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British Journal of Social Psychology (2014), 53, 711–730 © 2014 The British Psychological Society www.wileyonlinelibrary.com

The political downside of dual identity: Group identifications and religious political mobilization of Muslim minorities Borja Martinovic* and Maykel Verkuyten Department of Interdisciplinary Social Science/Ercomer, Utrecht University, Utrecht, The Netherlands Research on the political mobilization of ethnic minorities has shown that dual ethno-national identification facilitates involvement in political action on behalf of the ethnic group. This study extends this research by proposing that a dual identity can impede political mobilization on behalf of another relevant in-group – the religious community – especially if this in-group is not accepted by the wider society. Using a sample of 641 Muslims of Turkish origin living in Germany and the Netherlands, dual ethno-national identity (Turkish-German/Turkish-Dutch) was examined in relation to religious Muslim identification and religious political mobilization. Dual identity was expected to be indirectly related to lower mobilization via decreased religious group identification. Further, this mediating process was predicted to be stronger for Turkish Muslims who perceived relatively high religious group discrimination. In both countries we found support for the mediating hypothesis, however, the moderating role of discrimination was confirmed only for the Netherlands. Turkish-Dutch identification was associated with lower support for religious political mobilization because of lower Muslim identification only for Turkish-Dutch participants who perceived high levels of discrimination. These findings indicate that a strong dual (ethno-national) identity can undermine minority members’ support for political rights and actions on behalf of a third relevant in-group, and therefore qualify the social psychological benefits of the dual identity model.

In their social psychological analysis of minority groups’ collective action, Simon and Klandermans (2001, p. 326) argue that a politicized collective identity is typically a dual identity in which minority members ‘acknowledge or even stress their identity as a member of that society because only by virtue of their membership in this more inclusive group or community are they entitled to societal support for their claims’. A minority’s dual identity functions as a politicized collective identity because of the combination of perceptions of injustice (derived from identification with the ethnic minority group) with feelings of entitlement (derived from identification with the wider society). Evidence for the unique mobilizing power of such dual identities has been found in cross-sectional and longitudinal studies among Turkish and other migrants in Germany (Simon & Grabow, 2010; Simon & Ruhs, 2008; Simon, Reichert, & Grabow, 2013) and the Netherlands (Klandermans, Van der Toorn, & Van Stekelenburg, 2008).

*Correspondence should be addressed to Borja Martinovic, Department of Interdisciplinary Social Science/Ercomer, Utrecht University, Padualaan 14, 3584 CH Utrecht, The Netherlands (email: [email protected]). DOI:10.1111/bjso.12065

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However, minorities, and particularly Muslims in Western Europe, do not only have to reconcile their ethnic and host national belonging but also need to manage their religious group membership that most clearly sets them apart from the host society. Research has shown that Muslim minorities do not only identify with their ethnic group and the host nation but also, and often strongly, with their religious group (e.g., Fleischmann, Phalet, & Klein, 2011; Verkuyten & Yildiz, 2007). Thus, a key question is how these immigrants’ dual ethno-national identification relates to their Muslim identification and religious political activism. This is a pressing issue because the focus of West European immigration and diversity debates is on Islam which is claimed to form a ‘bright boundary’ separating immigrants from the host societies (Alba, 2005; Zolberg & Long, 1999). That is, Muslims are singled out as prototypical outsiders, with Islam presented as incompatible with Western norms and values (see Kundnani, 2007; Scholten & Holhacker, 2009; Vasta, 2007; Verkuyten, 2013). In turn, Muslim citizens face negative stereotypes, public prejudice, and widespread distrust when it comes to political participation and recognition of minority rights (Helbling, 2012; Hindriks, Verkuyten, & Coenders, 2014; Sniderman & Hagendoorn, 2007). Thus, from a social justice perspective support for Muslim minority rights and political engagement is critical. Our aim was to extend the existing research on dual ethno-national identity and collective action (Klandermans et al., 2008; Simon & Grabow, 2010; Simon & Ruhs, 2008) by examining whether (and under what conditions) a strong dual identity may stand in the way of a religious identification that is known to be conducive to religious political mobilization (Fleischmann et al., 2011). We investigate the potential for a dual identity to undermine activism in terms of a religious identity among Turkish Muslims living in Germany and the Netherlands. We consider three aspects of religious political mobilization: endorsement of Muslim expressive rights, political organization of Islam, and the intention to defend Islam in normatively acceptable ways. In addition, we examine whether perceived religious group discrimination moderates the expected negative relationship between dual identity and religious identification.

Dual identity The focus on Islam in immigration and diversity debates in Western Europe means that Muslims’ Islamic background sets such immigrants apart from the historically Christian and secularized nature of their countries of settlement (Alba, 2005). In Germany and the Netherlands, and in contrast to the United States and the United Kingdom (Hopkins, 2011), self-identification as German/Dutch Muslim is rather exceptional (Verkuyten & Martinovic, 2012a). Instead, dual identification as Turkish-German/Turkish-Dutch is more common and we investigate if this might undermine a strong Muslim identity and thereby reduce religious political mobilization. For Muslim immigrants, ethnic and religious group identifications are typically strong and interconnected (Fleischmann et al., 2011; Verkuyten & Martinovic, 2012b; Verkuyten & Yildiz, 2007). Furthermore, being a Muslim tends to be considered as incompatible with a host national identification. Research in different European countries has found that higher Muslim group identification is associated with lower host national identification (Chryssochoou & Lyons, 2010; Fleischmann, 2011). This negative association is particularly strong for minorities that are united by and differ from the host nation in terms of both their ethnic and religious identities (Verkuyten & Martinovic, 2012b). These findings suggest that simultaneously identifying with the ethnic minority group and the host society could undermine a politicized Muslim identity.

