Behavioral Sciences and the Law Behav. Sci. Law 32: 335–346 (2014) Published online 28 April 2014 in Wiley Online Library (wileyonlinelibrary.com) DOI: 10.1002/bsl.2118
Terrorism in Pakistan: A Behavioral Sciences Perspective Asad Tamizuddin Nizami, M.B.B.S.*, Mowadat Hussain Rana, M.B.B.S.†, Tariq Mahmood Hassan, M.B.B.S.‡ and Fareed Aslam Minhas, M.B.B.S.§ This article reviews the behavioral science perspectives of terrorism in Pakistan. It can be argued that Pakistan has gained worldwide attention for “terrorism” and its role in the “war against terrorism”. The region is well placed geopolitically for economic successes but has been plagued by terrorism in various shapes and forms. A behavioral sciences perspective of terrorism is an attempt to explain it in this part of the world as a complex interplay of historical, geopolitical, anthropological and psychosocial factors and forces. Drawing from theories by Western scholars to explain the behavioral and cognitive underpinnings of a terrorist mind, the authors highlight the peculiarities of similar operatives at individual and group levels. Thorny issues related to the ethical and human right dimensions of the topic are visited from the unique perspective of a society challenged by schisms and divergence of opinions at individual, family, and community levels. The authors have attempted to minimize the political descriptions, although this cannot be avoided entirely, because of the nature of terrorism. Copyright # 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
It is difficult to define terrorism, but most definitions refer to it as unlawful, mass violence directed particularly at civilians, resulting in widespread fear. Such violence is often (but not exclusively) motivated by political, religious, or ideological ideals and intended to induce societal and national changes. However, the international community has as yet not succeeded in developing a consensus on a comprehensive definition of terrorism: The United Nations General Assembly defines political terrorism as : a political violence in an asymmetrical conflict that is designed to induce terror and psychic fear (sometimes indiscriminate) through the violent victimization and destruction of noncombatant targets (sometimes iconic symbols). The purpose of terrorism is to exploit the media in order to achieve maximum attainable publicity as an amplifying force multiplier in order to influence the targeted audience(s) in order to reach short and midterm political goals and/or desired long-term end states (Schorn, 2006).
“Terrorism” is a politically and emotionally charged word, which greatly compounds the difficulty of providing a precise definition (Gardner, 2008; Nunberg, 2001). *Correspondence to: Asad Tamizuddin Nizami, M.B.B.S, Assistant Professor, Institute of Psychiatry, WHO Collaborating Centre for Mental Health, Rawalpindi Medical College, Rawalpindi, Pakistan. E-mail: [email protected] † Director General, Centre for Trauma Research and Psychosocial Interventions, National University of Sciences & Technology (NUST), Islamabad, Pakistan ‡ Department of Psychiatry, Division of Forensic Psychiatry, Queen’s University, Kingston, Ontario Canada § Head Institute of Psychiatry, WHO Collaborating Centre for Mental Health, Rawalpindi Medical College, Rawalpindi, Pakistan
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Attempts by the state to protect civilians against terrorism may also lead to social oppression, and that in turn may result in further acts of terrorism (Hoffman, 1998; Record, 2003). Pakistan is a classic example of a country caught in an ongoing war against terrorism, where the state, its people, its neighbors, allies and friends have had diverse and often conflicting views on the subject. Surprisingly, Pakistan is considered to be both a frontline nation in the international war against terrorism and at the same time a sponsor of international terrorism. More than a decade after its active involvement in an all-out war against terrorism, it finds its allies as well as its own government entering into a dialogue with the terrorist organizations to find a palatable solution. At this important juncture in history, this article aims to look at terrorism in Pakistan from the perspective of the behavioral sciences. It takes into account an interplay of diverse factors that have contributed to unprecedented suffering by the nation at the hands of terrorists. The article also takes into account the country’s unique and advantageous geopolitical status, which has resulted in a peculiar anthropological experience through its use as a corridor used for thousands of year by Greeks, Arabs, Mongols, Turks, Afghans, and Iranians to reach India’s capital, Delhi, the seat of power in the subcontinent. We also discuss the psychological, social, and religious vulnerabilities of the people of Pakistan, which may predispose this country to both contributing to, and becoming a victim of, terrorism.
PAKISTAN: GEOPOLITICAL SCENARIO Pakistan is situated in the northwest part of the South Asian subcontinent and lies between 24ºN and 37ºN in latitude and 67ºE and 75ºE in longitude. It is bordered to the east by India (1,950 km) and to the north and northwest by Afghanistan (1,200 km), including the one-km-wide, largely porous Wahkhan strip. To the southwest is the oil-rich heart of the Persian Gulf region, Iran (800 km), and to the south is the Arabian Sea. Pakistan also has a common border to the north with China (600 km). From a strategic point of view, Pakistan is at the crossroads of central, south and southwest Asia and provides the easiest and the quickest link between the oil-rich Persian Gulf and China. Its upcoming Gwadar sea port is a natural harbor that has the potential to serve the Central Asian states and Russia through Afghanistan. Pakistan is a federation of four provinces (Sindh, Punjab, Baluchistan, and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa), a capital territory (Islamabad) and a group of federally administered tribal areas in the northwest along with the disputed area of Azad Jammu and Kashmir (World Health Organization, 2009). Pakistan has a geographical area of approximately 800,000 sq. km which is spread over a diverse terrain, comprising some of the highest peaks of the world, such as K2, deep valleys, the fertile plains of the world’s oldest civilization, the Indus Valley, and deserts in Sindh and Balochistan. Pakistan is the world’s sixth most populous country with a population of 180,808,000. The average population density is 229 individuals per sq. km, and the population is projected to reach 210 million by 2020 and then to double by 2045. Pakistan has access to the Indian Ocean, through which most of the world’s trade passes, and enjoys 700 km of coastline, with the promise of offshore oil and gas Copyright # 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Behav. Sci. Law 32: 335–346 (2014) DOI: 10.1002/bsl
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reserves. China, which is developing its southern and western provinces, particularly the Xinjiang region, shares a border with Pakistan and is merely 2,600 km away from the sea ports of Karachi and Gwadar. Pakistan offers a unique opportunity for China and other Central Asian states that are landlocked to have trade access to the Indian Ocean. The main geopolitical threat to Pakistan is the compromised strategic position that was traditionally provided by the friendly Pakhtuns (residents of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province) in the northwest of the country, but which is now challenged by al-Qaeda and the anti-Pakistan Taliban of Afghanistan. The terrorist organizations, sponsoring a separatist movement in Balochistan, are hampering the realization of the full potential of the province in terms of its mineral, oil, and gas resources. These organizations pose the same threat to the road linking China to the Gwadar port and to the gas pipeline project with Iran. However, despite the geopolitical advantages, factors that perpetuate terrorism include the population explosion, rampant poverty, illiteracy, poor health parameters, severe power shortages, unexploited natural resources, a fragile industrial and agricultural infrastructure, limited financial resources and, in the last decade, the ongoing war against terrorism.
