Australian and New Zealand Journal of Psychiatry (1979) 13:219-224
O N LAYING THE GHOSTS: A RESPONSE TO McCONAGHY DEBORAH MCINTYRE
The intention of McConaghy’s article seems clear, if rather grand: to lay the ghost of maternal deprivation. Citing certain ‘grave social consequences’ attendant on the widespread uncritical acceptance of Bowlby’s hypothesis, he proceeds to place in question the validity of the research used to support the hypothesis. He outlines different kinds of evidence that Bowlby has drawn on, argues that all the studies suffer from methodological defects of various kinds, and concludes-not reluctantly it seems-that there is no definitive evidence of the detrimental effects of maternal deprivation. Triumphant, he urges that we lay the ghost of this particular theoretical construct. Several important issues are raised in the paper. We are alerted to the ways in which social and psychological research are used (and misused) in the formulation of social policy. It reminds us of the continuing need for reflection on, and re-evaluation of, the research work on which hypotheses are based, by highlighting the frequently uncritical manner in which theoretical concepts are absorbed into the literature read by mental health workers. But McConaghy’s specific concern, and his recommendation that we dispense with the concept of maternal deprivation, necessitate very careful appraisal of his argument. McConaghy only hints at its enormous implications when he writes that if he is correct, attachment theory would be of no particular concern to those concerned with disturbed development. Given the ramifications of his argument, we are entitled to expect a careful, academically rigorous appraisal of the whole issue. The reader is encour-
aged in this expectation by McConaghy’s early insistence that part of his concern is to ‘reassert academic standards of methodological rigour’. It is surprising, then, to discover that his own argument falters on precisely that count. It depends to a significant degree on bias, distortion, and misrepresentation. His failure to take account of more recent work in the area suggests that McConaghy’s intention is to discredit Bowlby’s work and motivations, together with those of his associates, rather than to attempt an objective appraisal. The argument is artfully constructed, but in the end it suffers from its author’s failure to adhere to the very academic standards he claims to want to preserve. The first thing to note is that nowhere does McConaghy really specify his understanding of the ‘maternal deprivation hypothesis’. The closest he comes to it is in the introduction where he refers to Bowlby’s hypothesis that ‘separation from a mother (or mother-substitute) in early life predisposes an individual to psychopathology later in life’. It is generally accepted now that Bowlby’s early work suffered from a lack of precise definition with regard to terminology, a lack which Ainsworth (1962) acknowledged to have been ‘an understandable source of confusion to many’ (p. 99). She went on to clarify various aspects of the term, and in particular, to distinguish between separation and deprivation. She then proposed the following as the most accurate representation of Bowlby’s position: That the prolonged deprivation of the young child of maternal care may have grave and farreaching effects on his character and so on the whole of his future life. (quoted p. 103)
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McConaghy is obviously not enamoured of Ainsworth’s article but his early dismissal of it as ‘ill-reasoned and unscientific’ (on rather spurious grounds, as will be considered later) surely does not allow him to disregard her attempt at clarification of the thesis. Similarly, McConaghy appears to believe that on the basis of his own judgement of Rutter’s work as ‘muted’, ‘reverential’, and ‘protective’, he is freed from having to take account of the latter’s rather painstaking efforts to sort through the evidence and clarify the hypothesis. McConaghy’s response to those who argue that Bowlby has been misrepresented is to quote selective passages, such as Bowlby’s description of the ‘ideal mother-child relationship’ and Ainsworth’s statement about the pressing of mothers to delay resuming their careers, and then to suggest that the reader must make up his or her own mind. McConaghy does not help in this, however, having apparently disposed of writers such as Rutter, who would appear to have made a far more comprehensive attempt to assess Bowlby’s work, its gaps, and its implications. What we come down to here is an issue of interpretation. McConaghy is making his own interpretation of Bowlby’s work, while at the same time implying that he is engaged in ‘scientific’assessment. Undoubtedly he is entitled to his own interpretation, but is he not obliged to make it clear that he is rejecting the redefinitions of Ainsworth and Rutter? Moreover, is he not obliged to justify his interpretation on the basis of reasoned argument rather than innuendo? This is no small matter, for in making his particular interpretation of the ‘maternal deprivation’ hypothesis, he is enabled more easily to point an accusing finger at Bowlby’s work when he moves on to consider the ‘grave social consequences’ which supposedly follow from it. Rutter (1976), in particular, has pointed out (p. 15) that it is precisely these sorts of consequences which derive from the very narrow interpretation which McConaghy has chosen to adopt. This is evidenced in the rather interesting fashion in which McConaghy calls on Margaret Mead to support his position. He would have us believe that she is referring to Bowlby’s work when he quotes her as saying that the insistence that all separation is damaging is simply a more subtle form of antifeminism. Reference to the original article, however, reveals that this distorts Mead’s intention. She wrote, in fact, that ‘at present, the specific biological situation of the continuing relationship of the child to its biological mother and its need for care by human beings are being hopelessly confused in the growing insistence that child and biological mother, or mother surrogate, must never be
