The changing face of terrorism in the 21st century: the communications revolution and the virtual community of hatred.

Behavioral Sciences and the Law Behav. Sci. Law 32: 306–334 (2014) Published online in Wiley Online Library (wileyonlinelibrary.com) DOI: 10.1002/bsl.2123

The Changing Face of Terrorism in the 21st Century: The Communications Revolution and the Virtual Community of Hatred Jerrold M. Post, M.D.*, Cody McGinnis† and Kristen Moody†, Psy.D. There are no psychological characteristics or psychopathology separating terrorists from the general population. Rather, it is group dynamics, with a particular emphasis on collective identity, that helps to explain terrorist psychology. Just as there is a diverse spectrum of kinds of terrorism, so too is there a spectrum of terrorist psychologies. Some terrorists, those in nationalist-separatist groups, such as Fatah and the IRA, are continuing with the mission of their parents who are dissident to the regime. The opposite generational provenance is seen among social-revolutionary terrorists, such as the Weather Underground and the Red Army Faction in Germany, who are rebelling against their parents’ generation, which is loyal to the regime. Four waves of terrorism can be distinguished: the “anarchist wave”; the “anti-colonial wave” (nationalist-separatist), with minority groups seeking to be liberated from their colonial masters or from the majority in their country; the “new left” wave (social-revolutionary); and now the “religious” wave. With the communications revolution, a new phenomenon is emerging which may presage a fifth wave: lone wolf terrorists who through the Internet are radicalized and feel they belong to the virtual community of hatred. A typology of lone wolf terrorism is proposed. Copyright # 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

In attempting to portray the changing face of terrorism in the 21st century for this special edition of Behavioral Sciences & the Law, it is important first to summarize briefly the progress in understanding the psychology and motivations of terrorism as they have come to be understood. First, let us consider a definition drawing on Alex Schmid’s painstaking examination of the elements in common of 108 definitions of terrorism for his pioneering 1983 book Political Terrorism: A Research Guide and an early definition by the intelligence community: terrorism is violence or the threat of violence against innocent victims in order to gain political, ideological or religious goals through fear and intimidation (Schmid, 1983). The target of the violence differs from the targets of attention, which comprise: the target of fear (the members of the same class as the victims); the target of intimidation; and the target of influence (usually the government or the establishment). This emphasizes the distinction between the victims of violence, such as the workers in the World Trade Center attack of 9/11 and the terrorized audience to this terror spectacle.

*Correspondence to: Jerrold M. Post, M.D., Professor of Psychiatry, Political Psychology, and International Affairs, and Director of the Political Psychology Program, Elliott School of International Affairs, The George Washington University, Washington, DC 20052, U.S.A. E-mail: [email protected] † The George Washington University, Washington, DC.

Copyright # 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

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When Osama bin Laden distributed a video warning pious Muslims not to live or work in high-rise buildings and not to fly in airplanes, because thousands of Muslim youth were seeking martyrdom and wanting to kill the weak Americans clinging to life, his target was not pious Muslims; his target was the American public and the West. He was seeking to propagate the message of terror. He well recognized the importance of the media in transmitting the images of violence to the audience to be influenced. Indeed, he was to establish his own media production company to magnify his power and influence. The central role of the media in propagating terror has been magnified by the communications revolution. When the senior author (J.M.P.) initiated the US government program to understand the mind of the terrorist in 1979, there was a widespread assumption in the lay community that terrorists were crazed fanatics, hence the selection of a psychiatrist to lead this effort.1 There had been a number of efforts to describe a terrorist personality, but the initial review made it clear that, as individuals, terrorists were psychologically “normal,” in the sense that they were not psychotic and did not fit the criteria for Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders Axis I disorders.2 There is now a broad consensus among terrorism scholars that it is not individual psychopathology but rather group and organizational psychology, with a particular emphasis on collective identity, that offers most explanatory power in understanding terrorist psychology. This was the consensus conclusion of the Committee on the Psychological Roots of Terrorism prepared for the 2005 International Summit on Terrorism, Security and Democracy (Post, 2005). Crenshaw (1981) observed that “the outstanding characteristic of terrorists is their normality.” McCauley and Segal (1987), in a broad review of the social psychology of terrorist groups, concluded that “the best documented generalization is negative; terrorists do not show any striking psychopathology.” In his book, The Psychology of Terrorism, Horgan (2005) emphasized that there are no psychological characteristics that distinguish terrorists from the general population. He too emphasizes the central role of group dynamics. But the label of terrorism takes in a diverse spectrum of groups, with widely varying causes and, not surprisingly, widely varying psychologies. Accordingly we should be speaking of terrorisms, and terrorist psychologies, in the plural in attempting to portray the changing face of terrorism. We cannot address where terrorism is going without addressing where it has been, i.e., without briefly reviewing its history. Bruce Hoffman, a leading international terrorism scholar, presciently observed in the conclusion of the first edition of his Inside Terrorism (Hoffman, 1998) that “we were … at the dawn of a new era of terrorist violence … even bloodier and more destructive than before.” The extent of the violence and change, with the punctuation mark of 9/11, prompted Hoffman to publish a revised and expanded second edition in 2006. While there are numerous other excellent historical perspectives that have been offered – see, for example, Walter Laqueur’s The Age of Terrorism, subsequently expanded and revised (1999) as The New Age of Terrorism (Laqueur, 1987, 1999) – the perspective of terrorist scholar David Rapoport has been selected to summarize where we have been, because he has discerned waves 1

The author was founding director of CIA’s Center for the Analysis of Personality and Political Behavior. Space limitations do not permit a comprehensive review of the rich terrorism literature bearing on terrorist behavior and decision-making. For such reviews, see The Psychology of Terrorism (Horgan, 2005) and The Mind of the Terrorist (Post, 2007). 2


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associated with different types, a view that is now widely accepted within the community of terrorism scholarship. As will be developed in this article, there is reason to believe that a major new wave of terrorism has begun in this age of the communication revolution, which poses profound counter-terrorism challenges.

THE FOUR WAVES OF MODERN TERRORISM In his seminal article “The four waves of modern terrorism,” terrorist scholar David Rapoport delineates four waves of terrorism, each of which has different characteristics (Rapoport, 2004). The first wave of which Rapoport speaks is the anarchist wave, which originated in Russia in the l880s, and spread to Europe, the Americas and Asia. Its ideologues were Nechaev, who authored “The Revolutionary Catechism,” Bakunin and Kropotkin, and the first terrorist group in this first wave of modern terrorism was Narodnaya Volnya, “The People’s Will.” It was to last some 40 years. Rapoport observes that terrorist groups had operated throughout human history, but singles out the anarchist wave as the beginning of the modern era of terrorism, because of technology and communication, and hence its spread internationally and its duration of 40 years. The second, or “anti-colonial,” wave emerged after the First World War and was to last through to the Second World War. A group of new states emerged – Algeria, Cyprus, Ireland, Israel, and Yemen – as the empires of the defeated colonial powers dissolved. Be it in the pubs of Northern Ireland or the coffee houses of Algeria, they were carrying on the mission of their oppressed parents. They were loyal to parents and grandparents who were disloyal to and dissidents of the regime.3 This dynamic is illustrated in Figure 1. The opposite generational provenance is demonstrated by the third wave, the “new left” wave, which was born during the Vietnam War. These terrorists were rebelling against the generation of their parents who were loyal to the regime. This dynamic is illustrated in Figure 2. In the aptly titled Hitler’s Children, Jillian Becker (1977) describes the rise of socialrevolutionary terrorism in the wake of the defeat of the fascist Third Reich among disillusioned youth who were rebelling against the generation of their parents who were committed followers of Hitler. Among the groups attracted to Marxist-Leninist revolutionary theory and practice were the Red Army Faction of West Germany, the Red Brigades of Italy, Action Directe in France, the Japanese Red Army, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), Sendero Luminoso (“the Shining Path”) in Peru, and, in the U.S., the Weather Underground, who drew their name from a line in the popular 1963 Bob Dylan song, Subterranean Homesick Blues: “You don’t need a weatherman to know which way the wind blows.” The implosion of the Soviet Union in 1989 marked the end of this wave for the most part, although several of the Latin American social-revolutionary groups, such as the FARC and the Tupameros, were to hang on. The emergence of the fourth wave, the “religious” wave, began in the 1980s. Although Muslim fundamentalist terrorism played a major role, terrorism with religious motivations was found in the other Abrahamic religions as well. Thus Yigal Amir, who assassinated Israeli prime minister Yitzhak Rabin, was a Jewish 3 The concept of the generational provenance of terrorism reflected in Figures 1 and 2 was first presented to the World Congress of Psychiatry in 1983 (Post, 1983).




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Figure 1. “Anti-colonial” wave of terrorism. These nationalist-separatists are loyal to parents and grandparents, who are disloyal to and dissidents of the regime.

