T h e T h r e e M o d e s of the Science o f Psychoanalysis" ROBERT LANGS, M . D . * * A N T H O N Y BADALAMENTI, Ph.D.*** Three modes of t h e science of p s y c h o a n a l y s i s are identified: ( 1 ) t h e d o m a i n mode, w h i c h is established s i m p l y by identifying t h e area o f n a t u r e t h a t p s y c h o a n a l y s i s proposes t o study ( h u m a n e m o t i o n a l development and f u n c t i o n i n g ) ; also c h a r a c t e r i s t i c is a scientific a t t i t u d e and d i s c i p l i n e d d i r e c t o b s e r v a t i o n ; ( 2 ) t h e s t a t i s t i c a l mode, w h i c h is characterized by t h e use o f q u a n t i f i a b l e v a r i a b l e s , and s t a t i s t i c a l and stochastic methods; ( 3 ) f o r m a l mode, w h i c h uses time-series observations of quantified d a t a and m a t h e m a t i c a l t r e a t m e n t s i n a search f o r t h e deep l a w s o f nature. Each mode o f science c o n t r i b u t e s t o t h e f i e l d and y e t suffers from particular limitations. The issue of the scientific status of psychoanalysis—by which we mean all forms of dynamic psychotherapy (analyst and therapist will not be distinguished)—is of concern to clinicians, theorists, and researchers within and outside of the field of analysis itself. For the clinician, a scientific foundation that informs therapeutic practice is essential as a means of insuring sound interventions and optimal treatment results. For the theorist and researcher, the issues of science are an integral part o f his or her daily concerns, touching as they do on problems of methodology, validation, selection of observables, testing of theory, the experimental enhancement of the field, and a variety of heuristic and practical matters. A n d finally, the relationship between psychoanalysis and other sciences—e.g., social science, computer science, systems science, biology, physics, and the like—depends i n large measure on the scientific status of its own endeavors. The augmentation of these relationships has important consequences for psychoanalytic ideas i n that interdisciplinary thinking and research will, i n general, enhance psychoanalytic thinking i n unique and important ways. *From The Nathan S. Kline Institute for Psychiatric Research, Old Orangeburg Road, Orangeburg, NY 10962. This Research was supported through grants from the Blumenthal Foundation. * * Executive Director, The Psychoanalytic Center for Communicative Education, New York, NY; Visiting Clinical Research Investigator, The Nathan S. Kline Institute for Psychiatric Research. M a i l i n g a d d r e s s : 133 W 72d Street, Rm. 304, New York, N Y 10023. * * * F u l l Research Scientist, The Nathan S. Kline Institute for Psychiatric Research. A M E R I C A N J O U R N A L O F P S Y C H O T H E R A P Y , V o l . X L V I , N o .2 , A p r i l

1992

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I t is the purpose of this paper to propose three distinctive scientific modes to confer the status of a science on psychoanalysis. Each has its positive elements and its limitations, and each shapes the nature of the clinical work, scientific activities, and thinking of those that adhere, knowingly or unwittingly, to just one mode of science. I t is for this reason i n particular that a study of these scientific approaches promises to clarify many uncertain issues i n the field. The present discussion is based on our proposed definition of psychoanaly s i s as that branch of t h e science o f e m o t i o n a l c o g n i t i o n for which the axiom of u n c o n s c i o u s processes, mentation, adaptation, and communication is fundamental. ' The science of emotional cognition is a subscience of the basic family of biological sciences, while the field of psychoanalysis is divided into two subsciences: developmental p s y c h o a n a l y s i s and i n t e r a c t i o n a l p s y c h o a n a l y sis. The former deals w i t h emotional development, normal and pathological, while the latter entails the investigation of therapeutic and emotionally charged interactions and monologues. O u r own commitment is to the interactional subtype and it is on this basis that we have identified three distinctive scientific modes. W e suspect that these distinctions are relevant as well to the developmental form of psychoanalytic science, though a study of this possibility is beyond the scope of this paper. W i t h this as background, we turn now to the three modes we have investigated. 1

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M O D E

Psychoanalysis is a science merely through its claim of a selected aspect of nature that is its somewhat exclusive territory—its field of observation or the particulars that it proposes to explore and understand. But even here, at the simplest level, problems arise. There is as yet no clear consensus regarding the subject matter of psychoanalysis, even though one's decision on this issue will have a great effect on the nature of the science that the field—its practitioners and scientists—accepts and develops. For psychoanalysis, the domain mode is largely a clinically founded approach, one i n which broad and gross qualitative observations—clinical impressions—drawn from the therapeutic situation f o r m the data base. While arguments could be summoned to extend the field of observation beyond the clinical situation into daily life and special experimental settings, the more compelling issue appears to be how to demarcate the locus of observation for this level of scientific activity. For example, the realm of psychoanalysis may be defined as that aspect of human functioning (and to a lesser extent, perhaps that of animals) that involves emotional adaptation and functioning. This is an appealing defini164

