Downloaded from http://jme.bmj.com/ on August 7, 2015 - Published by group.bmj.com
JME Online First, published on June 19, 2015 as 10.1136/medethics-2015-102786 Response
Religion, secular medicine and utilitarianism: a response to Biggar Kevin R Smith ABSTRACT Nigel Biggar has argued that religion ought to be given a seat at the negotiating table of medical ethics. I respond in broadly utilitarian terms, arguing that the flawed empirical basis, lack of rationality and non-universality inherent in religion disqualify it from ethical discourse. I conclude that while it would be unacceptable to attempt to debar religious individuals from the negotiating table, an exclusively secular approach is required for ethical decision making in medicine. Nigel Biggar has recently claimed that religion deserves a place in secular medicine, entailing the acceptance of religious arguments (eg, from Christianity) to negotiate ethical controversies in medicine.1 Perhaps unsurprisingly, given the radical nature of its claims, Biggar’s paper immediately elicited a number of on-line responses on the journal website,2 and one may predict that additional and more extensive responses will be developed. Here I present a response to Biggar from the perspective of utilitarianism.
UTILITARIANISM Utilitarianism as a moral theory is frequently employed (explicitly or implicitly) in bioethical decision making. Utilitarian theory is predicated upon the principle that ethical judgements should be based on the consequences arising (or likely to arise) from a course of action, with desirable consequences being those in which positive utility is maximised. Utility refers to the balance of positive mental states (‘happiness’) versus negative mental states (‘suffering’) in aggregate across all affected individuals. Several variants of utilitarianism exist, some of which seek to maximise utility through indirect means, for example, through the maximisation of preference satisfaction. Religious principles play no part in utilitarianism. While it is not a flawless moral doctrine, utilitarianism possesses a number of features which render it viable as a moral theory, including a high degree of internal consistency. Importantly, because happiness and suffering (in all their Correspondence to Dr Kevin R Smith, SET, Abertay University, Bell Street, Dundee DD1 1HG, UK; [email protected]
variant forms) are, respectively, highly valued and strongly deprecated by virtually all agents, utilitarianism holds the potential for universal agreement between all people on ethical matters. Such potential universality is in marked contrast to religiously based ethics.
RELIGIOUS VERSUS SECULAR ETHICS Biggar plausibly claims that: Even if medicine were religion-free, its peace would still be disturbed by disputes between philosophical schools— Aristotelian, utilitarian and Kantian, to mention only a few.
It is undeniable that competing secular ethical approaches exist and that each has its proponents. It is also true that one is under no obligation to accept any particular moral system. As Biggar says: …questions of ethics, cannot be answered simply by appeal to empirical data and thereby to medical science.
However, the distinction between secular philosophical schools and religion is fundamental. With the former, ethical discourse is based on sets of principles that are open to rational analysis and dissection. Examples of such principles include Aristotelian ethical virtues (such as magnificence), Kant’s categorical imperative and the utilitarian assumption that maximising utility is ethically desirable. By contrast, religiously inspired ethical claims are posited upon belief in God(s). Accordingly, many of the resulting ethical claims derive from God’s authority, not reason. For example, traditional interpretations of the Bible hold that it is wrong to kill (ie, murder) humans because this is a Commandment relayed by Moses as an injunction from God. Such ethical claims are in principle empirical: in the foregoing example, various questions can be asked—did Moses really convey God’s word, did God actually make such an injunction, does God in fact exist? Those who do not find the empirical basis behind the ‘it is wrong to kill’ dictum compelling are bound to reject the ethical claim. This would include atheists and many theists of non-Christian religions. Of course, a moral claim may be both reasoned and religiously inspired. The reprehensibility of killing provides an
example: while Christianity (and indeed several other religions) considers killing to be wrong on the basis of a Commandment from God, strong non-religious reasons exist to prohibit killing, including the reduction in happiness and increase in suffering that are frequent consequences of murder. These non-religious reasons may be accepted and deployed by religious individuals; in such cases, the religious justification is rendered redundant. It would be inaccurate to depict all theological systems of ethics as being dependent solely upon the sort of ‘divine command ethics’ entailed by the foregoing Biblical example. For example, some Christian ethicists consider God as an exemplar and thus the source of moral motivation, as opposed to simply being the source of moral diktat. It is beyond the scope of the present paper to consider the myriad variants of Christian or other religious ethical systems; however, it is axiomatic that the existence of God(s) is fundamental to ethics emanating from religion. Again, such ethical claims can have no purchase upon those who reject the empirical basis for the existence of God(s). A further major difficulty for ethics based on religion is one of interpretation. Abortion, raised by Biggar, provides an example: Biggar opposes on religious grounds ‘the unqualified right to kill fetuses’. This position, common among Christians, is frequently an interpretation of the ‘do not kill’ Biblical injunction. To be of any practical use, morality must be compatible with the modern world—a context unimaginable at the time of Moses. This includes the (accelerating) capacity for prenatal disease detection, the ability of modern medicine to terminate in utero life at any stage by a range of reliable technologies and the capability for creating and maintain life at embryo stage ex utero. Even for those who believe that God issued the injunction ‘do not kill’, the derivation of moral guidance on questions of embryo and fetal life from this edict will be fraught with contention. And such contention will often be irresolvable, given the impossibility—short of a divine revelation—of knowing God’s present views on the issue. Such problems of interpretation help to explain the wide range of views on abortion evident among Christians. Moreover, these interpretational problems may be worse in forms of religious ethics that are not based on the notion of ‘divine command’, because in such approaches the start point for interpretation (such as the motivation of God) will often be less clear than a straightforward command.