EVOLUTION OF TERRORISM IN PAKISTAN The northwest region of the country bordering Afghanistan is the part of Pakistan that has been worst hit by terrorism since September 2001, with its epicenter in and around the city of Peshawar, capital of the province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK). Historically, the famous “Khyber Pass” in KPK has served as an important route for armies that invaded the subcontinent and India from the northwest. Throughout history the inhabitants of this part of Pakistan have been exposed to wars, battles, armament, and soldiers. Trading in arms and ammunition is a norm. Pakhtun men are expected to carry a weapon as an integral part of their dress. Indeed, they feel “naked” without it. Many sections of this diverse society are practitioners of a concept of religion that discourages modernization and the participation of women in educational and occupational pursuits. A behavioral sciences approach to the evolution of terrorism in this region must link these influences to the collective unconscious (Carl Jung) of the largely Muslim population, particularly the Pakhtun tribes that have occupied the northwest of Pakistan for centuries. The current wave of insurgency shows gross similarities to a similar movement led by the clerics Syed Ahmed Barevli (1786–1831) and Shah Ismail when the region was under Sikh rule in the 19th century. The two clerics revered themselves as saints and great warriors, who were fighting for the implementation of an Islamic way of life. Many Pakhtun tribes rallied under them, took up arms under the leadership of Syed Ahmed, who declared himself to be the Amir ul Momineen (Head of the Believers), and challenged the military might of the Sikhs. They demanded and implemented a change in the traditional lifestyles of the inhabitants, strictly implementing their concept of Sharia (Islamic lifestyle) and started to collect 10% of the people’s gross earnings as Ushr (a form of taxation introduced in the early years of Islam). Annexing hundreds of villages in and around Peshawar, they enhanced their influence and fought pitched battles against Sikh armies at their stronghold at Akora Copyright # 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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(the current site of one of the largest religious seminaries in Pakistan, with its alumni including Mullah Umar, the former Taliban ruler of Afghanistan) in the 1820 s. This movement took root and gained momentum in the same geographical and cultural area where Fazal Ullah (the current commander of Taliban in Pakistan) and his father-in-law, Sufi Muhammad, took up arms against the Pakistan government from 2002 to 2009, and attempted to establish a very similar Islamic state in the Swat district of KPK. The movement was eventually crushed by the forces of Ranjeet Singh (1780–1839) when he joined hands with local tribal chieftains, in a battle at Balakot in the Hindu Kush mountains. The establishment of the Sikh militias led to the formation of the Sikh State in the early 19th century. Both clerics were killed in the battle of Balakot and achieved the status of martyrs of Islam. Thus, the anthropological roots and strategic inspiration for today’s insurgency and militancy in this region are hundreds of years old. At the time of Pakistan’s independence in 1947, examples of extortion and extremism – emanating from acts of aggression, brutality, killings, arson, looting, rape, and torture of Muslim migrants by Hindu and Sikh extremists –were rampant during the mass migration to Pakistan. The gory details of these acts of terror are still fresh in the minds of present-day survivors. An estimated one million people lost their lives and 14–18 million people were forcefully displaced. In Punjab alone, the loss of life was between 500,000 and 800,000, and 10 million people were forcefully displaced (Ahmed, 2013). After the Second World War, this was the first case of ethnic cleansing, through terrorism, that took place in Pakistan. The Kashmir conflict is a territorial dispute involving India, Kashmiri insurgent groups and Pakistan that has continued since 1947. India and Pakistan have fought at least three wars over the Kashmir issue, including the wars of 1947, 1965, and 1999. This issue has continuously sparked violence and acts of terrorism in the region. An armed insurgency in Kashmir led to the formation of militant wings, which were in fact the beginning of the mujahideen insurgency, and continues to this day. India contends that the insurgency was largely started by Afghan mujahideen who entered the Kashmir valley after the end of the Soviet Afghan war. The 1960s Mukti Bahni movement in the east wing of Pakistan, urging that a separate homeland be established for the Bengalis (local population of East Pakistan), was marred by terror and violence. It was a classic example of the worsening vicious cycle of terrorism and counter-terrorism. As a result, a new country, Bangla Desh (Homeland of the Bengalis) came into being in 1971, but it endorsed the use of similar terror tactics and foreign support for the separatist elements in Balochistan and the North West Frontier province of Pakistan. Using a behavioral model, the antecedents and consequences of these events may have led to both operant and classical conditioning for pursuing violent means in the pursuance of political agendas. For the two decades after 1971, successive regimes undertook measures, particularly in Balochistan and Sindh, to curb what they considered challenges to the integrity of the country. Meanwhile, the entry of the Soviet Union into Afghanistan in 1979 prompted the United States, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and China to support rebels fighting against the Soviet-backed Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and to funnel foreign support to the mujahideen and rebel groups all across Afghanistan. The war also attracted Arab volunteers, known as “Afghan Arabs”, including Osama bin Laden. The humanist Rogerian concept of “unconditional positive regard” was stretched well beyond its wildest possible interpretation when Pakistan and Saudi Arabia became the first and probably the only two countries to recognize the Taliban government in Copyright # 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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Kabul as legitimate. This “regard and recognition” of a terrorist group that went on a rampage and started destroying Buddhist relics, subjugating women, closing girls’ schools and swiftly and systematically destroying progressive thought, was ignored by the civil society in Afghanistan. On the home front, the mujahideen, who were being equipped with the latest weapons by the U.S. during the Afghan war, included many of the clerics and students of madrassas (seminaries, usually attached to a mosque, for imparting religious education), and they returned, along with their ammunition, from the Afghan war to their respective villages in Punjab and Sindh as battle-hardened soldiers. The rural and suburban cultures of regions far away from the Afghan border, and in the heart of the Punjab, now had a “new authority” on stage, which until then had been dominated by the feudal lords and industrialists. Most of these clerics received regular foreign funding to make madrassas that were bigger than ever and which were to become the breeding grounds for terrorists of the post-9/11 era (Ahmad, 2008). The authors believe that successive governments looked the other way as the terrorist groups made inroads into the society to become a “subculture”. In the meantime, the evangelical schools working with young men and women alike provided a perfect cover for them to be converted to a militant way of life by representatives of terrorist groups. The regular recruitment of young men from across the country to be used as suicide bombers and jihadi fighters was not once denounced by the religious leaders and leaders of political parties. The war on terror in Afghanistan was an intervention by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and allied forces in the Afghan political struggle, under cover of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, to dismantle the al-Qaeda terrorist organization and to remove the Taliban government from power, which at the time controlled 90% of Afghanistan. The U.S. and its allies drove the Taliban from power; however, most al-Qaeda and Taliban members escaped to neighboring Pakistan or retreated to rural or remote mountainous regions. While NATO forces continued to battle the Taliban insurgency, the war expanded into neighboring north-west Pakistan. Most of the mujahideen groups from the Afghan war were never disarmed and some of these groups were later activated in the form of the Lashkar-e-Taiba, the Harkat-ulMujahideen and others, such as the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). The same groups started taking on the state itself, causing the greatest threat to both the state and the citizens of Pakistan through the politically motivated killing of civilians and police officials. The annual death toll from terrorist attacks in Pakistan ranged from 164 in 2003 to 3,318 in 2009 (Bloch, 2006; Musharraf, 2006) with a total of 35,000 Pakistanis killed between September 11, 2001 and May 2011. According to the government of Pakistan, the direct and indirect economic costs of terrorism totaled 68 billion US dollars from the years 2000 to 2010 (Bloch, 2006). From the late 1990s onwards, the callousness and pathological nature of “la belle indifference” shown by mainstream society set in, leading to a partial paralysis of civic life and the state machinery. While the majority of the population is still committed to liberalism, progress, democracy, a pluralistic world view, tolerance, and peace, there is an ever-growing, deep intrusion of reactionary, fundamentalist, and pagan thinking in some sections of Pakistani society. A deeper understanding of how these macrosocopic changes have influenced the psyche and social lives of the vulnerable population falling prey to terrorism is in order. Copyright # 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE PERSPECTIVES Psychological Perspective From its inception in 1947, the Pakistani nation was challenged by the trauma of migration, where millions were killed, looted, murdered, raped, and burnt alive by Hindu and Sikh extremists. Stability in the nation was significantly hampered by the lack of resources, the burden of hundreds and thousands of homeless families, and the mass influx of migrants form East Pakistan to West Pakistan across a tortuous landscape. The country lost its leader Muhammad Ali Jinnah in 1948, and within a year of his death, through the Objectives Resolution adopted by the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan on March 12, 1949, the democratic, liberal, and secular spirit gave way to a particular interpretation of religion, which had little to offer to its non-Muslim minorities. These events were followed by wars with India in 1948 and 1965, which, along with the eventual separation of East from West Pakistan, were traumatic events for the entire nation. These events were bound to be reflected in the psychological profile of individual citizens. Mixed with socioeconomic adversity, these political challenges have affected the psyche of the average Pakistani. It is against this backdrop that we need to understand the psychological perspective of terrorism in Pakistan. It may not be appropriate to label all terrorists as merely psychopathic personalities or mad people (Atran, 2003; Horgan, 2008). It may be equally naïve to consider a suicide bomber as a depressed or suicidal individual. To understand the “psychology” of a terrorist in Pakistan or otherwise, one must try to understand how they view their own conduct and why. They view their own actions as rational and purposeful, driven in response to their own perception of social, political, religious, and other realities (Horgan, 2008). But dismissing terrorists as “mad”, “evil” or “aliens” is perhaps reassuring as it distances us from them and their