547311
research-article2014
ISP0010.1177/0020764014547311International Journal of Social PsychiatryScheff
E CAMDEN SCHIZOPH
Letter to the editor International Journal of Social Psychiatry 2014, Vol. 60(7) 724–725 © The Author(s) 2014 Reprints and permissions: sagepub.co.uk/journalsPermissions.nav DOI: 10.1177/0020764014547311 isp.sagepub.com
Toward a concept of stigma Thomas Scheff
The study of stigma has become one of the central concerns in sociology, psychology and many other disciplines, including medicine. Searching for the term on Google Scholar reveals 677k mentions. Given the amount of interest, and the fact that it is interdisciplinary, we probably need to define stigma as a concept, rather than continue to use it as a vernacular word. Searching the literature for a definition of stigma brings up a 2001 attempt by Link and Phelan: Stigma exists when elements of labeling, stereotyping, separating, status loss and discrediting occur in a power situation that allows these processes to occur. (p. 382)
This is a lengthy and complex definition that includes behaviours and social elements (status, power). Dictionaries, however, offer a much shorter and simpler one. For example, the Merriam-Webster Online dictionary defines stigma as ‘a mark of shame or discredit’. It seems that the Link/Phelan definition confounds stigma itself with stigmatization, the process that leads to stigma. Only one of the six elements in their definition can be related to stigma, what they call ‘status loss’, which can be seen as a roundabout way of referring to shame. In a more recent article, Link, Yang, Phelan and Collins (2004) have a section on conceptualizing stigma that continues to confound stigma and the process of stigmatization. In one paragraph, they mention shame, but only briefly and in passing. In his book on stigma, Goffman (1963) does not attempt to define it directly, but makes many, many references to shame. Here are four of them. (For the reader’s convenience, I have bolded the shame terms. However, in the third quote, the word shameful was already bolded in the text.) Notice that in the second quote, three shame terms occur in a single sentence: Shame becomes a central possibility, arising from the individual’s perception of one of his own attributes as being a defiling thing to possess, and one he can readily see himself as not possessing. (p. 7, first chapter) (The stigmatized person’s) identification with (other) offenders like himself (e.g. mentally ill) holds him to what repels him, transforming repulsion into shame, and then transforming ashamedness itself into something of which he is ashamed. (p. 108)
Most important of all, the very notion of shameful differences assumes a similarity in regard to crucial beliefs, those regarding identity. (p. 13) Once the dynamics of shameful differentness are seen as a general feature of social life, one can go on to look at the relation of their study to the study of neighboring matters associated with the term ‘deviance’ … (p. 140, last chapter)
Even though the Link and Phelan (2001) article on stigma cites Goffman’s book several times, they don’t refer at all to shame. As it turns out, this abstinence is not unusual. The great majority of studies of stigma do not define it in terms of shame, mostly don’t even use the word shame and don’t cite any of the shame literature. For a preliminary estimate of the extent to which research on stigma refers to shame, I searched a book on the social psychology of stigma (Heatherton, Kleck, Hebl, & Jull, 2000) that has 14 chapters written by some 50 authors. The word shame doesn’t appear in the index, nor its close kin, embarrassment and humiliation, even though the Goffman book is cited many times. However, several chapters have a near miss, since they discuss Charles Cooley’s (1922) idea of ‘the looking glass self’. They failed to notice, however, that according to Cooley, seeing one’s self as others see us often ends in shame: [The self] seems to have three principal elements: 1. The imagination of our appearance to the other person 2. The imagination of his [or her] judgment of that appearance 3. Some sort of self-feeling, such as pride or [shame]. (p. 184)
Although sociologists have been referring to Cooley’s idea of the looking glass self in great numbers since the 1950s, few have noticed the connection with shame either, and most still don’t. What is going on?
