J o u r n a l of Religion a n d H e a l t h , Vol. 25, No. 1, S p r i n g 1986

Psychoanalysis and Theology: Two Dialectics CHARLES D. HACKETT A B S T R A C T : In t h e v o c a b u l a r y of p s y c h o a n a l y s i s , " h e a l t h " m e a n s s o m e t h i n g r o u g h l y corr e l a t i v e to " s a l v a t i o n " in t h e v o c a b u l a r y of theology. Both h e a l t h a n d s a l v a t i o n a s s u m e some m a n n e r of c h a n g e from a previous p a t h o l o g i c a l or doomed state. A g a i n s t t h i s b a c k g r o u n d t h i s p a p e r seeks to d e l i n e a t e two d i f f e r e n t possible models of change: one in w h i c h r e a l i t y p e r se is changed as opposed to one in w h i c h t h e perception of r e a l i t y is changed. In theology, t h e f o r m e r can be r e p r e s e n t e d by Paul a n d t h e l a t t e r by John. In p s y c h o a n a l y s i s , F r e u d represented each p o i n t of view in his s t r u c t u r a l a n d t o p o g r a p h i c a l p a r a d i g m s respectively. In c o n t e m p o r a r y p s y c h o a n a l y t i c a l therapy, Otto K e r n b e r g r e p r e s e n t s t h e f o r m e r a n d J a c q u e s Lacan t h e latter.

Introduction This paper is an effort to clarify and offer some thoughts toward u n d e r s t a n d ing certain similarities that occur in theology and psychoanalysis. Most broadly put, both psychoanalysis and theology address themselves to the issues of healing and salvation. In doing so, both disciplines a u t o m a t i c a l l y involve themselves in the issue of change. It will be on these t h r e e concepts that I will focus in what follows. In the history of theology, the notions of salvation and health have been tied to two different paradigms of change. One was a literalist-historical point of view, identified with Antioch, which looked for a radical change in the totality of reality. The other was a g n o s t i c a l l y oriented outlook which was identified with Alexandria. This view tended to see change as change in the way one understood reality and consequently tended to see salvation in terms of a right perception of things. Though these two views have h a r d l y ever appeared in absolute form in a n y sophisticated theologian, the tension has existed and does exist implicitly in v i r t u a l l y every serious soteriological discussion. One need only recall the " p o s t - B u l t m a n n i a n " debates over "existentialist" theology to find issues in modern form. It will be the task of this paper to propose that this same tension has existed C h a r l e s D. H a c k e t t , Ph.D., a n Episcopal priest, is a n A s s i s t a n t Professor of C h u r c h M i n i s tries at E m o r y U n i v e r s i t y in A t l a n t a . He m a i n t a i n s a p r i v a t e p r a c t i c e of p s y c h o t h e r a p y at t h e Parkwood M e n t a l H e a l t h Center. T h i s p a p e r is based on a p r e s e n t a t i o n to t h e F a c u l t y Research F o r u m of C a n d l e r School of Theology. For t h e i r e d i t o r i a l a s s i s t a n c e , t h e a u t h o r is grateful to J e a n E. Levenson, M.Div., a n d David M. Moss, Ph.D. 29

9 1986 Institutes of Religion and Health

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in psychoanalytic reflection, beginning with F r e u d h i m s e l f and r e p r e s e n t e d today by two different schools of psychoanalytic theory. My method will be as follows: first, to review in b r i e f form the dichotomous theologies of change as they took form in the New Testament; second, to elucidate the positions of two c u r r e n t psychoanalytical schools; and third, to suggest a t e n t a t i v e conclusion or two which might be drawn from the correlation of these a p p a r e n t l y diverse disciplines.

Change a n d history in the N e w Testament It is clear that for the earliest believers in Jesus, change and history were the vehicles of salvation. Assuming the J e w i s h view of history, some of Jesus' disciples understood him to be the Messiah who would usher in the Kingdom of God. This was to be a radical change in n a t u r e itself such that justice, harmony, and peace would be established in t h e place of the injustice, suffering, and death which characterized existence since Adam's fall years before. After his crucifixion, the crisis that resulted from the heretofore inconceivable idea that the Messiah would die "hanging on a tree ''1 was m a n a g e d by the notion of the i m m i n e n t Parousia. 2 The next crisis in the Church's u n d e r s t a n d i n g of salvation was occasioned by the delay of the Parousia. By around A.D. 50, the issue of w h y some Christians were dying before J e s u s r e t u r n e d was causing Paul to propose a highly suspect theory. 3 Indeed, the problem of this delay is a p r i m a r y reason for the development of the Gospel tradition in which the synopticists and J o h n offer t h e i r s e v e r a l r e w o r k i n g s of t h e e x p e c t a t i o n of t h e i m m i n e n t Eschaton. Each in his own manner, the Synoptics offered an explanation for the delay and a program for life while awaiting its eventual arrival. By the time of the writing of John, the situation is quite different. Though the Parousia is nowhere denied, it has simply ceased to function, even as a limiting horizon. Functionally, it has been replaced by a notion of salvation that is clearly individual. How one responds to J e s u s in some way alters the way in which the world is for the believer. A certain relationship with J e s u s somehow produces a different relationship with reality and enables the believer to function in a saved manner: with an ability to obey Jesus' c o m m a n d m e n t to love. This state of existence of the believer, u t t e r l y different from the state of existence of the nonbeliever, 4 is to be extended e t e r n a l l y in heaven for each individual believer, while, presumably, the world will go on as it is, sinful and unchanged. 5 Thus, in the synoptics and in John, we see the two prototypical responses to the delay of the Parousia. Though their view of how history operates is different, Mark, Luke-Acts, and M a t t h e w all offer a "history of salvation" which ultimately involves a change in the very n a t u r e of reality. John, on the other hand, uses the language of change to denote what happens to individu-