separated . . .’. Further, McConaghy neglects to make clear that Mead was referring more to those extreme conclusions drawn from Bowlby’s work than to Bowlby’s work itself. This is not to deny the potential significance of the social policy issues which McConaghy considers. He is right to alert us to the ways in which Bowlby’s research has been, and can be, used. The present writer would oppose vehemently the use of that work to argue against the provision of child care services, and would dispute Ainsworth’s implication that women be pressed to delay resuming their careers. (That this is an implication rather than a specific recommendation, as McConaghy encourages us to believe, can be seen [p. 1481 from the original article.) But this does not reflect necessarily on Bowlby’s work per se. Rather, it concerns the ways in which certain groups may use information or research in pursuit of their own objectives. McConaghy is attempting to establish some direct link between the accuracy or otherwise of a piece of research and its translation into social policy. The implication, that if the research is then discovered to be invalid its authors are to be held responsible for any social consequences which follow, seems a trifle naive. There is no necessary correspondence between the validity of research and its enshrinement in social policy. Accurate information on the link between asbestos and certain forms of cancer has had little appreciable effect on social policy. From the other side, the recent discovery that areas of Burt’s research were invalid has not prompted the widespread abandonment of I.Q. testing in Australia. Is it at Bowlby’s door then, that we lay the responsibility for those who would use his work to argue against the provision of child care services? Certainly the fact that the work is being used in this fashion creates extra pressure on the ‘maternal deprivation’ theorists to demonstrate the validity of their work. But we cannot blame Bowlby, however implicitly, for the ‘social consequences’ which McConaghy deems to have been the result of his work. The partisan nature of McConaghy’s argument here is demonstrated again when we consider that Bowlby’s work could just as easily be invoked to argue in support of such initiatives as better child care facilities, the provision of child care services at the work place, increased benefits for mothers (or fathers) who do want to stay home to raise their children, and increased and more readily available maternity leave. In fact, it would appear that McConaghy is rather loath to concede that there have been any ‘desirable’ social consequences at all as a result of Bowlby’s investigations. He laments the fact that some children have suffered under the
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‘better a bad home than a good institution’ doctrine, but finds it unnecessary to refer to the original impetus for Bowlby’s research, namely the United Nations’ decision to study the needs of homeless children. As is stated in the W.H.O. publication, Deprivation of Maternal Care (W.H.O. 1962), Bowlby’s ‘indictment of the nurseries, institutions, and hospitals of even the socalled advanced countries has contributed to the remarkable change in outlook that has led to a widespread improvement in the institutional care of children’ (p. 7). This is a curious omission if McConaghy really wants the reader to consider Bowlby’s work in the light of its consequences. One particular theme in the paper, namely the importance of genetic influence, may throw some light on this. McConaghy cites Bowlby’s advice to child care workers that they rid themselves of the notion that the children of psychopathic parents are likely to turn out less favourably than those not so endowed, as one of four ‘grave social consequences’ resulting from Bowlby’s work. It is not immediately clear how this constitutes a ‘grave social consequence’. Is it grave for the children, the caseworkers, or the society which might be forced to provide funds in the fruitless attempt to help such children?* The only clue that McConaghy provides as to his motivation here is a reference to the Schulsinger study which reputedly demonstrates a genetic factor in psychopathy. Reading further, we discover that this long-term and highly controversial debate is one of the major bases on which McConaghy would have us dismiss Bowlby’s research. In fact, apart from his comments on scientific methodology (of which more later), the only objection that McConaghy raises to two of the three types of evidence that Bowlby used is the latter’s failure to control for the genetic factor in psychopathic behaviour. By concentrating the reader’s attention on psychopathy, McConaghy manages to avoid discussing all the other categories and degrees of disturbance with which Bowlby was concerned. He achieves this feat partly by assimilating the ‘affectionless’ character into the psychopathic. McConaghy’s indignation at this failure to take account of the genetic factor again colours his appraisal of the relevant literature. Thus he condemns Rutter for failing to consider it until the end of his book, and then only to dismiss it. A cursory glance at the introduction to Rutter’s book makes it *One might even go so far as to suggest that the genetic viewpoint may have ‘grave social consequences’ of its own, namely the withdrawal of services from these children on the grounds that they and their bad genes cannot be helped.