Figure 2. The “new left” wave of terrorism. These social-revolutionaries are rebelling against their parents’ generation, which is loyal to the regime.

fundamentalist religious student inspired by the radical rabbinate in Israel who believed that “the judgment of the pursuer had been fastened to Rabin,” drawing on the book of Leviticus: “Thou shall not stand idly by the brother’s innocent blood.” According to this reasoning, by entering the Oslo negotiations, Rabin was placing a group of murderous terrorists on the borders of Israel, endangering his innocent Israeli brethren. The violence toward abortion clinics and the murders of health care providers in these clinics can be seen as a form of Christian fundamentalist terrorism. Aum Shinrikyo’s sarin gas attack on the Tokyo subways was justified by the peculiar theology of Aum Supreme Truth and its guru Shoko Asahara. He was seeking to precipitate an apocalyptic struggle, from which he and his true believer followers would be resurrected as the Christ and his followers.

Islamic Fundamentalism The dominant form of religious terrorism in the fourth religious wave is that perpetrated by Islamist extremists. The Koran specifically prohibits suicide. But radical interpretations of the Koran have led to the adoption of suicide terrorism, justifying this as defensive aggression and rationalizing this not as the prohibited suicide, but as Copyright # 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.


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martyrdom instead, which is rewarded with a higher place in paradise (Ali & Post, 2008). Rapoport dates the beginning of this wave to 1979, when Muslim militants seized the U.S. embassy in Tehran, Iran, and held the occupants hostage for 444 days, not releasing them until the inauguration of President Ronald Regan in January 1981. A dramatic event in the early years of this wave was the truck bombing of the marine barracks in Beirut, Lebanon, in October 1983, in which 241 U.S. military personnel were killed. At the same time, a suicide bomber driving a pickup truck laden with explosives drove into a building housing French paratroopers, killing 58. The attacks, carried out by Hezbollah, the militant Lebanese Islamic terrorist group, were justified by their spiritual mentor, Sheikh Fadlallah, who indicated that the prohibition against suicide was overridden by the special times and justified the martyrdom action of the militants (Kramer, 1998). This act transformed the role of the U.S. in the Middle East as honest broker. Ayatollah Khomeini was impressed by the innovative tactic of the Hezbollah terrorists, and suicide terrorism was to become a staple of militant Islamist terrorists. While Khomeini was a Shi’ite Muslim, Osama bin Laden, a Wahabi Muslim, used the same justification for the terrorist violence employed by his own group, al-Qaeda (the base). Despite the substantial aid provided by the U.S. to the Muslim militants in their ultimately victorious struggle to expel the Soviet Union who had invaded the Muslim state of Afghanistan, bin Laden, who was accorded near God-like status after his victory over the Soviet superpower, next turned his attention to the remaining superpower, the U.S. The U.S. troops still remained on bases in Saudi Arabia, “the land of the two cities” (Mecca and Medina), after the first Gulf War, which was precipitated by the invasion of Kuwait by Saddam Hussein in July 1990. Initial fatwas focused on the need to expel the U.S. military from the bases in Saudi Arabia. In February 1993, the first World Trade Center bombing occurred. A van with a 1,336 pound fertilizer bomb was detonated in the underground garage of the North Tower. Had the van been parked in a position in the underground garage some 100 yards away from where it was placed, the plan to have the North Tower collapse against the South Tower, killing tens of thousands, would have succeeded. While only six were killed, there were more than a thousand casualties. A massive task force was able to identify the perpetrators. Evidence was established that the plot was carried out by a group of Islamist terrorists, headed by Ramzi Yousef, an electrical engineer ultimately captured in Pakistan. A plan to explode 12 airliners bound for the U.S. from Asia was also found in encrypted form on Yousef’s computer. While al-Qaeda never claimed responsibility for the bombing, the attack was financed by Yousef’s uncle, Khalid Sheik Mohammed, the architect of the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. Khalid Sheikh Mohammed was to become the chief of operations of al-Qaeda. No longer was the U.S. immune from international terrorism, but the Americans quickly forgot about this and continued to bask in their customary sense of invulnerability. In 1996, in what was to be the second largest terrorist attack since the bombing of the U.S. marine barracks in Beirut in 1983, a truck bomb was detonated in a U.S. military housing compound, Khobar Towers, in Saudi Arabia, killing 19. Hundreds of thousands of U.S. military personnel were now based in Saudi Arabia, angering Muslim extremists who were incensed about this invasion of the holy land by infidels. In 1998, in a coordinated twin city attack, al-Qaeda-supported terrorists detonated massive truck bombs against U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, leading to hundreds of deaths and massive damage. This resulted in the Copyright # 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.



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FBI, whose investigation identified bin Laden as the mastermind behind the plot, placing the al-Qaeda leader on its Ten Most Wanted list. In October 2000, the USS Cole, a Navy frigate, was attacked by a small craft laden with 300–700 pounds of explosives during a routine refueling stop in Aden, Yemen. The craft hit the port side of the frigate, and the resulting explosion led to 19 deaths and 37 casualties. This was also an al-Qaeda operation, and its success, alongside the successes of the attacks on the Khobar Towers attacks and the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, only added to the luster of bin Laden’s heroic reputation. He was on a roll. Confirming the U.S. as a potential target, in February 1998, an important fatwa, the “Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders World Islamic Front Statement,” was issued, signaling a broader purpose and target than earlier religious declarations: The ruling to kill the Americans and their allies – civilians and military – is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it, in order to liberate the al-Aqsa Mosque and the holy mosque [Mecca] from their grip, and in order for their armies to move out of all the lands of Islam, defeated and unable to threaten any Muslim. This is in accordance with the words of Almighty God, “and fight the pagans all together as they fight you all together,” and “fight them until there is no more tumult or oppression, and there prevail justice and faith in God.” We – with God’s help – call on every Muslim who believes in God and wishes to be rewarded to comply with God’s order to kill the Americans and plunder their money wherever and whenever they find it.

Note that the “ruling to kill the Americans – civilians and military – in any country in which it is possible to do it” was no longer just the struggle to expel the U.S. military from Saudi Arabia. Now the gloves were off, and when the attacks of 9/11 occurred, it was a devastating blow to the American psyche. The coordinated twin city attack in which hijacked U.S. airliners crashed into the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, with 3,000 casualties, transformed the international landscape. In a television posting after the devastating attack, bin Laden warned pious Muslims not to live or work in high-rise buildings and not to fly, because there were thousands of Muslims committed to martyrdom who would kill the weak Americans clinging to life. Betraying his narcissistic preoccupation with his own heroic image, in a recorded home video, bin Laden wondered how the event had played in Jidda, and indicated that the results had exceeded his expectations. The victory in Afghanistan against the Soviet superpower became the basis of bin Laden’s charismatic (leader–follower) relationship with his followers. He had preached during the 10-year struggle that Allah favored the underdog, and when bin Laden and his Afghan Arabs succeeded in expelling the Soviet forces from Afghanistan, this confirmed that he was an all-knowing, all-powerful leader. But with success in Afghanistan, bin Laden had lost his enemy. The presence of the U.S. military in Muslim lands provided him with the rationale to shift his attention to the U.S., the last remaining superpower. Initially, attacks were targeted against the U.S. military in the Middle East. The magnitude of the 2001 attacks in New York and Washington, the most devastating terrorist attack in history, confirmed for bin Laden and his followers that they had a historic role to play in the struggle to liberate Islam from Western domination and its corrupt influences. The architect of the Twin Towers attacks was instantly promoted to international stardom, the greatest terrorist of all time, a hero to alienated Muslim youth who were empowered by his dramatic act and flocked to al-Qaeda recruitment offices. Copyright # 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.


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This attack on the U.S. homeland led U.S. President George W. Bush to declare a war on terror, and within a few weeks the U.S. was mobilizing for a military strike against al-Qaeda central, which was based in Taliban-controlled Afghanistan. This was not so much state-supported terrorism as it was al-Qaeda, under the leadership of the wealthy bin Laden, supporting the failed state of Afghanistan. For the first 20 years of the fourth wave, the religious extremist phase, the first wavelet was concerned with the growth and international expansion of religious extremist terrorism, especially Islamist extremism under the charismatic leadership of the Wahabi-Sunni Muslim leader of al-Qaeda, bin Laden. Concomitantly, Shi’ite terrorism, supported by Iran, continued apace with the growth of Hamas and Hezbollah.