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als who recognize and believe in a J e s u s who embodies the u l t i m a t e t r u t h about how reality is, as opposed to how it shall be in the future. It is significant that this dichotomy a l r e a d y exists in Paul himself. For example, Paul speaks of the present state Of Christian existence as being qualitatively different from the rest of the world. ~ At the same time, this state of being of the Christian, which for Paul is typically described in the relational t e r m s of justification, reconciliation, and c o m m u n i t y conduct, is always historically contingent. The Christian is assured of a new, personal status provided that he or she behaves in a m a n n e r consistent with that status. 7 Paul acknowledges a double state of affairs. On one hand, the q u a l i t y of one's life depends on what "spirit" one has. One does experience salvation in this life. At the same time, this experience is contingent upon the Parousia for the experience of salvation, and is had in the midst of a r e a l i t y still ruled by sin, where the cross and not the r e s u r r e c t i o n is the d o m i n a n t figure of existence. In belonging to Christ by baptism, one is joined to the C h r i s t i a n community, which is, above all else, an eschatological c o m m u n i t y that has its sense of changed being as a function of its realization that, very soon, the whole of reality will in fact change. As Paul h i m s e l f points out, w i t h o u t the fact of the resurrection of J e s u s and the i m m i n e n t arrival of the K i n g d o m of God which that resurrection has inaugurated, a n y changed sense of being or any experience of salvation is false, s In brief, the situation with Paul seems to be that h u m a n s exist u n d e r the sway of sin and death. The h e r m e n e u t i c a l key to this existence is the Law, by which we are s i m u l t a n e o u s l y given the rules by which we might live and are condemned by our inevitable inability to do the good that the Law commands. 9 The Law m a k e s it impossible for us to t h i n k that s a l v a t i o n - - t h e ability to be or do g o o d - - i n this world is a possibilityJ ~ There are a b u n d a n t instances, however, in which Paul speaks of the p r e s e n t experience of salvation. M a n y of these belong to the category of "Christ m y s t i c i s m " and s p e a k the language of either s a c r a m e n t a l or mystical identification with the figure of the dying and rising Lord. 11 In each of these cases, however, no m a t t e r how vivid is Paul's expression of the present experience of change from a former state of sin and death to a present state of salvation, the present, saved state is necessarily d e p e n d e n t on the imminent b u t still future kingdom. Indeed, it is contingent upon the behavior of the "saved" one. 12 In other words, Paul is able to speak of a present "change" in certain h u m a n beings, not because they have understood present reality per se, b u t because they believe in a future change in reality, to which they are a l r e a d y conformed. Salvation, then, depends not on the understanding of the individual but, ultimately, on the possibility of actual change in reality. With this distinction in mind, let us t u r n our a t t e n t i o n to a description of change that has grown out of some basic currents in the history of psychoanalysis. As stated at the outset, this tension parallels the two theological paradigms of change j u s t described.

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Change and history in psychoanalysis: Frued In 1895, while still working with Breuer, F r u e d elaborated his initial notion of the unconscious in connection with hysteria. Opposing Janet, who t a u g h t that hysterics were "weak-minded," F r e u d and Breuer proposed that hysterics were engaging in a very difficult task. They were, in effect, m a n a g i n g to carry on two contradictory lines of t h o u g h t - - o n e conscious, the other unconscious. The unconscious t h o u g h t s are "split" from the conscious because they are, for one reason or another, i n a d m i s s a b l e to consciousness. 13 In 1900, Freud's own self-analysis produced The Interpretation of Dreams and the key t e r m s of the first phase of psychoanalytical theory: repression, p r i m a r y process, secondary process, 14 the unconscious, and the conscious 15 were put in place. With this publication F r e u d made it clear t h a t the unconscious is, more often t h a n not, the mover of h u m a n activity. He went on to say that symptoms result from a compromise b e t w e e n the conscious and the unconscious conflicts, as well as serve as a symbolic or indirect access to the unconscious. Indeed, it is only t h r o u g h m e a n s such as dreams, parapraxes, jokes, symptoms, and free associations that a n y access to the unconscious is to be had. Freud had originally a t t r i b u t e d t h e r a p e u t i c benefit to "catharsis," the simple v e n t i l a t i o n of m a t e r i a l r e p r e s s e d into t h e u n c o n s c i o u s . He had, however, become disillusioned with this theory as he found that much of the "traumatic" material recalled by hysterical patients was of their own unconscious f a b r i c a t i o n J 6 His analysis of his own dreams provided him with what became the cornerstone of the first phase of psychoanalytic theory. For example, the sexual t r a u m a t i z a t i o n fantasies of Freud's early hysterical patients were viewed as compromise constructions which indicated endogenous, unconscious wishes. The p a t i e n t who "remembered" that she had seen her mother and father engage in coitus and " r e m e m b e r e d " being terrified could be found actually to have wished to replace the mother in coitus with the father. The mother in the recollection, then, becomes a "screen" for the patient herself, and the terror she feels is attached not to what she "remembers" b u t to w h a t she wished for and consequently f e a r e d - - t h e taboo relation with the father. This exquisite negotiation b e t w e e n the conscious and the unconscious, extrapolated in The Interpretation of Dreams, was given appropriate theoretical form in Freud's Papers on MetapsychologyJ 7 In the third of these, "The Unconscious," F r e u d details the "topographical" theory of the mind. Here he divides psychological activity into two parts: "S. U c s " and "S. CsPcs" (System unconscious and S y s t e m conscious-preconscious) S. Ucs. is determined by instinctual drive. It fastens upon certain aims for gratification and seeks to move these into S. Cs-Pcs. in order that they may be acted upon and gratified. At this point a "censor" operates at the border b e t w e e n these two systems and d e t e r m i n e s w h e t h e r the aim proposed by S. Ucs. is acceptable in consciousness. U n a c c e p t a b i l i t y is u l t i m a t e l y to be understood in t e r m s of the reality that certain aims, if allowed gratification, would ultimately cause the person more pain t h a n the t e m p o r a r y pleasure of grati-