motives. The thinking that “I am good and right” and “You are bad and wrong” prevails in the mind of a terrorist in any part of the world. These beliefs distance them from their victims, and probably make it easier for them to kill their opponents with apparently little or no sense of remorse or guilt (Merari,1990). This mindset was a common finding among the majority of terrorists who were captured and taken into custody from various parts of Pakistan and interviewed while in confinement. The concept of themselves being “good” and their victims “bad” emerges from a range of religious, ideological, social, and cultural factors. Related to this idea is the concept of revenge, renown, and reaction in the pursuit of terrorism (Richardson, 2006). Female suicide bombers are usually more likely to be motivated by emotional factors, including revenge, whereas their male counterparts are driven by political and/or ideological factors (Jacques & Taylor, 2008). Revenge may explain why terrorist attacks often take place on the anniversary of some perceived injustice. Revenge is one of the principal reasons underlying the decision to become a bomber (Berko, 2009), but “machismo” is also reported to be an important factor. The example of Osama bin Laden incorporates most of these concepts. To some, he is viewed as a charming and gentle figure; to others he is a demoniacal figure. Was he fuelled by his own publicity or was he driven by an Islamic fervor or some more deeply rooted psychological factors? Moreover, it is difficult to disentangle his apparent religious and political aspirations, although he consistently emphasized his wish to return to the days of the Caliphate and the law of Sharia. Copyright # 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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Social Perspective For most of the time of Pakistan’s existence, its social environment has been challenged by poverty, illiteracy, disease, insecurity, and injustice. In such a setting, the terrorist was often seen by the oppressed populace less as a villain or an outlaw, and more as a “rescuer” who could “free” the society from its sufferings. Violence has emerged as a societal “norm”, leading to more delinquents, adolescents with conduct disorders, and a culture of “guns and drugs.” A paucity of outlets like sports, music, and gender interaction only makes matters worse. In certain parts of Pakistan, violence has strong cultural and religious endorsement and approval. A study conducted on 1,031 terrorist incidents in the northwestern province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa found that 100% of the perpetrators were unemployed and were motivated by religious factors, and 80% were unmarried (Khan, 2009). Families, too, influence the choice of individuals to commit themselves to terrorist events and to sacrifice their lives (Asal, Fair, & Shellman, 2008). A survey of families of over 100 slain militants showed that those who were materially better off were less likely to consent to their children joining a jihad (holy war) than poorer families (Asal et al., 2008). In their book, Who are Pakistan’s Militants and their Families?, Fair (2008) reported that the role of the family in encouraging or dissuading members to pursue militant links is a crucial subject of enquiry. In Pakistan, the madrassas have certainly been seen through Western eyes as a malevolent influence on young Muslims. These institutions, although under-researched, have developed a mythology of their own in relation to their responsibility for the radicalization of young Pakistanis. A survey of 50,000 households asked why parents chose to send their children to madrassas (Cockcroft, 2009). The primary reason seemed to be because these institutions provided good Islamic education. The second most common reason was the low cost of the madrassas and their provision of food and clothing (Cockcroft, 2009). In a study of Deobandi (a Muslim sect) religious schools, Bano (2007) asserted that only a small proportion of these institutions promote extremism, and that their reputation as “breeding grounds for terror” may not be justified.
Religious Perspective The 21st century has witnessed a revival of religious fundamentalism that runs counter to the previous perception that secularization, although erratic, is irreversible. The concept that the rise of modern society and the decay of religion are two sides of the same coin has unfortunately proved to be wrong. Even today, multiple examples exist of soldiers around the world displaying bravery and valor heading into battle at times knowing full well that theirs is a one-way journey. They make a choice, more likely than not, to go into battle and sacrifice their lives for a greater good, an ideal they believe in. The concept of self-sacrifice in Pakistan was idealized from the War of 1965 against India (Nawaz, 1965). During this war, at the Battle of Chawanda in the Pakistani city of Sialkot, the Pakistani soldiers tied landmines to their chest and lay down under the Indian tanks, thus halting their advance. The concept of self-sacrifice and martyrdom has been explicitly used in almost all religions, and their “conceptual abuse” in terrorism has started to emerge. Over time, terrorist organizations have groomed and used “suicide bombers” to instill fear into a community, hence furthering their political aims. It is argued that the overwhelming Copyright # 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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majority of bombers have been motivated by the ideology of Islamist martyrdom (Atran, 2003). By contrast, others argue that although suicide bombers are used by organizations for political purposes and claim to be ideologically driven “martyrs,” they are actually suicidal in the clinical sense and are attempting to escape personal crises (Lankford, 2013). The concept of “Islamist martyrdom” and its abuse were highlighted at the conclusion of the Swat operation against terrorism in Pakistan in 2009. A number of adolescents who were to be “future suicide bombers” in Pakistan were taken into custody and, before their release into the community, were psychologically profiled. Their narratives described the recipe for “making a suicide bomber in six weeks.” All the adolescents were recruited by the cleric of the madrassa they attended for their daily Koranic recitation. In the first week, the adolescents were closely observed and those who were more focused on the recitation were invited for more work at the madrassa – it was a gesture of respect to them, as working for the madrassa was considered a pious act. In the second week, the selected adolescents were given a task to note and list vehicles passing through a certain gateway. This was used as a “screening test” of their “obedience” and ability to focus on an “assignment”. Those adolescents who were more focused and vigilant in noting down the vehicles were taken to the next level. In the third week, selected adolescents were sent to a distant seminary where they were instructed in religious scriptures, more of those related to the concept of jihad. The families of these selected adolescents were informed that their siblings had been chosen for a “special religious act” and most parents were unable to exercise their right to grant or withhold permission. Daily sessions were conducted and an extreme emotional environment was experienced by the recruited adolescents, which revolved around the army and law enforcement agency personnel as infidels, thereby justifying their elimination. In the fourth week, they were given emotionally charged sermons, revolving around dreams, the clerics reporting having experienced visions. The visions were supplemented by Koranic scriptures; however, the original meaning was distorted into narratives that involved asking for revenge against the army and the security forces. As the adolescents had been reciting the same verses in Arabic from the Koran, it was “authenticated” that whatever the cleric was reciting was true; however, the adolescents were unaware of the “meaning” of the Koranic scriptures in their local language and were therefore misled by the meanings provided by the cleric. The fifth week would start with a congregation in which the recruits sat with twice the number of other adolescents, who were planted there by the cleric. A sacred “draw” was conducted by the cleric to select those for the “special mission” of God. The draw did not include the names of the planted adolescents, only those of the recruits. As their names were drawn, the recruits were congratulated by everyone. During the sixth week, these recruits remained in isolation and spent all of their time praying and focusing on the suicide bombing mission. They were finally guided to their destination under close supervision by the terrorists. If the terrorists sensed apprehension by any adolescent in blowing himself up, the bomb would be detonated by remote control. The family members of the deceased were informed of the success of their family member in a sacred cause and provided with financial assistance. The Pakistan earthquake of October 2005 affected over three million people of low income and from the poverty-stricken sections of the population residing in the KPK and the Azad Jammu and Kashmir regions of Pakistan. This provided an opportunity Copyright # 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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for the militant and terrorist organizations to reach out to the vulnerable sections of society, offering them food, shelter, clothing, and spiritual support. Many were convinced to opt for training and were recruited in the years that followed. Hundreds and thousands of females were also inducted into madrassas, the largest collection being at the Lal Masjid (Red Mosque) in Islamabad, a stone’s throw from the headquarters of both the Inter Services Intelligence (the primary intelligence agency of Pakistan) and the Navy. The Lal Masjid Incident Judicial Commission reported that, in April 2007, authorities of the Lal Masjid and Jamia Hafsa (LMJH) organized an “Enforcement of Sharia and Azmat-e-Jihad” conference at Lal Masjid, and decided that a “Sharia court” (Islamic court) comprised of 10 clerics would be set up to make decisions against those found to be involved in running brothels and following illegal practices, despite the presence of the Supreme Court of Pakistan only a walking distance away from the Lal Masjid. The commission reported that the leading cleric at the mosque warned the government there would be “suicide attacks” if hurdles were placed in their way. The cleric announced that suicide attacks would be their choice, and that from that day every decision in the area under their control would be made according to Sharia. After that meeting, the activities of LMJH expanded. The students of LMJH rehearsed for combat in a compound next to the mosque and later the surrounding areas were declared “no go” areas for security forces. The lead cleric warned the government that he had a sufficient number of suicide bombers inside the mosque and publicly announced that suicide bombers of Lal Masjid were permitted to find targets and strike wherever they chose to. An operation, headed by the army’s special services group, was eventually conducted to cleanse the mosque and the seminary of the militant elements. There were heavy causalities on both sides, including many homeless adolescents from the 2005 earthquake who died in cross-fire, while being forced to provide cover to the militants. Some clerics in Pakistan have made attempts to separate Islam from terrorism. The Darul Uloom Deoband, the largest Islamic seminary in the world, hosted an antiterrorist conference in 2008. This was attended by 6,000 Deobandi Imams. The conference declared that the synonymity of terrorism and Islam was inaccurate and unhelpful. Nonetheless, there still remain to be found better answers to the question as to why some individuals favor only the jihad version of Islam when there are alternative ways of pursuing and interpreting the Islamic faith (Berko, 2009).
