Copyright 7992 fay The Ccrontological Society of America The Cerontologist Vol. 32, No. 5, 601-606
At the core of the so-called "generational equity" construct is the notion that older persons exercise self-interested political power. This article examines what we know about one element of the politics of aging — the voting behavior of older persons in recent presidential elections — and suggests areas of research on the 1992 election that may tell us something about how far, and how soon, proponents of generational equity will be able to move toward dismantling policies that benefit older people. Key Words: Generational equity, Political consciousness, Political attitudes, Voting behavior
Older Voters and the 1992 Presidential Election
Since the late 1970s older Americans have increasingly become a scapegoat for a number of societal problems that have been thematically unified as issues of so-called "intergenerational equity" by journalists, academicians, policy analysts, and politicians (see Binstock, 1992; Cook et al., in press). The epithet "greedy geezers," introduced in 1988 (Fairlie, 1988), has become a familiar adjective in journalistic accounts of federal budget politics. Early this year Fortune declaimed that "the tyranny of America's o l d " is "one of the most crucial issues facing U.S. society" (Smith, 1992). By the early 1990s there was substantial evidence that leaders in both the private and public sectors accepted that issues of economic and social equity are properly viewed as matters of intergenerational conflict. At the 1990 scientific meeting of the Gerontological Society of America, for instance, the president of the prestigious American Association of Universities warned that: "[T]he shape of the domestic federal budget inescapably pits programs for the retired against every other social purpose dependent on federal funds, in the present and the future" (Rosenzweig, 1990, p. 6). And as the 101st Congress moved towards its conclusion, Representative Dan Rostenkowski, chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, observed: "One of the most unhappy results of our ongoing budget gridlock has been an uneven contest between the very young and the very o l d . . . . " He said that "the sad story of the 1980s" was that "the old have gotten more while the young have gotten less" (Tolchin, 1989). At the core of the generational equity construct is the notion that older persons use their voting power, and a coterie of Washington-based old-age interest groups, to maintain and enhance an old age welfare state that accounted for 30% of the federal budget in fiscal 1992, or nearly $450 billion. (These figures are 1 Henry R. Luce Professor of Aging, Health, and Society, School of Medicine, Case Western Reserve University, Cleveland, OH 44106.
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calculated on the basis of federal outlays, by category, estimated for fiscal year 1992 [U.S. Congress, 1992], as modified by more detailed information from Sonnefeld et al. [1991], U.S. Senate [1992], and U.S. Social Security Administration [1991].) As a journalist expressed it in reporting on budgetary negotiations affecting Social Security in 1991: America's older citizens are among the nation's most potent constituencies. They vote at higher rates than most other Americans. . . . In addition their organizations, lead [sic] by the American Association of Retired Persons, swing great weight on Capitol Hill. (Oreskes, 1990) Yet, comprehending the long and tenuous chain of connections between a large number of older voters and specific public policy outcomes — including such links as age-group consciousness, political attitudes, voting behavior, interest group activities, and decisions and actions by political, bureaucratic, and socioeconomic elites — is a complex task. The 1992 presidential election presents an opportunity to examine one element in the picture of "senior power" that is portrayed by proponents of generational equity. Are older voters an important and self-interested electoral constituency in presidential elections? Will they play a decisive or significant role in electing President George Bush or Governor Bill Clinton, voting for and against these candidates in substantially different proportions than younger voters? To what extent might their behavior be self-interested responses to campaign promises and issues that have relevance to the notion of generational equity? Conversely, does the potential significance of the elderly as an electoral constituency shape the content of campaign rhetoric? Is there any indication that organized efforts to mobilize older voters have a discernible impact on the distribution of their votes for president? The answers to such questions, before the fact, necessarily must be speculative. But a consideration of what we know to date can help in delineating 601
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Robert H. Binstock, PhD1
several areas of research on the 1992 election that could help us to understand more fully the role of older persons in presidential voting (as opposed to other elections and political activities) as a component in the complex mosaic of the politics of aging. Older Persons and Voting in Recent Elections
Older people, in terms of their proportion of total votes cast and their voting participation rates, certainly are a potentially important electoral constituency. Persons aged 65 and older cast 19.4% of all votes in the 1988 presidential election (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1989; these data do not include institutionalized persons). Moreover, as indicated in Table 1, older people voted at higher rates than most other Americans. The overall voting participation rate was 65.9%. The youngest age group —18—29 — had the lowest rate of participation, just 44.8%; with each successive older age group the rate increased until it peaked in the age range of 70-79 years (81.7% voting). Despite continuous simplistic assertions by journalists and academicians that "the elderly" are a "unified voting bloc" (e.g., Levy & Murnane, 1992), it Table 1 . Voting Participation, by Age, in the 1988 U.S. Presidential Election
Age 18-29 30-44 45-59 60-69 70-79 80 + Total
% Voting
% Not voting
% Not eligible
44.82 64.34 74.79 79.58 81.73 68.82 65.93
44.26 33.45 23.82 19.28 17.78 30.59 30.55
11.01 2.21 1.22 1.13 0.49 0.59 3.51
Changing Political Consciousness?
