The Victimizer: Recognition and Character S. M . S I L V E R M A N , P H . D . * | Lexington,
Mass.
A particular personality type, the victimizer, is an important component of destructive conflict. A victimizer syndrome includes a deep sense of deprivation and loss with a need for restitution, and a perception of the self as ineffectual in producing changes in his own life. The possible origin of the syndrome and societal effects on it are also discussed.
Over the past several millennia historical records have provided numerous examples of one group extending its control and resources at the expense of other groups. The spectrum of groups has ranged from social classes within a given society, as with the patrician-plebeian controversy of the Rome of the sixth century B.G. ( 1 ) , through racial groupings, such as the European-American Indian confrontations in the Americas in the centuries following Columbus' voyages, to the conflicts between national groupings which is the particular signature of our century. The effects on the impacted groups have ranged from total physical annihilation, as with the Tasmanian aborigines (2) and the Patagonians (3, 4), through the total loss of a separate group identity commonly found in the areas of the Moslem conquests to the voluntary cession of a portion of their power, as happened with the Roman patricians, and as is typical in the United States. In the atomic era with its potential for mass destruction involving victor, vanquished, and innocent bystander alike, conflict between groups becomes the major problem. I f one wishes for a solution which allows for survival of separate group identities, rather than a homogenization imposed by one successful conquering group, then one must analyze the process and its dynamics, and experiment with methods of nonfatal intergroup conflict resolution which at the same time maintain our human dignity. Here I focus on one crucial aspect of this over-all problem. I will first present the framework of the discussion. Elsewhere (5), I have proposed that the greatest amount of destruction of persons, property, and values has occurred and is likely to recur in situations where a newly emerging group has aspirations greater than their resources; that this group then searches out for victimization a group or groups who are easily identifiable, are possessed of resources, and will minimally resist the expropriation * Mailing
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of these resources; and that the societal ambient determines the allowable modes of victimization. I now extend the analysis by proposing that the aspirations of the newly emerging group are articulated and focused by a small fraction of the group, whom I shall designate as the victimizers, not more than one or two per cent of the group, whose motivations are quite different from those of the majority. For this small group a need exists to control the environment surrounding them, and the emergence of a group with unfulfilled aspirations in a period of unstable values presents an opportunity for influencing and manipulating which they can use to obtain control. Such opportunities were available, for example, in the democratic period following the March revolution in 1917 in Russia, utilized by Lenin and the Bolsheviks; in the breakdown of society in Germany following World War I , utilized by Hitler and the Nazis; and in the period following the major civil rights legislation of 1964-65, utilized by some black militants. An important aspect of any rational approach to the problem then becomes that of recognizing the victimizer and an analysis of his character, in order to eventually render him harmless. This paper is concerned then with the character of the victimizer. The approach used here differs from most of those concerned with war and violence in that attention is focused on a small group only as those who are the source of difficulty and who must be dealt with. I t is my contention that human nature in the mass need not be changed in order to make progress, but rather that the pathologic extreme in a small group must be dealt with. In practice the difference is one of either changing human nature, an enormous and possibly impossible job at this time, or learning to recognize and deal with the small number exhibiting pathologic extremes in the nature of Everyman, a difficult but more hopeful task. In the following I make a beginning. Character of the Victimizer: A Recognition Syndrome My observations of people of this sort (the type is widespread and occurs in many organizations and societies though not necessarily with the same virulence and pathology as exists in those we are primarily concerned with in this essay) and of reports of those of historical or journalistic interest indicate a number of common characteristics, which I list here. 1. There is a sense of alienation from others and from society. That this alienation is neither liked nor wanted is shown by appeals to a concept of global brotherhood and calls for unity with all. Most movements of this sort are therefore universalist-directed, or at least include many others outside the immediate group. On occasion this call for brotherhood involves ridiculous distinctions as in the black militant classification of the Semitic Arabs as black and the Semitic Jews as white.
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2. A deep sense of deprivation or loss is felt. This is often explicitly stated in some form or other. Typical are the irredentist movements: the varying sovereignties over Alsace-Lorraine; the dispute over the Trieste area following the first and second World Wars, as examples. Allied to the sense of loss is an inability to accept loss, a constant and continuing effort to retrieve that which was lost. Also allied to this is the refusal to give up anything which one currently has. Thus the Soviet Union refuses to return to Japan some small, essentially uninhabited islands taken after World War I I . This characteristic also came out in the sentiment voiced in the Soviet Union after the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 that they had liberated the country and therefore could do what they wished with it. Often the inability to accept loss is carried to the extent of a denial of reality in order to negate the loss. Thus the 1956 Suez campaign is commemorated in Egypt by "Victory Day." 3. There is a need to control a situation by dominating it. Thus confrontations and, when authority is at hand, the institution of surveillance over everyone and the elimination of actual or potential opposition. 4. Such people have a need to constantly justify their actions and the_ justification of these actions on "moral" grounds such as past injustice, the greater good, and so on. In fact a tendency to moralize is a good indicator that one should be cautious in dealing with them. 5. They believe that the deprivation or loss is always the result of actions by persons or forces outside of the individual: the boss, society, the capitalist class, the Zionists and others. This carries the corollary that it is not the individual who must change but the forces external to him, such as society, since they are responsible for the difficulties. An additional, and important, corollary is that it is therefore difficult, perhaps impossible, to treat these people since treatment presupposes an acceptance of the need or desirability of change in oneself. A result (or perhaps a cause) of this characteristic is that the world is perceived as hostile and that interpersonal relationships are perceived as polarized into a for or against stance. Hence a barrier between victimizer and others always exists and actions are judged on the basis of whether they indicate a for or against position. 6. The victimizer uses provocation techniques. The tactic is one where direct harmful action against others is not, initially at least, used but where provocatory techniques are deliberately used to goad the opponent into hurtful, irrational actions. These actions are then used to justify not only the initial provocatory actions but all future actions by the victimizer. Thus the justification of conduct, and the responsibility therefore, is not in terms of internal standards but of external actions directed against the individual. This has the effect of absolving the individual from any respon-