Smith KR. J Med Ethics Month 2015 Vol 0 No 0
Copyright Article author (or their employer) 2015. Produced by BMJ Publishing Group Ltd under licence.
1
Downloaded from http://jme.bmj.com/ on August 7, 2015 - Published by group.bmj.com
Response Referring to utilitarianism, Biggar posits the ‘right to kill infants’ as an argument against feticide: The Romans used to accord this right to the male parent (until Christians had it withdrawn), and some contemporary utilitarian philosophers are now arguing that it should be restored to parents in general.
Here Biggar is referring to the controversial paper ( published in this journal) by Giubilini and Minerva, ‘After-birth abortion: why should the baby live?’, in which it is argued that feticide and infanticide are morally equivalent and acceptable.3 While it is beyond the scope of the present discussion to consider this argument per se, the citing of this work by Biggar raises some relevant issues. The validity or otherwise of the pro-infanticide position expounded by Giubilini and Minerva rests upon a set of claims. Some of these claims are primarily empirical (eg, quality-of-life estimates), others are broadly philosophical (eg, personhood attributions): but in all cases, these claims are amenable to confirmation or refutation on the basis of evidence and reason. This contrasts fundamentally with religious arguments concerning infanticide: being based ultimately upon authority, such arguments can have no purchase on those who do not share the religious faith concerned. Among secular ethicists, and within utilitarian discourse, contention exists as to whether and when infanticide is morally acceptable. For example, while utilitarians have broadly supported infanticide for severe medical conditions, on the grounds that utility will be maximised by the elimination of lives not worth living, it can be argued that to permit infanticide—particularly for less severe medical conditions or ‘convenience’ reasons—will reduce utility (eg, through concomitant societal reduction in respect for life). However, such arguments are at least in principle resolvable on grounds of reason: in the foregoing example, the argument hinges upon demonstrating which policy will most likely lead to the greatest increase in utility. By contrast, contention among religious ethicists is not similarly amenable to rational solution. The exception is where coreligionists share the same fundamental beliefs concerning the word (or motivation) of God on matters of morality, in which case reasoned arguments may be premised upon this shared belief. However, while it is open for proponents of one school of philosophy (eg, utilitarians) to convince those of another school (eg, Kantians) by reasoned argument that 2
their fundamental principles (such as maximisation of utility) are valid, the same cannot be said for religious morality. Religious convictions are generally established by upbringing (as opposed to education) and maintained as a matter of faith, and it would be quite implausible to envisage a general situation in which followers of one religion convince by reasoned argument those of another religion that one set of allegedly God-given precepts is right and the other wrong.
DOES UTILITARIANISM GIVE ANY SPACE FOR RELIGION? Arguing from the premise that “religion is not simply, invariably or uniquely irrational”, Biggar claims that: …it should be allowed to sit at the table of public negotiation—whether in the legislature or in the governing body of a professional (say, medical) association or institution.