One line of argument for the possibility of greater cohesion among older voters has posited a growing age consciousness among U.S. old-age cohorts in the late 20th and early 21st centuries (e.g., Cutler,
Source: NORC, 1986-1991.
Table 2. Nationwide Vote Distribution, by Age Groups and Gender, in Elections for U.S. President, 1 9 8 0 , 1 9 8 4 , 1 9 8 8
The 1980 vote
The 1984 vote
The 1988 vote
Reagan
Carter
Anderson
Reagan
Mondale
Bush
Dukakis
Percentage of all voters All ages 18-29 years old 30-44 years old 44-59 years old 60 years & older
51% 43 54 55 54
41% 44 36 39 41
7% 11 8 5 4
59% 58 58 60 63
41% 41 42 39 36
53% 52 54 57 50
45% 47 45 42 49
Percentage of men All ages 18-29 years old 30-44 years old 44-59 years old 60 years & older
55 47 59 60 56
36 39 31 34 40
7 11 4 5 3
62 61 62 63 62
37 37 37 36 37
57 55 58 62 53
41 43 40 36 46
Percentage of women All ages 18-29 years old 30-44 years old 44-59 years old 60 years & older
47 39 50 50 52
45 49 41 44 43
7 10 8 5 4
56 55 54 58 64
44 45 46 41 35
50 49 50 52 48
49 50 49 48 52
Group
Sources: New York Times, 1980,1984, 1988.
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is obvious that they have not been. National election exit polls, which customarily describe older voters as age 60 and older, are the best available sources of data on the distribution of votes for president, by personal characteristic of voter. Election ballots are not recorded, of course, by age. Attempts to generalize about the behavior of older voters by studying returns from precincts that are predominantly populated by older people are methodologically flawed because of the "ecological fallacy" involved in studying persons who live in such unusual communities. Table 2, showing the results of exit polls in the last three presidential elections, should make clear that there are no discernible patterns that distinguish among the distributions of ballots by age categories in these recent elections. Although men of all age groups have favored Republican candidates more heavily than have women, age group comparisons — by gender or overall — do not show such consistency. Gerontologists, highly attuned in recent years to the diversity of the elderly population (e.g., Bass, Kutza, & Torres-Gil, 1990), should not be surprised by these data. Why would an age cohort ranging from 60 years old to over 100 — constituted of all races, ethnic groups, religions, economic and social status, political attitudes and attachments, and every other characteristic in American society — become homogenized in political behavior when it reaches the "old age" category? Yet, schools of thought suggest that under certain circumstances the patterns of voting by older persons could become more cohesive than those displayed by other age groupings.
Responses to Campaign Issues? A related argument is that the self-interests of older persons with respect to policies on aging promote political cohesion. This line of thought leads journalists and other observers to assert frequently that candidates who have been supportive of Social Security and Medicare (or hostile to those programs) have received more votes (or less votes) than would ordinarily be expected from older voters. On such occasions older voters are described, in the parlance of political analysts, as having been an important "swing vote." When such assertions are examined with care, however, they become problematic. One of the most prominently cited examples (e.g., see Butler, 1975, pp. 325-326) has been the 1964 presidential campaign in which Republican candidate Senator Barry Goldwater pointed up the pay-as-you-go nature of the Social Security program and suggested that participation in it should be voluntary. Political analysts asserted that Coldwater lost significant numbers of older persons' votes to his opponent, President Lyndon B. Johnson, because of statements regarding Social Security. But older persons were hardly distinctive in their desertion of the Republican candidate. In a landslide triumph the Democratic vote, which had been 50.1% for John F. Kennedy in 1960, increased to 61.3% for Johnson in 1964; and the shift in all age groups was approximately the same (Woll & Binstock, 1984, p. 160). Similarly, political journalists predicted that older people would be hostile to President Ronald Reagan in the 1984 election, when he was sharply criticized by Democrats for wanting to "destroy" Social SecuVol. 32, No. 5,1992
rity. But, as Table 2 shows, persons aged 60 and older gave him 63% of their votes. The percentages in all age groups of men were virtually identical. Older women, whose average income was lower than that of older men and who were more dependent on Social Security payments (Radner, 1991), voted even more heavily for Reagan than did younger women.