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Wright and Baray (2012) argue that collective action is facilitated by the high salience of social categories and a negative moral characterization of the more powerful out-group (see also Stott & Drury, 2004). However, a dual identification may work against such beliefs. A dual ethno-national identity implies a feeling of belonging which can lead to perceiving greater similarity between the groups and a more positive characterization of the majority out-group. Moreover, a feeling of belonging to the host society implies that group boundaries are relatively permeable, which makes an individualistic social mobility path likely in which there is a dissociation from the devalued religious in-group (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Wright, Taylor, & Moghaddam, 1990). Also, dual identifiers tend to have more positive attitudes towards out-groups than single identifiers (Gonz
alez & Brown, 2003; Hornsey & Hogg, 2000), and this is probably partly due to higher levels of positive contact with out-group members (e.g., Gonz
alez & Brown, 2003, 2006). Studies in Israel, India, South Africa, and the USA have shown that positive contact is associated with more favourable attitudes towards the advantaged majority group and at the same time with reduced awareness of group inequality and decreased support for social change (Dixon, Durrheim, & Tredoux, 2007; Saguy, Tausch, Dovidio, & Pratto, 2009; Wright & Lubensky, 2009). Drawing on such work, we propose a dual identity might discourage a strong religious identity that forms the basis for religious political mobilization. As Wright and Lubensky (2009, p. 297) put it, a dual identity may not encourage ‘the maintenance of a subordinate identity in service of collective action, but rather helps garner the disadvantaged group’s participation in contact to improve intergroup attitudes’. The implication for the current study is that we can expect that a stronger dual identity (Turkish-German/Turkish-Dutch) would undermine religious (Muslim) identification and thus lead to diminished religious political mobilization. Empirical support for this prediction would extend Simon and Klandermans’ (2001) dual identity model to a third and highly important identity, and to mobilization on behalf of this third group.

Perceived discrimination Because of the relatively widespread prejudice and discrimination against Muslims in European societies (Helbling, 2012), Muslim identity has been considered a ‘spoiled identity’ (e.g., Kamans, Gordijn, Oldenhuis, & Otten, 2009). Discrimination signals that one’s minority identity is devalued and this can lead to dissociating oneself from the devalued minority group in order to gain acceptance by the majority. This is particularly likely to occur for minority members who have a sense of national belonging. For ethno-national dual identifiers, perceived discrimination against their religious group may lead to lower religious group identification and thereby leading to reduced religious political mobilization. Discrimination and the public distrust of the political participation of Muslim citizens (Hindriks et al., 2014; Sniderman & Hagendoorn, 2007) makes it difficult for someone who identifies as Turkish-Dutch to maintain a politicized Muslim identity. Religious group discrimination signals the failure to be accepted despite one’s sense of national belonging. This can make dual identity and religious group identification less compatible and thus lead to a reduced tendency to get involved in religious political mobilization. Dual identifiers may react to experiences of religious group discrimination by identifying less strongly with their religious group and thereby refrain from mobilizing on the basis of their stigmatized Muslim identity (Fleischmann et al., 2011). This leads to the hypothesis that the expected relationship between dual identity and religious group identification would be more negative for Muslim minority members who perceive higher religious discrimination.

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The current study In Germany and the Netherlands, people of Turkish origin are the largest, and among the least accepted, minority groups. They also have similar histories of labour migration and similarly low socioeconomic positions. Yet, Germans are less accepting of Muslims than people in other Western European countries, including the Netherlands (Pollack, 2010; Van der Noll, 2014). For example, in Germany there is more opposition to the wearing of the Muslim headscarf and the establishment of new mosques than in countries such as France, Denmark, and the Netherlands. So too, there is less willingness to concede equal rights to minority religions. Furthermore, Turkish Muslims report more experiences of discrimination in Germany than in the Netherlands and the position of Islamic organizations is less established in the former than the latter country (Fleischmann & Phalet, 2012). In addition, it has been found that religiosity and integration in the host society are related negatively in Germany but not in the Netherlands (Fleischmann & Phalet, 2012). This suggests that in Germany, compared to the Netherlands, Turkish minorities have fewer possibilities to change the position of the Muslim group as a whole. This might mean that the more integrated they are in terms of their dual ethno-national identity, the more they will disassociate themselves from the stigmatized Muslim in-group. For these reasons, we can expect the association between dual identity and Muslim identification to be more negative in Germany than in the Netherlands. In testing the hypotheses, we followed Simon and Ruhs (2008) in using a direct measurement strategy for assessing the psychological experience of dual identity in terms of the ethnic (Turkish) and host national category (German/Dutch). Turkish and Dutch/ German identities are from a similar domain and can be represented in hyphenated form that indicates both origin and destination (Turkish-Dutch/German). Research on intersectionality has argued and shown that social categories like ethnicity, gender, and social class often depend on each other for meaning (Cole, 2009; Greenwood, 2012). Dual identity does not refer to one’s thoughts and feelings about each constituent group separately, like two component identifications that are subsequently combined by a multiplicative product term in statistical analysis. Rather, the phenomenology of dual identity should be understood as ‘a unitary category that has emerged subsequent to immigration and that is seen as distinct from either of the original categories’ (Wiley & Deaux, 2011, p. 52). Indeed, research has shown that dual identity has a unique role in the political mobilization of minorities over and beyond the two group identifications separately and their statistical interaction term (Simon & Grabow, 2010; Simon & Ruhs, 2008). Accordingly, in our analyses we followed Simon and Grabow’s (2010) example in controlling for the two separate components of dual identification – ethnic and host nation identification – in order to assess the independent role of dual identity in religious political mobilization.