Terrorist Management Theory Perspective Terrorist organizations operating in Pakistan alter and misinterpret the sacred text of the Koran to motivate potential suicide bombers. They do so by exploiting the theme of shahadat (martyrdom) in Islam. Koranic scriptures state that a person whose death is classed as shahadat never dies and remains alive like everybody else, and receives his due from God, except that the mortals cannot see him, and he is promised the highest status in heaven. In the Muslim faith, the world in which a Muslim lives is a transient state, and is an opportunity for the believer to achieve a higher status in the life hereafter. The worldly pursuits and interest in material realities of this world are seen as distractions created by Satan to obstruct and distract the Muslim while he walks the “straight path” (sirat e mustaqeem) that leads him to eternal happiness in heaven. Copyright # 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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Rosenblatt, Greenberg, Solomon, Pyszczynski, & Lyon (1989), their article “Evidence for terror management theory”, proposed that …natural selection bestowed humans and most other animals with a diverse set of adaptations oriented towards self preservation and continued life, with humans alone having the awareness that they will die some day. It is this awareness that creates a state of terror in them.
They highlight the role of self-esteem, world views, and adherence to the norms and values of society in wanting to attain its recognition even after death, in an attempt to transcend death and thus immortalize oneself, as well as to attain eternal paradise. This theory explains the successful, albeit exploitative, use of the concept of shahadat by the trainers of suicide bombers and other terrorist operatives.
CONTROVERSIES Psychosocial Support for the Survivors Although human resilience can be regarded as the norm in relation to terrorist incidents and other traumatic events, there is no doubt that certain terrorist acts can cause serious psychopathology. The risk of psychiatric morbidity is highest when traumatic events are characterized by perceived threat to life, lack of predictability, low controllability, high loss and injury, the risk of recurrence, and exposure to death and mutilation (Ursano, Fullerton, Weisaeth, & Raphael, 2007). In Pakistan, there is a gross scarcity of professional and organized psychosocial support for those affected by such psychopathology. Most mental health professionals lack understanding and the requisite skills to treat conditions like post-traumatic stress disorder, dissociative disorder, anxiety and depression secondary to terrorist acts. The care provided by rescue workers, health authorities, and disaster management authorities is treatment of the physical wounds and provision of financial compensation. Attempts are still under way in Pakistan to organize psychosocial interventions and provide evidence-based treatment options to individuals and families affected by acts of terrorism.
The Family of the Terrorist and the “Missing Persons” Once identified, pictured, or discovered to be a terrorist, how are (and how should) the rest of the family be dealt with? Most terrorists, suicide bombers, and their accomplices know when they enter the terrorists’ network that their bond and relationship with their family is over, that they will never be able to return to them again. Yet there are others whose families are aware of the “pursuits” of the individual. Some even receive shares, compensation or monthly “income” from terrorist organizations, occasionally in foreign currency. The question, in this case, is what should be the attitude of neighbors, relatives, law enforcement agencies, and society at large? In Pakistan, the picture is confusing. Often the families of known terrorists spend the rest of their lives at the mercy of police and security agencies. In a highly religious society where burial rituals are given much importance, a valid, socially cohesive response to the death of a known terrorist or suicide bomber lurks in the darkness. It can range from a highly respectable burial of a “martyr” to a hurried Copyright # 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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burial at night with little or no knowledge or participation from the family, neighbors, and relatives. The normal behavioral and psychological processes of shock, disbelief, denial, guilt, anger, blame, depression and eventual acceptance of the loss may therefore never take place. The social support of the various post-burial rituals (Soyem, Khatam, Jumaiarat, Daswan, and the concluding congregation of Chehlum, held on the fortieth day after the burial) never take place. These rituals, which are known to play a protective role for the mental health of the widow, the offspring, and all others who survive the dead person, are thus denied to them. It is not difficult to assess the long-term risk of abnormal grief, clinical depression, and various other clinical complications that afflict the family members and loved ones of the terrorist. An equally difficult task for mental health professionals is to deal with the family members who suffer from these grief reactions. Left in a quandary, to date the clinicians have no clear guidelines on how to deal with this clinical eventuality. The authors have taken it upon themselves to try to convince the law enforcement agencies and other stakeholders of the right of the family of the deceased to receive mental health and social support, albeit with scant success. It becomes even more difficult in situations where a suicide bomber is considered by the family to be a martyr; in this case, the suicide bomber often leaves a death note in which he lists names of several family members who he demands from God to join him in the heavens. Humanistic and professional handling calls for an approach whereby the family members of the terrorists are respected and not automatically considered terrorists too. A behavioral sciencesoriented approach would demand provision of all psychosocial support to such families. The ethos of the medical profession would also endorse this. Law enforcement agencies are accused by human rights activists and, at times, by high offices of the judiciary of being responsible for additional discomfort to the terrorist’s family by repeatedly interrogating them even after the death of the terrorist. The families of the “missing persons” in Pakistan are indeed emotionally challenged and suffer from psychological trauma of another kind. Living in a state of heightened anxiety and expectation, they may develop “learned helplessness.” The families (particularly the children) of law enforcement personnel abducted or taken hostage by terrorists live under similar conditions. The authors have treated several of these families, who have spent up to five years waiting to receive access to appropriate mental health services. Barraged by an array of possibilities regarding their loved one’s fate, they spend their days and nights praying or visiting faith healers and shrines of saints, living an emotionally numb or even paralyzed life that seems suspended from the day on which they last saw their loved one. Challenged and marred by serious mental health challenges, these families find it stigmatizing when they are asked to seek psychological help. The mental health professionals who try to provide such help are equally lost with regard to counseling and selecting the most appropriate psychotherapeutic interventions. The magnitude of mental health, economic, and psychosocial challenges faced by the wives, children and parents of all the missing persons is immense. The complexity deepens when questions are posed with regard to their pensions or benefits, housing, and eligibility for compensation. Usually, most of these families agree to take compensation meant for the deceased, yet legally they are not entitled to the service benefits after a certain amount of time. No legislation exists to provide guidance in deciding the matter. Such eventualities simply add to the social woes of these unfortunate Copyright # 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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individuals. There can be religious sanctions in certain sects of Islam prohibiting the wives of such persons from marrying or being announced as widows. Given the fact that neither the end of terrorism nor the end of the war on terror is in sight in Pakistan, such complex and impossible scenarios can only become more common and even more complex.
