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International Journal of Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/nhyp20

On flashback and hypnotic recall Roland Fischer

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Maryland Psychiatric Research Center , Published online: 31 Jan 2008.

To cite this article: Roland Fischer (1977) On flashback and hypnotic recall, International Journal of Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis, 25:4, 217-235, DOI: 10.1080/00207147708415983 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00207147708415983

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The InternationalJOWMI of Clinicd and Exprimenid Hypnoris 1977, Vol. XXV. No. 4 217-235

ON FLASHBACK AND HYPNOTIC RECALL1 ROLAND FISCHER2* Maryland Psychiatric Research Center

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The Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine Abstract This essay deals with both the intra-individual and interindividual varieties of arousal state-bound experiences. The former are labelled as “flashbacks” while the latter embrace the great fantasms and repetitive schemes, the ever re-written plots and images of literature, art, and religion. Flashbacks are both arousal-state and stage (i.e., set and setting) bound experiences. Flashback and hypnotic recall differ only in the ways by which they are induced. Induction methods should be distinguished from induced states on the hyperaroused perception-hallucination and hypoaroused perception-meditation continuum. Flashbackers may be characterized by their (a) variability on perceptual-behavioral tasks; (b) tendency to minimize (or reduce) sensory input; (c) high resting heart rates; (d) hypnotizability; and, hence (e) preferential right-cerebral-hemispheric cognition; and (0a display of EEGalpha dominance in the resting, waking state.

THE STATE-BOUND AND STAGE-BOUND NATURE OF THE FLASHBACK The following “Dear Abby” (1971)-storyilluminates significant features of the arousal, state-bound nature of the flashback. I was in love with a college classmate, but he married someone else. I also married and even after four years and a beautiful baby I still dreamed about this fellow. Whenever I saw a car like his, my heart would pound even though he had left town years before and I knew it couldn’t possibly be his [p. 131.

Dissecting the body of this conscious experience, we find a “poundManuscript submitted August 27, 1976; final revision received March 6, 1977. The present paper is based on an invited address delivered to the 84th annual meeting of the American Psychological Association, Division of Psychological Hypnosis, Washington, D. C., September 1976. * The author is grateful to Clinton Brown, Lee McCabe, and John Rhead for critically reading this paper and to Helen O’Brien for conscientiously nurturing and raising the manuscript. Reprint requests should be addressed to Roland Fischer, Maryland Psychiatric Research Center, P. 0. Box 3235, Baltimore, Maryland 21228. 217

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ing heart,” or emotional state of autonomic (subcortical) arousal and “a car like his,” a symbol of the cognitive (cortical) interpretation of that arousal. Accordingly, an arousal, state-bound event-structure may be re-presented or flashed back in two ways: either by inducing naturally, or with drugs or with hypnosis, a particular level of hyperor hypoarousal, or by presenting some symbol of its interpretation such as an image, a melody, or taste. Neither focal lesions nor molecules of a hallucinogenic drug are necessary for either the induction of a state-bound experience or the re-experiencing of it as a flashback. A symbol of a past experience may be sufficient to evoke a state-bound experience. An 18-year-old boy who had had a “bum trip” on “acid“ and could not “come down” for two weeks. . . . aRer he drank wine with a group of fiends and was then told by one of them that the wine contained a high dose of LSD [which it did not], he experiencedhallucinationscontinuously for 14 days [Tec, 1971; p. 9801.

The reverse is also true as in the case of N.B., a college volunteer, who was repeatedly exposed to the hallucinogenic drug psilocybin; later, a hypnotically induced drug experience was substituted for the real drug experience. The hypnotic induction placed the subject in a peaceful beach scene with waves lapping at the seashore. The experiments were interrupted after two sessions, when N.B. left for a Florida vacation. Upon her return, she reported the strange event which happened to her while walking down to the beach for the first time; when gazing at the seashore the whole scene suddenly “blackedout,” and instead ‘her old‘ beach returned -the beach of the hypnotically induced, psilocybin experience. Thus, the hypnotically induced experience could be re-experienced by exposure to an aspect of ordinary reality (the Florida beach) which symbolized and re-presented the hypnotic experience (Fischer & Landon, 1972). The common happening of alcohol inducing the arousal state necessary for recall of a state-bound experience is relived in the diaries of Evelyn Waugh (cited in Davie, 1976) who on October 23, 1944, remarked “how boring it was to be obliged to tell Randolph [Churchill] everything twice -once when he was drunk, once when he was sober [p. 5851.” Evidently, then, consciousness may extend either between drunken states or between sober states, but there is no communication between the two discontinuous states of sobriety and drunkenness. The implications of such ‘incommunicado’between disparate levels of arousal for criminology, jurisprudence, and psychotherapy are hinted at by an older member of Alcoholic Anonymous: “there was a time when I was drinking . . . there was a lady in San Antonio. . . , I