T h e T h r e e M o d e s o fthe Science o f Psychoanalysis tion since cognitive science explores nonemotional adaptation and functioni n g , leaving emotional cognition and adaptation to a different approach. I t also is attractive i n being sufficiently broad to allow for many varieties of subscience, which is, i n general, a healthy state of affairs; even i n science monopolies are easily translated into abuses of power and misconception. As for the observables that would be summoned by this definition, they would derive mainly from patient/therapist interactions, though they could stem as well from everyday interchanges of a psychologically charged nature and even from emotionally laden monologues (self-reflections). 3

There are, of course, other existing definitions of this realm—some broader, others more restrictive—and these need to be articulated and sorted out so that the best possible demarcation can be established. For F r e u d , ' and most of those who followed i n his footsteps, the realm of psychoanalysis is the human m i n d or psyche (the psychic apparatus); on this basis, the main source of data is the mind of the patient and, more explicitly, his or her reports of subjective experience. A critical difference between this "science of the m i n d ' ' definition and the "science of emotional interaction" lies i n the focus i n the former on the patient as the fundamental unit of investigation (and the therapist only secondarily, the interaction only peripherally), while the latter places its focus on the exchanges between patients and therapists (and others), and the conditions under which these exchanges take place. I n substance, there is a fundamental systemic cast to the second approach. While b o t h of these definitions can employ a domain mode of scientific approach to the field, it is well to realize that the entire configuration of the resultant subscience will be—and is—vitally different i n each case. The various domain modes, therefore, must compete w i t h each other and strive to establish their own superiority i n respect to prediction, explanation, and the like. D o i n g so for a domain mode is, however, quite difficult because of the weaknesses i n the methodology and forms of verification in this type of scientific approach. Still, for the moment, it seems best to opt for the widest possible definition as the general investigation of t h e p s y c h o b i o l o g y o f h u m a n e m o t i o n s as expressed i n i n t e r a c t i o n and s o l i t u d e . The definition of the domain mode is established by fiat and simply asks that the practitioners, researchers, and others who represent the field accept and adhere to, i n general and i n spirit, the broad credos of science i n general—i.e., that they adopt a s c i e n t i f i c s p i r i t . A m o n g the attributes of this attitude are such principles and methods as the use of direct and unencumbered observation; the development of logical inferences and theories that are compatible w i t h what has been observed; the availability of the observed 4

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T h e T h r e e M o d e s of the Science of Psychoanalysis vulnerable to emotional pressures that color and distort observations and lead to error. The domain-mode subscience is relatively naturalistic and it is i n this particular sense, that of a careful impressionistic attitude far more than a specific methodology, that most psychoanalysts strive to be scientific. This spirit also prevails i n the applications of domain theory to clinical practice, for unlike some sciences, psychoanalysis has its origins as a therapy rather than a theory that came first and then spawned a treatment approach; at the very least, the two developments—practice and theory—occurred simultaneously rather than i n sequence. This aspect of the origins of the field has been fateful for the history of its science ' ' ; Freud's role was more analogous to that of the engineer i n physics, than to that of the pure researcher and theoretician. The stress on service and clinical utility tends to blind practitioners—and theorists and researchers as w e l l — t o observations and data that r u n counter to existing theories and practices. The situation is further complicated by the fact that often the same person adopts more than one of these roles—e.g., is a researcher with a part-time private practice, or a practitioner who has written on theory. The near-absence of "pure scientists" who can work w i t h o u t a strong investment i n a set of practices or i n a particular clinical theory places severe restrictions on the freedom of investigation and openness to nonconfirmatory observations on which the growth of a field relies. 1 2 7

Practitioners—the main purveyors of psychoanalytic domain-mode subscience—inherently are highly biased researchers and relatively poor observers of nature. They tend to seek validation for their ideas i n observables unwittingly selected because they are likely to confirm their position. This is quite different from the scientific attitude that produces a relatively unbiased observer who can allow nature to speak for herself—with an even hand that accentuates her choices rather than those of the observer. Clinicians also tend to miss or misperceive aspects of nature that run counter to their vested-interest theory. The domain-mode subscience is especially subject to the many insidious effects of these departures from the ideal. This mode sorely needs a division of labor that separates the deeply invested practitionerresearcher from the analytically informed, but nonpracticing researcher and theoretician. Returning to the positive contributions of the domain mode, another advantage to the field is that domain-mode scientists generally create imaginative theories and beliefs that guide research i n the other two modes of science, and that shape and support clinical practice and further development of the field. Domain-mode subscience is an important first step; the 167