This claim is open to differing interpretations, with ambiguity around the concept of ‘religion’ sitting at a table. On one interpretation, it could mean [A] ‘those who happen to be religious’ being permitted to take part in negotiations; alternatively, it could mean [B] ‘religious ideas ought to be given credence’. I suggest that utilitarian arguments against [A] are unlikely to succeed. Ethical decision making based on sound empirics and reasoning is likely to lead to the most beneficent outcomes, and therefore ought to be supported by utilitarians; however, attempts to bar those with irrational or delusional ideas from access to negotiations would be highly fraught. On practical grounds, it would close to impossible (how could such people be identified if they chose to hide their faith?) and on moral grounds it would be indefensible, with the Orwellian nature of such a proscription arguably leading to a reduction in utility, directly by damaging the interests of religious persons and indirectly by restricting political freedom more generally. Biggar is never entirely clear as to what he means by religion being allowed to sit at the table. To some extent, he appears to argue for [A]. For example, he suggests that: (taking a seat at the table) requires the abandonment of all sheer appeal to authority—whether to that of the Bible or of the Pope or of the Qur’an.
If a bioethical argument raised by a religious person is based upon sound empirical ground and proceeds on the basis of reason, then the religious convictions of this person become essentially irrelevant. By analogy with medical practice, when a
patient requires professional advice on treatment, any religious beliefs held by the physician ought to be irrelevant. Parts of Biggar’s paper appear to support this approach; for example, his discussion of abortion ethics refers to rational arguments as opposed to religious dogma. This appears reasonable, nevertheless it should be recognised that a situation of bad faith will arise where reasoned arguments are simply used as a form of sophistry to defend a covertly religious position. Elsewhere in his paper, Biggar comes close to [B], the notion that religious ideas themselves ought to be given credence. For example: To take a seat at the negotiating table, however, implies a readiness to negotiate and so to persuade; and that has implications for what one does at the table, for how one behaves. To persuade, one must become persuasive.
If, as seems likely, ‘persuasion’ means to deploy religiously based arguments, a number of serious issues arise. Continuing the above medical analogy, it would be professionally unacceptable for the physician to permit religion to influence her deliberations—for example, to recommend that the patient undergo faith healing. In pragmatic terms, ethical progress will be slowed whenever religious dogma is deployed, as this will engender irresolvable disagreement (as discussed in the previous section). When an impasse is inevitably reached between the secular and religious negotiators, it must be asked: how can a decision be reached? Biggar wants religion to be given a role in legislature and in governing bodies, and this carries an implication that religious views ought to count in decision making (as opposed to being politely listened to and ignored). The means by which religion might be facilitated are not made clear in Biggar’s paper—perhaps a voting or a veto system would suffice. But regardless of the mechanism, it seems clear that any inclusion of religion would be retrogressive, as the injection of non-rational influences would skew decisions in a suboptimal direction. This is antithetical to utilitarian ethics.
CONCLUDING REMARKS It appears axiomatic that ethical decision making should be informed by rational argument and grounded on sound empirics. Utilitarianism fulfils these criteria, as do other schools of secular ethics. Religion, by its inherent nature, fails in this respect. It follows that a secular approach ought to be a precondition for ethical negotiations. Contra Biggar, I conclude that religion deserves no place in secular medicine. Smith KR. J Med Ethics Month 2015 Vol 0 No 0
Downloaded from http://jme.bmj.com/ on August 7, 2015 - Published by group.bmj.com
Response Competing interests None declared.
Accepted 31 May 2015
To cite Smith KR. J Med Ethics Published Online First: [ please include Day Month Year] doi:10.1136/ medethics-2015-102786 Received 13 March 2015 Revised 15 April 2015
Smith KR. J Med Ethics Month 2015 Vol 0 No 0
REFERENCES 1
Provenance and peer review Not commissioned; externally peer reviewed.
2
▸ http://dx.doi.org/10.1136/medethics-2013-101776 3
J Med Ethics 2015;0:1–3. doi:10.1136/medethics-2015-102786
Biggar N. Why religion deserves a place in secular medicine. J Med Ethics 2015;41:229–33. Earp BD. Does religion deserve a place in secular medicine? J Med Ethics Blog, 26 Feb 2015. http:// blogs.bmj.com/medical-ethics/2015/02/26/doesreligion-deserve-a-place-in-secular-medicine/ Giubilini A, Minerva F. After-birth abortion: why should the baby live? J Med Ethics 2013;39:261–3.