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could find her home when I was drunk. But I could not find it when I was sober [personal communication cited in Fischer, 1975a; p. 1991.” Amnesia between disparate levels of arousal has many important implications; one of them is that an ‘exciting‘ experience may be meaningful only at that level of arousal at which it occurred. (No wonder that marriage licenses had to be invented!) Indeed, we may be, for instance, capable of interpreting a dream by dreaming its interpretation, says Erich Fromm (1951), referring to people who were placed into hypnotically induced dreaming and asked to interpret their dreams; without hesitation, these subjects gave a meaningful interpretation of the symbolic argot employed by the dream, whereas in the usual waking state, the same dream seemed entirely meaningless. Fromm also quotes Jochanan (cited in Erich Fromm, 1951)who holds that, when asleep, we can understand the meaning of another dream and interpret it correctly. Stekel (1943) also stressed the unity of each individual’s dreams: “A patient’s dreams in their entirety are like a serial novel, each installment ending with the subscription ‘to be continued . . .’ [p. 1591.” Dreams, like masterworks of art, are, in Ricoeur‘s (1970) formulation, “not mere projections of the artist’s conflicts, but also the sketch of their solutions Zp. 5211.” It follows from the state-bound4nature of experience and from the fact that no communication exists between states of normal, daily routine and states of hyper- and hypoarousal, that what is called the “subconscious” may be but one name for many levels of amnesia. Therefore, instead of one subconscious, there appear to be as many layers of potential self-awareness as there are levels of arousal and corresponding significant but covert interpretations in the individual’s interpretive repertoire. The many layers of self-awareness, remind one of the captain with girl friends in many ports, each girl unaware of the existence of the others, and each existing only from visit to visit (that is, from s t a t e to s t a t e ) . I shared living quarters in Honolulu with a man from Woburn, Massachusetts, who was a heavy drinker. When drunk, the only visible sign was t h a t the whites of his eyes showed all around the cornea. His actions were unusual. He would take up a position on a street comer in mid-town and expound on the battles of the Civil War. His knowledge of the subject was extensive and everytime he became drunk he would take up his lecture where he lefl off in strict chronological order.5



State-bound but not state-specific in the sense that Tart (1972)favors the introduction of state-specific (Christian?) Sciences. The present author perceives a transformation and re-naming of art, literature, and religion into Sciences as another American Tragedy. Evans, personal communication, 1976.

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This is how multiple existences become possible-by living from one waking state to another waking state; from one dream to the next (“the dream is a second life”);from one (Maslow-ian)peak experience to another; from one amobarbital-narcoanalysis session to the next; from LSD to LSD; from one Ketamine anesthesia-induced, cataleptic hallucinatory state to the next; from childbirth to childbirth; from one epileptic aura to another; from one to another experience of creative, artistic, religious, or psychotic inspiration or possession; from trance to trance; and from reverie to reverie (Fischer, 1971). THE AROUSAL-STATE BOUNDNATURE OF LITERARY-ARTISTIC AND RELIGIOUSEXPERIENCE What is the relation of state-dependent learning to state-boundness? State-dependent learning, a special case of the more general phenomenon of state-boundness, occurs when responses are learned in a particular state and become retrievable only if the conditions of learning are reinstated. State-boundness, the more general concept, embraces both the intra-individual and inter-individual varieties of arousal state-bound experiences. The former are usually labeled as “flashbacks,” particularly when their unpleasant and unexpected nature evokes anxiety. Almost exclusively, these flashbacks become common knowledge, while pleasant flashbacks - so far -remain unheralded. The realm of inter-individually inducible state-boundness encompasses the great fantasms or daydreams and repetitive schemes, the ever re-written plots and images of the world’s art and literature. Representing the human program, i.e., the innate knowledge which according to Plato “is already there,” these wish-fulfilling self-interpretations of the mind are constantly re-written, re-painted, re-sculpted, and re-composed for each generation with but slight variation in style. Accordingly, an essential criterion of masterful and hence effective art and literature is to induce state-bound flashbacks for archetypal human experiences of deep love, seething hate, overwhelmingjoy, loneliness, abject despair, ultimate dread, surging hope, and cosmic ecstasy. Hence, all art is good art insofar as it can re-induce an experiential “high” which closely resembles that level of inspired-possessed “religious”arousal which prevailed in the writer, painter, composer, film-maker, or poet “once upon a time.” It is not the quality of the artist’s preceding feelings that determines the religious nature of his work, but rather his ability to probe and to articulate the religious attitude in the creative process itself. Authentic art at all times, including our own, retains a potentially sacred quality (Dupr6, 1975). We now may visualize the human program -the scientific, artistic,