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problem lies w i t h the difficulties inherent i n discovering the inevitable flaws in that way of scientific thinking. Many of the problems w i t h a domain-mode subscience arise because its methodology is primarily qualitative (e.g., the single or several case study), crude, and global; uncontrolled clinical observation, inference making, theory formation, and (rarely) validation are its main tools. Testing of hypotheses is minimal and usually relies on supportive observations made under circumstances different from the original basis for a construct—e.g., material from patient or setting different f r o m the original source of an idea. Global efforts of this kind are remarkably vulnerable to error—errors that are themselves difficult to detect. The scientific safeguards are minimal. As Descartes stated, "Sense impressions are sense deceptions." I n this mode of science, competing or contradictory interpretations of the same observations and data are often impossible to resolve. This means that conflicting theories can flourish side by side, and faith, intuition, and personal preference tend to play an especially strong role i n the choice of a favored theory—often, far more than one's own observations and wellreasoned conclusions. Furthermore, it is exceedingly difficult to establish a genuinely new paradigm for the field i n this mode of science ; change and progress are exceedingly slow. Overall, unconscious emotional factors play an especially great role i n the prevailing scientific beliefs i n the field. Related to this point is the historical observation that most sciences begin by establishing a domain and relying on gross observations—sense impressions and natural "experiments" rather than controlled experimentation. Over centuries, the shift is made to more definitive forms of science, usually through the two very gradual developments: a sudden, dramatic leap to a new basic clinical theory, and the establishment of statistical and then mathematical (formal) scientific methods. O f course, most of the other sciences of nature have already reached these later phases, while psychoanalysis stands as an anachronism—a field largely defined i n domain rather than statistical and mathematical t e r m s . ' Because it is largely based on a domain-mode approach, there are many unsolved problems i n the science of psychoanalysis. T o cite a few, we may begin w i t h the uncertainty of the specific data base on which the science should be founded—the most pertinent types of observations needed for an optimal and sound theory. For some, the data of psychoanalysis are the subjective reports or free associations of the patient. For others, the subjective experiences of b o t h patient and analyst are essential. Still others regard the communications between patient and therapist/analyst as the proper field of observation. Furthermore, some domain analytic scientists 8

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T h e T h r e e M o d e s of the Science of Psychoanalysis regard the setting or context of observation—the frame or backdrop—as irrelevant, while others see it as vital. As noted earlier, the entire structure of the science of psychoanalysis depends on the position taken on these issues. This uncertainty regarding the nature of the most meaningful observables is related to another problem i n the domain mode of the science of psychoanalysis, namely, that there is a plethora of contradictory postulates and theories that can find ample support through a variety of domain-mode investigations. Indeed, the more global the science, the greater the range of viable competing theories—and clinical practices derived from them—and the lower the discriminating power of the field. Determining the predictive and explanatory power of each set of concepts is exceedingly difficult i n this mode of science, largely because each theory will be buttressed by supportive observations (even as it fails to account for other phenomena). The existence of data that challenges or even refutes a particular theory is, as noted, easily explained away or ignored as irrelevant to the theory. A domain-mode subscience is typically beset by multiple viewpoints or so dominated by a particular theory that it stultifies the development of new ideas and stifles the possibility of growth and revision. Another characteristic of this mode is the inordinate power of individuals to create alleged theorems and beliefs which become so profoundly established and accepted that disconfirming observations have no notable impact. This is another factor that mitigates against the identification of erroneous and misleading postulates. Significant change often requires decades of unnoticed uncertainties and doubts, initiated as challenges that come either from unrecognized or rebellious practitioners or scientists whose ideas are shunned. Major changes i n the domain-mode approach require a confluence of extraordinary factors. Effective challenge to domain-mode scientific concepts is difficult to mount and the eventual change of postulates to those that are more i n keeping w i t h verifiable observations is slow i n coming. Indeed, dramatic change i n theory often awaits the emergence of a charismatic rebel who is able to flourish i n the context of a seething but suppressed discontent within the field. Circumstance and personality then combine to spark the k i n d of revolution that overthrows a personality-dominated flawed theory. The danger, of course, lies i n replacing the old overidealized theory w i t h a new one, but this pitfall is hard to avoid when the domain mode lacks support from the other two modes of scientific approach. Every science has its remarkable examples of this kind of authoritarian theory. Aristotles' mistaken theory of motion held sway for 2,000 years before it was overturned by Galileo and N e w t o n . M u c h the same phenom169

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ena occurred w i t h Galen's deeply flawed theory of circulation, which was not dismissed for over a century i n the face of abundant nonconfirming evidence until the meticulous work of Harvey finally discredited its main tenets w i t h incontrovertible evidence to the contrary. I t is inconceivable to think that psychoanalysis could have escaped this fate. Yet, given that the field is dominated by the domain-mode approach, it is all but impossible to produce examples of such error that would convince today's practitioners and researchers. N o one i n the field as yet possesses the kind of data and personal power to overthrow Freud and his followers, even though such a step, soundly carried forth, would inevitably advance the field by providing it w i t h a more accurate and compelling theory. O n the whole, then, clinical findings tend to have little power to compel practitioners to abandon an evidently unfounded tenet based on a theory derived f r o m the domain mode to which they subscribe. Their adherence to the theory is fueled by the need to satisfy their own unconscious emotional needs and to provide a structure and justification for the clinical practices through which they earn a livelihood. Conditions such as these mitigate against the smooth evolution of theory and practice. Where needed, change in theory will come either f r o m the exceedingly slow process of change i n the domain mode cited above, or f r o m challenges generated through dramatic results f r o m the statistical and formal modes of the science of psychoanalysis (this is far more likely to come f r o m the latter than f r o m the former). The domain mode is, as noted, typically quite loose in the kinds of validation that is seen as theory affirming. A case i n point is the muchheralded debate about Freud's tally argument —the contention that the favorable outcome of a psychoanalysis and the logic of the interwoven chain of insights produced by such therapy affirms the basic propositions of the field. One can easily mobilize a prima facie argument that the reported outcome of a therapeutic experience says nothing whatsoever about the theory that guided the therapy—all the more so because the analytic patient's conscious reports of treatment outcome are quite vulnerable to the use of denial and overidealization of the therapist and therapy. This kind of scientifically untenable debate suggests that the very pledge to adhere to a scientific spirit is difficult to maintain i n this realm and that spurious arguments are all too common. I t seems evident that domain mode is a weak f o r m of science, grounded in a shaky body of observations and undisciplined reasoning. A domainmode scientific theory is likely to be inherently flawed and rife w i t h unrecognized errors; its propositions should be taken w i t h a grain of salt at all times. Nonetheless, this mode of science is a vital first phase and 9