3
Downloaded from http://jme.bmj.com/ on August 7, 2015 - Published by group.bmj.com
Religion, secular medicine and utilitarianism: a response to Biggar Kevin R Smith J Med Ethics published online June 19, 2015
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These include:
References Email alerting service
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JME Online First, published on June 19, 2015 as 10.1136/medethics-2015-102786 Response
Religion, secular medicine and utilitarianism: a response to Biggar Kevin R Smith ABSTRACT Nigel Biggar has argued that religion ought to be given a seat at the negotiating table of medical ethics. I respond in broadly utilitarian terms, arguing that the flawed empirical basis, lack of rationality and non-universality inherent in religion disqualify it from ethical discourse. I conclude that while it would be unacceptable to attempt to debar religious individuals from the negotiating table, an exclusively secular approach is required for ethical decision making in medicine. Nigel Biggar has recently claimed that religion deserves a place in secular medicine, entailing the acceptance of religious arguments (eg, from Christianity) to negotiate ethical controversies in medicine.1 Perhaps unsurprisingly, given the radical nature of its claims, Biggar’s paper immediately elicited a number of on-line responses on the journal website,2 and one may predict that additional and more extensive responses will be developed. Here I present a response to Biggar from the perspective of utilitarianism.
UTILITARIANISM Utilitarianism as a moral theory is frequently employed (explicitly or implicitly) in bioethical decision making. Utilitarian theory is predicated upon the principle that ethical judgements should be based on the consequences arising (or likely to arise) from a course of action, with desirable consequences being those in which positive utility is maximised. Utility refers to the balance of positive mental states (‘happiness’) versus negative mental states (‘suffering’) in aggregate across all affected individuals. Several variants of utilitarianism exist, some of which seek to maximise utility through indirect means, for example, through the maximisation of preference satisfaction. Religious principles play no part in utilitarianism. While it is not a flawless moral doctrine, utilitarianism possesses a number of features which render it viable as a moral theory, including a high degree of internal consistency. Importantly, because happiness and suffering (in all their Correspondence to Dr Kevin R Smith, SET, Abertay University, Bell Street, Dundee DD1 1HG, UK; [email protected]
variant forms) are, respectively, highly valued and strongly deprecated by virtually all agents, utilitarianism holds the potential for universal agreement between all people on ethical matters. Such potential universality is in marked contrast to religiously based ethics.
RELIGIOUS VERSUS SECULAR ETHICS Biggar plausibly claims that: Even if medicine were religion-free, its peace would still be disturbed by disputes between philosophical schools— Aristotelian, utilitarian and Kantian, to mention only a few.
It is undeniable that competing secular ethical approaches exist and that each has its proponents. It is also true that one is under no obligation to accept any particular moral system. As Biggar says: …questions of ethics, cannot be answered simply by appeal to empirical data and thereby to medical science.
However, the distinction between secular philosophical schools and religion is fundamental. With the former, ethical discourse is based on sets of principles that are open to rational analysis and dissection. Examples of such principles include Aristotelian ethical virtues (such as magnificence), Kant’s categorical imperative and the utilitarian assumption that maximising utility is ethically desirable. By contrast, religiously inspired ethical claims are posited upon belief in God(s). Accordingly, many of the resulting ethical claims derive from God’s authority, not reason. For example, traditional interpretations of the Bible hold that it is wrong to kill (ie, murder) humans because this is a Commandment relayed by Moses as an injunction from God. Such ethical claims are in principle empirical: in the foregoing example, various questions can be asked—did Moses really convey God’s word, did God actually make such an injunction, does God in fact exist? Those who do not find the empirical basis behind the ‘it is wrong to kill’ dictum compelling are bound to reject the ethical claim. This would include atheists and many theists of non-Christian religions. Of course, a moral claim may be both reasoned and religiously inspired. The reprehensibility of killing provides an
example: while Christianity (and indeed several other religions) considers killing to be wrong on the basis of a Commandment from God, strong non-religious reasons exist to prohibit killing, including the reduction in happiness and increase in suffering that are frequent consequences of murder. These non-religious reasons may be accepted and deployed by religious individuals; in such cases, the religious justification is rendered redundant. It would be inaccurate to depict all theological systems of ethics as being dependent solely upon the sort of ‘divine command ethics’ entailed by the foregoing Biblical example. For example, some Christian ethicists consider God as an exemplar and thus the source of moral motivation, as opposed to simply being the source of moral diktat. It is beyond the scope of the present paper to consider the myriad variants of Christian or other religious ethical systems; however, it is axiomatic that the existence of God(s) is fundamental to ethics emanating from religion. Again, such ethical claims can have no purchase upon those who reject the empirical basis for the existence of God(s). A further major difficulty for ethics based on religion is one of interpretation. Abortion, raised by Biggar, provides an example: Biggar opposes on religious grounds ‘the unqualified right to kill fetuses’. This position, common among Christians, is frequently an interpretation of the ‘do not kill’ Biblical injunction. To be of any practical use, morality must be compatible with the modern world—a context unimaginable at the time of Moses. This includes the (accelerating) capacity for prenatal disease detection, the ability of modern medicine to terminate in utero life at any stage by a range of reliable technologies and the capability for creating and maintain life at embryo stage ex utero. Even for those who believe that God issued the injunction ‘do not kill’, the derivation of moral guidance on questions of embryo and fetal life from this edict will be fraught with contention. And such contention will often be irresolvable, given the impossibility—short of a divine revelation—of knowing God’s present views on the issue. Such problems of interpretation help to explain the wide range of views on abortion evident among Christians. Moreover, these interpretational problems may be worse in forms of religious ethics that are not based on the notion of ‘divine command’, because in such approaches the start point for interpretation (such as the motivation of God) will often be less clear than a straightforward command.
