Journal of Religion and Health, Vol. 14, No. 2, 1975
The Metapsychology of Abraham Joshua Heschel NORMAN
S. GOLDMAN
Introduction There is an effort on the part of some theologians and psychotherapists to bring psychology and theology together in a way that enables the vision of theology to lend depth and value to the techniques of psychotherapy. New approaches to religious counseling and education can be extracted from clinical data. Consequently, the synthesis of these two disciplines contributes toward a deeper understanding of h u m a n nature. I hope in this brief essay to demonstrate that the late Rabbi Abraham Joshua Heschel was involved, to some extent, in precisely the area where theology and psychology merge into metapsychology. Professor Heschel's treatment of man in his general theological works has often been noted; references have been made to his compassion and concern for the human condition. It is my intention to show that his concern was more than just sympathy. It led to fundamental speculation on the nature of man, the structure of his personality, and a hypothesis for change. Heschel's observations do not appear in any one systematic paper, but are embedded within his theological writings. Just as it was understood that Freud's clinical observations led him to make certain philosophical propositions, it must be pointed out that Heschel's theology includes assertions about the nature of man and his inner conflict. While I do not intend to argue that Heschel has created a comprehensive psychological theory, I believe he did give great consideration to the problems of the personality structure and its implications for man. Indeed, his evaluation of psychology ranges from a general critique of the nature of the discipline, its assumptions and methodology, to a more particular analysis of the ego as a source of man's religious difficulties.
Critique of panpsychology Professor Heschel carefully notes that there is a dangerous trend today toward reducing phenomena to their most basic elements; for example, Rabbi Norman S. Goldman, M.H.L., is Rabbi of Congregation Beth Sholom of Dover, Delaware. He is a consultant on religion and psychotherapy to the Kent County Mental Hygiene Clinic in Dover and a member of the Institutes of Religion and Health. 106
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problems of ethics or religion can be reduced to psychological problems. Heschel's criticism of psychology is that it often slips from its role as scientific observer and recorder of phenomena to that of metaphysical interpreter. When this confusion occurs, psychological interpretation becomes an excuse for sound explieation of the phenomena. Thus psychic phenomena are not treated clearly by psychological theorists. Instead, standard equations are made between the phenomena and theory, thereby substituting a thorough explanation of the phenomena for a theory purporting to explain why they exist. Heschel maintains t h a t the first task of scientific discipline is to deal with the " h o w " rather than the " w h y . " As he describes it: "There is a tendency which we should like to call PanPsychology. It proclaims psychology as capable of explaining the origin and development of the laws, principles and values of logic, religion and ethics by reducing both form and c o n t e n t of thought and conduct to subjective psychical processes . . . . ,1 This identification of c o n t e n t with process is n o t only a logical fallacy--it leads to the conclusion that the ideas of certain individuals can be disregarded because of a technical dysfunction of their thought processes. Or, to take another example, the demonstration of the separability of cognition from impulse or of c o n t e n t from function has implications for religious thought. Inherent in this proposition is the distinction between the intrinsic value of religion as opposed to the psychological function of religion. For Heschel, the appreciation of religion per se is the central focus of religious thinking. All too often, religion is reduced to a fulfillment of human needs rather than a challenge to and stimulation of human potentialities. This view contrasts with Heschel's description of the "reductionist" view in which religion would be reduced to its functional dynamics. Thus Heschel understands religion as an entity rather than as an instrument. Its ultimate value is n o t therapeutic. Heschel, however, affirms the possibility of man's "will to meaning" being satisfied in religion; but, for him, this satisfaction of needs is merely one aspect of religion. 2 Heschel's understanding of religion is based upon ontological criteria in which the psychic components of a human situation are seen merely as one aspect of that situation. Thus religion exists in primary relationship to meaning, to God, rather than man. Implicit in this discussion is a refutation of the "Freudian explanation" of God as the cosmic extension of man's need. Heschel carefully distinguishes between the adoption of an end (e.g., God) as a personal need and the logical fallacy that concludes t h a t the " e n d " was of psychological origin. Thus is laid the groundwork for Heschel's critique of panpsychology. His argument with contemporary psychology is based upon his observation that it sometimes fails to explain h u m a n conditions adequately; instead it proceeds to reduce phenomena to preconceived notions. 3 In order to elaborate upon this point, Heschel cites the examples of the psychological anomalies that are found in the prophet and the artist. He sees the value of neurosis not as the prime cause of artistic or prophetic expression, but merely that "which challenges an artist. ''4 It is the mechanism of transcendence; t h a t is,