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literary, religious, or esoteric “knowledge already there” - as being distributed in ‘inner space’ over different levels of arousal (see Figure 1). Note that scientia, or knowledge, in Latin is contained in conscientia, or ‘consciousness,’ and imagine an immensely large and

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NORMAL

FIG.1. Varieties of conscious states are mapped on a perception-hallucination continuum of increasing ergotropic or hyper-arousal (left halo and a perceptionmeditation continuum of increasing trophotropic or hypoamusal (right halo. Note that a labeling in terms of psychopathology has been omitted from this map. Hence it i s perfectly normal to give a hyperphrenic (i.e., manic or schizophrenic) and ultimately ecstatic interpretation of rising levels of ergotropic hyperarousal. Only when a person gets stuck in a particular state, then we label his reaction as abnormal. The hyper-aroused rapid eye movement (REM) stage of dreaming sleep may be comparable to creative and anxious arousal states on the leR side of our Western perception hallucination continuum, whereas the delta slow-wave EEG sleep may be located on the horizontally corresponding right side of the map, i.e., between zazen and dh6rn6, on the hypoaroused Eastern perception-meditation continuum. Each night while asleep, we repeatedly move through a revolving trophotropic and ergotropic stage set of arousal states and become actor-and-audience of creative or stereotyped scenarios, the dialogue between the ‘I’ (or the world) and the ‘Self.

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moving circular continuum of hyper- and hypoarousal, each revolving stage-set representing different levels of arousal. Experiencing-knowing, then, is distributed over a variety of arousal states in such a manner that a certain scenario is bound to, and only retrievable at, a particular level of arousal. As already mentioned, there is no communication between disparate levels of arousal, or, in paraphrasing Spencer-Brown (1969) and the Coptic Gospel according to Thomas (cited in Summers, 19681, what is revealed on one level (of arousal state) is concealed on the other; but what is concealed will again be revealed. The interpretation of particular levels of arousal can only be enacted in a restricted, stereotyped, or archetypal manner. Whenever the stage is set by a particular level of arousal, the pertaining cortical interpretation of “knowing,”myth, narrative, script, role, or “great story” may be enacted, re-experienced or flashed back. This is how scripts of an inner Schau-spiel are enacted on stage in one’s experiential magic theatre (Fischer, 1976). Witness the continuous pattern of independent rediscovery of esoteric knowledge throughout the ages. The remarkable identity of doctrine and practice, irrespective of time and space, testifies to the arousal-state-bound nature of conscious knowledge. Saint Teresa, for instance, in her “Interior Castle,” describes patterns of meditative prayer appropriate to specified states of consciousness, not realizing that her outline closely parallels the levels of consciousness described in the Hindu Upanishads.’jThe rediscovery occurs when Saint Teresa simply achieves that religious state of arousal at which the pertinent knowledge is revealed. Note also the significant sameness in the descriptions of a Saint Teresa, the Protestant Bohme, and the Muslim Gazzali, a sameness which would make it very difficult to distinguish one from another (Bdz, 1906,cited in Schipperges, 1972). Experience, however, is not only arousal-state-bound but is also history- and “culture-bound.”The fact that scientific discoveries, e.g., the Mendelian laws of inheritance, to give just one example, are discovered independently by various researchers at about the same time testifies to the history and cultwe-bound nature of ‘knowing’ (zeitgeist!) and, hence, consciousness. But “culture-bound is just another way of referring to cortical interpretations or “set and setting,” or even better, stage-set and setting. Hence, we may say that experience is (arousal) state-bound and stage-bound. The optimal retrieval of an arousal-state-boundexperience may be described by defining arousal as rate of data processing or time and cortical interpretation as data content or space. Since rate of data processing is a function of the level of arousal, state-boundness refers Mackey, personal communication, October 1975.