Smith KR. J Med Ethics Month 2015 Vol 0 No 0
Copyright Article author (or their employer) 2015. Produced by BMJ Publishing Group Ltd under licence.
1
Downloaded from http://jme.bmj.com/ on August 7, 2015 - Published by group.bmj.com
Response Referring to utilitarianism, Biggar posits the ‘right to kill infants’ as an argument against feticide: The Romans used to accord this right to the male parent (until Christians had it withdrawn), and some contemporary utilitarian philosophers are now arguing that it should be restored to parents in general.
Here Biggar is referring to the controversial paper ( published in this journal) by Giubilini and Minerva, ‘After-birth abortion: why should the baby live?’, in which it is argued that feticide and infanticide are morally equivalent and acceptable.3 While it is beyond the scope of the present discussion to consider this argument per se, the citing of this work by Biggar raises some relevant issues. The validity or otherwise of the pro-infanticide position expounded by Giubilini and Minerva rests upon a set of claims. Some of these claims are primarily empirical (eg, quality-of-life estimates), others are broadly philosophical (eg, personhood attributions): but in all cases, these claims are amenable to confirmation or refutation on the basis of evidence and reason. This contrasts fundamentally with religious arguments concerning infanticide: being based ultimately upon authority, such arguments can have no purchase on those who do not share the religious faith concerned. Among secular ethicists, and within utilitarian discourse, contention exists as to whether and when infanticide is morally acceptable. For example, while utilitarians have broadly supported infanticide for severe medical conditions, on the grounds that utility will be maximised by the elimination of lives not worth living, it can be argued that to permit infanticide—particularly for less severe medical conditions or ‘convenience’ reasons—will reduce utility (eg, through concomitant societal reduction in respect for life). However, such arguments are at least in principle resolvable on grounds of reason: in the foregoing example, the argument hinges upon demonstrating which policy will most likely lead to the greatest increase in utility. By contrast, contention among religious ethicists is not similarly amenable to rational solution. The exception is where coreligionists share the same fundamental beliefs concerning the word (or motivation) of God on matters of morality, in which case reasoned arguments may be premised upon this shared belief. However, while it is open for proponents of one school of philosophy (eg, utilitarians) to convince those of another school (eg, Kantians) by reasoned argument that 2
their fundamental principles (such as maximisation of utility) are valid, the same cannot be said for religious morality. Religious convictions are generally established by upbringing (as opposed to education) and maintained as a matter of faith, and it would be quite implausible to envisage a general situation in which followers of one religion convince by reasoned argument those of another religion that one set of allegedly God-given precepts is right and the other wrong.
DOES UTILITARIANISM GIVE ANY SPACE FOR RELIGION? Arguing from the premise that “religion is not simply, invariably or uniquely irrational”, Biggar claims that: …it should be allowed to sit at the table of public negotiation—whether in the legislature or in the governing body of a professional (say, medical) association or institution.
This claim is open to differing interpretations, with ambiguity around the concept of ‘religion’ sitting at a table. On one interpretation, it could mean [A] ‘those who happen to be religious’ being permitted to take part in negotiations; alternatively, it could mean [B] ‘religious ideas ought to be given credence’. I suggest that utilitarian arguments against [A] are unlikely to succeed. Ethical decision making based on sound empirics and reasoning is likely to lead to the most beneficent outcomes, and therefore ought to be supported by utilitarians; however, attempts to bar those with irrational or delusional ideas from access to negotiations would be highly fraught. On practical grounds, it would close to impossible (how could such people be identified if they chose to hide their faith?) and on moral grounds it would be indefensible, with the Orwellian nature of such a proscription arguably leading to a reduction in utility, directly by damaging the interests of religious persons and indirectly by restricting political freedom more generally. Biggar is never entirely clear as to what he means by religion being allowed to sit at the table. To some extent, he appears to argue for [A]. For example, he suggests that: (taking a seat at the table) requires the abandonment of all sheer appeal to authority—whether to that of the Bible or of the Pope or of the Qur’an.