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it is h o w the individual responds to the psychological p h e n o m e n o n that really creates the artist. Consequently, we see how Heschel re-evaluates our understanding of " m a d n e s s " (psychosis) as man's a t t e m p t " t o reach transcendence, or to rise b e y o n d himself."s In his criticism of " P a n - P s y c h o l o g y " Heschel has directed our attention to fallacies and inconsistencies of logical thought. He has enabled us to look objectively at psychology and see some of its weaknesses. The c o n c e p t of the ego is one such problematic element. B e y o n d the ego In his theological magnum opus, Man Is N o t Alone, Abraham Joshua Heschel, has written: " C o n f o r m i t y to the ego is no longer our exclusive concern, and our right to harness reality in the service of so called practical ends becomes a problem."6 We may take this statement as our starting poi nt in discussing Heschel'; view o f the ego. He asserts t hat in actuality the ego is not the sole judge of reality; on the contrary, he suggests the role of the ego in distorting reality to m e e t its predetermined requirements and objectives. This, of course, appears to cont r a di c t our accepted understanding of the funct i on of the ego as the " e x e c u t i v e " of the personality, the mediator between the drives of the id and the altruism of the superego. It is generally argued t hat the ego is the assessor o f reality. However, this is under suspicion n o t only in Heschel's thought, b u t in the thinking of H e r ber t Marcuse as well. 7 Heschel intimates the possibility that since the ego is oriented to "practical ends," the demands of p er f o r man c e may have colored the ego's perception of reality. Consequently, we see the reality principle redefined in utilitarian terms. Thus, by defining reality in terms of utility, we deprive the ego of a true perspective o f reality. Having established t ha t reality is m or e encompassing than the limitations of the ego allow it to be, Heschel t hen goes on to the next step in positing a new dimension t hat transcends the ego in man's efforts to c o n f r o n t the greater reality. He writes: " F o r the essence and greatness of man do n o t lie in his ability to please his ego, to satisfy his needs, b u t rather in his ability to stand above his ego . . . . . 8 This dimension is n o t the Freudian "super-ego"; it is an entirely new construct that, unlike the superego, is n o t merely the result of internalized social values. This new dimension involves reality in its totality, a new m o d e of being. Let us name this the "supra-ego" to refer to the extension of man's awareness o f reality b e y o n d the limitations of the ego. It appears t hat this "supra-ego" is identical with the soul. The soul, as we shall see, is the source of man's potential and seems to function in the same way as does our h y p o t h e t i c a l "supra-ego." Both seek to transcend the idolatrous nature of the ego. 9 According to Heschel, n o t only does the ego limit man's appreciation of reality, b u t by doing so it encourages man to make the ego and its requirements an object of ultimate concern.
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Pivotal to man's success in his struggle against idolatry is his ability to transcend the ego. Heschel believes firmly in man's capacity for selftranscendence as the only alternative against a steady regression to the beastlike existence of primal man. A t t e n d a n t with idolatry is its psychological c o m p o n e n t of regression to a more primitive state of h u m a n existence. Man's life is in constant tension with b o t h positive and negative (regressive) forces. " O u r existence seesaws between animality and divinity, between that which is more and t hat which is less than h u m a n i t y . ''1~ Thus, within this c o n t e x t - - t h a t is" the polarities of divinity and bestiality--Heschel evaluates man's hopes and his potential. The process of detaching oneself f r o m the ego is a difficult task. Heschel appreciates the implications involved in striving to stand above the ego and seeking to fulfill one's p o t e n t i a l i t y - "darkness of potentiality is the h o t bed of anxiety. ''1 1 Heschel recognizes the u n c e r t a i n t y involved in what is n o t y e t established or concretized. Thus in any endeavor involving t ha t which is as incorporeal as t r u t h or value, t he individual ma y b e c o m e confused and insecure. As a r e m e d y for this state there is little t hat can be offered aside from faith. As we can see, Heschel's understanding of man's nature and pr edi cam ent is realistic and y e t hopeful. He recognizes t h a t most men are directed toward their own ego as t he object o f their ultimate concern. Therefore, it is n o t only man's