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clear that this charge is quite unfounded. McConaghy makes much of the various prejudices and motivations which prompt mental health workers to accept Bowlby’s thesis. Could it be that his own attachment to the genetic explanation is as prejudicial, but in the opposite direction? Before we leave the question of social consequences, it must also be said that McConaghy appears to take no account of the fact that equally ‘grave’ social consequences may attend the premature or inaccurate conclusion that maternal deprivation is not harmful, (It is important to note in this regard that McConaghy’s argument, despite appearances to the contrary, can only allow him to conclude that maternal deprivation has not so far been demonstrated to be harmful.) Apart from the issue previously noted of the quality of care provided for children once they are institutionalized, McConaghy neglects a whole range of recent work examining such things as the relationship between early motherlchild interaction and child abuse. To skew the discussion so that it appears that grave social consequences follow from the invalid acceptance of the maternal deprivation hypothesis, but none from the ‘scientific’ insistence that so long as it is not proved we cannot assume anything about it, much less act on it, is questionable from a social and psychological viewpoint, if not from the ‘scientific’.McConaghy objects strenuously to the characterization of infant day care as a pathogen on the same level as thalidomide and we may agree with him that the comparison is a little overdrawn, but the discussion is not bound by the examples. The point for health care workers, surely, is whether or not to wait around for the results of scientific experiments before acting in a preventive fashion. (Should we have waited, for example, to be absolutely sure about the accuracy of Bowlby’s research before we acted to improve institutional care?) This is particularly so in the area of mental health, when the applicability of the strict scientific approach is not always self-evident. While such a claim is not likely to sit easily with McConaghy, it is an issue with grave social consequences. Given his championship of the latter, it is to be hoped that he will bear with the discussion. It is here at the level of McConaghy’s notion of science, his understanding of the scientific enterprise and its relationship to the fields of child development theory, psychology, social work, and child psychiatry, that we encounter the broader intention in the article. He begins and ends with a question: ‘Maternal Deprivation: Can Its Ghost Be Laid?’ and ‘Can the expectation be advanced that child development theory in psychology and
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psychiatry accept the conventional rules of scientific methodology?’ There is a tone of high-minded seriousness in this last question, carrying with it an image of a judge of some High Court of Science peering over his glasses at the lowly child development theorist who has dared, whether through carelessness or deliberate intent, to bend the rules. For the assumption that McConaghy makes throughout the paper, and one which is apparently unthinkable to question, is that the ‘conventional rules of scientific methodology’ provide the only yardstick by which any theoretical work is to be judged. According to this position, the only valid knowledge is that which derives from scientific experiment of a very precise type: one which includes the construction of theories, the deduction of law-like hypotheses which can be tested, operations of observation and measurement, and the monitoring and utilization of feedback. Knowledge not so derived cannot make claim to the status of ‘valid’ knowledge. Without the scientific imprimatur, it is declared void, or variously labelled fantasy, conjecture, or subjective opinion. ‘Scientific’ knowledge is rational; therefore, by definition, anything else is irrational. To question this set of axioms is to be considered unscientific (pejoratively speaking), romantic, old-fashioned or wrong-headed. It is from this nexus of assumptions that McConaghy makes his argument, and the force of it is, I submit, to eject from the scientific community those who hold out for a different kind of knowledge. As noted earlier, McConaghy is not averse to a bit of deviousness and distortion in the effort to make his argument. A glaring example of this, and one which casts serious doubt on his own concern for academic standards, is his handling of Ainsworth’s comments on research methodology. While I agree with him that Ainsworth was neglectful in not taking up more directly some of the criticisms offered of Bowlby’s work, I think he does her severe injustice when he indicts her on the basis of the following statement, which he quotes: Once the hypothesis has been put forward that prolonged deprivation experiences in early childhood may have lasting adverse effects upon subsequent development, it was out of the question to expose young children experimentally to deprivation in order to test the hypothesis. McConaghy is not circumspect in his denunciation-he declares this ‘the grossest limitation of understanding of the scientific method to be found in an academic publication’. He insists that Ainsworth is suggesting ‘that a hypothesis is put forward in scientific research not to be tested but to
be acted upon as correct’, and that this means, in effect, that ‘it is out of the question to carry out a controlled trial’. Finally, he expresses concern for those unfortunate students who will be referred to the article, and concludes by accusing Ainsworth and her colleagues of using the above as a rationale for opting out of doing research to confirm their hypothesis. It all sounds very convincing, until one goes to the original reference (not a popular move these days, but occasionally instructive). Again, we discern McConaghy’s penchant for neglecting the context in order to make his argument. The paragraph from which Ainsworth’s quote was taken must be quoted in full if we are to appreciate McConaghy’s gross misrepresentation of her work. The experimental method, the backbone of laboratory research, has limited applicability to the study of maternal deprivation. Once the hypothesis has been put forward that prolonged deprivation experiences in early childhood may have lasting adverse effects upon subsequent development, it was out of the question to expose young children experimentally to deprivation in order to test the hypothesis. Consequently, research into the effects of maternal deprivation cannot avail itself of the great advantage of the experimental method-namely, precise control of the conditions the effect of which is to be studied. Thus it is impossible to arrange a depriving situation of controlled nature and degree of severity, into which a child may be introduced at a given age and kept for a pre-determined time. Since the depriving conditions cannot be controlled through experimental manipulation, they must be controlled through selection-i.e., by choosing for study a deprived group who happen to experience deprivation under certain defined conditions. It is impossible to over-emphasize the importance of control of conditions through careful selection if other than equivocal results are to be obtained. (p. 105) This is hardly a statement to the effect that a hypothesis is put forward in scientific research, not to be tested, but to be acted upon as correct. Nor is it a statement that it is out of the question to carry out a controlled trial. Finally, it seems rather hard on Ainsworth to accuse her of wanting to opt out of researching the matter, when she spends the next thirty-six pages describing ‘the major research strategies that are being used in the field of maternal deprivation’. (p. 106). Again we glimpse McConaghy’s efforts to underscore his own commitment, i.e., that theorists in