UCSB, Santa Barbara, CA, USA Corresponding author: Thomas Scheff, 3009 Lomita Road, S.B. CA 93105, USA. Email: [email protected]
Downloaded from isp.sagepub.com at Bobst Library, New York University on May 23, 2015
725
Scheff
The Taboo on the S-Word The first studies of sexual behaviour published by Kinsey, Pomeroy and Martin (1948) and by Masters and Johnson (1966) met condemnation because they discussed subjects that had previously been taboo. Yet, they quickly became known both to the research world and to the public at large. Suppose, however, that they had used an inoffensive but ambiguous word like LOVE or INTIMACY instead of the word SEX, which at that time was more taboo than it is now. They would have caused less offense, but their work would have become much less well known except by the most diligent researchers. Studies of the emotion of shame still face a similar dilemma because shame, much more today than sex, appears to be taboo. This idea has been suggested by the psychologist Gershen Kaufman (1989), one of several writers who have argued that shame is taboo in our society: American society is a shame-based culture, but … shame remains hidden. Since there is shame about shame, it remains under taboo … The taboo on shame is so strict … that we behave as if shame does not exist.
Another indication of taboo is the reduced usage of the word shame, as predicted by Elias’ study (1939/1994). It is now possible to chart the occurrence of shame and other words in millions of digitalized books from 1800 to 2007 in Google Ngrams (Aiden & Michel, 2011). I found that the use of the word ‘shame’ in American English and four European languages has decreased threefold. Finally, here are two further suggestions of taboo by researchers of shame that avoid the word itself. Evelin Lindner’s (2000, 2006a, 2006b, 2010) ability to organize a worldwide following for the study of shame themes may be due, at least in part, to avoiding the s-word, especially in titles, not only for her organization (Human Dignity and Humiliation Studies) but also her books. Another instance is the work of Robert W. Fuller (2003, 2006, 2008). He has attracted large audiences all over the world using title words like Lindner’s and avoiding the s-word.
The taboo on shame seems to have weakened in the last 10 years among researchers. The downward slope for the word shame has slowed slightly in the Ngrams. But it continues to exert a powerful influence in the vernacular and even in research: shame is still close to being unspeakable and unprintable. This essay has suggested that stigma can be defined as shame, and also that this usage might allow shame researchers to know of each other’s work. In a broader sense, this change would also mean that stigma researchers, at least, would stop reinforcing the taboo on shame. References Aiden, E., & Mitchell, J. (2011). http://books.google.com/ngrams Cooley, C. (1922). Human nature and conduct. New York: Scribners. Goffman, E. (1963). Stigma. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall. Elias, N. (1939/1994). The Civilizing Process. London: Blackwell. Fuller, R. W. (2003). Somebodies and nobodies. Gabriola Island, British Columbia, Canada: New Society Publishers. Fuller, R. W. (2006). All rise. San Francisco, CA: BarrettKoehler Publishers. Fuller, R. W., & Gerloff, P. A. (2008). Dignity for all. San Francisco, CA: Barrett-Koehler Publishers. Heatherton, T., Kleck, R., Hebl, M., & Jull, J. (2000). The social psychology of stigma. New York: Guilford Press. Kaufman, G. (1989). The psychology of shame. New York: Springer. Kinsey, A., Pomeroy, W., & Martin, C. (1948). Sexual behavior in the human male. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Lindner, E. (2000). The psychology of humiliation. Oslo: Oslo University. Lindner, E. (2006a). Emotions and conflict. Westport, CT: Praeger. Lindner, E. (2006b). Making enemies. Westport, CT: Praeger. Lindner, E. (2010). Gender, humiliation, and global security. Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger. Link, B., & Phelan, J. (2001). Conceptualizing stigma. Annual Review of Sociology, 27, 363–385. Link, B., Yang, L., Phelan, J., & Collins, P. (2004). Measuring mental illness stigma. Schizophrenia Bulletin, 30, 511–541. Masters, W. H., & Johnson, V. E. (1966). Human sexual response. New York: Bantam Books.