Pseudo-Christian Ideology In the middle 1990s, reflecting a pseudo-Christian ideology, an act of domestic terrorism within the U.S. occurred when the right-wing extremist Timothy McVeigh, consumed by hatred of the U.S. government, carried out a major attack on the Alfred P. Murah Federal Building in Oklahoma City on April 19, 1995. This was the largest domestic terrorism attack until those that took place on 9/11. One hundred and sixty-eight people were killed in the massive explosion, timed to create “maximal body count,” and more than 680 were injured. Within a 16-block radius, 324 buildings were destroyed or damaged, with an estimated property loss of $652 million. The date is significant, timed to coincide with the anniversary of the conflagration at Ranch Apocalypse, the Branch Davidian headquarters in Waco, Texas, in which David Koresh and 75 of his true believer followers perished during the FBI siege of their headquarters. Before this event, four items were circulating on right-wing websites: 1. We must do something to commemorate the government attack on the Branch Davidian compound in Waco. 2. The FBI agent in charge at Waco has been transferred to Oklahoma City (not true). 3. Here is a list of federal buildings not protected by building security, including the Alfred P. Murah Federal Building. 4. A reminder: here are simple directions for making a fertilizer bomb, using materials easily purchased at a local agricultural supply store and a hardware store. The paranoid right in the U.S. had delegitimized the federal government and had developed a pseudo-Christian ideology to provide a cognitive rationale for their fear and distrust of Washington, and they formed the Church of Jesus Christ, Christian. Why Jesus Christ, Christian? Because for these intensely racist anti-Semitic individuals, it was unthinkable that Christ could have been a Jew. The outlines of their creative theology, the basis of the Christian Identity movement, can be summarized as follows: In the Garden of Eden, Eve mated with two: Adam, who was blond haired and blue eyed, from whom the true chosen people descended, the Adamic line, the Aryan nation. Abel was first of the Adamic line. She also mated with the serpent who was the devil in disguise, from whom the Jews, the spawn of the devil descended. Cain was the first of this line. The Garden of Eden was God’s second attempt at creation. The first attempt failed, from which a group of sub-humans emerged, the “mud people,” blacks and people of color. When Cain slew Abel, it was the prototype of the genocide of the whites, the true chosen people, by the spawn of the devil, the Jews, who controlled and manipulated the “mud people.” The apocalypse is Copyright # 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.



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approaching, the final battle will between the true chosen people, the Aryan nations, the forces of good, and the Jews, the forces of evil. It is the God-given task of the Aryans to warn of the dangers represented by the Jews in league with “the mud people,” and to prepare for the final battle and destroy them. The Aryan Nations is the action arm of the Christian Identity movement.4

The creedal statement of the Aryan Nations and the Church of Jesus Christ, Christian, to which new members swear on joining, embodies this ideology (as cited in Barkun, 1994, p. 131): We believe that there are literal children of Satan in the world today. These children are the descendants of Cain, who was a result of Eve’s original sin, her physical seduction by Satan… There is a battle and a natural enmity between the children of Satan and the children of the Most High God… We believe there is a battle being fought this day between the children of darkness (known today as Jews) and the children of light (God), the Aryan race, the true Israel of the Bible.

Thus the extremists in the militia movement that achieved great prominence in the 1990s are not mere weekend warriors; rather they are fighters preparing for this final battle. While this extremist sentiment has not been the basis for violent actions in the U.S. in recent years, it is related to the radical right in Europe, which has carried out violent actions against Muslim émigrés. A recent example was Anders Breivik, who killed 77 in a rampage in Norway in 2011, first killing eight in a bombing of government buildings in Oslo, then killing 69, mostly teenagers, in a mass shooting at a labor youth camp on the island of Utøya. Breivik characterized himself as “the point of the spear,” seeking to warn of the danger of Muslim “mongrelization” of Christian Europe. He has been convicted of mass murder and is now serving a life sentence in Norwegian prison. As noted earlier, the second phase of the wave of religious terrorism was precipitated by the al-Qaeda attacks of 9/11 on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, with the subsequent declaration of a war on terror by President George W. Bush and the initiation of the war in Afghanistan in October 2001, as the first battle of that continuing war. That war led to the destruction of al-Qaeda central in Afghanistan and the flight of al-Qaeda leadership. From a place of hiding in the mountainous region of Pakistan, bin Laden sent out a communiqué instructing his franchised groups that it was now up to them to plan and fund their operations, which had previously been planned and funded by al-Qaeda central, under the leadership of bin Laden and his deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri. It was an adaptive response now that al-Qaeda leadership was on the run, a decision to decentralize. Now that they had shown the way, it was up to such organizations as al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, al-Qaeda in Iraq, and other affiliates to continue the struggle against the West, but they would continue to provide guidance. The West mounted a strategy of decapitation of al-Qaeda, relying on sophisticated remotely piloted aircraft (drones). This program, while producing a major outcry of invasion of sovereignty by Pakistan, was quite successful in killing a significant number of senior al-Qaeda leaders and placing al-Qaeda on the defensive. This phase of the wave of religious extremist terrorism was concluded with the successful raid on bin

4 For an extensive discussion of the origins of the Christian Identity movement and its justification of violence against Jews and people of color, see Robins and Post (1997), Political Paranoia: The Psychopolitics of Hatred, Yale Univ. Press, pp. 182–187.



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Laden’s headquarters in Abbottabad, Pakistan, in an operation conducted from Afghanistan by a joint CIA/Navy Special Warfare (U.S. Seals) team, in which bin Laden was killed. The identification of bin Laden’s refuge in Pakistan was the result of a massive intelligence effort. With this punctuation mark, the third phase of the wave commenced. Now, however, the al-Qaeda elements, such as al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, pursued nationalistic objectives, although still attacking the West in the name of radical Islam. A good example of this was the September 2013 attack on an upscale shopping mall in Nairobi, Kenya, with 72 killed, carried out by the Somali terrorist group, al-Shabaab, as revenge for Kenya’s support for the Somali government.

A NEW PHASE: THE VIRTUAL COMMUNITY OF HATRED AND LONE WOLF TERRORISM A new phase of terrorism is now emerging, a reflection of the communication revolution, which is increasingly evident and alarming. Indeed, it would be demeaning to consider this phase another “wavelet.” Rather it may prove to be a tsunami. While it is difficult in the midst of an historical process to have the perspective to identify this as the beginning of a fifth wave, the social media revolution may indeed prove to be the next wave. The wave of social protest that swept the Middle East, popularly known as the Arab Spring, began in December 2010 and was catalyzed by a cell phone photo of a vegetable peddler in Tunis who set himself on fire in protest at the confiscation of his cart and humiliation by public officials. The image went viral, leading to widespread protests, forcing the then President Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali, who had ruled Tunisia for 23 years, to step down after 23 days of demonstrations. The success of the social media-inspired revolution in Tunisia inspired citizens throughout the Middle East, leading to the overthrow of the authoritarian leaders of Egypt, Libya, and Yemen and sparking the civilian rebellion in Syria. A major slogan of the protesters throughout the Arab world was: “The people want to bring down the regime.” Hosni Mubarak, who had ruled Egypt with an iron fist for 30 years, was forced to step down after only 18 days of protest, in what came to be known as the cell phone revolution. In fact, a year and a half earlier, it was the bloody image of a young Iranian woman, Neda Agha-Soltan, that sparked another round of protests in the region. Agha-Soltan was shot in the chest while speaking on her cell phone during a political protest in June 2009 and her image was captured on a bystander’s cell phone, later going viral. This single image of violence led to widespread protests in Iran of the election results, demonstrating the power of the new media. The image of Neda bleeding to death was posted on YouTube, Facebook and Twitter, and was widely shown on the Internet and on television. It became the spark that precipitated the shortlived wave of political protests, brought to an end after ruthless suppression by government security. With every citizen potentially a photojournalist, dictatorial regimes can no longer control the media and suppress news of popular expressions of protest. Copyright # 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.



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While the initial sentiment facilitated by the Internet and social media was that of the people of oppressed societies yearning to be free, the overthrow of these regimes did not produce a yield of budding democracies, but it powerfully demonstrated the power of the new media. And in the world of terrorism and political violence, it has been a power that has been exploited to create a virtual community of hatred. Three notorious terrorists – Abdul Farouk Abdulmutallab, popularly known as the “underwear bomber,” Faisal Shahzad, the “Times Square bomber,” and Major Nidal Hasan, who carried out the massacre at Fort Hood – had all been involved with the radical internet. Indeed they had all been involved with “the bin Laden of the Internet,” Anwar al-Awlaki (Madhani, 2011).

Apparent Generational Dynamics In the earlier discussion of the generational dynamics of social-revolutionary terrorism, it was observed that they are rebelling against the generation of their family associated with the regime. These are the dynamics of bin Laden! When he criticized the Saudi ruling class from Sudan for hosting the U.S. military in the “land of the two cities,” i. e., Arabia, referring to the holy sites of Mecca and Medina, he was rebelling against the generation of his family that is strongly identified with the Saudi regime that enriched his family. And these are the dynamics of American-born cleric Anwar al-Awlaki, dubbed “the bin Laden of the Internet” by Arabic satellite network Al Arabiya (Madhani, 2011). His father was cosmopolitan, had served as minister of agriculture, and had been chancellor at two Yemeni universities. He was not especially religious. From youth onward, alAwlaki was an ardent Muslim preacher, who increasingly blamed the West and saw Muslims as victims. Al-Awlaki had a unique ability to reach would-be jihadists around the world through his online sermons. His fluency in English, fiery support of Islamic terrorist organizations and adeptness at effectively communicating through a variety of online platforms all led to him being one of the most effective recruiters of lone wolves (Meyer, 2009). Analysis of al-Alawki’s highly influential sermons and writings reveals three themes: 1. Muslims are victims. Their economic and social difficulties are caused by “them.” 2. “They” – the enemy out to humiliate and defeat Muslims – refers to the West, especially the U.S. and Great Britain, and Israel. 3. Therefore, jihad is required by all Muslims to defend Islam, which is under attack by “them.” In emphasizing Muslims as victims and providing external reason for their troubles, these themes are particularly appealing to lonely isolated young men. In effect, al-Awlaki has developed an externalizing logic. It is justified defensive jihad. Al-Awlaki’s connection to Abdulmutallab grew from propagandist to recruiter to operational player. In October 2009, al-Awlaki posted, “Could Yemen be the next surprise of the season?” (al-Awlaki, 2009). Abdulmutallab, the “underwear bomber,” once wrote in an online forum, “I do not have a friend, I have no one to speak to, no one to consult, no one to support me and I feel depressed and lonely. I do not know what to do” (Gambrell, 2009). Terrorist recruiters take advantage of the insecurity of these individuals and their intense need for human connection. They downplay the Copyright # 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.