Applying the Rational Self-interest Model What accounts for recurring discrepancies between perceptions of the elderly as a significant voting group and the actual voting behavior of older people? The notion that older voters form an important electoral constituency rests primarily on the assumption that old-age-related issues are likely to be more important to them than other issues, partisan attachments, the characteristics of specific candidates, or any other campaign-related stimuli. Implicit in this perspective is a model of voting behavior that has its roots in neoclassical economics and statistical decision theory. Simply put, it assumes that each voter's decision among candidates is rationally calculated, on the basis of complete and accurate information, to optimize her or his self-interest. Applying this rational self-interest model to predict and interpret voting behavior has a fundamental problem, even if one stipulates the predominance of self-interest as a motivating factor. It leads the analyst to characterize the political situation not as it appears subjectively to the voter but as it appears objectively to the analyst. As Nobel Laureate Herbert Simon has described the problem in characterizing the situation of an individual voter: Differences in the kinds of evidence you respond to may have nothing to do with your utility function. Instead, they may reflect the model you have of the world, the beliefs you have formed about the meanings and predictive value of different kinds of available information, and what information has come to your attention. (Simon, 1985, p. 300) In other words, even if the voter shares the analyst's vision of his or her self-interest, they do not necessarily have the same views of everything that may bear on it. This problem is frequently compounded when the model is applied to single out older voters as an electoral constituency. One common flaw is the tendency of analysts to focus on the voter's old-age characteristic to the exclusion of most other personal characteristics. Thus, the self-interest of a 67-yearold woman is perceived in terms of her "old-age interests," and not in terms of interests that may flow from such characteristics as her gender, race, ethnicity, religion, education, health, family status, economic condition, labor force participation, and soon — all of which are assumed to be important factors in shaping the self-interests of younger adults. But, in fact, it is these latter characteristics — not the old-age characteristic — that predict the political attitudes of older persons (Day, 1990; Hudson & Strate, 1985). A second common flaw is the failure of analysts to 603
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1981). This school of thought speculates that political solidarity among older persons will increase in the contexts of ongoing population aging and political mobilization efforts undertaken by old-age-based organizations such as the American Association of Retired Persons (AARP). Although the possibility of increased old-age political solidarity in the years ahead cannot be dismissed, there have been no indications of increasing cohesion in political attitudes expressed by contemporary older persons. Rather, an analysis of a number of national opinion surveys conducted during the 1970s and 1980s found that "older people are nearly indistinguishable from younger adults [both the middle-aged and younger categories] on most issues — including aging policy issues" (Day, 1990, p. 47). Moreover, as illustrated by AARP's role in endorsing the Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act of 1988, and opposing its repeal in 1989, the organization shows little sign of being able to mobilize cohesive political support from older persons, in this case from high-income elderly (Crystal, 1990; Holstein & Minkler, 1991). And although the ranks of older voters have changed somewhat due to birthdays and deaths since the presidential elections of the 1980s, the impact of these changes on the overall composition of such a large cohort should be minimal, to date.
Table 3. Percentage of Income of Aged Family Units, by Income Quintiles, from Different Sources of Income, 1989'
Income quintile, lowest to highest
Percentage of income Earnings
Social Security
Property
Pension
Other
1 2 3 4 5
2.0% 6.1 11.2 18.9 32.1
80.0% 72.3 55.5 37.2 15.9
4.1% 8.8 14.9 21.6 33.2
3.1% 7.1 15.4 19.7 17.1
10.8% 5.7 3.0 2.6 1.7
Top 5%
35.8
40.2
13.6
8.9
1.5
"Income adjusted for size of family unit and age of head. Source: Tabulations from Radner, 1991, p. 12.