Downloaded from isp.sagepub.com at Bobst Library, New York University on May 23, 2015
research-article2014
ISP0010.1177/0020764014547311International Journal of Social PsychiatryScheff
E CAMDEN SCHIZOPH
Letter to the editor International Journal of Social Psychiatry 2014, Vol. 60(7) 724–725 © The Author(s) 2014 Reprints and permissions: sagepub.co.uk/journalsPermissions.nav DOI: 10.1177/0020764014547311 isp.sagepub.com
Toward a concept of stigma Thomas Scheff
The study of stigma has become one of the central concerns in sociology, psychology and many other disciplines, including medicine. Searching for the term on Google Scholar reveals 677k mentions. Given the amount of interest, and the fact that it is interdisciplinary, we probably need to define stigma as a concept, rather than continue to use it as a vernacular word. Searching the literature for a definition of stigma brings up a 2001 attempt by Link and Phelan: Stigma exists when elements of labeling, stereotyping, separating, status loss and discrediting occur in a power situation that allows these processes to occur. (p. 382)
This is a lengthy and complex definition that includes behaviours and social elements (status, power). Dictionaries, however, offer a much shorter and simpler one. For example, the Merriam-Webster Online dictionary defines stigma as ‘a mark of shame or discredit’. It seems that the Link/Phelan definition confounds stigma itself with stigmatization, the process that leads to stigma. Only one of the six elements in their definition can be related to stigma, what they call ‘status loss’, which can be seen as a roundabout way of referring to shame. In a more recent article, Link, Yang, Phelan and Collins (2004) have a section on conceptualizing stigma that continues to confound stigma and the process of stigmatization. In one paragraph, they mention shame, but only briefly and in passing. In his book on stigma, Goffman (1963) does not attempt to define it directly, but makes many, many references to shame. Here are four of them. (For the reader’s convenience, I have bolded the shame terms. However, in the third quote, the word shameful was already bolded in the text.) Notice that in the second quote, three shame terms occur in a single sentence: Shame becomes a central possibility, arising from the individual’s perception of one of his own attributes as being a defiling thing to possess, and one he can readily see himself as not possessing. (p. 7, first chapter) (The stigmatized person’s) identification with (other) offenders like himself (e.g. mentally ill) holds him to what repels him, transforming repulsion into shame, and then transforming ashamedness itself into something of which he is ashamed. (p. 108)
Most important of all, the very notion of shameful differences assumes a similarity in regard to crucial beliefs, those regarding identity. (p. 13) Once the dynamics of shameful differentness are seen as a general feature of social life, one can go on to look at the relation of their study to the study of neighboring matters associated with the term ‘deviance’ … (p. 140, last chapter)
Even though the Link and Phelan (2001) article on stigma cites Goffman’s book several times, they don’t refer at all to shame. As it turns out, this abstinence is not unusual. The great majority of studies of stigma do not define it in terms of shame, mostly don’t even use the word shame and don’t cite any of the shame literature. For a preliminary estimate of the extent to which research on stigma refers to shame, I searched a book on the social psychology of stigma (Heatherton, Kleck, Hebl, & Jull, 2000) that has 14 chapters written by some 50 authors. The word shame doesn’t appear in the index, nor its close kin, embarrassment and humiliation, even though the Goffman book is cited many times. However, several chapters have a near miss, since they discuss Charles Cooley’s (1922) idea of ‘the looking glass self’. They failed to notice, however, that according to Cooley, seeing one’s self as others see us often ends in shame: [The self] seems to have three principal elements: 1. The imagination of our appearance to the other person 2. The imagination of his [or her] judgment of that appearance 3. Some sort of self-feeling, such as pride or [shame]. (p. 184)
Although sociologists have been referring to Cooley’s idea of the looking glass self in great numbers since the 1950s, few have noticed the connection with shame either, and most still don’t. What is going on?