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child development ought to be bound by those ‘conventional rules’ of scientific methodology. It would have been perfectly legitimate for McConaghy to argue that the research strategies Ainsworth detailed were inappropriate or deficient. It is a wholly different thing to assert, on the basis of a quotation taken quite out of context, that Ainsworth was opting out of doing research altogether, thus impugning her work and that of the maternal deprivation theorists collectively. It would seem that McConaghy engages in this frank misrepresentation to justify his own attachment to the most rigid interpretation of ‘scientific methodology’. Here we confront a crucial issue, namely the appropriateness of the research strategy with regard to its object. McConaghy’s pontifical question at the end of the article carries with it the clear assumption that any object of study-whether it is ‘maternal deprivation’ or anything else-must be studied in a very particular way if the knowledge derived is to be counted as valid knowledge. As was noted earlier, the object of study must be rendered measurable, and quantifiable. It must be able to be counted, classified, manipulated, tested, verified, and replicated. If we look at the behaviour of human beings in the same framework, then it too becomes something to be observed, tested, and rendered ‘law-like’. Any meaning or purpose which might be ascribed to it must be jettisoned in the name of rigour and re-conceptualized according to what can be measured. Thus the concept of maternal deprivation can make no sense unless it is translated into components which can be subjected to the above manipulations. This means automatically that those aspects of the concept which might refer to non-measurable things, e.g. the quality of parenting, or the meaning of a particular separation experience to an individual parent or child, cannot be brought under the rubric of legitimate or valid knowledge, unless they can be broken down into measurable units. Presumably one of the major reasons that psychiatrists, psychologists, and social workers have resisted this sort of ‘scientization’ is precisely because they are confronted with these ‘nonmeasurable’ aspects in their work. It is this resistance .on the part of mental health workers, their insistence on the validity of the individual’s experience, their understanding that what an event means to a particular individual is frequently of much greater importance than the event itself-it is this which is the ultimate target of McConaghy’s at tack. This is not to suggest that scientific research cannot make a valuable and necessary contribution
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to the study and understanding of human behaviour; it is to deny its sole claim to that understanding. Behaviour is not simply the sum total of a discrete set of measurable events; it is also about meaning, intention, interpretation. It is this aspect which empirical science must deny-it searches out the ‘fact’, the piece of knowledge which eschews interpretation. A comprehensive understanding of behaviour must also take into account that it is constituted and heavily influenced by social practices, customs, traditions and understandings. McConaghy’s cavalier assertion that ‘among the various patterns of child care existing throughout the world, many could be found where each of the variables considered a part of “maternal deprivation” could be controlled in a completely ethical way’ assumes that those variables are all trans-cultural. This forecloses any attempt to consider the way in which particular societies produce particular kinds of family patterns and standards of parental behaviour, or the ways in which they structure the experience and meaning of a ‘depriving’ situation. The argument I am making here-that the insistence on the slotting of concepts like ‘maternal deprivation’ into a Procrustean bed of scientific methodology squeezes out precisely those aspects of it which are most likely to be of significance for those of us working in the mental health field-is a difficult one to mount. It immediately provokes the question ‘how do you propose to get objective, valid knowledge?’, a question which again presupposes that objective, valid knowledge can only be generated by activities such as measuring, counting and testing. Anglo-Americans find this argument particularly difficult to counter because we have so long and so effectively been subjected to this scientific self-understanding. The European intellectual tradition allows much more debate on the issue of what counts as valid knowledge. Fortunately, it is a debate which is beginning to filter into the English speaking world. Winch, Taylor, Habermas, Adorno, and other authors allow questions which until now have seemed akin to nonsense syllables: ‘Is it so that science is the final arbiter of valid knowledge?’ ‘Is it true that everything other than scientifically-gathered knowledge is second class, not knowledge, but fantasy, subjective, opinion, value?’ The questions are of particular relevance to those who work in the field of mental health, both theorists and practitioners alike. It is not scientific methodology that is at issue, but whether such work must be bound by its rules. For the most part, the behavioural sciences have suffered under the illusion that they must at all times and in all places
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be seen to be approaching science as closely as they are able. I submit that it is this pressure which has made it extremely difficult to sort out, for example, those aspects of ‘maternal deprivation’ that can be observed and tested in the way that McConaghy insists, and those which must be approached in a manner more appropriate to their nature. This discussion cannot proceed at the present time, without arousing the wrath of those like McConaghy who would arbitrarily evict the participants from the House of Science and Rationality. Undoubtedly, the concept of ‘maternal deprivation’ is exceptionally difficult to unravel, to define, to study, and to understand. We may agree with McConaghy that Bowlby’s early work contained exaggerated claims and assertions, that it has been used and abused by numerous groups of people, that its proponents have frequently resorted to global statements and prescriptions unsustained by the knowledge we have about it. But this is no basis on which to indict the whole effort, as McConaghy would have us do. Even the acknow-
ledgement of certain inaccuracies and deficiencies in some of the original research studies is not sufficient ground for ‘laying the ghost’ of maternal deprivation. It does point to the necessity for careful and continuing investigation of the hypothesis. The question, of course, is whether that investigation must conform rigidly to the ‘conventional rules’ of scientific methodology as McConaghy insists: for my money, this is the ghost that must be laid. Acknowledgements
The author wishes to acknowledge the contributions of the following people in the preparation of this paper: Bob Adler, Warwick Anderson and Norm Kelk. Reference8 AINSWORTH, M. D. (1962)The effects of maternal deprivation:a review offindings andcontroversy in thecontcxt ofresearchstrategy. In Deprivafionof Maternal Care. Public Health Paper, 14, W.H.O., Geneva. RUTTER, M. (1976) Mafernal Deprivation Reassessed. Penguin Books, Harmondsworth. W.H.O. (1962) Deprivarion of Mafernal Care. Public Health Paper 14, Geneva.
DEBORAH MCINTYRE, B.A., B.Soc.Stud.(Hons ) Social Worker, Department of Child and Family Psychiatry, Royal Alexandra Hospital for Children, Camperdown, N.S.W.