Method Sample Data were collected in 2008 from 699 participants of Turkish origin living in the Netherlands (53%) and Germany (47%). They were recruited by means of snowball sampling, with four chains being initiated in each country. In an open-ended question, the participants described themselves as Muslim, with 66% self-identified as Sunni, and 34% as Alevi. All had a father and mother of Turkish background and were born in the

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Netherlands/Germany (29%) or had moved to one of these countries (71%) on average 21.5 years ago (SD = 10.36). In all, 45% of the participants were women and 55% were men. Aged between 15 and 84, their mean age was 36 (SD = 12.65). A proportion of 45% of the sample officially had Turkish nationality (i.e., passport), 28% Dutch or German nationality, and 27% a dual Turkish-Dutch or Turkish-German nationality. Twenty-five percent had completed no education or only attended primary school, while 23% had a tertiary-level degree. Comparing the German and Dutch samples showed their ages (MGER = 34, MNL = 37) and length of stay in the host country (MGER = 22, MNL = 23) were similar, but the German sample was somewhat more highly educated, MGER = 4.61, MNL = 3.98, t(639) = 3.66, p < .001 (a score of 4 corresponds to lower secondary-level education). The gender and religious subgroup distributions were comparable in the two countries, but more participants in the German sample (62%) had host country nationality than in the Netherlands (49%), v2(1) = 10.61, p < .01.

Measures Three aspects of religious political mobilization were examined: support for political organization of Islam, support for Muslim expressive rights, and willingness to engage in normative political actions to defend Islam.

Political organization of Islam Four questions assessed the extent to which Muslims should be politically organized in the Netherlands (see Verkuyten & Yildiz, 2007, 2010): ‘It is important for Muslims that an Islamic political party is established in the Netherlands/Germany’, ‘Muslims have to start to work together in order to gain political influence in the Netherlands/Germany’, ‘Islam must have a voice in political issues, just like other religions’, and ‘Politics should be based on Islam’. Answers ranged from 1 (disagree strongly) to 7 (agree strongly). The items formed a reliable scale (Cronbach’s a = .81).

Muslim expressive rights Four items assessed the endorsement of the rights for Muslims to publicly express their identity: ‘Muslims have the right to show and express their religion in public life’, ‘The right to establish our own Islamic schools should always exist in the Netherlands/ Germany’, ‘Dutch/German TV should broadcast more programs by and for Muslims’, and ‘In the Netherlands/Germany the wearing of a headscarf should certainly not be forbidden’. These items have been successfully used in previous Dutch studies (e.g., Verkuyten & Yildiz, 2007, 2010). Responses were assessed with 7-point scales (Cronbach’s a = .85).

Normative political action After a short introduction in which reference was made to the Danish cartoons of the Prophet Mohammed and national debates about the deportation of orthodox imams and the closing of mosques, the participants indicated which of the following means they would use in Germany/the Netherlands to help defend Islam against these ‘attacks’: ‘Participate in a petition’, ‘Join a protest march’, and ‘Donate money for campaigns’. Answer possibilities ranged from (1) ‘certainly not’ to (5) ‘certainly’ (Cronbach’s a = .91).

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Whereas the first two measures of political mobilization (Political organisation of Islam and Muslim expressive rights) capture the desirability of achieving a specific group goal, the third measure (Normative political action) captures participants’ potential for personal involvement via concrete means. The main independent variable dual identity can be measured in different ways (e.g., Hopkins, 2011). For example, a dual identity can be conceptualized in terms of identity compartmentalization and alternation in which the context determines which aspect of the duality predominates. Or, it can be conceptualized in terms of fusion and blending. On the basis of pilot interviews with Turkish Muslims and items developed by Benet-Mart
ınez and Haritatos (2005), we presented the participants with five items (7-point scales) capturing both of these conceptualizations: ‘I feel Turkish-Dutch/Turkish-German’, ‘For me it is simple: In one situation I feel Dutch/German and in another Turkish’, ‘I feel at home with Turks and with the Dutch/Germans’, ‘Among Turks and among the Dutch/ Germans I can really be myself’, and ‘I feel like I am both: Dutch/German and Turkish’. These items formed a reliable scale (Cronbach’s a = .80). Furthermore, confirmatory factor analysis showed a clear single factor with loadings ranging between .57 and .72. In addition, although a two-factor model in which the first and the fifth items (‘blended duality’) were made to load on a new factor had a somewhat better fit, as indicated by a significant chi-square difference test, Dv2 = 30, Ddf = 8, p < .001, the other fit indices remained unchanged. Therefore, we used a single measure with all five items. However, in order to check the robustness of our results we also estimated our structural model with only the two ‘blended duality’ items. As we will show later, the results are robust regardless of the measure employed. The mediator in the relationship between dual identification and political action – Muslim group identification – was assessed with five items (7-point scales) referring to the strength and importance of religious identity previously used in studies on Muslim minorities (Verkuyten & Yildiz, 2007, 2010). Sample items are ‘My Muslim identity is an important part of me’, ‘I identify strongly with Muslims’, and ‘Being a Muslim is the most important thing in my life’ (Cronbach’s a = .94). The moderator of the association between dual identification and Muslim identification – Perceived discrimination – was measured by four items (7-point scales) referring to religious discrimination against Muslims in Germany/the Netherlands (see Verkuyten & Yildiz, 2007). The items are ‘Muslims are often discriminated against when looking for a job or internship’, ‘Muslims are often discriminated against in cafes and clubs’, ‘Muslims are often discriminated against in daily life’, and ‘Over the years discrimination of Muslims has increased’ (Cronbach’s a = .84). In order to test whether dual identity independently predicted political mobilization our analysis controlled for the ethnic and host nation identification. Ethnic identification was measured using the following four questions (7-point scales) about the strength of belonging to one’s ethnic group: ‘I identify strongly with my cultural group’, ‘I am attached to my cultural group’, ‘I am proud of my cultural background’, and ‘I feel connected to the people from my cultural group’. It was made clear to the participants that by ‘cultural group’ we meant Turks (Cronbach’s a = .90). Host nation identification was measured with similar items referring to identification with the Dutch/German group (Cronbach’s a = .85). Other control variables included standard demographic characteristics such as gender (0 = man, 1 = woman), age (measured continuously in years), and education (ranging from 1 = no education to 8 = university degree), as well as minority-specific characteristics host country nationality (0 = no, 1 = yes) and length of stay in the host country