dum proposition. Greater spending on schools is conventionally regarded as increasing their quality; when the local school system has a favorable reputation, the market value of homes is commonly assumed to be enhanced. Perspectives on the 1992 Election
In the context of what we know about the voting behavior of older persons in recent presidential elections, and the limitations of models used to focus on older persons as a significant electoral constituency, it is reasonable to assume that neither Bush nor Clinton will receive a significantly larger proportion of votes from older voters than from younger adults in the 1992 election. Yet there are several features of this particular campaign that are worthy of research. When Ross Perot was a potential independent candidate during the spring and early summer of 1992, journalists and pollsters actively attempted to probe the demographic base of his support as an "outsider." Although surveys showed that adults in various age groups supported the three candidates in more or less the same proportions, some age differences did show up in attitudes about American politics in general. Most notably, a poll released in July 1992 by the Times Mirror Center for the People and the Press (3,517 adults interviewed between May 28 and June 10, with sampling error of plus or minus two percentage points) found that about two-thirds of persons over 50 agreed with the statement: "We need new people in Washington even if they are not as effective as experienced politicians"; fewer than half of the respondents under the age of 30 shared this view (Rosenbaum, 1992). Political scientist Richard Niemi, an authority on the political attitudes of age-group cohorts, interpreted this finding by suggesting that older cohorts remember an era in which they perceived the nation to be in better condition and as preeminent economic power in the world (Rosenbaum, 1992). Following this .line of interpretation, Clinton might attract a disproportionate share of older voters if he is perceived by them as a "new" outsider who can restore an era of national prosperity and prominence. It will be worth tracking the extent to which this attitudinal difference persists through election day (among finer gradations of age groupings) and whether it is associated with voting patterns. If so, 604
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make distinctions among older persons with respect to the self-interests they have in relation to old-age issues. For instance, some older persons have a much greater stake in the maintenance and enhancement of the Old Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI) program than do others. As shown in Table 3, for the lowest income quintile of older persons, Social Security accounts for 80% of all income, whereas for the highest quintile, Social Security payments contribute 15.9% of income. Similarly, the percentage of black older persons with incomes below the poverty line is 30.8%; for white older persons it is 9.6% (Aging America, 1991, p. 53). Accordingly, 68.1% of black older persons feel we are spending "too little on Social Security," compared with 43.8% of white older persons who share this view (National Opinion Research Center, 1986-1991). Even when electoral analysts isolate specific social and economic characteristics among older voters, they commonly err by making unwarranted inferences regarding the self-interests that might flow from those characteristics. This type of error is especially evident in analyses of local referenda when (as is not the case with Social Security or Medicare policies) voters deal solely with issues rather than candidates (and the images and attachments that they may evoke). It is frequently reported, for instance, that older voters have been decisive in defeating local referenda propositions for increasing property taxes to support public schools. Yet, both meta-analyses (e.g., Chomitz, 1987) and specific studies (e.g., Button & Rosenbaum, 1989) show that old age is not a statistically significant variable associated with the distribution of votes in such referenda. What might account for this recurring discrepancy between perceptions and reality? Analysts of such referenda typically focus on older persons as consumers who own taxable property (primarily their own homes) but who do not have school-age children. The inference is that these older voters will reject a school financing proposition on the basis of a self-interested economic calculation; if the proposition passes they will have to pay higher taxes without receiving any increase or improvement in services relevant to them. An equally plausible perspective for applying the rational selfinterest model, however, would view older homeowners as investors. From this perspective one might infer that these older voters would favor the referen-
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political feasibility of efforts to dismantle the old age welfare state in the years ahead. Also worthwhile would be detailed state-level analyses of special efforts to mobilize and appeal to older voters. "Senior citizens" have customarily been one of the prime targets of campaign efforts focused on critical states with large blocs of electoral votes, because of their aggregate numerical importance, and the relative ease with which they can be accessed through formal and informal age-segregated residential enclaves and through preexisting organizational and programmatic mechanisms such as local AARP chapters, senior centers, "golden age" clubs, and congregate meal sites. A state-by-state postelection analysis of voting by age groups, along with detailed attention to local campaign activities targeted at older voters, would throw substantial light on whether efforts to mobilize a "senior vote" yield any significant results. Moreover, in light of the general neglect of older persons in 1992 campaign rhetoric, it would be interesting to find out whether such local appeals to older voters focused on improving and/or defending old-age policies. These various lines of inquiry, of course, would hardly confirm or undermine the current stereotype of greedy geezers who effectively use their political power to further their self-interests at the expense of younger and future generations. The politics of aging includes much more than presidential campaigns and elections, such as: congressional, state, and local elections; lobbying efforts by AARP, the National Committee to Preserve Social Security and Medicare, and some 30 other old-age-based interest groups that wield an "electoral bluff" of cohesive old-age voting; ad hoc expressions of support and protest (such as the objections to the Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act of 1988); former leaders like President Franklin D. Roosevelt and career public servant Wilbur J. Cohen who, as a matter of general social reform, were the architects of specific policies on aging such as Social Security and Medicare; and all-purpose "champions of the aged" such as Congressman Claude Pepper. Nonetheless, the perception that older voters are an important force to be reckoned with in presidential politics has, until now, been a major element in shaping perceptions of Washington political cognoscenti regarding the feasibility of major changes in policies on aging. The behavior of older voters in the 1992 presidential election may tell us something about how far, and how soon, proponents of generational equity will be able to move toward dismantling the old age welfare state. References Aging America: Trends and projections. (1991). Washington, DC: U.S. Senate Special Committee on Aging, American Association of Retired Persons, Federal Council on the Aging, and U.S. Administration on Aging. Bass,S. A., Kutza, E. A., & Torres-Gil, F. M. (Eds.). (1990). Diversity in aging: Challenges facing planners and policymakers in the 1990s. Clenview, IL: Scott, Foresman. Bengtson, V. L, & Cutler, N. E. (1976). Generations and intergenerational relations: Perspectives on age groups and social change. In R. H. Binstock & E. Shanas (Eds.), Handbook of aging and the social sciences (pp. 130-159). New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold.