REFERENCES Ahmed, I. (2013). Who began the violence? The how and why of Partition. Agency: IANS. Ahmad, S. (2008). Post-9/11 Turnaround. World Times, 2(3), p. 7. Asal, V., Fair, C. C., & Shellman, S. (2008). Consenting to a child’s decision to join a Jihad: insights from a survey of militant families in Pakistan. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 31,1001–1022. Atran, S. (2003). Genesis of suicide terrorism. Science, 299, 1534–1539. Bano, S. (2007). Beyond politics: The reality of a Deobandi madrassa in Pakistan. Journal of Islamic Studies, 18, 43–68. Berko, A. cited in: Canter, D.; editor. (2009). The faces of terrorism (pp. 163–154). Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell. Bloch, Q. B. (2006). American Intervention in the Muslim World: Before and Beyond 9/11. The Dialogue, (Peshawar: Quarterly Journal), 1(3), 1. Cockcroft, A. (2009). Challenging the myths about madaris in Pakistan: a national household survey of enrolment and reasons for choosing religious schools. International Journal of Educational Development, 29, 342–349. Fair, C. C. (2008). Who are Pakistan’s militants and their families? Terrorism and Political Violence, 20, 49–65. Gardner, E. (2008). Harold Pinter: Theater’s singular voice falls silent. USA Today. Hoffman, B. (1998). Inside Terrorism. Columbia University Press, p. 32. ISBN 0-231-11468-0. Horgan, J. (2008). From profiles to pathways and roots to routes: Perspectives from psychology in radicalization into terrorism. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 618, 80–94. Jacques, K., & Taylor, P. J. (2008). Male and female suicide bombers: different sexes, different reasons? Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 31, 304–326. Khan, N. A. (2009). Suicide bombing in the NWFP: the need for research and information collection on human bombers. Pakistan Journal of Criminology, 1, 67–80. Lankford, A. (2013). The myth of martyrdom: What really drives suicide bombers, rampage shooters, and other self-destructive killers. ISBN 978-0-23-034213-2. Merari, A. (1990). The readiness to kill and die: Suicidal terrorism in the Middle East. In W. Reich (Ed.), Origins of terrorism: Psychologies, ideologies, theologies and states of mind (pp. 118–124). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Musharraf, P. (2006). In the Line of Fire. New York: Free Press, p. 201. Nawaz, U. (1965). Biggest tank battle since World War II: Pakistani victory? The Australian, 14(364), 1–5. Nunberg, G. (2001). Head games / It all started with robespierre / terrorism: The history of a very frightening word. San Francisco Chronicle. Record, J. (2003). Bounding the global war on terrorism, Strategic Studies Institute (SSI). Richardson, L. (2006). What Terrorists Want. London: John Murray. Rosenblatt, A., Greenberg, J., Solomon, S., Pyszczynski, T., & Lyon, D. (1989). Evidence for terror management theory : the effects of mortality salience on reactions to those who violate or uphold cultural values. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 57(4), 681–690. Schorn, D. (2006). Ed Bradley Reports On Extremists Now Deemed Biggest Domestic Terror Threat 60 Minutes. Ursano, R. J., Fullerton, C. S., Weisaeth, L., & Raphael, B. (2007) Individual and community responses to disasters. In R. J. Ursano, C. S. Fullerton, L. Weisaeth, & B. Raphael (Eds.), Textbook of Disaster Psychiatry. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 5. World Health Organization. (2009). A report of the assessment of the mental health system in Pakistan using the World Health Organization – Assessment Instrument for Mental Health Systems (WHO-AIMS).
Copyright # 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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Terrorism in Pakistan: A Behavioral Sciences Perspective Asad Tamizuddin Nizami, M.B.B.S.*, Mowadat Hussain Rana, M.B.B.S.†, Tariq Mahmood Hassan, M.B.B.S.‡ and Fareed Aslam Minhas, M.B.B.S.§ This article reviews the behavioral science perspectives of terrorism in Pakistan. It can be argued that Pakistan has gained worldwide attention for “terrorism” and its role in the “war against terrorism”. The region is well placed geopolitically for economic successes but has been plagued by terrorism in various shapes and forms. A behavioral sciences perspective of terrorism is an attempt to explain it in this part of the world as a complex interplay of historical, geopolitical, anthropological and psychosocial factors and forces. Drawing from theories by Western scholars to explain the behavioral and cognitive underpinnings of a terrorist mind, the authors highlight the peculiarities of similar operatives at individual and group levels. Thorny issues related to the ethical and human right dimensions of the topic are visited from the unique perspective of a society challenged by schisms and divergence of opinions at individual, family, and community levels. The authors have attempted to minimize the political descriptions, although this cannot be avoided entirely, because of the nature of terrorism. Copyright # 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
It is difficult to define terrorism, but most definitions refer to it as unlawful, mass violence directed particularly at civilians, resulting in widespread fear. Such violence is often (but not exclusively) motivated by political, religious, or ideological ideals and intended to induce societal and national changes. However, the international community has as yet not succeeded in developing a consensus on a comprehensive definition of terrorism: The United Nations General Assembly defines political terrorism as : a political violence in an asymmetrical conflict that is designed to induce terror and psychic fear (sometimes indiscriminate) through the violent victimization and destruction of noncombatant targets (sometimes iconic symbols). The purpose of terrorism is to exploit the media in order to achieve maximum attainable publicity as an amplifying force multiplier in order to influence the targeted audience(s) in order to reach short and midterm political goals and/or desired long-term end states (Schorn, 2006).
“Terrorism” is a politically and emotionally charged word, which greatly compounds the difficulty of providing a precise definition (Gardner, 2008; Nunberg, 2001). *Correspondence to: Asad Tamizuddin Nizami, M.B.B.S, Assistant Professor, Institute of Psychiatry, WHO Collaborating Centre for Mental Health, Rawalpindi Medical College, Rawalpindi, Pakistan. E-mail: [email protected] † Director General, Centre for Trauma Research and Psychosocial Interventions, National University of Sciences & Technology (NUST), Islamabad, Pakistan ‡ Department of Psychiatry, Division of Forensic Psychiatry, Queen’s University, Kingston, Ontario Canada § Head Institute of Psychiatry, WHO Collaborating Centre for Mental Health, Rawalpindi Medical College, Rawalpindi, Pakistan
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Attempts by the state to protect civilians against terrorism may also lead to social oppression, and that in turn may result in further acts of terrorism (Hoffman, 1998; Record, 2003). Pakistan is a classic example of a country caught in an ongoing war against terrorism, where the state, its people, its neighbors, allies and friends have had diverse and often conflicting views on the subject. Surprisingly, Pakistan is considered to be both a frontline nation in the international war against terrorism and at the same time a sponsor of international terrorism. More than a decade after its active involvement in an all-out war against terrorism, it finds its allies as well as its own government entering into a dialogue with the terrorist organizations to find a palatable solution. At this important juncture in history, this article aims to look at terrorism in Pakistan from the perspective of the behavioral sciences. It takes into account an interplay of diverse factors that have contributed to unprecedented suffering by the nation at the hands of terrorists. The article also takes into account the country’s unique and advantageous geopolitical status, which has resulted in a peculiar anthropological experience through its use as a corridor used for thousands of year by Greeks, Arabs, Mongols, Turks, Afghans, and Iranians to reach India’s capital, Delhi, the seat of power in the subcontinent. We also discuss the psychological, social, and religious vulnerabilities of the people of Pakistan, which may predispose this country to both contributing to, and becoming a victim of, terrorism.
PAKISTAN: GEOPOLITICAL SCENARIO Pakistan is situated in the northwest part of the South Asian subcontinent and lies between 24ºN and 37ºN in latitude and 67ºE and 75ºE in longitude. It is bordered to the east by India (1,950 km) and to the north and northwest by Afghanistan (1,200 km), including the one-km-wide, largely porous Wahkhan strip. To the southwest is the oil-rich heart of the Persian Gulf region, Iran (800 km), and to the south is the Arabian Sea. Pakistan also has a common border to the north with China (600 km). From a strategic point of view, Pakistan is at the crossroads of central, south and southwest Asia and provides the easiest and the quickest link between the oil-rich Persian Gulf and China. Its upcoming Gwadar sea port is a natural harbor that has the potential to serve the Central Asian states and Russia through Afghanistan. Pakistan is a federation of four provinces (Sindh, Punjab, Baluchistan, and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa), a capital territory (Islamabad) and a group of federally administered tribal areas in the northwest along with the disputed area of Azad Jammu and Kashmir (World Health Organization, 2009). Pakistan has a geographical area of approximately 800,000 sq. km which is spread over a diverse terrain, comprising some of the highest peaks of the world, such as K2, deep valleys, the fertile plains of the world’s oldest civilization, the Indus Valley, and deserts in Sindh and Balochistan. Pakistan is the world’s sixth most populous country with a population of 180,808,000. The average population density is 229 individuals per sq. km, and the population is projected to reach 210 million by 2020 and then to double by 2045. Pakistan has access to the Indian Ocean, through which most of the world’s trade passes, and enjoys 700 km of coastline, with the promise of offshore oil and gas Copyright # 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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reserves. China, which is developing its southern and western provinces, particularly the Xinjiang region, shares a border with Pakistan and is merely 2,600 km away from the sea ports of Karachi and Gwadar. Pakistan offers a unique opportunity for China and other Central Asian states that are landlocked to have trade access to the Indian Ocean. The main geopolitical threat to Pakistan is the compromised strategic position that was traditionally provided by the friendly Pakhtuns (residents of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province) in the northwest of the country, but which is now challenged by al-Qaeda and the anti-Pakistan Taliban of Afghanistan. The terrorist organizations, sponsoring a separatist movement in Balochistan, are hampering the realization of the full potential of the province in terms of its mineral, oil, and gas resources. These organizations pose the same threat to the road linking China to the Gwadar port and to the gas pipeline project with Iran. However, despite the geopolitical advantages, factors that perpetuate terrorism include the population explosion, rampant poverty, illiteracy, poor health parameters, severe power shortages, unexploited natural resources, a fragile industrial and agricultural infrastructure, limited financial resources and, in the last decade, the ongoing war against terrorism.
