Perceptual and Motor Skills, 1976,42,227-232.
@ Perceptual and Motor Skills 1976
T H E "CONSCIOUSNESS PROBLEM IS N O T THE PROBLEM1 LAWRENCE CASLER
State University of New York at Geneseo Summy.-Although the concept of consciousness is not necessary for the behavioral scientist, it is closely related to a number of psychological concepts that are generally believed to be necessary. Consciousness may be defined as the very short-term memory of a just-completed perceptual act. It may thus be understood as a psychological consequence of psychological antecedents. The question of how brain processes result in consciousness is a misleading one and should be replaced by questions concerning the relationships between the brain and perception, memory, and the other psychological processes that precede consciousness.
W e all have to think about consciousness from time to time. Regardless of our theoretical preferences, we have to come to grips with the following questions: ( 1 ) Is the concept "consciousness" necessary for the field of psychology? ( 2 ) How is "consciousness" related to what we already know about psychology? ( 3 ) How is "consciousness" mediated by brain activity? One person attempts to answer these questions as follows. (1) I do not believe that psychologists need the concept in order to pursue their objectives effectively. Without it, we can continue to improve our abilities to predict, control, and even understand a progressively larger number of phenomena. This is not to say that consciousness does not exist, but only that it is a conceptual tool that does not have to be taken out of the tool chest. As a matter of fact, I am fairly certain that consciousness does exist, at least insofar as I detect it in myself. My consciousness, along with my consciousness of my consciousness (etc.), may not be very important to very many people and may not help me or anybody else to predict my behavior better than would strict attention to my genes and my reinforcement history. But I find my consciousness to be a fascinating aspect of myself, and I suspect that other people are fascinated by their consciousnesses. It is, therefore, not pragmatic necessity but sheer curiosity that prompts consideration of the second and third questions on the above list. ( 2 ) I suggest that the currently unpopular concept of consciousness is intimately related to a large number of concepts so popular that they are chapter titles in most introductory textbooks. 'This paper is not peppered with references to the many writers whose ideas provided the springboards for the ideas that have been presented. Certainly readers familiar with the writings of Hebb, Pillsbury, George Klein, and numerous others, will have no difficulry in detecting my indebtedness to, or misinterpretations of, previously published work. What I have attempted in these pages is a s o n of medley, and I can claim authorship for none of the themes with which I have meddled. Nevertheless, since it is I who have made this quodlibet, it is I who must now lie in it.
228
L. CASLER
Perception.-Although it is probably inaccurate to say that perception always involves consciousness, it may be quite accurate to say that consciousness always involves perception. Much remains to be understood about the nature of perception, and I expect that when these mysteries are resolved, the nature of consciousness will suddenly become self-evident. As for now, it may be useful to conceive of consciousness as an individual's perception of his/her own perceptions. Emotion.-Here is another tricky but apparently inescapable concept, and one about which more is unknown than known. I like to think of emotion as the perception of physiological changes in one's body, with the specific ernotionlabel determined by the perceived similarity to previously experienced (and labeled) physiological changes or their antecedents. So for me, the relationship between consciousness and emotion is a rather close one. And even for people with different orientations or approaches, it may be appropriate to point to the heightened emotionality that accompanies many of the so-called altered states of consciousness. Motivation.-That variations in conscious experience have motivational significance is evident from the efforts and risks that many individuals are willing to assume in order to achieve them. Much depends, of course, on how we choose to define motivation. For some theorists, motivation is virtually synonymous with arousal, a term whose relationship to consciousness will be commented upon later. But it is probably true that consciousness is implicitly embedded in most if not all of the standard definitions of motivation. If, for example, we infer that John has a hunger motive because he approaches food after enduring a period of food deprivation, what would we infer if John, experimentally rendered unaware of his own organic state and/or of the presence of food in his environment, does not approach the food? W e would probably infer, and would probably be correct in inferring, that John does not have a hunger motive at that particular moment. But the motivational significance of conscious~~ess goes further than this. If, w the textbooks used to say, all behavior is motivzted, then consciousness is as deserving as hunger, sex, etc., to be called a motive. In the Skinner box that constitutes our total operative environmenr, we may push a figurative lever at least as often to obtain a bit of information as we do to obtain a bit of food. Learning.-I find it pleasing to entertain the proposition-certainly not original with me-that consciousness is learned. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, I suggest that the neonate is not blessed with consciousness. If consciousness subsequently emerges, I believe ic can be made at least partially comprehensible in terms of a set of behaviors which, in the presence of certain types of stimulus conditions, have been shaped by their consequences. Prime candidates for the eliciting stimulus conditions are novelty, conflict, and/or a mis-