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seriousness of their actions and attempt to promote a sort of “jihadi cool” through propaganda methods, like producing rap videos advocating terrorism and releasing them on the web (Bjelopera, 2013). Abdulmutallab first met and attended lectures by al-Awlaki at the Finsbury Park Mosque in London in 1995. A 2009 video shows Abdulmutallab and others training in a desert camp in Yemen, firing weapons at targets including the Jewish Star of David, the British Union Jack, and the UN logo. A martyrdom statement by him justified his actions “against the Jews and the Christians and their agents.” (Cole, Ross, & Atta, 2010). Abdulmutallab told the FBI that he met with al-Qaeda members in Yemen, who gave him explosives and training, and that he had met al-Awlaki during training and indoctrination prior to attack. There were probably phone calls between al-Awlaki and Abdulmutallab as well. The radicalization of Abdulmutallab occurred gradually. He was the youngest of 16 children of one of the richest men in Africa, the former chairman of the First Bank of Nigeria and a man known to be a cosmopolitan and not especially religious. In the British International School in Togo, Abdulmutallab was very pious and was nicknamed “the Pope,” and “Alfa” (a name for Muslim clerics). At University College London, where he studied engineering, he was president of the Islamic Society. At an Islamic Society paintball outing, he heard a preacher proclaim: “Dying while fighting jihad is one of the surest ways to paradise” (Nigerian Eye, 2014). He told a classmate at the university: “My greatest wish is for sharia and Islam to be the rule of law across the world” (Newell et al., 2010). He condemned his father’s banking profession as “un-Islamic” and “immoral,” and urged him to quit. He would not eat at the same table as his father, whom he condemned for eating meat that had not been slaughtered properly, which was considered “haram.” He finally broke completely from his family in 2009. In his farewell note, he implored, “Please forgive me. I will no longer be in touch with you. Forgive me for any wrongdoing. I am no longer your child.” (cited in Nance, 2014, p. 310). There are some 300 postings on Abdulmutallab’s website that displayed an acute awareness of, and aversion to, Western customs. He discussed his loneliness and wish to be married. He was inspired by a sermon by al-Awlaki in Finsbury Park Mosque and found a sense of belonging in the radical ummah (Muslim community) offered by al-Awlaki. He was inspired and acknowledged his wish to participate in jihad as well. “I imagine how the great jihad will take place, how the Muslims will win, inshallah, and rule the whole world, and establish the greatest empire once again.” (as cited in Al-Shishani, 2011, p. 5). On his website, he discussed his admiration for the Muslim cleric Abdullah al-Faisal, who was imprisoned in the UK for urging his followers to murder Jews, Hindus, and Americans.

The “Times Square Bomber,” Faisal Shahzad Examining the background and family relationships of Faisal Shahzad, the “Times Square bomber,” reveals many features in common with Abdulmutallab. He seemed to be thriving in the West. He had earned a B.A. in computer applications and information systems and an M.B.A., and was working as an analyst at the Affinion Group, a financial marketing firm. He married the daughter of a Pakistani-American oil industry engineer and they had two young children. He owned a two-story house in Connecticut and became a U.S. citizen in April 2009. Copyright # 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.



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But there had been signs of radicalization for years, under this façade of successfully adapting to U.S. culture. He had long been critical of U.S. foreign policy. Days after 9/11, he said, “They had it coming.” (as cited in Elliott, Tavernise, & Barnard, 2010). He gave voice to his belief that Western countries conspired to mistreat Muslims. In 2003, he e-mailed messages showing Guantanamo Bay detainees, handcuffed and crouching, below the words, “Shame on you, Bush. Shame on you” (cited in Elliott et al., 2010). In 2006, echoing words on radical Islamist websites, he sent e-mails to his friends, declaring that the West was at war with Muslims and that Muslims were suffering humiliation at the hands of the West and had a duty to fight back: “Can you tell me a way to fight back when rockets are fired at us, and Muslim blood flows?” (cited in Elliott et al., 2010). As was the case with Abdulmutallab, the father of Shazad was a prominent official who was secular in his lifestyle. He was a senior Pakistani military officer, who was not particularly religious and who drank. Faisal became increasingly religious, prayed five times a day, and stopped drinking. He saw everything through the framework of radical Islam, writing: “The crusade has already started against Islam and Muslims with cartoons of our beloved Prophet” (Elliott et al., 2010). Muslims must defend themselves against “foreign infidel forces.” He cited Islamic theology and tradition, observing his admiration for the 14th-century extremist sheikh, Ibn Taymiyyah. He pressured his cosmopolitan wife to wear the hijab and the marriage became strained (Elliott et al., 2010). He was also sending friends e-mails that were deeply critical of the West, claiming that the U.S. was at war with Islam and that Muslims were constantly being humiliated and demeaned by Westerners. Shahzad was also experiencing severe financial difficulties during this time. He had taken out a $218,400 mortgage on his home, but he was struggling to make the payments and the mortgage went into foreclosure (Deutsch, Jackson, Lysiak, & Schapiro, 2010). Shahzad’s wife eventually left him, and on June 2, 2009, he left the U.S. on a flight to Dubai. He spent the next eight months living in Pakistan (Wall Street Journal, 2010). There, initially, he lived with his parents in Peshawar, where he repeatedly clashed with his more secular father and his liberal lifestyle (Elliott et al., 2010). He criticized his father for drinking alcohol, which is prohibited by sharia law. At one point he had asked his father for permission to fight with the Taliban in Afghanistan, which his father strictly refused to allow. He continually voiced his anger at American drone strikes along the Pakistan and Afghanistan border. This anger and frustration mounted to the point that Shahzad left his parents’ home and entered the path to violent jihad. Later, after his arrest, Shahzad admitted that during this time period, he traveled to a Taliban training camp in North Waziristan, where he met several high-profile members of various terrorist organizations, including the leader of the Pakistani Taliban and members of Lashkar-e-Taiba (McElroy, 2010). It was in this training camp that Shahzad learned bomb-making techniques and prepared for his quest to launch an attack inside the U.S. On his return to the U.S., Shahzad told immigration officials that he had been living with his parents in Pakistan and that he would be staying in a hotel in Connecticut while he searched for a job and a place to live (Mayko, 2010). Shahzad eventually rented an apartment and used this location to plan his attack on Times Square in New York City. On May 1, 2010, Shahzad drove an SUV into a crowded Times Square location, parked the car, and walked away. The vehicle was loaded with propane, gasoline, fireworks, fertilizer, an alarm clock and electrical wiring (BBC, 2010). His intention was to maximize Copyright # 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.


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the damage and kill as many innocent bystanders as possible. The device failed to detonate, and later examination of the components by pyrotechnics experts found that it was very poorly made and demonstrated very little bomb-making prowess (Keller, 2010). After the vehicle was found in Times Square, a manhunt ensued, and two days later Shahzad was pulled off of a flight at New York’s John F. Kennedy Airport. He was attempting to leave the country on a flight to Dubai (Katersky, 2010). Following his arrest and the subsequent investigation, sources revealed that Shahzad had been heavily influenced by the online sermons of Anwar al-Awlaki. Investigators also determined that Shahzad had family connections and had been childhood friends with several members of various terrorist organizations linked to al-Qaeda (Esposito, Vlasto, & Cuomo, 2010). Shahzad believed that carrying out an act of violent jihad was necessary for the greater good of besieged Muslims everywhere, demonstrating a radical altruism. When questioned by the judge about his failed plot and whether he considered the potential victims to be innocent, including children, Shahzad replied, “When the drones [in Pakistan] hit, they don’t see children” (Katersky, 2010). Fueled by radical propaganda, Shahzad believed it was his duty to attack the West and fight back against the perceived war against Muslims. In court, Shahzad made clear what he felt was his moral obligation, stating, “I consider myself a Muslim soldier” (Hays, 2010). Thus, both Abdulmutallab and Shazad showed the same social-revolutionary terrorist dynamics and reflected the same generational provenance as their heroes, bin Laden and al-Awlaki. They were both rebelling against the generation of their parents – the secular establishment.

