On psycho-linguistic paradigms.

Journal of Psycholinguistic Research, Vol. 2, No. 4, 1973

On Psycho-Linguistic Paradigms ! Arthur

S. R e b e r 2

Received January 18, 1972

Some frustration and confusion are detectable in the work o f those researching the psychology o f language. The suggestion is made that the lack o f focus is due, in part, to the lack o f a dominant paradigm or overall system within which to view recent developments. It appears possible to isolate three broad and conflicting perspectives within the contemporary Zeitgeist: an Association position with behaviorist traditions, a Process approach with origins in general cognitive theory, and a Content approach which has evolved along with the resurgence o f a nativist position in linguistic theory. Several issues-empiricaL theoretical and philosophical-are discussed, each within the context o f the three potential paradigms. Although no effort has been made to be prescriptive, it wouM appear that the Process orientation provides the most radical alternative, and it is implicit throughout the paper that the Zeitgeist is moving in this direction.

INTRODUCTION In the two decades since the initial meetings o f the interdisciplinary conference supported b y the Social Science Research Council (see Osgood and Sebeok, 1965), psycho-linguistics, as an i n d e p e n d e n t discipline, has u n d e r g o n e iBy psycho-linguistics is meant the sometimes joint efforts of both psychologists and linguists to unravel the problems of language. The term generally used is psycholinguistics, without the hyphen. However, in recent years, due largely to the elegant and persuasive presentations of Miller (1964, 1965) it has come to refer to a particular form of the scientific study of psychological and linguistic problems (see, for example, Deese, 1970). It goes almost without saying that many of the theoreticians and researchers discussed in this paper would be somewhat distressed to fred themselves so labeled. In deference to those who would disparage the title and to eliminate any distortions, this paper discusses the discipline of psycho-linguistics rather than that of psycholinguistics. 2Department of Psychology, Brooklyn College of CUNY, Brooklyn, New York. 289

~) 1973 Plenum Publishing Corporation, 227 West 17th Street, New York, N.Y. 10011.

290

Reber

a remarkable evolution. The historical markers of legitimacy of a discipline are now beginning to appear: the collections of writings of major theorists (Miller; 1967; Brown, 1970), the introductory texts (DeVito, 1970; Slobin, 1971), and the search for historical origins (Blumenthal, 1970). Amidst the flurry of research and theory, it is possible, however, to detect distinct feelings of frustration and a certain lack of focus in the community of scholars who have dealt with the psychological aspects of language. If one accepts a Kuhnian (Kuhn, 1962) analysis of historical evolution of scientific ideas, 3 then focus or the lack of it can be traced to dominance or the lack of it of one particular paradigm. In the case of psycho-linguistics, this would seem to be one of our current problems. I believe it is possible to delineate three broad perspectives in the psychological study of language, three candidates for a psycho-linguistic paradigm. Each, owing to particular historical and philosophical influences, has a different conception of what constitutes legitimate data for study, each starts with a different set of assumptions about the nature of language, each has a different interpretation of the place of language in the overall cognitive and behavioral makeup of man, and, it follows, each has a very different model of "mind." The orientation that finally is dominant will control to a very real extent the accepted description of the psychological nature of language, the psycho-linguistic paradigm. The first approach (which we call the Associationist position) developed from the behavioristic psychology of the 1920s and 1930s. It grew alongside of, although largely independent from, the taxonomic approach in linguistics (Bloomfield, 1933) and can be seen historically as a reaction against what was considered the spurious mentalisms of structuralists and introspectionists. The second (which we call the Process approach) is a natural extension of recent cognitive theory. It views language within the relatively comfortable framework of functionalism and since it emphasizes "process" over "association" has important parallels in the works of Neisser (1967) and Gibson (1969) on cognitive and perceptual processes. The third (the Content approach)evolved along with recent developments in linguistic theory. It is more clearly mentalistic than the others, reacting in turn to what its adherents considered the sterility of behaviorism. Historically, the approach can be seen as a revival of Humboltian linguistics and Wundtian Geisteswissenschaft (see Blumenthal, 1970). 3Although Kuhn, a physicist, maintains that his perspective of the history of scientific ideas does not include the social sciences, there are many, primarily social scientists, who dispute this exclusion~In fact, it may well be the case that extension to the social sciences would help rescue Kuhn's pleasantly subjective view of the advance of knowledge from its vigorous critics (see Lakatos and Musgrave, 1970).

On Psycho-LinguisticParadigms

291

Thus each orientation has its own vocabulary of primitives or givens, a disparity which has made communication and understanding difficult. For example, a cursory reading of Chomsky (1959) on one hand and Skinner (1957) and MacCorquodale (1970) on the other will reveal that the advocates of either position do not really appreciate the merits of the other, a state of affairs that, within a Kuhnian perspective, is not entirely unexpected.

DEFINITIONS OF THE THREE APPROACHES

The overall purpose of this paper is to try to put the three potential paradigms into perspective by detailing the positions that each has or might possibly take on a variety of critical issues. However, before this can be meaningful some preliminary comments are necessary. First, it is recognized that there are many contemporary psycho-linguists who would argue that as a paradigm appropriate for language the Associationist position is dead (or, more kindly, dormant) and has contributed little in recent years. It is also recognized that the distinctions which are drawn between the Process and Content approaches may not as yet be sufficiently well formed to warrant the inference of two separate paradigms. However, it should be made clear at the outset that this paper is not so much a classificatory review of current theory as it is an attempt to parse the contemporary Zeitgeist. Psycho-linguistics today is under pressure from a variety of philosophic positions and nonpsychological disciplines. These pressures will be felt, and they will doubtlessly help to drive the discipline into one or another paradigmatic mold. It is important that the options are recognized. One cannot ignore Associationism simply because it does not suit contemporary prejudices; history is notoriously cyclical. Nor can one dismiss the distinctions between Process and Content approaches on the grounds that they are not yet sufficiently distinct from each other. As we point out later, while they do share a common antipathy for Associationism, they dispute it for very different reasons and they provide different classes of alternatives. Second, the motivation for this paper is not to review psycho-linguistics; Fillenbaum (1971) has rendered any such attempt redundant for at least a few years. Nor is the motivation to pigeonhole various scholars into uncomfortable categories. Rather, we wish simply to delineate the possibilities for a psycho-linguistic paradigm, and the possibilities seem, historically and epistemologically, to be provided by the three positions outlined here. With these caveats in mind, the following section provides a skeletal outline of each of the possible paradigms.

292

Reber

The Associationist Orientation The Associationist position developed directly and logically within the behaviorist school of thought. 4 The fundamental operation is the conditioned association between a stimulus and a response. There are many learning theorists who have espoused variations on this general position when dealing with language-Mowrer (1954), Osgood (1963, 1968, 1971), Skinner (1957), Staats (1968), and Suppes (1969a), to name but a few. Although there are differences among these positions, some of a nontrivial nature, 5 there are also fundamental agreements among them. All regard language 6 as behavior that is learned. The full complexity of language behavior is assumed to develop through the chaining and combining of S-R connections. Classical and operant learning paradigms as well as nonrepresentational and representational mediation systems are called upon to handle various aspects of verbal behavior. The power and flexibility of this orientation are best shown through the use of complex S-R mechanisms. In particular, Staats (1968) cites the following: 1. Single-stage S-R sequences: The assumption is that verbal responses also possess stimulus properties which in turn become conditioned to and elicit other responses. These responses also have stimulus properties, and the result is a sequence or chain of associative links. 2. Single-stage S-R hierarchies: Any one stimulus may become associated with a number of different responses. By combining chaining operations with S-R hierarchies, extremely complex convergent and divergent mechanisms are possible. 3. Two-stage mediation systems: Any stimulus can give rise to one or more covert responses, which in turn may produce a chain of covert associations prior to the occurrence of the overt response. Mediation 4Obviously, from any but the most short-sighted historical point of view this statement is not true. Associationism as it developed within British empiricism antedates behaviorism by several centuries. It should be quite clear that Associationism as a potential psycho-linguistic paradigm is something very different from Locke's or Hartley's associationism as a theory of mental organization. 5For example, the intersection between the models of language behavior presented by Osgood (1963, 1968, 1971) and Skinner (1957) is very nearly the empty set. They are included together here mainly because both are learning theoretical approaches using associations as the key building block. 6The word "language" as used here within the Associationist framework is meant to apply to the overt spoken language. The difference between language as an abstraction and language as a set of speech behaviors, long of interest to linguists (de Saussure,

1916), has only recently become a factor in psycho-linguistic theory. The distinction is discussed in more detail in the section on competence and performance.