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(measured in years) that were used in previous research on political mobilization of immigrant groups (Simon & Grabow, 2010; Simon & Ruhs, 2008). We also controlled for religious subgroup (0 = Alevi, 1 = Sunni) and country differences (0 = Netherlands, 1 = Germany). Five hundred and seventy-nine participants answered all the items used in this study. Sixty-two participants had occasional missing values, and we imputed these using the expectation maximization algorithm. The remaining 58 participants had missing values on the items measuring the dependent variable. Therefore the final sample consisted of 641 Turkish Muslims, 295 living in Germany, and 346 in the Netherlands.

Results Descriptive findings Descriptive statistics are shown in Table 1. Independent sample t-tests indicated that the mean scores on religious identification, t(639) = 3.62, p < .001, discrimination, t(639) = 4.27, p < .001, and Muslim expressive rights, t(639) = 4.48, p < .001, were significantly higher in Germany. Scores on the scale measuring political organization of Islam, t(639) = 2.01, p < .001 were, on the other hand, significantly higher in the Netherlands. Levels of dual identification, t(639) = 1.90, p > .05, and normative political action, t(639) = 0.10, p > .05, did not differ between the two countries. In both countries the three dependent variables were positively correlated with each other. In addition, both higher perceived discrimination and Muslim identification were associated with stronger support for religious political mobilization. In Germany, dual identity was negatively related to Muslim identification and to the three forms of political mobilization. In the Netherlands, however, these constructs varied independently. Moreover, in the Netherlands dual identity was positively related to both ethnic and host national identification, while in Germany it was positively related to host national identification and negatively to ethnic identification. This suggests that in the Netherlands the dual identity measure captures a dual sense of belonging, whereas in Germany identification as Turkish-German reflects a strong national and weak ethnic identity.

Measurement model Confirmatory factor analysis using Mplus was employed to determine whether an empirical distinction could be made between the proposed eight constructs (including ethnic and host nation identification). An eight-factor model had an acceptable fit, with CFI = .91, TLI = .90, and RMSEA = .064. The chi-square was significant, v2(467) = 1,700, p < .001, as is often the case with large samples (Kline, 2005). The loadings of the items on their respective latent factor were >.58. Because of the relatively high correlation between political organization of Islam and support for Muslim expressive rights (r = .68, p < .001), we checked whether a seven-factor solution in which the items measuring these two constructs were combined into a single factor fitted the data better. This was not the case. A model with seven factors yielded a worse fit, as indicated by a significant chi-square difference test, Dv2 = 166, Ddf = 7, p < .001. Further, making ethnic or national identification load together with dual identity significantly worsened the model fit (Dv2 = 1,095, Ddf = 7, p < .001 and

1 0.79*** 0.61*** 0.66*** 0.31** 0.54*** 0.40*** 0.46***

0.57*** 1 0.55*** 0.72*** 0.39*** 0.58*** 0.44*** 0.49***

2 0.35*** 0.30*** 1 0.51*** 0.22** 0.41*** 0.25*** 0.33***

3 0.54*** 0.44*** 0.28*** 1 0.30*** 0.54*** 0.27*** 0.42***

4 0.07 0.09 0.02 0.14** 1 0.26*** 0.19** 0.65***

5 0.28*** 0.31*** 0.12* 0.30*** 0.19*** 1 0.25*** 0.32**

6 0.22*** 0.04 0.09 0.33*** 0.33*** 0.32*** 1 0.23***

7 0.13* 0.07 0.05 0.08 0.52*** 0.14** 0.16** 1

8

Note. Subscript ‘NL’ refers to the Netherlands and ‘GER’ to Germany. All variables were measured on a 7-point scale, except for normative political action, which was measured on a 5-point scale. *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.

