Society for Radiological Protection J. Radiol. Prot. 34 (2014) 717–718
Journal of Radiological Protection doi:10.1088/0952-4746/34/3/717
Letter to the Editor
The siting of UK nuclear power stations Dear Sir In the Conclusions of the recent Review article (Grimston et al 2014) it implies that the policy of limiting population density around nuclear plant has endured. This is not quite so although it was the stated policy at the Sizewell B Inquiry. The planning authority, the Suffolk Coastal District Council (SCDC), told the Inquiry that only another 157 houses would be built in Leiston, which in effect referred to the whole of the old Leiston UDC area and not just the town. When the Inquiry was over and consent given for the building of Sizewell B, SCDC ‘turned a blind eye’ and encouraged the development of the town to such an extent that it has doubled in population, not by extending its boundaries but by packing in more properties into the few open spaces available. As a result I estimate the population density of the town is now about 6800 km−2, which is comparable to that of a London borough. I use the term ‘turned a blind eye’ because the policy statement made to the Inquiry has never been officially and publically withdrawn, nor has there been any technical case put forward for the change. Although Sizewell B started operating in 1997 the emergency planning is still based upon that for Sizewell A, which was shut down at the end of 2006. The maximum credible accident for that station was reckoned to be when the reactor, at full power, had a sudden loss of coolant. The predicted result was that up to 10 fuel channels, out of a total of 3784, would melt and release 10% of their radioactivity. On this basis it was thought that the public hazard would be unlikely to extend beyond 1.5 miles. This became known as the Detailed Emergency Planning Zone (DEPZ). No such assessment appears to have been done for Sizewell B but we do know that at Three Mile Island the accident due to loss of coolant resulted in a partial core meltdown. On that basis a maximum accident for Sizewell B would probably release something like 1000 times more radioactivity than for Sizewell A. Perhaps that is why no such assessment has been made and the DEPZ remains at 1.5 miles although there are proposals to reduce it. It is not just emergency considerations that go against building these massive nuclear power stations; the transmission process is another concern that has been overlooked. The current thoughts are that if Sizewell C is built then the power will be exported using the existing transmission lines. This would mean they would be carrying about 12 times the load that they carried for Sizewell A. This would increase the magnetic flux by that amount. A link between magnetic flux from transmission lines and cancer/leukaemia has not been established but I suspect that such research has not covered such intense flux. Our brains and bodies work with electric pulses and we know that electricity is affected by magnetic fields so there is a primary case for suspecting that such high flux levels could have health effects other than the cancers. There is another aspect of these heavily loaded transmission lines: it is their vulnerability to terrorist attack or natural disaster. The sudden loss of these lines could create problems for the nuclear stations feeding into them and also for the national grid system. I wrote my short, inexpensive novel The Day England Died to draw attention to this problem. 0952-4746/14/030717+2$33.00 © 2014 IOP Publishing Ltd Printed in the UK
717
Letters to the Editor
J. Radiol. Prot. 34 (2014) 717
Reference Grimston M, Nuttall W J and Vaughan G 2014 J. Radiol. Prot. 34 R1–24
Yours sincerely,
B Skelcher Leiston, Suffolk, UK E-mail: [email protected]
718
Copyright of Journal of Radiological Protection is the property of IOP Publishing and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use.
Journal of Radiological Protection doi:10.1088/0952-4746/34/3/717
Letter to the Editor
The siting of UK nuclear power stations Dear Sir In the Conclusions of the recent Review article (Grimston et al 2014) it implies that the policy of limiting population density around nuclear plant has endured. This is not quite so although it was the stated policy at the Sizewell B Inquiry. The planning authority, the Suffolk Coastal District Council (SCDC), told the Inquiry that only another 157 houses would be built in Leiston, which in effect referred to the whole of the old Leiston UDC area and not just the town. When the Inquiry was over and consent given for the building of Sizewell B, SCDC ‘turned a blind eye’ and encouraged the development of the town to such an extent that it has doubled in population, not by extending its boundaries but by packing in more properties into the few open spaces available. As a result I estimate the population density of the town is now about 6800 km−2, which is comparable to that of a London borough. I use the term ‘turned a blind eye’ because the policy statement made to the Inquiry has never been officially and publically withdrawn, nor has there been any technical case put forward for the change. Although Sizewell B started operating in 1997 the emergency planning is still based upon that for Sizewell A, which was shut down at the end of 2006. The maximum credible accident for that station was reckoned to be when the reactor, at full power, had a sudden loss of coolant. The predicted result was that up to 10 fuel channels, out of a total of 3784, would melt and release 10% of their radioactivity. On this basis it was thought that the public hazard would be unlikely to extend beyond 1.5 miles. This became known as the Detailed Emergency Planning Zone (DEPZ). No such assessment appears to have been done for Sizewell B but we do know that at Three Mile Island the accident due to loss of coolant resulted in a partial core meltdown. On that basis a maximum accident for Sizewell B would probably release something like 1000 times more radioactivity than for Sizewell A. Perhaps that is why no such assessment has been made and the DEPZ remains at 1.5 miles although there are proposals to reduce it. It is not just emergency considerations that go against building these massive nuclear power stations; the transmission process is another concern that has been overlooked. The current thoughts are that if Sizewell C is built then the power will be exported using the existing transmission lines. This would mean they would be carrying about 12 times the load that they carried for Sizewell A. This would increase the magnetic flux by that amount. A link between magnetic flux from transmission lines and cancer/leukaemia has not been established but I suspect that such research has not covered such intense flux. Our brains and bodies work with electric pulses and we know that electricity is affected by magnetic fields so there is a primary case for suspecting that such high flux levels could have health effects other than the cancers. There is another aspect of these heavily loaded transmission lines: it is their vulnerability to terrorist attack or natural disaster. The sudden loss of these lines could create problems for the nuclear stations feeding into them and also for the national grid system. I wrote my short, inexpensive novel The Day England Died to draw attention to this problem. 0952-4746/14/030717+2$33.00 © 2014 IOP Publishing Ltd Printed in the UK
717
Letters to the Editor
J. Radiol. Prot. 34 (2014) 717
Reference Grimston M, Nuttall W J and Vaughan G 2014 J. Radiol. Prot. 34 R1–24
Yours sincerely,
B Skelcher Leiston, Suffolk, UK E-mail: [email protected]
718
Copyright of Journal of Radiological Protection is the property of IOP Publishing and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use.