293

mechanisms, particularly those which are representational, are especially important in analysis of symbolic processes and extensions of Associationism into the realm of syntax (see Osgood, 1971). The primary emphasis of the Associationist is on learning and learning theory. Although the biological components of behavior are usually acknowledged and their role noted, they are generally treated as comprising a sort of blackboard on which the environment writes its message. The possibility that humans possess a significant innate capacity for language is generally passed over lightly. Staats (1968), for example, devotes only a few sentences to the topic and they are designed to minimize: We have had in the history of psychology issues that correspond to the present (biological predisposition). . . . . controversy, with relatively little lasting worth for the effort expended. For example, there was at one time a great controversy over whether the development of behavior seen in children was due to an inferred maturational process that was related to biological conditions, or whether behavior development was due to learning. Staats goes on to argue that any notions about a biological predisposition for language are useless without a well-developed theory of behavior to which they can be related. This position is reasonably characteristic of an Associationist orientation. The Process Orientation 7 A Process orientation starts by assuming that a set of general cognitive mechanisms-or procedures and inference rules (Slobin, 1966)-are necessary for explanations of language behavior. There are several variations on this particular theme. Fodor (1966) has suggested that the process mechanisms may possibly be conceptualized as a set of intrinsic learning principles. Thus what characterizes language is the ability of the child to learn learning principles on the basis of the regularities contained in the linguistic input. Slobin (1966) argues for similar cognitive structures, but he prefers to refer to them as representing a general capacity to learn categories and process information in predictable ways. Reber (1967, in preparation) has proposed a conceptual learning schema whereby the child is looked upon as abstracting an implicit model of the language from his observations. Regardless of the differences between these positions (and others, see Sutherland, 1966; Gibson, 1969; Premack, 1969, 1971; Bever, 1970a, b), they have important features in common. First, they assume that the regularities 7This term, as well as the term "content" which is used for the third approach, was first suggested by Slobin (1966).

294

Reber

observed in and hypothesized for natural languages are a result of general innate process mechanisms. Second, they assume that the linguistic system (grammar) that the child acquires is a result of a general cognitive ability to abstract out the regularities in the language he hears. The nature of this assumed ability differs for different theorists, but all agree that it is a general ability and one that is not immutably linked to language behavior. Third, they all assume that the end result of the acquisition process is a generative mechanism which enables the child to generate novel utterances and to understand similarly novel inputs. The emphasis of the Process approach is divided between learning and biological development. It is acknowledged that there is a large and complex biological foundation which dictates the form and substance of natural languages. The hypothetical mechanism, however, is also assumed to control other cognitive behaviors. Learning is central to the Process theorist and is as critical an issue here as in Associationism. The difference is that here learning is viewed as an abstraction of basic relationships and rules and not as a linking together or elaboration of S-R associations. The Content Orientation At the core of the Content approach is the assumption of a specific, nativistic content of the mind, a sort of facultd de langue. This position has been argued for by linguists (Chomsky, 1965, 1968; Katz, 1964) as well as by psychologists (McNeill, 1966, 1968, 1970). In essence, the argument is as follows. A child is biologically endowed with a language acquisition system or device (LAD). The contents of LAD are assumed to be a set of substantive and formal universals. 8 The universals comprise, in essence, an innately given theory of any potential natural language. On the basis of the linguistic data that the child receives, he develops hypotheses that account for the input by using the formal and substantive universals. That is, he determines structural descriptions of the language he hears that are appropriate in terms of the contents of LAD. Language learning is viewed as something more than the induction of a particular set of rules (or grammar) from the input. The child is assumed to know much more than he has learned. The role that learning plays in this orientation is relatively modest. For example, as Katz (1964) views the problem, learning is not even mentioned: 8By substantive universals are meant universals regarding the description of natural languages such as a set of distinctive features, a cataloguing of word classes, or a set of semantic features. By formal universals are meant those which are concerned with the nature of the generative rules that are found in natural languages such as transformations that map deep structures onto surface structures (see Chomsky, 1965).


295

How do speakers come to acquire this (linguistic) ability? That is, what innate dispositions and developmental processes are responsible for transforming a non-verbal infant into a fluent speaker? For Katz, then, innate dispositions and a set of developmental processes are sufficient. This position is perhaps a bit extreme; other Content theorists (McNeill, 1970) have not so completely neglected the role of learning. In any event, whatever a child learns when he acquires a natural language is assumed to be filtered through a set of innately determined operators. In a sense, the acquisition process is rather like a selection process. The child is like a scientist searching through his data (language inputs) and building a theory (a generative grammar). It is worth noting here that the conceptualization of a mature speakerhearer of a natural language arrived at by this approach is not markedly different from that arrived at by a Process approach. Both view the linguistically sophistocated person as the possessor of a generative grammar which provides the means for language behavior. The processes assumed to guide the person to this level, however, are quite different under the two approaches, a point which is pursued below.

TIlE BASIC ISSUES The above introductory descriptions hardly do justice to the three approaches. The purpose has been merely to establish the overall framework for each. In the sections to follow, the orientations are discussed with respect to the manner in which they do (or do not) handle a number of basic issues.

Biological Foundations for Language The issue of a biological predisposition for language is of first priority. As mentioned above, the three models present very different pictures of the assumed role of biological aspects. In fact, it is probably this issue more than any other which serves to keep them apart. The Associationist position is fairly straightforward. It relegates the biological component to a subsidiary level. The neurology and physiology of the organiSm are accepted as definitions of the limitations of the organism's behavioral repertoire. Associationism recognizes the structure and innervation of the articulators as limiting the sounds we can produce, it appreciates the role of the cortex in control over sensory inputs and motor responding, and it acknowledges that evolutionarily determined factors play a part in controlling some of the development of language. But historically Associationism has always regarded such biological

296

Reber

factors as simply defining the scope and form of the nature of the learning theory analysis. Staats (1968) argues that no biological model can possibly provide an explanatory theory of behavior. At best, he claims, such models are descriptive, and at worst they are confusing. Furthermore, any descriptive virtues that may arise are, he contends, only of value when they are tied in with studies that involve the manipulation of variables that modify behavior. In short, Associationism would view the biological basis of language as a framework which serves to provide the researcher with a set of functional limitations. The biological basis of language exists in the same way as the biological basis of motor learning-two hands, ten fingers, an opposing thumb, distinct hand preferences, contralateral innervation, etc. Both Process and Content orientations assume a much greater role for biological antecedents. In fact, it is this issue which led Slobin (1966) to suggest the names "process" and "content" for the two approaches. A Process approach assumes that there is a biologically given cognitive mechanism which allows for the processing of information inputs in a particular way. A Content approach assumes that there are innate structures which define the linguistic content of mind. The former approach is quite general and views the innate components as broad-based, information-processing mechanisms; the other is quite specific and treats the innate components as themselves representing the form of language and no other behavior. The issue which serves to keep the two approaches separate, then, is the degree of specificity of the innate, biological organization. As McNeiU (1970) and Chomsky before him (1965) suggest, one may characterize linguistic emergence in terms of a language acquisition device (or LAD). Such a device receives language input from the environment in the form of a finite set of utterances and develops a theory about the regularities that are in (or underlie) the speech. LAD is, in reality, a biological metaphor and one cannot dispute over it until it is characterized more formally. Following McNeill (1970), it is reasonable to suppose that LAD could contain one (or perhaps both) of two broad classes of mechanisms. First, LAD could consist of a set of procedures or rules of inference which would allow it to discover a grammar. The assumption here is that there exists a biological predisposition to process complexly structured information in certain intrinsically human ways. The basic linguistic operation here would be the extraction of the grammar from the environment; the grammatical information is assumed to exist in the language corpus, not in the child. From the Process point of view, LAD's biological programming is seen as effective in differentiating subtle grammatical regularities from a complex stimulus set; there are no assumptions about grammar, only assumptions about how to process information. Language acquisition is still language learning.


