the highest documented occurrence of miscommunication at 62 per cent. The data showed that FEMA was documented as having engaged in miscommunication with 22 other organisations during the first days of the relief effort. This finding suggests that all other organisations that relied on the central organisations were negatively affected by the presence of the observed level of miscommunication during the response.

Discussion There were two hypotheses tested in this study. As predicted, communication and coordination variables were found to be positively correlated. However, contrary to prediction, miscommunication was also positively correlated with coordination. FEMA and the federal, state and local levels of government were found to be the most central organisations to the relief effort.   Miscommunication appeared to occur more frequently than communication in the reports that were reviewed. Even when communication scores for each organisation were combined with coordination scores, miscommunication made up a substantial part of the total interaction (the sum of coordination, communication and miscommunication scores). This finding is also supported by anecdotal accounts reported in newspaper articles.   The lack of provisions and authority at the New Orleans Superdome where local residents had taken refuge (Haygood, 2005; Treaster and Sontag, 2005), the poor flow of information between all levels of government (Gallagher et al., 2007), and the heavy reliance on the press for urgent information (US House of Representatives, 2006) are just some examples of how inefficient communication was immediately following Hurricane Katrina.   The positive correlation between communication and coordination indicates that these two constructs go hand in hand. Organisations working toward a common purpose cannot reach their goal if they do not know their role or what other organisations are doing. In order for each organisation to understand the part they play in reaching a particular objective while working with another entity, they must communicate their intentions and discuss any potential obstacles to working together efficiently (Kahn and Barondess, 2008). Communication among organisations also makes the execution of a plan for system coordination possible. Interorganisational

Understanding communication and coordination among government and service organisations after a disaster

relations are essential for an effective community response to major disasters since working together can reduce the number of fatalities and the extent of destruction (Gillespie et al., 1993).   Miscommunication was also found to be positively correlated with coordination. This finding suggests that as the communication necessary for coordination increased, the likelihood of miscommunication also increased. Thus, the hypothesis that miscommunication and coordination would be negatively correlated was not supported. Nevertheless, this finding provides insight into the slow response of the government and the inefficiency of most service organisations during the first days of the relief effort. The literature indicates that the response to Katrina was not unified, and coordination among local, state and federal authorities failed in several areas (Carroll, 2005; Sobel and Leeson, 2007; US House of Representatives, 2006; Walters and Kettl, 2005). This likely occurred because miscommunication was so prevalent among the organisations most central to the response effort.

Organisational interaction in disaster Overall interaction The total interaction scores, which combined scores for communication, coordination and miscommunication, indicated that the organisations most central to the relief effort in New Orleans were FEMA, the federal government, the state government and the local government of New Orleans. These organisations are expected to be at the forefront of such a large undertaking, so it is not surprising that they would score the highest in overall interaction.   FEMA’s mission is to support citizens and first responders in building, sustaining and improving the nation’s capacity to prepare for, respond to and mitigate all disasters. All levels of government are collectively responsible for seeing that people get the help they need in times of crisis and make the decisions that would ensure help arrives in a timely manner. Unfortunately, miscommunication scores accounted for more than half of the total interaction scores for the four most central organisations. It also suggests that miscommunication can become widespread in the early days of a disaster when information flows through large bureaucracies during a crisis (for example, FEMA and all levels of government). Communication and coordination Combined communication and coordination scores indicated a high amount of interaction of organisations with FEMA, the New Orleans Police Department, the city of New Orleans, the Louisiana state government and the White House (see Table 3). FEMA had to work with many organisations to fulfill its objective of helping survivors of the storm return to some level of normalcy, and high scores in communication and coordination were to be expected.