EVOLUTION OF TERRORISM IN PAKISTAN The northwest region of the country bordering Afghanistan is the part of Pakistan that has been worst hit by terrorism since September 2001, with its epicenter in and around the city of Peshawar, capital of the province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK). Historically, the famous “Khyber Pass” in KPK has served as an important route for armies that invaded the subcontinent and India from the northwest. Throughout history the inhabitants of this part of Pakistan have been exposed to wars, battles, armament, and soldiers. Trading in arms and ammunition is a norm. Pakhtun men are expected to carry a weapon as an integral part of their dress. Indeed, they feel “naked” without it. Many sections of this diverse society are practitioners of a concept of religion that discourages modernization and the participation of women in educational and occupational pursuits. A behavioral sciences approach to the evolution of terrorism in this region must link these influences to the collective unconscious (Carl Jung) of the largely Muslim population, particularly the Pakhtun tribes that have occupied the northwest of Pakistan for centuries. The current wave of insurgency shows gross similarities to a similar movement led by the clerics Syed Ahmed Barevli (1786–1831) and Shah Ismail when the region was under Sikh rule in the 19th century. The two clerics revered themselves as saints and great warriors, who were fighting for the implementation of an Islamic way of life. Many Pakhtun tribes rallied under them, took up arms under the leadership of Syed Ahmed, who declared himself to be the Amir ul Momineen (Head of the Believers), and challenged the military might of the Sikhs. They demanded and implemented a change in the traditional lifestyles of the inhabitants, strictly implementing their concept of Sharia (Islamic lifestyle) and started to collect 10% of the people’s gross earnings as Ushr (a form of taxation introduced in the early years of Islam). Annexing hundreds of villages in and around Peshawar, they enhanced their influence and fought pitched battles against Sikh armies at their stronghold at Akora Copyright # 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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(the current site of one of the largest religious seminaries in Pakistan, with its alumni including Mullah Umar, the former Taliban ruler of Afghanistan) in the 1820 s. This movement took root and gained momentum in the same geographical and cultural area where Fazal Ullah (the current commander of Taliban in Pakistan) and his father-in-law, Sufi Muhammad, took up arms against the Pakistan government from 2002 to 2009, and attempted to establish a very similar Islamic state in the Swat district of KPK. The movement was eventually crushed by the forces of Ranjeet Singh (1780–1839) when he joined hands with local tribal chieftains, in a battle at Balakot in the Hindu Kush mountains. The establishment of the Sikh militias led to the formation of the Sikh State in the early 19th century. Both clerics were killed in the battle of Balakot and achieved the status of martyrs of Islam. Thus, the anthropological roots and strategic inspiration for today’s insurgency and militancy in this region are hundreds of years old. At the time of Pakistan’s independence in 1947, examples of extortion and extremism – emanating from acts of aggression, brutality, killings, arson, looting, rape, and torture of Muslim migrants by Hindu and Sikh extremists –were rampant during the mass migration to Pakistan. The gory details of these acts of terror are still fresh in the minds of present-day survivors. An estimated one million people lost their lives and 14–18 million people were forcefully displaced. In Punjab alone, the loss of life was between 500,000 and 800,000, and 10 million people were forcefully displaced (Ahmed, 2013). After the Second World War, this was the first case of ethnic cleansing, through terrorism, that took place in Pakistan. The Kashmir conflict is a territorial dispute involving India, Kashmiri insurgent groups and Pakistan that has continued since 1947. India and Pakistan have fought at least three wars over the Kashmir issue, including the wars of 1947, 1965, and 1999. This issue has continuously sparked violence and acts of terrorism in the region. An armed insurgency in Kashmir led to the formation of militant wings, which were in fact the beginning of the mujahideen insurgency, and continues to this day. India contends that the insurgency was largely started by Afghan mujahideen who entered the Kashmir valley after the end of the Soviet Afghan war. The 1960s Mukti Bahni movement in the east wing of Pakistan, urging that a separate homeland be established for the Bengalis (local population of East Pakistan), was marred by terror and violence. It was a classic example of the worsening vicious cycle of terrorism and counter-terrorism. As a result, a new country, Bangla Desh (Homeland of the Bengalis) came into being in 1971, but it endorsed the use of similar terror tactics and foreign support for the separatist elements in Balochistan and the North West Frontier province of Pakistan. Using a behavioral model, the antecedents and consequences of these events may have led to both operant and classical conditioning for pursuing violent means in the pursuance of political agendas. For the two decades after 1971, successive regimes undertook measures, particularly in Balochistan and Sindh, to curb what they considered challenges to the integrity of the country. Meanwhile, the entry of the Soviet Union into Afghanistan in 1979 prompted the United States, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and China to support rebels fighting against the Soviet-backed Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and to funnel foreign support to the mujahideen and rebel groups all across Afghanistan. The war also attracted Arab volunteers, known as “Afghan Arabs”, including Osama bin Laden. The humanist Rogerian concept of “unconditional positive regard” was stretched well beyond its wildest possible interpretation when Pakistan and Saudi Arabia became the first and probably the only two countries to recognize the Taliban government in Copyright # 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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Kabul as legitimate. This “regard and recognition” of a terrorist group that went on a rampage and started destroying Buddhist relics, subjugating women, closing girls’ schools and swiftly and systematically destroying progressive thought, was ignored by the civil society in Afghanistan. On the home front, the mujahideen, who were being equipped with the latest weapons by the U.S. during the Afghan war, included many of the clerics and students of madrassas (seminaries, usually attached to a mosque, for imparting religious education), and they returned, along with their ammunition, from the Afghan war to their respective villages in Punjab and Sindh as battle-hardened soldiers. The rural and suburban cultures of regions far away from the Afghan border, and in the heart of the Punjab, now had a “new authority” on stage, which until then had been dominated by the feudal lords and industrialists. Most of these clerics received regular foreign funding to make madrassas that were bigger than ever and which were to become the breeding grounds for terrorists of the post-9/11 era (Ahmad, 2008). The authors believe that successive governments looked the other way as the terrorist groups made inroads into the society to become a “subculture”. In the meantime, the evangelical schools working with young men and women alike provided a perfect cover for them to be converted to a militant way of life by representatives of terrorist groups. The regular recruitment of young men from across the country to be used as suicide bombers and jihadi fighters was not once denounced by the religious leaders and leaders of political parties. The war on terror in Afghanistan was an intervention by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and allied forces in the Afghan political struggle, under cover of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, to dismantle the al-Qaeda terrorist organization and to remove the Taliban government from power, which at the time controlled 90% of Afghanistan. The U.S. and its allies drove the Taliban from power; however, most al-Qaeda and Taliban members escaped to neighboring Pakistan or retreated to rural or remote mountainous regions. While NATO forces continued to battle the Taliban insurgency, the war expanded into neighboring north-west Pakistan. Most of the mujahideen groups from the Afghan war were never disarmed and some of these groups were later activated in the form of the Lashkar-e-Taiba, the Harkat-ulMujahideen and others, such as the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). The same groups started taking on the state itself, causing the greatest threat to both the state and the citizens of Pakistan through the politically motivated killing of civilians and police officials. The annual death toll from terrorist attacks in Pakistan ranged from 164 in 2003 to 3,318 in 2009 (Bloch, 2006; Musharraf, 2006) with a total of 35,000 Pakistanis killed between September 11, 2001 and May 2011. According to the government of Pakistan, the direct and indirect economic costs of terrorism totaled 68 billion US dollars from the years 2000 to 2010 (Bloch, 2006). From the late 1990s onwards, the callousness and pathological nature of “la belle indifference” shown by mainstream society set in, leading to a partial paralysis of civic life and the state machinery. While the majority of the population is still committed to liberalism, progress, democracy, a pluralistic world view, tolerance, and peace, there is an ever-growing, deep intrusion of reactionary, fundamentalist, and pagan thinking in some sections of Pakistani society. A deeper understanding of how these macrosocopic changes have influenced the psyche and social lives of the vulnerable population falling prey to terrorism is in order. Copyright # 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE PERSPECTIVES Psychological Perspective From its inception in 1947, the Pakistani nation was challenged by the trauma of migration, where millions were killed, looted, murdered, raped, and burnt alive by Hindu and Sikh extremists. Stability in the nation was significantly hampered by the lack of resources, the burden of hundreds and thousands of homeless families, and the mass influx of migrants form East Pakistan to West Pakistan across a tortuous landscape. The country lost its leader Muhammad Ali Jinnah in 1948, and within a year of his death, through the Objectives Resolution adopted by the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan on March 12, 1949, the democratic, liberal, and secular spirit gave way to a particular interpretation of religion, which had little to offer to its non-Muslim minorities. These events were followed by wars with India in 1948 and 1965, which, along with the eventual separation of East from West Pakistan, were traumatic events for the entire nation. These events were bound to be reflected in the psychological profile of individual citizens. Mixed with socioeconomic adversity, these political challenges have affected the psyche of the average Pakistani. It is against this backdrop that we need to understand the psychological perspective of terrorism in Pakistan. It may not be appropriate to label all terrorists as merely psychopathic personalities or mad people (Atran, 2003; Horgan, 2008). It may be equally naïve to consider a suicide bomber as a depressed or suicidal individual. To understand the “psychology” of a terrorist in Pakistan or otherwise, one must try to understand how they view their own conduct and why. They view their own actions as rational and purposeful, driven in response to their own perception of social, political, religious, and other realities (Horgan, 2008). But dismissing terrorists as “mad”, “evil” or “aliens” is perhaps reassuring as it distances us from them and their