J o u r n a l of Religion and Health, Vol. 27, No. 2, Summer 1988
Religion and Health: A Theological Reflection NATHAN GLUECK A B S T R A C T : Are healthy people necessarily religious? Are religious people necessarily healthy?
Does holism imply t h a t holiness equals health? This paper presents a model for a multidimensional u n d e r s t a n d i n g of h u m a n progress t h a t does not lose sight of the fundamental unity of personhood.
In the performance of ministry, especially pastoral counseling, it is often easy to lose one's spiritual orientation. It was Paul Pruyser who pointed out t h a t m a n y ministers have lost touch with their theological foundation, and have chosen a fully therapeutic model of helping. 1 In doing so, they have abandoned a long heritage and a collective body of knowledge millennia old. Pruyser therefore advances several key criteria by which ministers can diagnose their clients. These are drawn from theological language and help to identify spiritual concerns. Pruyser's point is well taken, and his diagnostic criteria have proven their usefulness in the field,~ yet a basic tension remains unresolved. He is in effect suggesting t h a t the diagnostic criteria used in a theological content differ from those used in other therapeutic contexts. This legitimates pastoral counseling insofar as it now has a set of diagnostic criteria. On the other hand, it also implies that the pastoral diagnosis does not translate into any other diagnostic terminology. If so, this challenges the very notion of "spiritual health." While it is often asserted t h a t spirituality is linked to the health of the total person and t h a t those more in touch with the divine are healthier for it, 3 the theological perspective seems, in fact, to relate to a separate set of concerns. If so, it becomes possible to conceive of spiritual and holy people who happen not to be emotionally healthy, as well as perfectly healthy people who happen to rate poorly by religious criteria. The notion t h a t holiness and health are holistically equivalent implies t h a t one who is not spiritually developed is not fully healthy, and t h a t someone Rabbi N a t h a n Glueck is a chaplain in Miami Beach. Address reprint requests to Rabbi Glueck at 4561 Prairie Avenue, Miami Beach, FL 33140. 109
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who is not healthy is not fully spiritual. Etiology indicates t h a t the words "health," "wholeness," and "holiness" share a common linguistic source. However, this does not always do justice to the complexity of life. Let us examine the following examples: 1.
2.
3.
4. 5.
A young college student's family is struck by catastrophic illness. The student must make some hard choices. To support her family, she must forgo her education. In addition, she cannot entertain marriage, although she is very much in love. Since she is a committed Christian, she struggles with her sexuality to remain celibate until marriage. She feels pulled in m a n y different directions. Shall she choose personal fulfillment or moral rightness? How much sexual frustration should she tolerate for the sake of her religious commitment? A Catholic couple are struggling with the church's teaching on birth control. They must choose between sexual abstinence (unhealthy) or alienation from the church (unholy) or continued childbirth (unhealthy). A religious m a r t y r dies for her belief. Can we seriously argue that this person has become healthy, when, in fact, she has died? Can we deny t h a t she has attained holiness? A pastor's marriage ends in divorce. Let us say that the marriage was in some way unhealthy. Does t h a t mean the pastor is unholy? Last, what of the Jewish person who will not take cold medicine on the Sabbath? (Jewish law still forbids healing minor illnesses on the Sabbath.)
Most of my Christian colleagues with whom I have raised the issue (I am a Jewish Orthodox rabbi) have responded with the following argument: "When looking at the whole person, all dimensions, physical or spiritual, are integrated. Therefore, any religion which compels a choice between 'health' and 'holiness' cannot be a true faith." I have heard this argument primarily from liberal rabbis and pastors in mainline Protestant denominations. The Catholic priests I've interviewed perceived more tension, while the Orthodox rabbis I've spoken to seemed to accept the tension as a matter of fact. I have never taken a formal survey, but I suggest the following as a hypothesis: the more demanding a religion is of its adherents, the more health and spirituality will be seen as distinct. In Hebrew the concepts of health, wholeness, and holiness have no linguistic connection: In Hebrew "holy" is qadosh, something set aside for God. "Whole" is shalem, complete, contented, and well rounded. "Healthy" is bari, something created, natural, and creaturely. And so the question: When we speak of "spiritual health," are we perhaps combining spirituality with another term foreign to its essential nature?
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Need we always assert the equivalency of religion and self-fulfillment? Should religion be judged by the health of its adherents? Should medicine be judged by the religiosity of those it has cured? 4 In order to examine the alternative to absolute holism, let us begin with the following assumption: health of the organism, social adjustment, moral rightness, and holiness are different from one another. Yet they do not inherently contradict one another. Under most circumstances we can manifest all these qualities in our lives. However, stressful times may bring these different priorities into conflict with one another. In a similar vein, the absence of any one quality does not imply the absence of another. Not all holy people are h e a l t h y - - p h y s i c a l l y or emotionally - - n o r are all healthy people holy. A minister who wishes to be truly helpful must be willing to care for people in their physical, psychic, and spiritual dimensions without falling into the trap of compartmentalization. 5 To help us understand this alternative conception, I offer the following model:
Trajectories and vectors. Imagine a trajectory. It begins at one point and ends at another. The first point we will call "death," the second, "health." Let us now imagine a new trajectory, beginning at a point called secularity and ending at another called holiness. In fact, we can imagine an infinite number of trajectories, m a n y t h a t we cannot even name, t h a t other societies may have named. Actually, in the society in which we live, it is useful to t h i n k of five. Each one counts distance using its own terms, terms without equivalent on any other trajectory. It is like counting distance in feet, heat in degrees, and color in wavelength. Although each trajectory is independent~ they all cross at a single point and time. That point is the person. The time is the present. What we really have, then, looking from the present toward the future, are vectors, t h a t is, possible directions for h u m a n choice. We can list our five vectors as follows: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.