PROBLEM OF CONSCIOUSNESS
229
match between current sensory input and currently reverberating neural circuits. With roots in Pavlov's orienting reflex and in the competing tendencies to approach and avoid novel stimuli, consciousness can be viewed as a specific set of responses that have become so prepotcnt, or functionally autonomous, or whatever, that they are among the most frequently exhibited in our repertoires. (This analysis presupposes, of course, possession of requisite neural structures, presumably the results of usual Darwinian mechanisms.) The concept of memory is inseparable from that of learning. And memory, too, is inseparably linked with consciousness. I suspect that it is neither longterm nor short-term memory that will prove to be of greatest heuristic value, buc rather that long-neglected sibling, very short-term memory. By very short-term memory (sometimes called immediate memory or sensory memory) is meant the brief persistence in imagery-not necessarily visual-f a just-completed experience or activity. Thus defined, there is a close, perhaps inextricable, relationship between very short-term memory and the perception of perception alluded to earlier. If it makes any sense to spelk of the perception of perception, perhaps it also makes sense to posit very short-term memory as the mechanism whereby this perception takes place. I do not believe that this postulation of immediate precursors (or, alternatively, this preliminary attempt at definition) is inconsistent with anything currently believed by studencs and devotees of consciousness. At the same time, the formulation is suggestive of a possibly useful rapprochement among mind-centered, brain-centered, and behavior-centered researchers. Attention.-I hope I will be forgiven for invoking here a concept with such a checkered past and promiscuous present. But the term seems better than any other for denoting ( a ) the disposition of sensory receptors to provide optimal input, and ( b ) the disposition of "memory receptors" (in the cortical association areas?) to reinstate optimal input. For both of these purposes, what we call paying, or directing, or focusing artention means about the same as bringing past or present input into very short-term memory, or becoming conscious of something. More than half a century ago, in a slightly different context, a not dissimilar formulation was stillborn; but perhaps it is not too late to think of resuscitation: "The fact that some kind of memory is concerned in all sensation and perception to which meaning is attached-in other words, in all attentive consciousness-leads us to inquire what binds together the elements of sensation and perception. W e answer that it is attention" (Picard, 1921, p. 3 5 2 ) . Material that is "in the unconscious" is simply material that we compulsively, habitually, or fortuitously are not attending to. W e learn to keep certainpresumably unpleasant-experiences out of awareness by directing our anention elsewhere. Because very short-term memory has a limited capacity (1 item at a time? 7 f 2 items at a time? ), the only way that the "unconscious" can be
L. CASLER
230
made "conscious" is to make attention available by withdrawing it from its usual objects. The therapeutic implications are readily discernible. ( 3 ) The third general question that needs to be asked and answered concerns the mediational role of the brain How can events in and between brain cells result in the feeling-state called consciousness? Thus phrased, the question is as unanswerable as similar ones regarding the production of water out of two gases, or the emergence of a unitary melody from a group of discrete tones. Clearly, we are dealing in these instances with Gestalts that are, by definition, different from their component parts. But to say this is merely to define the mystery, not to solve it. Moreover, the mystery, when thus defined, is actually being obscured. Brain activities do not result in consciousness. Rar:her, they result in perception, in memory, and in motivational and actentional states; and it is these latter processes (and possibly others) that give rise to consciousness. This sequence is presented in Fig. 1. The central problem is not the emergence of D out of C, because this is a relatively straightforward matter of psychological causes and psychological consequences. No, the central problem has to do with how C emerges out of B. It should not, therefore, be labeled "the problem of consciousness"-a label that I believe is misleading and counterproductive. Better labels would be "the problem of perception" or "the problem of memory," not only because they are more accurate but also because they sound like (and are) parts of the mainstream of psychology and so are relatively more likely to stimulate vigorous and rigorous research efforts.
