BIOL PSYCHIATRY 1990;28:649
649
EDITORIAL
Theory and Practice In this "decade of the brain" we are atl witnessing an extraordinary exponential accumulation of data in our field. We know of more brain circuits, more receptors, more chemicals, more particles, and more ir~tracellular processes than ever before. Hypotheses on the relative importance of each of them for a particular disorder are competing with each other. But do we know more about the way they all act together, to shed light on how we think, know, ar feel? Not yet. We are not even sure that much of "~hecertainly correct data that we so cherish are even relevant to the processes of thinking and feeling, and their disorders. Some of the facts might relate to coincidental or adventitious functions or nave no relevance at all, in spite of immutable proof of their existence. When somebody ventures to suggest how these disparate facts might hang together, we tend to disdain ideas that are launched without solid underpinnings of fresh data. But it may just be possible that some of these original half-bLed ideas are worthy of attention. M ~ b e , just maybe, a new interpretation of data might be no less important than its meticulously cultivated collection. The history of science reveals many examples of fruitful concepts that preceded confirmatory data, flying above and before them, followed after a time by the data that closed the gap. It may well be that our scientific field is at a stage when it should tolerate or even embrace and encourage so-called speculations, it might be rewarding. We are much too partial to a posteriori demonstration, and far too prejudiced against a priori reasoning. But both are necessary for progress. These reflections were inspired by seine recent doggerel (Evans 1990) about a mythic ~L-.~.ur C. • • this aoble beast, defunct ten million years at leasd'), who was Lhe fortunate possessor of two separate brains f~: c,a,:h type o;" cognition, One in his head, the usual place, The other in his spinal base. The creature could reason a priori As well as a posteriori. l=fsomething escaped _hisforward mind 'Twas rescued by the one behind. Thus it could thLnk without congestion Upon both sides ,ff every question. Perhaps he became extinct because he only used one brain, and let the othe~ atrophy.
Oriel Halbreich
geterence Evans H (1990): Behold the dinosaurs. Condd Nast Traveler, June: 103.
© 199QSociety of BiologicalPsychiatry
0006-3223/90/$03.50
649
EDITORIAL
Theory and Practice In this "decade of the brain" we are atl witnessing an extraordinary exponential accumulation of data in our field. We know of more brain circuits, more receptors, more chemicals, more particles, and more ir~tracellular processes than ever before. Hypotheses on the relative importance of each of them for a particular disorder are competing with each other. But do we know more about the way they all act together, to shed light on how we think, know, ar feel? Not yet. We are not even sure that much of "~hecertainly correct data that we so cherish are even relevant to the processes of thinking and feeling, and their disorders. Some of the facts might relate to coincidental or adventitious functions or nave no relevance at all, in spite of immutable proof of their existence. When somebody ventures to suggest how these disparate facts might hang together, we tend to disdain ideas that are launched without solid underpinnings of fresh data. But it may just be possible that some of these original half-bLed ideas are worthy of attention. M ~ b e , just maybe, a new interpretation of data might be no less important than its meticulously cultivated collection. The history of science reveals many examples of fruitful concepts that preceded confirmatory data, flying above and before them, followed after a time by the data that closed the gap. It may well be that our scientific field is at a stage when it should tolerate or even embrace and encourage so-called speculations, it might be rewarding. We are much too partial to a posteriori demonstration, and far too prejudiced against a priori reasoning. But both are necessary for progress. These reflections were inspired by seine recent doggerel (Evans 1990) about a mythic ~L-.~.ur C. • • this aoble beast, defunct ten million years at leasd'), who was Lhe fortunate possessor of two separate brains f~: c,a,:h type o;" cognition, One in his head, the usual place, The other in his spinal base. The creature could reason a priori As well as a posteriori. l=fsomething escaped _hisforward mind 'Twas rescued by the one behind. Thus it could thLnk without congestion Upon both sides ,ff every question. Perhaps he became extinct because he only used one brain, and let the othe~ atrophy.
Oriel Halbreich
geterence Evans H (1990): Behold the dinosaurs. Condd Nast Traveler, June: 103.
© 199QSociety of BiologicalPsychiatry
0006-3223/90/$03.50