instinctual drives that must be controlled; it is also the " c o n t r o l l e r " itself t h a t m ust be surpassed if man is to ascend to the dimension of the holy. In this respect o f moving b e y o n d the narrow limitations of the ego, Heschel's m e t a p s y c h o l o g y shares with that of Viktor Frankl a strong faith in man's "will to m e a n i n g . " Frankl sees man's excessive egocentric concerns as an anomaly of the "will to meaning. ''1 2 The possibility of realizing a new position b e y o n d the ego remains m o r e within the realm of hypothesis than of actuality. However, even within the f r amewo r k of Freudian psychology there is a capability for accomplishing this task. This capability lies in the f unc ti on of fantasy. Marcuse writes: " t h e tr u th value of imagination relates n o t only to the past b u t also to the future. The forms o f f r e e dom and happiness which it invokes claim to deliver the historical reality. In its refusal to accept as final the limitations i m posed u p o n f r eed o m and happiness by the reality principle, in its refusal t o forget what can be lies the critical f unct i on of fantasy. ''1 3 Marcuse sees fantasy as the primary force in man's efforts to break out of the limiting circle of ego-reality. Heschel, too, searches for a similar function, which he locates in "spiritual ecstasy." For him, "inner f r e e d o m is spiritual ecstasy, the state of being b e y o n d all interests and selfishness. ''1 4 This force t hat frees man f r o m t h e narrowness of the self is the basic c o m p o n e n t in the over-all process of detaching man f r om his ego, in " d e - d e i f y i n g " the self as the object of m an's ultimate concern. The next steps in the procedure are to intensify m an's efforts and to give them direction and perspective. In order to accomplish these ends, Heschel conceives of adapting the ego itself to the service of t he ,,supra_ego.,,~ s Thus the powerful influence of the ego would lend i m p e t u s
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toward the a t t a i n m e n t of a qualitatively higher form of being. An illustration o f the e m p l o y m e n t of the ego in its own transcendence would be the situation o f a man deriving satisfaction from charitable or religious activities. These activities, although providing ego gratification, are also situations in which man is serving something ot her than his own ego. By utilizing the requirements of ego gratification, instead of condem ni ng t hem in t ot o, man becomes more effective in his a t t e m p t to accomplish a self-attachment to new values and ideals. Consequently, the problem of the ego is to be u n d e r s t o o d n o t in terms of the need to eliminate the ego, but simply to give the ego its appropriate place. This position is n o t t h a t of man's ultimate concern, but merely an element of man's awareness of reality. Indeed, the ego is a necessary compon en t o f man's psychic structure and Heschel does n o t eschew it, he merely places it in a n o t h e r perspective. Perhaps this is what he m e a n t in stating that: " c o n f o r m i t y to the ego is no longer our exclusive concern. ''1 6 By reorganizing th e psychic structure, he allows the ego to assume a less significant-although by no means insignificant--position. Heschel includes three components in the m a t ur e h u m a n being: " T h e self, the fellow man and the dimension of the holy. ''~7 In order to attain and maintain a healthy personality, all three aspects are necessary. The primary f unc t i on of the ego is to co-ordinate the personality and direct it in accordance with the values of religion and society. However, the ego must n o t develop a system of values that, by definition, would be p e r f o r m a n c e oriented. Clearly, Heschel sees the problem of the ego in its creation of values: " t h e enemy is n o t in the f l e s h . . , it is in the ego. ''1 8 And by the term " e g o " Heschel means all that is implied by the ego, including a sense o f reality and a sense of accomplishment. Even man's religiosity is distorted by his ego, which determines things according to the requisites of its performance-reality. As we can see, the balance between ego, needs, and the "supra-ego" is a delicate one. We tend to overemphasize the importance of our needs, almost to a morbid fear of neglecting them. Heschel com m ent s: "needs are looked u p o n t o d a y as if t h e y were hol y . . . . Suppression of a desire is considered a sacrilege that must inevitably avenge itself in the form of some mental disorder.,,~ 9 We do n o t want to suffocate the ego by depriving it of its genuine needs. However, Heschel urges caution in regard to satisfying all our needs and warns of total satisfaction as capitulation to the ego. 2 0 We can see t hat Heschel bases his analysis of man upon the enormous p o w e r o f the ego--an element of man's personality t hat should, according to Heschel, function in the service of G o d - - n o t in the place of God. T h e nature o f m a n
The theology of Abraham Joshua Heschel has been referred to as a " d e p t h t h e o l o g y , " a theology as cognizant of man as it is of God. As we have seen, Heschel gives serious attention to man and to the dynamic and structure of