297

Second, LAD could consist of a program of linguistic information, assumptions about grammar in the form of universal procedures of linguistic analysis. Here the human infant is viewed as acquiring language because the auditory inputs trigger a set of highly specific innate structures which are "pretuned" to universal linguistic abstractions. In this view, the c o n t e n t of LAD takes precedence over the procedures and language acquisition is closer to language development. At the present time, largely due to work of Lenneberg (1967), very little argument remains over the existence of an extensive biological basis for language. The points at issue are the specificity of the biological foundations and, as one must naturally infer, the degree to which these biological foundations so critical for language are shared by other behaviors. In summary, then, an Associationist position assumes an underlying equivalence between natural language behavior and other behaviors with no allowances made for specific biological properties of a special kind. Both Process and Content positions assume that there is a complex and intricate set of innately linked predispositions for language. A Process theorist would expect to f'md at the core of this biological heritage a set of general information-processing mechanisms. A Content theorist would expect a specific structure that guides the development of language. It seems clear that we are moving toward nativism once again. The Uniqueness Problem Clearly, assumptions about the position of language with respect to other behaviors, both human and infrahuman, are necessary within any paradigm. The issue which was hinted at above becomes especially clear when one tries to order the three approaches along a dimension of uniqueness-that is, to what degree would each separate language behavior from other behaviors. Associationism reflects its Darwinian roots and characterizes linguistic behavior as an extension of the same principles that have been assumed to underlie all others behaviors. From this perspective, there is nothing unique about language. It is important to realize that if the Associationist claim that language behavior is just another piece of behavior possessing no unique qualities can ultimately be defended then the position will receive its strongest support. The class of theories known as S-R has been studied in more detail and formalized more precisely then any others, and, most importantly, a greater variety of behaviors has been explored within the S-R framework than within the context of any other theory. If language behavior is in no way unique, and if the principles of Associationism are capable of unambiguous extrapolation to such complex behavior, then it would be inefficient and

298

Reb~

counterproductive to abruptly shift to a new paradigm. Osgood (1968, 1971) has probably presented this case more persuasively than anyone else. Both Process and Content approaches are in distinct opposition to this position. Both regard language as representing a class of behavior which is, in some respects, fundamentally separate from other more primitive classes of behavior. Language and the notion of competence for language are treated as though they lie outside the conceptual limits of Associationism. The two approaches, however, differ in the degree to which they would separate a psychology of language from other psychological explorations. For example, some scholars have seized on the claim of generative grammarians that language is based on innate structures and interpreted it to mean that such structures are without generality and are limited to linguistic expression. This stand, which characterizes the strong Content orientation, would present language as behavior of uniqueness, twice stated-once, in that language is viewed as unique to man and without significant parallel in other species, and twice, in that it is viewed as behavior unique within man and demands treatment, empirical and theoretical, of a special nature. Such a position would deny that structures underlying language could be reflected in other aspects of human behavior. The acquisition of a natural language, in particular, first language acquisition in a naturalistic setting, is thus characterized as a psychological phenomenon without parallel or analogy. Therefore, a Content paradigm would maintain that extrapolation of learning principles from other behaviors or extension of theoretical models found adequate for other psychological settings would be futile and ultimately counterproductive. In a Process approach, the notion of uniqueness is tempered somewhat. Language is viewed as representing a class of behaviors characterized by certain attributes, t w o of which are that the stimulus materials be structured and that the response classes be rule governed. A Process approach would assume, however, that the notion of linguistic competence is necessary to account for the myriad phenomena of language. It would also be sympathetic to the claims that the concept of a generative grammar and its fundamental implication-the creation of unique instances-is beyond the capacity of Associationism. However, a Process paradigm would not insist that such issues necessitate the isolation of linguistic competence from other cognitive and perceptual processes. What is theoretically necessary for language behavior is a brain whose intrinsic organization is such that it enables its possessor to abstract redundancies from a structured stimulus array. It is deemed sufficient to argue that all of the grammatical rules of any natural language exist in the overall linguistic and sensory input and that they will be learned if they are attended to by an organism with the requisite physiology. The learning process itself is

On Psycho-Linguistic Paradigms

299

viewed as a construction of an abstract implicit model of the stimulus inputs-a generative grammar which mirrors the properties of the linguistic environment. The issue is one of species specificity and not one of operational specificity. Language is viewed as unique only insofar as the biology of the organism is unique. In Homo sapiens, language is not a unique behavior but one of a class of behaviors called "cognitive" or "perceptual" (see Bever, 1970a, b). With regard to finding language or language-like behaviors in other organisms, the question can be answered only in terms of the innate organization of the particular species. Those that possess the requisite cognitive capacities will be able to acquire such behavior, those that do not, will not. 9 There have been a number of empirical efforts to resolve this question of species specificity. Hayes (1951) and Kellogg and Kellogg (1933)reported complete failure to teach a chimpanzee even the more primitive rudiments of English. Work with parrots and mynah birds has shown quite clearly that the birds never say anything not specifically taught; there is no creative or referential aspect in their vocalizations. Ferster (1964) failed to teach a chimp a simple binary code. Deese (1970) concludes, finally, that in these endeavors "no success has been reported and an attitude of skepticism seems to be amply justified." Thus the answer to the question, "Can an organism other than a human acquire a natural language?" has, to date, been an unequivocal "no." However, recent research has presented a new slant on the problem. Premack (1969, 1971) has suggested that it might be more profitable to rephrase the basic question. Rather than ask "Can an organism other than a human acquire a natural language?" he asks "What must an organism do in order to give evidence that it has language?" Phrasing it this way emphasizes function rather than structure. It suggests that it might be more fruitful to broaden the defmition of those behaviors we call linguistic. In Premack's (1969) words, The functions an organism carries out when engaged in language need to be separated from the form these functions take in man. Not only human phonology but quite possibly human syntax may be unique to man; both may encompass mechanisms not found in any other species. But if this is so, it does not commit the mechanisms of logic and semantics to the same status. The latter may be more widely distributed and it may be them, not the human form of syntax and phonology upon which the basic functions of language depend. 9It is possible to beg off the circularity inherent in such a statement by claiming that the issue ultimately is an empirical one. That is, ff the organism learns, then we can conclude that it did indeed possess the necessary structures. However, failures must be treated as no proof at all, for our instructional procedures may be at fault and not the ability of the organism to learn. Many children fail to learn to read at no fault of their own.

300

Reber

Premack goes on to show that by using strict training procedures a chimpanzee may learn a variety of linguistic and metalinguistic behaviors, including use of words, generation of simple and compound sentences, appropriate responding to interrogatives, and certain metalinguistic operations such as "X is the name for Y." In addition, there is evidence for displacement (referring to objects and events not present) and predication (assertion of state of affairs) behaviors. Finally, the chimp is creative; assembling new combinations of words, concatenating words in novel ways, and immediately incorporating new words into the existing grammatical system. In a similar vein, the studies of Gardner and Gardner (1969, 1971) support many of these observations. They have also reported evidence that chimps can acquire what amounts to a limited but formal generative grammar based on a set of concatenation rules. The approaches differ in certain respects. In particular, Premack's interest is in a broad series of studies investigating general cognitive processes, whereas the Gardners are explicitly trying to teach language to a chimpanzee. There is, however, one important aspect in common to the two investigations: both have abandoned the vocal and auditory media and are using variations within the visual modality. Premack employs plastic forms of varying shape and color, and the Gardners are using the American sign language of the deaf. In this way, the problems of voluntary control over articulation and the limitations imposed by the physical structure of the vocal tract 10 are circumvented. Note that these results do not imply that chimps learn natural language, nor do they imply that there is nothing special or unique about natural languages. Premack's orientation is strongly in the Process tradition, and the inferences from his work are clear in that they suggest that there is a general cognitive framework, which, if possessed by an organism, can avail it of language-like behavior. The language taught to these chimps is not language as it is acquired naturally by a child, but it is possibly acquired in a manner analogous to the way the human acquires other language-like behavior. The issue of the uniqueness of the innate structures for language may be resolvable if we can separate the various functional aspects of language. A Process approach acknowledges that the phonological component is probably unique and that certain syntactic operations may be due to unique structures. It would maintain, however, that the ability to use concatenation and/or trans10Lieberman and Wilson (1969) have shown through a simulation of the chimpanzee vocal tract that the phonemes of naturM languages are simply not possible for the chimp because of the physical properties of the system.


301

formational systems and to generate novel sequences is probably not due to any unique system, neither unique within man nor even to him.