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fication would justify. Thus, w h e n the "censor" finds an unconscious aim dangerous, it t u r n s it back or forces repression. In this case, the S. Ucs. can retain the repressed u n t i l some later t i m e when it can f o r m u l a t e a compromise proposal (such as a sublimation) or can seek to circumvent S. Cs-Pcs. by expressing itself in an u n - n e g o t i a t e d compromise; perhaps an unconsciously hostile action or a hysterical symptom. If, on the other hand, e i t h e r the aim proposed by S. Ucs. or some comproraise of t h a t aim is acceptable to S. Cs-Pcs.'s "censor," t h e n the aim is "admitted" to the preconscious. This preconscious is a kind o f " s t a g i n g area." Aims there take the form of ideas which are not yet conscious, but when the opportunity for t h e m to be so occurs, t h e y are a d m i t t e d easily and n a t u r a l l y to consciousness with no sense of conflict. Is This t h e o r y had, and continues to have, great e x p l a n a t o r y power. On a clinical level, it p e r m i t t e d the a n a l y s t to u n d e r s t a n d and, in one way or another, explain to the p a t i e n t the origin of consciously m y s t i f y i n g symptoms. The presupposition of the topographical t h e o r y was t h a t conscious discovery of the tactics of the unconscious would bring symptoms u n d e r a partial sway of reason or the r e a l i t y principle, and at least a p a r t i a l cure would occur. That is to say, an alleviation of certain symptoms would result from such a process. Ultimately, of course, F r e u d t h o u g h t t h a t h a r m o n y between the unconscious drives and the r a t i o n a l S. Cs-Pcs. was u n a t t a i n a b l e . Consequently, he could say to a p a t i e n t n e a r t e r m i n a t i o n of t h e r a p y t h a t he felt he or she h a d been cured of v i r t u a l l y e v e r y t h i n g except life. In other words, n o t h i n g r e a l l y changed in reality, and relative s a l v a t i o n - - t h a t is, a relative freedom from s y m p t o m s - - w a s all we could hope for. This came, on the presuppositions of the topographical theory, from recognizing r e a l i t y more n e a r l y as it is and u n d e r s t a n d i n g our own place in it. Salvation, such as it is, comes t h r o u g h understanding. In 1923, F r e u d published The Ego and the Id. The scheme posed in this work was nothing less t h a n an a l t e r n a t i v e to the topographical theory. 19 Freud had employed the t e r m "ego" in previous writings, a n d its use h a d been imprecise, but roughly equivalent to S. Cs-Pcs. when t h a t e n t i t y was seen as a behavioral e n t i t y - - t h a t is, a r a t i o n a l person. Now the ego h a d t a k e n on a quite different role. It was to be understood in a developmental way. The word "id" was used to describe t h a t reservoir of i n s t i n c t u a l e n e r g y which forms the psychical basis of each person. The ego was t h a t s t r u c t u r e which develops out of the id at t h a t "surface" where the primitive drives of the id m u s t compromise with the realities of the world. 2~ As a result, the ego had its origin in an a t t e m p t to modify, to control, the u n r u l y id. In t h i s c o n n e c t i o n , F r e u d i n t r o d u c e s t h e t e r m s " s u p e r e g o " a n d "ego~ ideal.''21 Though later they will come to have very different meanings, F r e u d uses t h e m here interchangeably. His idea seems to have been t h a t a child loves and idealizes its parents. It t h e n moves this ideal into its own psychic structure in order to m a i n t a i n the struggle w i t h the impulsive id. 22 The vicissitudes of the Oedipal conflict will e v e n t u a l l y d e t e r m i n e the p r i m a r y gender-identification of the child, as well as w h e t h e r the ego-ideal is pre-

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dominantly punitive or benign. Within this scheme, it is to be noted that the ego and the superego are partly conscious and partly unconscious. The struggle b e t w e e n the ego and the id occurs more at the unconscious level t h a n at the conscious level. The alliance of ego with superego a g a i n s t the id is at the level of the unconscious. This alliance often t u r n s sour w h e n the superego is frightening or punitive, so that the ego becomes an e m b a t t l e d s t r u c t u r e caught b e t w e e n the impulsive id and the punitive, rigid, and often t a u n t i n g superego. This shows the unconscious to be a p a r t i c u l a r l y active region. For our purposes, two observations must be made. First, F r e u d did not seek to replace the topographical model with the s t r u c t u r a l model. Somewhat like the wave and corpuscular theories of light, he found each useful in understanding certain p h e n o m e n a and so r e t a i n e d t h e m both. Indeed, from a clinical point of view, he continued to operate primarily on the topographical assumption that m a k i n g the unconscious conflicts (between ego and id or ego and superego) conscious was the aim and change-agency of psychoanalysis. Second, in conceiving the s t r u c t u r a l model, F r e u d introduced a possibility for also conceiving of actual change in the h u m a n psyche. He proposed that the ego develops out of a m e e t i n g of instinct and circumstance. Evolution has laid down the general developmental sequence of the psychic structures, b u t each individual ego is different because of the combination of its genetic variables and the u t t e r u n i q u e n e s s of its history. The history of the individual is, then, a history of development and change. The structural model provides a way to u n d e r s t a n d how this change t a k e s place and to conceive of it as actual change in a h u m a n being. It does not m a t t e r that F r e u d h i m s e l f m a y have r e m a i n e d u n s a n g u i n e about the possibilities for change in h u m a n beings; his s t r u c t u r a l model provided those who came after an alternative to Freud's modest claims that the best we can do is u n d e r s t a n d and the best we can hope for is to t u r n neurotic misery into common unhappiness.

Change and history in psychoanalysis: Ego psychology The structural t h e o r y provided for two somewhat different, though not necessarily incompatible, lines of development after Freud. Anna Freud and Heinz H a r t m a n n laid down the general lines of ego psychology within the p a r a m e t e r s of Freud's s t r u c t u r a l language. They emphasized the adaptive and creative role of the ego in the development of the personality. They increasingly saw pathology as an a t t e m p t of the ego to adapt to m a l a d a p t i v e life situations. The method of the a n a l y s t was to free the ego from what had once been a necessary (defensive) adaptation to a t h r e a t e n i n g life situation so that it might grow and a d a p t to present, reality-oriented life situations. Whereas F r e u d had tended to see conflict b e t w e e n the id and the superego as the structural m a n i f e s t a t i o n of the eternal conflict b e t w e e n the pleasure principle and the reality principle, the ego psychologists were more optimistic. They believed that the h u m a n ego was able to m a k e creative, relatively conflict-free a d a p t a t i o n s to the necessary contradictions of instinct and

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reality. They tended to place t h e locus of pathology in environmentally given pathogenic factors. Neuroses were a t t e m p t s to adapt to neurotic situations; they were defenses against the dissolution of the ego in u n n a t u r a l l y stressful situations, which were then carried over into situations w h e r e they were no longer necessary and were, in fact, h a r m f u l to the ego's good function. Analysis, then, became increasingly "analysis of the defenses," to the end that the ego would u n d e r s t a n d its own defensive p a t t e r n s and give them up for more healthily adaptive ones. In order to do this, the relation with the a n a l y s t was crucially important. An "alliance" had to be formed b e t w e e n the "part" of the ego that could t r u s t another h u m a n being (the analyst) and the a n a l y s t in order to analyze the neurotically defensive "part" of the ego. W h e n this was done, the analytical presuppositions of the topographical model came into use; the unconscious defenses could come under the s c r u t i n y of the conscious a n a l y s t - a n a l y s a n d alliance, and they might then be modified or even discontinued. The result would be structural change in the ego, for to change the ego's defenses was to change the ego itself. Thus, for the ego-psychologists, actual s t r u c t u r a l change became the goal of therapy. A pivotal place was accorded to the relation of a n a l y s t to analysand, b u t the change itself continued to pivot upon u n d e r s t a n d i n g - - a form of m a k i n g the unconscious conscious. 23