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his personality. He approaches man f r o m the perspective of God seeing m an in an inverted way: f r om the general to the particular rather than from the particular t o the general. Therefore, Heschel's examination of man's personality is neither scientific nor clinical. He sees man in his uniqueness and wholeness. Whereas Freudian psychology sees God as created in the image of man, Heschelian psychology sees man in the image of God. Thus, for example, Heschel understands madness n o t simply in terms of pat hol ogy and normality; it is also a not he r dimension of man's existence. For Heschel, man is the essential link between nature and spirit. 21 Man's potential is almost infinite, and his essence resides in his potentiality. Heschel's view of man is in contrast to the psychological view o f man, which sees him as a p r o d u c t of ego, drives, and environment. Heschel sees man capable of ultimately transcending the limitations of function, dynamics, and environment. The loftiness of Heschel's vision must n o t be confused with psychological nai'vet& He clearly sees the reality of man's condition, his potential for good as well as for evil; "because of his immense power, man is potentially the most wicked of beings. ''22 Within his soul is the potential to becom e either wicked or holy. Man's capacity for good is n o t construed as a magical or wishful condition. If man is to succeed at achieving holiness, he must engage in an arduous process. Heschel charts man's course toward holiness beginning with man's efforts to " br e a k o u t o f the circle of the self. ''23 He affirms man's ability to live b e y o n d his needs. This divergence f r om classical psychological t h e o r y has as its basic postulate the "sense of the ineffable." And, of course, this is where Heschel's metap s y ch o logy begins, in the rarified atmosphere of the divine rat her t han in the stagnation of ego and environment. It is psychology grounded in theology, rather than in the social and biological sciences. In a way t hat is analogous to Maurice Friedman's reference to Buber's "philosophical anthrop o l o g y , " we can discuss Heschel's "theological p s y c h o l o g y " or metapsyc h o l o g y ? 4 It is a psychology t hat goes b e y o n d the limits of behavioristic observation. In concluding, I wish to poi nt o u t t hat Heschel's m e t a p s y c h o l o g y takes issue with some of the basic psychological notions of classical Greek thought. He provides a new c o n c e p t of the soul (psyche) in contrast to Platonic and Aristotelian dogma. For the Greeks, the soul's i m m o r t a l i t y was limited to its ability to reason. T he r ef or e, reason was an inseparable aspect of the soul. Heschel differentiates soul f rom reason and frees the soul f r o m the limits of reason. The soul, then, is pure potentiality u n f e t t e r e d by the limitations of intellective function. 2 s As a result, man is seen anew, released from the rigid perspective of classical psychology.
References 1. Heschel, A. J., Man Is N o t Alone. New York, Harper Torchbooks, 1966, p. 221. 2. For an explanation of "will to meaning," see Frankl, V. E., The Will to Meaning. New York, World Publishing Co., 1969. 3. Frankl, op. cit., p. 21, writes: "at the moment totality is claimed psychology becomes psychologism."
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4. Heschel, The Prophets. New York, Harper & Row, 1962, p. 408. 5. Ibid., p. 392. See also May, R., Love and Will. New York, Norton, 1969, p. 19. May sees in clinical examples the same phenomena Heschel discusses. May sees a "prophetic" or "predictive" element in psychosis. 6. Heschel, Man Is N o t Alone, op. cit., p. 39. 7. See Marcuse, H., Eros and Civilization. New York, Vintage Books, 1962, p. 117 ff. 8. Heschel, God in Search o f Man. New York, Harper Torchbooks, 1966, p. 117. 9. Heschel equates ego with the "Evil Drive." See ibid., p. 384 and p. 388. He also equates ego with idolatry. Ibid., p. 9, p. 401. 10. - - , Man Is Not Alone, op. cir., p. 210. 11. Ibid., p. 209. 12. Cf. Frankl, op. cir., p. 18, p. 38. 13. Marcuse, op. cit., p. 135. 14. Heschel, Man Is N o t Alone, op. cit., p. 142. 15. - - , God in Search o f Man, op. cit., p. 384. 16. - - - , Man Is N o t Alone, op. cit., p. 226. 17. Ibid., p. 136. See also Ungersma, A. J., The Search for Meaning: A New Approach to Pastoral Counseling (Philadelphia, Westminster Press, 1961) on the development of maturity reflecting the Freudian principle, the Adlerian principle, and the "will to meaning" cited by Frankl (op. cit.). There is a clear parallelism here. The Freudian principle clearly refers to the ego, id, superego (i.e., the self). The Adlerian concept refers to man's striving with others, and the "will to meaning" refers to a transcendent dimension. 18. Heschel, Man Is N o t Alone, op. cit., p. 264. 19. Ibid., p. 186. 20. Ibid., p. 262. 21. Ibid., p. 210. 22. Ibid., p. 211. 23. Ibid., p. 212. 24. Buber, M., The Knowledge o f Man. Edited with introductory essay by Friedman, M. New York, Harper & Row, 1965, see Introduction. 25. Cf. Ryle, G., The Concept of Mind. New York, Barnes & Noble, 1949, p. 28 ff. Ryle discusses the "intellectualist legend" in clarifying the concept of mind in relation to cognitive functions.