Major Nidal Hasan, the Perpetrator of the Massacre at Fort Hood Born in Arlington, Virginia, to Palestinian immigrant parents, Nidal Hasan was considered to be a very studious child throughout his school years, and he preferred to be called Michael, rather than Nidal (The Week, 2009). After graduating from college with honors, Hasan felt it was his duty to serve his country and join the military, and against the wishes of his parents, he joined the Army (Chittum & Valencia, 2009). He attended the Uniformed Services University of Health Sciences in Bethesda, MD, for medical school and pursued a military career in psychiatry (McKinley Jr., 2009). But Hasan’s sense of duty to serve his country dissipated as he experienced perceived harassment in the Army for his Muslim faith and he began seeking a discharge as a conscientious objector. In a 2007 grand rounds presentation that he gave during his psychiatric residency at Walter Reed Army Medical Center, which was supposed to be on a medical topic, Hasan gave a PowerPoint presentation in which he argued the difficulties for Muslims of serving in a military that remains at war against Muslims, alluding to his beliefs that the war on terror was actually a war against Islam (CNN, 2009). While this raised some eyebrows, it did not lead to an evaluation of the already troubled Hasan. Aside from being outspoken in his opposition to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, Hasan was relatively quiet and isolated in his personal life. This isolation increased after the deaths of his parents in 1998 and 2001, when Hasan began devoting more time to reading books on Islam and less time socializing with others (McKinley & Dao, 2009). Hasan had also been interested in finding a wife, but he had been having great difficulty and would occasionally ask others within his prayer community if they knew of any Muslim women whom he could possibly marry (Sherwell & Spillius, 2009). Eventually Copyright # 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.



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he was transferred to Fort Hood in Texas, where he became apprehensive as his first deployment to Iraq or Afghanistan became imminent. On November 5, 2009, Hasan walked into the Soldier Readiness Processing Center at Fort Hood and opened fire with a pistol, killing 13 people and wounding 30 others (McFadden, 2009). After the shooting, reports began to emerge suggesting his motive in the attack, including several reports linking Hasan to radical cleric al-Awlaki. Al-Awlaki clearly had a unique ability to successfully reach would-be jihadists around the world through his online sermons. His English fluency, fiery support of Islamic terrorist organizations, and adeptness at effectively communicating through a variety of online platforms all led to him being one of the most effective recruiters for lone wolf terrorists, including Hasan (Meyer, 2009). While living in Virginia, Hasan had attended the Dar al-Hijrah mosque in Falls Church in 2001 at the same time that al-Awlaki was presiding over the mosque as the imam (Sherwell & Spillius, 2009). Two of the 9/11 hijackers also attended the mosque during this time, and the funeral for Hasan’s mother was held at the mosque that same year. While there may not be evidence demonstrating a close relationship between al-Awlaki and Hasan during this time, apparently this exposure to al-Awlaki’s sermons led Hasan into becoming a lifelong al-Awlaki devotee and to their establishing an online relationship. Sometime following the shooting at Fort Hood, the FBI released an unclassified report detailing a number of e-mails that had been exchanged between Hasan and al-Awlaki, with the first e-mail dated 11 months before the Fort Hood incident (Shaughnessy, 2012). Although the FBI had been aware that Hasan was communicating with al-Awlaki, the e-mails were somehow determined to be work-related and to not indicate any violent intentions from Hasan and thus were not forwarded to the Department of Defense. Overall, 18 e-mails were exchanged between Hasan and al-Awlaki from December 2008 until June 2009 (Cratty, 2012). Hasan e-mailed al-Awlaki seven times before receiving a response from him, and the topics of Hasan’s e-mails ranged from what kind of advice or recommendations al-Awlaki could offer to Hasan in his quest to find a wife, to asking al-Awlaki whether or not American Muslim soldiers who kill other U.S. soldiers in order to help Muslims fighting jihad should be considered martyrs (Shaughnessy, 2012). In another telling exchange, Hasan asked al-Awlaki, “Is it OK for Muslims to kill soldiers if their mission is to kill Muslims?” He was told “yes” and went on to describe this as an obligation. After the November 5 Fort Hood massacre, al-Awlaki praised Hasan as a hero (The Middle East Media Research Institute, 2009): Nidal Hasan is a hero. He is a man of conscience who could not bear living the contradiction of being a Muslim and serving in an army that is fighting against his own people. This is a contradiction that many Muslims brush aside and just pretend that it doesn’t exist… Any decent Muslim cannot live understanding properly his duties towards his Creator and his fellow Muslims and yet serve as a US soldier. The US is leading the war against terrorism, which in reality is a war against Islam. Its army is directly invading two Muslim countries and indirectly occupying the rest through its stooges… Nidal opened fire on soldiers who were on their way to be deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan. How can there be any dispute about the virtue of what he has done? In fact the only way a Muslim could Islamically justify serving as a soldier in the US army is if his intention is to follow the footsteps of men like Nidal… The heroic act of brother Nidal also shows the dilemma of the Muslim American community. Increasingly they are being cornered into taking stances that would either make them betray Islam or betray their nation. Many amongst them are choosing the former. The Muslim organizations in America came out in a pitiful chorus condemning Nidal’s operation… The fact that fighting against the US army is an Islamic duty today cannot be disputed. No scholar with a grain of Islamic knowledge can Copyright # 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.


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defy the clear-cut proofs that Muslims today have the right – rather than the duty – to fight against American tyranny. Nidal has killed soldiers who were about to be deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan in order to kill Muslims. The American Muslims who condemned his actions have committed treason against the Muslim Ummah and have fallen into hypocrisy.

Hasan was lonely, isolated, and conflicted about serving in a military that he felt was at war against Islam. This was not the life he had imagined for himself when he had once believed it was his duty to serve his country. Al-Awlaki proved to be the perfect hero for Hasan, offering him virtual advice and guidance, and moving Hasan along on his radical path to violent jihad. These three prominent terrorists all were influenced by the revolution in communications, including the new media: the Internet and 24/7 cable channels, as well as the explosion of social media. As FBI intelligence analyst Lauren B. O’Brien wrote in a 2011 FBI publication, The Evolution of Terrorism Since 9/11, “Previously, the Internet was used primarily to spread propaganda; today, it facilitates recruitment, training, and fund-raising activities and allows HVEs [homegrown violent extremists] to overcome their geographic isolation to connect with other like-minded extremists” (O’Brien, 2011).

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE LONE WOLF AND WOLF PACKS5 No longer is the threat just from abroad, as was the case with the attacks of September 11, 2001; the threat is now increasingly from within, from homegrown terrorists who are inspired by violent Islamist ideology to plan and execute attacks where they live (U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 2008).

During the past decade, there has been an increasing incidence of violent terrorist actions being carried out by individuals who do not belong to and are not directed by al-Qaeda central or its affiliates. This appears to be due to the fact that al-Qaeda’s new strategy is “to empower and motivate individuals to commit acts of violence completely outside any terrorist chain of command” (Hoffman, 1998). Homegrown terrorism, or lone wolf terrorism, has been defined as “radicalized groups and individuals that are not regularly affiliated with, but draw clear inspiration and occasional guidance from, al-Qaeda core or affiliated movements” (Nelson & Sanderson, 2011, p.vii). (Recently these terrorists have been characterized by the security community as “lone actor terrorists.”) In a September 2011 FBI publication, intelligence analysts Ryan Hunter and Daniel Heinke highlight a model of the radicalization process based on an analysis of data from several national and international intelligence and law enforcement agencies, including the FBI. They note that (Hunter & Heinke, 2011): While no typical pathway exists for this radicalization process, three main components include deeply ingrained grievances as the basis for an identity crisis, an elementary Islamist/Salafist ideology providing a sense for one’s existence and sense of belonging to a chosen community, and the individual’s mobilization to join the terrorist movement. 5 This section draws significantly on an article on lone wolf psychology, “The psychology of lone wolf and lone wolf pack terrorists: joining the virtual community of hatred” by Cody McGinnis, Kristen Moody and Jerrold Post, presented to the annual scientific meeting of the International Society of Political Psychology, Herzliya, Israel, July, 2013.




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Such research is clearly significant for its examination of the differences between an individual becoming radicalized and becoming a terrorist, or rather, the separation between ideology and action. While new research continues to surface on this particular topic, there still remains a surprising lack of research on identifiable psychological commonalities and patterns of lone wolves that can help to combat the threat of the lone, violent jihadist. The lone wolf terrorist phenomenon is very diverse. In Europe, many extremists have come from impoverished and isolated communities (Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2012; Leiken, 2005). However, in the U.S., homegrown terrorists come from a diverse group of educational, socioeconomic, ethnic, and family backgrounds. Some, with limited education, have criminal backgrounds, while others are highly educated. They vary in levels of operational ability, training and access to financing. Their plots require varying degrees of planning, and the likelihood of success tends to be rather limited, with plots often being thwarted prior to any real threat. But as is demonstrated by the case of the Tsarnaev brothers, the perpetrators of the Boston Marathon bombings, even the simplest of plots can have devastating consequences. In expanding on the definition of lone wolves and wolf packs, this article identifies four types of lone wolf terrorists, with a discussion of their psychological characteristics and motivations. The group dynamics of the lone wolf pack is also considered in order to help identify the types of individuals who join such groups and the manner in which they pose a threat to the security of the country. There have been several definitions proposed for lone wolf terrorists (Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2012; Jenkins, 2010; Instituut voor Veiligheidsen Crisis Management; Nelson & Sanderson, 2011; Pantucci, 2011). While they act alone, they see themselves as belonging to a virtual community, a virtual community of hatred (Warner, 2010). Pantucci (2011) identifies four types of homegrown terrorists: the loner, the lone wolf, the lone wolf pack and the lone attacker. Although these definitions and typologies are primarily rooted in the behavioral characteristics of lone wolves, they are helpful in beginning to formulate the capabilities of the terrorists, their connection to jihadist ideology and access to members of terrorist organizations. Who are the lone wolf terrorists in America? A number of them were born in the U. S., possess U.S. citizenship, or entered the U.S. under the guise of attending school with a student visa. Many are children of diasporans from varying national origins and ethnicities who have found it difficult to feel accepted or develop a sense of belonging in their host country. Nearly all the individuals within this group have been Muslims or converts to Islam (Jenkins, 2010), but the inspiration for their plots was largely garnered through the gradual absorption of radical propaganda and exposure to extremists who preach the merits of violent jihad. Unlike terrorists who are affiliated with a larger organization, the lone wolves typically design plots that will ensure their survival, in contrast to the plots of affiliated terrorists, which involve martyrdom. For the purpose of this article, we define a lone wolf terrorist as an individual who acts independently, in response to the ideology of a larger terrorist group (e.g., alQaeda), without specifically belonging to the organized terrorist group or network. Their methods are typically conceived without any direct outside command, but may be influenced by members of the larger network. Based on an extensive review of open-source journalistic reports, we examined the available biographical information and histories of 43 lone wolf terrorists and have been able to differentiate four types of lone wolves: glory seekers, hero worshippers, lonely romantics and radical altruists. Copyright # 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.