As organisms, we strive toward health. As psychosocial beings, we strive toward adjustment. As existential beings, we strive toward meaning. As moral beings, we strive for rightness. As religious beings, we strive toward holiness. (Many argue as to which theological word to place here. Some might prefer reconciliation or salvation to holiness. For the time being, let us take holiness as an all-encompassing term for the goal of the religious endeavor.)
If we borrow terms from any of these domains and apply them to another, we fail to recognize the differing contexts from which these words arise, and from which they cannot be extricated.
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The terms used in any one vector cannot be reduced to any other set of more primitive terms. Let us examine the philosophical question, "Can we derive ought from is?" How do moral imperatives arise out of the facts as th ey stand in the present? Evidently, "ought" is rooted in a different kind of language, one t h a t makes use of present factual material, but views those data within the context of moral valuesJ But we may have missed a more basic contextual shift. Is it any more possible to derive "will" from "is?" "[s" presupposes a static state of affairs. To say "will" is to presuppose a context in which the present state of affairs lies between a past and future, from which it comes and toward which it moves. To say "will" is to recognize the present's rootedness in this context and our inability to envision it any other way. "Will," therefore, cannot be derived from "is." To say "will" is to presuppose points of origin and d e s t i n a t i o n - - i n other words, a trajectory. A few examples can help us clarify this. A pool hustler has t a k e n his cue in his hand. He makes his shot and says, "The eight ball will land in the corner pocket." He can foresee the final destination of the eight ball. He has made a prediction, and he knows the rightness of his assertion. We, as we watch the ball progress, share his conviction. However, t here is some uncert ai nt y present. Anything can happen, and so our pool hustler, as well as his audience, m a y be disappointed. The world around us appears to be moving toward orderliness, predictability, and increasing complexity. 7 Yet uncert ai nt y operates also, so t h a t predictability tends to break down along statistical lines when we consider the smaller items of which complex wholes are composed. Let us say t h a t one of our friends tells us, "I will arrive at the bus terminal at twelve-thirty." If he intends to say t h a t he is riding on a bus, which, if e v e r y t h i n g goes predictably, is scheduled to arrive at twelve-thirty, then his s t a t e m e n t is not much different from the one made by the pool hustler. If, however, he is sitting in the coffee shop across the street, eating lunch, his s t a t e m e n t takes on a different context. The past from which our friend comes and the future toward which he moves form a trajectory of h u m a n violation, a line through time drawn by choice and freedom. Over all, the total of human choices moves society toward reliability, orderliness, unity, and rightness. Yet unpredictability, rooted in the h u m a n psyche's capacity for "wrong" choice, makes the orderliness of society a reality t h a t holds t rue for the most part, but breaks down along statistical lines when we consider choices made by individual persons. We have seen here how "is" gives way to "will," which in t u r n gives way to "ought," through the accepting and presupposing of new contexts for being. We will apply this understanding of contexts to the categories of "health," "moral rightness" and "religious holiness." Although the contexts of "social adjustment" and "existential meaning" lie beyond the scope of this paper, we can assert, in a general sort of way, t hat "adjustment" is associated with
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health, while m e a n i n g seems associated with both "rightness" and "holiness." Looking at the emergence of rightness as a trajectory, we can see t h a t it involves not just an individual's movement but the m ovem ent of society as a whole. One becomes moral because one's relationships to others are moral ones. In other words, we can best describe rightness as a state of relatedness to others, in which the relationship is expressed by the ordered p a t t e r n i n g of one's activity. It stands to reason t h a t holiness could be understood in a similar way. Rightness and holiness are different because the relationships th ey embody are pa t t e r ned by different kinds of activity. What makes holiness special is t h a t it presumes t h a t God is a m e m b e r of the community so related. To quote Deuteronomy 23:15, "Since the Lord your God moves about in your c a m p . . , let your camp be holy." M o v e m e n t . How does one m a ke "progress" along a vector? Another example can help us illustrate the process. A woman has written a note to a person whom she does not know. "My n ame is Sally, and I would like to meet you. My n u m b e r is 2 2 2 - 1 1 1 1 . " Were we to ask her, "Why did you write t h a t letter?" Sally might reply, "I just felt like it." We might press the point. "Is your life in some way lacking, t h a t you need to pursue this relationship?" and Sally might reply indignantly, "Of course not! I'm successful and content just as I am!" It would indeed be presumptuous to assume t h a t her life is in any way deficient. She is moving steadily along her trajectory toward success. While on it, progress is counted in a vocabulary unique to itself. As long as she remains in this trajectory, t he r e can be no discontent, no lack. The language to describe what is lacking does not exist within this context. When Sally tells us she is pursuing a relationship, "because I feel like it," she is describing how the awareness of anot her trajectory arises in her consciousness. There is no precedent in her present vocabulary to account for it. This awareness comes to he r not by emerging from her past, but by descending from her future. It is an awareness of potentiality, grounded not in how life is but how it might be. It is, in a sense, prophetic. Using a colorful metaphor, we can refer to it as the voice of the fut ure self. In Sally's case, it calls h er from unrelatedness to relatedness. How does she m a ke this transition? She makes it t hrough the medium of language. The language she uses is the language of related people; hence, it has significance. This is ironic because she isn't related before she writes it and only becomes related t h r o u g h the act of writing it. This should not surprise us. After all, she is not writing in a language t h a t describes, and is therefore consequent to, reality. Hers is the language t h a t transforms reality. These are the words of her future self, the speech act of w hat she wishes to become. Because she speaks those words, she becomes t h a t self. As she sits to write the first word of her letter, she must struggle. The words refuse to emerge on paper. She knows t hey are groundless; she feels
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absurd as she writes them; they presume what is not real. It is only after the words are written and the act is done t h a t these words can have sense. Since Sally is capable of free choice, we can never assume t h a t her choice will favor increased relatedness. There is nothing in her present context which is lacking. She is, perhaps, content to remain there. Every context is self-contained and is lacking nothing save the achievement of its implied goal. Who says t h a t she needs to write this letter at all? Let her just forget the whole thing; she will be no worse off for it. But the voice has already called to her. If she chooses to become related, her trajectory will become a vector. A tension will be introduced. The possibility t h a t she will one day be compelled to choose between her relationship and personal success will become conceivable.