The Metapsychology of Abraham Joshua Heschel NORMAN
S. GOLDMAN
Introduction There is an effort on the part of some theologians and psychotherapists to bring psychology and theology together in a way that enables the vision of theology to lend depth and value to the techniques of psychotherapy. New approaches to religious counseling and education can be extracted from clinical data. Consequently, the synthesis of these two disciplines contributes toward a deeper understanding of h u m a n nature. I hope in this brief essay to demonstrate that the late Rabbi Abraham Joshua Heschel was involved, to some extent, in precisely the area where theology and psychology merge into metapsychology. Professor Heschel's treatment of man in his general theological works has often been noted; references have been made to his compassion and concern for the human condition. It is my intention to show that his concern was more than just sympathy. It led to fundamental speculation on the nature of man, the structure of his personality, and a hypothesis for change. Heschel's observations do not appear in any one systematic paper, but are embedded within his theological writings. Just as it was understood that Freud's clinical observations led him to make certain philosophical propositions, it must be pointed out that Heschel's theology includes assertions about the nature of man and his inner conflict. While I do not intend to argue that Heschel has created a comprehensive psychological theory, I believe he did give great consideration to the problems of the personality structure and its implications for man. Indeed, his evaluation of psychology ranges from a general critique of the nature of the discipline, its assumptions and methodology, to a more particular analysis of the ego as a source of man's religious difficulties.
Critique of panpsychology Professor Heschel carefully notes that there is a dangerous trend today toward reducing phenomena to their most basic elements; for example, Rabbi Norman S. Goldman, M.H.L., is Rabbi of Congregation Beth Sholom of Dover, Delaware. He is a consultant on religion and psychotherapy to the Kent County Mental Hygiene Clinic in Dover and a member of the Institutes of Religion and Health. 106
The Metapsychology o f Abraham Joshua Heschel
107
problems of ethics or religion can be reduced to psychological problems. Heschel's criticism of psychology is that it often slips from its role as scientific observer and recorder of phenomena to that of metaphysical interpreter. When this confusion occurs, psychological interpretation becomes an excuse for sound explieation of the phenomena. Thus psychic phenomena are not treated clearly by psychological theorists. Instead, standard equations are made between the phenomena and theory, thereby substituting a thorough explanation of the phenomena for a theory purporting to explain why they exist. Heschel maintains t h a t the first task of scientific discipline is to deal with the " h o w " rather than the " w h y . " As he describes it: "There is a tendency which we should like to call PanPsychology. It proclaims psychology as capable of explaining the origin and development of the laws, principles and values of logic, religion and ethics by reducing both form and c o n t e n t of thought and conduct to subjective psychical processes . . . . ,1 This identification of c o n t e n t with process is n o t only a logical fallacy--it leads to the conclusion that the ideas of certain individuals can be disregarded because of a technical dysfunction of their thought processes. Or, to take another example, the demonstration of the separability of cognition from impulse or of c o n t e n t from function has implications for religious thought. Inherent in this proposition is the distinction between the intrinsic value of religion as opposed to the psychological function of religion. For Heschel, the appreciation of religion per se is the central focus of religious thinking. All too often, religion is reduced to a fulfillment of human needs rather than a challenge to and stimulation of human potentialities. This view contrasts with Heschel's description of the "reductionist" view in which religion would be reduced to its functional dynamics. Thus Heschel understands religion as an entity rather than as an instrument. Its ultimate value is n o t therapeutic. Heschel, however, affirms the possibility of man's "will to meaning" being satisfied in religion; but, for him, this satisfaction of needs is merely one aspect of religion. 2 Heschel's understanding of religion is based upon ontological criteria in which the psychic components of a human situation are seen merely as one aspect of that situation. Thus religion exists in primary relationship to meaning, to God, rather than man. Implicit in this discussion is a refutation of the "Freudian explanation" of God as the cosmic extension of man's need. Heschel carefully distinguishes between the adoption of an end (e.g., God) as a personal need and the logical fallacy that concludes t h a t the " e n d " was of psychological origin. Thus is laid the groundwork for Heschel's critique of panpsychology. His argument with contemporary psychology is based upon his observation that it sometimes fails to explain h u m a n conditions adequately; instead it proceeds to reduce phenomena to preconceived notions. 3 In order to elaborate upon this point, Heschel cites the examples of the psychological anomalies that are found in the prophet and the artist. He sees the value of neurosis not as the prime cause of artistic or prophetic expression, but merely that "which challenges an artist. ''4 It is the mechanism of transcendence; t h a t is,
