The Journal of Social Psychology, 155: 356–369, 2015 Copyright © Taylor & Francis Group, LLC ISSN: 0022-4545 print / 1940-1183 online DOI: 10.1080/00224545.2015.1015476

Subjective Social Status and Well-Being: The Role of Referent Abstraction HEATHER M. HAUGHT JASON ROSE ANDREW GEERS JILL A. BROWN University of Toledo

ABSTRACT. Subjective social status (SSS) has been shown to predict well-being and mental health, above and beyond objective social status (OSS). However, little is known about the factors that moderate this relationship. Two studies explored whether the link between SSS and well-being varied depending upon the referent used for comparison in SSS judgments. Participants judged their well-being and SSS in comparison to referents that varied in abstraction. A confirmatory factor analysis on SSS judgments yielded two factors: (a) SSS perceptions toward global referents and (b) SSS perceptions toward local referents. SSS relative to a global referent was a better predictor of depression (Studies 1 and 2), life satisfaction (Studies 1 and 2), and self-esteem (Study 2) than SSS relative to a local referent. These findings have theoretical implications for understanding how people differentiate between local vs. global referents and practical implications for status-related health disparities. Keywords: social comparison, social status, well-being

FOR BOTH HUMAN AND NON-HUMAN PRIMATES, one’s status relative to others is essential for successful social interaction (Cheney & Seyfarth, 1990; Fiske, 1992, 2010) and has important implications for health and well-being (Sapolsky, 1982; Singh-Manoux, Adler, & Marmot, 2003). In relation to health, low social status is associated with more adverse health outcomes than high social status (Adler & Rehkopf, 2008; Morozink, Friedman, Coe, & Ryff, 2010). For example, objective social status (OSS) indicators in humans (i.e., income, education, and occupation) are associated with various outcomes, such as depression (D’souza, Strazdins, Clements, Broom, Parslow, & Rodgers, 2005), oral health (Mõttus, Starr, & Deary, 2013), cardiovascular disease (Kershaw, Mezuk, Abdou, Rafferty, & Jackson, 2010; Kaplan & Keil, 1993), and immune function (Glaser & Kietcolt-Glaser, 1994; Stowe et al., 2010). Although the link between OSS indicators, health, and well-being appears to be relatively straightforward, the realization that health disparities occur throughout the social hierarchy rather than simply at the poverty threshold suggests that the status-health link does not derive solely

Address correspondence to Heather M. Haught, University of Toledo, Department of Psychology, 2801 West Bancroft St., Toledo, OH 43606, USA. E-mail: [email protected]

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from resource-based deprivation. In one study, for instance, Cohen, Doyle, and Baum (2006) found that the link between status and health is not mitigated even in countries with universal healthcare. That is, even when resource deprivation is reduced in a relevant domain, discrepancies in overall health and mortality persist as a function of social status. Findings such as these have served to shift the focus of health disparities research away from OSS indicators alone and toward the investigation of subjective social status (SSS)—an individual’s perception of his or her position within the social hierarchy (Alder, Epel, Castellazzo, & Ickovics, 2000; Kraus, Adler, & Chen, 2012; Wolff, Subramanian, Acevedo-Garcia, Weber, & Kawachi, 2010). The current research explores whether the strength of the relationship between SSS, mental health, and well-being depends upon the nature of the comparison group on which subjective social status is derived (i.e., local vs. global referents). Social Comparison, Subjective Social Status, and Well-Being In an effort to examine the social processes underlying judgments of SSS, researchers have turned their attention to the specific criteria people use in order to place themselves within the social hierarchy. Such inquiry has generally centered on the “what” of SSS. That is, studies have examined whether SSS judgments are based more on the information people gain from classic OSS indicators (i.e., income, education, occupation) and measures of wealth vs. social psychological variables such as well-being, stress, and life satisfaction (Singh-Manoux et al., 2003). On the other hand, far less research has focused on the “whom” of SSS. For instance, it is relatively unknown who people are using as a point of comparison when making SSS judgments. Over the past five decades, social comparison theorists (e.g., Festinger, 1954; Suls & Wheeler, 2000) have accumulated a vast and compelling literature to suggest that people compare themselves with a variety of different referent groups as a means of evaluating their attributes, abilities, and opinions. Critically, for the current manuscript, researchers have made a distinction between local comparison referents (e.g., a best friend) and global comparison referents (e.g., the average student; Buckingham & Alicke, 2002; Klein, 2002; Zell & Alicke, 2010). In general, global referents refer to impersonal representations across large social categories such as sex, nationality, and occupation, whereas local referents refer to personal or concrete representations such as family and friends. Some initial research suggests that the distinction between local and global comparisons may be important. For example, people tend to demonstrate more comparative judgment bias in the context of global referents than local referents (Alicke, Klotz, Breitenbecher, Yurak, & Vredenburg, 1995) and are often more sensitive to local referents when forming self-evaluations (Zell & Alicke, 2010; 2013). Despite the intuitive appeal of this distinction between global and local referents, there has been little systematic research on how these two types of comparisons are made, and on whether they are differentially important for psychological outcomes, including well-being. Moreover, of the studies that have been done, none have examined the interplay between SSS perceptions, referent abstraction, and well-being. This is surprising given that well-being is related to a variety of clinically important outcomes, including productivity and achievement at work and school, the quality of social relationships, substance abuse, and even survival (Ostir, Markides, Black, & Goodwin, 2000; Palmore & Luikart, 1972; Proctor, Linley, & Maltby, 2010; Zullig, Valois, Huebner, Oeltmann, & Drane, 2001). The current research will fill this gap in the literature