1. Muslim expressive rights 2. Political organization 3. Normative political action 4. Muslim identification 5. Dual identity 6. Group discrimination 7. Ethnic identification 8. Host nation identification

1

3.95 3.83 3.28 4.15 4.31 4.23 4.69 4.23

MNL

1.42 1.30 1.04 1.55 1.27 1.36 1.49 1.26

SDNL

4.54 3.58 3.29 4.66 4.50 4.70 5.74 3.73

MGER

1.91 1.85 1.45 2.01 1.27 1.45 1.30 1.56

SDGER

Table 1. Means, standard deviations, and correlations for the measures in the Netherlands (N = 346, above the diagonal) and Germany (N = 295, below the diagonal)

718 Borja Martinovic and Maykel Verkuyten

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Dv2 = 358, Ddf = 7, p < .001, respectively). The fit also worsened when ethnic identification was forced to load together with Muslim identification (Dv2 = 1,505, Ddf = 7, p < .001), indicating that feeling Turkish and feeling Muslim are two separate identity constructs. A multiple group confirmatory factor analysis showed that in both Germany and the Netherlands an eight-factor model was supported. The same factor structure was found and the factor loadings were positive and high for all the items. However, the model which constrained each factor loading to be equal across countries, v2(959) = 2,355, p < .001, CFI = .90, TLI = .89, RMSEA = .067, had a worse fit than the unconstrained model, v2(934) = 2,279, p < .001, CFI = .90, TLI = .89, RMSEA = .067; Dv2 = 76, Ddf = 25, p < .001. This suggests that some of the item loadings differ in Germany and the Netherlands, raising the question of whether the latent constructs are measured equally well in both national contexts and whether our structural model can be compared across countries. After relaxing the most divergent loadings – the ones on the last item of dual identity, the second item of discrimination and the third item of ethnic identification – a fit similar to that of the unconstrained model was found, v2(956) = 2,308, CFI = .90, TLI = .89, RMSEA = .066; Dv2 = 29, Ddf = 22, p > .05. This means that the latent constructs of dual identity, discrimination and ethnic identification are partially invariant across the two national contexts. All the other constructs showed full measurement invariance. Importantly, each of our partially invariant constructs contained just one item that differed in its loadings in the two countries, and at least three items that had equal loadings. Moreover, the unconstrained items loaded high on their respective factors, albeit higher in Germany (.78, .81, and .86) than in the Netherlands (.57, .67, and .69). Across all factors, the lowest item loading for the Netherlands was .51 and for Germany .62. Therefore, we felt confident to proceed with estimating structural relations using data from both countries.

Structural model of religious political mobilization for the overall sample We estimated a path model of religious political mobilization with dual identity as a core independent variable and Muslim identification as a mediator. We wanted to see whether dual identity was associated with lower Muslim identification and indirectly with lower religious political mobilization. As we expected the path from dual identity to Muslim identification to depend on perceived discrimination, our model included a latent interaction between dual identity and perceived discrimination on Muslim identification. Direct paths from dual identity and discrimination to the three types of political mobilization were also estimated, and we controlled for the demographic variables (including country) as well as for ethnic and host nation identification and their latent interaction on the political mobilization variables. The interaction between dual identity and discrimination on Muslim identification was negative and significant, B = .210, t = 3.40, p < .001, confirming that dual identity was more negatively associated with Muslim identification when perceived discrimination was higher. The main effects of dual identity and discrimination on Muslim identification were, respectively, B = .146, t = 1.98, p < .05 and B = .746, t = 10.44, p < .001. Muslim identification, in turn, was positively and significantly related to political organization of Islam, B = .244, t = 7.50, p < .001, Muslim expressive rights, B = .421, t = 9.89, p < .001, and normative political action, B = .216, t = 5.92, p < .001. These findings are in line with our expectations. The remaining associations of dual identity,

.234 (.059)***

.110 (.088)

.123 (.036)***

.115 (.034)***

.006 (.058)

.018 (.026)

.000 (.004)

.003 (.007)

.076 (.121) 1.581 (.140)*** .005 (.027) .007 (.005) .106 (.098) .236 (.107)*

.152 (.121) .238 (.064)***

.212 (.079)** .273 (.049)***

.532 (.077)*** 1.003 (.100)*** .031 (.018) .002 (.003) .031 (.067) .006 (.072)

.421 (.043)***

Muslim expressive rights

.244 (.033)***

*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.

Muslim identification Dual identity Group discrimination Control variables Ethnic identification Host identification Ethnic 9 Host identification Germany Sunnis Education Age Women Host nationality Length of stay

Political organization of Islam

Total sample (N = 641)

.010 (.005)

.165 (.099) .959 (.120)*** .022 (.022) .013 (.005)** .159 (.082) .068 (.091)

.082 (.031)**

.053 (.073)

.027 (.047)

.070 (.102) .082 (.054)

.216 (.036)***

Normative political action

.001 (.006)

– 1.084 (.147)*** .002 (.024) .002 (.005) .173 (.091) .043 (.097)

.004 (.037)

.072 (.095)

.083 (.052)

.211 (.120) .255 (.059)***

.193 (.051)***

Political organization of Islam

.013 (.008)

– 1.324 (.198)*** .002 (.033) .000 (.006) .101 (.126) .229 (.131)

.146 (.050)**

.309 (.140)*

.151 (.080)

.156 (.157) .205 (.077)**

.409 (.064)***

Muslim expressive rights

.010 (.006)

– .627 (.150)*** .017 (.024) .014 (.005)** .278 (.099)** .181 (.113)

.099 (.045)*

.034 (.095)

