THE
MEDICAL CRITIC JlND
PSYCHOLOGICAL JOURNAL. JANUARY, 1863.
| Art. I.?ON THE NATURE OF VOLITION, PSYCHOLOGICALLY AND PHYSIOLOGICALLY
CONSIDERED. By
J. Lockhart Clarke,
F.R.S.
Part II. (Continued from No. viii. p. 592.) After showing that conscious intelligence is the distinctive element of volition; that pure sensation, in man and the higher animals, is a state of consciousness entirely distinct and different in its nature from that of intelligence, and therefore cannot, by itself, constitute volition; I concluded my former article by explaining the manner in which, by voluntary effort, we learn to initiate, control, and co-ordinate our muscular movements. I shall now proceed analytically to inquire more into the fully 'psychological character of volition.* It has ever been the opinion of some philosophers that volition or voluntary effort is the function of a special faculty termed the " Will," which is not only distinct and different in its nature from all other mental faculties, but also independent of them, by virtue of a peculiar and inherent power of self-determination. On the other hand, it is contended by a comparatively increasing number of philosophers, that no such special faculty exists for the performance of volition, any more than there exists a special faculty for walking, dancing, or any other particular kind of voluntary action; and that consequently the term Will" is simply the general expression of our ability to perform such actions by a special application and use of some of the ordinary "
*
No. IX.
See Note b
A,
p. 15.
/
MEDICAL CRITIC JlND
PSYCHOLOGICAL JOURNAL. JANUARY, 1863.
| Art. I.?ON THE NATURE OF VOLITION, PSYCHOLOGICALLY AND PHYSIOLOGICALLY
CONSIDERED. By
J. Lockhart Clarke,
F.R.S.
Part II. (Continued from No. viii. p. 592.) After showing that conscious intelligence is the distinctive element of volition; that pure sensation, in man and the higher animals, is a state of consciousness entirely distinct and different in its nature from that of intelligence, and therefore cannot, by itself, constitute volition; I concluded my former article by explaining the manner in which, by voluntary effort, we learn to initiate, control, and co-ordinate our muscular movements. I shall now proceed analytically to inquire more into the fully 'psychological character of volition.* It has ever been the opinion of some philosophers that volition or voluntary effort is the function of a special faculty termed the " Will," which is not only distinct and different in its nature from all other mental faculties, but also independent of them, by virtue of a peculiar and inherent power of self-determination. On the other hand, it is contended by a comparatively increasing number of philosophers, that no such special faculty exists for the performance of volition, any more than there exists a special faculty for walking, dancing, or any other particular kind of voluntary action; and that consequently the term Will" is simply the general expression of our ability to perform such actions by a special application and use of some of the ordinary "
*
No. IX.
See Note b
A,
p. 15.
/