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  As a central organisation, FEMA’s response affected many other organisations’ ability to aid in the relief and restoration of the Gulf Coast region. FEMA was created especially to manage and coordinate response and mitigation efforts in times of crisis. Yet, as media and government reports confirm, FEMA performed in a manner that caused immeasurable distress to survivors. This was evident when former FEMA director Michael Brown admitted that FEMA was unaware of the situation unfolding at the convention centre until the day of 1 September 2005 (Lipton and Shane, 2005).   For example, the American Red Cross and the National Guard were found to be very active in the response effort. Their scores where not as high as the most central organisations, but, as the data indicate, they were clearly visible working and communicating with other organisations. Each of these organisations could possibly have accomplished more had the more central organisations they were linked to scored higher on communication and coordination and lower on miscommunication. An organisation directly linked to many other organisations can pass on information through a minimum number of steps, making communication fast and efficient (Gillespie et al., 1993). Limitations The media and government documents used in this study were not expressly written for this particular analysis. Although quantitative content analysis was a very useful tool in analysing the data, the media reports did not capture every single event that took place in the weeks following Hurricane Katrina and there was no way to reduce the bias that may have been present in the documents used in this study. Some aspects of the recovery effort received far more attention than others and some events got no media coverage at all. In fact, any conclusions drawn from media reports are bound to be impacted by the inherent bias of the source of the information. Chances are that positive outcomes and successful collaborations were less likely to be reported and more likely to be ignored in favour of drawing attention to the more negative aspects of the relief effort.   In addition, much of what was reported by the media was present in multiple sources of information in the press (for example, The New York Times, The Washington Post and The Times Picayune reporting the same information). The press information was also reiterated in government documents reporting on the relief effort. While this increases one’s confidence that the events counted actually occurred as reported, multiple reports of the same events increases the possibility that these events were counted more than once in the data, thus skewing the results reported in this study.   Another limitation of this study is a lack of procedures to demonstrate inter-rater reliability. A single individual performed all of the coding. As a result, errors in coding may not have been detected; some events may have been missed while others may have been miscoded. Additionally, without an articulated code book with specific operational definitions, other researchers may have made different judgements as to what constitutes communication, coordination and miscommunication when reviewing media reports.

Understanding communication and coordination among government and service organisations after a disaster

Conclusion This study shows how integral communication is to disaster response. Moore et al. (2004) mentioned that the research on disaster management is commonly divided into four phases: preparation, response, relief and recovery. Each of these phases depends on communication to be carried out successfully. To ensure that organisations are properly prepared for potential catastrophe, they must create clear avenues of communication between themselves. This includes planning and preparing with other organisations before disaster strikes. The role and responsibility of each organisation involved in the response should be established before the catastrophic event (Kahn and Barondess, 2008). By doing this, the reality of differences in organisational goals, structures, cultures and language can be addressed. Otherwise, relief efforts will continue to be hampered by conflicting organisational missions, protocols and normative behaviour patterns. It is virtually impossible to coordinate during a catastrophic event when responding organisations do not know their role in relation to other organisations.   Because governmental and well-established, large, non-profit organisations can be highly bureaucratic and rigid, their ability to respond quickly and nimbly in times of crisis can be impaired. Additionally, communication between organisations immediately following a disaster can be extremely difficult due to differing missions and cultures. Such conflicts, combined with an abundance of misinformation (Manoj and Baker, 2007), make it that much easier for miscommunication to impede effective coordination.   There are a number of ways organisations can address this issue. First, preparedness is an essential element to implementing a successful disaster response. Organisations must communicate more effectively prior to disaster to help avoid miscommunication and poor coordination during a catastrophic event. This can be done by having key personnel meet from time to time to share knowledge that would benefit the entire community. Second, sharing organisation evaluations to demonstrate what does and does not work would also be useful. To date, evaluations are not usually shared outside of the organisations that conduct them (Twigg and Steiner, 2002). Third, through communication multi-organisational chains of command can be established before disaster strikes thus reducing the possibility of organisational roles being unclear. Finally, miscommunication would also be reduced if organisations consistently share information periodically over time and not just when there is a major event.   The failures that occurred during Hurricane Katrina were not due solely to people in key positions making poor choices and being ill informed. Many of the failures could be attributed to organisational system problems (Harrald, 2006). Adequate preparation would have allowed the responding organisations to respond to disaster with greater efficiency and speed. With adequate and appropriate preparation, organisations would be more likely to establish quickly ways of communicating and sharing information (Garnett and Kouzmin, 2007). They would also be able to coordinate

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more effectively because they would have developed an interorganisational language, mission and protocol across an entire network of responding organisations.   Hurricane Katrina was a sobering event that exposed many weaknesses in the disaster response system currently used in the United States. It also uncovered the systematic disenfranchisement of entire communities, which had a disproportionate negative impact on vulnerable populations. Unless governmental and non-governmental organisations make a concerted effort to build more reliable interorganisational networks through communication and coordination, with a renewed emphasis on preparedness and revamping disaster response protocols, any new approach taken will likely be unsuccessful.

Correspondence Christopher A. Curtis, Graduate School of Social Service, Fordham University, 113 West 60th Street, New York, NY 10023, United States. Telephone: +1 212 636 7077; fax: 00 1 212 636 7628; e-mail: [email protected]

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Understanding communication and coordination among government and service organisations after a disaster.

The purpose of this study is to discover how coordination and communication between the government and service organisations responsible for the relie...
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