.120 (.057)*

.092 (.107) .047 (.062)

.165 (.048)***

Normative political action

The Netherlands (N = 346)

.005 (.007)

– .892 (.142)*** .064 (.031)* .009 (.005) .122 (.107) .084 (.122)

.003 (.055)

.011 (.095)

.203 (.061)***

.206 (.123) .276 (.070)***

.328 (.042)***

Political organization of Islam

.012 (.012)

– 1.690 (.221)*** .028 (.042) .012 (.009) .103 (.144) .134 (.194)

.041 (.155)

.012 (.155)

.198 (.099)*

.182 (.204) .278 (.100)**

.410 (.058)***

Muslim expressive rights

Germany (N = 295)

Table 2. Regression of three aspects of political mobilization for the whole sample and for the Netherlands and Germany separately

.005 (.010)

– 1.230 (.192)*** .101 (.039)** .007 (.007) .061 (.134) .101 (.155)

.094 (.081)

.216 (.179)

.058 (.085)

.332 (.242) .112 (.094)

.253 (.056)***

Normative political action

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discrimination and the control variables with the political mobilization variables are presented in Table 2.

Comparing countries We estimated the path model with latent interactions separately for Germany and the Netherlands using country as a moderating variable (Figure 1). In both countries, Muslim identification was associated with more support for political organization of Islam, Muslim expressive rights and normative political action. In the Netherlands we found support for the hypothesis concerning the moderating role of perceived discrimination on the association between dual identity and Muslim identification. The latent interaction was negative and significant, indicating that dual identity was more negatively associated with Muslim identification at higher levels of perceived discrimination. In Germany the

Figure 1. Structural multi-group model with country as a grouping variable. Note. Unstandardized coefficients with standard errors in the brackets. Correlations between the dependent variables are included by default. The model controls for ethnic and host national identification and their latent interaction, in addition to the demographic control variables, in relation to the dependent variables. Direct effects of discrimination on the mediator and the three dependent variables, and of dual identification on the three dependent variables, are also included in the model.

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interaction was not significant; dual identification was related to lower Muslim identification irrespective of perceived discrimination.

Muslim identification as a mediator The main advantage of the latent interaction models presented above is that they use all the variation available in the scores on items measuring dual identification and discrimination. In addition, these models control for the association between discrimination and political religious mobilization, which is important given that discrimination is a well-documented predictor of collective action (Van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008). However, latent interaction models are not easy to interpret (e.g., no information on simple slopes is available), and they are less convenient for estimating moderated indirect effects. Therefore, in order to test whether dual identity is related to religious political mobilization via reduced Muslim identification for participants who perceive high religious discrimination, we performed a multi-group analysis in which a distinction was made between those reporting lower and higher perceived discrimination by means of a median spilt (per country). Moreover, because the latent interaction models showed that discrimination modifies the association between dual and Muslim identification in the Netherlands but not in Germany, we also looked at the countries separately. This means that our multi-group model consisted of four groups: low (N = 162) and high (N = 184) perceived discrimination in the Netherlands, and low (N = 146) and high (N = 149) perceived discrimination in Germany (Figure 2). We again controlled for ethnic and host nation identification and their interaction, as well as demographic characteristics, in relation to the dependent variables political organization of Islam, Muslim expressive rights and normative political action.1 To test whether the coefficients for the paths depicted in Figure 2 differ significantly between the four groups, we first estimated a model in which all the paths were constrained to be equal in all groups. The fit of the constrained model was then compared to the fit of the models in which specific paths were allowed to vary between groups. If a model with an unconstrained path has a better fit, this is evidence for a moderated relationship. The fit statistics of the fully constrained model were v2(1,368) = 2,780.02, p < .001, CFI = .84, TLI = .82, RMSEA = .079. The model in which we allowed the coefficient for the association between dual identity and Muslim identification to be different in the low discrimination group in the Netherlands had a significantly better fit than the constrained model, Dv2 = 57.44, Ddf = 1, p < .001. Releasing this association for the low discrimination group in Germany did not further improve the model fit. Thus, the association between dual identity and Muslim identification could be treated as identical in all groups but the low discrimination group in the Netherlands. The model fit was further improved by relaxing the constraint on the association between Muslim identification and political organization of Islam for the high perceived discrimination group in Germany, Dv2 = 12.38, Ddf = 1, p < .001. This relationship was identical in the remaining three groups. Relaxing any further constraints did not additionally improve model fit. This means that there are two significant three-way interaction effects.

1 In the model that estimates indirect effects we had to compute an interaction term using centred scores on these two constructs instead of a latent interaction between ethnic and host nation identification.

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Figure 2. Moderated mediation model with discrimination and country as grouping variables. Note. Unstandardized coefficients with standard errors in the brackets. Correlations between the dependent variables are included by default. The model controls for ethnic and host national identification (centred) and their interaction, in addition to the demographic control variables, in relation to the dependent variables. Direct effects of dual identification on the three dependent variables are also included in the model. Coefficients that are exactly the same have been constrained.