The Acquisition Problem The concern here is with the two classical aspects of acquisition problems: (1) the explication of the nature of the material acquired, the depiction of what is being learned; and (2) the characterization of the learning process itself, the theory of h o w it is acquired. Associationism's characterization of language acquisition is the most traditional of the three and places the greatest stress on principles of learning. In general, Associationist interpretations of h o w language is learned have controlled the characterizations of what is being learned. In particular, a theory of complex associations is assumed to satisfy the requirements of both; i.e., language is acquired through associationistic principles and language is a set of associations. This point is seen most clearly in Skinner's analysis (1957), where the behavior is classified and categorized in ways that are amenable to treatment as stimuli, responses, and reinforcers. Language to Skinner becomes sets of functional units such as "tacts" (ways of naming objects) and "mands" (ways of requesting things), and the acquisition problem is treated in the context of the shaping and reinforcement of these functional verbal classes. Staats' (1968) interpretation of language is also of this general type. That is, S-R analysis is assumed to provide a sufficiently powerful model of language acquisition, and the behavior itself is catalogued in terms which are applicable to such an analysis. A language for Staats is a system that contains terms which stand for important events of the empirical world with rules for relating the terms.., it does not contain terms, other than purely formal (syntactic) ones which have no counterparts in the empirical world. Language viewed in this fashion is ideally suited to a S-R theory of language acquisition. Since Associationism starts with a conceptualization of the acquisition process which is based on an analysis of learning processes in terms of stimuli, responses, and reinforcers, it would naturally tend to view language as behavior which can be characterized as stimuli, responses, and reinforcers. With few exceptions (Osgood, 1968, 1971; Suppes, 1969a), the Associationists have paid little attention to the work of theoretical linguists. Moreover, the roles that maturation and innate structures might play in the acquisition process are considered to be of little or no consequence. Language is not viewed as the result of a developmental process but rather as the result of a learning process. The basic acquisition process, in an Associationist reference frame, is outlined as follows: Language is assumed to be acquired through a series of

302

Reber

complex associations. Sound patterns are gradually shaped through reinforcement of successive approximations. Syllables and words are learned in a similar conditioning fashion, and meaning is attached to them by association between the environment in which the word is used and its acoustic properties. Higher order grammatical structures are assumed to develop by learning structured phrases and sentence frames which contain syntactic and semantic slots. The slots are filled in appropriate ways by substituting words (or phrases) that share similar privileges of occurrence. In most cases, the principle of generalization is given considerable theoretical weight (cf. Skinner, 1957; Braine, 1963; Staats, 1968), for it is by generalizing a particular grammatical structure that novel sentences may be uttered and a new input understood. Mediational processes are also provided with important theoretical roles (Osgood, 1963, 1968, 1971), particularly in explications of semantic factors. It is thus not unreasonable to generalize across Associationist models and characterize them as searches for the effective stimulus, the appropriate response classes, and the mediational system. The primary emphasis has been on making the system (language) fit the theory (S-R, behavior theory), and hence the problem of how the system is acquired has been given priority over any further explorations or reevaluations of what is acquired. In the Content approach, there is a reversal of the how-what priority. Rather than allow preconceptions of general learning theory to dictate what was being acquired, Content theory would allow linguistic interpretations of language to prescribe the nature of how it could be acquired. In Chomsky's highly critical review of Skinner's book Verbal Behavior (Chomsky, 1959), this point is emphasized repeatedly, e.g., It is futile to inquire into the causation of verbal behavior until much more is known about the specific character of this behavior; and there is little point in speculation about the process of acquisition without much better understanding of what is aequired. The main thrust of this comment has been echoed by a number of investigators, mainly those who identify with a Content orientation (Katz, 1964; McNeill, 1966, 1968, 1970). The theory of language acquisition presented, however, is always dependent to some degree on the particular characterization of language provided by the theoretical grammarian. Any Content approach must begin with a model of language; the model is taken to represent the behavioral phenomena under scrutiny, and theories of acquisition are developed which a r e assumed to be adequate for these particular linguistic models. McNeiU (1968) presents this approach directly:


303

The problem of language acquisition can be stated clearly. We aspire toward a theory of linguistic development that will explain the emergence of a transformational grammar by age four years with the period of active acquisition covering a span of approximately 30 months. The lines are clearly drawn here; the model of language is that provided by the transformational grammarian, the acquisition process is developmentally guided and sharply restricted by critical periods, and the problem is to construct a theory which conforms to these bounds. Because a Content orientation would stress linguistic rather than psychological factors, the actual theories proposed have lacked the precision and formality of those of the Associationists. McNeill's (1970) is probably the most rigorously stated, although, in his words, it still cannot be said to explain the acquisition of language in a definite or comprehensive way.., it omits many details and ignores certain larger issues, the mechanism of acquisition perhaps being the most conspicuous among them. (MeNeill, 1968) In general, McNeill's theory views the learning of a language as the formulation of a grammatical system on the basis of the speech the child hears. The formulation process is carried out under the guidance of LAD. The acquisition process itself is assumed to take place in stages, with the development within and across stages guided by a universal hierarchy of categories. Within each stage, the child uses particular linguistic classes and combinatory and transformational rules for manipulating the classes. At the earliest stages, there are only two classes and simple pretransformational concatenation rules; at later stages, the classes become highly differentiated and the c0mbinatory rules become complex and transformational in nature. The approach assumes that the child speaks an exotic tongue whose relationship to adult language is at the deep structure level as determined by the universals. Adult grammars are not learned in the standard sense, they are not even discovered; rather, they are developed and guided by a nativistic structure. Thus, with reference to a particular structure, the noun phrase: The very intricate simultaneous differentiation and integration that constitutes the evolution of the noun phrase is more reminiscent of the biological development of an embryo than it Js of the acquisition of a conditioned reflex. (Brown and BeUugi, 1964) A Process paradigm would depart significantly from the positions of both Associationism and a Content approach. The initial complaint is that Associationism places too much weight on models of speech which are primarily psychological and ignores models of language which are primarily linguistic. The complaint with the Content approach is that it too errs but in

304

Rebet

the other direction. That is, a strong Content position would allow psychological thinking to be governed by linguistic theory. Numerous models of language behavior and language acquisition have appeared that are based on theoretical linguistics, usually transformational grammar (among others, Miller, 1962; Gough, 1965; Fodor and Bever, 1965; McNeill, 1970). The argument is that these efforts have relied too heavily on linguistic theories and not sufficiently on psychological evaluations. Further, a Process theorist would argue that the Content position is founded on the logical operation that allows the inference of a mechanism on the basis of an operation. McNeill (1966), for example, assumes that base structures are a part of the innate mechanism because he can find no direct evidence for their expression in surface structure. A Process position would maintain that such an inference is not warranted. One could assume, just as reasonably, that there are general cognitive properties which allow the child to extract the underlying regularities from the surface structure and construct an implicit model that mirrors base structure. Sutherland (1966), reflecting a Process orientation, has maintained that a parallel case can be shown to exist in visual perception. It is possible to characterize size judgments by the relationship "Multiply retinal size by the distance an object is away." Such a statement about competence, however, need not be construed to mean that a corresponding mechanism is part of the native organization of the visual system, and neither should it be construed that the organism "knows" this algebraic relationship in any explicit fashion. Similarly, a theory of perceptual learning need not postulate a precisely structured acquisition device to account for size constancy. Language acquisition, then, would finally be characterized by a Process approach as an information-processing operation. The regularities that are seen in the output are assumed to reflect regularities in the input. Instead of a LAD containing formal and substantive universals forming a grammatical theory which conforms to the data, there is a LAD containing a general "differentiation" mechanism with a minimum of innate structure that allows it to recognize and internalize regularities in the i_nput data. Ultimately, a Process paradigm will be the most balanced between the problems of specifying what is acquired and speculating about how it is acquired. It is almost axiomatic that what is acquired is a set of grammatical rules that are used in generative fashion, although there is no commitment to one or the other of the formal models now under consideration by theoretical linguists. The problem of how is dealt with as though the acquisition process represented a general class of learning operations that will eventually be found to have significant parallels in a variety of other complex stimulus situations. Bever (1970a), in a paper pointedly titled "The cognitive basis for linguistic structures," sees his approach to the study of language as the study of


305

a conceptual and communicative system which recruits various kinds of human behavior, but which is not exhaustively manifested in any particular form of language behavior. In summary, then, both the Process and Content paradigms would conceive of the speaker-hearer as a sentence-generating system that knows in some implicit fashion the generative grammar of the language. A Content approach would stress that the grammar is selected and the data are enriched, while a Process approach would stress that the grammar is induced and the data are differentiated. These two positions are separated by a wide philosophical and conceptual gulf from that of Associationism.