Implications for theology. Our analysis has lent some clarity to the notions of "health," "rightness," and "holiness." First, each operates within its own context; when added to each other, they yield vectors for h u m a n choice. Therefore, it is not correct to speak of holy people as being more healthy t h a n others. Nor are all right people holy or healthy. There is one exception to this, which holds true in the Judeo-Christian tradition: one should not strive toward holiness without simultaneously striving toward rightness. (We will say more about this later.) Second, rightness and holiness are manifested through the ordered patterning of acts t h a t transpire between individuals. To illustrate: A person begins as self. After self comes the context of relatedness. Being related is a real experience; it feels a certain way. But if we wished to describe it, we would have to make a list of those acts t h a t carry significance between related people. But on the other hand, if these patterns do in fact express relatedness, it is because they are grounded in the reality of t h a t feeling. This may seem paradoxical and circular, but it is actually an example of systematic thinking. Is "logic" real outside of the statements that express it? If not, would we ever be able to distinguish between logical and incoherent statements? And yet, could "logic" exist if not for the statements t h a t convey it? The same holds true for any h u m a n feeling. When dealing with relationships, feeling and expression mirror the medieval notion of form and matter. Each generates the other, in a cycle t h a t prohibits our asking, "Which came first?" How then did relatedness become real? We can only imagine t h a t somewhere, at the dawn of h u m a n consciousness, someone must have paused along the trajectory of day-to-day survival long enough to utter a word. How utterly senseless! Such a pointless, inexplicable gesture! But once spoken, relatedness became real, and t h a t word, repeated over and over, grew into language. Rightness and holiness can be seen as other forms of relatedness. Once again, we question why rightness is different from mere relatedness. It is
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because it is expressed by different kinds of acts. If one is standing in the context of relatedness alone, one can hardly predict or find any sense in the acts expressive of rightness. One must presuppose rightness, and, having awareness of its basic feeling, one must give expression to t h a t feeling in the appropriate sort of act. To one who is not yet "right," the acts t h a t express rightness are meaningless. Discovering "rightness" or "holiness" involves acting, not in a way t h a t is a priori sensible, but t h a t transforms life in such a way t h a t the act requires meaning. In summation, the process of coming to rightness or holiness involves placing the deed before its meaning. Conversion comes to us from the real m of what "might be" and manifests language to us t h a t is not grounded in our past experience. It is no wonder t h a t conversions are seen in the Bible as an outcome of revelation.
Implications for therapy. We are now in a position to draw some definite conclusions. For one committed to "health," "rightness," and "holiness," progress can be made at the same time in all these directions. Nevertheless, one must often choose priorities; there are not always sufficient resources. For this reason the minister should be capable of helping people achieve a creative synthesis, or at least a compromise, among their differing vectors. The paths of rightness and holiness do from time to time demand sacrifice. To convey this, the minister must be grounded in the context of faith. From a secular point of view, one m i ght encourage the opposite sacrifice. We must also be wary of encouraging the sacrifice of rightness for holiness. We need not assume t h a t individuals without a conscience are incapable of religious experiences. The barbarism of ancient paganism is well known; but there is no doubting its religiosity. The Bible's message, however, is this: holiness mus t build upon the language of rightness. Our faith recoils at the thought of immoral prophets, although these certainly did exist in ancient times. Scripture helps us see t h a t what is moral must set the limit for the expression of holiness. A nyt hi ng else is an affront to God. When ministering to an emotionally disturbed person, one must avoid two errors. The first is to deprive this person of holiness because he or she is disturbed. We tend to believe t h a t religious awareness is the n a t u r a l outcome of h ealth y h u m a n growth. When people grow up in a caring home, they l earn to see the world as a safe place. Consequently, as their religious beliefs develop, th ey perceive God as caring, just, and loving. The disturbed person will more t h a n likely not share such an attitude. But does this preclude his or her being holy? It is therefore easy to assume t h a t the disturbed will not understand religious acts correctly. But our discussion of religious action leads to the conclusion t h a t understanding is subsequent to acting. If this is true, then the minister's role is to perceive the disturbed person as a holy individu a l - - i n other words, to see t h a t person's potential self and t hen encourage action.