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sibility for his actions, and thus making any action of his, no matter how horrible, permissible. The use of provocation techniques has been made explicit by the Provos of Amsterdam and is part of the basic techniques of current confrontations. The aim has been stated to be to show up the hypocrisy of society, or, to put it perhaps a little more accurately, to show that society is responsible for the ills done to the individuals concerned who thereby have the right to act in any manner they please. 7. I t is impossible to satisfy the needs of the victimizers. I f the demands are acceded to, then a new set of demands is forthcoming. Thus Che Guevara, having shared the success of one revolution, became restless and dissatisfied and had to find a new revolution. The behavior is typical— an enemy must always be at hand and if one dragon has been slain, new dragons must be found. Stalin's career was sufficiently long that a wide diversity of enemies were attacked, including his fellow revolutionaries. The fact that most revolutions devour their own probably results from this factor. 8. Language, or, more generally, interactions with others, is used for influencing the actions of these others rather than for communicating information or exchanging ideas. Everything is designed to influence others in such a way that they join forces with the victimizer rather than his enemy. Thus no dialogue, no compromise, is involved. Apparent compromises, such as the Munich pact of 1938, are invariably temporary since no real bilateral interaction exists. Interaction with others is all-important but is always a one-way attempt to influence and control. 9. Heroes. Hitler had the Wagnerian heroes, Arab propaganda is full of the conquerors of the past, and the New Left militants have an entire pantheon including Guevara and Mao. The primary characteristic of the heroes is that they overcome insuperable obstacles to emerge victorious against a host of enemies. When an inconvenient fact like Guevara's failure and death in Bolivia appears, this is disposed of by the knowledge that history will vindicate him, so that eventually he does, in fact, emerge victorious. These characteristics can be subsumed under a simpler syndrome: The victimizer feels a deep sense of deprivation and loss which must somehow be made up, and this can only be done by and through others and not through his own efforts. Consequently he must learn how to influence and control others before he can obtain restitution. The charismatic leader is one who has correctly gauged the frustrations, hopes, and aspirations of people and is able to articulate them. This ability is necessary in the eyes of one who sees himself as basically helpless since he can accomplish anything only by influencing others. I t is because of this ability that one must accept the fact that militants very often cor-
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rectly state real injustices. The error that many people make, and which the militants deliberately encourage, is to confuse a problem with its solution. While the revolutionary may accurately state the problem, the solution he proposes may be more disastrous than the problem itself. Yet many people feel that if they accept the existence of a problem then they must also accept the solution which is proposed. The distinction between problem and solution is very real and should never be blurred. The lack of belief of the victimizer in the efficacy of his actions leads to a sense of unreality about these actions, the sense that he does not believe anything he does has any real effect. Thus everything has the character of a game, of make-believe, of a play in which all the bodies on the floor at the end of the last act will take bows at curtain call time. This sense of noneffect is important since the victimizer thus has no sense of wrongdoing, no sense that he is in any way responsible, since his actions, he knows, have no effect. I t is also as though whatever has happened has not really happened and is therefore retrievable. The victimizer, in fact, does not himself do anything but expend his efforts in influencing others to do something and eventually, if successful, ordering others to do something. Thus Hitler himself, with the questionable exception of the murder of Rohm, never committed an act of violence but acted always through the influence or power he had over others. The situation is, in its essentials, that of the small child who fantasizes and believes in the power of his wishes. The Victimizer Character: A More Detailed Analysis As I have shown above, the character of the victimizer can be described as one in which there is a disbelief in the efficacy of his actions in producing changes in his life coupled with a perception of the world as consisting of antagonistic forces in constant struggle and also coupled with a deep sense of deprivation and loss which must somehow be retrieved. I shall consider each of these elements separately but not in this order and not at the same length. The simplest of the three elements above is the concept of antagonistic forces which must be overcome. That the concept is deep rooted in the history of man is shown by the philosophies of Zoroastrianism and Manichaeism, among others, in which both good and evil are thus considered as active principles. In more recent times the ideologies which have been quoted as justifying the world as struggle are those of evolution—the survival of the fittest—and Marxism—the class struggle whose final nirvana will be the classless society. The concept demands that everyone be placed in two categories only, with no spectrum between—no gray—the two groupings being, in their