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it is h o w the individual responds to the psychological p h e n o m e n o n that really creates the artist. Consequently, we see how Heschel re-evaluates our understanding of " m a d n e s s " (psychosis) as man's a t t e m p t " t o reach transcendence, or to rise b e y o n d himself."s In his criticism of " P a n - P s y c h o l o g y " Heschel has directed our attention to fallacies and inconsistencies of logical thought. He has enabled us to look objectively at psychology and see some of its weaknesses. The c o n c e p t of the ego is one such problematic element. B e y o n d the ego In his theological magnum opus, Man Is N o t Alone, Abraham Joshua Heschel, has written: " C o n f o r m i t y to the ego is no longer our exclusive concern, and our right to harness reality in the service of so called practical ends becomes a problem."6 We may take this statement as our starting poi nt in discussing Heschel'; view o f the ego. He asserts t hat in actuality the ego is not the sole judge of reality; on the contrary, he suggests the role of the ego in distorting reality to m e e t its predetermined requirements and objectives. This, of course, appears to cont r a di c t our accepted understanding of the funct i on of the ego as the " e x e c u t i v e " of the personality, the mediator between the drives of the id and the altruism of the superego. It is generally argued t hat the ego is the assessor o f reality. However, this is under suspicion n o t only in Heschel's thought, b u t in the thinking of H e r ber t Marcuse as well. 7 Heschel intimates the possibility that since the ego is oriented to "practical ends," the demands of p er f o r man c e may have colored the ego's perception of reality. Consequently, we see the reality principle redefined in utilitarian terms. Thus, by defining reality in terms of utility, we deprive the ego of a true perspective o f reality. Having established t ha t reality is m or e encompassing than the limitations of the ego allow it to be, Heschel t hen goes on to the next step in positing a new dimension t hat transcends the ego in man's efforts to c o n f r o n t the greater reality. He writes: " F o r the essence and greatness of man do n o t lie in his ability to please his ego, to satisfy his needs, b u t rather in his ability to stand above his ego . . . . . 8 This dimension is n o t the Freudian "super-ego"; it is an entirely new construct that, unlike the superego, is n o t merely the result of internalized social values. This new dimension involves reality in its totality, a new m o d e of being. Let us name this the "supra-ego" to refer to the extension of man's awareness o f reality b e y o n d the limitations of the ego. It appears t hat this "supra-ego" is identical with the soul. The soul, as we shall see, is the source of man's potential and seems to function in the same way as does our h y p o t h e t i c a l "supra-ego." Both seek to transcend the idolatrous nature of the ego. 9 According to Heschel, n o t only does the ego limit man's appreciation of reality, b u t by doing so it encourages man to make the ego and its requirements an object of ultimate concern.
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Pivotal to man's success in his struggle against idolatry is his ability to transcend the ego. Heschel believes firmly in man's capacity for selftranscendence as the only alternative against a steady regression to the beastlike existence of primal man. A t t e n d a n t with idolatry is its psychological c o m p o n e n t of regression to a more primitive state of h u m a n existence. Man's life is in constant tension with b o t h positive and negative (regressive) forces. " O u r existence seesaws between animality and divinity, between that which is more and t hat which is less than h u m a n i t y . ''1~ Thus, within this c o n t e x t - - t h a t is" the polarities of divinity and bestiality--Heschel evaluates man's hopes and his potential. The process of detaching oneself f r o m the ego is a difficult task. Heschel appreciates the implications involved in striving to stand above the ego and seeking to fulfill one's p o t e n t i a l i t y - "darkness of potentiality is the h o t bed of anxiety. ''1 1 Heschel recognizes the u n c e r t a i n t y involved in what is n o t y e t established or concretized. Thus in any endeavor involving t ha t which is as incorporeal as t r u t h or value, t he individual ma y b e c o m e confused and insecure. As a r e m e d y for this state there is little t hat can be offered aside from faith. As we can see, Heschel's understanding of man's nature and pr edi cam ent is realistic and y e t hopeful. He recognizes t h a t most men are directed toward their own ego as t he object o f their ultimate concern. Therefore, it is n o t only man's instinctual drives that