Change and history in psychoanalysis: Object relations theory As Anna F r e u d and others elaborated Freud's suggestions about the place of the ego in the h u m a n psyche, Melanie Klein focused on another aspect of The Ego and the Id. She was concerned with the process by which the superego or ego-ideal became p a r t of the ego. Klein concentrated on how "objects" external to infants and c h i l d r e n - - w h e t h e r they be a breast or a whole p e r s o n - were perceived by and t a k e n into the psychic s t r u c t u r e of the child. The socalled "British School" of object relations t h e o r y developed this point in the years to follow. However, it is beyond the scope of this paper to survey the work of the object relations theorists and their influence on work of such pioneers as Edith Jacobson in this country. In fact, we will be b e t t e r served by briefly outlining the theory of a person who is both a direct inheritor of this line of investigation and c u r r e n t l y one of the most i n f l u e n t i a l t h i n k e r s in the psychoanalytic field. Otto Kernberg's work is prolific and rich. It would be n e i t h e r possible nor necessary for our purpose to a t t e m p t a complete overview of his contributions. Instead, w h a t I will p r e s e n t is one small facet of his t h e o r e t i c a l construction as it relates to a specific kind of pathology. By so doing, it will be possible for us to get a sense of the way in which a c o n t e m p o r a r y psychoanalytic t h i n k e r conceives of development and change within the actual h i s t o r y of a given h u m a n being. The theoretical schematization that follows will be Kernberg's a t t e m p t to elucidate the s t r u c t u r e and dynamics of the "Borderline P e r s o n a l i t y Organization," a character s t r u c t u r e t h e clinical picture of which includes a ten-

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dency to chronic, agitated depression, a proclivity for addictions and eating disorders, an i n a b i l i t y to m a i n t a i n s t a b l e , i n t i m a t e r e l a t i o n s h i p s , and periodic eruptions of rage and/or self-destructive impulses. Subjectively, "borderlines" experience polarized feeling clusters of self-doubt and selfloathing, coupled with feelings of loneliness, emptiness, and a b a n d o n m e n t at one time and intense, diffuse anxiety and even panic to the point of disorganization at other times. They f r e q u e n t l y resort to hostility and contempt in an effort to protect themselves from these feelings. In the past, these people have been difficult to u n d e r s t a n d in t e r m s of psychoanalytic theory and have most often been seen as a milder v a r i a n t of the schizophrenics. 24 Kernberg proposes that the genesis of this character-form can be found in the first twenty-four months of life, concentrated in roughly the six- to twenty-four-month period. In t h a t time framework, he proposes the following hypothesis: In the first few months of life, the neonate experiences discrete, unconnected moments of comfort-pleasure and discomfort-anxiety. These relate to internal body sensations such as h u n g e r or gas pains and concomitant external experiences such as the absence of being held, wet diapers, etc. Conversely, comfort and pleasure come with being held, fed, etc. These discrete moments K e r n b e r g calls "all good" and "all bad" experiences. They can be schematized thus:

@Q During the earliest months the infant does not distinguish b e t w e e n itself and the external world. There are only discrete experiences which alternate. A short time later, the child begins to identify the "object," typically the mother, who is i n t i m a t e l y connected with these good and bad experiences. She is not at first seen as the same object, b u t as different and discrete as are the good and bad experiences.

2

@@

At this point, the child's ego is not sufficiently individuated that it can have a sense of itself as separate from those objects external to it which are j u s t beginning to assume some semblance of individuality in its perception. In this stage, the first primitive stirrings of what will become individuation, a sense of self, is still fused with the significant external objects. Thus, within the ego, two new states m a k e their appearance. In one, the "all-good-mother" appears with the infant who is e x p e r i e n c i n g her, and who, because it is not distinct from her, feels of itself what it experiences of her. Thus, the most primitive intimations of ego-identity are fused with primitive perceptions of the p r i m a r y n u r t u r i n g object.

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FIGURE 3

~

~

These are still discrete moments of experience. Shortly afterwards, however, the child begins to have a primitive sense of the continuity of experience, though not of the continuity of objects. Experiences begin to be contiguous, but objects do not as yet have continuity or "permanence." At this point, our schema is:

FIGURE 4

At the next stage, a sense of object permanence begins to develop. The child begins to get the idea that the good mother and the bad mother are one in the same object. Concomitantly, the child begins to have a sense of itself ("selfobject") as being in continuity. Our ego-scheme now has a four-quadrant division:

FIGURE 5

~k Good|GoodJ It is at this juncture that the development of the young ego reaches a crisis. There is a drive toward differentiation, toward individuation of experience into ego-structures. The "healthy" movement of the ego is to separate the experience of the mother from the experience of the self (individuation) and, at the same time, to begin to be able to experience both the mother and the self as being neither all good nor all bad, but a mixture of both (integration).

FIGURE 6

If, however, for some reason this individuating and integrating step cannot be taken, then another defensive maneuver will take place. For instance, if the mother is herself "fused" to her child in such a way that when she senses that he or she seeks to make a psychic separation from her (signalled around

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24 months by an increasingly oppositional attitude) the mother becomes very anxious, then the child is presented with another dilemma. An anxious mother is very frightening to a child. He or she may well fear that if he or she does accomplish a modicum of separation-individuation, the mother will become so anxious that she will disappear. The child will discover that not separating calms mother. This angers the child, for there is a drive to separate. In turn, a new situation arises. When the child wants to be close to mother, and mother is content, all seems good in the regressive fusion of mother-child. Nevertheless, in those moments when the child wishes to separate, but fears to, he or she will express frustration, not by pushing away, but by staying in undifferentiated fusion with a painful, hostile, and even sadistic grasping. These two states of being will now become split, kept separate and distinct within the ego, so that our diagram now represents a vertical rather than horizontal split in the ego.