Competence-Performance Distinctions It has been long recognized by philosophers and linguists that a conceptual, and eventually a theoretical, distinction must be made between speech as a set of operations performed by humans and language as an abstract representation of what can and what cannot be said. Von Humboldt (1836), for example, differentiated between speech as overt behavior and language as an underlying generative structure that was part of the mental capacities of the speaker. De Saussure (1916) made a similar distinction but one which differed in subtle ways from yon Humboldt's. He too regarded speech (la parole) as behavior, but rather than view language (la langue) as a representation of some ideal speaker-hearer he posed it as a formal abstraction of the natural language itself, independent of the user and his capabilities. The primary difference between yon Humboldt's and de Saussure's conceptualizations lies in their characterizations of language, the abstract component; there is no disagreement at the level of speech. De Saussure's conception of language involved primarily an inventory of linguistic items, while yon Humboldt's was concerned with a characterization of a generative grammar (cf. Chomsky, 1964). De Saussure's emphasis can be considered almost entirely linguistic, while yon Humboldt's has interesting implications for psychology in that the nature of the generative system is assumed to reflect properties of the mind of the speaker-hearer. Chomsky has reintroduced the Humboldtian form of the dichotomy and proposed the terms "competence" and "performance" to parallel the language-speech distinctions. By competence is meant the speaker-hearer's underlying knowledge of his language, by performance the speaker-bearer's use of the language. It is in this sense that the terms are used here. Theories of competence and/or performance will be clearly psycholinguistic in nature, although one may be more or less psychological or linguistic than the other. A theory of competence will be primarily a linguistic theory, a set of hypotheses about the underlying nature of language. Similarly,

306

Reber

a theory of performance will be primarily a psychological theory, a set of hypotheses about the linguistic behavior of a speaker-hearer of a particular language. Associationism has not, until recently, explicitly recognized the competence-performance distinction. 11 The primary emphasis has been and would continue to be the objective observations of speech. Although some theorists have pointedly maintained that the distinction is not necessary (Skinner, 1957), most have simply avoided the issue altogether. Staats (1968), for example, makes no mention at all of the distinction in his recent book. In fact, except for recent efforts (Osgood, 1968, 1971; Suppes, 1969a) Associationism has been characterized by a neglect of the distinction between competence and performance. It now seems safe to Conclude that this failure to deal directly with the issue has in the past made the Associationist position exceedingly vulnerable. Many critics have persistently argued that Associationism cannot handle the fact that people utter and understand with facility sentences never experienced previously. This simple fact of verbal behavior, they have maintained, reveals the role of a linguistic competence which underlies, directs, generates, and interprets the actual linguistic inputs and outputs. Without recognizing this aspect of language behavior and allowing for it theoretically, one cannot hope to comprehend the nature of language. However, it must be recognized that these are arguments against a failure to appreciate a critical distinction. Although those espousing Associationism have frequently been guilty of this neglect, the argument cannot be leveled against Associationism itself. Clearly, any theorist who leans toward a Process or Content approach and who ignores the competence-performance distinction will also imperil his conceptualizations of psycho-linguistics. Several Association theorists have made concerted efforts to expand the approach to include theoretical analyses of competence. Osgood (1968, 1971, in press) suggests that the way to accomplish this goal is to expand Associationism beyond the realm o f single-stage S-R mechanisms and to incorporate representational mediation processes, thereby allowing for information integration and coding operations. Wickelgren (1969) has argued for 11Associationists, however, have long been concerned with a tantalizingly similar issue in the distinction between learning and performance (see Kimble, 1961). Learning is a theoretical entity assumed to reflect the organism's optimal level of behavior or his competence. Many variables that affect his actual behavior, or performance, do not necessarily have an effect on learning, and different measures of performance will reflect differential aspects of what has been learned. "Although the psychologist's interest is in learning, atl of the data available for analysis are performance data" (Kimble, 1961, p. 109). Substitute for "psychologists," "psycho-linguists"; for "learning," "language"; and for "performance," "speech"; and the parallel becomes clear.


307

inclusion of context-sensitive assocations (although see Halwes and Jenkins, 1971). Suppes (1969a) maintains as well that S-R theory, as stimulus-sampling theory (Suppes and Atkinson, 1960), is, in principle at least, capable of a characterization of linguistic competence. It is important to realize that all of these efforts are attempts to characterize linguistic competence in terms which are basically psychological. They (particularly Osgood) start with linguistic data and some variation of Associationism and attempt to construct theories which can account for data actually observed and any other that might possibly occur. Thus the psycholinguistic theory of competence that evolves from Associationism will be primarily psychological. It must certainly be congruent with the nature of language as revealed through linguistic science, but it will be fundamentally

psycho-hnguistic. It is on this last point that a Content approach will be most clearly distinguishable from an Associationist approach. A Content paradigm would begin with certain assumptions about the nature of language and assume that an adequate generative grammar will provide a full characterization of linguistic competence. Performance data are assumed to correspond to and reflect the competence model and are analyzed in this context. With this order of priorities, the psycho-linguistic theory of competence will be primarily psycho-linguistic. The position derives mainly from the theoretical work of Chomsky and in ways extends beyond the caveats he offered. Chomsky assumed that an adequate model of natural language is to be found in the theory of generative, transformational grammar and that a model of competence will best be expressed in these terms. Other Content theorists, notably McNeil1 (1968, 1970), have extended this basic notion so that transformational theory is also regarded as outlining the structure of a theory of performance. This inference is a rather compelling one; it would be of particular importance if a model of generative grammar were also to provide us with a theory of how we could accomplish our linguistic aims. 12 A Process position can be differentiated from a Content position primarily in the degree to which it would pursue the idealization of 12Chomsky himself, however, has not made this inference. In point of fact, he has maintained that there is no logical reason to suppose that an adequate theory of competence will be, simultaneously~ an adequate theory of performance. Chomsky suggests that generative theory may provide a model of competence-as a mentalistic abstraction-although there are many other considerations such as memory load and attitudinal and emotional factors that must be taken into account before a theory of performance-as a behavioristic description-can be developed. He is suggesting simply that a model of competence may not be a representation of the process of performance (Chomsky, 1964, 1965).

308

Reber

competence. Any theory of competence must be a theory of the knowledge of the speaker-hearer unaffected by limits of memory, breath, attention, understanding, and so forth. To pursue this aim, however, means to ignore, or at least underplay, these limits on memory, attention, and physiology. Most Process theorists are simply not willing to sacrifice these performance variables. Moreover, they maintain, the expectation that models of competence can be used as blueprints for models of performance may be poorly conceived. As Sutherland (1966) argues, although the type of grammar developed by Chomsky may be one way of axiomatizing language it is not necessarily the only way and it need not correspond to the axiomatization system (if any) represented in the brain... It seems possible that performance may be controlled more by a system of analogies than by a more rigorous generative procedure in which the axioms of linguistic [competence] are directly represented in the brain. The psycho-linguistic theory of competence developed within a Process approach will have roughly equal emphasis on both the psychological and the linguistic components. The Process model, in general, is more concerned with how models of performance fall within the scope of formal representations of competence than with how models of competence may be extrapolated to account for language performance. Perhaps it will be instructive to distinguish (as Sutherland does) between competence as a formal axiomatic system and competence as a representational mechanism. A Content theorist tends to look upon competence as an algebra of linguistic rules; a Process theorist prefers to regard it as a physiologically based set of cognitive operations. In an effort to reduce the polarization resulting from excessive concentration on either performance or competence, Bever (1970b) takes to task those who would espouse the Content paradigm. The argument, in his words, is as follows: in recent considerations of language learning attention has been focused on the acquisition of linguistic competence as isolated in linguistic investigations of grammar. This view of language "structure" and its development in children isolated from the rest of cognitive development has been too narrow. Many aspects of adult language derive from the interaction of grammar with the child's processes of learning and using language. Certain ostensibly grammatical structures may develop out of other behavioral systems rather than being inherent in grammar. That is, linguistic structure is itself partially determined by the learning and behavioral processes that are involved in acquiring and implementing that structure. I n summary, Associationism forces a focus on performance to the relative neglect of competence. When the need for a concept such as competence is considered, it is generally regarded as being of secondary importance. Precisely the reverse focus is manifested by a strong Content approach. Competence is regarded as central and performance as secondary.


309

Performance factors are assumed to provide restrictions on what a person is able to do linguistically, although the final theory of performance will take the form of variations on the basic structure of competence. A Process paradigm will be ultimately less committed to priorities; neither competence nor performance can be regarded as central. We are always reminded that how the mind behaves with linguistic devices is not necessarily the same as how the theoretical grammarian behaves with them. Note here that each approach carries with it the vestiges of its disciplinary origins: Associationism from behaviorism, Process theory from cognitive theory, and Content theory from theoretical linguistics. Behaviorism and Mentalism The Associationist's position identifies cIosely with traditional behaviorism, in strong opposition to mentalism. Operating within the tradition initiated by Watson, the Associationist rejects the use of concepts involving mental phenomena not unequivocally linked to behavior. Pressed finally to recognize the obvious, we say that "man thinking is man behaving," then represent the thought as a movement, an utterance-or even a vaguely "cognitive" mediation-but always hold that the thought is describable by the behavior theory that describes the behavior of stimuli and responses. (Dulaney, 1968) There are a number of different variations on the basic behaviorist dogma, and they vary considerably in their orthodoxy. Skinner (1957), for example, is much stricter a behaviorist than Osgood (1971). While Skinner insists on treating only those language components which are observable and functionally manipulable. Osgood bases his Associationistic models on unobservables whose role is inferred from behavior and the manipulation of behavior. In this section, however, these models and others are treated together, for two important reasons. First, they fall within what Fodor (1968) called the "Liberal" definition of behaviorism, i.e., any doctrine that espouses the truth of the proposition "For each mental predicate that can be employed in a psychological explanation, there must be at least one description of behavior to which it bears a logical connection." Second, all variations of behaviorism are in agreement in thek dismissal of mentalism as a doctrine. The behaviorist base of Associationism is derived from at least four varieties of what is generally called "behavior theory" (Osgood, 1968). First, there are the simple, single-stage S-R models (Pavlovian and Skinnerian); second, the nonrepresentational mediation models (Braine, 1963; Staats, 1968); third, the representational mediation models 0Vlowrer, 1964; Osgood, 1963, 1971); and fourth, Osgood's three-stage model which incorporates S-S and R-R laws (Osgood, 1968).