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most simple statement, friends and enemies. The pervasiveness of this in the Communist bloc, for example, is shown by the greeting as almost revolutionary of the change in Hungary a few years ago from "those who are not with us are against us" to "those who are not against us are with us." In a more negative form there is the Arab proverb "the enemy of my enemy is my friend." The conception demands that one support one's friends without reservation and struggle against one's enemies unceasingly. Thus there is no room for compromise, room only for confrontation in which one or the other emerges victorious. Unfortunately, defeating the enemy does not bring safety—new enemies immediately appear or must be found. Thus colonialism and racism are replaced by neocolonialism and neoracism. Perhaps a useful approach might be to see how the older religions have dealt with the struggle in such a way as to make a relatively peaceful life possible. Certainly the Parsees are no more aggressive than others and are in fact industrious, sober people. If an "out" for the struggle which allows for peaceful methods without abandoning the basic concept of life as a struggle can be found and publicized, then perhaps this element of the pathology can be neutralized. The sense of deprivation and loss also leads to certain consequences. First of all examples are sought in the external reality to justify this sense —like injustice and exploitation. Thus it has recently become clearer that many, if not most, of the revolutionary leaders are either of middle class origins or had been favored by the establishment with advancement. Yet these are the people who point out, with great passion, how much has been taken from them and their people. The very oppressed peasants and workers do not readily participate in revolution. A good example of the depth of the feeling of deprivation and loss was given by Stokely Carmichael, who is quoted as saying, Death and liquidation awaits us blacks in the United States. My certainty of that is the foundation of my political opinion. I see the day before me when there will be made an effort in the United States to exterminate the Negroes, to treat them the way the Nazis treated the Jews (7). It seems improbable that this result can be inferred from the past few years' history of civil rights legislation, increased political power, and greater educational and job opportunities for Negroes and from the history of minority groups in the United States; therefore Carmichael's prophecy must be taken as more indicative of his state of mind than of objective realities. The deep sense of loss means not only that previous losses must be retrieved (as, for example, the Russian sense that whatever had in the past belonged to them is theirs by right) but also that any additional loss is unacceptable. This results from the sense that so much has already been lost
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that survival hangs by a mere thread and that even the smallest loss will cut that thread. The inability to accept loss was shown by Hitler perhaps most dramatically at Stalingrad, by Stalin's orders for the same battle (8), and, in a more esoteric example, by Lopez, dictator of Paraguay, during the 1865-70 war, when he executed for desertion a commander who had defended a fortress as long as possible against great odds and then had made his way home across inhospitable terrain (9). The Arab leadership has consistently refused to recognize even the existence of Israel, and insists on regaining the "stolen" land of Palestine. Thus Nasser, in a speech to the United Nations Assembly on September 27, 1960, stated (10) : The only solution to Palestine . . . is that matters should return to the condition prevailing before the error was committed—i.e. the annulment of Israel's existence. Similarly, Yasir Arafat, recognized by the United Nations in November, 1974 as the de facto head of state of a Palestinian nation, had stated earlier (11): . . . the dimensions of our struggle will always remain those outlined by the principles of Al Fatah: First, revolutionary violence is the only means for the liberation of the land of our forefathers; second, the goal of this violence is the elimination of Zionism from Palestine in all its political, economic, and military aspects. . . . Of the three components which go into the victimizer personality perhaps the most difficult to define and clarify is that of the capacity of the individual to affect his own life and the role played by his perception of this capacity. There are thus several strands to be untangled, and each must be clearly distinguished from the others. I begin with the capacity for effecting change and distinguish this from the capacity for carrying out change. The dictionary lists effectual and effective as synonyms, both indicating the power to produce an effect or the actual production of an effect. I will here separate these two possibilities and consider them as two distinct concepts. For the quality which is the power to produce an effect I will use the word "effectual," and for the quality involved in the actual production of an effect I will use the word "effective." The distinction is that between the maker of a policy and the executor of that policy—the one has the power to cause change to happen, the other carries out the change itself. With the definitions I am using here, the one is effectual, the other is effective. The two qualities are not necessarily coexistent, as even casual observation of any organization will show. A person can be very effective in carrying out policy (technicians, ad-
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ministrative assistants, secretaries, for example) without at the same time having either the capacity or the desire to make that policy. On the other hand, a person can be effectual in policy making without the capacity to execute the policy. As a trivial example, consider the executive who causes a message to be sent but does not himself possess the secretarial skills involved in the actual carrying out of the action. The next important distinction is that of effectuality regarding self, that is, to what extent does the individual control what happens to him, to what extent do his actions affect his life and what happens to him. Most people adopt one of two extremes as a premise for their behavior: either they alone control their destiny—the concept of self-reliance and responsibility; or forces external to themselves (society, the boss, and others) exercise this control. While it is not essential for the present discussion it is perhaps worth noting that normally the reality is probably a combination of both, with differing weightings of the two factors for different situations, and with examples of the two extremes also to be found. There are several indicators of whether the individual considers himself effectual-with-regard-to-himself. One of the more obvious is whether his modus operandi involves producing change through his own efforts or those of others, in stereotypic terms, whether he is Indian or chief, worker or administrator. A less obvious indicator is a continuing series of trials in which the individual pits himself against nature or some other type of antagonist. This category is exemplified by some eminent men: Theodore Roosevelt, Ernest Hemingway, Robert Kennedy, as well as many others. The preceding emphasizes the important point that it is the individual's perception of himself that matters, and not the reality of the situation. In terms of my analysis of situations involving this type of personality the practical implication is that the perception of reality becomes a major factor of the reality itself and in dealing with such people it is not sufficient to operate out of a reality framework, but rather to understand, allow for, and take account of the perceptual framework in any proposed solution. Enough examples have been given to indicate that the range of behavior of individuals who regard themselves as ineffectual is quite broad, and that the resulting behavior can range from benign (Malraux, as an examplef) to pathologic and malignant (Stalin, as an example). We are here concerned with the pathologic aspects, and therefore must add those additional characteristics that lead to them. Of the two other components listed at the beginning of this section, one, the perception of the world as struggle seems to be also present in those who constantly are overcoming nature. It would appear, therefore, that the pathologic component is the sense of f "I have sometimes managed to act, but the interest of action, except when it risei to the level of history, lies in what we do and not in what we say" (8).