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to the re-presentation of a particular spatio-temporal neuronal-syn-

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aptic firing pattern that prevailed during the initial experience. Through self-reference, self-observation, and self-description I am consciously reflecting upon experience qua experience and analyzing it. Or, in Borges’ (1962) words: “Time is a river which sweeps me along, but I am the river; it is a tiger which destroys me, but I am the tiger; it is a fire which consumes me, but I am the fire [p. 2281.”

WHO IS LIABLETO HAVEFLASHBACKS? “Re-experiencers” are, as a group, variable subjects, i.e., they display variable standard deviations on perceptual and/or behavioral tasks. A simple and most convenient method for the measurement of a subject’s stability or variability is to compute the standard deviation on repeated measurements of his handwriting area. The “handwriting test” consists in copying a 28-word text four times on separate sheets of paper under standardized conditions. A large standard deviation reflects large, intra-individual variability, i.e., increasing uncertainty in terms of information available as cognitive or interpretive repertoire (Fischer, Kappeler, Wisecup, & Thatcher, 1970; Thatcher, Kappeler, Wisecup, & Fischer, 1970). Stable subjects, i.e., those who display consistently small standard deviations and, as a group, a low, mean-resting heart rate (Panton & Fischer, 1973) are not flashbackers. They merely remember a n experience. Re-experiencers belong to the group of variable subjects who display significantly high, mean-resting heart rates (higher arousal!) as well as an ability to enter hypnosis easily. The latter observation described by Gwynne, Fischer, and Hill (1969) was recently confirmed by Matefy and Krall(l975). These two overlapping criteria -variability and ease of entering hypnosis - point to a subject with a cortical repertoire so extensive that its interpretive capacity may be shared or partially replaced by another -a hypnotically induced interpretation, a selectively imposed ‘‘set and setting.” Variable subjects are an interesting group; they display a high, mean-resting heart rate, prefer to minimize sensory input -particularly a t the peak of a hallucinogenic-drug experience- and hence wear sun-glasses, and are in contrast to stable maximizers who prefer to increase sensory input -particularly at drug-peak. Our minimizers and maximizers are likely to correspond to what Petrie (1967) and Silverman (cited in Meyer, 1969)call “reducers” and “augmenters.” Fischer and Hill (1971) as well as Panton and Fischer (1973) have found that the standard deviation follows a log-normal distribution and, hence, variable subjects may constitute about one-third of the population. How many of these subjects also enter hypnosis easily,

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i.e., are imaginative role-players? A reasonable estimate would be 10%. An example should highlight the importance of the standard deviation in the design and evaluation of experiments involving flashbacks, hypnotic recall, and placebo effects. When, for instance, inexperienced users of marijuana are contrasted with frequent users, the frequent users are found to be inferior in distinguishing placebo ‘Ijoints” from the delta-9 THC containing ones (Jones, 1971). The present author suggets that the subjects with large standard deviations in the group of experienced users are liable to experience flashbacks from the correctly tasting and smelling placebo Ijoints’ and, hence, the mean score of the mixed (small and large standard deviation) group of subjects will be significantly influenced by the large standard deviations of these subjects. Subjects in placebo groups should be broken down into subgroups of subjects with small and large standard deviations. Thus, if you happen to be a hypnotizable and variable subject’ and an avid reader of “great stories,” you may re-experience at your will in the “eternal now” the pounding heart of Proust by reading, for instance, the following passage in Swann’s Way: And soon, mechanically, weary aRer a dull day with the prospect of a depressing morrow, I raised to my lips a spoonful of the tea in which I had soaked a morsel of the cake. No sooner had the warm liquid, and the crumbs in it, touched my palate than a shudder ran through my whole body, and I stopped, intent upon the extraordinary changes that were taking place [p. 621.

“Memory is [therefore] not that which we remember, but that which remembers us,” concludes another re-experiencer, Paz (1970); “memory is a present that never stops passing [p. 971.” NATURE OF HYPNOTIC RECALL THE FLASHBACK What can be said about the nature of the flashback in neurophysiological terms? We have emphasized that a state-bound experience may be recollected or re-experienced either by (a)inducing a particular level of arousal, or ( b ) by presenting some symbol of its cortical interpretation. In the first instance, we may say that those subcortical structures which regulate levels of arousal have been shown to modulate cortical-neural activity (Knispel & Siegel, 1972, 1973; Moruzzi & Magoun, 1949) while in the second, evidence is accumulating that cortico-fugal-descendinginfluences serve to regulate brainstem arousal systems; Deli, Bonvallet, and Hugelin (1971) and Koella and Ferry (1963) in particular have demonstrated that the cortex can