310

Reber

The rejection of mentalism by all of these varieties of Associationism is traceable to the fact that the anchor points for all are stimuli and responses. Stimuli are traditionally defined in terms of operations in the environment, and responses are defined as observable reactions of the organism in the context of a specifiable environment. Operating from a positivistic base, the objections to the use of unobservables are restricted to those situations where there is no theoretical model for mapping the unobservable onto an observable. To quote Osgood (1968), It is one thing to use notions like "competence," "knowledge," and "rules," as heuristic devices, as sources of hypotheses about performance; it is quite another thing to use them as explanations of performance-unless, of course, one is ready to give up his behavioristic moorings entirely in exchange for a frankly"dualistic mentalism. Even the liberal Associationist commitment to behaviorism is obviously quite strong. It has been pointed out, not inaccurately (Fodor, 1968), that the prominent belief o f Anglo-American experimental psychologists has been that some form of behaviorism must be true. The extension of the Associationist's realm to complex behaviors such as language has not diminished his identification with this position. Just as the behaviorist bias of the Association-theorist can be traced to the parent discipline o f behavior theory, so the mentalist bias o f a Content orientation can be found in its parent discipline, generative grammar theory. In an article entitled explicitly "'Mentalism in linguistics," Katz (1964) argues that the failure of a taxonomic theory to handle the full range of facts about linguistic structure is due to the failure of such theories to concern themselves with mental capacities, events, and processes. The variation o f mentalism that Katz favors, however, is not necessarily the one that Associationists so abhor. Katz goes on to say that The step of hypothesizing such a (mentalistic) mechanism in the process of theory construction in linguistics is not different from the hypothetical postulation in theory construction in any other branch of science where some component of the system about which we wish to gain understanding is inaccessible to observation. The issue can be shown to be actually one o f implicit agreement provided that two qualifications are satisfied: ( 1 ) t h a t the Associationist recognize the nonequivalence o f mentalism and dualism, and ( 2 ) t h a t the Content theorist use his mental constructs as hypotheses about data and not as theories. Both of these points require some elaboration. 1. On the confusion between mentalism and dualism: There is a long history o f attacks on mentalism in both psychology and linguistics. Bloomfield (1933) is representative of the linguistic:


311

The mentalist theory.., supposes that the variability of human conduct is due to the interference of some non-physical factor, a spirit or will or mind.., that is present in every human being. This spirit, according to the mentalist view, is entirely different from material things and accordingly follows some other kinds of causation or perhaps none at all. This particular quote reveals a rather biased notion o f mentalism. W~ite it is true that today some Content theorists may be leading toward a Cartesian form o f dualist mentalism, most are not. 13 Mentalism is too often confused with dualism, since a dualist will most certainly be a mentalist, although subscribing to mentalism in no way implies assertion of dualistic principles. Because a Content theorist argues for unobservables or mental constructs in his psycho-hnguistic theory does not mean that he is assuming that the mental entities are o f a different kind than the behavioral entities. The arguments for a concept of linguistic competence and the oftexpressed need for a theory of competence are in essence arguments for a mentalistic approach to language and a psychology of language; but they are not necessarily assertions of dualism. In many ways, the neobehaviorism of Osgood (see especially 1971) and the mentalism o f Katz (1964), Fodor (1966), and Bever (1968, 1970a, b) and others are closer together than any of the disputants cares to admit. 2. On mental constructs as hypotheses: Appeal to mental constructs is generally made on two grounds. First, the data are not within the scope of the behavioral model (or do not appear to be so), and, second, they are intuitively pleasing. However, it is reasonable to demand that what starts as a mentalist construct eventually become tied to observables or at least be formally theoretically derivable from observables. A number of theorists, not unexpectedly those with a Process orientation, have used mentalistic constructs m this fashion, t4 Slobin (1965), for example, argues strongly for the existence of abstract grammatical rules as representing the basis for a child's speech, but he is careful to establish behavioral criteria for them. We can be fairly sure that a child has some rule system if his production is regular, if he extends these regularities to new instances, and if he can 13This issue, naturally, is much more complex than suggested here. Dualism comes in several varieties, and it is not always clear which is being inveighed against. Although few today would assert a Cartesian interactive dualism, a parallelistic or relativistic dualism along the lines suggested by Wundt is somewhat more palatable. As Blumenthal (1970) points out, Wundtian parallelism is not as metaphysical as many early critics and contemporary historians suggest. Rather, Wundt was a relativist; mind and body were not necessarily of different stuff but were systems that were best evaluated using different methodologies. 14Although Osgood (1971, in press) has recently endeavored to include such notiens into his neobehavioristic model.

312

Reber detect deviations from regularity in his own speech and in the speech of others.

Similar attitudes have been voiced by Brown and Fraser (1963) and Brown et al. (1964). In general, those with a Process orientation are psychologists trained in rigorous empiricism where the subject matter is, of course, behavior. However, the recognition that complex cognitive structures of as yet unknown properties must be postulated to account for psycho-linguistic phenomena makes them hospitable to mentalist theorizing. Perhaps we ought to heed Bever's pleas for an "experimental phenomenology." Further, it seems clear that the debate over behaviorism and mentalism is intimately involved in the competence-performance distinction. As Osgood (1968) argues, from an Associationist's position a mentalistic notion such as competence becomes valid only when it can be shown that there are components within behavior theory that correspond to it. McNeill (1966, 1968) and Bever et al. (1968), however, maintain that existing behavioristic theory restricted to the assumptions of Associatio;c~ism is, in principle, incapable of constructing a model of competence. The eventual resolution of this issue probably depends on the anchoring of mentalistic dogma in either observables or models of observables. To quote Mandler (1969), Maybe my problem is that I do not think that psychology is the science of behavior, any more than physics is the science of pointer readings or chemistry is the science of smells. Psychology talks about behavior, but the scientific endeavor is, and must be, theoretical and one of the names we have for the theoretical structure underlying behavior is "the mind." No injustice to Mandler nor violence to the topic should result from the simple substitution of "psycho-linguistics" for "psychology." In summary, strict Associationism denigrates mentalistic explanation, preferring to work toward the behavioristic goal of predicting the output of an "empty" organism strictly from environmental events. Both Content and Process approaches are more comfortable with mentalistic theorizing, although a Process paradigm would be more likely to insist on establishing links between the mentalistic constructs and the exterior observable events. It is not clear that any of the approaches currently espouses a dualistic philosophy, the recent contention of Osgood (1968) notwithstanding. Reductionism The issue of reductionism is an issue of degree and kind, an issue of limits and boundaries, and finally an issue of elegance. There are two sides to the issue and they need be kept conceptually distinct. First, there is the


313

question of ultimate reductionism-Can all behavioral principles be shown to reduce ultimately to a given set of primitive terms and axioms? The issue here is strictly one of formalism, and the answer can only be given by a formal demonstration that such a set of primitive terms and axioms exists or by a proof that no such set can exist. Second, there is the question of pragmatic reductionism-Is it profitable or productive to seek to reduce elaborate behavioral principles to simple component parts? The issue here is more complicated; there are no formal metapsychological rules to follow. The decisions must be made in terms of the growth and development of understanding of the subject matter. In some cases, it may welt prove fruitful to decompose behavior into its several parts and thereby gain insight. In other cases, a search for behavioral atoms could well disguise the very nature of the phenomena. The endeavor, its philosophical impetus, and the nature of the final theory all will differ depending on whether one is operating within the pragmatic or the ultimate framework. Furthermore, the outcome of the efforts of each may have absolutely no effect on the other. The existence of a representation theorem detailing the form that the reduction must ultimately take may be only of passing philosophical interest to empirical workers. Similarly, behavioral analyses which suggest that the reduction must cease at a particular level, in view of pragmatic considerations of explanatory adequacy, are of no consequence at all to theoreticians unless they are accompanied by formal demonstrations of inadequacy. Associationism has traditionally focused on pragmatic reductionism with the strong conviction, developed over decades of experimentation, that nature is consistent and that the fundamental components of all behavior, no matter how complex, can be accounted for by using associationistic principles. Note that this is a conviction based on pragmatic considerations; it is not an assertion. It is not a claim that all operations must reduce to S-R connections; rather, it is an inference from empirical considerations that there is, as yet, no reason to assume otherwise. As MacCorquodale (1970) put it, in a defense of Skinner's model of language behavior, The supposition that the laws of behavior are general enough to account for the verbal case is not a claim that they are sufficient; it is working assumption that they will prove to be. Similarly, Osgood (1963, 1968), Staats (1968), and others have presented vigorous defenses of the applications of S-R models to complex linguistic behavior. All the arguments are quasiempirical and consist of the presentation of models of (presumed) sufficient power to handle certain aspects of language behavior. In general, there has been no attempt to develop