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The second error is to present religion as something that can cure the disturbed person. If so presented, religion may become another part of a delusional system, used by a disturbed client in a vain attempt to escape his or her pain. The minister may encourage prayer in this area, but always with the reservation t h a t God may say no. The process of ministering to the disturbed can be compared to unknotting a ball of thread. The vectors are tangled up, so t h a t religion and delusion, ritual and maladaptation, morality and neuroses, are difficult to differentiate. The minister can assist the disturbed client in sorting these things out. If the minister can help the client become healthy, excellent. But even if the u n h e a l t h y remain unhealthy, they can still achieve holiness. But can the religious vector influence the health-oriented vector? Very certainly! Remember t h a t it is the individual, dysfunction and all, who moves along this religious direction. Holiness can interpret the meaning of a client's pain in such a way t h a t it can become a vehicle for increased holiness. If holiness can reinterpret a client's suffering in such a way, then the suffering can be thought of as cured, but only if we understand this healing in the unique language of the sacred, whose terms have no counterparts in other languages. To be precise, healing is a useful term, both in medicine and the pursuit of holiness, as long as we remember exactly which language we are speaking when we use it2
Implications for pedagogy. Another area of concern has to do with pedagogy. Piaget was the first to document the cognitive phases of how children learn and develop. Kohlberg, along the same line, devised a model of the development of moral judgment and reasoning in children and adults. Fowler, working upon this foundation, identified stages of faith development. In addition, it is Fowler's belief that all moral judgments are in some way grounded in religious faith? This last statement has been effectively criticized. 1~'The picture presented here also contradicts such a notion. Morality and religion can exist apart from each other. Being moral is not another form of religion. In fact, the concept of covenant seems to say t h a t morality provides the reciprocity that makes religion possible. Kohlberg's argument presumes t h a t morality is based upon an ethical rule. From where does this rule derive its authority? Initially it comes from parents, who are expected to punish if the rule is not followed. At a subsequent stage, the authority is transferred to society. Nevertheless, adherence to the rule remains an act of self-interest. When the rule can be sufficiently abstracted from its authority so t h a t it stands alone as a value, when it becomes universal, then one's moral reasoning has acquired maturity. This assumption has been challenged as well, mostly along the following lines. For Kohlberg to have made the universal rule the highest level of moral reasoning, he must have made a judgment as to the nature of morality
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itself. Within this judgment, someone who says, "You shouldn't steal because you might get caught," can be placed on a low level of reasoning. T here is only one problem. The same someone doesn't necessarily share Kohlberg's judgment. P ut differently, we don't know w hat morality is unless we ask people. The resulting information will yield several different general pictures. Kohlberg, however, in a t t e m p t i n g to create a developmental system has simply imposed his own opinion on the data. According to the description presented in this paper, it is unfair to judge the moral act based upon the rule one uses to generate it. The acts t h a t express the relationships of right persons are n a t u r a l l y nonverbal. T hey do not tr an s lat e presupposed rules into action. Instead, action calls forth t h a t set of relations within which one is a moral being, and from which moral rules are generalized. To illustrate, imagine a selfish corporate executive. He is highly competitive, living in a "dog-eat-dog" world. Nothing could m a k e less sense to him t h a n to give some money to a beggar. But t here on the street corner is the neighborhood beggar, who clearly hasn't eaten in several days. The executive pauses on this trajectory. He feels an impulse. "Give the beggar ten dollars." He doesn't h e a r a universal principle of ethical behavior, such as, "One should always share one's money with those less fortunate." T h a t would have been easy to ignore. He could even have t hought up his own universal principle: "All property-owner relationships must never be severed unless replaced by other property." This impulse is not talking in generalities. It is his conscience calling him to concrete action. This impulse m akes little sense to our wealthy executive, but he follows it anyway. Because he acted in this way, he has become moral. He has discovered a new vector with a different past, and a different future toward which he m ay now proceed. Let us look at this another way. To m easure levels of reasoning is to see how well people have learned to m a s t e r words. To be able to make universal pronouncements is a neat trick. First, one must learn how to divorce language from the concrete. Obviously children t ake time to learn this. Does t h a t mean t h a t a child who is intensely involved in practicing moral behavior is actually less moral because he can't talk about who he is? What of the highly precocious child, who has learned how to use the right kind of language, yet fails to perform ethical deeds? Which one is a better person? The implication for pedagogy is this: to teach is to encourage action, and to act does not require our formulating a basis for the action. U n d e r s t a n d i n g comes insofar as the act is already being accomplished. We may conclude with the following story as told in the Talmud. When the Israelites gave precedence to "we will do" over "we will hear" [that is, understand] a heavenly voice went forth and exclaimed to them. "Who revealed this secret to my children?! This is the expression used by the ministering angels! As it is written 'Bless the Lord you Angels of his, you mighty in strength, that fulfill his word, that hearken to the sound of his word' first they fulfill, and then they hearken. '1~
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References 1. Pruyser, P.W., The Minister as Diagnostician: Personal Problems in Pastoral Perspective. Philadelphia, Westminister Press, 1976. 2. Collins, W.J., "Pastoral-Diagnostic Understanding of a Counseling Case," Pastoral Psychology, 1985, 34, Winter, 101-111. 3. Dolores Curran's finding, "The Healthy Family has a shared religious core," is an excellent example of this belief. See Curran, D., Traits of a Healthy Family. Minneapolis, Winston Press, 1983. 4. Here is Howard Clinebell's description of pastoral counseling: "A counseling relationship can help overcome that alienation from ourselves, other persons, and God which is the essence of sin. Whether the issues are identified by theological labels or not, they are there at the heart of counseling--sin and salvation, guilt and forgiveness, judgement and grace, spiritual death and rebirth." See Clinebell, H., Basic Types of Pastoral Counseling. Nashville, Abingdon Press, 1982, p. 46. Compare this to Carlfred Broderick's statement about therapeutic values: "The therapeutic world is founded upon existential values. The ultimate goal is held to be individual growth and self actualization (not loyalty), assertiveness (not self sacrifice), differentiation (not commitment) and openness (not privacy). These values are promoted without apology or debate, but they are not the only viable sense of values." Broderick, C., The Therapeutic Triangle, A Sourcebook on Marital Therapy. Beverly Hills, Sage Publications, 1983, p. 171. 5. Clinebell, o19 cit., pp. 41-48. 6. Flathman, R.E., ed., Concepts in Social and Political Philosophy. New York, MacMillan Publishing Company, 1973, pp. 57-66. 7. De Chardin, Teilhard, The Phenomenon of Man, Bernard Wall, trans. New York, Harper and Row, 1965, p. 48. 8. A similar point was made by Stern, E.M., in Psychotherapy and The Religiously Committed Patient. New York, The Haworth Press, 1985, pp. 1-10. 9. Wilcox, M.M., Developmental Journey: A Guide to the Development of Logical and Moral Reasoning and Social Perspective. Nashville, Abingdon Press, 1980. 10. Munsey, B., ed., Moral Development, Moral Education, and Kohlberg. Birmingham, Religious Education Press, 1980, pp. 272-291. 11. Ibid., pp. 214-231. 12. Babylonian Talmud, Tractate Shabbat, p. 88a.