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this development could usefully update and refine a substantial body of survey research on political attitudes that indicates that party identification has been more stable among the voter cohorts that are now old than among those that have followed (Wallace & Williamson, 1992). With respect to issues and causes, the 1992 campaign has been remarkable for its lack of specific rhetorical appeals to older voters. In contrast to other campaigns in recent decades, the litanies of issues and causes recited by the candidates — the deficit, taxes, the economy, jobs, children, family values, education, health care, drugs, homelessness, abortion, the environment, and so on — have so far not included specific attention to the needs of senior citizens. Even when previous presidential campaigns have invested relatively little money and activity in wooing older voters, the issues of aging have at least been the subject of prominent rhetorical flourishes (see, e.g., Riemer & Binstock, 1978). It would be useful to learn, from interviews with campaign officials, why the traditional senior citizen sound bites have been omitted. Has the intergenerational equity construct ascended to the extent that political advisors believe that appeals to older persons will alienate younger voters? Do they feel that it is unseemly to appeal to greedy geezers? Do they think that few older persons need governmental help? Or have they observed that older persons vote about the same as younger persons and are not worth a special appeal? For the first time, the issue of intergenerational equity has been raised, explicitly, as part of a presidential campaign. In her July 13 keynote speech to the 1992 Democratic convention, former Congresswoman Barbara Jordan asserted that federal mandatory entitlement programs (read Social Security and Medicare) must be cut by implementing measures of "generational equity." The next evening, in a television interview with Robin McNeil of the Public Broadcasting System, Governor Clinton said that he would probably seek "fuller taxation of Social Security benefits." On the other hand, neither of these statements was subsequently picked up by the national press. In fact, in a postconvention commentary, the editor-in-chief of the Washington Monthly chastised Clinton and Senator Al Gore for not challenging "the greedy geezers to give up benefits that they don't need" (Peters, 1992). Although the intergenerational equity theme has not been especially prominent, researchers could determine the extent to which older voters were aware of it and whether it was associated with their electoral behavior. If the trend of hostile public discourse toward older persons and programs on aging continues to flourish and intensify, at some point older persons may respond politically. The old-age group political consciousness posited by Bengtson and Cutler (1976) some years ago could manifest itself as a protective reaction to an antagonistic milieu. Whether and when such a reaction will take place are matters of conjecture. But an early reading on such a possibility would shed some light on the
New York Times/CBS News Poll (1988, November 10). Portrait of the electorate. New York Times, 18Y. National Opinion Research Center (NORC), University of Chicago. (19861991). Data provided by the Roper Center, University of Connecticut, Storrs, CT. Oreskes, M. (1990, September28). Social Security: A tinderbox both parties handle gingerly. New York Times, 1A. Peters, C. (1992, July 18). Who will play Captain Courageous? New York Times, Y17. Radner, D. R. (1991). Changes in the income of age groups, 1984-89. Social Security Bulletin, 54(12), 2-18. Riemer, Y., & Binstock, R. H. (1978). Campaigning for the "senior vote": A case study of Carter's 1976 campaign. The Cerontologist, 18, 517-524. Rosenbaum, D. E. (1992, July 8). Older Americans are found more alienated than the young. New York Times, A9. Rosenzweig, R. M. (1990, November). Address to the president's opening session. Presented at the 43rd Annual Scientific Meeting of the Cerontological Society of America, Boston. Simon, H. A. (1985). Human nature in politics: The dialogue of psychology with political science. American Political Science Review, 79, 293-304. Smith, L. (1992). The tyranny of America's old. Fortune, 725(1), 68-72. Sonnefeld, S. T., Waldo, D. R., Lemieux, J. A., & McKusick, D. R. (1991). Projections of national health expenditures through the year 2000. Health Care Financing Review, 73(1), 1-27. Tolchin, M. (1989, November 23). Lawmakers tell the elderly: 'Next year' on health care. New York Times, 10Y. U.S. Bureau of the Census. (1989). Voting and registration in the election of November 1988. Current Population Report Series, P-20, No. 440. U.S. Congress, Congressional Budget Office. (1992). The economic and budget outlook: Fiscal years 1993-1997. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office. U.S. Senate, Special Committee on Aging. (1992). Developments in aging: 1991, volume 1. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office. U.S. Social Security Administration. (1991). Social Security Bulletin, Annual Statistical Supplement, 7997. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. Wallace, S. P., & Williamson, J. B. (1992). The senior movement: References and resources. New York: G. K. Hall. Woll, P., & Binstock, R. H. (1984). America's political system, 4th edition. New York: Random House.