’ and hopefully “fidd-independent” as well as easily dishabituating-

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exert both phasic and tonic inhibitory influences upon the arousal system. Hence, a reticulo-cortico-reticular negative feedback loop may be “in charge” to set and to reinstate a particular level of arousal. Zuckerman, Murtaugh, and Siege1 (1974)hypothesize that individuals lie along a dimension of excitatory-inhibitory equilibrium setpoints, i.e., people differ as to the level of reticulo-cortical excitatory activation which will trigger the cortico-fugal (inhibitory) feedback necessary to dampen and control further reticular arousal. Minimizers (or reducers) possess a low threshold for initiation of the corticofugal inhibitory process. Thus, at stimulation intensities above this point, increasing levels of stimulation produce increasing cortical inhibitory influences which regulate the arousal level to a given setpoint and insulate the individual from sensory overload. In our research (Panton & Fischer, 1973), we have found such minimizers to be variable subjects with high, resting heart rates; hence, the large standard deviation in flashbackers is also an indicator of their minimizing capability which they need since they already operate a t higher base line levels of arousal. We have so far differentiated between two subcortical arousal systems -probably mutually inhibitory (Goldstein & Nelsen, 1973)which produce the same end product, namely cortical activation. One of the systems appears to be related to the reticular formation and the other, to the limbic system, particularly the hippocampus. If retrieval of information is dependent on the existence of certain functional interrelationships between the two arousal systems (Goldstein & Nelsen, 1973), then one could view state-bound phenomena as a “special case” of learning. Ommaya and Fedio (1972)suggest a dual role for the limbic system in memory. The more ancient “inner limbic ring,” which includes fornix hippocampus and amygdala, is primarily concerned with providing “attention” or affective “coloring” to new memoranda. More specific coding for memory is conceived of as being in the domain of the “outer limbic ring,” which includes the cingulum, hippocampal gyrus, and uncinate bundle; the cingulum is believed to work mainly as the connecting system between the “affective coding“ and “retrieval coding” parts of the limbic system. Coding of memoranda for retrieval from storage is most probably achieved by the hippocampal gyrus via the associative neocortex. Observations by Penfield and Perot (1963) suggest that visual experiential responses and dkju uu are obtained mainly from the nondominant hemisphere; the memory of things, not described by words, being coded for retrieval in a much wider area bilaterally but

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predominantly on the side of the brain opposite to the hemisphere which mediates speech production. It was pointed out recently that a preferential, cerebral, hemispheric shiR toward the non-dominant, Gestalt-site is characteristic for states of consciousness on both the perception-hallucination and perception-meditation continua (Fischer, 1975a, 1975b). This shift correlates with measured hypnotizability: right-handed persons who show hemispheric preference by looking more often to the left and are therefore activating the right hemisphere (Bakan, 1971) are the more hypnotizable individuals (Hilgard & Hilgard, 1975; Morgan, McDonald, & Macdonald, 1971). The relationship of the Gestalt-site to imagination and emotions (Schwartz, Davidson, & Maer, 1975) highlights the role of imagery and arousal in hypnotizability. Let us summarize, at this point, the characteristics of flashbackers: (a)they display variable standard deviations on perceptual-behavioral tasks; and are ( b ) minimizers (or reducers) of sensory stimulation; ( c ) they display high resting heart rates; ( d ) are hypnotizable and hence (e) they show preferentially right-hemispheric cognition as well as (f,EEG-alpha dominance in the resting-waking state (Nowlis & Rhead, 1968).

INDUCTION AND HYPNOTIC STATES HYPNOTIC In 1972 and in a paper mainly concerned with the arousal-statebound nature of experience, Fischer and Landon started to formulate the beginnings of a theory, the essence of which was that any hyperor hypoaroused state on the perception-hallucination and perceptionmeditation continua (see Figure 1)can be recalled through hypnotic induction, but only by “variable” subjects who display large standard deviations on perceptual and behavioral tasks. In re-formulating that theory in the light of the question whether hypnosis is a state (Hilgard, 1965; Orne, 1959)or not a state (Barber, 1969; Sarbin & Anderson, 1967; Sarbin & Coe, 1972) it may be said that there are a variety of agents and many relaxing as well as alerting methods, (Banyai & Hilgard, 1976) for hypnotically inducing any ordinary or non-ordinary state (of consciousness) which the subject has - at least once - experienced before. Hence, hypnotic induction is not to be confounded with the induced state (of arousal) that is a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for the reexperiencing of a particular event-structure. Hypnotically induced recall and flashback are experiences which differ only in the way@)and means they are triggered. Banyai and Hilgard (1976) quote Lindsley (1961) and Ludwig (1966) as stating that altered states of consciousness may be produced by a