If a bioethical argument raised by a religious person is based upon sound empirical ground and proceeds on the basis of reason, then the religious convictions of this person become essentially irrelevant. By analogy with medical practice, when a
patient requires professional advice on treatment, any religious beliefs held by the physician ought to be irrelevant. Parts of Biggar’s paper appear to support this approach; for example, his discussion of abortion ethics refers to rational arguments as opposed to religious dogma. This appears reasonable, nevertheless it should be recognised that a situation of bad faith will arise where reasoned arguments are simply used as a form of sophistry to defend a covertly religious position. Elsewhere in his paper, Biggar comes close to [B], the notion that religious ideas themselves ought to be given credence. For example: To take a seat at the negotiating table, however, implies a readiness to negotiate and so to persuade; and that has implications for what one does at the table, for how one behaves. To persuade, one must become persuasive.
If, as seems likely, ‘persuasion’ means to deploy religiously based arguments, a number of serious issues arise. Continuing the above medical analogy, it would be professionally unacceptable for the physician to permit religion to influence her deliberations—for example, to recommend that the patient undergo faith healing. In pragmatic terms, ethical progress will be slowed whenever religious dogma is deployed, as this will engender irresolvable disagreement (as discussed in the previous section). When an impasse is inevitably reached between the secular and religious negotiators, it must be asked: how can a decision be reached? Biggar wants religion to be given a role in legislature and in governing bodies, and this carries an implication that religious views ought to count in decision making (as opposed to being politely listened to and ignored). The means by which religion might be facilitated are not made clear in Biggar’s paper—perhaps a voting or a veto system would suffice. But regardless of the mechanism, it seems clear that any inclusion of religion would be retrogressive, as the injection of non-rational influences would skew decisions in a suboptimal direction. This is antithetical to utilitarian ethics.
CONCLUDING REMARKS It appears axiomatic that ethical decision making should be informed by rational argument and grounded on sound empirics. Utilitarianism fulfils these criteria, as do other schools of secular ethics. Religion, by its inherent nature, fails in this respect. It follows that a secular approach ought to be a precondition for ethical negotiations. Contra Biggar, I conclude that religion deserves no place in secular medicine. Smith KR. J Med Ethics Month 2015 Vol 0 No 0
Downloaded from http://jme.bmj.com/ on August 7, 2015 - Published by group.bmj.com
Response Competing interests None declared.
Accepted 31 May 2015
To cite Smith KR. J Med Ethics Published Online First: [ please include Day Month Year] doi:10.1136/ medethics-2015-102786 Received 13 March 2015 Revised 15 April 2015
Smith KR. J Med Ethics Month 2015 Vol 0 No 0
REFERENCES 1
Provenance and peer review Not commissioned; externally peer reviewed.
2
▸ http://dx.doi.org/10.1136/medethics-2013-101776 3
J Med Ethics 2015;0:1–3. doi:10.1136/medethics-2015-102786
Biggar N. Why religion deserves a place in secular medicine. J Med Ethics 2015;41:229–33. Earp BD. Does religion deserve a place in secular medicine? J Med Ethics Blog, 26 Feb 2015. http:// blogs.bmj.com/medical-ethics/2015/02/26/doesreligion-deserve-a-place-in-secular-medicine/ Giubilini A, Minerva F. After-birth abortion: why should the baby live? J Med Ethics 2013;39:261–3.
3
Downloaded from http://jme.bmj.com/ on August 7, 2015 - Published by group.bmj.com
Religion, secular medicine and utilitarianism: a response to Biggar Kevin R Smith J Med Ethics published online June 19, 2015
Updated information and services can be found at: http://jme.bmj.com/content/early/2015/06/19/medethics-2015-102786
These include:
References Email alerting service
This article cites 2 articles, 2 of which you can access for free at: http://jme.bmj.com/content/early/2015/06/19/medethics-2015-102786 #BIBL Receive free email alerts when new articles cite this article. Sign up in the box at the top right corner of the online article.
Notes
To request permissions go to: http://group.bmj.com/group/rights-licensing/permissions To order reprints go to: http://journals.bmj.com/cgi/reprintform To subscribe to BMJ go to: http://group.bmj.com/subscribe/