FIGURE 7

This accounts, according to Kernberg, for the alternation of feeling states (depression and angry agitation) experienced serially by borderlines, as well as for the difficulty they have in maintaining intimacy, and in their periodic feelings of both loneliness and panicked agitation. They could never experience closeness except in a regressive, infantile way which, when experienced, always preceded an experience of feeling smothered, of panic, and of trapped rage. These experiences have literally formed the ego-structure in ways relating to self-perception and the perception of o t h e r s - - p a r t i c u l a r l y those who would enter into any intimacy. When faced with situations in which the subject feels threatened, either with attack or intimacy, the "split ego" permits the defense of projection on a massive scale. In effect, by seizing the undifferentiated ego-model represented in Figure 5, the experience of the "bad me" is split off along with the experience of mother so that any ambivalent feelings are denied and everything bad or unpleasant is located external to the person. This is the defensive mechanism of "splitting and projecting" which is employed by almost everyone from time to time, 25 but which is, for the sort of person Kernberg describes, virtually the only method available for survival. For our purposes, two things should be noted. First, Kernberg attempts to understand pathology as historically caused. It is, by and large(the effect of the ego in attempting to cope with an external, environmental factor (such as an anxious, clinging mother) the best way it can. The pathological condition itself, no matter how crippling, is a sign of the organism's innate drive to cope and live. Second, the pathology is conceived in terms of psychic structures. When Kernberg speaks of "splitting" the ego, he is using terminology which is

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more concrete and definite t h a n metaphorical. Though it cannot be seen under a microscope, there is for h i m a psychological e n t i t y called "ego," in a certain relation to the psychological e n t i t i e s id and superego, w i t h i n which there are "internalized objects" of v a r y i n g degrees of importance, benignity, malignancy, and integration. This being the case, it is possible, at least in principle, to change a structure. K e r n b e r g writes: In psychoanalytic theory, the term "structural intrapsychic change" (in the direction of clinical improvement) refers to change in the relationship among ego, id, superego and external reality. In clinical terms, this means changes in impulse-defense configurations, that is, in the defensive structures which determine the boundaries among ego, superego and id. Such changes require interpretation and resolution of these defenses so that unconscious conflicts can become conscious and be resolved in consciousness. Such conflict resolution, in turn, modifies the impulse-defense equilibrium and in the direction of more effective ego functioning, brings about a broadening of the sphere of the mature ego, greater ego autonomy, and better gratification of instinctual needs as well as of reality demands. 26 It is not w i t h i n the scope of this paper to deal with the difficult questions of

how analysis effects s t r u c t u r a l change. 27 We do wish to note t h a t the s t r e a m s of psychoanalytic t h o u g h t following from Freud's structural m e t a p s y c h o l o g y have and use the theoretical tools to conceive of real and actual change in individual h u m a n beings. Moreover, they tend to t h i n k of each p a t i e n t historically. They tend to t h i n k in t e r m s of the h i s t o r y this person has lived, and u n d e r s t a n d h i m or her in t e r m s of the defensive s t r u c t u r e s a n d i n t e r n a l psychic configurations he or she would have formed, given the adaptive t a s k s of living in this or t h a t family and e n v i r o n m e n t a l situation.

Change and history in psychoanalysis: Lacanian theory The sort of t h i n k i n g j u s t described is most f a m i l i a r in the E n g l i s h - s p e a k i n g world. However, it is not the only line of development t h a t p s y c h o a n a l y t i c t h o u g h t has taken. French p s y c h o a n a l y t i c t h i n k i n g has moved in a quite different direction and has been influenced to an enormous degree by one man: Jacques Lacan. Lacan himself, a kind of caricature of Gallic irascibility and eccentricity, has made a career out of criticism and rebellion a g a i n s t the psychoanalytical establishment. This has sometimes been difficult for h i m since he often has been the p s y c h o a n a l y t i c a l e s t a b l i s h m e n t in France. Nevertheless, he has found ways to m a n a g e , u s u a l l y by rebelling a g a i n s t an organization he h i m s e l f has founded, and s e t t i n g up an opposing organization. 2s His constant foe since the 1940s has been ego psychology. This opposition has been more t h a n m e r e l y the opposition of the F r e n c h m a n to a n y intellectual movement t h a t speaks E n g l i s h and G e r m a n . Nevertheless, Lacan has shown a distinct theoretical distaste for the s t r u c t u r a l t h e o r y and a relative lack of i n t e r e s t in the individual history of his patients. Instead, Lacan

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prefers the topographical model, and f r e q u e n t l y asserts that in r e t u r n i n g to the dialectic, of S. U c s . - S . C s . - P c s , one r e t u r n s to the "true F r e u d "'29 In order to u n d e r s t a n d this claim, it will be necessary to sketch something of Lacan's own theoretical framework. Lacan sets the beginning of a universal h u m a n dilemma in infancy. Here he describes a prototypical situation in which a baby sees itself in a mirror. At that moment two things happen. The baby has its first recognition of "itself' and, at the same time, senses that the b a b y in the mirror appears perfect from the "outside" as it were, while proprioceptively the b a b y feels itself to be imperfect, incomplete, and not fully competent. 3~ Consequently, Lacan asserts, at the very m o m e n t of first identity-formation t h e r e is given a narcissistic "fault"; a split b e t w e e n w h a t the child knows of itself and what it thinks others perceive it to be. In one way or another, it is the person's destiny to try to hide its imperfection from the world and from itself t h r o u g h repression. This foundational event precedes the acquisition of language. Hence, for Lacan, this stage is t e r m e d "imaginary," suggesting both the m e t a p h o r of the mirror-image and the fact that the unconscious into which this experience is repressed operates in images, associations, and figures rather than in linear, historical language, which is the property of the conscious. With the acquisition of language, Lucan proposes that another layer of complication is added to the child's dilemma. With l a n g u a g e comes the power to symbolize abstractly. With l a n g u a g e also comes the ability to orient in t e r m s of time. Thus, with language comes a sense of control over history, a sense that one can u n d e r s t a n d and change things by re-ordering the relationships in which images stand to one another. On the other hand, language also comes bearing all the rules of h u m a n society. For Lacan, this is epitomized in a metaphorical play on words. In language, one receives one's father's family name, hence, one's place in society and one's place in history. In other words, to know one's n a m e is to have an identity. But this identity, the "nom de p~re," comes simultaneously with the whole series of p a t e r n a l prohibitions society lays upon its members. Paradigmatic of these is the incest-taboo, the Oedipal prohibition, the terrible "Non!" of the father to the child's wish to have the mother. Thus, the "Non!" of the father and the "Nom" of the father come at once. Now there is inevitably duplicated in the Oedipal register the original narcissistic anxiety. Something is expected of the child which he does not entirely understand, which he is afraid he cannot accomplish, and which he m u s t therefore hide, deny, repress. 31 Furthermore, he now sets about the project of t r y i n g to heal his original, "imaginary" flaw by r e s o r t i n g to the use of language with its symbolic, ordering powers. The child seeks to become whole, healed, by doing what the world of language and society seem to require. Almost needless to say, this inevitably adds only another layer of deception upon the pre-linguistic layer. The narcissistic "fault" is not healed by a t t e m p t s to deal with the Oedipal problem. The a t t e m p t to condense, control, and heal the original mirror-flaw by finding the right and competent use for the p e n i s - - t h a t symbol of control,