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by systematically examining the distinction between local and global SSS ratings and their consequences for well-being (e.g., depression, life satisfaction).

STUDY 1 There were two main goals for Study 1. First, we sought to clarify several issues relevant to people’s judgments of SSS relative to local and global referents. Although prior research has assumed that people think and process information about local and global referents differently in terms of SSS, there are limitations in that research. For instance, prior research has relied on a restricted range of referents that did not provide an adequate representation of the “local” referent group (Wolff et al., 2010). Moreover, this prior research did not systematically examine and conduct factor analyses to determine whether local and global distinctions emerged in judgments of SSS. In Study 1, participants judged their SSS relative to an extensive set of referent groups that varied more widely than in past research in their level of abstraction, spanning from highly concrete (i.e., best friend) to highly abstract (i.e., average American). Here we sought to provide a firmer empirical basis for the assumption that participants would distinguish between a global factor characterized by impersonal and abstract referents and a local factor characterized by concrete and individuated referents. The second goal of Study 1 was to examine the role of referent abstraction in the relationship between SSS and various indicators of well-being, including depression and life satisfaction. Although prior research has shown that SSS is correlated with well-being (e.g., D’souza et al., 2005), no study has examined whether this relationship is sensitive to the referent used for comparison. Based on prior research, two competing hypotheses were tendered. The first was that SSS ratings relative to local referents would more strongly correlate with mental health and wellbeing than SSS ratings relative to global referents. This idea is consistent with research on the local dominance effect (Zell & Alicke, 2010; 2013) showing that local comparison information is a better predictor of self-evaluations than global comparison information. Presumably, this is because people evolved in small groups where their survival depended upon their rank relative to close group members (Buss, 2009). Today, people continue to live and work with a small number of friends, family, and acquaintances despite access to the Internet and greater geographic mobility (Brewer & Caporael, 2006; Zell & Alicke, 2010); and people’s success (or failure) hinges upon their performance relative to local group members. It is not surprising, therefore, that local comparison information impacts self-evaluations more than global comparison information. In fact, research has shown that people make comparisons with others in their immediate environment automatically and uncontrollably (Gilbert, Giesler, & Morris, 1995). Given these findings, it is logical to suggest that people’s well-being would be more influenced by their SSS judgments relative to local than global referents. The second and competing hypothesis was that SSS ratings relative to global referents would more strongly correlate with mental health and well-being than SSS ratings relative to local referents. Support for this hypothesis is derived from the literature on self-enhancement. Selfenhancement has been shown to be important for mental health and well-being (e.g., McFarland & Alvaro, 2000; Taylor & Brown, 1988). Healthy people have a pervasive tendency to see themselves as better than others (e.g., Alicke, 1985) and not doing this is associated with depression (Taylor & Brown, 1988). Research has shown that people are more likely to self-enhance in

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ambiguous than unambiguous contexts because people have more flexibility to construe information to be consistent with their motivations for self-enhancement (Critcher, Helzer, & Dunning, 2011; Dunning, Meyerowitz, & Holzberg, 1989). The ability to flexibly construe social status may be important for maintaining well-being, and this may be more easily accomplished in the context of global than local referents as global referents are defined more ambiguously and abstractly (Alicke et al., 1995).