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T h e T h r e e M o d e s of the Science of Psychoanalysis continued source of challenge and inspiration for most fields. First intuitions are vital to the origination and progress of any scientific endeavor. However, they must be followed by an honest parting w i t h preconceptions and prejudice, and a turning to more exact methods. W i t h o u t rigorous support, intuitions tend to grow into misconceptions and self-deceptions, and these into faulty theories that spawn misguided practices. Nonetheless, it seems best to think of the domain mode as a way of getting things going, even though it often puts the field onto the wrong track. Such are the ultimate limitations of qualitative studies; i n time, more exact methods are needed. T H E STATISTICAL

M O D E

The domain mode of science generally finds itself i n need of quantitative methods at some point i n its history, and the use of measurement ushers i n the next developmental phase and form of psychoanalysis as a science—the statistical mode, which introduces quantification. I n this mode of science, aspects of emotionally laden behaviors and communications are measured and correlated w i t h one another. By and large, there are two contexts i n which this can and has been done—within the therapy situation and outside of treatment in some type of laboratory or research setting. I n the latter situation, it is possible to develop controlled studies, so that the effects of particular variables can be somewhat isolated for investigation. 10

Shulman cites five examples of this kind of research, and they include a variety of studies that involve the postulated subliminal activation of unconscious processes and the use of hypnotic and other techniques. Most of the investigations support isolated psychoanalytic hypotheses such as the importance of unconscious conflict, the formulation of distinctive forms of depression, a particular thesis regarding the etiology of narcissistic disturbances, and the validity of the concept of projection. 10

For example, an inventory of narcissistic attributes was used to select patients high on that particular scale. The effects of two subliminal stimuli were then tested—one involving the sentence: I am needy and hateful (in keeping w i t h Kernberg's formulations on the etiology of the disturbance) and the other stating: I ' m not a complete person (in keeping w i t h Kohut's ideas on the same issue). Only the former stimulus produced significant effects on subsequent measures of narcissism when compared to a neutral, control stimulus. I n another study, it was shown that subjects who are rated as highly defended sexually deny their own (supposedly repressed) sexual impulses after being exposed to pornographic stimuli, and that they attribute significant lustful qualities to the photographs of other individuals—i.e., they project their own repressed sexuality onto others. 10

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These studies reveal some of the assets and liabilities of this mode of science. O n the positive side, the statistical mode allows for quantified, controlled, and replicable experimentation—a great refinement i n methodology as compared to the domain mode. Specific hypotheses can be tested i n a variety of creative ways and i f sufficient negative evidence is found for a particular postulate, there would be good cause for reconsideration and revision (as yet, this has not actually materialized i n response to such investigations i n the psychoanalytic realm). Furthermore, quantitative observations may at times suggest new hypotheses and foster some revision i n current tenets; this too is as yet quite rare, but this mode of science is relatively new to the field. A t present, the statistical mode is a major tool of normal scientific investigations : it is laborious, repetitive, often microscopic if not trivial, and seldom able to produce surprising or powerful results. The statistical mode is more systematic than the domain one and has a number of more rigorous requisites that render it more reliable. A m o n g these are the specific requirements of quantification and measurement, controlled conditions, openness to verification or refutability, significant levels of results, and meaningful connectedness to other studies. Yet this same exactness of methodology has a stultifying effect i n that it promotes relatively trivial studies of a k i n d unlikely to change the field. 8

O n the whole statistical research, especially as now conducted, is global and involves data that summarize extended epochs of time—a long series of events—rather than using moment-by-moment observations. However, the same probabilistic Markov model or cross-correlation can be the consequence of an enormous number of different sequences of events. Thus, these studies involve the loss of a great deal of information and while they can indicate broad relationships, they cannot speak of causality and lawfulness. 1