must be controlled; it is also the " c o n t r o l l e r " itself t h a t m ust be surpassed if man is to ascend to the dimension of the holy. In this respect o f moving b e y o n d the narrow limitations of the ego, Heschel's m e t a p s y c h o l o g y shares with that of Viktor Frankl a strong faith in man's "will to m e a n i n g . " Frankl sees man's excessive egocentric concerns as an anomaly of the "will to meaning. ''1 2 The possibility of realizing a new position b e y o n d the ego remains m o r e within the realm of hypothesis than of actuality. However, even within the f r amewo r k of Freudian psychology there is a capability for accomplishing this task. This capability lies in the f unc ti on of fantasy. Marcuse writes: " t h e tr u th value of imagination relates n o t only to the past b u t also to the future. The forms o f f r e e dom and happiness which it invokes claim to deliver the historical reality. In its refusal to accept as final the limitations i m posed u p o n f r eed o m and happiness by the reality principle, in its refusal t o forget what can be lies the critical f unct i on of fantasy. ''1 3 Marcuse sees fantasy as the primary force in man's efforts to break out of the limiting circle of ego-reality. Heschel, too, searches for a similar function, which he locates in "spiritual ecstasy." For him, "inner f r e e d o m is spiritual ecstasy, the state of being b e y o n d all interests and selfishness. ''1 4 This force t hat frees man f r o m t h e narrowness of the self is the basic c o m p o n e n t in the over-all process of detaching man f r om his ego, in " d e - d e i f y i n g " the self as the object of m an's ultimate concern. The next steps in the procedure are to intensify m an's efforts and to give them direction and perspective. In order to accomplish these ends, Heschel conceives of adapting the ego itself to the service of t he ,,supra_ego.,,~ s Thus the powerful influence of the ego would lend i m p e t u s
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toward the a t t a i n m e n t of a qualitatively higher form of being. An illustration o f the e m p l o y m e n t of the ego in its own transcendence would be the situation o f a man deriving satisfaction from charitable or religious activities. These activities, although providing ego gratification, are also situations in which man is serving something ot her than his own ego. By utilizing the requirements of ego gratification, instead of condem ni ng t hem in t ot o, man becomes more effective in his a t t e m p t to accomplish a self-attachment to new values and ideals. Consequently, the problem of the ego is to be u n d e r s t o o d n o t in terms of the need to eliminate the ego, but simply to give the ego its appropriate place. This position is n o t t h a t of man's ultimate concern, but merely an element of man's awareness of reality. Indeed, the ego is a necessary compon en t o f man's psychic structure and Heschel does n o t eschew it, he merely places it in a n o t h e r perspective. Perhaps this is what he m e a n t in stating that: " c o n f o r m i t y to the ego is no longer our exclusive concern. ''1 6 By reorganizing th e psychic structure, he allows the ego to assume a less significant-although by no means insignificant--position. Heschel includes three components in the m a t ur e h u m a n being: " T h e self, the fellow man and the dimension of the holy. ''~7 In order to attain and maintain a healthy personality, all three aspects are necessary. The primary f unc t i on of the ego is to co-ordinate the personality and direct it in accordance with the values of religion and society. However, the ego must n o t develop a system of values that, by definition, would be p e r f o r m a n c e oriented. Clearly, Heschel sees the problem of the ego in its creation of values: " t h e enemy is n o t in the f l e s h . . , it is in the ego. ''1 8 And by the term " e g o " Heschel means all that is implied by the ego, including a sense o f reality and a sense of accomplishment. Even man's religiosity is distorted by his ego, which determines things according to the requisites of its performance-reality. As we can see, the balance between ego, needs, and the "supra-ego" is a delicate one. We tend to overemphasize the importance of our needs, almost to a morbid fear of neglecting them. Heschel com m ent s: "needs are looked u p o n t o d a y as if t h e y were hol y . . . . Suppression of a desire is considered a sacrilege that must inevitably avenge itself in the form of some mental disorder.,,~ 9 We do n o t want to suffocate the ego by depriving it of its genuine needs. However, Heschel urges caution in regard to satisfying all our needs and warns of total satisfaction as capitulation to the ego. 2 0 We can see t hat Heschel bases his analysis of man upon the enormous p o w e r o f the ego--an element of man's personality t hat should, according to Heschel, function in the service of G o d - - n o t in the place of God. T h e nature o f m a n
The theology of Abraham Joshua Heschel has been referred to as a " d e p t h t h e o l o g y , " a theology as cognizant of man as it is of God. As we have seen, Heschel gives serious attention to man and to the dynamic and structure of