motives. The thinking that “I am good and right” and “You are bad and wrong” prevails in the mind of a terrorist in any part of the world. These beliefs distance them from their victims, and probably make it easier for them to kill their opponents with apparently little or no sense of remorse or guilt (Merari,1990). This mindset was a common finding among the majority of terrorists who were captured and taken into custody from various parts of Pakistan and interviewed while in confinement. The concept of themselves being “good” and their victims “bad” emerges from a range of religious, ideological, social, and cultural factors. Related to this idea is the concept of revenge, renown, and reaction in the pursuit of terrorism (Richardson, 2006). Female suicide bombers are usually more likely to be motivated by emotional factors, including revenge, whereas their male counterparts are driven by political and/or ideological factors (Jacques & Taylor, 2008). Revenge may explain why terrorist attacks often take place on the anniversary of some perceived injustice. Revenge is one of the principal reasons underlying the decision to become a bomber (Berko, 2009), but “machismo” is also reported to be an important factor. The example of Osama bin Laden incorporates most of these concepts. To some, he is viewed as a charming and gentle figure; to others he is a demoniacal figure. Was he fuelled by his own publicity or was he driven by an Islamic fervor or some more deeply rooted psychological factors? Moreover, it is difficult to disentangle his apparent religious and political aspirations, although he consistently emphasized his wish to return to the days of the Caliphate and the law of Sharia. Copyright # 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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Social Perspective For most of the time of Pakistan’s existence, its social environment has been challenged by poverty, illiteracy, disease, insecurity, and injustice. In such a setting, the terrorist was often seen by the oppressed populace less as a villain or an outlaw, and more as a “rescuer” who could “free” the society from its sufferings. Violence has emerged as a societal “norm”, leading to more delinquents, adolescents with conduct disorders, and a culture of “guns and drugs.” A paucity of outlets like sports, music, and gender interaction only makes matters worse. In certain parts of Pakistan, violence has strong cultural and religious endorsement and approval. A study conducted on 1,031 terrorist incidents in the northwestern province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa found that 100% of the perpetrators were unemployed and were motivated by religious factors, and 80% were unmarried (Khan, 2009). Families, too, influence the choice of individuals to commit themselves to terrorist events and to sacrifice their lives (Asal, Fair, & Shellman, 2008). A survey of families of over 100 slain militants showed that those who were materially better off were less likely to consent to their children joining a jihad (holy war) than poorer families (Asal et al., 2008). In their book, Who are Pakistan’s Militants and their Families?, Fair (2008) reported that the role of the family in encouraging or dissuading members to pursue militant links is a crucial subject of enquiry. In Pakistan, the madrassas have certainly been seen through Western eyes as a malevolent influence on young Muslims. These institutions, although under-researched, have developed a mythology of their own in relation to their responsibility for the radicalization of young Pakistanis. A survey of 50,000 households asked why parents chose to send their children to madrassas (Cockcroft, 2009). The primary reason seemed to be because these institutions provided good Islamic education. The second most common reason was the low cost of the madrassas and their provision of food and clothing (Cockcroft, 2009). In a study of Deobandi (a Muslim sect) religious schools, Bano (2007) asserted that only a small proportion of these institutions promote extremism, and that their reputation as “breeding grounds for terror” may not be justified.
Religious Perspective The 21st century has witnessed a revival of religious fundamentalism that runs counter to the previous perception that secularization, although erratic, is irreversible. The concept that the rise of modern society and the decay of religion are two sides of the same coin has unfortunately proved to be wrong. Even today, multiple examples exist of soldiers around the world displaying bravery and valor heading into battle at times knowing full well that theirs is a one-way journey. They make a choice, more likely than not, to go into battle and sacrifice their lives for a greater good, an ideal they believe in. The concept of self-sacrifice in Pakistan was idealized from the War of 1965 against India (Nawaz, 1965). During this war, at the Battle of Chawanda in the Pakistani city of Sialkot, the Pakistani soldiers tied landmines to their chest and lay down under the Indian tanks, thus halting their advance. The concept of self-sacrifice and martyrdom has been explicitly used in almost all religions, and their “conceptual abuse” in terrorism has started to emerge. Over time, terrorist organizations have groomed and used “suicide bombers” to instill fear into a community, hence furthering their political aims. It is argued that the overwhelming Copyright # 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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majority of bombers have been motivated by the ideology of Islamist martyrdom (Atran, 2003). By contrast, others argue that although suicide bombers are used by organizations for political purposes and claim to be ideologically driven “martyrs,” they are actually suicidal in the clinical sense and are attempting to escape personal crises (Lankford, 2013). The concept of “Islamist martyrdom” and its abuse were highlighted at the conclusion of the Swat operation against terrorism in Pakistan in 2009. A number of adolescents who were to be “future suicide bombers” in Pakistan were taken into custody and, before their release into the community, were psychologically profiled. Their narratives described the recipe for “making a suicide bomber in six weeks.” All the adolescents were recruited by the cleric of the madrassa they attended for their daily Koranic recitation. In the first week, the adolescents were closely observed and those who were more focused on the recitation were invited for more work at the madrassa – it was a gesture of respect to them, as working for the madrassa was considered a pious act. In the second week, the selected adolescents were given a task to note and list vehicles passing through a certain gateway. This was used as a “screening test” of their “obedience” and ability to focus on an “assignment”. Those adolescents who were more focused and vigilant in noting down the vehicles were taken to the next level. In the third week, selected adolescents were sent to a distant seminary where they were instructed in religious scriptures, more of those related to the concept of jihad. The families of these selected adolescents were informed that their siblings had been chosen for a “special religious act” and most parents were unable to exercise their right to grant or withhold permission. Daily sessions were conducted and an extreme emotional environment was experienced by the recruited adolescents, which revolved around the army and law enforcement agency personnel as infidels, thereby justifying their elimination. In the fourth week, they were given emotionally charged sermons, revolving around dreams, the clerics reporting having experienced visions. The visions were supplemented by Koranic scriptures; however, the original meaning was distorted into narratives that involved asking for revenge against the army and the security forces. As the adolescents had been reciting the same verses in Arabic from the Koran, it was “authenticated” that whatever the cleric was reciting was true; however, the adolescents were unaware of the “meaning” of the Koranic scriptures in their local language and were therefore misled by the meanings provided by the cleric. The fifth week would start with a congregation in which the recruits sat with twice the number of other adolescents, who were planted there by the cleric. A sacred “draw” was conducted by the cleric to select those for the “special mission” of God. The draw did not include the names of the planted adolescents, only those of the recruits. As their names were drawn, the recruits were congratulated by everyone. During the sixth week, these recruits remained in isolation and spent all of their time praying and focusing on the suicide bombing mission. They were finally guided to their destination under close supervision by the terrorists. If the terrorists sensed apprehension by any adolescent in blowing himself up, the bomb would be detonated by remote control. The family members of the deceased were informed of the success of their family member in a sacred cause and provided with financial assistance. The Pakistan earthquake of October 2005 affected over three million people of low income and from the poverty-stricken sections of the population residing in the KPK and the Azad Jammu and Kashmir regions of Pakistan. This provided an opportunity Copyright # 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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for the militant and terrorist organizations to reach out to the vulnerable sections of society, offering them food, shelter, clothing, and spiritual support. Many were convinced to opt for training and were recruited in the years that followed. Hundreds and thousands of females were also inducted into madrassas, the largest collection being at the Lal Masjid (Red Mosque) in Islamabad, a stone’s throw from the headquarters of both the Inter Services Intelligence (the primary intelligence agency of Pakistan) and the Navy. The Lal Masjid Incident Judicial Commission reported that, in April 2007, authorities of the Lal Masjid and Jamia Hafsa (LMJH) organized an “Enforcement of Sharia and Azmat-e-Jihad” conference at Lal Masjid, and decided that a “Sharia court” (Islamic court) comprised of 10 clerics would be set up to make decisions against those found to be involved in running brothels and following illegal practices, despite the presence of the Supreme Court of Pakistan only a walking distance away from the Lal Masjid. The commission reported that the leading cleric at the mosque warned the government there would be “suicide attacks” if hurdles were placed in their way. The cleric announced that suicide attacks would be their choice, and that from that day every decision in the area under their control would be made according to Sharia. After that meeting, the activities of LMJH expanded. The students of LMJH rehearsed for combat in a compound next to the mosque and later the surrounding areas were declared “no go” areas for security forces. The lead cleric warned the government that he had a sufficient number of suicide bombers inside the mosque and publicly announced that suicide bombers of Lal Masjid were permitted to find targets and strike wherever they chose to. An operation, headed by the army’s special services group, was eventually conducted to cleanse the mosque and the seminary of the militant elements. There were heavy causalities on both sides, including many homeless adolescents from the 2005 earthquake who died in cross-fire, while being forced to provide cover to the militants. Some clerics in Pakistan have made attempts to separate Islam from terrorism. The Darul Uloom Deoband, the largest Islamic seminary in the world, hosted an antiterrorist conference in 2008. This was attended by 6,000 Deobandi Imams. The conference declared that the synonymity of terrorism and Islam was inaccurate and unhelpful. Nonetheless, there still remain to be found better answers to the question as to why some individuals favor only the jihad version of Islam when there are alternative ways of pursuing and interpreting the Islamic faith (Berko, 2009).