UCSB, Santa Barbara, CA, USA Corresponding author: Thomas Scheff, 3009 Lomita Road, S.B. CA 93105, USA. Email: [email protected]
Downloaded from isp.sagepub.com at Bobst Library, New York University on May 23, 2015
725
Scheff
The Taboo on the S-Word The first studies of sexual behaviour published by Kinsey, Pomeroy and Martin (1948) and by Masters and Johnson (1966) met condemnation because they discussed subjects that had previously been taboo. Yet, they quickly became known both to the research world and to the public at large. Suppose, however, that they had used an inoffensive but ambiguous word like LOVE or INTIMACY instead of the word SEX, which at that time was more taboo than it is now. They would have caused less offense, but their work would have become much less well known except by the most diligent researchers. Studies of the emotion of shame still face a similar dilemma because shame, much more today than sex, appears to be taboo. This idea has been suggested by the psychologist Gershen Kaufman (1989), one of several writers who have argued that shame is taboo in our society: American society is a shame-based culture, but … shame remains hidden. Since there is shame about shame, it remains under taboo … The taboo on shame is so strict … that we behave as if shame does not exist.
Another indication of taboo is the reduced usage of the word shame, as predicted by Elias’ study (1939/1994). It is now possible to chart the occurrence of shame and other words in millions of digitalized books from 1800 to 2007 in Google Ngrams (Aiden & Michel, 2011). I found that the use of the word ‘shame’ in American English and four European languages has decreased threefold. Finally, here are two further suggestions of taboo by researchers of shame that avoid the word itself. Evelin Lindner’s (2000, 2006a, 2006b, 2010) ability to organize a worldwide following for the study of shame themes may be due, at least in part, to avoiding the s-word, especially in titles, not only for her organization (Human Dignity and Humiliation Studies) but also her books. Another instance is the work of Robert W. Fuller (2003, 2006, 2008). He has attracted large audiences all over the world using title words like Lindner’s and avoiding the s-word.
The taboo on shame seems to have weakened in the last 10 years among researchers. The downward slope for the word shame has slowed slightly in the Ngrams. But it continues to exert a powerful influence in the vernacular and even in research: shame is still close to being unspeakable and unprintable. This essay has suggested that stigma can be defined as shame, and also that this usage might allow shame researchers to know of each other’s work. In a broader sense, this change would also mean that stigma researchers, at least, would stop reinforcing the taboo on shame. References Aiden, E., & Mitchell, J. (2011). http://books.google.com/ngrams Cooley, C. (1922). Human nature and conduct. New York: Scribners. Goffman, E. (1963). Stigma. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall. Elias, N. (1939/1994). The Civilizing Process. London: Blackwell. Fuller, R. W. (2003). Somebodies and nobodies. Gabriola Island, British Columbia, Canada: New Society Publishers. Fuller, R. W. (2006). All rise. San Francisco, CA: BarrettKoehler Publishers. Fuller, R. W., & Gerloff, P. A. (2008). Dignity for all. San Francisco, CA: Barrett-Koehler Publishers. Heatherton, T., Kleck, R., Hebl, M., & Jull, J. (2000). The social psychology of stigma. New York: Guilford Press. Kaufman, G. (1989). The psychology of shame. New York: Springer. Kinsey, A., Pomeroy, W., & Martin, C. (1948). Sexual behavior in the human male. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Lindner, E. (2000). The psychology of humiliation. Oslo: Oslo University. Lindner, E. (2006a). Emotions and conflict. Westport, CT: Praeger. Lindner, E. (2006b). Making enemies. Westport, CT: Praeger. Lindner, E. (2010). Gender, humiliation, and global security. Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger. Link, B., & Phelan, J. (2001). Conceptualizing stigma. Annual Review of Sociology, 27, 363–385. Link, B., Yang, L., Phelan, J., & Collins, P. (2004). Measuring mental illness stigma. Schizophrenia Bulletin, 30, 511–541. Masters, W. H., & Johnson, V. E. (1966). Human sexual response. New York: Bantam Books.
Downloaded from isp.sagepub.com at Bobst Library, New York University on May 23, 2015