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Binstock, R. H. (1992). The oldest old and "intergenerational equity." In R. Suzman, D. Willis, & K. Manton (Eds.), The oldest old (pp. 394-417). New York: Oxford University Press. Butler, R. N. (1975). Why survive? Being old in America. New York: Harper & Row. Button, J. W., & Rosenbaum, W. A. (1989). Seeing gray: School bond issues and the aging in Florida. Research on Aging, 77(2), 158-173. Chomitz, K. M. (1987). Demographic influences on local public education expenditure: A review of econometric evidence. In Committee on Population, Commission on Behavioral and Social Sciences Education, National Research Council (Eds.), Demographic change and the wellbeing of children and the elderly (pp. 45-53). Washington, DC: National Academy Press. Cook, F. L, Marshall, V. W., Marshall, J. C , & Kaufman, J. E. (in press). Intergenerational equity and the politics of income security for the old. In V. L. Greene, T. R. Marmor, & T. M. Smeeding (Eds.), Economic security, intergenerational justice, and the North American elderly. Washington, DC: Urban Institute Press. Crystal, S. (1990). Health economics, old-age politics, and the catastrophic Medicare debate. Journal of Cerontological Social Work, 75(3/4), 21-31. Cutler, N. E. (1981). Political characteristics of elderly cohorts in the twentyfirst century. In S. Kiesler, J. N. Morgan, & V. K. Oppenheimer (Eds.), Aging: Social change (pp. 127-157). New York: Academic. Day, C. L. (1990). What older Americans think: Interest groups and aging policy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Fairlie, H. (1988). Talkin"bout my generation. New Republic, 798(13), 19-22. Holstein, M., & Minkler, M. (1991). The short life and painful death of the Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act. In M. Minkler & C. L. Estes (Eds.), Critical perspectives on aging: The political and moral economy of growing old (pp. 189-208). Amityville, NY: Baywood. Hudson, R. B., & Strate, J. (1985). Aging and political systems. In R. H. Binstock & E. Shanas (Eds.), Handbook of aging and the social sciences, second edition (pp. 554-585). New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold. Levy, F., & Murnane, R. ). (1992, February 6). Orphans of the ballot box. New York Times, A15. New York Times/CBS News Poll (1980, November 9). How different groups voted for president. New York Times, 28. New York Times/CBS News Poll (1984, November 8). Portrait of the electorate. New York Times, A19.
At the core of the so-called "generational equity" construct is the notion that older persons exercise self-interested political power. This article examines what we know about one element of the politics of aging — the voting behavior of older persons in recent presidential elections — and suggests areas of research on the 1992 election that may tell us something about how far, and how soon, proponents of generational equity will be able to move toward dismantling policies that benefit older people. Key Words: Generational equity, Political consciousness, Political attitudes, Voting behavior
Older Voters and the 1992 Presidential Election
Since the late 1970s older Americans have increasingly become a scapegoat for a number of societal problems that have been thematically unified as issues of so-called "intergenerational equity" by journalists, academicians, policy analysts, and politicians (see Binstock, 1992; Cook et al., in press). The epithet "greedy geezers," introduced in 1988 (Fairlie, 1988), has become a familiar adjective in journalistic accounts of federal budget politics. Early this year Fortune declaimed that "the tyranny of America's o l d " is "one of the most crucial issues facing U.S. society" (Smith, 1992). By the early 1990s there was substantial evidence that leaders in both the private and public sectors accepted that issues of economic and social equity are properly viewed as matters of intergenerational conflict. At the 1990 scientific meeting of the Gerontological Society of America, for instance, the president of the prestigious American Association of Universities warned that: "[T]he shape of the domestic federal budget inescapably pits programs for the retired against every other social purpose dependent on federal funds, in the present and the future" (Rosenzweig, 1990, p. 6). And as the 101st Congress moved towards its conclusion, Representative Dan Rostenkowski, chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, observed: "One of the most unhappy results of our ongoing budget gridlock has been an uneven contest between the very young and the very o l d . . . . " He said that "the sad story of the 1980s" was that "the old have gotten more while the young have gotten less" (Tolchin, 1989). At the core of the generational equity construct is the notion that older persons use their voting power, and a coterie of Washington-based old-age interest groups, to maintain and enhance an old age welfare state that accounted for 30% of the federal budget in fiscal 1992, or nearly $450 billion. (These figures are 1 Henry R. Luce Professor of Aging, Health, and Society, School of Medicine, Case Western Reserve University, Cleveland, OH 44106.