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domination, and c o m p l e t e n e s s - - w i l l never really succeed. Indeed, to the extent that it does not succeed, a n x i e t y will compound anxiety, and the person will be driven to more and more neurotic a t t e m p t s to heal the fault and conceal from h i m s e l f or h e r s e l f and from others what unconsciously seems like a fatal flaw. It is significant for an overall u n d e r s t a n d i n g of Lacan t h a t near the end of a programmatic address delivered in 1968, 32 Lacan cites Heidegger. He suggests that, in the end, all h u m a n a t t e m p t s to m a s t e r the anxieties of uncontrolled circumstances and to repair the flaws given in the h u m a n situation should be interpreted in the light of Dasein: the h u m a n being at some level is aware of, b u t seeks to avoid his own existential truth, namely, that h u m a n being is being thrown toward death. The goal of psychoanalysis, then, is precisely to m a k e the unconscious conscious. The process involves i n t e r p r e t i n g the symptoms, the dreams, the parapraxes, the behaviors, the associations in such a way as to find the thread of the struggling unconscious efforts to heal the fault and, at the same time, dissemble, hide, deny, its very existence. Ultimately, however, Lacan is not s a n g u i n e a b o u t change. U l t i m a t e l y t r e a t m e n t can, at best, b r i n g a basically u n c h a n g e d individual to a recognition of the self-defeating n a t u r e of his or her efforts to avoid the r e a l i t y of the h u m a n condition. What h a p p e n s when, in Heideggerian terms, one finds oneself confronting one's own finitude--that is the moment of a u t h e n t i c existence. This is a m a t t e r that Lacan, in the spirit of Freud, suggests is crucial b u t beyond the p u r v i e w of t h e r a p y as such. Consequently, for Lacan, change is change only in the way one finds to perceive an essentially u n c h a n g e d h u m a n situation. Indeed, in a significant sense, there is no change in the individual w r o u g h t by analysis. One can protest that i f a p a t i e n t has exchanged a debilitating hysterical s y m p t o m for a view of things that permits him to function, there has been change. Though this be granted, it is also true that the change in this case is quite different from the kind of change suggested by the s t r u c t u r a l l a n g u a g e employed b y Kernberg. Such language implies a different level of change. It implies, in effect, that change so real and concrete can occur in t h e psychic a p p a r a t u s of an individual that reality itself is c h a n g e d - - i f only incrementally.

Change and history in theology and psychoanalysis: Parallels I hope it is a p p a r e n t that there are some parallels b e t w e e n theology in t h e crisis of the delay of the Parousia and psychoanalytic t h e o r y in our time. It remains to a t t e m p t to clarify t h e s e parallels and to essay some lesson from them. To begin such a process, a basic point needs to be underscored: t h e r e was no doubt among the early Christians that the world stood in need of change. The evidence of sin was all around and stood in sharp contrast to the promises of the Old Testament. It was a m a t t e r of foundational belief for t h e m that this change would be w r o u g h t soon, at the t u r n i n g of the ages with Parousia. In response to the d e l a y - - t h e continued n o n - o c c u r r e n c e - - o f the Parousia, two theological tendencies developed.

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The first, r e p r e s e n t e d in a broad way by the Synoptics, sought to understand history as itself indicative of the change in reality. Though Mark, Luke-Acts, and M a t t h e w in no way gave up the notion of the Parousia as the t e r m i n u s ad q u e m of the p r e s e n t state of reality, yet they sought to show how the events of history are, in fact, indications of the change which is taking place and will t a k e place. It has been this line of theological thinking which has, t h r o u g h the past nineteen h u n d r e d years, enabled the Church as an i n s t i t u t i o n to m a i n t a i n itself as an i n s t i t u t i o n and to involve itself in the social and political affairs of the world. It has been the theological spirit t h a t has provided the impetus for theologies of social progress and social reform. It has been the theological rationale that has p e r m i t t e d C h r i s t i a n i t y to accept and even bless apparently revolutionary changes in h u m a n u n d e r s t a n d i n g and b e h a v i o r - - u s u ally born in the sciences. The second line of response to the delay of the Parousia is r e p r e s e n t e d by John. Though John does not deny the "literal" shift of the ages in any formal way, he does minimize its importance and places the emphasis on a different c o n t i n u u m - - t h a t of the individual. In m e e t i n g Jesus, one meets the key to one's own proper connection with reality as it i s - - t h a t is, with the Father who is love. This m e e t i n g enables one to live in (though not "of") this world and on into e t e r n i t y in what must be described as a gnostic u n d e r s t a n d i n g of reality. In it the reality does not change. Instead, one learns to overcome or pierce through an illusion in order to come into the presence of the source of reality as it has always been and shall always be. In this experience, which is impossible to describe, the seeker finds his or her destiny and identity, which are typically described as having been "lost" heretofore. It has been this line of t h o u g h t t h a t has produced much of t h e evangelical spirit. It has provided a counterpoint to the a u t h o r i t a r i a n and conservative tendencies of the Church. It has p e r m i t t e d reformers to find a purchase on salvation a p a r t from the h e g e m o n y of institutions, be they ecclesiastical or otherwise. Most recently, it provided the impetus for the existentialist theological synthesis. 33 Psychoanalytic t h o u g h t never had a parousia to look forward to as a future. Instead, it originated with a medical presupposition that pathology is an interruption in the " n a t u r a l " course of organic life, and the biological assumption that organic systems seek homeostasis. 34 Freud himself proceeded with a double sense of his own activity. On one hand, he sought to ameliorate suffering: to heal, to change. On the other, he was profoundly skeptical as to what changes could actually occur, in individuals and certainly in society. Indeed, he believed that the tension b e t w e e n the pleasure principle and the reality principle, and the latter's necessary institutionalization in civilization, forecast an inevitable disease in h u m a n beings. 35 Considering later psychoanalytic thought, these two tendencies have become clearly divergent in French and Anglo-American psychoanalytical thinking. In one way, the divergence in psychoanalytical thought can be resolved by simply pointing out that the two "schools" see things differently because they look for different results. The English-speaking a n a l y s t s have tended to