Religion and Health: A Theological Reflection NATHAN GLUECK A B S T R A C T : Are healthy people necessarily religious? Are religious people necessarily healthy?
Does holism imply t h a t holiness equals health? This paper presents a model for a multidimensional u n d e r s t a n d i n g of h u m a n progress t h a t does not lose sight of the fundamental unity of personhood.
In the performance of ministry, especially pastoral counseling, it is often easy to lose one's spiritual orientation. It was Paul Pruyser who pointed out t h a t m a n y ministers have lost touch with their theological foundation, and have chosen a fully therapeutic model of helping. 1 In doing so, they have abandoned a long heritage and a collective body of knowledge millennia old. Pruyser therefore advances several key criteria by which ministers can diagnose their clients. These are drawn from theological language and help to identify spiritual concerns. Pruyser's point is well taken, and his diagnostic criteria have proven their usefulness in the field,~ yet a basic tension remains unresolved. He is in effect suggesting t h a t the diagnostic criteria used in a theological content differ from those used in other therapeutic contexts. This legitimates pastoral counseling insofar as it now has a set of diagnostic criteria. On the other hand, it also implies that the pastoral diagnosis does not translate into any other diagnostic terminology. If so, this challenges the very notion of "spiritual health." While it is often asserted t h a t spirituality is linked to the health of the total person and t h a t those more in touch with the divine are healthier for it, 3 the theological perspective seems, in fact, to relate to a separate set of concerns. If so, it becomes possible to conceive of spiritual and holy people who happen not to be emotionally healthy, as well as perfectly healthy people who happen to rate poorly by religious criteria. The notion t h a t holiness and health are holistically equivalent implies t h a t one who is not spiritually developed is not fully healthy, and t h a t someone Rabbi N a t h a n Glueck is a chaplain in Miami Beach. Address reprint requests to Rabbi Glueck at 4561 Prairie Avenue, Miami Beach, FL 33140. 109
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who is not healthy is not fully spiritual. Etiology indicates t h a t the words "health," "wholeness," and "holiness" share a common linguistic source. However, this does not always do justice to the complexity of life. Let us examine the following examples: 1.
2.
3.
4. 5.
A young college student's family is struck by catastrophic illness. The student must make some hard choices. To support her family, she must forgo her education. In addition, she cannot entertain marriage, although she is very much in love. Since she is a committed Christian, she struggles with her sexuality to remain celibate until marriage. She feels pulled in m a n y different directions. Shall she choose personal fulfillment or moral rightness? How much sexual frustration should she tolerate for the sake of her religious commitment? A Catholic couple are struggling with the church's teaching on birth control. They must choose between sexual abstinence (unhealthy) or alienation from the church (unholy) or continued childbirth (unhealthy). A religious m a r t y r dies for her belief. Can we seriously argue that this person has become healthy, when, in fact, she has died? Can we deny t h a t she has attained holiness? A pastor's marriage ends in divorce. Let us say that the marriage was in some way unhealthy. Does t h a t mean the pastor is unholy? Last, what of the Jewish person who will not take cold medicine on the Sabbath? (Jewish law still forbids healing minor illnesses on the Sabbath.)
Most of my Christian colleagues with whom I have raised the issue (I am a Jewish Orthodox rabbi) have responded with the following argument: "When looking at the whole person, all dimensions, physical or spiritual, are integrated. Therefore, any religion which compels a choice between 'health' and 'holiness' cannot be a true faith." I have heard this argument primarily from liberal rabbis and pastors in mainline Protestant denominations. The Catholic priests I've interviewed perceived more tension, while the Orthodox rabbis I've spoken to seemed to accept the tension as a matter of fact. I have never taken a formal survey, but I suggest the following as a hypothesis: the more demanding a religion is of its adherents, the more health and spirituality will be seen as distinct. In Hebrew the concepts of health, wholeness, and holiness have no linguistic connection: In Hebrew "holy" is qadosh, something set aside for God. "Whole" is shalem, complete, contented, and well rounded. "Healthy" is bari, something created, natural, and creaturely. And so the question: When we speak of "spiritual health," are we perhaps combining spirituality with another term foreign to its essential nature?
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Need we always assert the equivalency of religion and self-fulfillment? Should religion be judged by the health of its adherents? Should medicine be judged by the religiosity of those it has cured? 4 In order to examine the alternative to absolute holism, let us begin with the following assumption: health of the organism, social adjustment, moral rightness, and holiness are different from one another. Yet they do not inherently contradict one another. Under most circumstances we can manifest all these qualities in our lives. However, stressful times may bring these different priorities into conflict with one another. In a similar vein, the absence of any one quality does not imply the absence of another. Not all holy people are h e a l t h y - - p h y s i c a l l y or emotionally - - n o r are all healthy people holy. A minister who wishes to be truly helpful must be willing to care for people in their physical, psychic, and spiritual dimensions without falling into the trap of compartmentalization. 5 To help us understand this alternative conception, I offer the following model:
Trajectories and vectors. Imagine a trajectory. It begins at one point and ends at another. The first point we will call "death," the second, "health." Let us now imagine a new trajectory, beginning at a point called secularity and ending at another called holiness. In fact, we can imagine an infinite number of trajectories, m a n y t h a t we cannot even name, t h a t other societies may have named. Actually, in the society in which we live, it is useful to t h i n k of five. Each one counts distance using its own terms, terms without equivalent on any other trajectory. It is like counting distance in feet, heat in degrees, and color in wavelength. Although each trajectory is independent~ they all cross at a single point and time. That point is the person. The time is the present. What we really have, then, looking from the present toward the future, are vectors, t h a t is, possible directions for h u m a n choice. We can list our five vectors as follows: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.