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O N LAYING THE GHOSTS: A RESPONSE TO McCONAGHY DEBORAH MCINTYRE
The intention of McConaghy’s article seems clear, if rather grand: to lay the ghost of maternal deprivation. Citing certain ‘grave social consequences’ attendant on the widespread uncritical acceptance of Bowlby’s hypothesis, he proceeds to place in question the validity of the research used to support the hypothesis. He outlines different kinds of evidence that Bowlby has drawn on, argues that all the studies suffer from methodological defects of various kinds, and concludes-not reluctantly it seems-that there is no definitive evidence of the detrimental effects of maternal deprivation. Triumphant, he urges that we lay the ghost of this particular theoretical construct. Several important issues are raised in the paper. We are alerted to the ways in which social and psychological research are used (and misused) in the formulation of social policy. It reminds us of the continuing need for reflection on, and re-evaluation of, the research work on which hypotheses are based, by highlighting the frequently uncritical manner in which theoretical concepts are absorbed into the literature read by mental health workers. But McConaghy’s specific concern, and his recommendation that we dispense with the concept of maternal deprivation, necessitate very careful appraisal of his argument. McConaghy only hints at its enormous implications when he writes that if he is correct, attachment theory would be of no particular concern to those concerned with disturbed development. Given the ramifications of his argument, we are entitled to expect a careful, academically rigorous appraisal of the whole issue. The reader is encour-
aged in this expectation by McConaghy’s early insistence that part of his concern is to ‘reassert academic standards of methodological rigour’. It is surprising, then, to discover that his own argument falters on precisely that count. It depends to a significant degree on bias, distortion, and misrepresentation. His failure to take account of more recent work in the area suggests that McConaghy’s intention is to discredit Bowlby’s work and motivations, together with those of his associates, rather than to attempt an objective appraisal. The argument is artfully constructed, but in the end it suffers from its author’s failure to adhere to the very academic standards he claims to want to preserve. The first thing to note is that nowhere does McConaghy really specify his understanding of the ‘maternal deprivation hypothesis’. The closest he comes to it is in the introduction where he refers to Bowlby’s hypothesis that ‘separation from a mother (or mother-substitute) in early life predisposes an individual to psychopathology later in life’. It is generally accepted now that Bowlby’s early work suffered from a lack of precise definition with regard to terminology, a lack which Ainsworth (1962) acknowledged to have been ‘an understandable source of confusion to many’ (p. 99). She went on to clarify various aspects of the term, and in particular, to distinguish between separation and deprivation. She then proposed the following as the most accurate representation of Bowlby’s position: That the prolonged deprivation of the young child of maternal care may have grave and farreaching effects on his character and so on the whole of his future life. (quoted p. 103)
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McConaghy is obviously not enamoured of Ainsworth’s article but his early dismissal of it as ‘ill-reasoned and unscientific’ (on rather spurious grounds, as will be considered later) surely does not allow him to disregard her attempt at clarification of the thesis. Similarly, McConaghy appears to believe that on the basis of his own judgement of Rutter’s work as ‘muted’, ‘reverential’, and ‘protective’, he is freed from having to take account of the latter’s rather painstaking efforts to sort through the evidence and clarify the hypothesis. McConaghy’s response to those who argue that Bowlby has been misrepresented is to quote selective passages, such as Bowlby’s description of the ‘ideal mother-child relationship’ and Ainsworth’s statement about the pressing of mothers to delay resuming their careers, and then to suggest that the reader must make up his or her own mind. McConaghy does not help in this, however, having apparently disposed of writers such as Rutter, who would appear to have made a far more comprehensive attempt to assess Bowlby’s work, its gaps, and its implications. What we come down to here is an issue of interpretation. McConaghy is making his own interpretation of Bowlby’s work, while at the same time implying that he is engaged in ‘scientific’assessment. Undoubtedly he is entitled to his own interpretation, but is he not obliged to make it clear that he is rejecting the redefinitions of Ainsworth and Rutter? Moreover, is he not obliged to justify his interpretation on the basis of reasoned argument rather than innuendo? This is no small matter, for in making his particular interpretation of the ‘maternal deprivation’ hypothesis, he is enabled more easily to point an accusing finger at Bowlby’s work when he moves on to consider the ‘grave social consequences’ which supposedly follow from it. Rutter (1976), in particular, has pointed out (p. 15) that it is precisely these sorts of consequences which derive from the very narrow interpretation which McConaghy has chosen to adopt. This is evidenced in the rather interesting fashion in which McConaghy calls on Margaret Mead to support his position. He would have us believe that she is referring to Bowlby’s work when he quotes her as saying that the insistence that all separation is damaging is simply a more subtle form of antifeminism. Reference to the original article, however, reveals that this distorts Mead’s intention. She wrote, in fact, that ‘at present, the specific biological situation of the continuing relationship of the child to its biological mother and its need for care by human beings are being hopelessly confused in the growing insistence that child and biological mother, or mother surrogate, must never be