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avoid "philosophical" issues and have focused on therapeutic m a t t e r s . It is, after all, the physician's t a s k to u n d e r s t a n d and relieve whatever can be relieved. The French analysts, on the other hand, have tended, p a r t l y for historical reasons, to be identified with the more heterogeneous intellectual and political community, ~6 and have typically come up a g a i n s t the broader philosophical issues u n d e r discussion in t h a t community. It is no wonder, then, t h a t French p s y c h o a n a l y s t s should be concerned with e x i s t e n t i a l i s t questions and with both Marxist and s t r u c t u r a l i s t methodologies. 37 In another way, such a resolution is superficial. The issue is very deep, and u l t i m a t e l y it is a theological issue. It m i g h t be put like this: In a world where meaningful change is h i g h l y problematical, how does one continue w i t h o u t falling heir to despair? One can focus upon possible, i n c r e m e n t a l change and in some sense leave the " u l t i m a t e " scheme of t h i n g s t o - - w h a t ends? Here faith and the psychological m e c h a n i s m of denial would seem to have s o m e t h i n g in common. On the other hand, one can focus upon the u l t i m a t e questions of h u m a n life, probably most d r a m a t i c a l l y symbolized by the i n e v i t a b i l i t y of death, and urge t h a t each one of us can but m a k e our own existential peace with it. However, h e r e u n f l i n c h i n g r e a l i s m seems to side-step r a t h e r e a s i l y t h e h u m a n suffering, as well as the h u m a n happiness, which is a c t u a l l y all around us and which does speak of t h e need for and the possibility of c h a n g e within history.

Conclusion What I am proposing is t h a t we find in the parallel between p s y c h o a n a l y t i c a l thought and theological t h o u g h t a f u n d a m e n t a l h u m a n conundrum. The evidence for the possibility of m e a n i n g f u l change is mixed. In our best moments we are able to grasp this t r u t h partially, and yet c a r r y on m e a n i n g ful activity. For Paul and the earliest C h r i s t i a n s , this was possible because of their belief in an i m m i n e n t Parousia. One could work to achieve and maintain limited c h a n g e - - i n oneself, in one's i m m e d i a t e c o m m u n i t y - - p r e c i s e l y because such change was itself symbolic of the total change which was about to take place when the Kingdom came in its fullness. For most of us today, this theological option is simply not open. Historically, we know t h a t we are tempted to choose an optimism ( p a r a d i g m a t i c a l l y Pelagian) which denies the power of sin and death, or a gnosticism which seeks a special experience to nullify the power of sin and death. It seems clear t h a t psychoanalysis does not and, in fact, would not wish, to offer an answer here. Yet c e r t a i n l y a n y psychoanalyst who is not t o r m e n t e d by the question so implied by her or his daily work, is exercising m o n u m e n t a l denial. Theology has not offered a clear answer either, t h o u g h it is c o n v e n t i o n a l l y within the province of this discipline to deal with these u l t i m a t e m a t t e r s . This in itself suggests t h a t there are, in fact, no clear answers to the existential questions, and t h a t the function of the notion of the Parousia in the theology of the early church was to project a f u t u r e reality, which is to say a

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r e a l i t y n o t at p r e s e n t p o s s i b l e i n w h i c h t h e i s s u e s o f c h a n g e w o u l d b e r e solved. Indeed, one of the functions of the notion of the future Parousia is to permit the Christian to have a means: a kind of Archimedean fulcrum o u t s i d e of p r e s e n t r e a l i t y b y w h i c h t o a c k n o w l e d g e t h e c o n t r a d i c t o r y e l e ments of apparent historical change on one hand and the apparent fruitlessness of such change on the other. A p a r t f r o m s u c h a n A r c h i m e d e a n p o i n t , t h e a n a l o g o u s e x p e r i e n c e of t h e o l ogy and psychoanalysis suggests one hypothesis. Functionally, the depth and b r e a d t h o f h u m a n e x p e r i e n c e r e q u i r e s a d i a l e c t i c o f both a n o t i o n o f p o s s i b l e historical change and a notion of its ultimate impossibility. This dialectic must remain a dialectic of tension which is unresolvable into any synthesis, since any attempt at synthesis turns out to be one or another form of collapse i n t o o n e o r t h e o t h e r of t h e o r i g i n a l t e r m s o f t h e d i a l e c t i c . I n t h e a b s e n c e of a symbol such as the Parousia, which might give formal coherence to this dialectical tension, perhaps we can only seize upon the tension itself as a formal symbol. I t m a y b e t h a t i n o u r t i m e , a s i t w a s f i f t y y e a r s a g o , t h e t a s k o f t h e o l o g y i s to clarify the human situation by pointing out the inadequacy of both "gnostic" and "optimistic" Christian alternatives. In this task, I am suggesting that we may have a surprising ally in clinical psychoanalytical theory.

References 1. Gal. 3:13; cf. Deut. 21:23. 2. Mark 16:7 suggests a very early tradition involving the empty tomb and an expectation of the Parousia in Galilee as compared with I Cor. 15 in which Paul does not seem to know of the empty tomb tradition but does connect the Resurrection tradition with the imminent Parousia and general resurrection that will actualize the Kingdom of God which as been inaugurated by Jesus' resurrection. Thus, two apparently diverse traditions pivot on the expectation of an imminent Parousia, 3. I Cor. 11:30. 4. John 15:18 ff. 5. John 14. 6. Rom. 7:4, 8:1 ff.; II Cor. 5:17; Gal. 4:1-7; Col. 1:21, 7. Col. 1:23; Gal. 4:8 ff.; and particularly the whole argument about the eschatological, eucharistic community in I Cot. 11:17-34 and the consequent discussion of the proper relationship of the charisms to the community, to the eschaton, and to the sign of the eschaton, the spirit of love. I Cor. 12-14. 8. I Cor. 15:12 ff. 9. Rom. 7; Gal. 3:19 ff. 10. Rein. 7:15 ff. 11. Gal. 3:27; Col. 2:20-3:4; Rom. 8:1-12; II Cor. 12. II Cor. 5:10 f.; Phil. 3:10. Of special note in this regard are Rom. 8:12 ff. and Gal. 4 in which Paul is using the notions of patrimony, sonship, and adoption to make a legal argument. As in the ancient world one could inherit property and hence legal status (the original sense ofousia) only as a Son, and since the Jews were the people who could in a sense claim legal status in the coming Kingdom by virtue of their status under the Law, Christians have been adopted as "sons" of God through their identification with the actual Son of God, Jesus. Thus, the Spirit of God in the hearts of Christians which inspires them to call God "Abba" connotes a status conferred on them in the coming Kingdom of God. Here Paul seems to merge the Hellenistic notions of the pre-existent Kyrios who has the status of Divine Sonship and sacramental identification with that Lord with the Hebraic notion of the coming Kingdom of God in which the whole world will acknowledge God as King and creation will obey His will. Here again, the functional importance of the former, Hellenis-

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13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22.