Stimulation
-
Attention Perroption
Cortical arousal
-, Motivation
19Consriou~nosm
Memory
FIG. 1. Antecedents of consciousness
Let us return to Fig.. 1. As already indicated, the processes included in Column C are not separate entities. They are separable, but, like certain atoms, tend to latch on to one another. Thus, for example, a perception is usually remembered, if only for a very short time. A suggestive hint as to how these various processes are intertwined, and how they y e related to brain activity, can be gleaned from Welker's proposal that chc inattentiveness manifested by decorticated animals may be largely attributable to ". . . the loss of pattern perception and of the memory for patterns which is mediated by the afferent areas of the cerebral cortex" (1961, p. 213). Similarly, the role of the reticular for-
PROBLEM OF CONSCIOUSNESS
231
mation in converting sensory variables into attentional variables is now well established. Our behaviors are, of course, patterns of stimuli as well as patterns of responses and may thus constitute the occasions for certain perceptions, the immediate memories of which serve as the "contents" of consciousness. So consciousness may be both a precursor (see earlier comments on motivation) and a consequence of behavior. (Lest I become too persuasive, I hasten to iterate that the study of behavior has been proceeding marvelously well without recourse to the concept of consciousness and can probably continue to do so. Even the likely motivational properties of consciousness do not make it indispensable, any more than the concept of motivation is itself indispensable. But it seems a pity to discount consciousness for doctrinaire or paradigmatic reasons. T o do so is something like arbitrarily switching off the color on a color TV set.) In addition to its probable connection with behavior, consciousness has other sequelae as well, so that Column D should not be viewed as the end of the line. It is easy to continue the sequence wi!h a Column E, which would include such well-known phenomena-dare I cal! them phre~zomena?-as thinking and problem-solving. And still another column, Column F, might be a good place for creativity. (Feedback loops among all of these processes complicate but do not essentially alter the basic scheme.) N o premature limits should be set. Believers in the drive for self-actualization or self-transcendance may want to postulate additional columns, which we may designate, for the nonce and with no disrespect intended, whatchama-columns. Thinking, problem-solving, and creativity are elaborations of consciousness, emerging when there are obstacles to the attainment of some stimulus situation (reinforcement?) that is the end of the line but may also constimte a new beginning. Consciousness, caused by a concatenation of such basic, lower-order processes as perception and memory, is sustained by the requirements of the higher-order processes just listed. Both the causative and the maintaining conditions can be understood as examples of what happens when there is a discrepancy between current input and an anticipated and/or optimal stimulus configuration. T o conclude, consciousness is here defined as the very short-term memory of a just-concluded perceptual act. It can be understood without neurologizing, but its components can probably not be understood without neurologizing. Although the term "consciousness" need not be part of the vocabulary of the psychologist-scientist, it need not be rejected as something strange, subjective, or "soft." Serving as a bridge between the traditional concerns of psychologists and the newer interests in the cognitive and humanistic domains, consciousness may become a unifying concept that can provide an underlying order to our diversified pursuits. Then again, it may not.
232
L. CASLER REFERENCES
PICARD,M. The unicy of consciousness. Journal of Philosophy, 1921, 18, 347-357. WELKER, W. An analysis of exploratory and play behavior in animals. In D . Fiske & S. Maddi (Eds.), Functions of varied experience. Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey, 1961. Pp. 175-226. Accepted October 30, 1975.