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wide variety of agents or maneuvers which interfere with the normal inflow of sensory or proprioceptive stimuli and the normal outflow of motor impulses. In our words, there is an optimal, low range of inner sensory to voluntary motor or sensorylmotor ratio necessary for maintaining levels of consciousness associated with daily routine activities, whereas a rising sensorylmotor ratio (Fischer, 1969; Fischer et al., 1970;Landon & Fischer, 1970a, 1970b;“hatcher et al., 1970), is characteristic for states of consciousness on both the hyperaroused perception-hallucination and the hypoaroused perceptionmeditation continuum (see Figure 1). To have flashbacks, as we have seen, one has to be a “variable” performer on perceptual-behavioral tasks (who can vary over, i.e., select from a large interpretive repertoire) and an imaginative (or easily hypnotizable) role-player. Conversely, to (produce) hypnotic recall one has to be a “variable” performer and an imaginative roleplayer in whom flashbacks may be easily induced. Both flashback and hypnotic recall require cognitive effort to enable the subject to stay in state-or in the terminology of Thorn and Zeeman’s (1975)catastrophe theory, to avoid the unstable bifurcation set within the model of a cusp catastrophe. Hilgard, Macdonald, Marshall, and Morgan (1974) testify to this by having observed aroused heart rates and blood pressure increases in subjects who were anticipating a difficult hypnotic task, such as maintaining analgesia to circulating ice water. In both flashback and hypnotic recall, a particular experience (arousal-state bound) may be evoked much like a dissipative nonequilibrium structure during heat transfer when a critical thermal gradient has been reached (Prigogine, 1974; Rowland & Blumenthal 1974). Both flashback and hypnotic recall may be structured and represented so as to gradually delay the dissipation of energy. There are experiences which could be considered mixtures falling between flashback and hypnotic recall; for example the stigmatizations in Saint Francis of Assisi, Theresa of Konnersreut, or in Janet’s (1928)famous and well-documented case of Madeleine, all of whom repeatedly bore on Friday, the day Christ died, the bleeding wounds of the Son of God. Both self-hypnosisand state-bound flashback seem to be involved in these experiences during which the subject becomes the symbol of Jesus Christ himself and hence displays his wounds. Such stigmatization or symbolic somatization is also described within a nonreligious context by Moody (1946) who observed, for example, that rope weals, which a patient had years before suffered on both forearms, reappeared when the initial experience was recalled. In a similar case, a woman re-experienced petechial hemor-

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rhages and bruises over the same rib she had broken 25 years before in a riding accident. The ingenious and scholarly research of Hilgard (1974) and his associates (Hilgard & Hilgard, 1975; Hilgard, Morgan, 8z Macddnald, 1975) on hypnotically induced anaesthesia contradicted by the subject’s “hidden observer” brings us to the many (dissociated or repressed) layers of Janet’s (1928) subconscious, “layers” which refer to selective-idormation feedback loops of a self-referential consciousness. In paraphrasing Maturana’s (1970) definition of consciousness, we may say: “if an organism can generate a communicable description of its interactions and then interact with the communicable description, the process can, in principle, be carried on in a potentially infinite recursive manner, [here then are the potentially innumerable “layers” of consciousness] and the organism becomes an observer [p. 171” of a hidden observer of a hidden observer. . . . The selective amnestic capability between “layers” -i.e., the talent to dissociate between the observers in us-is an admirable talent indeed. Recall the simple fact that driving a car while simultaneously solving a problem may result in re-membering either the solving of the problem or the driving performance but not both, recall of the amnestic experience, however, may be hypnotically induced (if the subject is hypnotizable). Or, if one wishes to choose a more cumbersome procedure, one may go “on a re-search of the lost, selective feedback loop” by using the technique of free association. In structuralist terminology, hypnotic recall of a selective eventstructure may be analogous to the “syntagmatic” aspect of the speech act. This aspect is concerned with the selective recall of words that will play the appropriate role in the syntax we are constructing. Such selection takes place during “synchronic” scanning of “paradigmatic” possibilities.* Hypnotic amnesia, on the other hand, may be compared to the active suppression of all situationally irrelevant “lexemes” which have been displaced by the former process.$ This scanning process may be called “retrieval from the subconscious,”an act of a “hidden observer” that refers to the paradigmatic or vertical synchronic relationship of a word which may be contrasted with the syntagmatic or diachronic one, the latter conceptualized as a linear-horizontal axis along which a sentence is spread out in its necessary order &holes, 1974). What about the ease with which hypnotic amnesia may be lifted by the reversibility cue? Fischer and Landon (1972) have reported that symbols (which stand for experiences of widely differing significance), may affect the level of a “variable” subject’s drug-induced arousal, as measured in terms of simplified syntax. A symbol of high significance can further simplifj, the syntax of texts written during the (aroused) drug state, the simplification being nearly as great as the simplification of