In both countries the associations between Muslim identification and the three types of political mobilization were always positive and significant (see Figure 2), but only in Germany were Muslim identification and political organization of Islam more strongly associated among individuals who perceived discrimination against Muslims. Further, the association between dual identity and Muslim identification was negative and significant in Germany irrespective of the level of perceived discrimination, whereas in the Netherlands this association was significantly positive for participants in the low discrimination group and significantly (and equally as in Germany) negative for those in the high discrimination group.2 As we were interested in mediation via Muslim identification, we estimated indirect effects for each group. The indirect effects of dual identity on the three political mobilization variables via Muslim identification were all negative and significant in Germany regardless of the level of discrimination. Yet, as the path from Muslim identification to political organization of Islam was more positive for participants with perceptions of higher discrimination, we obtained two values for the indirect effect of dual identity on political organization of Islam: for lower discrimination group, B = .070, t = 4.77, p < .001, for higher discrimination group, B = .146, t = 4.53, p < .001. For the remaining two political mobilization variables the indirect effects were the same for the low and high discrimination groups: B = .132, t = 5.20, p < .001 for Muslim expressive rights and B = .072, t = 4.59, p < .001 for normative political action. In the Netherlands, for the group perceiving higher levels of discrimination the indirect effects were also negative and identical to those in the low discrimination group in Germany (the coefficients for all the hypothesized relationships were comparable in these two groups and therefore set to be equal). For the group perceiving lower levels of discrimination, the indirect effects were all positive: political organization of Islam, B = .092, t = 4.43, p < .001; Muslim expressive rights, B = .173, t = 4.81, p < .001; normative political action, B = .095, t = 4.31, p < .001. Thus, in Germany, dual identity was negatively related to religious political mobilization via lower Muslim identification regardless of the level of perceived religious discrimination. In the Netherlands, this association depended on the level of discrimination: for those perceiving lower levels of discrimination, dual identity was associated with more religious political mobilization via increased Muslim identification, whereas

2 We also estimated a multi-group model using only the two ‘blended’ items of dual identity (‘I feel Turkish-Dutch/ Turkish-German’, ‘I feel like I am both: Dutch/German and Turkish’). The findings were the same. The association between dual and Muslim identification was negative in Germany (irrespective of discrimination) and in the Netherlands for the high discrimination group, B = .401, t = 6.47, p < .001. For the low discrimination group in the Netherlands the coefficient was positive, B = .609, t = 5.22, p < .001. Similar findings were found in an analysis using only the ‘situational’ dual identity items. The findings are thus robust irrespective of the dual identity items used.

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for those perceiving higher levels of discrimination, dual identity was negatively related to Muslim identification, and thereby to lower support for religious political mobilization.3

Discussion This article provides novel insights into the role of dual identity in the political mobilization of disadvantaged minority groups. Previous research has demonstrated that dual ethno-national identity is an important motor of political action on behalf of the ethnic group (Klandermans et al., 2008; Simon & Grabow, 2010; Simon & Ruhs, 2008). We extended this reasoning and argued that such a dual identity can at the same time discourage the maintenance of a strong third (religious) identity, thereby undermining support for religious political mobilization (Wright & Lubensky, 2009). Our findings are in support of this reasoning and therefore this study is one of the first to demonstrate the political downside of dual identities (see also Simon et al., 2013). Most researchers argue for the social psychological benefits of a dual identity for disadvantaged group members (but see Baysu, Phalet, & Brown, 2011). Such an identity is considered beneficial because it affirms the value and distinctiveness of the subgroup identity in the context of connection with the majority group. However, many minorities, and certainly Muslims in Western Europe, do not only develop a sense of ethnic and host national belonging but also need to manage their religious group membership that most clearly sets them apart from the host society (Alba, 2005). From a social justice perspective, the widespread public prejudice against Muslims, and their disadvantaged position in West European societies (see Helbling, 2012), makes support for Muslim minority rights and religious political engagement critical. But these negative conditions can also make it difficult to combine a sense of religious and host national belonging. Rather, national belonging in the form of an ethno-national identity may lead to a distancing from one’s religious group. Thus, the political downside of a sense of dual ethno-national identity is that it discourages a strong religious group identification that is pivotal for religious political mobilization and collective action support (Van Zomeren et al., 2008). Furthermore, perceived religious group discrimination can make dual identity and religious group identification less compatible because it signals the failure to be accepted despite one’s sense of national belonging. Dual identifiers may react to experiences of religious group discrimination by identifying less strongly with their religious group and thereby refrain from mobilizing on the basis of their stigmatized Muslim identity (Fleischmann et al., 2011). A negative identity instigates identity management strategies. For dual ethno-national identifiers, the ethno-national group boundaries are relatively

3 Following Simon and Ruhs (2008), we controlled for ethnic and host nation identification, and their interaction, in predicting religious political mobilization to show that it is dual identity and not one of its components that guides mobilization. However, a more rigorous test of the role of dual identification would include ethnic and host nation identification and their interaction also in relation to the mediator (Muslim identification). We estimated such a model and discovered that, in contrast to the model presented in Figure 2, in Germany the association between dual identity and Muslim identification was in both discrimination groups negative but no longer significant, B = .053, t = 0.46, p > .05. This is because host nation identification turned out to be the more important predictor of low Muslim identification in Germany, both for Turkish Muslims perceiving lower and higher discrimination (respectively, B = .348, t = 2.78, p < .01; and B = .213, t = 2.08, p < .05). For the Netherlands we replicated the findings from Figure 2. This suggests that in the Netherlands dual identity reflects a real sense of duality of belonging, and is on its own predictive of Muslim identification (and indirectly of religious political mobilization), whereas in Germany dual identification primarily reflects high host nation identification.