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deprivation and loss, and the concomitant fears, anger, and need of retribution associated with this sense. Whether the presence of these three factors is sufficient to produce the victimizer personality is questionable. Perhaps an intensity factor needs also to be taken into account. Certainly the sense of deprivation needs to be very severe. A possible approach would be to think in terms of a personality imbalance such that one need becomes overwhelmingly dominant and that any action is considered justified in the satisfaction of that need. The existence of restraints must also be considered. Thus for Jews, the existence of a strong sense of obligation to others acts as a brake on the satisfaction of hungers resulting from the deprivation. Finally, it may be noted that the ordinary definitions of madness, involving either a lack of contact with reality or an unawareness of right and wrong, are of no help here since we are dealing with the single-minded pursuit of goals such as security or the satisfaction of psychic hungers, and it is in the goals that the distortion exists. DISCUSSION
The basic components of the victimizer's character, the sense of ineffectual! ty-with-regard-to-self, the perception of the world as hostile, and the strong sense of deprivation and loss, must all derive from those very early experiences in life, in which the social milieu is the family, which determine our perception of the world and our way of dealing with it. While one cannot with certainty deduce causes from effects, a likely origin for the victimizer syndrome is that in the very early helpless years the parents consciously or unconsciously imposed an environment entirely controlled and dominated by parental needs, and in which all actions of the child received no response. In the case of the executors of the Nazi policy in the concentration camps it may be possible to derive cause from effect. Malraux (8, p. 405) has pointed out that historically torture was used either to gain information or to punish, but that for the Nazis the motive seemed to be to produce the degradation of the individual. Furthermore it was important that the individual recognize and participate in his own degradation. I f we accept the mechanism of retrojection defined by Hubbard by: "The behavior or ideation which is retrojected must ideally cause in the new victim exactly the same feelings formerly produced in the original victim" (9), then the necessity of the victim's knowledge of his own degradation becomes clear. The mechanisms for coping with reality are those which derive from an unresponsive environment. Thus provocation and confrontation are ways of ensuring that one will be at least listened to. If in addition to
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being unresponsive, the parents are arbitrary, capricious, and unpredictable so that the child's actions in fact can accomplish nothing and he can only control his environment by influencing his parents to do something, then he develops a mind-reading characteristic as a survival mechanism—that is, he develops the first prerequisite of charismatic leader or revolutionary. Finally, in the extreme, he may decide that safety can only exist when he totally controls his environment. By contrast, for the individual accustomed to control of his environment and secure in his mastery of it, it might be more accurate to speak in terms of a responsiveness to the environment, the knowledge of potential control being enough to make actual control unnecessary. The individual insecure in his sense of control tries other mechanisms, and often success does not bring belief in his efficacy so that one witnesses a continual testing in attempts at reassurance. For the pathology I am considering here, the individual assumes that control can only be exercised through others and develops a number of mechanisms for controlling the effectual others—influencing by appeals to ideas or hopes; operating on existing fears; the deliberate imposition of fear by a judicious use of terror; and outright control by the use of superior force, as examples. The particular society or culture can exacerbate or reduce the incidence of pathology. I f one accepts the above picture then it would seem that for most societies the child rearing practices are such that one would anticipate only a few individuals to suffer from this pathology. For some, in fact, such as the Samoan (or Polynesian in general) the presence of what amounts to group mothering results in children being taken care of by those who are able and willing to so that one may assume a responsiveness of the environment to the child's actions for the satisfaction of his needs. The Israeli Kibbutz provides a similar margin of safety with regard to environmental responsiveness. At the other extreme there are societies in which maternal resentment of her position and role, and the absence of paternal participation in the child rearing, can lead to the mother venting her anger by the deliberate frustration of the wishes of the male children. This can be seen in individual cases in our own society. The result will be a sense of ineffectuality in the child, with all its consequences, including a strong fantasy life peopled with heroes overcoming obstacles and conquering all. As a final comment, at either extreme the danger is least. For societies in which environmental responsiveness exists there is no need to control others. For societies in which there is no responsiveness, the individual sees himself as ineffectual and therefore, in a real sense, incapable of taking action. The greatest danger comes from those societies in which most
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people are indeed effectual, and thus a source of resources, and in which those few who see their survival through controlling the actions of others, are in control of the government and operate with no restraints. This, for example, was the situation in Nazi Germany and appears to be the present situation in the Soviet Union. I n American society the few also exist but enough restraints are built into the government structure and enough power is in the hands of different segments of the population so that total control of our resources has thus far eluded these few. If man created philosophy in his own image as God created man in his, then these different conceptions of good and evil are mirrors of man's perceptions of the world. If he perceives the world as hostile and warring, then good and evil become opposing forces, with both having a life of their own. For most philosophies based on this concept, one or the other must win and compromise does not exist. Perhaps the best one can hope for here is a Rabbinic conception that both are necessary for a balance of power to maintain the world. Thus if the victimizer could be convinced of such a concept then co-existence would at least be possible, and perhaps such a philosophy should be publicized. Toynbee's theory of challenge and response as necessary for the survival of a civilization could be a plausible starting point. For the individual who has grown up in a responsive environment, the world is a harmonious place and the problem of good and evil is either meaningless or alien. While suffering exists it becomes a part of life itself, to be experienced as one experiences joy or any other emotion. Good and evil are part of the same fabric: " I form the light and create darkness; I make peace and create evil; I am the Lord that doeth all these things." (Isaiah 45:7). For such a man the presence of evil as a distinct force becomes incomprehensible, he can only withdraw and ask why, as Job did, and find no answer. I f the analysis given here is correct then one can absolve God of his culpability and find the answer in the human condition of a small part of mankind. SUMMARY
It is proposed that an appreciable fraction of destructive conflict is initiated and guided by people of a particular personality syndrome, denominated "victimizers" for simplicity. That type of person can be recognized by: a sense of alienation; a deep sense of loss or deprivation; a need for control; a need for constant justification of his actions; the attribution of all ills to forces external to himself; the use of provocation techniques; the impossibility of appeasing the stated needs ; the use of language for influencing others rather than for communicating; and a rich fantasy life exemplified by the search for heroes.
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These characteristics can be seen as the result of a deep sense of deprivation and loss requiring restitution combined with a sense that this can only be accomplished by others, that is, the individual is himself ineffectual in his own behalf. REFERENCES
1. Dionysius of Halicarnassus. I n Roman Antiquities, Loeb Classical Library, Vols. 3 and 4. English transl. by E . Gary. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1940, 1943. See especially Books V I and V I I . 2. Ling Roth, H . The Aborigines of Tasmania. F . King, Halifax, England, 1899, p. 164. 3. Anonymous. U N E S C O Courier. The Last of the Fuegians, 7:14, 1954, p. 14. 4. Borrero, J . M. (1928) La Patagonia Tragica. Editorial Americana, Buenos Aires, 1967. 5. Silverman, S. M. Conflict Avoidance and Resolution: Problems and Prospects. Int. J. Group Tensions, 3:112, 1973. 6. New York Times, January 21, 1969. 7. Masterman, G. F . Seven Eventful Years in Paraguay, Chapter 16.
Low, Son, & Marston, London, 1870. 8. Malraux, A. Anti-Memoirs. Transl. by T . Kilmartin. ston, New York, 1968, p. 1. 9. Hubbard, D. G.
The Skyjacker:
His Flights
Sampson
Holt, Rinehart, & Win-
of Fantasy.
Macmillan, New
York, 1971, p. 100. 10. Cited in Harkabi, Y . Arab Attitudes to Israel, 2nd E d . Israel Universities Press, Jerusalem, Israel, 1974, p. 4. 11. From a 1970 interview by Oriana Fallaci in The New Republic. November 16, 1974.