Statistical studies tend to be relatively simple i n order to maintain sufficient controls, and they involve many different kinds of assumptions that are both open to question and difficult to substantiate. O n the clinical level, often there are great gaps between a theoretical construct and the research measures used to represent that construct. This is seen, for example, i n the assumptions that each of the two subliminal stimuli alluded to above i n the statistical test of competing theories of narcissism serve fairly and powerfully to represent a substantial aspect of the theories under consideration. The selection of representative variables is an issue i n all modes of science, but the problem is especially difficult to resolve on the level of statistics where simple measures must be used. Similar issues pertain to the implications 172

T h e T h r e e M o d e s o f t h e Science o f Psychoanalysis drawn f r o m the results of statistical studies; bold and highly questionable leaps are not uncommon. O n the deeper, mathematical level, statistics embodies a series of inherent or fundamental assumptions that may be at odds w i t h nature itself. Assumptions such as normality, identity of distribution, independence, et al., are open to question, yet they are basic to statistical research. M u c h of statistics involves linear relationships, when often real-world correlations are nonlinear; although this problem can be corrected, it greatly complicates and limits results from this level of science. Indeed, even i f the assumptions of statistics are valid, statistics, which evolved from agriculture, does not give information about natural processes—only the resultant of these processes. Natural processes are the subject matter of the formal mode of science and its mathematical methods. Overall, then, it is almost impossible to create a statistical, correlational or probabilistic experiment whose assumptions and implications are definitive. A t best these studies may accumulate more and more evidence that supports or refutes a particular aspect of the domain-mode approach to psychoanalytic theory, but a definitive or crucial, watershed experiment is exceedingly difficult to design and carry out. Indeed, i t has been aptly remarked that statistical forms of psychotherapy research have yet to significantly affect or alter basic psychoanalytic theory and practice. Statistics, while it gives dignity and controlled methodology to the field, seems to be too weak to exert a compelling influence. Creative change evidently must come f r o m unbiased imaginative scientists who use the domain-mode approach, or f r o m scientists who are tapping into previously unexplored regions, f r o m a formal-mode base. Statistics provides psychoanalysis w i t h a more solid foundation for the field than does a domain-mode approach, although the grossness and limitations of correlational studies again leave a great deal of room for biased results and erroneous conclusions. I t is highly unlikely that major revisions i n analytic theory and practice, or a major scientific revolution, will come from statistics. A healthy evolution of a science and its field requires a still stronger mode of science. Stochastic

Models

The transition to the third mode of science is mediated by an intermediary f o r m that we will consider under statistics because it falls short of the strictly predictive and mathematical ways of the formal mode—even though it introduces the use of mathematical equations. W e refer to stochastic m o d e l l i n g which shares w i t h the formal mode the requisite of time-series 173

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observations (as compared to the single-moment data o f most statistical methods), but falls short of the mode of formal methodology by being limited to post hoc mathematical models that characterize key aspects of the sequence of data points. Stochastic models pertain to deep properties of observables, but do not entail the definition of laws of nature—an exclusive feature of the formal mode. I n substance, stochastic models deal with phenomena i n terms of both deterministic and random factors; they provide probable representations for the time course of a target phenomenon. One of the most commonly used stochastic techniques are the B o x Jenkins models, which are configured by post hoc equations that define the trajectory o f a set o f observations over time i n terms o f two components. The first is termed a u t o r e g r e s s i v e , and refers to the extent to which a prior state predicts a subsequent state—i.e., the extent to which a system is sensitive to feed-forward effects and, therefore, shows resistance to change or inertia. The second component is termed m o v i n g average, and refers to the measurable effects of random shocks to the system generating the data. The nature of these disturbances can be determined through supplementary investigation. For example, we found a first application of the Box-Jenkins models for psychotherapy data by using them to characterize mathematically speakerduration time-series data—the number of seconds i n sequence that a patient and therapist s p o k e . The models indicated that i n most instances the dialogues between patients and therapists show a strong autoregressive component—prior-state sensitivity (i.e., the person speaking at a given second into a session is very likely to be the person speaking the next second). This finding speaks for deep stability. 11

12,13

Individual differences, which are relatively neglected i n statistical studies, come to the fore i n these models—e.g., patient/therapist systems vary i n respect to the size of their autoregressive parameter or the extent of prior state influence. I n addition, some systems cannot be characterized by a basic Box-Jenkins model, though more complex models go through well. These exceptions, which generally speak for instability, lend themselves for special study. This change f r o m general results to specific characterizations of the behavior of variables over time is critical for the much-needed shift of psychoanalysis as an Aristotelian science to one that is Galilean and postGalilean i n nature—a transformation promoted mainly through formal science efforts, to which we now turn. 13

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This third mode of science has until very recently been all but inconceivable for psychoanalysis. However, the shift to this mode is a major step that would move the field f r o m impressionism to definitive science. As yet, scientists steeped i n the domain mode have been able only to generate a variety of arguments designed to soften the implications of the absence of this scientific mode. The claim is made that the field is similar to anthropology where direct observation and historical reconstruction must prevail, and formal experimentation is all but impossible. The notion that psychoanalysis can be a science i n the sense that physics is a science has, to our knowledge, not appeared i n the literature. The use of mathematics, while creatively envisioned by a few w r i t e r s , ' has not been conceptualized i n a fashion that has lent itself to application i n the real world. I n substance then, it appears that psychoanalysts are at a loss as to how to conceive of and create a formal mode of science for the field. 1,2