separated . . .’. Further, McConaghy neglects to make clear that Mead was referring more to those extreme conclusions drawn from Bowlby’s work than to Bowlby’s work itself. This is not to deny the potential significance of the social policy issues which McConaghy considers. He is right to alert us to the ways in which Bowlby’s research has been, and can be, used. The present writer would oppose vehemently the use of that work to argue against the provision of child care services, and would dispute Ainsworth’s implication that women be pressed to delay resuming their careers. (That this is an implication rather than a specific recommendation, as McConaghy encourages us to believe, can be seen [p. 1481 from the original article.) But this does not reflect necessarily on Bowlby’s work per se. Rather, it concerns the ways in which certain groups may use information or research in pursuit of their own objectives. McConaghy is attempting to establish some direct link between the accuracy or otherwise of a piece of research and its translation into social policy. The implication, that if the research is then discovered to be invalid its authors are to be held responsible for any social consequences which follow, seems a trifle naive. There is no necessary correspondence between the validity of research and its enshrinement in social policy. Accurate information on the link between asbestos and certain forms of cancer has had little appreciable effect on social policy. From the other side, the recent discovery that areas of Burt’s research were invalid has not prompted the widespread abandonment of I.Q. testing in Australia. Is it at Bowlby’s door then, that we lay the responsibility for those who would use his work to argue against the provision of child care services? Certainly the fact that the work is being used in this fashion creates extra pressure on the ‘maternal deprivation’ theorists to demonstrate the validity of their work. But we cannot blame Bowlby, however implicitly, for the ‘social consequences’ which McConaghy deems to have been the result of his work. The partisan nature of McConaghy’s argument here is demonstrated again when we consider that Bowlby’s work could just as easily be invoked to argue in support of such initiatives as better child care facilities, the provision of child care services at the work place, increased benefits for mothers (or fathers) who do want to stay home to raise their children, and increased and more readily available maternity leave. In fact, it would appear that McConaghy is rather loath to concede that there have been any ‘desirable’ social consequences at all as a result of Bowlby’s investigations. He laments the fact that some children have suffered under the
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‘better a bad home than a good institution’ doctrine, but finds it unnecessary to refer to the original impetus for Bowlby’s research, namely the United Nations’ decision to study the needs of homeless children. As is stated in the W.H.O. publication, Deprivation of Maternal Care (W.H.O. 1962), Bowlby’s ‘indictment of the nurseries, institutions, and hospitals of even the socalled advanced countries has contributed to the remarkable change in outlook that has led to a widespread improvement in the institutional care of children’ (p. 7). This is a curious omission if McConaghy really wants the reader to consider Bowlby’s work in the light of its consequences. One particular theme in the paper, namely the importance of genetic influence, may throw some light on this. McConaghy cites Bowlby’s advice to child care workers that they rid themselves of the notion that the children of psychopathic parents are likely to turn out less favourably than those not so endowed, as one of four ‘grave social consequences’ resulting from Bowlby’s work. It is not immediately clear how this constitutes a ‘grave social consequence’. Is it grave for the children, the caseworkers, or the society which might be forced to provide funds in the fruitless attempt to help such children?* The only clue that McConaghy provides as to his motivation here is a reference to the Schulsinger study which reputedly demonstrates a genetic factor in psychopathy. Reading further, we discover that this long-term and highly controversial debate is one of the major bases on which McConaghy would have us dismiss Bowlby’s research. In fact, apart from his comments on scientific methodology (of which more later), the only objection that McConaghy raises to two of the three types of evidence that Bowlby used is the latter’s failure to control for the genetic factor in psychopathic behaviour. By concentrating the reader’s attention on psychopathy, McConaghy manages to avoid discussing all the other categories and degrees of disturbance with which Bowlby was concerned. He achieves this feat partly by assimilating the ‘affectionless’ character into the psychopathic. McConaghy’s indignation at this failure to take account of the genetic factor again colours his appraisal of the relevant literature. Thus he condemns Rutter for failing to consider it until the end of his book, and then only to dismiss it. A cursory glance at the introduction to Rutter’s book makes it *One might even go so far as to suggest that the genetic viewpoint may have ‘grave social consequences’ of its own, namely the withdrawal of services from these children on the grounds that they and their bad genes cannot be helped.