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These types are not totally distinct, but rather reflect an emphasis. It should be emphasized that these are impressions from a broad review of limited open-source information and do not represent a formal typology per se. At this time, lone wolves who have been convicted and are incarcerated are not available for systematic semistructured interviews in the service of developing a definitive typology. Thus, these impressions, while stated in a definitive fashion for expositional clarity, are first impressions. They are offered to stimulate discussion in pursuit of better understanding of this increasingly important phenomenon.

Glory Seekers Glory seekers are individuals who feel the world does not understand or appreciate their talents. This frustration generally stems from unrealized expectations of success, acceptance, and recognition from within their new community. They are often immigrants or children of immigrants, who find that they are experiencing a difficult time adjusting to a new American culture, and appear to have become more isolated from mainstream society. They seem to become more extreme in their belief systems regarding Islam as they become immersed in the actions of radical jihad movements and their online presence. In this echo chamber of extremist websites, they do not feel alone with their polarizing view of the world, and they come to find a vehicle in their mind’s eye for achieving significance through acting for this righteous cause. But underlying their dreams of glory are profound insecurity and feelings of inadequacy.

Abu Khalid Abdul-Latif One example of a lone wolf glory seeker is Abu Khalid Abdul-Latif. Abdul-Latif lived a troubled life during his adolescent years, full of parental neglect and two possible suicide attempts (Vedder & Cohen, 2011). Eventually he wound up in prison, where he converted to Islam. Following his release from prison, Abdul-Latif married practicing Muslim Binta Moussa-Davis, and the couple lived in a Seattle apartment complex with their infant son (Valdes & Baker, 2011). From this apartment, Abdul-Latif began fantasizing about achieving notoriety as a violent jihadist. He ran a struggling janitorial business, but he was having difficulty paying his bills and filed for bankruptcy (Ross & Patel, 2011). He became increasingly isolated and radical in his beliefs, and he began regularly posting online videos in which he spoke of the quest for violent jihad and claimed the West was at war with Islam. In his videos, he routinely praised Anwar al-Awlaki, Nidal Hasan, and Osama bin Laden. Eventually he drew the suspicions of the FBI, after an informant had learned that Abdul-Latif and an accomplice, Walli Mujahidh, were plotting to attack a military entrance processing station in Seattle using machine guns and grenades. Abdul-Latif and his accomplice had hoped to carry out an attack similar to, but more devastating than, Hasan’s attack on Fort Hood. The men were arrested when they showed up to purchase their weapons from an FBI informant (Ross, Patel, & Cole, 2011). In the days leading up to his arrest, Abdul-Latif boasted to the informant about his upcoming fame and glory. He told the informant, “We’re trying to send a message. We’re trying to get something that’s gonna be on CNN and all over the world” (Esposito & Ryan, 2011). Copyright # 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.



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Hero Worshippers A large contingent of the lone wolves have apparently become radicalized due to the powerful influence of one or more key individuals. These lone wolves belong to the “hero worshippers” type. Through the use of an idealized other, these members enter the path of radicalization and are ultimately persuaded to carry out an act of violent jihad. The hero worshippers seek to identify with high-ranking members of the terrorist organization. They become enmeshed with the cause of their heroes and define themselves completely by identification with the idealized other or group. Because of the emptiness they feel in their own lives, these hero worshippers seek to emulate an idealized other who is seen as embodying all they would like to become. Unlike the glory seekers, who use jihad as means to gain individual attention, the association with the idealized other and the larger group cause represented by their hero drives the hero worshippers. The group identity provides outward symbols of affiliation, and provides a means of definition and identity. Al-Qaeda’s ideology demands strict obedience to a state of mind, and this ideology prescribes how members should think, feel, and behave. These individuals, who feel as though they lack a personal code or a sense of belonging, tie themselves completely to the group’s cause and the idealized hero who embodies that cause. For many of these lone wolves, the powerful and influential hero is not usually someone with whom the terrorists have actually established a close interpersonal relationship. Through the use of the internet alone, many lone wolves are exposed to the influential hero via the virtual community and radical online propaganda. Terrorist organizations make wide use of the internet for fundraising, disseminating propaganda, and recruiting new members (Weimann, 2006). Among these heroes, the online propaganda and lectures of one radicalizer in particular, the American-born cleric Anwar al-Awlaki, as discussed earlier, have managed to influence many. Because of his success in recruiting terrorists and planning terrorist operations, al-Awlaki was considered a high-value target and was killed in a drone attack in Yemen on September 30, 2011. As discussed, the Fort Hood shooter Nidal Hasan was among those inspired by al-Awlaki. The lone wolf hero worshippers are concerned with affiliating themselves to a defined organization or group such as al-Qaeda and seem to focus on specific highranking members of terrorist organizations. They become enmeshed with the cause of their worshipped idols and define themselves completely by the identity of the larger group or an idealized other. In their quest to eradicate the emptiness that they feel in their own lives, they turn to an idealized other who is seen as embodying all they would like to become. This need for identification with an idealized other makes them easily susceptible to the charismatic influence of terrorist leaders like bin Laden or al-Awlaki. In examining the hero worshippers, the trait of enmeshment, which refers to an extreme form of proximity and intensity in interactions with another individual, or a larger group, is observed. In a highly enmeshed setting, the boundaries that define individual autonomy are so weak that functioning in individually differentiated ways is impossible. This lack of clear boundaries forces an unnatural fusion, a condition that interferes with a clear sense of self. An individual is enmeshed when they use someone else for their own identity, sense of value, well-being, safety, purpose and security. One vicissitude of the wounded self is the ideal hungry personality who does not feel complete unto himself and seeks to become the follower of an idealized other (Post, 1986). Copyright # 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.


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In the case of lone wolf hero worshippers, we see individuals who lack their own sense of identity, and instead tie themselves to a larger cause (e.g., al-Qaeda) or to an individual person within that cause (e.g., al-Awlaki). While they may have limited contact with the organization, or sometimes none at all, these individuals focus their attention on this outside group. In turn, the high-ranking members of the organization appear powerful, secure within their ideals and actions, and unrelenting in their message to the rest of the world. Individuals who are craving identity and find themselves within an environment that fosters enmeshment to a larger cause are more likely to be drawn to blurring the lines of personal identity.

The Lonely Romantics The lonely romantics are those isolated individuals who wish to become part of a group or brotherhood. They are influenced by the romanticized idea of becoming part of a global, violent jihadist organization, due to its recognition around the world. Typically immature and naïve as individuals, their romanticized notion of “revolution” provides a common bonding experience for individuals struggling with the development of a self-identity. Organizations like al-Qaeda and its affiliates, such as al-Shabaab, the Somali terrorist group, present themselves as the most direct path to satisfying the need for belonging, and these groups provide a clear narrative for inclusion. Like the glory seekers, these individuals are usually immigrants who have found it difficult to assimilate into the culture of the U.S. The promise of inclusion in a larger group appeals to their need to belong, and these individuals find themselves engaging in acts they probably would never have carried out if circumstances had presented more socially acceptable opportunities. The plots of lonely romantics suggest that intermediaries and social networks can emphasize persuasive messages that feature radical elements outside of jihadist religious rhetoric. There is an obvious romanticized notion of “revolution” present in the radicalization process, and a desire to protect the Muslim community (or “ummah”) against perceived Western incursion. In many ways, lonely romantics are similar to hero worshippers, in that they are looking for a sense of belonging and purpose. In this case, they are persuaded by the romanticized idea of becoming part of a global jihadist movement, due to its recognition around the world. Organizations like al-Shabaab are appealing to them because these groups use propaganda to sell a romanticized version of violent jihad and “revolution” without consequences, while also portraying their organizations as a brotherhood. The lonely romantics often experience difficulties assimilating into a broader Western culture and this encourages a seeking to belong, which is exploited in their online recruitment. The lonely romantics can be seen as playing the follower role in the charismatic leader–follower relationship (Post, 1986). Although the larger group (i.e., al-Qaeda) is dangerous, it provides support, comfort and a strong message to follow. The lonely romantics, who crave attention, gain recognition, support and guidance by engaging in acts that support the larger group message. In the case of the lone wolf, this can even be done from the safety of their own home. The lone wolf can become part of the larger group simply by producing hate messages through online social media outlets and gaining recognition through the comments of support they receive in return. This, in turn, helps to continue their promotion of jihad for the larger group (the leader), which Copyright # 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.