Mass.
A particular personality type, the victimizer, is an important component of destructive conflict. A victimizer syndrome includes a deep sense of deprivation and loss with a need for restitution, and a perception of the self as ineffectual in producing changes in his own life. The possible origin of the syndrome and societal effects on it are also discussed.
Over the past several millennia historical records have provided numerous examples of one group extending its control and resources at the expense of other groups. The spectrum of groups has ranged from social classes within a given society, as with the patrician-plebeian controversy of the Rome of the sixth century B.G. ( 1 ) , through racial groupings, such as the European-American Indian confrontations in the Americas in the centuries following Columbus' voyages, to the conflicts between national groupings which is the particular signature of our century. The effects on the impacted groups have ranged from total physical annihilation, as with the Tasmanian aborigines (2) and the Patagonians (3, 4), through the total loss of a separate group identity commonly found in the areas of the Moslem conquests to the voluntary cession of a portion of their power, as happened with the Roman patricians, and as is typical in the United States. In the atomic era with its potential for mass destruction involving victor, vanquished, and innocent bystander alike, conflict between groups becomes the major problem. I f one wishes for a solution which allows for survival of separate group identities, rather than a homogenization imposed by one successful conquering group, then one must analyze the process and its dynamics, and experiment with methods of nonfatal intergroup conflict resolution which at the same time maintain our human dignity. Here I focus on one crucial aspect of this over-all problem. I will first present the framework of the discussion. Elsewhere (5), I have proposed that the greatest amount of destruction of persons, property, and values has occurred and is likely to recur in situations where a newly emerging group has aspirations greater than their resources; that this group then searches out for victimization a group or groups who are easily identifiable, are possessed of resources, and will minimally resist the expropriation * Mailing
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of these resources; and that the societal ambient determines the allowable modes of victimization. I now extend the analysis by proposing that the aspirations of the newly emerging group are articulated and focused by a small fraction of the group, whom I shall designate as the victimizers, not more than one or two per cent of the group, whose motivations are quite different from those of the majority. For this small group a need exists to control the environment surrounding them, and the emergence of a group with unfulfilled aspirations in a period of unstable values presents an opportunity for influencing and manipulating which they can use to obtain control. Such opportunities were available, for example, in the democratic period following the March revolution in 1917 in Russia, utilized by Lenin and the Bolsheviks; in the breakdown of society in Germany following World War I , utilized by Hitler and the Nazis; and in the period following the major civil rights legislation of 1964-65, utilized by some black militants. An important aspect of any rational approach to the problem then becomes that of recognizing the victimizer and an analysis of his character, in order to eventually render him harmless. This paper is concerned then with the character of the victimizer. The approach used here differs from most of those concerned with war and violence in that attention is focused on a small group only as those who are the source of difficulty and who must be dealt with. I t is my contention that human nature in the mass need not be changed in order to make progress, but rather that the pathologic extreme in a small group must be dealt with. In practice the difference is one of either changing human nature, an enormous and possibly impossible job at this time, or learning to recognize and deal with the small number exhibiting pathologic extremes in the nature of Everyman, a difficult but more hopeful task. In the following I make a beginning. Character of the Victimizer: A Recognition Syndrome My observations of people of this sort (the type is widespread and occurs in many organizations and societies though not necessarily with the same virulence and pathology as exists in those we are primarily concerned with in this essay) and of reports of those of historical or journalistic interest indicate a number of common characteristics, which I list here. 1. There is a sense of alienation from others and from society. That this alienation is neither liked nor wanted is shown by appeals to a concept of global brotherhood and calls for unity with all. Most movements of this sort are therefore universalist-directed, or at least include many others outside the immediate group. On occasion this call for brotherhood involves ridiculous distinctions as in the black militant classification of the Semitic Arabs as black and the Semitic Jews as white.
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2. A deep sense of deprivation or loss is felt. This is often explicitly stated in some form or other. Typical are the irredentist movements: the varying sovereignties over Alsace-Lorraine; the dispute over the Trieste area following the first and second World Wars, as examples. Allied to the sense of loss is an inability to accept loss, a constant and continuing effort to retrieve that which was lost. Also allied to this is the refusal to give up anything which one currently has. Thus the Soviet Union refuses to return to Japan some small, essentially uninhabited islands taken after World War I I . This characteristic also came out in the sentiment voiced in the Soviet Union after the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 that they had liberated the country and therefore could do what they wished with it. Often the inability to accept loss is carried to the extent of a denial of reality in order to negate the loss. Thus the 1956 Suez campaign is commemorated in Egypt by "Victory Day." 3. There is a need to control a situation by dominating it. Thus confrontations and, when authority is at hand, the institution of surveillance over everyone and the elimination of actual or potential opposition. 4. Such people have a need to constantly justify their actions and the_ justification of these actions on "moral" grounds such as past injustice, the greater good, and so on. In fact a tendency to moralize is a good indicator that one should be cautious in dealing with them. 5. They believe that the deprivation or loss is always the result of actions by persons or forces outside of the individual: the boss, society, the capitalist class, the Zionists and others. This carries the corollary that it is not the individual who must change but the forces external to him, such as society, since they are responsible for the difficulties. An additional, and important, corollary is that it is therefore difficult, perhaps impossible, to treat these people since treatment presupposes an acceptance of the need or desirability of change in oneself. A result (or perhaps a cause) of this characteristic is that the world is perceived as hostile and that interpersonal relationships are perceived as polarized into a for or against stance. Hence a barrier between victimizer and others always exists and actions are judged on the basis of whether they indicate a for or against position. 6. The victimizer uses provocation techniques. The tactic is one where direct harmful action against others is not, initially at least, used but where provocatory techniques are deliberately used to goad the opponent into hurtful, irrational actions. These actions are then used to justify not only the initial provocatory actions but all future actions by the victimizer. Thus the justification of conduct, and the responsibility therefore, is not in terms of internal standards but of external actions directed against the individual. This has the effect of absolving the individual from any respon-