314

Reber

formal demonstrations that behavior models are adequate; the matter is almost wholly pragmatic. In this context, a paper by Suppes (1969a) is interesting. Suppes has presented a formal demonstration that at least one version of S-R theory (the form of stimulus-sampling theory discussed in Suppes and Atkinson, 1960) is asymptotically isomorphic with finite automata (Chomsky, 1968). The inference is that S-R theory is ultimately capable of explanatory adequacy in a wide range of linguistic behaviors. Despite problems in specification of the (finite) number of states in the appropriate automaton (Arbib, 1969), the exact form of the S-R theory (Suppes 1969a), and the power of a finite automaton at asymptote (Pylyshyn, 1973), it is clear that Suppes' theorem gives the Associationist appproach some added force. However, these factors do not and certainly will not negate the proposals of those with Process and Content orientations. Ultimate reductionism is largely independent of pragmatic reductionism. The possibility that general cognitive or perceptual systems or specific linguistic structt~res form the analytical and pragmatic components of the behavior is still very real. Empirical analyses, models of data, and theories of behavior are carried out on one level, formal demonstrations of adequacy on a separate level. It is also worth noting that any effort at ultimate reduction is ipso facto dependent on the existence of a formal psychological theory. So far, the theoretical developments of the Process and Content approaches have not approached the precision of stimulus-sampling theory. The informality of Process theories such as Gibson's (1969) or Neisser's (1967) or Content theories such as McNelll's (1970) precludes the possibility of the deduction of formal theorems. Without a set of formal primitive terms and axioms, there is no hope of demonstrations of ultimate reductionism. The question of reductionism from both the ultimate and pragmatic points of view is and should be of fundamental importance to psycholinguistic endeavors. It seems clear that the prime considerations must be in terms of what we have called pragmatic reductionism. In fact, it may well be the case that formal existence proofs will be little more than interesting intellectual exercises, without impact on our understanding of language and linguistic behavior. The values that determine the level of pragmatic reduction that we should seek are largely subjective. They include parsimony, fruitfulness, elegance, and, finally, historical judgment, and they will be independent of demonstrations of ultimate reductionism for a long time to come. Perhaps if we appreciate the differences between these two forms of reductionism, a great deal of confusion can be avoided. For example, in their debate, Suppes (1969b) and Arbib (1969) fail to recognize explicitly that each is arguing from a different side of the issue. Arbib takes Suppes to task for

On Psycho-LinguisticParadi~ns

315

presenting an unnecessarily complicated proof. He then shows that Suppes' theorem is a simple corollary of a postulate in another system and argues that One gains more insight by viewing Suppes' theorem as a simple corollary of [the following general postulate].., than by given as a complex proof directly from axioms. Clearly, Arbib is concerned with pragmatic reductionism, and the conditions with high value are those that provide insight, not those that provide ultimate reduction. There have been many debates over the position of Associationism in complex behavior. A number of chapters in a recent review volume (Dixon and Horton, 1968) attest to the acerbic nature of the disagreements. With a single exception (Bever et aL, 1968), they are all carried out at the level of pragmatic polemics, and it is at this level that the new psycho-linguistic paradigm will most probably emerge.

SUMMARY Table I provides a general structure within which to view each of the paradigms. Some generalizations can be drawn from the table. First, the Content and Process orientations are relatively sympathetic to each other, if only in that both present counter-behavioristic views which dispute with the very foundations of Associationism. It would seem more likely that a compromise paradigm might evolve from interactions between these two than from any other combinations of positions. Second, to some extent, all positions seek ties with areas outside of language, although clearly the claims to generality of the Content paradigm are more muted than those of the Process and Association positions. It may be that a new psycho-linguistic paradigm will have considerable impact on other areas, or we may witness a replay of the Gestalt movement where the paradigm failed to have a significant impact beyond the area of its own specialization. Third, the three potential paradigms have been presented as though there were two extreme positions (behavioristic, empiricistic Associationism and mentalistic, rationalistic Content) and one moderate (cognitively based Process). However, in terms of historical perspective it can be argued that the Process position is really the more radical of the three. The Association position proposes a continuation of the neobehavioristic approach of the past several decades, a conservative if not reactionary stance. The Content position would characterize language as species specific and nativistically endowed and not amenable to traditional empiricist analysis. Such a proposition would

316

Reber Table I a Issue

Orientation Association

1. Biological considerations a. Subsidiary level: defining scope and form of physical response b. Generalized structures: assumptions about processing of information c. Specific structures: assumptions about universal grammar 2. Uniqueness questions a. Language shares common base with other behaviors b. Language linked in general cognition c. Language independent from other behaviors 3. Acquisition a. S-R : associative linking and mediational processes b. Differentiation: abstractions derived from experience c. Enrichment: matching principles based on innate ideas 4. Competence-performance (knowledge-use) a. Performance: stress on observables (use) b. Competence: stress on a general representational mechanism (knowledge and use) c. Competence: stress on a formal axiomatic system (knowledge) 5. Mentalistic considerations a. Behavioristic: links to observables b, Mentalistie: links to generallcognitive systems c. Mentalistie: links to linguistic systems 6. Reductionism a. Strong reductionism: S-R principles b. Weak reductionism: general cognitive operations c. Weak reductionism: sentences

Process

Content

*

*

*

*

*

*

7. General philosophical position a. Empiricism b. Rationalism

*

8. Description of language a. Markovian b. Generative

* *

*

aThanks to Steinberg (1971) for bringing to my attention the value of a table such as this one.


317

produce a dramatic reappraisal of our attitudes toward language, but its primary effect would be to isolate linguistic behaviors from other nonlinguistic ones, a reformist endeavor more than anything else. The Process orientation, on the other hand, since it (1)treats language as generative in nature and (2) views language as fundamentally equivalent to other cognitively based behaviors, is probably the most radical of the three. Within a Process paradigm, all of the behaviors of a species that involve complex, patterned stimuli and rule governed response classes must be analyzed within the context o f that species' multiplicity o f information-processing capacities. Such an approach would call for a new learning themT, hardly a conservative or reformist proposal.

REFERENCES Arbib, M. A. (1969). Memory limitations of stimulus-response models. Psychol. Rev. 76:507-510. Bever, T. G. (1968). Associations to stimulus-response theories of language. In Dixon, T. R., and Horton, D. L. (eds.), Verbal Behavior and General Behavior Theory, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N.J. Bever, T. G. (1970a). The cognitive basis for linguistic structures. In Hayes, J. R. (ed.), Cognition and the Development o f Language, Wiley, New York. Bever, T. G. (1970b). The integrated study of language behavior. In Morton, J. R. (ed.), Biological and Social Factors in Language Learning, Logos Press, London. Beret, T. G., Fodor, J. A., and Gaxrett, M. A. (1968). A formal limitation of associationism. In Dixon, T. R., and Horton, D. L. (eds.), Verbal Behavior and General Behavior Theory, Prentice-Hail, Englewood Cliffs, N.J. Bloomfield, L. (1933). Language, Holt, New York. Blumenthal, A. L. (1970). Language and Psychology: Historical Aspects of Psycholinguistics, Wiley, New York. Braine, M. D. S. (1963). On learning the grammatical order of words. PsychoI. Rev. 70:323-348. Brown R. (1970). Psycholinguistics: Selected Papers, University Of Illinois Press, Urbana. Brown, R., and Bellugi, U. (1964). Three processes in the child's acquisition of syntax. Harvard Educ. Rev. 34(2): 133-151. Brown, R., and Fraser, C. (1963). The acquisition of syntax. In Corer, C. N., and Musgrave, B. S. (eds.), Verbal Behavior and Learning, McGraw-Hill, New York. Brown, R., Fraser, C., and Bellugi, U. (1964). Explorations in grammar evaluation. In Brown R., and Bellugi, U. (eds.), The acquisition of language. Monogr. Soc. Child Develop. 29:No. 1. Chomsky, N. (1959). Review of Verbal Behavior by B. F. Skinner. Language 35:26-58. Chomsky, N. (1964). Current Issues in Linguistic Theory, Mouton, The Hague. Chomsky, N. (1965). Aspects of a Theory o f Syntax, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass. Chomsky, N. (1968). Language and Mind, Harcourt, New York. Deese, J. (1970). Psycholinguistics, Allyn and Bacon, Boston. de Saussure, F. (1916). Cours de Linguistique Generale, Paris. Translated: Baskin, W. (1959). Course in General Linguistics, Philosophical Library, New York. DeVito, C. (1970). Introduction to Psycholinguistics, Holt, New York. Dixon, T. R., and Horton, D. L. (eds.) (1968). Verbal Behavior and General Behavior Theory, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N.J.