@ Perceptual and Motor Skills 1976
T H E "CONSCIOUSNESS PROBLEM IS N O T THE PROBLEM1 LAWRENCE CASLER
State University of New York at Geneseo Summy.-Although the concept of consciousness is not necessary for the behavioral scientist, it is closely related to a number of psychological concepts that are generally believed to be necessary. Consciousness may be defined as the very short-term memory of a just-completed perceptual act. It may thus be understood as a psychological consequence of psychological antecedents. The question of how brain processes result in consciousness is a misleading one and should be replaced by questions concerning the relationships between the brain and perception, memory, and the other psychological processes that precede consciousness.
W e all have to think about consciousness from time to time. Regardless of our theoretical preferences, we have to come to grips with the following questions: ( 1 ) Is the concept "consciousness" necessary for the field of psychology? ( 2 ) How is "consciousness" related to what we already know about psychology? ( 3 ) How is "consciousness" mediated by brain activity? One person attempts to answer these questions as follows. (1) I do not believe that psychologists need the concept in order to pursue their objectives effectively. Without it, we can continue to improve our abilities to predict, control, and even understand a progressively larger number of phenomena. This is not to say that consciousness does not exist, but only that it is a conceptual tool that does not have to be taken out of the tool chest. As a matter of fact, I am fairly certain that consciousness does exist, at least insofar as I detect it in myself. My consciousness, along with my consciousness of my consciousness (etc.), may not be very important to very many people and may not help me or anybody else to predict my behavior better than would strict attention to my genes and my reinforcement history. But I find my consciousness to be a fascinating aspect of myself, and I suspect that other people are fascinated by their consciousnesses. It is, therefore, not pragmatic necessity but sheer curiosity that prompts consideration of the second and third questions on the above list. ( 2 ) I suggest that the currently unpopular concept of consciousness is intimately related to a large number of concepts so popular that they are chapter titles in most introductory textbooks. 'This paper is not peppered with references to the many writers whose ideas provided the springboards for the ideas that have been presented. Certainly readers familiar with the writings of Hebb, Pillsbury, George Klein, and numerous others, will have no difficulry in detecting my indebtedness to, or misinterpretations of, previously published work. What I have attempted in these pages is a s o n of medley, and I can claim authorship for none of the themes with which I have meddled. Nevertheless, since it is I who have made this quodlibet, it is I who must now lie in it.
228
L. CASLER
Perception.-Although it is probably inaccurate to say that perception always involves consciousness, it may be quite accurate to say that consciousness always involves perception. Much remains to be understood about the nature of perception, and I expect that when these mysteries are resolved, the nature of consciousness will suddenly become self-evident. As for now, it may be useful to conceive of consciousness as an individual's perception of his/her own perceptions. Emotion.-Here is another tricky but apparently inescapable concept, and one about which more is unknown than known. I like to think of emotion as the perception of physiological changes in one's body, with the specific ernotionlabel determined by the perceived similarity to previously experienced (and labeled) physiological changes or their antecedents. So for me, the relationship between consciousness and emotion is a rather close one. And even for people with different orientations or approaches, it may be appropriate to point to the heightened emotionality that accompanies many of the so-called altered states of consciousness. Motivation.-That variations in conscious experience have motivational significance is evident from the efforts and risks that many individuals are willing to assume in order to achieve them. Much depends, of course, on how we choose to define motivation. For some theorists, motivation is virtually synonymous with arousal, a term whose relationship to consciousness will be commented upon later. But it is probably true that consciousness is implicitly embedded in most if not all of the standard definitions of motivation. If, for example, we infer that John has a hunger motive because he approaches food after enduring a period of food deprivation, what would we infer if John, experimentally rendered unaware of his own organic state and/or of the presence of food in his environment, does not approach the food? W e would probably infer, and would probably be correct in inferring, that John does not have a hunger motive at that particular moment. But the motivational significance of conscious~~ess goes further than this. If, w the textbooks used to say, all behavior is motivzted, then consciousness is as deserving as hunger, sex, etc., to be called a motive. In the Skinner box that constitutes our total operative environmenr, we may push a figurative lever at least as often to obtain a bit of information as we do to obtain a bit of food. Learning.-I find it pleasing to entertain the proposition-certainly not original with me-that consciousness is learned. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, I suggest that the neonate is not blessed with consciousness. If consciousness subsequently emerges, I believe ic can be made at least partially comprehensible in terms of a set of behaviors which, in the presence of certain types of stimulus conditions, have been shaped by their consequences. Prime candidates for the eliciting stimulus conditions are novelty, conflict, and/or a mis-