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his personality. He approaches man f r o m the perspective of God seeing m an in an inverted way: f r om the general to the particular rather than from the particular t o the general. Therefore, Heschel's examination of man's personality is neither scientific nor clinical. He sees man in his uniqueness and wholeness. Whereas Freudian psychology sees God as created in the image of man, Heschelian psychology sees man in the image of God. Thus, for example, Heschel understands madness n o t simply in terms of pat hol ogy and normality; it is also a not he r dimension of man's existence. For Heschel, man is the essential link between nature and spirit. 21 Man's potential is almost infinite, and his essence resides in his potentiality. Heschel's view of man is in contrast to the psychological view o f man, which sees him as a p r o d u c t of ego, drives, and environment. Heschel sees man capable of ultimately transcending the limitations of function, dynamics, and environment. The loftiness of Heschel's vision must n o t be confused with psychological nai'vet& He clearly sees the reality of man's condition, his potential for good as well as for evil; "because of his immense power, man is potentially the most wicked of beings. ''22 Within his soul is the potential to becom e either wicked or holy. Man's capacity for good is n o t construed as a magical or wishful condition. If man is to succeed at achieving holiness, he must engage in an arduous process. Heschel charts man's course toward holiness beginning with man's efforts to " br e a k o u t o f the circle of the self. ''23 He affirms man's ability to live b e y o n d his needs. This divergence f r om classical psychological t h e o r y has as its basic postulate the "sense of the ineffable." And, of course, this is where Heschel's metap s y ch o logy begins, in the rarified atmosphere of the divine rat her t han in the stagnation of ego and environment. It is psychology grounded in theology, rather than in the social and biological sciences. In a way t hat is analogous to Maurice Friedman's reference to Buber's "philosophical anthrop o l o g y , " we can discuss Heschel's "theological p s y c h o l o g y " or metapsyc h o l o g y ? 4 It is a psychology t hat goes b e y o n d the limits of behavioristic observation. In concluding, I wish to poi nt o u t t hat Heschel's m e t a p s y c h o l o g y takes issue with some of the basic psychological notions of classical Greek thought. He provides a new c o n c e p t of the soul (psyche) in contrast to Platonic and Aristotelian dogma. For the Greeks, the soul's i m m o r t a l i t y was limited to its ability to reason. T he r ef or e, reason was an inseparable aspect of the soul. Heschel differentiates soul f rom reason and frees the soul f r o m the limits of reason. The soul, then, is pure potentiality u n f e t t e r e d by the limitations of intellective function. 2 s As a result, man is seen anew, released from the rigid perspective of classical psychology.
References 1. Heschel, A. J., Man Is N o t Alone. New York, Harper Torchbooks, 1966, p. 221. 2. For an explanation of "will to meaning," see Frankl, V. E., The Will to Meaning. New York, World Publishing Co., 1969. 3. Frankl, op. cit., p. 21, writes: "at the moment totality is claimed psychology becomes psychologism."
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4. Heschel, The Prophets. New York, Harper & Row, 1962, p. 408. 5. Ibid., p. 392. See also May, R., Love and Will. New York, Norton, 1969, p. 19. May sees in clinical examples the same phenomena Heschel discusses. May sees a "prophetic" or "predictive" element in psychosis. 6. Heschel, Man Is N o t Alone, op. cit., p. 39. 7. See Marcuse, H., Eros and Civilization. New York, Vintage Books, 1962, p. 117 ff. 8. Heschel, God in Search o f Man. New York, Harper Torchbooks, 1966, p. 117. 9. Heschel equates ego with the "Evil Drive." See ibid., p. 384 and p. 388. He also equates ego with idolatry. Ibid., p. 9, p. 401. 10. - - , Man Is Not Alone, op. cir., p. 210. 11. Ibid., p. 209. 12. Cf. Frankl, op. cir., p. 18, p. 38. 13. Marcuse, op. cit., p. 135. 14. Heschel, Man Is N o t Alone, op. cit., p. 142. 15. - - , God in Search o f Man, op. cit., p. 384. 16. - - - , Man Is N o t Alone, op. cit., p. 226. 17. Ibid., p. 136. See also Ungersma, A. J., The Search for Meaning: A New Approach to Pastoral Counseling (Philadelphia, Westminster Press, 1961) on the development of maturity reflecting the Freudian principle, the Adlerian principle, and the "will to meaning" cited by Frankl (op. cit.). There is a clear parallelism here. The Freudian principle clearly refers to the ego, id, superego (i.e., the self). The Adlerian concept refers to man's striving with others, and the "will to meaning" refers to a transcendent dimension. 18. Heschel, Man Is N o t Alone, op. cit., p. 264. 19. Ibid., p. 186. 20. Ibid., p. 262. 21. Ibid., p. 210. 22. Ibid., p. 211. 23. Ibid., p. 212. 24. Buber, M., The Knowledge o f Man. Edited with introductory essay by Friedman, M. New York, Harper & Row, 1965, see Introduction. 25. Cf. Ryle, G., The Concept of Mind. New York, Barnes & Noble, 1949, p. 28 ff. Ryle discusses the "intellectualist legend" in clarifying the concept of mind in relation to cognitive functions.