23.

24. 25. 26. 27.

28. 29. 30.

31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36.

37.

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tic notions is d e p e n d e n t upon t h e r e a l i t y of t h e f u t u r e c h a n g e in t h e whole n a t u r e of reality. Freud, S., Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Strachey, J., ed., Vol. 2. New York, N o r t o n , t r a n s l a t e d 1976, p. 222 ff. Ibid., Vol. 5, p. 588 ff. Ibid., Vol. 5, p. 610 ff. Jones, E., TheLife and Work of SigmundFreud. New York, Basic Books, 1961, pp. 172-173. Freud, op. cit., Vol. 14, pp. 111-261. Ibid., Vol. 14, pp. 172-196. Ibid., Vol. 19, pp. 12-69. Ibid., Vol. 19, pp. 19-28. Ibid., Vol. 19, pp. 28-40. L a t e r p s y c h o a n a l y t i c t h o u g h t will m a k e m u c h of t h i s process a n d will coin t h e t e r m s " i m i t a t i o n , " " i n c o r p o r a t i o n , " " i n t r o j e c t i o n , " " i n t e r n a l i z a t i o n , " a n d " i d e n t i f i c a t i o n " for various n u a n c e s of t h e process F r e u d deals w i t h in twelve pages of TheEgo and theld. For a n overview of t h e c u r r e n t s t a t u s of t h e topic, cf. Meissner, W. W., Internalization in Psychoanalysis. New York, I n t e r n a t i o n a l U n i v e r s i t i e s Press, 1981, pp. 5-73. S i m i n a l m o n o g r a p h s in Ego Psychology are: F r e u d , A., The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defense. New York, I n t e r n a t i o n a l U n i v e r s i t i e s Press, revised ed., 1966; a n d H a r t m a n n , H., Ego Psychology and the Problem of Adaption. David R a p p a p o r t , t r a n s . New York, I n t e r n a t i o n a l U n i v e r s i t i e s Press. The t e r m " b o r d e r l i n e " o r i g i n a l l y s u g g e s t e d a p e r s o n "on t h e b o r d e r l i n e of s c h i z o p h r e n i a . " Cf. Green, A., " T h e B o r d e r l i n e Concept," Hartocolis, P., ed., I n Borderline Personality Disorders. New York, I n t e r n a t i o n a l U n i v e r s i t i e s Press, 1977, pp. 15-42. Who h a s not h a d t h e experience, upon k n o c k i n g s o m e t h i n g over in t h e k i t c h e n , of t h i n k ing in a f l a s h of a n g e r : " W h o p u t t h a t t h e r e ? " K e r n b e r g , O., Object-Relations Theory and Clinical Psychoanalysis. New York, J a s o n Aronson, Inc., 1976, p. 241. Suffice it to say in p a s s i n g t h a t c o n t e m p o r a r y a n a l y s t s t e n d to see t h e c h a n g e process as h a v i n g to do p r i m a r i l y w i t h t h e l a r g e l y u n c o n s c i o u s processes of t r a n s f e r e n c e a n d i d e n t i fication w i t h i n t h e a n a l y t i c a l r e l a t i o n s h i p such t h a t t h e m o d i f i c a t i o n of i n t e r n a l i z e d objects or " i n t r o j e c t s " t a k e s place on t h e b a s i s of t h e a n a l y s a n d ' s experience w i t h t h e a n a l y s t . The m a k i n g conscious of u n c o n s c i o u s conflicts, t h e a i m of classical psychoa n a l y s i s , t h e n becomes a f i n a l a n d s o m e t i m e s even u n n e c e s s a r y step. Cf. Meissner, loe. cit., pp. 73-94. Cf. Turkle, S., Psychoanalytic Politics. New York, Basic Books, 1978. Lacan, J., "The F r e u d i a n T h i n g , " 1957 inEcrits, Selection. A. S h e r i d a n , t r a n s . New York, W. W. H o r t o n & Co., Inc., 1977, pp. 114-145. ., "The M i r r o r - S t a g e as F o r m a t i v e of t h e I as Revealed in P s y c h o a n a l y t i c Experience," Ecrits, op. cir. __, The Language of the Self" The Function of Language in Psychoanalysis, A. Wilden, t r a n s . New York, D e l t a Books, 1975, pp. 35. Ibid., pp. 82 ff, It is h a r d l y a coincidence t h a t , despite his l a s t i n g l y i n v a l u a b l e f o r m - - c r i t i c a l a n d h i s t o r ical work in t h e synoptic t r a d i t i o n , B u l t m a n n ' s theological r e f l e c t i o n s found t h e i r b e s t i n s p i r a t i o n in t h e Paul who p r e a c h e d t h e Cross a n d in t h e Gospel of J o h n . Freud's s p e c u l a t i o n s a b o u t t h e " d e a t h i n s t i n c t " were g r o u n d e d in s p e c u l a t i o n s a b o u t t h e drive on t h e p a r t of i n d i v i d u a l cells to achieve ( i n o r g a n i c ) rest. See F r e u d , Vol. 19, op. cir., pp. 40-48. __, Civilization andlts Discontents, Vol. 21, op. cir., pp. 64-149. P s y c h o a n a l y s i s was e m b r a c e d by t h e A m e r i c a n p s y c h i a t r i c c o m m u n i t y in a way t h a t m a d e it m e d i c a l l y " o r t h o d o x " a n d v i r t u a l l y t h e p r o p e r t y of t h e m e d i c a l community. I n F r a n c e , p s y c h i a t r y h a s r e m a i n e d suspicious of such a n " i n o r g a n i c " methodology, a n d psychoa n a l y s i s h a s b e e n forced to find its s u p p o r t in t h e more g e n e r a l i n t e l l e c t u a l c o m m u n i t y . For surveys of F r e n c h p s y c h o a n a l y t i c a l practice, cf. Psychoanalysis in France. New York, I n t e r n a t i o n a l U n i v e r s i t i e s Press; Returning to Freud: Clinical Psychoanalysis in the School ofLacan, LeGovici, S., a n d Wicllocher, D., eds. New York, 1981, a n d S c h e i d u m o n , S., ed. New Haven, Yale U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1980. S t r u c t u r a l i s m as r e f e r r i n g to t h e m e t h o d s o f L 6 v i - S t r a u s s et al. m u s t not be confused w i t h t h e s t r u c t u r a l model of t h e m i n d proposed by F r e u d in 1923.