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calculated on the basis of federal outlays, by category, estimated for fiscal year 1992 [U.S. Congress, 1992], as modified by more detailed information from Sonnefeld et al. [1991], U.S. Senate [1992], and U.S. Social Security Administration [1991].) As a journalist expressed it in reporting on budgetary negotiations affecting Social Security in 1991: America's older citizens are among the nation's most potent constituencies. They vote at higher rates than most other Americans. . . . In addition their organizations, lead [sic] by the American Association of Retired Persons, swing great weight on Capitol Hill. (Oreskes, 1990) Yet, comprehending the long and tenuous chain of connections between a large number of older voters and specific public policy outcomes — including such links as age-group consciousness, political attitudes, voting behavior, interest group activities, and decisions and actions by political, bureaucratic, and socioeconomic elites — is a complex task. The 1992 presidential election presents an opportunity to examine one element in the picture of "senior power" that is portrayed by proponents of generational equity. Are older voters an important and self-interested electoral constituency in presidential elections? Will they play a decisive or significant role in electing President George Bush or Governor Bill Clinton, voting for and against these candidates in substantially different proportions than younger voters? To what extent might their behavior be self-interested responses to campaign promises and issues that have relevance to the notion of generational equity? Conversely, does the potential significance of the elderly as an electoral constituency shape the content of campaign rhetoric? Is there any indication that organized efforts to mobilize older voters have a discernible impact on the distribution of their votes for president? The answers to such questions, before the fact, necessarily must be speculative. But a consideration of what we know to date can help in delineating 601
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Robert H. Binstock, PhD1
several areas of research on the 1992 election that could help us to understand more fully the role of older persons in presidential voting (as opposed to other elections and political activities) as a component in the complex mosaic of the politics of aging. Older Persons and Voting in Recent Elections
Older people, in terms of their proportion of total votes cast and their voting participation rates, certainly are a potentially important electoral constituency. Persons aged 65 and older cast 19.4% of all votes in the 1988 presidential election (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1989; these data do not include institutionalized persons). Moreover, as indicated in Table 1, older people voted at higher rates than most other Americans. The overall voting participation rate was 65.9%. The youngest age group —18—29 — had the lowest rate of participation, just 44.8%; with each successive older age group the rate increased until it peaked in the age range of 70-79 years (81.7% voting). Despite continuous simplistic assertions by journalists and academicians that "the elderly" are a "unified voting bloc" (e.g., Levy & Murnane, 1992), it Table 1 . Voting Participation, by Age, in the 1988 U.S. Presidential Election
Age 18-29 30-44 45-59 60-69 70-79 80 + Total
% Voting
% Not voting
% Not eligible
44.82 64.34 74.79 79.58 81.73 68.82 65.93
44.26 33.45 23.82 19.28 17.78 30.59 30.55
11.01 2.21 1.22 1.13 0.49 0.59 3.51
Changing Political Consciousness?
One line of argument for the possibility of greater cohesion among older voters has posited a growing age consciousness among U.S. old-age cohorts in the late 20th and early 21st centuries (e.g., Cutler,
Source: NORC, 1986-1991.