PROBLEM OF CONSCIOUSNESS
229
match between current sensory input and currently reverberating neural circuits. With roots in Pavlov's orienting reflex and in the competing tendencies to approach and avoid novel stimuli, consciousness can be viewed as a specific set of responses that have become so prepotcnt, or functionally autonomous, or whatever, that they are among the most frequently exhibited in our repertoires. (This analysis presupposes, of course, possession of requisite neural structures, presumably the results of usual Darwinian mechanisms.) The concept of memory is inseparable from that of learning. And memory, too, is inseparably linked with consciousness. I suspect that it is neither longterm nor short-term memory that will prove to be of greatest heuristic value, buc rather that long-neglected sibling, very short-term memory. By very short-term memory (sometimes called immediate memory or sensory memory) is meant the brief persistence in imagery-not necessarily visual-f a just-completed experience or activity. Thus defined, there is a close, perhaps inextricable, relationship between very short-term memory and the perception of perception alluded to earlier. If it makes any sense to spelk of the perception of perception, perhaps it also makes sense to posit very short-term memory as the mechanism whereby this perception takes place. I do not believe that this postulation of immediate precursors (or, alternatively, this preliminary attempt at definition) is inconsistent with anything currently believed by studencs and devotees of consciousness. At the same time, the formulation is suggestive of a possibly useful rapprochement among mind-centered, brain-centered, and behavior-centered researchers. Attention.-I hope I will be forgiven for invoking here a concept with such a checkered past and promiscuous present. But the term seems better than any other for denoting ( a ) the disposition of sensory receptors to provide optimal input, and ( b ) the disposition of "memory receptors" (in the cortical association areas?) to reinstate optimal input. For both of these purposes, what we call paying, or directing, or focusing artention means about the same as bringing past or present input into very short-term memory, or becoming conscious of something. More than half a century ago, in a slightly different context, a not dissimilar formulation was stillborn; but perhaps it is not too late to think of resuscitation: "The fact that some kind of memory is concerned in all sensation and perception to which meaning is attached-in other words, in all attentive consciousness-leads us to inquire what binds together the elements of sensation and perception. W e answer that it is attention" (Picard, 1921, p. 3 5 2 ) . Material that is "in the unconscious" is simply material that we compulsively, habitually, or fortuitously are not attending to. W e learn to keep certainpresumably unpleasant-experiences out of awareness by directing our anention elsewhere. Because very short-term memory has a limited capacity (1 item at a time? 7 f 2 items at a time? ), the only way that the "unconscious" can be
L. CASLER
230
made "conscious" is to make attention available by withdrawing it from its usual objects. The therapeutic implications are readily discernible. ( 3 ) The third general question that needs to be asked and answered concerns the mediational role of the brain How can events in and between brain cells result in the feeling-state called consciousness? Thus phrased, the question is as unanswerable as similar ones regarding the production of water out of two gases, or the emergence of a unitary melody from a group of discrete tones. Clearly, we are dealing in these instances with Gestalts that are, by definition, different from their component parts. But to say this is merely to define the mystery, not to solve it. Moreover, the mystery, when thus defined, is actually being obscured. Brain activities do not result in consciousness. Rar:her, they result in perception, in memory, and in motivational and actentional states; and it is these latter processes (and possibly others) that give rise to consciousness. This sequence is presented in Fig. 1. The central problem is not the emergence of D out of C, because this is a relatively straightforward matter of psychological causes and psychological consequences. No, the central problem has to do with how C emerges out of B. It should not, therefore, be labeled "the problem of consciousness"-a label that I believe is misleading and counterproductive. Better labels would be "the problem of perception" or "the problem of memory," not only because they are more accurate but also because they sound like (and are) parts of the mainstream of psychology and so are relatively more likely to stimulate vigorous and rigorous research efforts.