As organisms, we strive toward health. As psychosocial beings, we strive toward adjustment. As existential beings, we strive toward meaning. As moral beings, we strive for rightness. As religious beings, we strive toward holiness. (Many argue as to which theological word to place here. Some might prefer reconciliation or salvation to holiness. For the time being, let us take holiness as an all-encompassing term for the goal of the religious endeavor.)
If we borrow terms from any of these domains and apply them to another, we fail to recognize the differing contexts from which these words arise, and from which they cannot be extricated.
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The terms used in any one vector cannot be reduced to any other set of more primitive terms. Let us examine the philosophical question, "Can we derive ought from is?" How do moral imperatives arise out of the facts as th ey stand in the present? Evidently, "ought" is rooted in a different kind of language, one t h a t makes use of present factual material, but views those data within the context of moral valuesJ But we may have missed a more basic contextual shift. Is it any more possible to derive "will" from "is?" "[s" presupposes a static state of affairs. To say "will" is to presuppose a context in which the present state of affairs lies between a past and future, from which it comes and toward which it moves. To say "will" is to recognize the present's rootedness in this context and our inability to envision it any other way. "Will," therefore, cannot be derived from "is." To say "will" is to presuppose points of origin and d e s t i n a t i o n - - i n other words, a trajectory. A few examples can help us clarify this. A pool hustler has t a k e n his cue in his hand. He makes his shot and says, "The eight ball will land in the corner pocket." He can foresee the final destination of the eight ball. He has made a prediction, and he knows the rightness of his assertion. We, as we watch the ball progress, share his conviction. However, t here is some uncert ai nt y present. Anything can happen, and so our pool hustler, as well as his audience, m a y be disappointed. The world around us appears to be moving toward orderliness, predictability, and increasing complexity. 7 Yet uncert ai nt y operates also, so t h a t predictability tends to break down along statistical lines when we consider the smaller items of which complex wholes are composed. Let us say t h a t one of our friends tells us, "I will arrive at the bus terminal at twelve-thirty." If he intends to say t h a t he is riding on a bus, which, if e v e r y t h i n g goes predictably, is scheduled to arrive at twelve-thirty, then his s t a t e m e n t is not much different from the one made by the pool hustler. If, however, he is sitting in the coffee shop across the street, eating lunch, his s t a t e m e n t takes on a different context. The past from which our friend comes and the future toward which he moves form a trajectory of h u m a n violation, a line through time drawn by choice and freedom. Over all, the total of human choices moves society toward reliability, orderliness, unity, and rightness. Yet unpredictability, rooted in the h u m a n psyche's capacity for "wrong" choice, makes the orderliness of society a reality t h a t holds t rue for the most part, but breaks down along statistical lines when we consider choices made by individual persons. We have seen here how "is" gives way to "will," which in t u r n gives way to "ought," through the accepting and presupposing of new contexts for being. We will apply this understanding of contexts to the categories of "health," "moral rightness" and "religious holiness." Although the contexts of "social adjustment" and "existential meaning" lie beyond the scope of this paper, we can assert, in a general sort of way, t hat "adjustment" is associated with
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health, while m e a n i n g seems associated with both "rightness" and "holiness." Looking at the emergence of rightness as a trajectory, we can see t h a t it involves not just an individual's movement but the m ovem ent of society as a whole. One becomes moral because one's relationships to others are moral ones. In other words, we can best describe rightness as a state of relatedness to others, in which the relationship is expressed by the ordered p a t t e r n i n g of one's activity. It stands to reason t h a t holiness could be understood in a similar way. Rightness and holiness are different because the relationships th ey embody are pa t t e r ned by different kinds of activity. What makes holiness special is t h a t it presumes t h a t God is a m e m b e r of the community so related. To quote Deuteronomy 23:15, "Since the Lord your God moves about in your c a m p . . , let your camp be holy." M o v e m e n t . How does one m a ke "progress" along a vector? Another example can help us illustrate the process. A woman has written a note to a person whom she does not know. "My n ame is Sally, and I would like to meet you. My n u m b e r is 2 2 2 - 1 1 1 1 . " Were we to ask her, "Why did you write t h a t letter?" Sally might reply, "I just felt like it." We might press the point. "Is your life in some way lacking, t h a t you need to pursue this relationship?" and Sally might reply indignantly, "Of course not! I'm successful and content just as I am!" It would indeed be presumptuous to assume t h a t her life is in any way deficient. She is moving steadily along her trajectory toward success. While on it, progress is counted in a vocabulary unique to itself. As long as she remains in this trajectory, t he r e can be no discontent, no lack. The language to describe what is lacking does not exist within this context. When Sally tells us she is pursuing a relationship, "because I feel like it," she is describing how the awareness of anot her trajectory arises in her consciousness. There is no precedent in her present vocabulary to account for it. This awareness comes to he r not by emerging from her past, but by descending from her future. It is an awareness of potentiality, grounded not in how life is but how it might be. It is, in a sense, prophetic. Using a colorful metaphor, we can refer to it as the voice of the fut ure self. In Sally's case, it calls h er from unrelatedness to relatedness. How does she m a ke this transition? She makes it t hrough the medium of language. The language she uses is the language of related people; hence, it has significance. This is ironic because she isn't related before she writes it and only becomes related t h r o u g h the act of writing it. This should not surprise us. After all, she is not writing in a language t h a t describes, and is therefore consequent to, reality. Hers is the language t h a t transforms reality. These are the words of her future self, the speech act of w hat she wishes to become. Because she speaks those words, she becomes t h a t self. As she sits to write the first word of her letter, she must struggle. The words refuse to emerge on paper. She knows t hey are groundless; she feels
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absurd as she writes them; they presume what is not real. It is only after the words are written and the act is done t h a t these words can have sense. Since Sally is capable of free choice, we can never assume t h a t her choice will favor increased relatedness. There is nothing in her present context which is lacking. She is, perhaps, content to remain there. Every context is self-contained and is lacking nothing save the achievement of its implied goal. Who says t h a t she needs to write this letter at all? Let her just forget the whole thing; she will be no worse off for it. But the voice has already called to her. If she chooses to become related, her trajectory will become a vector. A tension will be introduced. The possibility t h a t she will one day be compelled to choose between her relationship and personal success will become conceivable.