METHOD Participants Two-hundred and two undergraduate students (120 females) at a large Midwestern university in the United States participated in exchange for course credit. Participants were between the ages of 18–24 and were enrolled in an introductory psychology course. Measures Center for Epidemiological Studies Depression Scale (CES-D). To assess depression, we used the CES-D questionnaire (Radloff, 1977). For this inventory, participants indicated the frequency with which they experienced 21 depression-related symptoms over the past week (e.g., “felt lonely,” “felt sad”; α = .85; M = 1.75, SD = .47) using a 4-point scale ranging from 0 (rarely or none of the time) to 3 (most or all of the time). Satisfaction with Life Scale (SWLS). To assess global life satisfaction, we used the Satisfaction with Life Scale (SWLS; Diener, Emmons, Larsen, & Griffin, 1985). For this inventory, participants indicated their extent of agreement on a scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree) with 5 statements (e.g., “I am satisfied with my life”, “In most ways my life is close to my ideal”; α = .87; M = 3.53, SD = .62). Subjective social status (SSS). To assess SSS, participants completed an 8-item questionnaire similar to that used in previous studies (Dunn, Veenstra, & Ross, 2006; Stiles & Kaplan, 2004; Wolff et al., 2010). Specifically, participants were asked to carefully consider the following statement: “Some people are better off—they have more money, more education, and better jobs. Other people are worse off—they have less money, less education, and worse jobs.” Afterward, participants assessed how well off they were compared to 8 referent groups (see Table 1) using a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (a lot worse off ) to 5 (a lot better off ).1 Procedure During the testing session, questionnaires were administered on individual computers using Authorware software. Before beginning, participants were informed that the purpose of the study was to aid in understanding how people judge themselves and other people across dimensions related to their personality, health, and well-being. Participants then progressed through each questionnaire (randomly ordered). Upon completion, participants were debriefed and thanked for their participation.

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TABLE 1 Correlations Among Referent Groups Observed variable

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

1. Others in American society 2. Average person in the USA 3. Same-sex student in the USA 4. Same-sex student at university 5. Fellow intro. psychology students 6. Best friend 7. Friend 8. Friend of a friend

—

.49∗∗∗ —

.37∗∗∗ .44∗∗∗ —

.39∗∗∗ .41∗∗∗ .67∗∗∗ —

.24∗∗∗ .41∗∗∗ .54∗∗∗ .46∗∗∗ —

.10 .15∗ .25∗∗∗ .11 .27∗∗∗

.13 .21∗∗ .28∗∗∗ .26∗∗∗ .29∗∗∗

.24∗∗∗ .36∗∗∗ .48∗∗∗ .40∗∗∗ .32∗∗∗

—

.48∗∗∗ —

.46∗∗∗ .49∗∗∗ —

∗p

< .05; ∗∗ p < .01; ∗∗∗ p < .001.

RESULTS Referent Categorization Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was undertaken to determine whether participants distinguished between global and local referent groups when making SSS judgments. The hypothesized 2-factor model is presented in Figure 1. Specifically, two latent factors, local SSS and global SSS, are defined by three and five referent groups, respectively. Correlations among the referent groups are presented in Table 1. Before assessing model fit, boxplots and Mahalanobis distance were used to identify univariate and multivariate outliers. No outliers were identified, and there was no missing data. Furthermore, Maximum Likelihood estimation was used because the data were normally distributed. For comparison purposes, we assessed the fit of the hypothesized 2 factor model alongside a 1 factor model.2 Fit indices for both models can be seen in Table 2. The Chi-square (χ 2 ) value assesses the magnitude of the discrepancy between the sample and fitted covariance matrices (Hu & Bentler, 1995). A good model fit yields an insignificant result at α = .05 (Barrett,

Global SSS

Local SSS Same-sex student at university

Others in American society

e

Average person in USA

Same-sex student in USA

Fellow psychology students

e

e

e

e

Friend

Friend of a friend

Best friend

e

e

e

FIGURE 1 Hypothesized 2-factor model of referent abstraction. Note. e = error.