Stimulation
-
Attention Perroption
Cortical arousal
-, Motivation
19Consriou~nosm
Memory
FIG. 1. Antecedents of consciousness
Let us return to Fig.. 1. As already indicated, the processes included in Column C are not separate entities. They are separable, but, like certain atoms, tend to latch on to one another. Thus, for example, a perception is usually remembered, if only for a very short time. A suggestive hint as to how these various processes are intertwined, and how they y e related to brain activity, can be gleaned from Welker's proposal that chc inattentiveness manifested by decorticated animals may be largely attributable to ". . . the loss of pattern perception and of the memory for patterns which is mediated by the afferent areas of the cerebral cortex" (1961, p. 213). Similarly, the role of the reticular for-
PROBLEM OF CONSCIOUSNESS
231
mation in converting sensory variables into attentional variables is now well established. Our behaviors are, of course, patterns of stimuli as well as patterns of responses and may thus constitute the occasions for certain perceptions, the immediate memories of which serve as the "contents" of consciousness. So consciousness may be both a precursor (see earlier comments on motivation) and a consequence of behavior. (Lest I become too persuasive, I hasten to iterate that the study of behavior has been proceeding marvelously well without recourse to the concept of consciousness and can probably continue to do so. Even the likely motivational properties of consciousness do not make it indispensable, any more than the concept of motivation is itself indispensable. But it seems a pity to discount consciousness for doctrinaire or paradigmatic reasons. T o do so is something like arbitrarily switching off the color on a color TV set.) In addition to its probable connection with behavior, consciousness has other sequelae as well, so that Column D should not be viewed as the end of the line. It is easy to continue the sequence wi!h a Column E, which would include such well-known phenomena-dare I cal! them phre~zomena?-as thinking and problem-solving. And still another column, Column F, might be a good place for creativity. (Feedback loops among all of these processes complicate but do not essentially alter the basic scheme.) N o premature limits should be set. Believers in the drive for self-actualization or self-transcendance may want to postulate additional columns, which we may designate, for the nonce and with no disrespect intended, whatchama-columns. Thinking, problem-solving, and creativity are elaborations of consciousness, emerging when there are obstacles to the attainment of some stimulus situation (reinforcement?) that is the end of the line but may also constimte a new beginning. Consciousness, caused by a concatenation of such basic, lower-order processes as perception and memory, is sustained by the requirements of the higher-order processes just listed. Both the causative and the maintaining conditions can be understood as examples of what happens when there is a discrepancy between current input and an anticipated and/or optimal stimulus configuration. T o conclude, consciousness is here defined as the very short-term memory of a just-concluded perceptual act. It can be understood without neurologizing, but its components can probably not be understood without neurologizing. Although the term "consciousness" need not be part of the vocabulary of the psychologist-scientist, it need not be rejected as something strange, subjective, or "soft." Serving as a bridge between the traditional concerns of psychologists and the newer interests in the cognitive and humanistic domains, consciousness may become a unifying concept that can provide an underlying order to our diversified pursuits. Then again, it may not.
232
L. CASLER REFERENCES
PICARD,M. The unicy of consciousness. Journal of Philosophy, 1921, 18, 347-357. WELKER, W. An analysis of exploratory and play behavior in animals. In D . Fiske & S. Maddi (Eds.), Functions of varied experience. Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey, 1961. Pp. 175-226. Accepted October 30, 1975.