Implications for theology. Our analysis has lent some clarity to the notions of "health," "rightness," and "holiness." First, each operates within its own context; when added to each other, they yield vectors for h u m a n choice. Therefore, it is not correct to speak of holy people as being more healthy t h a n others. Nor are all right people holy or healthy. There is one exception to this, which holds true in the Judeo-Christian tradition: one should not strive toward holiness without simultaneously striving toward rightness. (We will say more about this later.) Second, rightness and holiness are manifested through the ordered patterning of acts t h a t transpire between individuals. To illustrate: A person begins as self. After self comes the context of relatedness. Being related is a real experience; it feels a certain way. But if we wished to describe it, we would have to make a list of those acts t h a t carry significance between related people. But on the other hand, if these patterns do in fact express relatedness, it is because they are grounded in the reality of t h a t feeling. This may seem paradoxical and circular, but it is actually an example of systematic thinking. Is "logic" real outside of the statements that express it? If not, would we ever be able to distinguish between logical and incoherent statements? And yet, could "logic" exist if not for the statements t h a t convey it? The same holds true for any h u m a n feeling. When dealing with relationships, feeling and expression mirror the medieval notion of form and matter. Each generates the other, in a cycle t h a t prohibits our asking, "Which came first?" How then did relatedness become real? We can only imagine t h a t somewhere, at the dawn of h u m a n consciousness, someone must have paused along the trajectory of day-to-day survival long enough to utter a word. How utterly senseless! Such a pointless, inexplicable gesture! But once spoken, relatedness became real, and t h a t word, repeated over and over, grew into language. Rightness and holiness can be seen as other forms of relatedness. Once again, we question why rightness is different from mere relatedness. It is
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because it is expressed by different kinds of acts. If one is standing in the context of relatedness alone, one can hardly predict or find any sense in the acts expressive of rightness. One must presuppose rightness, and, having awareness of its basic feeling, one must give expression to t h a t feeling in the appropriate sort of act. To one who is not yet "right," the acts t h a t express rightness are meaningless. Discovering "rightness" or "holiness" involves acting, not in a way t h a t is a priori sensible, but t h a t transforms life in such a way t h a t the act requires meaning. In summation, the process of coming to rightness or holiness involves placing the deed before its meaning. Conversion comes to us from the real m of what "might be" and manifests language to us t h a t is not grounded in our past experience. It is no wonder t h a t conversions are seen in the Bible as an outcome of revelation.
Implications for therapy. We are now in a position to draw some definite conclusions. For one committed to "health," "rightness," and "holiness," progress can be made at the same time in all these directions. Nevertheless, one must often choose priorities; there are not always sufficient resources. For this reason the minister should be capable of helping people achieve a creative synthesis, or at least a compromise, among their differing vectors. The paths of rightness and holiness do from time to time demand sacrifice. To convey this, the minister must be grounded in the context of faith. From a secular point of view, one m i ght encourage the opposite sacrifice. We must also be wary of encouraging the sacrifice of rightness for holiness. We need not assume t h a t individuals without a conscience are incapable of religious experiences. The barbarism of ancient paganism is well known; but there is no doubting its religiosity. The Bible's message, however, is this: holiness mus t build upon the language of rightness. Our faith recoils at the thought of immoral prophets, although these certainly did exist in ancient times. Scripture helps us see t h a t what is moral must set the limit for the expression of holiness. A nyt hi ng else is an affront to God. When ministering to an emotionally disturbed person, one must avoid two errors. The first is to deprive this person of holiness because he or she is disturbed. We tend to believe t h a t religious awareness is the n a t u r a l outcome of h ealth y h u m a n growth. When people grow up in a caring home, they l earn to see the world as a safe place. Consequently, as their religious beliefs develop, th ey perceive God as caring, just, and loving. The disturbed person will more t h a n likely not share such an attitude. But does this preclude his or her being holy? It is therefore easy to assume t h a t the disturbed will not understand religious acts correctly. But our discussion of religious action leads to the conclusion t h a t understanding is subsequent to acting. If this is true, then the minister's role is to perceive the disturbed person as a holy individu a l - - i n other words, to see t h a t person's potential self and t hen encourage action.