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sibility for his actions, and thus making any action of his, no matter how horrible, permissible. The use of provocation techniques has been made explicit by the Provos of Amsterdam and is part of the basic techniques of current confrontations. The aim has been stated to be to show up the hypocrisy of society, or, to put it perhaps a little more accurately, to show that society is responsible for the ills done to the individuals concerned who thereby have the right to act in any manner they please. 7. I t is impossible to satisfy the needs of the victimizers. I f the demands are acceded to, then a new set of demands is forthcoming. Thus Che Guevara, having shared the success of one revolution, became restless and dissatisfied and had to find a new revolution. The behavior is typical— an enemy must always be at hand and if one dragon has been slain, new dragons must be found. Stalin's career was sufficiently long that a wide diversity of enemies were attacked, including his fellow revolutionaries. The fact that most revolutions devour their own probably results from this factor. 8. Language, or, more generally, interactions with others, is used for influencing the actions of these others rather than for communicating information or exchanging ideas. Everything is designed to influence others in such a way that they join forces with the victimizer rather than his enemy. Thus no dialogue, no compromise, is involved. Apparent compromises, such as the Munich pact of 1938, are invariably temporary since no real bilateral interaction exists. Interaction with others is all-important but is always a one-way attempt to influence and control. 9. Heroes. Hitler had the Wagnerian heroes, Arab propaganda is full of the conquerors of the past, and the New Left militants have an entire pantheon including Guevara and Mao. The primary characteristic of the heroes is that they overcome insuperable obstacles to emerge victorious against a host of enemies. When an inconvenient fact like Guevara's failure and death in Bolivia appears, this is disposed of by the knowledge that history will vindicate him, so that eventually he does, in fact, emerge victorious. These characteristics can be subsumed under a simpler syndrome: The victimizer feels a deep sense of deprivation and loss which must somehow be made up, and this can only be done by and through others and not through his own efforts. Consequently he must learn how to influence and control others before he can obtain restitution. The charismatic leader is one who has correctly gauged the frustrations, hopes, and aspirations of people and is able to articulate them. This ability is necessary in the eyes of one who sees himself as basically helpless since he can accomplish anything only by influencing others. I t is because of this ability that one must accept the fact that militants very often cor-
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rectly state real injustices. The error that many people make, and which the militants deliberately encourage, is to confuse a problem with its solution. While the revolutionary may accurately state the problem, the solution he proposes may be more disastrous than the problem itself. Yet many people feel that if they accept the existence of a problem then they must also accept the solution which is proposed. The distinction between problem and solution is very real and should never be blurred. The lack of belief of the victimizer in the efficacy of his actions leads to a sense of unreality about these actions, the sense that he does not believe anything he does has any real effect. Thus everything has the character of a game, of make-believe, of a play in which all the bodies on the floor at the end of the last act will take bows at curtain call time. This sense of noneffect is important since the victimizer thus has no sense of wrongdoing, no sense that he is in any way responsible, since his actions, he knows, have no effect. I t is also as though whatever has happened has not really happened and is therefore retrievable. The victimizer, in fact, does not himself do anything but expend his efforts in influencing others to do something and eventually, if successful, ordering others to do something. Thus Hitler himself, with the questionable exception of the murder of Rohm, never committed an act of violence but acted always through the influence or power he had over others. The situation is, in its essentials, that of the small child who fantasizes and believes in the power of his wishes. The Victimizer Character: A More Detailed Analysis As I have shown above, the character of the victimizer can be described as one in which there is a disbelief in the efficacy of his actions in producing changes in his life coupled with a perception of the world as consisting of antagonistic forces in constant struggle and also coupled with a deep sense of deprivation and loss which must somehow be retrieved. I shall consider each of these elements separately but not in this order and not at the same length. The simplest of the three elements above is the concept of antagonistic forces which must be overcome. That the concept is deep rooted in the history of man is shown by the philosophies of Zoroastrianism and Manichaeism, among others, in which both good and evil are thus considered as active principles. In more recent times the ideologies which have been quoted as justifying the world as struggle are those of evolution—the survival of the fittest—and Marxism—the class struggle whose final nirvana will be the classless society. The concept demands that everyone be placed in two categories only, with no spectrum between—no gray—the two groupings being, in their
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most simple statement, friends and enemies. The pervasiveness of this in the Communist bloc, for example, is shown by the greeting as almost revolutionary of the change in Hungary a few years ago from "those who are not with us are against us" to "those who are not against us are with us." In a more negative form there is the Arab proverb "the enemy of my enemy is my friend." The conception demands that one support one's friends without reservation and struggle against one's enemies unceasingly. Thus there is no room for compromise, room only for confrontation in which one or the other emerges victorious. Unfortunately, defeating the enemy does not bring safety—new enemies immediately appear or must be found. Thus colonialism and racism are replaced by neocolonialism and neoracism. Perhaps a useful approach might be to see how the older religions have dealt with the struggle in such a way as to make a relatively peaceful life possible. Certainly the Parsees are no more aggressive than others and are in fact industrious, sober people. If an "out" for the struggle which allows for peaceful methods without abandoning