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Bioethics ISSN 0269-9702 (print); 1467-8519 (online) Volume 29 Number 9 2015 pp 681–682

doi:10.1111/bioe.12175

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF PERSONAL IDENTITY FOR DEATH DUNCAN PURVES The concept of death is of central importance in bioethics. For instance, whether it is permissible to retrieve a patient’s organs for reallocation depends on whether the patient has died. On the face of it, the question of the concept of death seems closely related to questions of personal identity. Different theories of personal identity seem to yield different definitions of death. In this journal, David Shoemaker has argued that identity is, despite appearances, irrelevant for the concept of death.1 Shoemaker’s argument for this conclusion goes as follows. First, he assumes that most writers on personal identity reason in the following way to the conclusion that personal identity is important for the concept of death: 1. X exists only insofar as X’s numerical identity is preserved across time, i.e. X at t1 ceases to exist at or by t2 just in case there is no Y at t2 with whom X is numerically identical. 2. What preserves the identity of some individual across time is preservation of that individual’s essence {psychological continuity, mind, biological organism}. 3. If X ceases to exist, X dies. 4. Thus, if X’s essence {psychological continuity, mind, biological organism} is not preserved, X dies. Shoemaker: 487 I will assume along with Shoemaker that this argument represents the typical inference made by personal identity theorists regarding the importance of personal identity for death. Shoemaker points out (correctly to my mind) that premise 3 is false; ceasing to exist is not sufficient for death. A person can cease to exist without dying. Shoemaker’s reasons for rejecting premise 3 come from consideration of fission cases. “When one amoeba splits into two, it seems the original ceases to exist without dying. This is also true of the embryo that twins and the sci-fi person who enters the fission machine. In such cases, there is no Y at the time of the split, twinning, or fission with whom the original X is identical, precisely because uniqueness, an essential constituent of numerical identity, has been lost. Nevertheless, it seems bizarre to say that X died at that point, that fission killed him, given that everything else involved in ordinary survival remains completely intact” (Shoemaker: 487). 1

D. Shoemaker. The Insignificance of Personal Identity for Bioethics. Bioeth 2010; 9: 481–489.

In these cases it is even tempting to go so far as to say that the individual who splits survives (or at least that what matters survives) even though she ceases to exist. Of course, if the individual survives then she doesn’t die. Fission cases, let’s suppose with Shoemaker, are cases of ceasing to exist, but they are not cases of death. Shoemaker claims that the existence of fission cases, cases where someone ceases to exist without dying, reveal a ‘conceptual gap between ceasing to exist and dying.’ He then infers from the fact that there is a conceptual gap between ceasing to exist and dying that it is unlikely that personal identity – which is about the conditions under which an individual continues or ceases to exist – has any role to play in deciding the definition of death. Having shown that premise 3 of the above argument is false, Shoemaker concludes that personal identity is irrelevant to the concept of death. Shoemaker shows that personal identity can be lost without death occurring, but he infers from this the stronger conclusion that any conceptual gap between death and personal identity implies that personal identity is irrelevant for death. This strong conclusion is not warranted. The following argument establishes a weaker relationship between personal identity and death while retaining the relevance of personal identity for death. 1. X exists only insofar as X’s numerical identity is preserved across time, i.e. X at t1 ceases to exist at or by t2 just in case there is no Y at t2 with whom X is numerically identical. 2. What preserves the identity (i.e. existence) of some individual across time is (i) the preservation of that individual’s essence {psychological continuity, mind, biological organism} and (ii) the absence of fission. 3. If X dies then X ceases to exist. 4. If X dies then either (i) X dies because X’s essence is lost or (ii) X dies because X fissions.2 (From 2 and 3) 5. If X dies then X does not fission. (From Shoemaker’s examples) 6. Thus, if X dies then X’s essence is lost. (From 4, 5) Premise 1 is Shoemaker’s. Premise 2 claims that there are two and only two ways of losing personal identity. This premise is independently plausible, and it is consist2

I will assume, following Shoemaker, that X does not cease to exist in virtue of losing his essence when he fissions.

Address for correspondence: Dr. Duncan Purves, Center for Bioethics and Department of Environmental Studies, New York University, 285 Mercer Street, 10th Floor, New York, NY 10003, Phone: 212-992-7950. Email: [email protected] © 2015 John Wiley & Sons Ltd

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Duncan Purves

ent with Shoemaker’s arguments. Premise 3 is independently plausible. It simply states that all individuals go out of existence when they die, but, importantly, premise 3 does not state that all individuals die when they go out of existence.3 Premise 3 is therefore not susceptible to refutation by Shoemaker’s fission examples. Premise 4 follows logically from premises 2 and 3. Premise 5 is an explicit acknowledgement of the lesson drawn by Shoemaker from his fission cases. Cases where someone ceases to exist by fission are not cases of death. The conclusion follows logically from premises 4 and 5. Even taking into account Shoemaker’s examples concerning fission, an inference to the conclusion that the loss of essence is necessary for death is still warranted. We have simply learned from Shoemaker that the relation between death and personal identity is not quite what we thought: loss of essence is sufficient for loss of personal identity, loss of essence is merely necessary for death. Does the relationship between personal identity and death captured by the conclusion of my argument ensure the relevance of personal identity to the concept of death? I believe that it does succeed in ensuring the relevance of personal identity to the concept of death, because the relationship between death and essence captured by my conclusion is of both theoretical and practical signifi3 Eternalists such as Ben Bradley will deny that X ceases to exist simpliciter. They will contend that while it is no longer true that X exists now, X does exist in the past. This is unproblematic, for a theory of personal identity can remain neutral between theories of time. Eternalists can simply understand theories of personal identity to be providing conditions under which some presently existing object is numerically identical to some past object. B. Bradley. Well-being and Death. Oxford: Oxford University Press; 2009.

cance. We learn from the conclusion that in any case where death occurs, personal identity is lost.4 On its own, this is an interesting fact about the relationship between personal identity and death.5 But we learn another fact about the relationship between death and personal identity: that when death occurs, personal identity is lost in a particular way: through loss of essence. The conclusion can also be applied (indeed ought to be applied) in the medical arena. Consider a physician who must decide whether to declare a patient’s death for the purposes of organ retrieval. If the patient’s essence is preserved {psychological continuity, mind, biological organism}, then a physician should conclude – assuming that she has arrived at the correct theory of personal identity – that the patient has not died. Notice that the physician must have a theory of personal identity in hand in order to reach this conclusion. In cases where one of the necessary conditions for death, loss of essence, has not been satisfied, organ retrieval is not permitted.6 Duncan Purves is a Postdoctoral Fellow affiliated with the Bioethics Center and Environmental Studies Department at New York University. His areas of research include Ethical Theory, Bioethics, and Environmental Ethics, focusing especially on issues concerning death, wellbeing and our obligations to future generations. 4 This is consistent with the possibility that individual identity remains even after personal identity is lost. Fred Feldman for instance, has denied that that the ceasing to exist of the person entails the ceasing to exist of the individual. It is not clear what Feldman would say about the importance of his view for the ethics of organ retrieval. F. Feldman. The Termination Thesis. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2000; 24: 98–115. 5 I am unsure of whether its interest is ‘derivative’ or ‘non-derivative’, to use Shoemaker’s terminology. 6 The evidence would be decisive in favor of the verdict that the patient is still alive but for the possibility of fission, but the physician is presumably in a good position to determine whether fission has occurred.

© 2015 John Wiley & Sons Ltd

The Significance of Personal Identity for Death.

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