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The second error is to present religion as something that can cure the disturbed person. If so presented, religion may become another part of a delusional system, used by a disturbed client in a vain attempt to escape his or her pain. The minister may encourage prayer in this area, but always with the reservation t h a t God may say no. The process of ministering to the disturbed can be compared to unknotting a ball of thread. The vectors are tangled up, so t h a t religion and delusion, ritual and maladaptation, morality and neuroses, are difficult to differentiate. The minister can assist the disturbed client in sorting these things out. If the minister can help the client become healthy, excellent. But even if the u n h e a l t h y remain unhealthy, they can still achieve holiness. But can the religious vector influence the health-oriented vector? Very certainly! Remember t h a t it is the individual, dysfunction and all, who moves along this religious direction. Holiness can interpret the meaning of a client's pain in such a way t h a t it can become a vehicle for increased holiness. If holiness can reinterpret a client's suffering in such a way, then the suffering can be thought of as cured, but only if we understand this healing in the unique language of the sacred, whose terms have no counterparts in other languages. To be precise, healing is a useful term, both in medicine and the pursuit of holiness, as long as we remember exactly which language we are speaking when we use it2
Implications for pedagogy. Another area of concern has to do with pedagogy. Piaget was the first to document the cognitive phases of how children learn and develop. Kohlberg, along the same line, devised a model of the development of moral judgment and reasoning in children and adults. Fowler, working upon this foundation, identified stages of faith development. In addition, it is Fowler's belief that all moral judgments are in some way grounded in religious faith? This last statement has been effectively criticized. 1~'The picture presented here also contradicts such a notion. Morality and religion can exist apart from each other. Being moral is not another form of religion. In fact, the concept of covenant seems to say t h a t morality provides the reciprocity that makes religion possible. Kohlberg's argument presumes t h a t morality is based upon an ethical rule. From where does this rule derive its authority? Initially it comes from parents, who are expected to punish if the rule is not followed. At a subsequent stage, the authority is transferred to society. Nevertheless, adherence to the rule remains an act of self-interest. When the rule can be sufficiently abstracted from its authority so t h a t it stands alone as a value, when it becomes universal, then one's moral reasoning has acquired maturity. This assumption has been challenged as well, mostly along the following lines. For Kohlberg to have made the universal rule the highest level of moral reasoning, he must have made a judgment as to the nature of morality
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itself. Within this judgment, someone who says, "You shouldn't steal because you might get caught," can be placed on a low level of reasoning. T here is only one problem. The same someone doesn't necessarily share Kohlberg's judgment. P ut differently, we don't know w hat morality is unless we ask people. The resulting information will yield several different general pictures. Kohlberg, however, in a t t e m p t i n g to create a developmental system has simply imposed his own opinion on the data. According to the description presented in this paper, it is unfair to judge the moral act based upon the rule one uses to generate it. The acts t h a t express the relationships of right persons are n a t u r a l l y nonverbal. T hey do not tr an s lat e presupposed rules into action. Instead, action calls forth t h a t set of relations within which one is a moral being, and from which moral rules are generalized. To illustrate, imagine a selfish corporate executive. He is highly competitive, living in a "dog-eat-dog" world. Nothing could m a k e less sense to him t h a n to give some money to a beggar. But t here on the street corner is the neighborhood beggar, who clearly hasn't eaten in several days. The executive pauses on this trajectory. He feels an impulse. "Give the beggar ten dollars." He doesn't h e a r a universal principle of ethical behavior, such as, "One should always share one's money with those less fortunate." T h a t would have been easy to ignore. He could even have t hought up his own universal principle: "All property-owner relationships must never be severed unless replaced by other property." This impulse is not talking in generalities. It is his conscience calling him to concrete action. This impulse m akes little sense to our wealthy executive, but he follows it anyway. Because he acted in this way, he has become moral. He has discovered a new vector with a different past, and a different future toward which he m ay now proceed. Let us look at this another way. To m easure levels of reasoning is to see how well people have learned to m a s t e r words. To be able to make universal pronouncements is a neat trick. First, one must learn how to divorce language from the concrete. Obviously children t ake time to learn this. Does t h a t mean t h a t a child who is intensely involved in practicing moral behavior is actually less moral because he can't talk about who he is? What of the highly precocious child, who has learned how to use the right kind of language, yet fails to perform ethical deeds? Which one is a better person? The implication for pedagogy is this: to teach is to encourage action, and to act does not require our formulating a basis for the action. U n d e r s t a n d i n g comes insofar as the act is already being accomplished. We may conclude with the following story as told in the Talmud. When the Israelites gave precedence to "we will do" over "we will hear" [that is, understand] a heavenly voice went forth and exclaimed to them. "Who revealed this secret to my children?! This is the expression used by the ministering angels! As it is written 'Bless the Lord you Angels of his, you mighty in strength, that fulfill his word, that hearken to the sound of his word' first they fulfill, and then they hearken. '1~
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References 1. Pruyser, P.W., The Minister as Diagnostician: Personal Problems in Pastoral Perspective. Philadelphia, Westminister Press, 1976. 2. Collins, W.J., "Pastoral-Diagnostic Understanding of a Counseling Case," Pastoral Psychology, 1985, 34, Winter, 101-111. 3. Dolores Curran's finding, "The Healthy Family has a shared religious core," is an excellent example of this belief. See Curran, D., Traits of a Healthy Family. Minneapolis, Winston Press, 1983. 4. Here is Howard Clinebell's description of pastoral counseling: "A counseling relationship can help overcome that alienation from ourselves, other persons, and God which is the essence of sin. Whether the issues are identified by theological labels or not, they are there at the heart of counseling--sin and salvation, guilt and forgiveness, judgement and grace, spiritual death and rebirth." See Clinebell, H., Basic Types of Pastoral Counseling. Nashville, Abingdon Press, 1982, p. 46. Compare this to Carlfred Broderick's statement about therapeutic values: "The therapeutic world is founded upon existential values. The ultimate goal is held to be individual growth and self actualization (not loyalty), assertiveness (not self sacrifice), differentiation (not commitment) and openness (not privacy). These values are promoted without apology or debate, but they are not the only viable sense of values." Broderick, C., The Therapeutic Triangle, A Sourcebook on Marital Therapy. Beverly Hills, Sage Publications, 1983, p. 171. 5. Clinebell, o19 cit., pp. 41-48. 6. Flathman, R.E., ed., Concepts in Social and Political Philosophy. New York, MacMillan Publishing Company, 1973, pp. 57-66. 7. De Chardin, Teilhard, The Phenomenon of Man, Bernard Wall, trans. New York, Harper and Row, 1965, p. 48. 8. A similar point was made by Stern, E.M., in Psychotherapy and The Religiously Committed Patient. New York, The Haworth Press, 1985, pp. 1-10. 9. Wilcox, M.M., Developmental Journey: A Guide to the Development of Logical and Moral Reasoning and Social Perspective. Nashville, Abingdon Press, 1980. 10. Munsey, B., ed., Moral Development, Moral Education, and Kohlberg. Birmingham, Religious Education Press, 1980, pp. 272-291. 11. Ibid., pp. 214-231. 12. Babylonian Talmud, Tractate Shabbat, p. 88a.