Terrorist Management Theory Perspective Terrorist organizations operating in Pakistan alter and misinterpret the sacred text of the Koran to motivate potential suicide bombers. They do so by exploiting the theme of shahadat (martyrdom) in Islam. Koranic scriptures state that a person whose death is classed as shahadat never dies and remains alive like everybody else, and receives his due from God, except that the mortals cannot see him, and he is promised the highest status in heaven. In the Muslim faith, the world in which a Muslim lives is a transient state, and is an opportunity for the believer to achieve a higher status in the life hereafter. The worldly pursuits and interest in material realities of this world are seen as distractions created by Satan to obstruct and distract the Muslim while he walks the “straight path” (sirat e mustaqeem) that leads him to eternal happiness in heaven. Copyright # 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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Rosenblatt, Greenberg, Solomon, Pyszczynski, & Lyon (1989), their article “Evidence for terror management theory”, proposed that …natural selection bestowed humans and most other animals with a diverse set of adaptations oriented towards self preservation and continued life, with humans alone having the awareness that they will die some day. It is this awareness that creates a state of terror in them.
They highlight the role of self-esteem, world views, and adherence to the norms and values of society in wanting to attain its recognition even after death, in an attempt to transcend death and thus immortalize oneself, as well as to attain eternal paradise. This theory explains the successful, albeit exploitative, use of the concept of shahadat by the trainers of suicide bombers and other terrorist operatives.
CONTROVERSIES Psychosocial Support for the Survivors Although human resilience can be regarded as the norm in relation to terrorist incidents and other traumatic events, there is no doubt that certain terrorist acts can cause serious psychopathology. The risk of psychiatric morbidity is highest when traumatic events are characterized by perceived threat to life, lack of predictability, low controllability, high loss and injury, the risk of recurrence, and exposure to death and mutilation (Ursano, Fullerton, Weisaeth, & Raphael, 2007). In Pakistan, there is a gross scarcity of professional and organized psychosocial support for those affected by such psychopathology. Most mental health professionals lack understanding and the requisite skills to treat conditions like post-traumatic stress disorder, dissociative disorder, anxiety and depression secondary to terrorist acts. The care provided by rescue workers, health authorities, and disaster management authorities is treatment of the physical wounds and provision of financial compensation. Attempts are still under way in Pakistan to organize psychosocial interventions and provide evidence-based treatment options to individuals and families affected by acts of terrorism.
The Family of the Terrorist and the “Missing Persons” Once identified, pictured, or discovered to be a terrorist, how are (and how should) the rest of the family be dealt with? Most terrorists, suicide bombers, and their accomplices know when they enter the terrorists’ network that their bond and relationship with their family is over, that they will never be able to return to them again. Yet there are others whose families are aware of the “pursuits” of the individual. Some even receive shares, compensation or monthly “income” from terrorist organizations, occasionally in foreign currency. The question, in this case, is what should be the attitude of neighbors, relatives, law enforcement agencies, and society at large? In Pakistan, the picture is confusing. Often the families of known terrorists spend the rest of their lives at the mercy of police and security agencies. In a highly religious society where burial rituals are given much importance, a valid, socially cohesive response to the death of a known terrorist or suicide bomber lurks in the darkness. It can range from a highly respectable burial of a “martyr” to a hurried Copyright # 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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burial at night with little or no knowledge or participation from the family, neighbors, and relatives. The normal behavioral and psychological processes of shock, disbelief, denial, guilt, anger, blame, depression and eventual acceptance of the loss may therefore never take place. The social support of the various post-burial rituals (Soyem, Khatam, Jumaiarat, Daswan, and the concluding congregation of Chehlum, held on the fortieth day after the burial) never take place. These rituals, which are known to play a protective role for the mental health of the widow, the offspring, and all others who survive the dead person, are thus denied to them. It is not difficult to assess the long-term risk of abnormal grief, clinical depression, and various other clinical complications that afflict the family members and loved ones of the terrorist. An equally difficult task for mental health professionals is to deal with the family members who suffer from these grief reactions. Left in a quandary, to date the clinicians have no clear guidelines on how to deal with this clinical eventuality. The authors have taken it upon themselves to try to convince the law enforcement agencies and other stakeholders of the right of the family of the deceased to receive mental health and social support, albeit with scant success. It becomes even more difficult in situations where a suicide bomber is considered by the family to be a martyr; in this case, the suicide bomber often leaves a death note in which he lists names of several family members who he demands from God to join him in the heavens. Humanistic and professional handling calls for an approach whereby the family members of the terrorists are respected and not automatically considered terrorists too. A behavioral sciencesoriented approach would demand provision of all psychosocial support to such families. The ethos of the medical profession would also endorse this. Law enforcement agencies are accused by human rights activists and, at times, by high offices of the judiciary of being responsible for additional discomfort to the terrorist’s family by repeatedly interrogating them even after the death of the terrorist. The families of the “missing persons” in Pakistan are indeed emotionally challenged and suffer from psychological trauma of another kind. Living in a state of heightened anxiety and expectation, they may develop “learned helplessness.” The families (particularly the children) of law enforcement personnel abducted or taken hostage by terrorists live under similar conditions. The authors have treated several of these families, who have spent up to five years waiting to receive access to appropriate mental health services. Barraged by an array of possibilities regarding their loved one’s fate, they spend their days and nights praying or visiting faith healers and shrines of saints, living an emotionally numb or even paralyzed life that seems suspended from the day on which they last saw their loved one. Challenged and marred by serious mental health challenges, these families find it stigmatizing when they are asked to seek psychological help. The mental health professionals who try to provide such help are equally lost with regard to counseling and selecting the most appropriate psychotherapeutic interventions. The magnitude of mental health, economic, and psychosocial challenges faced by the wives, children and parents of all the missing persons is immense. The complexity deepens when questions are posed with regard to their pensions or benefits, housing, and eligibility for compensation. Usually, most of these families agree to take compensation meant for the deceased, yet legally they are not entitled to the service benefits after a certain amount of time. No legislation exists to provide guidance in deciding the matter. Such eventualities simply add to the social woes of these unfortunate Copyright # 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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individuals. There can be religious sanctions in certain sects of Islam prohibiting the wives of such persons from marrying or being announced as widows. Given the fact that neither the end of terrorism nor the end of the war on terror is in sight in Pakistan, such complex and impossible scenarios can only become more common and even more complex.
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