the basic concept of life as a struggle can be found and publicized, then perhaps this element of the pathology can be neutralized. The sense of deprivation and loss also leads to certain consequences. First of all examples are sought in the external reality to justify this sense —like injustice and exploitation. Thus it has recently become clearer that many, if not most, of the revolutionary leaders are either of middle class origins or had been favored by the establishment with advancement. Yet these are the people who point out, with great passion, how much has been taken from them and their people. The very oppressed peasants and workers do not readily participate in revolution. A good example of the depth of the feeling of deprivation and loss was given by Stokely Carmichael, who is quoted as saying, Death and liquidation awaits us blacks in the United States. My certainty of that is the foundation of my political opinion. I see the day before me when there will be made an effort in the United States to exterminate the Negroes, to treat them the way the Nazis treated the Jews (7). It seems improbable that this result can be inferred from the past few years' history of civil rights legislation, increased political power, and greater educational and job opportunities for Negroes and from the history of minority groups in the United States; therefore Carmichael's prophecy must be taken as more indicative of his state of mind than of objective realities. The deep sense of loss means not only that previous losses must be retrieved (as, for example, the Russian sense that whatever had in the past belonged to them is theirs by right) but also that any additional loss is unacceptable. This results from the sense that so much has already been lost
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that survival hangs by a mere thread and that even the smallest loss will cut that thread. The inability to accept loss was shown by Hitler perhaps most dramatically at Stalingrad, by Stalin's orders for the same battle (8), and, in a more esoteric example, by Lopez, dictator of Paraguay, during the 1865-70 war, when he executed for desertion a commander who had defended a fortress as long as possible against great odds and then had made his way home across inhospitable terrain (9). The Arab leadership has consistently refused to recognize even the existence of Israel, and insists on regaining the "stolen" land of Palestine. Thus Nasser, in a speech to the United Nations Assembly on September 27, 1960, stated (10) : The only solution to Palestine . . . is that matters should return to the condition prevailing before the error was committed—i.e. the annulment of Israel's existence. Similarly, Yasir Arafat, recognized by the United Nations in November, 1974 as the de facto head of state of a Palestinian nation, had stated earlier (11): . . . the dimensions of our struggle will always remain those outlined by the principles of Al Fatah: First, revolutionary violence is the only means for the liberation of the land of our forefathers; second, the goal of this violence is the elimination of Zionism from Palestine in all its political, economic, and military aspects. . . . Of the three components which go into the victimizer personality perhaps the most difficult to define and clarify is that of the capacity of the individual to affect his own life and the role played by his perception of this capacity. There are thus several strands to be untangled, and each must be clearly distinguished from the others. I begin with the capacity for effecting change and distinguish this from the capacity for carrying out change. The dictionary lists effectual and effective as synonyms, both indicating the power to produce an effect or the actual production of an effect. I will here separate these two possibilities and consider them as two distinct concepts. For the quality which is the power to produce an effect I will use the word "effectual," and for the quality involved in the actual production of an effect I will use the word "effective." The distinction is that between the maker of a policy and the executor of that policy—the one has the power to cause change to happen, the other carries out the change itself. With the definitions I am using here, the one is effectual, the other is effective. The two qualities are not necessarily coexistent, as even casual observation of any organization will show. A person can be very effective in carrying out policy (technicians, ad-
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ministrative assistants, secretaries, for example) without at the same time having either the capacity or the desire to make that policy. On the other hand, a person can be effectual in policy making without the capacity to execute the policy. As a trivial example, consider the executive who causes a message to be sent but does not himself possess the secretarial skills involved in the actual carrying out of the action. The next important distinction is that of effectuality regarding self, that is, to what extent does the individual control what happens to him, to what extent do his actions affect his life and what happens to him. Most people adopt one of two extremes as a premise for their behavior: either they alone control their destiny—the concept of self-reliance and responsibility; or forces external to themselves (society, the boss, and others) exercise this control. While it is not essential for the present discussion it is perhaps worth noting that normally the reality is probably a combination of both, with differing weightings of the two factors for different situations, and with examples of the two extremes also to be found. There are several indicators of whether the individual considers himself effectual-with-regard-to-himself. One of the more obvious is whether his modus operandi involves producing change through his own efforts or those of others, in stereotypic terms, whether he is Indian or chief, worker or administrator. A less obvious indicator is a continuing series of trials in which the individual pits himself against nature or some other type of antagonist. This category is exemplified by some eminent men: Theodore Roosevelt, Ernest Hemingway, Robert Kennedy, as well as many others. The preceding emphasizes the important point that it is the individual's perception of himself that matters, and not the reality of the situation. In terms of my analysis of situations involving this type of personality the practical implication is that the perception of reality becomes a major factor of the reality itself and in dealing with such people it is not sufficient to operate out of a reality framework, but rather to understand, allow for, and take account of the perceptual framework in any proposed solution. Enough examples have been given to indicate that the range of behavior of individuals who regard themselves as ineffectual is quite broad, and that the resulting behavior can range from benign (Malraux, as an examplef) to pathologic and malignant (Stalin, as an example). We are here concerned with the pathologic aspects, and therefore must add those additional characteristics that lead to them. Of the two other components listed at the beginning of this section, one, the perception of the world as struggle seems to be also present in those who constantly are overcoming nature. It would appear, therefore, that the pathologic component is the sense of f "I have sometimes managed to act, but the interest of action, except when it risei to the level of history, lies in what we do and not in what we say" (8).