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clear that this charge is quite unfounded. McConaghy makes much of the various prejudices and motivations which prompt mental health workers to accept Bowlby’s thesis. Could it be that his own attachment to the genetic explanation is as prejudicial, but in the opposite direction? Before we leave the question of social consequences, it must also be said that McConaghy appears to take no account of the fact that equally ‘grave’ social consequences may attend the premature or inaccurate conclusion that maternal deprivation is not harmful, (It is important to note in this regard that McConaghy’s argument, despite appearances to the contrary, can only allow him to conclude that maternal deprivation has not so far been demonstrated to be harmful.) Apart from the issue previously noted of the quality of care provided for children once they are institutionalized, McConaghy neglects a whole range of recent work examining such things as the relationship between early motherlchild interaction and child abuse. To skew the discussion so that it appears that grave social consequences follow from the invalid acceptance of the maternal deprivation hypothesis, but none from the ‘scientific’ insistence that so long as it is not proved we cannot assume anything about it, much less act on it, is questionable from a social and psychological viewpoint, if not from the ‘scientific’.McConaghy objects strenuously to the characterization of infant day care as a pathogen on the same level as thalidomide and we may agree with him that the comparison is a little overdrawn, but the discussion is not bound by the examples. The point for health care workers, surely, is whether or not to wait around for the results of scientific experiments before acting in a preventive fashion. (Should we have waited, for example, to be absolutely sure about the accuracy of Bowlby’s research before we acted to improve institutional care?) This is particularly so in the area of mental health, when the applicability of the strict scientific approach is not always self-evident. While such a claim is not likely to sit easily with McConaghy, it is an issue with grave social consequences. Given his championship of the latter, it is to be hoped that he will bear with the discussion. It is here at the level of McConaghy’s notion of science, his understanding of the scientific enterprise and its relationship to the fields of child development theory, psychology, social work, and child psychiatry, that we encounter the broader intention in the article. He begins and ends with a question: ‘Maternal Deprivation: Can Its Ghost Be Laid?’ and ‘Can the expectation be advanced that child development theory in psychology and
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psychiatry accept the conventional rules of scientific methodology?’ There is a tone of high-minded seriousness in this last question, carrying with it an image of a judge of some High Court of Science peering over his glasses at the lowly child development theorist who has dared, whether through carelessness or deliberate intent, to bend the rules. For the assumption that McConaghy makes throughout the paper, and one which is apparently unthinkable to question, is that the ‘conventional rules of scientific methodology’ provide the only yardstick by which any theoretical work is to be judged. According to this position, the only valid knowledge is that which derives from scientific experiment of a very precise type: one which includes the construction of theories, the deduction of law-like hypotheses which can be tested, operations of observation and measurement, and the monitoring and utilization of feedback. Knowledge not so derived cannot make claim to the status of ‘valid’ knowledge. Without the scientific imprimatur, it is declared void, or variously labelled fantasy, conjecture, or subjective opinion. ‘Scientific’ knowledge is rational; therefore, by definition, anything else is irrational. To question this set of axioms is to be considered unscientific (pejoratively speaking), romantic, old-fashioned or wrong-headed. It is from this nexus of assumptions that McConaghy makes his argument, and the force of it is, I submit, to eject from the scientific community those who hold out for a different kind of knowledge. As noted earlier, McConaghy is not averse to a bit of deviousness and distortion in the effort to make his argument. A glaring example of this, and one which casts serious doubt on his own concern for academic standards, is his handling of Ainsworth’s comments on research methodology. While I agree with him that Ainsworth was neglectful in not taking up more directly some of the criticisms offered of Bowlby’s work, I think he does her severe injustice when he indicts her on the basis of the following statement, which he quotes: Once the hypothesis has been put forward that prolonged deprivation experiences in early childhood may have lasting adverse effects upon subsequent development, it was out of the question to expose young children experimentally to deprivation in order to test the hypothesis. McConaghy is not circumspect in his denunciation-he declares this ‘the grossest limitation of understanding of the scientific method to be found in an academic publication’. He insists that Ainsworth is suggesting ‘that a hypothesis is put forward in scientific research not to be tested but to
be acted upon as correct’, and that this means, in effect, that ‘it is out of the question to carry out a controlled trial’. Finally, he expresses concern for those unfortunate students who will be referred to the article, and concludes by accusing Ainsworth and her colleagues of using the above as a rationale for opting out of doing research to confirm their hypothesis. It all sounds very convincing, until one goes to the original reference (not a popular move these days, but occasionally instructive). Again, we discern McConaghy’s penchant for neglecting the context in order to make his argument. The paragraph from which Ainsworth’s quote was taken must be quoted in full if we are to appreciate McConaghy’s gross misrepresentation of her work. The experimental method, the backbone of laboratory research, has limited applicability to the study of maternal deprivation. Once the hypothesis has been put forward that prolonged deprivation experiences in early childhood may have lasting adverse effects upon subsequent development, it was out of the question to expose young children experimentally to deprivation in order to test the hypothesis. Consequently, research into the effects of maternal deprivation cannot avail itself of the great advantage of the experimental method-namely, precise control of the conditions the effect of which is to be studied. Thus it is impossible to arrange a depriving situation of controlled nature and degree of severity, into which a child may be introduced at a given age and kept for a pre-determined time. Since the depriving conditions cannot be controlled through experimental manipulation, they must be controlled through selection-i.e., by choosing for study a deprived group who happen to experience deprivation under certain defined conditions. It is impossible to over-emphasize the importance of control of conditions through careful selection if other than equivocal results are to be obtained. (p. 105) This is hardly a statement to the effect that a hypothesis is put forward in scientific research, not to be tested, but to be acted upon as correct. Nor is it a statement that it is out of the question to carry out a controlled trial. Finally, it seems rather hard on Ainsworth to accuse her of wanting to opt out of researching the matter, when she spends the next thirty-six pages describing ‘the major research strategies that are being used in the field of maternal deprivation’. (p. 106). Again we glimpse McConaghy’s efforts to underscore his own commitment, i.e., that theorists in