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What, then, are the necessary requisites for a formal mode of science of psychoanalysis? They begin w i t h those shared with statistics: replicability, power of prediction, accessibility to nonconfirmation and refutation, and, of course, the use of measurement and quantified data. To these necessities are added a number of distinctive features: the use of observables that are meaningfully quantifiable on a moment-to-moment basis; the creation of a second-by-second time series for analysis so that the specific trajectory of a variable can be tracked over time (rather than summarized by a single number, as i n statistics); the application of mathematical treatments and models to these data (a s i n e qua n o n for this mode of science); and the search for deep regularities, constraints, and especially l a w s o f n a t u r e . As far as we know, our own work stands alone i n claiming to meet all of these criteria and to constitute a research program that has developed a formal mode of science for psychoanalysis. ' Though unexpected, the data for this mode are not drawn from laboratory studies but f r o m a wide range of psychotherapy consultations and ongoing treatment sessions—as well as emotionally laden dialogues and monologues outside of therapy. Thus, the expectations of writers like G r u n b a u m and Shulman, that scientific approaches to psychoanalysis will be developed outside of the treatment experience, are challenged by this work. 1,2 15

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types of emotionally charged dialogues and monologues as w e l l . This general relevance of formal-mode science results—the discovery of universal factors—distinguishes this mode from the other t w o ; the search is for general laws. Though drawn from the therapeutic situation, the findings from these psychoanalytic studies will have broad implications and not be limited to properties of psychotherapy per se. 1

However, once a basic law is discovered, individual differences come into play—another special feature of this mode of science. For example, the ways in which patient/therapist pairs adhere to the laws of the mind, i.e., of emotional communication, prove to be distinctive. I n our own work, there are many instances of such results. These arise from our investigations of the time-series behavior of five quantified variables chosen on the basis of communicative theory ' : (1) Newness of themes ( N T ) , (2) e x t e n t o f n a r r a t i v e i m a g e r y ( N I ) (3) p o s i t i v e l y toned themes and images ( P o s T ) , (4) n e g a t i v e l y toned themes and images ( N e g T ) , (5) c o n t i n u i t y o f d i a l o g u e ( C T Y ) . I n general, these items reflect choice of c o m m u n i c a t i v e v e h i c l e , rather than content, meaning, psychodynamics, and the like. They appear to reflect the vicissitudes of very basic properties of human expression, including the cyclical flow f r o m unconscious or encoded expression to material that has little or no encoded (derivative) valence. ' ' ' 1

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As a rule, the formal mode of science is founded on measurement of relatively mundane, ever-present variables that have a profound capacity to reflect critical aspects of nature. The science of physics was launched by measuring three simple dimensions: position, time, and mass. The variables on which our own formal mode of the science of psychoanalysis is grounded are commonplace aspects of emotional expression that fit these criteria— they are a far cry f r o m today's highly abstract psychoanalytic pronouncements. I t remains to be seen i f these same variables—or others, as yet u n k n o w n — w i l l help to forge a formal-mode version of developmental psychoanalysis as well. I t will also be of interest to see i f there are other dimensions of interactional psychoanalysis—of human communication— that will play a significant role i n this mode of science. Challenges like these are of a kind that typically open up new vistas for the field. T o cite an example of how psychotherapy data share features w i t h emotional dialogues, yet do so i n distinctive fashion, the general rule is for patients to visit about 120 different states of the 5-variable (5-dimensional) vector or Information Particle (IP) composed of scores f r o m the five variables that we have been studying. That is, patients use 120 different combinations of these five quantified scores i n the course of a session, therapists about 80. 176