318

Reber

Dulaney, D. E. (1968). Awareness, rules and propositional control: A confrontation with S-R theory, tn Dixon, T. R., and Horton, D. L. (eds.), Verbal Behavior and General Behavior Theory, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N. J. Ferster, C. B. (1964). Arithmetic behavior in chimpanzees. Sci. Amer., May. Fillenbaum, S. (1971). Psycholinguistics. Ann. Rev. Psychol. Fodor, J. A. (1966). How to learn to talk: Some simple ways. In Smith, F., and Miller, G. A. (eds.), The Genesis o f Language, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass. Fodor, J. A. (1968) Psychological Explanation: An Introduction to the Philosophy o f Psychology, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass. Fodor, J. A., and Bevel T. G. (1965). The psychological reality of linguistic segments, J. Verb. Learn. Verb. Behav. 4:414-420. Gardner, R. A., and Gardner, B. T. (1969). Teaching sign language to a chimpanzee Science 165:664-672. Gardner, B. T., and Gardner, R. A. (1971). Two way communication with an infant chimpanzee. In Schrier, A. M., and Stollnitz, F. (eds.), Behavior o f Nonhuman Primates, Vol. 4, Academic Press, New York. Gibson, E. J. (1969). Principles o f Perceptual Learning and Development, AppletonCentury-Crofts, New York. Gough, P. B. (1965). Grammatical transformations and speed of understanding. J. Verb. Learn Verbal Behav. 4:107-111. Halwes, T., and Jenkins, J. J. (1971). Problem of serial order in behavior is not resolved by context-sensitive associative memory models. Psychol. Rev. 78:122-129. Hayes, C. (1951). The Ape in Our House, Harper's, New York. Katz, J. J. (1964). Mentalism in linguistics. Language 40:124-137. Kellogg, W. N., and Kellogg, L. A. (1933). The Ape and the Child: A Study of Environmental lnfluence upon Early Training, McGraw-Hill, New York. Kimble, G. A. (1961). Hilgard and Marquis' Conditioning and Learning, AppletonCentury-Crofts, New York. Kuhn, T. S. (1962). The Structure o f Scientific Revolutions, University of Chicago Press, Chicago (2nd ed., 1970). Lakatos, I., and Musgrave, A. (eds.) (1970). Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, Cambridge University Press, New York. Lenneberg, E. H. (1967). The Biological Foundations of Language, Wiley, New York. Lieberman, P., and Wilson, W. A. (1969). The phonetic "code" of primates. Paper presented at the meetings of the American Psychological Association, Washington, D.C. MacCorquodale, K. (1970). On Chomsky's review of Skinner's Verbal Behavior. J. Exp. Anal Behav. 13:83-99. Mandler, G. (1969). Acceptance of things past and present: A look at the mind and the brain. In MacLeod, R. B. (ed.), William James: Unfinished Business, APA Inc., Washington, D. C. McNeill, D. (1966). Developmental psycholinguistics. In Smith, F., and Miller, G. A. (eds.), The Genesis o f Language, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass. McNeill, D. (1968). On theories of language acquisition, In Dixon, T. R., and Horton, D. L. (eds.), Verbal Behavior and General Behavior Theory, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N.J. McNeill, D. (1970). The Acquisition o f Language: The Study of Developmental Psycholinguistics, Harper and Row, New York. Miller, G. A. (1962). Some psychological studies of grammar. Am. Psychologist 17:748-762. Miller, G. A. (1964). The psycholinguists: The new scientists' of language. Encounter 23:29-37. Miller, G. A. (1965). Some preliminaries to psychollnguistics. Am. Psychologist 20:15-20. Miller, G. A. (1967). The Psychology o f Communication: Seven Essays, Basic Books, New York.


319

Mowrer, O. H. (1954). The psychologist looks at language. Am. Psychologist 9:660-694. Neisser, U. (1967). Cognitive Psychology, Appleton-Century-Crofts, New York. Osgood, C. E. (1963). On understanding and creating sentences. Am. Psychologist 18:735-751. Osgood, C. E. (1968). Toward a wedding of insufficiencies. In Dixon, T. R., and Horton, D. L. (eds.), Verbal Behavior and General Behavior Theory, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N.J. Osgood, C. E. (1971). Where do sentences come from? In Steinberg, D. D. and Jakobvitz, L. A. (eds.), Semantics, Cambridge University Press, London. Osgood, C. E. Is neo-behaviorism up a blind alley? To appear in a collection of papers by C. E. Osgood, Mouton Press, The Hague. Osgood, C. E., and Sebeok, T. A. (1965). Psycholinguistics, Indiana University Press, Bloomington (originally published 1954). Premack, D. (1969). Language: On the difference between training a chimp to press a lever and telling it to press the lever. Invited Address, American Psychological Association Meetings, Washington, D.C. Premack, D. (1971). On the assessment of language competence in the chimpanzee. In Schrier, A. M., and Stollnitz, F. (eds.), Behavior of Nonhuman Primates, Vol. 4, Academic Press, New York. Pylyshyn, Z. W. (1973). The role of competence theories in cognitive psychology. J. Psych. Res. 2:21-50. Reber, A. S. (1967). Implicit learning of artificial grammars. J. Verb. Learn. Verb. Behav. 6:855-863. Reber, A. S. Toward a theory of implicit learning. In preparation. Skinner, B. F. (1957). Verbal Behavior, Appleton-Century-Crofts, New York. Slobin, D. (1965). Supplementary statement to grammatical development in Russian speaking children. In Riegel, K. F., (ed.) The Development o f Language Functions, Report No. 8. Language Development Program, University of Michigan. Slobin, D. (1966). Comments on McNeill's "Developmental Psycholinguistics." In Smith, F., and Miller, G. A., (eds.), The Genesis o f Language, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass. Slobin, D. (1971). Psycholinguistics, Scott, Foresman, Glenview, 111. Staats, A. W. (1968). Learning Language, and Cognition, Holt, New York. Steinberg, D. D. (1971). Introduction to psycholinguistics section. In Steinberg, D. D. and Jakobvitz, L. A. (eds.), Semantics, Cambridge University Press, London. Suppes, P. (1969a). Stimulus-response theory of f'mite automata. J. Math. PsychoL 6:327-355. Suppes, P. (1969b). Stimulus-response theory of automata and TOTE hierarchies: A reply to Arbib. PsychoL Rev. 76:511-514. Suppes, P., and Atkinson, R. C. (1960) Markov Learning Models for Multiperson Interactions, Stanford University Press, Palo Alto, Calif. Sutherland, N. S. (1966). Discussion of Fodor and Garrett's "Some reflections on competence and performance." In Lyons, J., and Wales, R. L. (eds.), Psycholinguistic Papers, Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh. yon Humbolt, W. (1836). Ueber die Verschiedenheit des menschlichen Sprachbaues, Berlin. Wickelgren, W. A. (1969). Context sensitive coding, associative memory, and serial order in speech behavior. PsychoL Rev. 76:1-15.

Research on psycholinguistic training critique and guidelines.

Psycholinguistic analyses of coercive communications.

Psycholinguistic abilities and their influence on creative expression.

The Brazilian Portuguese Lexicon: An Instrument for Psycholinguistic Research.

New paradigms on siRNA local application.

Glossolalic speech from a psycholinguistic perspective.

Collecting psycholinguistic response time data using Amazon mechanical Turk.

How useful are corpus-based methods for extrapolating psycholinguistic variables?

Psycholinguistic research in language intervention programming: The pronoun system.

BRIEF REPORT: PSYCHOLINGUISTIC PERFORMANCE AS AN INDICATOR OF MODERNIZATION.

Psycholinguistic findings in gilles de la Tourette syndrome.

Craniofacial growth: evolving paradigms.

Pain: paradigms and treatments.

Control effects of stimulus paradigms on characteristic firings of parkinsonism.

Pins and posters: Paradigms for content publication on situated displays.

Selecting Presuppositions in Conditional Clauses. Results from a Psycholinguistic Experiment.

Psycholinguistic, cognitive, and neural implications of bimodal bilingualism.

A psycholinguistic study of English stress assignment rules.

Spontaneous speech of aphasic patients: a psycholinguistic analysis.

Shifting sugars and shifting paradigms.

Changing paradigms in clean cooking.

Computational Paradigms for Mental Health.

Future paradigms for precision oncology.

Contemporary Treatment Paradigms in Keratoconus.