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TABLE 2 Goodness-of-Fit Indices for Models of Referent Abstraction Model 1 Factor 2 Factors ∗∗∗ p

χ2

df

χ 2 /df

SRMR

CFI

TLI

RMSEA

120.00∗∗∗ 55.89∗∗∗

20 19

6.00 3.49

.09 .05

.72 .93

.80 .89

.16 .09

< .001.

2007). Neither of the models tested met this criterion. However, several researchers have pointed out severe limitations in the use of χ 2 as a fit statistic (e.g., Bentler & Bonnet, 1980; Kenny & McCoach, 2003; McIntosh, 2006). Consequently, several alternative goodness-of-fit indices have been developed. The relative chi-square (χ 2 /df ) index developed by Wheaton, Muthen, Alwin, and Summers (1977), which corrects for the impact of sample size, should not exceed 5. The 2-factor model meets this criterion; however, the 1-factor model does not. The root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA; Steiger & Lind, 1980) indicates how well the model with unknown, but optimally chosen, parameter estimates would fit the covariance matrix. Values exceeding .10 indicate poor fit (MacCallum, Browne, & Sugawara, 1996). Only the 2-factor model has a RMSEA value of less than .10. The standardized root mean square residual (SRMR) is the square root of the difference between the residuals of the sample covariance matrix and the hypothesized covariance matrix. Well-fitting models are indicated by values of .05 or less (Diamantopoulos & Siguaw, 2000). Again, the 2-factor model meets this criterion, but the 1factor model does not. The comparative fit index (CFI; Bentler, 1990) compares the fit of the specified model against the null model. There is some debate about the threshold for CFI ranging from values of greater than .90 to greater than .95 (Hooper, Coughlan, & Mullen, 2008). The 2-factor model CFI value exceeds .90, but is less than .95. The Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI) is generally reported with the CFI. As is the case with the CFI, there is some debate about the threshold for TLI ranging from values greater than .80 to greater than .95 (Hooper, 2008). Both models have a TLI value of .80 or greater; however, neither model exceeds .95. In sum, looking across the fit indices, it appears that the hypothesized 2-factor model adequately fits the data and is superior to the 1-factor model. In particular, the 2-factor model met the value threshold for 5 of 6 goodness of fit indices, whereas the 1-factor model met the value threshold for only 1 of 6 goodness of fit indices. We provide the standardized and unstandardized parameter estimates for the 2-factor model in Table 3. In all subsequent analyses, referents have been combined in accordance with their factor loadings to form composite scores for SSS relative to local referents (α = .73; M = 3.25, SD = .62) and global referents (α = .80; M = 3.35, SD = .52).3 SSS, Mental Health, and Well-Being Next, we examined whether the relationship between SSS and well-being depended upon referent abstraction. Given that our two dependent measures, depression and life satisfaction, were so highly correlated (r = −.60), we averaged ratings across both scales (after reverse-scoring depression scores) to produce a composite measure of well-being. After centering, we regressed our composite well-being measure onto ratings of SSS for the two referent types.4 The model

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TABLE 3 Unstandardized and Standardized Estimates for the 2-Factor Model Global SSS Item Others in American society Average person in the USA Same-sex student in the USA Same-sex student at your university Fellow introductory psychology students Best friend Friend Friend of a friend

Local SSS

B

β

1.00 (–) 1.15 (.20) 1.69 (.26) 1.51 (.24) 1.32 (.23)

.49 .58 .84 .77 .63

B

β

1.00 (–) 1.06 (.16) 1.18 (.19)

.59 .64 .80

accounted for 17.1% of the variance in well-being, F(2, 197) = 20.26, p < .001. This was primarily driven by global SSS, β = .20, t = 4.78, p < .001, indicating that greater SSS was associated with greater well-being. Local SSS did not significantly predict well-being, β = .07, t = 1.53, p = .13. Note that individual regression analyses for depression and self-esteem produced the same pattern of results (global referent: βs > |.24|, ts > |3.08|, ps < .002; local referent: βs < |.12|, ts < |1.63|, ps > .11).