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cycles back to reinforce the behavior. With some individuals, the positive feedback they receive from other members of the group or outside admirers gives them the motivation they need to engage in acts of violent jihad as a means of gaining even more recognition and acceptance in the virtual group. We see clear elements of lonely romanticism amongst the Minnesota Somali “wolf pack” and in the case of Shirwa Ahmed.

Shirwa Ahmed The first wave of Somali-American men suspected of joining al-Shabaab (The Party of Youth) began in 2007. These men, largely in their 20s and 30s at the time of recruitment by al-Shabaab, had originally arrived in Minneapolis with their parents and families as young refugees, some of them in their teens, and largely struggled to find their place in America (Yuen & Aslanian, 2010). The men spent time together at the Abubakar As-Saddique Islamic Center in Minneapolis, where several volunteered on the mosque’s committees and in the local Somali community (Yuen & Aslanian, 2010). But their search for belonging eventually made them easy targets for al-Shabaab recruitment. Ahmed was one of the first known suicide bombers with American citizenship. He immigrated with his family to the Minneapolis area in the mid-1990s. He graduated from Roosevelt High School in 2000, where he was said to have attempted to dive into American culture (Elliott, 2009). He memorized Ice Cube’s lyrics, played basketball after school, and took note of the clothing and the culture of his African-American classmates. Peers remember him as someone who wore saggy pants and spoke of “homeboys,” but also as someone who never quite fit in, due to his adherence to the rules. When a classmate’s purse was stolen, Ahmed turned in the thief. His peers taunted him saying, “You’re not black, go back to Africa” (Elliott, 2009). His friends said Ahmed had a difficult time reconciling his role in America and dealing with the frequent clashes between Somali and African-American students in the school. He asked, “How can they be mad at me for looking like them? We’re from the same place” (Elliott, 2009). As he was trying to fit into school, Ahmed also experienced difficultly finding a place in his home and faced disapproval from relatives who complained about his attempt to mix with “ghetto people.” After school, Ahmed, like many other Somali teenagers in the area, worked at the airport pushing passengers in wheelchairs. He sent half of his income to Somalia, to “relatives he didn’t even know” (Elliott, 2009). He took several classes at local community colleges, but struggled, finding it difficult to fit in to the college environment. In 2004, Ahmed found a religious group that provided the type of brotherhood and comfort he had been seeking since his arrival to the U.S.. These religious young men were pegged as “born-agains” or “fundis” and set themselves apart in the way they dressed. They attempted to emulate the Prophet Muhammad, who is said to have kept his clothes from touching the ground (Elliott, 2009). Ahmed returned to Somalia after he was recruited by al-Shabaab propagandists in his home town (Johnston, 2009). His sister, Hibo Ahmed, reported that her brother called two days before he died, saying, “He didn’t sound right” (AP Minneapolis, 2012). Ahmed was one of five bombers who carried out near-simultaneous suicide bombings in the Somali city of Hargeisa, targeting the presidential palace, the consulate of Ethiopia, and a UN complex. Ahmed drove an explosive-laden vehicle towards an office of the Puntland Intelligence Service in Bosasso on October 29, 2008. The Copyright # 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.


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simultaneous explosions killed 29 individuals, including the suicide bombers (Escobedo, 2009; Fitsanakis, 2009; Johnston, 2009).

Radical Altruists Radical altruists are individuals who plan or carry out an act of jihad due to moral outrage against the West or in sympathy with the victims of perceived Western oppression. There is not a specific incident that causes this moral outrage; rather, it is the individual’s opinion that Western ideals, as represented, in most cases, by the U.S. as a whole, are oppressing the larger Muslim community. These individuals perceive themselves, or their Muslim community, as victims in society. External forces (i.e., the U.S.) are causing unhappiness and making it difficult for the individual, or the larger Muslim community, to succeed. One study that focused on interviewing 2,032 foreign fighters found that many of the individuals who joined al-Qaeda said they were fighting to “punish the West for its attacks on Muslims,” with 30% joining the organization because they were “angry.” (Venhaus, 2010, pp. 8–9). These individuals have an inflated sense of self-worth and believe their actions will set things right in the world. They subordinate their individuality to what they believe to be the group cause. Many of these individuals have unfounded anger, perceiving slights they themselves have never personally or physically experienced. Al-Qaeda propaganda and recruitment efforts fuel this underlying anger and give the individual direction in channeling it against the West. The radical altruists appear to have traits of narcissistic rage, which can lead to unparalleled destruction. While the individuals engage in acts that often exceed the usual standards of acceptable behavior, they, at the time, feel justified in their exaggerated response. The narcissist, in this case, places himself or herself in the role of a victim in society. They hide behind the perceived misfortune or victimization of the Muslim community and feel entitled to shame others’ actions and feelings. They attempt to make those around them believe that they are suffering more than most do. In this sense, the individuals are trying to gain power over others by positioning themselves as victims of injustice; and instead of taking responsibility for their actions, they try to make others feel responsible for their plight. These types of narcissist are highly adept at the game of manipulation, and they will inevitably find a way to make others responsible for not helping them or taking their side in the cause. When their victim stance is not fully recognized, or the individuals do not receive a response that gratifies their narcissistic need for attention, they engage in dangerous acts to gain attention. With their injury sustained, the individuals assign labels to others as inferior and almost non-human. In this case, they look at the West or the U.S. as a single entity, as opposed to consisting of millions of individuals. The West, or the U. S., is the cause of the radical altruists’ feelings of diminished esteem and therefore has no right to survive. These cycles of rage to shame to bitterness can have terrifying effects on the individuals around them. The need for revenge, to right a perceived wrong and undo a hurt by whatever means, is a deeply anchored, unrelenting compulsion in the pursuit of all aims (Kohut & Ornstein, 1978). An early example of a radical altruist is Leila Khaled, a Palestinian fighter who is widely regarded as a hero to the Palestinian cause for her role in a series of airline hijackings in the late 1960s and early 1970s. As a member of the Palestinian Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), Khaled hijacked a commercial airliner en route Copyright # 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.



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from Rome to Israel and forced it to land in Damascus in 1969. Motivated by the perceived oppression she witnessed and experienced while growing up in a Palestinian refugee camp as a child, Khaled later stated that her mission “was as a warrior in the inevitable battle between oppressors and oppressed, exploiters and exploited” (Post, 2007, p. 24). A more recent example of a radical altruist is would-be Times Square bomber, Faisal Shahzad.

WOLF PACK TERRORISM Much like lone wolf terrorists, wolf pack terrorists are individuals who act under the ideology of a larger terrorist group. The difference is that, as opposed to acting independently, they act with other individuals. They conceive their plots or actions without direct outside command, but again may be influenced by members of the larger network. The members of the wolf pack can include any of the individual lone wolf types. A perceived external threat, such as from economic, cultural or political ideologies, may arouse certain feelings, leading them to form a cohesive group (Ozeren, Gunes, & Badayneh, 2007). Members of the group may know each other prior to the formation or may meet through online forums or other activist outlets. Group dynamics plays a large role in the formation and longevity of wolf pack terrorists. Specifically, the concept of “groupthink” is important to consider when conceptualizing this particular terrorist group. Groupthink is a psychological phenomenon occurring in a group of individuals in which a desire for conformity and acceptance within a group results in deviant decision-making outcomes. Group members try to minimize conflict and reach a consensus decision without critical evaluation of alternative ideas or viewpoints, and they isolate themselves from outside influences (Janis, 1972). There is a deterioration of reality testing and moral judgment among the individuals in the group. Janis (1972, 1989) and Janis and Mann (1977) highlight eight symptoms of groupthink, including the illusion of invulnerability (excessive optimism that encourages the taking of extreme risks), collective rationalization, belief in inherent morality (members believe in the rightness of their cause and ignore ethical consequences of their decisions), stereotyped views of the out-group (negative view of the “enemy”), direct pressure on dissenters, self-censorship, the illusion of unanimity and self-appointed mind guards (members protect the group from information that is problematic or contradictory to the group’s cohesiveness, view, or decisions). When examining groups of terrorists, or wolf packs, we see this type of groupthink behavior in play. One wonder if the plots of attacks might have gone as far as they did without encouragement from fellow pack members. The wolf packs (i.e., the Fort Dix six, the JFK would-be bombers, the Lackawanna six, Virginia five, the Minneapolis Somali youth who left to join al-Shabaab and participate in the struggle within Somalia) played dangerously into the groupthink mentality. By joining together in a common purpose, the groups isolated themselves from outside perspectives and judgment. They fed off one another’s statements and actions, and essentially made their dreams of action acceptable within a smaller group. Their mentality can perhaps be considered as a form of cognitive dissonance, as many of these individuals did not grow up within environments that one would imagine might foster terrorism. Copyright # 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.