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Such an analogical description of hypnotic recall and hypnotic amnesia is not much of an explanation. It is only a comparison, which follows good literary tradition (“Shall I compare thee to a Summer‘s day?”) and attempts to highlight the intricate problem of thought formation by self-referential man. Indeed, it is nothing more than a thought formed about how a thought is formed, is formed, is formed.

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A little bit more can be said, however, about how a thought is expressed. The spoken word has a suggestive quality that is inherent in the unitary nature of information-perception and action (Konorski, 1964). Moreover, verbal competence and voluntary motor ability are inseparable within the speech act. A sentence may be structured either to describe past information- a narrative -or to utilize present information - a commentary. The use of past tenses characterizes the narrative, whereas present and future tenses predominate in the commentary. Every commentary is, therefore, a fragment of action with a built-in, persuasive, performative force (Weinrich, 1973). By distinguishing between narrative and commentary, we may now distinguish between types of text, not by whether the event recounted actually occurred or not, put by how the speaker-listener axis functions in the text. When commentative present and future tenses predominate - as they do in speech utilized for hypnotic induction in a variety of ways -the material is received with vigilant and imaginative attention, whereas in narrative discourse, it is accepted with calm detachment. Certain forms of human behavior may be, therefore, brought into existence simply by being announced as a commentary. Hence “anything” may become true within the limits of a human cortical repertoire if it is announced as a commentary during states characterized by a high sensory/motor ratio on the perceptionhallucination continuum. This may account for a hypnotized subject’s confusing the hypnotist’s words with his own thoughts (Hilgard, 1969) and things then become true by simply being announced.

CODA The author must apologize for the sketchy and unsystematic nature of this essay. The essay did not deal with the prearranged reversal of hypnotic amnesia as the syntax observed between the non-drug and the drug states. But a symbol of low significance to the volunteer can decrease the level of drug-induced arousal, as measured by a more complex syntactic structure. In light of the above, the reversibility cue may then be regarded as a particular symbol that signifies and signals the state of daily routine with its lower level of arousal. On that level, the amnesia or “incommunicado”between states is lifted and pertinent knowledge becomes readily available.

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reinstatement of one of the many observers in us although Nace, Ome, and Hammer (1974)have hinted at the therapeutic potential of the amnesia-lifting process. It was not mentioned that there may be states of consciousness extending from myth to myth, fairy tale to fairy tale, and fiction to fiction and that the states of mind concerned with daily routine are the amnestic periods of these continuous states. The essay did not dwell on the differences between self-hypnosis and heterohypnosis, although the ego-split into “speaker,” experiencer, and observer during selfhypnosis discussed by Erika F r o m (1975)is consistent with the author’s view of consciousness and could have prompted the Lacanian question “who is speaking to whom?’ (Lacan, 1968). No attempt was made to sort out data-apparent or realconnected with physiological changes during both hypnotic induction and induced state. One could go on and on extending this list of omissions. But, as in Shakespeare’sZHenry ZV “Time, that takes survey of all the world, Must have a stop IV, IV, 81-82;p. 7011.” The structure or “grammar”of flashback and hypnotic recall is always consistent with the self on a personal level and with the fears, desires, expectations, defenses, and (over) compensations implicit in the human condition. Within this very same consistency the present author believes that Crashaw, the metaphysical poet, may well have referred to flashback and/or hypnotic recall when he wrote: When my dying Life is flying; Those sweet A i r s that often slew mee; Shall revive mee, Or reprive mee, And to many Deaths renew mee [p. 6011.

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FISCHER,R. Transformations of consciousness. A cartography: I. The perceptionhallucination continuum. Confin.psychiat., 1975,18, 221-244. (b) FISCHER,R. On creative, psychotic and ecstatic states: Consciousness as role and knowledge. In L. R. Allman & D. T. J d e (Eds.), Readings in abnormal psychology: Contemporaryperspectives, 1976-1977. New York: Harper & Row, 1976. Pp.