STUDY 2 Study 1 confirmed that when making SSS judgments, participants distinguished between two types of referents. Local referents were characterized by concrete, individuated comparison targets (e.g., friend) whereas global referents were characterized by abstract, impersonal comparison targets (e.g., average American). Additionally, SSS relative to a global referent was a better predictor of well-being (i.e., depression and life satisfaction). Study 2 was designed to replicate this pattern and extend it to another domain of well-being: self-esteem.

METHOD Participants One hundred and twenty-one undergraduate students (82 females) at a large Midwestern university in the United States participated in exchange for course credit. Participants were between the ages of 18–24 and were enrolled in an introductory psychology course. Measures Center for Epidemiological Studies Depression Scale (CES-D). As in Study 1, the CES-D questionnaire (Radloff, 1977) was used to assess depression (α = .87; M = 1.78, SD = .46).

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Satisfaction with Life Scale (SWLS). As in Study 1, the SWLS (Diener, Emmons, Larson, & Griffin, 1985) was used to assess global life satisfaction (α = .83; M = 4.72, SD = 1.23). State Self-Esteem Scale (SSES). To assess self-esteem, we used the State Self-Esteem Scale (SSES; Heatherton & Polivy, 1991). Participants indicated their extent of agreement ranging from 1 (not at all) to 5 (extremely) with 20 statements concerning a number of different dimensions, including performance (e.g., I feel confident about my abilities), social relationships (e.g., I am worried about whether I am regarded as a success or failure), and appearance (e.g., I feel satisfied with the way my body looks right now). Collectively, these statements represent a person’s state self-esteem (α = .92; M = 3.44, SD = .72). Subjective social status (SSS). Participants rated their SSS compared to the same eight referent groups used in Study 1 using a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (a lot worse off ) to 5 (a lot better off ). Ratings for the eight referent groups were combined in accordance with the CFA presented in Study 1 (see Table 3), yielding composite scores for local SSS (α = .72; M = 3.40, SD = .60) and global SSS (α = .84; M = 3.34, SD = .60). Procedure During the testing session, questionnaires were administered on individual computers using MediaLab software. Before beginning, participants were informed that the purpose of the study was to aid in understanding how people judge themselves and other people across dimensions related to their personality, health, and well-being. Participants then progressed through each questionnaire (randomly ordered). Upon completion, participants were debriefed and thanked for their participation.

RESULTS As in Study 1, our primary analysis involved whether the relationships between SSS and wellbeing depended upon referent abstraction. Again, our dependent measures were highly correlated (r’s ≥ .60) and combined (after reverse-scoring depression scores) to make a composite measure of well-being. After centering, we regressed our composite well-being measure onto ratings of SSS for the two referent types. The model accounted for 6.6% of the variance in well-being, F(2, 118) = 4.20, p = .02. This was primarily driven by global SSS, β = .20, t = 2.90, p = .004, indicating that greater SSS was associated with greater well-being. Local SSS did not significantly predict well-being, β = −.07, t = −1.06, p = .29. Note that individual regression analyses for depression, self-esteem, and state self-esteem produced the same pattern of results (global referent: βs > |.20|, ts > |2.08|, ps < .04; local referent: βs < |.17|, ts < |1.75|, ps > .08).

DISCUSSION Well-being is related to a variety of clinically relevant outcomes, including, relationship quality and achievement at work and school. Research has shown that SSS is a robust predictor of