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child development ought to be bound by those ‘conventional rules’ of scientific methodology. It would have been perfectly legitimate for McConaghy to argue that the research strategies Ainsworth detailed were inappropriate or deficient. It is a wholly different thing to assert, on the basis of a quotation taken quite out of context, that Ainsworth was opting out of doing research altogether, thus impugning her work and that of the maternal deprivation theorists collectively. It would seem that McConaghy engages in this frank misrepresentation to justify his own attachment to the most rigid interpretation of ‘scientific methodology’. Here we confront a crucial issue, namely the appropriateness of the research strategy with regard to its object. McConaghy’s pontifical question at the end of the article carries with it the clear assumption that any object of study-whether it is ‘maternal deprivation’ or anything else-must be studied in a very particular way if the knowledge derived is to be counted as valid knowledge. As was noted earlier, the object of study must be rendered measurable, and quantifiable. It must be able to be counted, classified, manipulated, tested, verified, and replicated. If we look at the behaviour of human beings in the same framework, then it too becomes something to be observed, tested, and rendered ‘law-like’. Any meaning or purpose which might be ascribed to it must be jettisoned in the name of rigour and re-conceptualized according to what can be measured. Thus the concept of maternal deprivation can make no sense unless it is translated into components which can be subjected to the above manipulations. This means automatically that those aspects of the concept which might refer to non-measurable things, e.g. the quality of parenting, or the meaning of a particular separation experience to an individual parent or child, cannot be brought under the rubric of legitimate or valid knowledge, unless they can be broken down into measurable units. Presumably one of the major reasons that psychiatrists, psychologists, and social workers have resisted this sort of ‘scientization’ is precisely because they are confronted with these ‘nonmeasurable’ aspects in their work. It is this resistance .on the part of mental health workers, their insistence on the validity of the individual’s experience, their understanding that what an event means to a particular individual is frequently of much greater importance than the event itself-it is this which is the ultimate target of McConaghy’s at tack. This is not to suggest that scientific research cannot make a valuable and necessary contribution
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to the study and understanding of human behaviour; it is to deny its sole claim to that understanding. Behaviour is not simply the sum total of a discrete set of measurable events; it is also about meaning, intention, interpretation. It is this aspect which empirical science must deny-it searches out the ‘fact’, the piece of knowledge which eschews interpretation. A comprehensive understanding of behaviour must also take into account that it is constituted and heavily influenced by social practices, customs, traditions and understandings. McConaghy’s cavalier assertion that ‘among the various patterns of child care existing throughout the world, many could be found where each of the variables considered a part of “maternal deprivation” could be controlled in a completely ethical way’ assumes that those variables are all trans-cultural. This forecloses any attempt to consider the way in which particular societies produce particular kinds of family patterns and standards of parental behaviour, or the ways in which they structure the experience and meaning of a ‘depriving’ situation. The argument I am making here-that the insistence on the slotting of concepts like ‘maternal deprivation’ into a Procrustean bed of scientific methodology squeezes out precisely those aspects of it which are most likely to be of significance for those of us working in the mental health field-is a difficult one to mount. It immediately provokes the question ‘how do you propose to get objective, valid knowledge?’, a question which again presupposes that objective, valid knowledge can only be generated by activities such as measuring, counting and testing. Anglo-Americans find this argument particularly difficult to counter because we have so long and so effectively been subjected to this scientific self-understanding. The European intellectual tradition allows much more debate on the issue of what counts as valid knowledge. Fortunately, it is a debate which is beginning to filter into the English speaking world. Winch, Taylor, Habermas, Adorno, and other authors allow questions which until now have seemed akin to nonsense syllables: ‘Is it so that science is the final arbiter of valid knowledge?’ ‘Is it true that everything other than scientifically-gathered knowledge is second class, not knowledge, but fantasy, subjective, opinion, value?’ The questions are of particular relevance to those who work in the field of mental health, both theorists and practitioners alike. It is not scientific methodology that is at issue, but whether such work must be bound by its rules. For the most part, the behavioural sciences have suffered under the illusion that they must at all times and in all places
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be seen to be approaching science as closely as they are able. I submit that it is this pressure which has made it extremely difficult to sort out, for example, those aspects of ‘maternal deprivation’ that can be observed and tested in the way that McConaghy insists, and those which must be approached in a manner more appropriate to their nature. This discussion cannot proceed at the present time, without arousing the wrath of those like McConaghy who would arbitrarily evict the participants from the House of Science and Rationality. Undoubtedly, the concept of ‘maternal deprivation’ is exceptionally difficult to unravel, to define, to study, and to understand. We may agree with McConaghy that Bowlby’s early work contained exaggerated claims and assertions, that it has been used and abused by numerous groups of people, that its proponents have frequently resorted to global statements and prescriptions unsustained by the knowledge we have about it. But this is no basis on which to indict the whole effort, as McConaghy would have us do. Even the acknow-
ledgement of certain inaccuracies and deficiencies in some of the original research studies is not sufficient ground for ‘laying the ghost’ of maternal deprivation. It does point to the necessity for careful and continuing investigation of the hypothesis. The question, of course, is whether that investigation must conform rigidly to the ‘conventional rules’ of scientific methodology as McConaghy insists: for my money, this is the ghost that must be laid. Acknowledgements
The author wishes to acknowledge the contributions of the following people in the preparation of this paper: Bob Adler, Warwick Anderson and Norm Kelk. Reference8 AINSWORTH, M. D. (1962)The effects of maternal deprivation:a review offindings andcontroversy in thecontcxt ofresearchstrategy. In Deprivafionof Maternal Care. Public Health Paper, 14, W.H.O., Geneva. RUTTER, M. (1976) Mafernal Deprivation Reassessed. Penguin Books, Harmondsworth. W.H.O. (1962) Deprivarion of Mafernal Care. Public Health Paper 14, Geneva.
DEBORAH MCINTYRE, B.A., B.Soc.Stud.(Hons ) Social Worker, Department of Child and Family Psychiatry, Royal Alexandra Hospital for Children, Camperdown, N.S.W.
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