T h e T h r e e M o d e s of the Science of Psychoanalysis Conversely, individuals engaged i n nontherapy coupled dialogues tend to both average about 100 states per dialogue; they are far more alike i n this regard than are patient/therapist pairings. A similar result is found w i t h cumulative work done by the force field that acts on the IPs i n the course of such dialogues: i n therapy, the value is greater for the patient as compared to that of the therapist (the exceptions to this rule appear to reflect therapist dysfunction), while lay people i n dialogue tend to have comparable amounts of work done on their IPs (the exceptions here would involve dialogues in which one party is especially silent; this too may be a sign of dysfunction). As can be seen, formal-mode science statements come from mathematically determined results; it is a mode that describes a world of phenomena and data—nature—as seen through mathematical windows. Statements from a scientist adhering to the formal mode involve deterministic regularities and constraints. Yet, as noted, individual tendencies exist within the confines of obeying the laws that have been uncovered. T o take a brief illustration f r o m physics, all bodies follow the law of gravity that speaks for the attraction of two bodies as a function of mass times distance squared. The result for any two bodies is consistent w i t h this law, yet individualized i n terms of the particular masses involved. L a w f u l n e s s i n d i v i d u a l l y obeyed is characteristic of the formal mode of science. I n our own w o r k i n the formal mode, we identified three laws of communication: (1) w o r k and (2) t e m p e r a t u r e , each separately defined mathematically f r o m quantified data taken f r o m the scores for the IP, a c c u m u l a t e over t h e course o f a n e m o t i o n a l l y charged d i a l o g u e as l i n e a r f u n c t i o n s o f time—i.e., there are equal increments of w o r k and temperature for each time epoch over a session; (3) c u m u l a t i v e e n t r o p y , is a l o g a r i t h m i c f u n c t i o n o f t i m e (specifically, 1 + time into a session). Yet each of these laws is followed in distinctive fashion by each patient, therapist, and lay person we have studied. Formal-mode propositions may reach deeper still, as seen i n the statement that human communication and the human mind adhere to the second law of thermodynamics—the law that closed systems show increasing degrees of complexity or entropy over time. This thesis stems from observations of the logarithmic increase i n entropy during a therapy session or emotional dialogue or monologue, e.g., within the closed system of a therapy session, complexity increases over time. Another such statement is to the effect that the informational or communicative force field is nonconservative, i.e., that the w o r k done to move a system f r o m one state to another is dependent on the path chosen f r o m the former to the latter (a property of the electromagnetic, but not the gravita177

T h e T h r e e M o d e s of the Science of Psychoanalysis patience and considerable tolerance of uncertainty; entry into any truly new territory is fraught w i t h anxiety and the formal mode of science is no exception to this rule. The difficulty to translate findings based on the formal-mode approach into domain-mode thinking varies. For example, it is relatively easy to grasp the finding that a patient's entropy or complexity, measured i n terms of the vicissitudes of the 5-vector I P (the complexity of the sequence of the five scores; see above) is, as a rule, greater than that of his or her therapist's. W e would expect a patient to use more communicative configurations than a therapist. But what are we to make of the strictly logarithmic growth of entropy, or the linear growth of work and temperature, as defined through measures that are analogous to those i n physics? The formal mode of science asks questions and explores levels of nature that are inconceivable and inaccessible to the two other modes. The formal-mode approach also changes our way of thinking about the fundamentals of psychoanalysis. I t seems of little importance i n the light of these developments to debate whether the fundamentals of the field involve transference, resistance, narcissism, conflict, and the like. W e are becoming aware that fundamentals should rather be seen i n terms of how and why we experience emotionally and communicate that experience to others. Only the formal mode of science can delve deeply into these issues. Results f r o m formal-mode investigations tend to be b o t h inordinately significant (despite the fact that they are based on reliable but human judgments) and readily replicated. (We await the time when teams other than our own replicate our own results, which we have already duplicated i n various settings—therapy and otherwise.) Where findings from the other two modes of science are quite soft—even statistical findings are difficult to confirm—those from the formal mode are strong and consistent. Where the domain mode of science allows for the widest conceivable range of observables, and statistics is restricted to phenomena that are measurable, the formal mode is even more limited i n the types of data it can deal w i t h . I n each mode, the selection of observables is grounded i n theory, intuition, and hypotheses selected for testing (areas for exploration). I t is not uncommon, however, for an observation or theory from one mode of science to stimulate research and advances i n another one. The formal mode of the science of psychoanalysis to which we lay claim came f r o m the communicative theory of psychoanalysis rooted i n the domain mode, and b o t h statistics and stochastics were used to obtain clues as to the best means through which to enter the formal mode of science. 179

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There is, of course, a trade-off i n all aspects of research. I n deciding on one set of variables to represent the complex phenomenon under study, all of the other possible variables are set aside. I n restricting formal science to the relatively commonplace, ever-present dimensions, the pay-back is that the formal mode of science, through the use of mathematical models, can bring entirely unforeseen insights and perspectives into the field. I n our own work, the energy distribution of the communicative force field—and the very conception of such a field—arose entirely through mathematical results. The profundity of this mode of science is awesome, the insights distinctly different f r o m those available i n the other two modes of science. Indeed, most results derived by formal-mode methods are impossible to anticipate from observations and theories constructed i n the other two modes of science. The formal mode has another advantage over the other two modes of science i n that it is, early on at least, unencumbered by the flaws and limitations of existing domain-mode science theory. For scientists working i n the formal mode there is no existing psychoanalytic theory of deep nature and no clinical prejudice to bias their efforts to observe nature. This mode works f r o m " b o t t o m u p " i n that it pertains to very basic elements that need to be transformed upward to higher-level concepts. The domain mode works in the opposite direction, f r o m " t o p d o w n . " Risk of error is greater w i t h the latter method, while reliability is characteristic of the former. Psychoanalysis has special problems i n endeavoring to develop a formal mode of science. Deep within, no therapist wishes to be studied quantitatively and w i t h mathematical models—the results are difficult to refute or rationalize away. I n addition, we have produced domain-mode and statistical evidence that reveals that the quest for deep truth i n the emotional area is especially hazardous and unwittingly opposed by most therapists. ' Everyone concerned w i t h therapy is deeply motivated to avoid anxiety-provoking realizations; resistance against the acceptance of formal-mode-of-science methods and propositions is to be expected. These problems make the development of a formal mode of science especially difficult for psychoanalysis. The deterrents are daunting, even though this mode is the sphere that holds the greatest possibility for the development of unprecedented findings, insights, and hypotheses, and is most likely to fuel the creation of truly new paradigms or even a scientific revolution. The protection and seeming support of existing theory and research models, the deep fear of change, the strangeness of the realm of formal science—each of these factors mobilizes great obstacles to this third mode of science. 1 2