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well-being and mental health. However, few studies have examined the influence of specific comparison groups on SSS and none have done so within the context of well-being. In two studies, participants reported their depression, life satisfaction, and self-esteem (Study 2 only) and rated their SSS relative to eight referents varying in abstractness (Table 1). Below we summarize the core findings and offer explanations for the pattern of results. The Local-Global Distinction We demonstrated that participants characterized their SSS to the set of referent groups along two distinct dimensions: local, individuated referents (e.g., best friend) vs. global, impersonal referents (e.g., average person in the USA). This result is consistent with prior research suggesting that local referent groups and global referent groups should not be treated identically, in terms of the judgments made relative to each type of group and in terms of their predictive validity (Alicke et al., 1995; Klein, 2002). Moreover, the current studies build on prior work involving SSS judgments (Wolff et al., 2010) but provide more definitive evidence that people psychologically distinguish between local and global referents. Although more direct evidence is needed to understand why people distinguish between these two types of referents, we suggest that familiarity, specificity, and singularity are key distinguishing features between global and local referents. Global referents, such as the average American, are unfamiliar, abstract, and group entities; however, local referents, such as a best friend, are familiar, specific, and single entities. Global SSS Better Predicts Well-Being SSS relative to global and local referents was shown to be differentially correlated with depression, life satisfaction, and self-esteem. Overall, it appeared that SSS relative to the set of global referents provided the most consistent predictor of well-being. Although we do not have any direct mechanism evidence, indirect evidence in the current studies and the broader theoretical/empirical literature leads us to suggest there are two key points that help to explain this relationship. First, people are motivated to use information in ways that allow for selfenhancement and positive self-views (e.g., Alicke, 1985), which is critical for achieving and maintaining well-being (e.g., Taylor & Brown, 1988). Second, global referents are more amenable to allowing self-enhancement than are local referents for two distinct but related reasons. The first reason why global referents are more amenable to allowing self-enhancement is that global referents are more ambiguous/broad and, hence, more flexible at allowing a person to self-enhance. Indeed, Dunning and colleagues (1989) have shown that people are more likely to self-enhance in ambiguous than unambiguous contexts because, in ambiguous contexts, people are free to construe information in a manner consistent with motivations. Likewise, scores of researchers have found that self-enhancement is reliably larger in the context of global referents than local referents (e.g., Alicke et al., 1995; Perloff & Fetzer, 1986; see also Price, Smith, & Lench, 2006; Kruger, Windschitl, Burrus, Fessel, & Chambers, 2008; Windschitl, Kruger, & Simms, 2003; for reviews, see Chambers, 2008; Chambers & Windschitl, 2004). Thus, the ability to flexibly construe social status may be important for maintaining well-being and this may be more easily accomplished in the context of global than local referents, as global referents are

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defined more abstractly. Consistent with this idea, we found in a follow-up study that participants rated the set of global referents used in Studies 1 and 2 as more ambiguous and less specific than the set of local referents (ds > .52). The second reason why global referents are more amenable to allowing self-enhancement comes from a Social Identity Theory (SIT) perspective (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). According to SIT, people derive their identity and worth from the status of their group (Abrams & Hogg, 1990; Hornsey, 2008) and, consequently, are motivated to view their group more positively than other groups (Dunham, Barren, & Carey, 2011; Hewstone, Rubin, & Willis, 2002). In the current studies, the local referent (e.g., best friend) could be viewed as the participants’ ingroup whereas the global referent (e.g., others in society) could be viewed as the participants’ outgroup. Therefore, participants should be more motivated to self-enhance relative to the outgroup (global referent) than the ingroup (local referent). Subsequently, achieving higher relative SSS to the global referent (outgroup) should be most relevant to well-being, whereas achieving higher SSS relative to the local referent (ingroup) should be unrelated to or perhaps even detrimental to well-being. In sum, our core explanation for the set of results is that 1) people are motivated to self-enhance to achieve and maintain well-being (Taylor & Brown, 1988) and 2) global referents offer more of an opportunity for self-enhancement than do local referents and, hence, are more predictive of well-being. Although this general perspective is supported here and in the literature, there may be alternative mechanisms that could be tested. For example, it could be that global SSS judgments correlate more strongly with well-being judgments because they are both global/broad and rely on gist-based, abstract information to be pulled from long-term memory (Brainerd & Reyna, 1993; Safer, Breslin, Boesch, & Cerqueira, 2007), hence making global SSS ratings a better match for well-being in terms of specificity than local SSS ratings (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1977; Jaccard, King, & Pomazel, 1977). One way to test between the self-enhancement and specificitymatching accounts would be to devise distinct measures of well-being (e.g., life satisfaction, self-esteem) that define these constructs in terms of specific behaviors, events, or outcomes or in terms of broad/global assessments (as in the current studies). If global SSS remains a better predictor of well-being regardless of the measure used (broad vs. specific), results would be more supportive of the self-enhancement perspective. If global SSS predicts broad well-being measures but local SSS predicts specific well-being measures, then the results would be more supportive of the specificity-matching perspective. Relation to Research on the Local Dominance Effect Our findings are interesting in light of recent work on the local dominance effect suggesting that people’s self-evaluations are more sensitive to local referent groups (Zell & Alicke, 2010; see also Buckingham & Alicke, 2002). While the reason for the inconsistency between our studies and this prior research is unclear, there are important differences in the context and design of these studies. First, our research was conducted in the context of social status, whereas prior research has been conducted in the context of performances, abilities, and risks. Second, another difference across studies is the issue of feedback vs. recall. In local dominance studies, people receive feedback about how their performances, abilities, or risks compare to those of others. In the current study, however, people did not receive comparison feedback. Rather, they evaluated their status relative to others. We suggest that this difference in feedback vs. recall may invoke the use of different memory systems, influencing sensitivity to local vs. global referent groups. In sum,