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deprivation and loss, and the concomitant fears, anger, and need of retribution associated with this sense. Whether the presence of these three factors is sufficient to produce the victimizer personality is questionable. Perhaps an intensity factor needs also to be taken into account. Certainly the sense of deprivation needs to be very severe. A possible approach would be to think in terms of a personality imbalance such that one need becomes overwhelmingly dominant and that any action is considered justified in the satisfaction of that need. The existence of restraints must also be considered. Thus for Jews, the existence of a strong sense of obligation to others acts as a brake on the satisfaction of hungers resulting from the deprivation. Finally, it may be noted that the ordinary definitions of madness, involving either a lack of contact with reality or an unawareness of right and wrong, are of no help here since we are dealing with the single-minded pursuit of goals such as security or the satisfaction of psychic hungers, and it is in the goals that the distortion exists. DISCUSSION
The basic components of the victimizer's character, the sense of ineffectual! ty-with-regard-to-self, the perception of the world as hostile, and the strong sense of deprivation and loss, must all derive from those very early experiences in life, in which the social milieu is the family, which determine our perception of the world and our way of dealing with it. While one cannot with certainty deduce causes from effects, a likely origin for the victimizer syndrome is that in the very early helpless years the parents consciously or unconsciously imposed an environment entirely controlled and dominated by parental needs, and in which all actions of the child received no response. In the case of the executors of the Nazi policy in the concentration camps it may be possible to derive cause from effect. Malraux (8, p. 405) has pointed out that historically torture was used either to gain information or to punish, but that for the Nazis the motive seemed to be to produce the degradation of the individual. Furthermore it was important that the individual recognize and participate in his own degradation. I f we accept the mechanism of retrojection defined by Hubbard by: "The behavior or ideation which is retrojected must ideally cause in the new victim exactly the same feelings formerly produced in the original victim" (9), then the necessity of the victim's knowledge of his own degradation becomes clear. The mechanisms for coping with reality are those which derive from an unresponsive environment. Thus provocation and confrontation are ways of ensuring that one will be at least listened to. If in addition to
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being unresponsive, the parents are arbitrary, capricious, and unpredictable so that the child's actions in fact can accomplish nothing and he can only control his environment by influencing his parents to do something, then he develops a mind-reading characteristic as a survival mechanism—that is, he develops the first prerequisite of charismatic leader or revolutionary. Finally, in the extreme, he may decide that safety can only exist when he totally controls his environment. By contrast, for the individual accustomed to control of his environment and secure in his mastery of it, it might be more accurate to speak in terms of a responsiveness to the environment, the knowledge of potential control being enough to make actual control unnecessary. The individual insecure in his sense of control tries other mechanisms, and often success does not bring belief in his efficacy so that one witnesses a continual testing in attempts at reassurance. For the pathology I am considering here, the individual assumes that control can only be exercised through others and develops a number of mechanisms for controlling the effectual others—influencing by appeals to ideas or hopes; operating on existing fears; the deliberate imposition of fear by a judicious use of terror; and outright control by the use of superior force, as examples. The particular society or culture can exacerbate or reduce the incidence of pathology. I f one accepts the above picture then it would seem that for most societies the child rearing practices are such that one would anticipate only a few individuals to suffer from this pathology. For some, in fact, such as the Samoan (or Polynesian in general) the presence of what amounts to group mothering results in children being taken care of by those who are able and willing to so that one may assume a responsiveness of the environment to the child's actions for the satisfaction of his needs. The Israeli Kibbutz provides a similar margin of safety with regard to environmental responsiveness. At the other extreme there are societies in which maternal resentment of her position and role, and the absence of paternal participation in the child rearing, can lead to the mother venting her anger by the deliberate frustration of the wishes of the male children. This can be seen in individual cases in our own society. The result will be a sense of ineffectuality in the child, with all its consequences, including a strong fantasy life peopled with heroes overcoming obstacles and conquering all. As a final comment, at either extreme the danger is least. For societies in which environmental responsiveness exists there is no need to control others. For societies in which there is no responsiveness, the individual sees himself as ineffectual and therefore, in a real sense, incapable of taking action. The greatest danger comes from those societies in which most
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people are indeed effectual, and thus a source of resources, and in which those few who see their survival through controlling the actions of others, are in control of the government and operate with no restraints. This, for example, was the situation in Nazi Germany and appears to be the present situation in the Soviet Union. I n American society the few also exist but enough restraints are built into the government structure and enough power is in the hands of different segments of the population so that total control of our resources has thus far eluded these few. If man created philosophy in his own image as God created man in his, then these different conceptions of good and evil are mirrors of man's perceptions of the world. If he perceives the world as hostile and warring, then good and evil become opposing forces, with both having a life of their own. For most philosophies based on this concept, one or the other must win and compromise does not exist. Perhaps the best one can hope for here is a Rabbinic conception that both are necessary for a balance of power to maintain the world. Thus if the victimizer could be convinced of such a concept then co-existence would at least be possible, and perhaps such a philosophy should be publicized. Toynbee's theory of challenge and response as necessary for the survival of a civilization could be a plausible starting point. For the individual who has grown up in a responsive environment, the world is a harmonious place and the problem of good and evil is either meaningless or alien. While suffering exists it becomes a part of life itself, to be experienced as one experiences joy or any other emotion. Good and evil are part of the same fabric: " I form the light and create darkness; I make peace and create evil; I am the Lord that doeth all these things." (Isaiah 45:7). For such a man the presence of evil as a distinct force becomes incomprehensible, he can only withdraw and ask why, as Job did, and find no answer. I f the analysis given here is correct then one can absolve God of his culpability and find the answer in the human condition of a small part of mankind. SUMMARY
It is proposed that an appreciable fraction of destructive conflict is initiated and guided by people of a particular personality syndrome, denominated "victimizers" for simplicity. That type of person can be recognized by: a sense of alienation; a deep sense of loss or deprivation; a need for control; a need for constant justification of his actions; the attribution of all ills to forces external to himself; the use of provocation techniques; the impossibility of appeasing the stated needs ; the use of language for influencing others rather than for communicating; and a rich fantasy life exemplified by the search for heroes.
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These characteristics can be seen as the result of a deep sense of deprivation and loss requiring restitution combined with a sense that this can only be accomplished by others, that is, the individual is himself ineffectual in his own behalf. REFERENCES
1. Dionysius of Halicarnassus. I n Roman Antiquities, Loeb Classical Library, Vols. 3 and 4. English transl. by E . Gary. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1940, 1943. See especially Books V I and V I I . 2. Ling Roth, H . The Aborigines of Tasmania. F . King, Halifax, England, 1899, p. 164. 3. Anonymous. U N E S C O Courier. The Last of the Fuegians, 7:14, 1954, p. 14. 4. Borrero, J . M. (1928) La Patagonia Tragica. Editorial Americana, Buenos Aires, 1967. 5. Silverman, S. M. Conflict Avoidance and Resolution: Problems and Prospects. Int. J. Group Tensions, 3:112, 1973. 6. New York Times, January 21, 1969. 7. Masterman, G. F . Seven Eventful Years in Paraguay, Chapter 16.
Low, Son, & Marston, London, 1870. 8. Malraux, A. Anti-Memoirs. Transl. by T . Kilmartin. ston, New York, 1968, p. 1. 9. Hubbard, D. G.
The Skyjacker:
His Flights
Sampson
Holt, Rinehart, & Win-
of Fantasy.
Macmillan, New
York, 1971, p. 100. 10. Cited in Harkabi, Y . Arab Attitudes to Israel, 2nd E d . Israel Universities Press, Jerusalem, Israel, 1974, p. 4. 11. From a 1970 interview by Oriana Fallaci in The New Republic. November 16, 1974.