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T h e T h r e e M o d e s of the Science of Psychoanalysis Psychoanalysts must be prepared for a wrenching experience forged by their own formal-mode approach to science. The language, measures, data, and theory derived f r o m the formal mode will be quite alien to existing ideas, yet the results will be far more reliable and secure than those obtained by the other two modes of science because the use of mathematics is almost immune to human manipulation and a single significant nonsupportive result immediately calls for revision i n prevailing theory. I n the formal-mode of science, the likelihood of success is relatively small—contrary to statistical studies, it is virtually impossible to anticipate results—but when success is achieved, the outcome tends to be remarkably innovative. I t is i n its powers of innovation and deep insight that the formal mode of science offers much that is valuable and special to the field. SUMMARY Three modes of the science of psychoanalysis are identified: (1) the d o m a i n mode is established when claim is laid for investigation of a distinctive area of nature for investigation. For psychoanalysis, this territory involves human adaptation, mentation, and communication i n the emotional arena. This mode essentially is one i n which a s c i e n t i f i c s p i r i t is central and gross, qualitative observation the source of data and theory; (2) the s t a t i s t i c a l mode is characterized by quantification (measurement), prediction, controlled study, and global correlational or probability methods. I n general, this mode of science serves to confirm, refute, or revise postulates derived from domain-mode observations. A n advanced aspect of this mode is termed stochastics, a form of science that deals w i t h events that are both random and deterministic, and which introduces post hoc mathematical equations that are probabilistic i n nature. (3) the f o r m a l mode is grounded i n moment-tomoment observations (time-series data); its results are defined entirely through mathematical treatments of quantified data. The unique quest i n this mode is for laws of nature. Each mode of the science of psychoanalysis is discussed for its actual and potential contributions to the field and for its limitations and pitfalls. Finally, the paper discusses aspects of recent research that has, we believe, established a heretofore absent formal mode of science for the field of psychoanalysis. REFERENCES 1. 2. 3. 4.

Langs, R., & Badalamenti, A. (in press). The physics o f t h e m i n d . New York: Ballantine. Langs, R. (in press). Science, systems, and t h e p r a c t i c e o f p s y c h o t h e r a p y . London: Karnac Books. Gardner, H . (1985). The m i n d ' s new science. New York: Basic Books. Freud, S. (1933). New introductory lectures on psycho-analysis. S t a n d a r d E d i t i o n , vol. 22, pp. 3-182.

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5 . Freud, S. (1940). A n outline of psycho-analysis. S t a n d a r d E d i t i o n , vol. 23, pp. 141-207. 6 . Langs, R. (1988). A p r i m e r of p s y c h o t h e r a p y . New York: Gardner Press. 7 . Langs, R. (1987). Psychoanalysis as an Aristotelian science.: Pathways to Copernicus and a modern-day approach. C o n t e m p o r a r y P s y c h o a n a l y s i s , 24:555-576. 8 . Kuhn, T. (1962). The s t r u c t u r e o f scientific r e v o l u t i o n . Chicago, I L : University of Chicago Press. 9 . Grunbaum, A. (1984) The f o u n d a t i o n o f p s y c h o a n a l y s i s : A p h i l o s o p h i c a l c r i t i q u e . Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. 1 0 . Shulman, D . (1990) The investigation of psychoanalytic theory by means of the experimental method. I n t e r n a t i o n a l J o u r n a l of P s y c h o - A n a l y s i s , 71:487-497. 1 1 . Box, E., & Jenkins, G. (1976). T i m e series a n a l y s i s : F o r e c a s t i n g and c o n t r o l . San Francisco, CA: Holden-Day. 1 2 . Langs, R., & Badalamenti, A. (1990). Stochastic analysis of the duration of the speaker role in psychotherapy. P e r c e p t u a l and M o t o r S k i l l s , 70:675-689. 1 3 . Badalamenti, A , & Langs, R. Stochastic and intervention analysis of the duration of the speaker role in the psychotherapy of an AIDS patient. A m e r i c a n J o u r n a l of P s y c h o t h e r a p y , 46:207-225. 1 4 . Langs, R. (1988). Mathematics for psychoanalysis. B r i t i s h J o u r n a l o f P s y c h o t h e r a p y , 5:204-212. 1 5 . Badalamenti, A , & Langs, R. (in press). Work and force in psychotherapy. M a t h e m a t i c a l and Computer Modelling.

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