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250-277.

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n b er Flashback und hypnotisches Erinnern Roland Fischer Abstrakt: E s wird in diesem Essay zwischen selbstprogrammierten, bzw. intraindividuellen und praeprogrammierten, d. h. inter-individuellen Erlebnissen unterschieden. Beide Erlebnis-Arten sind Erregungszustandgebunden,jedoch werden die

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Ersteren ale ‘Flashbacks’ bezeichnet, waehrenddem die Letzteren repetitive Schemata und Bilder von Kunst, Literatur und Religion als mythieehe und enaehlerische Fantasmen re-pnresentieren. An einer rieeigen, imaginaeren Drehbuehne der Erregung werden diese beiden obigen Erlebniskategorien ale Bewuestseinszustand-gebunden,sowie als Szenarium- und Buehnen-Set und Setting-gebunden dargestellt. Flashback und hypnotisches Erinnern untemheiden sich nur in der Art und Weise, durch die sie induziert werden. Induktionsmethoden sollten jedoch von induzierten Zustaenden am hyper-emgten Peneptions-Halluzination und dem hypo-erregten Perzeptions-Meditation Kontinuum untemhieden werden. Flashback-faehige Personen koennen wie folgt charakterisiert werden: (a) durch eine hohe inh-individuelle Variabilitaet bei Aufgaben der Wahrnehmung und der Verhaltensweise; (b) durch ihre Tendenz sensorisehen Input zu reduzieren; (c) durch hohe Herzfrequenz im Ruhezustand; (d) durch Hypnotiiierbarkeit und daher (e) durch Bevorzugung rechts-zerebral-hemisph~rischerKognition, und (0durch EEG-Alpha Dominanz im ruhenden Wachzustand. [Die Obersetzung wurde von dem Authoren geliefert.1 A propos du retour en a r r i e e et du rappel hypnotique Roland Fischer WsumC: Cet essai traite des formes tant intra-individuelles que extra-individuelles des exgriences likes un Qat d’activation. Les premihres sont 6tiqueUes ‘‘retours en arriee” alore que les secondea comprennent lee grands fantasmes et lee schbmes rkgtitifs, les trames et images constamment r&critm de la littkrature, de I’art, de la religion. Les retours en arrihre sont dea exgriences likes a la fois a un C t a t d’activation et h un stade (i.e. au set et au setting). Le retour en arrike et le rappel hypnotique ne diffhrent que par la manikre dont ils sont induits. Les mkthodes d’induction doivent Btre distingukes des Ctats de conscience induits sur le continuum hallucinatoire maitatif. Ceux qui vivent un retour en arriere peuvent se caractkriser par (a) la variabilit4 de leure rhponses dans des t h h e s perceptives-comportementales;(b) leur tendance a minimiser (ou a rbduire) l’influx sensoriel; (c) le niveau de base Clevb de leur rythme cardiaque; (d) leur hypnotisabilite et, par suite; (e) une activiU privil6giCe de I’hCmisphhre ckdbral h i t dans le processus de connaissance; et (0une dominance du rythme alpha dans I’EEG, a I’Ctat de dktente, en condition d’Cveil.

Sobre la imagen retrospectiva y la evocacion hipnotica Roland Fischer Resumen: Este articulo trata de las variedades intra- e inter-individuales de experiencias ligadas al estado de vigilancia. Las primeras reciben el nombre de “flashbacks.” mientras que las segundas comprenden las grandee fantasias y 10s esquemas repetitivos, las consabidas imhgenes y argumentos literarios, artisticos y religiosos. Las retrospectivas son tanto experiencias de un estado de vigilancia como de un “escenario”. La retrospectiva y la evocaci6n hipnotica difieren tan &lo en la forma en que una y otra son inducidas. Los mCtodos de induction debeh distinguirse de 10s estados

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inducidos del continuo de hipervigilancia que v a de la percepcion-alucinacidn a la percepcion meditacidn. Los sujetos que experimentan “flashbacks” pueden caracteriazarse por su: (a) variabilidad en lo referente a tareas perceptivo-comportamentales;(b) tendencia a minimizar (0 reducir) el estimulo sensorial; (c) SUB elevadas tasas de repom cardiaco; (d) susceptibilidad hipnotica J , por tanto, (e) preferente actividad cognoscitiva del hemisferio cerebral derecho; (0trazado alfa dominante en estado vigil de reposo.

On flashback and hypnotic recall.

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