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permeable which means that they tend to respond to discrimination with an individualistic social mobility strategy in which they dissociate themselves from the devalued religious in-group (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Wright et al., 1990). In agreement with the social psychological literature on collective action (see Van Zomeren et al., 2008), we found that higher Muslim group identification was related to stronger endorsement of Muslim expressive rights, stronger support for the political organization of Islam, and stronger intention to defend Islam in normatively acceptable ways. Furthermore, higher dual identity was related to lower Muslim group identification for Turkish-Dutch and Turkish-Germans who perceived high discrimination against Muslims, and this lower Muslim identification in turn mediated the association between dual identity and support for religious political mobilization. Thus, we showed in two national contexts that under conditions of discrimination a dual ethno-national identity can discourage the development or maintenance of a strong third (subordinate) identity that forms the basis of collective action on behalf of this third group. Only in the Netherlands and with low perceived discrimination against Muslims, did higher Turkish-Dutch identifiers have a stronger Muslim identification, which supported political action on behalf of their religious group. In Germany, dual identity and religious identification were incompatible even for participants who perceived low levels of discrimination. This country difference might reflect the non-representative nature of the data, but might also indicate that the specific social and political context has an impact on the political mobilization of minority groups. While in the Netherlands immigrants can relatively easily obtain Dutch nationality, in Germany (until recently) Turkish immigrants, as well as their children and grandchildren, could not naturalize easily. Furthermore, the acceptance and formal accommodation of Islam is much more advanced in the Netherlands than in Germany, and integration in the host society has been found to be inversely related to religiosity in Germany but not in the Netherlands (Fleischmann & Phalet, 2012). We found that perceived group discrimination was higher in Germany than the Netherlands, and in Germany the association between dual identity and Muslim identification was negative, independent of the level of discrimination. This suggests that it might be more difficult for Turks in Germany to develop a dual identity with a related sense of belonging to their Muslim minority group. These findings also support the claim that in Germany, but also in the Netherlands (Verkuyten & Martinovic, 2012a), self-understandings in terms of German/Dutch Muslims are rather exceptional compared to for example the self-identification of British Muslims (Hopkins, 2011). The findings further suggest that a dual identity has a somewhat different meaning in the two countries. While in the Netherlands the dual identity measure seems to assess a dual sense of belonging, in Germany it appears to reflect host national rather than ethnic identification, with national identification being negatively associated with identification as a Muslim (see also footnote 3). However, dual identity can be conceptualized in different ways, for example as fusion and mixing (Turkish-German) or rather contextual alternation (in one situation feeling Turkish, and in another, German). Our measure was based on pilot interviews with Turkish Muslims and we considered both of these conceptualizations. Yet, the items formed a single homogenous scale and the two conceptualizations had similar associations with religious group identification and political mobilization (see footnote 2). This suggests that for low status minority groups the distinction between dual identity fusion and

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alternation is not always easy to make or measure. Yet, interview research suggests there can be complex relationships between multiple identifications resulting in creative mixtures and in situationally flexible identity performances in which minority members enact a Muslim identity in the context of claiming host national belonging (Hopkins, 2011; Hopkins & Greenwood, 2013). Our results add to the literature on dual ethno-national identity and political mobilization by considering the role of a religious group identification which is central in European immigration and integration debates. The findings should be examined further in other national contexts, among other groups, and by using other measures of political mobilization. For example, most research on dual identities and political action has been conducted among Turkish migrants in Germany (Simon & Ruhs, 2008; Simon et al., 2013) and the Netherlands (Klandermans et al., 2008), and extensions to other contexts might provide additional insights about conditions that stimulate political mobilization of dual identifiers. Furthermore, it is important to try to find evidence for causality. Our data are cross-sectional and longitudinal research is needed to further test these relationships over time. For example, it is possible that a strong Muslim identification leads to lower dual identity when perceived religious group discrimination is high. Despite these limitations, our survey included different measures of political mobilization and different populations in two different countries and provided convincing evidence that minority group identification and perceived injustice form important conditions for collective action (Van Zomeren et al., 2008). Furthermore, we focused on the support for political organization of Islam and for Muslim expressive rights, together with the intention to defend Islam. These attitudes and intentions are important steps in collective action because they may influence actual behaviour and participation (Klandermans, 1997; Van Zomeren & Iyer, 2009). However, actual participation in collective action involves more than attitudes and intentions, and future studies should try to examine the political downside of dual identity with behavioural measures. Furthermore, Muslims can use different strategies of collective action, including working in established political organizations to advance the interest of Muslims as well as mobilizing against conservative Muslim leaderships which dominate some Muslim organizations and mosques. In addition, Turkish Muslim migrants’ political activity is often influenced by political developments in the country of origin (Yildiz & Verkuyten, 2012). These types of collective action should also be examined in order to understand the diverse forms of Muslim political activism of migrant groups and the ways in which these are related to group identification processes (Hopkins, 2011; Hopkins & Kahani-Hopkins, 2004). In conclusion, our findings provide support for the proposition that dual ethno-national identity can negatively relate to the development of a collective action-orientation on behalf of a third relevant in-group, that is, the religious community. Thus, this study provides an empirical demonstration of the political downside of a dual identity and the first support for Wright and Lubensky’s (2009) claim that a dual identity may not always be beneficial for maintaining and endorsing another subordinate identity in the service of collective action.

Acknowledgements This study was financed by the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO), project number W 07.68.104.00. The authors are grateful to Nick Hopkins for his constructive and detailed comments on earlier versions of this paper.

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