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Like the individual lone wolves, the wolf pack can be seen as a form of ethnocentrism. Ethnocentric groups have “a sentiment of cohesion, internal comradeship and devotion to the in-group, which carries with it a sense of superiority to any out-group and readiness to defend the interests of the in-group” (Sumner, 1911, p. 11). Ethnocentrism involves four traits: preference, superiority, purity, and exploitiveness (Bizumic & Duckitt, 2008). Preference involves a tendency to prefer and like one’s own ethnic or cultural group over others. Superiority is the belief that one’s own culture or ethnic group is better than or superior to others. Purity is a desire to maintain purity of one’s cultural or ethnic group. Exploitiveness is the belief that one’s own cultural or ethnic group interests are always of the foremost importance, even if pursuing them would harm other groups (Bizumic & Duckitt, 2008). In its most basic form, ethnocentrism can be seen as a group-level analogue to personal self-centeredness and belief of self-importance, or narcissism. Narcissists tend to see anything that is closely associated with themselves as grandiose, important, and superior. Thus they are likely to see their groups as important and accordingly may be ethnocentric (Bizumic & Duckitt, 2008). To highlight the concept of the wolf pack, particularly how groupthink and narcissism can combine in dangerous ways, we take a look at the Fort Dix six.

Fort Dix Six “Today we are dealing with a brand new form of terrorism; smaller, more loosely defined types of cells that may or may not be affiliated with al-Qaeda,” said J.P. Weis, chief agent in the Philadelphia FBI office. “These homegrown terrorists can prove to be as dangerous as any known group, if not more so… They strike when they feel things are ripe” (Riley & Brune, 2007). The case of the Fort Dix six is an example of a wolf pack terrorist cell in the U.S. Individuals in the middle-class community of Cherry Hill, NJ, had difficulty believing that their small town could be a host to terrorists. Many vehemently shouted that it was a case of government entrapment, and that the two government informants hired by the FBI to infiltrate the cell had their own troubled pasts and had pushed the individuals further into a plan than they had ever meant for it to go. However, as details emerged, it became clear that the young men involved were doing far more than just thinking about violent acts. The investigation began in January 2006 when Brian Morgenstern, a teenage electronics store clerk, was handed a video by a customer wanting to convert it to a DVD. The young clerk was uncomfortable with the content of the tape, which showed 10 men in the Poconos firing rifles at a range, engaging in militia-like training exercises during paintball and shouting in Arabic “jihad” and “Allahu Akbar” (Melly, 2009). He showed it to his boss, who in turn called the police, and the FBI was soon involved in an 18-month-long investigation. On a return trip to the Poconos, the men rented a house that had been previously bugged by the FBI. Members of the group were overheard discussing bombs and potential attack sites, as well as their supposed justification for an attack. One member, Eljvir Duka, stated, “In the end, when it comes to defending your religion, when someone … attacks your religion, your way of life, then you go jihad” (ABC News, 2007). A criminal complaint filed in the U.S. District Court stated that Dritan Duka conspired with five others “to kill officers and employees of agencies in the executive branch” of the government (Hauser & O’Connor, 1997). The men planned to purchase Copyright # 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.



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rocket-propelled grenade launchers and other firearms to use them in an attack on Fort Dix and other military installations, including the U.S. Coast Guard building in Philadelphia and the Dover Air Force Base in Delaware, and in attacking the crowd at the Army–Navy game as well as other federal facilities (Hauser & O’Connor, 1997). FBI affidavits note that among the materials used in organizing, training and proselytizing these individuals were al-Qaida training videos, the video wills of two 9/11 hijackers and videos of U.S. soldiers being killed in Iraq. The group members were described as “smiling” and “laughing” while watching the dismemberment and deaths of the U.S. soldiers (CNN, 2007; Gordan, 2007; Riley & Brune, 2007; Windrem, 2007). Although the men involved in this plot all came from varying backgrounds, they all appeared to be in search of a group to generate a sense of purpose and belonging. Once these men bonded, they were able to rally against a larger perceived threat. Groupthink was clearly evident throughout the course of the plot development, and any dissent expressed amongst any of the members was easily quieted, which ultimately led to the plot developing to the extent that it did. Individuals already struggling for a sense of community are easily susceptible to propaganda supporting a radical terrorist doctrine, and those radical beliefs are easily reinforced when individuals find a group that provides a sense of purpose and belonging.

VIRTUAL COMMUNITY OF HATRED: RADICALIZATION ON THE INTERNET The immersion in radical websites reflected in the four types of lone wolf terrorists described in the previous sections is not just self-radicalization. There is an active trolling of social networking sites by radicalizers like al-Awlaki. They are seeking lonely, alienated individuals to whom they offer a sense of belonging and significance. It is important to identify those becoming increasingly radical, as there are no indications and warnings for those becoming terrorists. Often there are triggering events, such as death or injury to a family member or friend, or personal crisis. But to the extent that we can identify those in the diasporas who are becoming increasingly radical over time, the goal is to reach those whose radical identities are not fully consolidated with countering messages. It is important to work with Muslim diaspora community leaders to increase the sense of acceptance while respecting cultural differences, as the British have done.

Worldwide Phenomenon While this article focuses on the lone wolf terrorist in the U.S., this phenomenon is much more widespread. In Great Britain, the frustrated diasporans who participated in the July 7, 2005 London transit bombing, the group whose plot to detonate bombs on U.S.-bound airliners from Heathrow was foiled, and, most recently, the gruesome hacking of the British soldier Lee Rigby in London, were all acts of lone wolf or wolf pack terrorists. The July 7, 2005 London transit bombing was particularly startling to the West. On the morning of July 7, 2005, a lone wolf pack consisting of four lone wolf terrorists detonated three bombs in quick succession aboard London Underground trains and a fourth on a double-decker bus in Tavistock Square. Along with the four bombers, 52 civilians were killed and over 700 more were injured. Copyright # 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.


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Investigations into all of these events by British intelligence revealed the perpetrators’ frustration at not being able to find acceptance in their homeland, to which their parents had emigrated in search of better lives; and while they were born in the U.K., the perpetrators felt estranged from their host society. The three whose parents emigrated from Pakistan (the fourth was a Jamaican) underwent defensive intensification of their identity as Muslims and of their South Asian identity. Indeed, a jihadi recruiter spoke about searching for individuals who seemed to be confused about their identity and were failing to adapt to their new homeland. British authorities have developed a policy of reaching out to Muslim community leaders to facilitate incorporation into British society, while emphasizing respect for their Muslim faith.

Online Radicalization In this age of the Internet, these lonely isolated individuals who so wish to belong and be accepted are driven to spend an inordinate amount of time online. There they find a plethora of radical Islamist websites. According to Gabi Weimann, author of Terror on the Internet, there are now upwards of 7,000 radical websites. Radical Islamic terrorist group recruiters consciously exploit the loneliness of individuals and convey a sense of belonging to a radical community of hatred. Far from being isolated loners, they are now members of a group dedicated to a cause larger than themselves. As demonstrated by al-Awlaki, this strategy of seeking out the loners and offering them a chance to belong is a conscious one. And messages on the internet clearly spell out a strategy, as shown by the following address to Muslim internet professionals from one of al-Qaeda’s websites: Al-Qaeda internet strategy Due to the advances of modern technology, it is easy to spread news, information, articles and other information over the Internet. We strongly urge Muslim Internet professionals to spread and disseminate news and information about the Jihad through e-mail lists, discussion groups, and their own websites. If you fail to do this, and our site closes down before you have done this, you may be held to account before Allah on the Day of Judgment… This way, even if our sites are closed down, the material will live on with the Grace of Allah.

A statement from an al-Qaeda manual published online four months before the Madrid train station bombing made it clear that this act was not one of homemade terrorism but was stimulated by the radical internet (from Jihadi Iraq: Hopes and Dangers, al-Qaeda manual published in December, 2003): In order to force the Spanish government to withdraw from Iraq, the resistance should deal painful blows to its forces… It is necessary to make the utmost use of the upcoming general election in March next year. We think that the Spanish government could not tolerate more than two, maximum three blows, after which it will have to withdraw as a result of popular pressure. If its troops remain in Iraq after these blows, the victory of the Socialist Party is almost secured, and the withdrawal of the Spanish forces will be on its electoral program.

And indeed this is precisely what happened. The incumbent government maladroitly continued to claim this was an act of domestic terrorism committed by ETA, the Basque terrorist insurgency. The socialist party made withdrawal from Iraq a key plank of their program, won the election, and within months Spain had withdrawn from the coalition fighting in Iraq. Copyright # 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.



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CONCLUDING NOTE The exponential growth of social media and access to the radical internet by these isolated Muslim youth who do not find acceptance or success in the new homeland is an alarming portent of the future growth of lone wolf terrorists and lone wolf packs who, in the echo chamber provided by extremist websites, may become increasingly radicalized as they find comfort in belonging to the virtual community of hatred. This could well be the beginning of a fifth wave of terrorism incorporating the new technology of communication. It provides daunting counter-terrorism challenges because of the conflict between security and democracy, with its assumption of human rights, including individual privacy.

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