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there are several methodological differences between our study and those involving standard local dominance paradigms. Clearly the emphasis should not be on whether it is global or local referent group comparisons that matter. Rather, the emphasis should be in the search for methodological, situational, or personal moderators that help to determine when local or global comparisons are more likely to be influential (Bruchmann & Evans, 2013). Limitations and Future Directions Limitations to the current research should be noted. First, our sample consisted of college students who tend to be relatively healthy and may provide a limited range of SSS perceptions. In the current research, SSS judgments for local and global referents tended to be relatively positive – mean ratings above 3 on a 5-point scale. Thus, studies using samples in which greater variation in well-being and status exist is necessary to ensure generalizability. That said, our findings are consistent with previous work examining the link between SSS and self-rated health that used a national sample of adults (Wolff et al., 2010). This suggests that using a sample in which greater variation in health and status exists is unlikely to alter the interpretation of our findings and may actually reveal stronger effects. Second, the correlational nature of our study cannot speak to the causal impact of social status on well-being or as mentioned above, the direct mechanism through which global SSS ratings influence well-being. For instance, it could be the case that well-being is causing changes in SSS ratings. Although prior research has shown that status is more likely to shape mental and physical health than vice versa (Adler & Rehkopf, 2008), more definitive evidence in this context is needed. Additionally, we have suggested that global SSS judgments have a stronger impact on well-being due to the fact that they involve sufficient conditions to promote self-enhancement (e.g., high ambiguity, outgroup comparisons). Although prior research supports this general position, we do not have direct mediational data in our study. Future research should more definitively examine why global SSS judgments are stronger correlates with well-being. Regardless of the precise explanation, this finding has important implications for understanding how people think about themselves in important domains like depression. Conclusions SSS is a robust predictor of health and well-being. With few exceptions, people with low SSS have worse outcomes than people with high SSS. Our findings add to the literature on SSS and health in several ways. First, we demonstrated that SSS judgments shift depending upon the referent used for comparison. This will be an important point of consideration for future studies aimed at understanding the consequences of SSS and the factors that contribute to SSS judgments. Second, we established an empirical foundation for the distinction between local and global referents that is so commonly used in research on local dominance theory. Third, we demonstrated that SSS relative to global referents is a better predictor of well-being than SSS relative to local referents. Consequently, researchers will reach different conclusions about how social status affects well-being and mental health depending upon the referent used for comparison. Our findings suggest that SSS relative to global referents may paint a more accurate picture well-being and that interventions targeting global SSS may be useful for reducing status-related disparities.

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NOTES 1. We also assessed objective social status by asking for parent education and income. Notably, our results did not meaningfully differ across Studies 1 and 2 when controlling for objective social status (i.e., parent education, parent income), race, or sex. 2. We also tested a 3 factor model. However, it is not presented here because there is not a sufficient theoretical basis for hypothesizing a 3 factor model, nor do we have a sufficient number of items to justify running this analysis. That said, fit indices for the hypothesized 2 factor model were superior to those of the 3 factor model. 3. Model fit could not be improved by removing referents. 4. We also ran each of the analyses including a Local × Global interaction term in the second step. The interaction term was not significant.

AUTHOR NOTES Heather M. Haught, Jason Rose, Andrew Geers, and Jill A. Brown are affiliated with the Department of Psychology, University of Toledo.

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Received April 16, 2014 Accepted January 15, 2015

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