Table 2. Nationwide Vote Distribution, by Age Groups and Gender, in Elections for U.S. President, 1 9 8 0 , 1 9 8 4 , 1 9 8 8
The 1980 vote
The 1984 vote
The 1988 vote
Reagan
Carter
Anderson
Reagan
Mondale
Bush
Dukakis
Percentage of all voters All ages 18-29 years old 30-44 years old 44-59 years old 60 years & older
51% 43 54 55 54
41% 44 36 39 41
7% 11 8 5 4
59% 58 58 60 63
41% 41 42 39 36
53% 52 54 57 50
45% 47 45 42 49
Percentage of men All ages 18-29 years old 30-44 years old 44-59 years old 60 years & older
55 47 59 60 56
36 39 31 34 40
7 11 4 5 3
62 61 62 63 62
37 37 37 36 37
57 55 58 62 53
41 43 40 36 46
Percentage of women All ages 18-29 years old 30-44 years old 44-59 years old 60 years & older
47 39 50 50 52
45 49 41 44 43
7 10 8 5 4
56 55 54 58 64
44 45 46 41 35
50 49 50 52 48
49 50 49 48 52
Group
Sources: New York Times, 1980,1984, 1988.
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is obvious that they have not been. National election exit polls, which customarily describe older voters as age 60 and older, are the best available sources of data on the distribution of votes for president, by personal characteristic of voter. Election ballots are not recorded, of course, by age. Attempts to generalize about the behavior of older voters by studying returns from precincts that are predominantly populated by older people are methodologically flawed because of the "ecological fallacy" involved in studying persons who live in such unusual communities. Table 2, showing the results of exit polls in the last three presidential elections, should make clear that there are no discernible patterns that distinguish among the distributions of ballots by age categories in these recent elections. Although men of all age groups have favored Republican candidates more heavily than have women, age group comparisons — by gender or overall — do not show such consistency. Gerontologists, highly attuned in recent years to the diversity of the elderly population (e.g., Bass, Kutza, & Torres-Gil, 1990), should not be surprised by these data. Why would an age cohort ranging from 60 years old to over 100 — constituted of all races, ethnic groups, religions, economic and social status, political attitudes and attachments, and every other characteristic in American society — become homogenized in political behavior when it reaches the "old age" category? Yet, schools of thought suggest that under certain circumstances the patterns of voting by older persons could become more cohesive than those displayed by other age groupings.
Responses to Campaign Issues? A related argument is that the self-interests of older persons with respect to policies on aging promote political cohesion. This line of thought leads journalists and other observers to assert frequently that candidates who have been supportive of Social Security and Medicare (or hostile to those programs) have received more votes (or less votes) than would ordinarily be expected from older voters. On such occasions older voters are described, in the parlance of political analysts, as having been an important "swing vote." When such assertions are examined with care, however, they become problematic. One of the most prominently cited examples (e.g., see Butler, 1975, pp. 325-326) has been the 1964 presidential campaign in which Republican candidate Senator Barry Goldwater pointed up the pay-as-you-go nature of the Social Security program and suggested that participation in it should be voluntary. Political analysts asserted that Coldwater lost significant numbers of older persons' votes to his opponent, President Lyndon B. Johnson, because of statements regarding Social Security. But older persons were hardly distinctive in their desertion of the Republican candidate. In a landslide triumph the Democratic vote, which had been 50.1% for John F. Kennedy in 1960, increased to 61.3% for Johnson in 1964; and the shift in all age groups was approximately the same (Woll & Binstock, 1984, p. 160). Similarly, political journalists predicted that older people would be hostile to President Ronald Reagan in the 1984 election, when he was sharply criticized by Democrats for wanting to "destroy" Social SecuVol. 32, No. 5,1992
rity. But, as Table 2 shows, persons aged 60 and older gave him 63% of their votes. The percentages in all age groups of men were virtually identical. Older women, whose average income was lower than that of older men and who were more dependent on Social Security payments (Radner, 1991), voted even more heavily for Reagan than did younger women.
Applying the Rational Self-interest Model What accounts for recurring discrepancies between perceptions of the elderly as a significant voting group and the actual voting behavior of older people? The notion that older voters form an important electoral constituency rests primarily on the assumption that old-age-related issues are likely to be more important to them than other issues, partisan attachments, the characteristics of specific candidates, or any other campaign-related stimuli. Implicit in this perspective is a model of voting behavior that has its roots in neoclassical economics and statistical decision theory. Simply put, it assumes that each voter's decision among candidates is rationally calculated, on the basis of complete and accurate information, to optimize her or his self-interest. Applying this rational self-interest model to predict and interpret voting behavior has a fundamental problem, even if one stipulates the predominance of self-interest as a motivating factor. It leads the analyst to characterize the political situation not as it appears subjectively to the voter but as it appears objectively to the analyst. As Nobel Laureate Herbert Simon has described the problem in characterizing the situation of an individual voter: Differences in the kinds of evidence you respond to may have nothing to do with your utility function. Instead, they may reflect the model you have of the world, the beliefs you have formed about the meanings and predictive value of different kinds of available information, and what information has come to your attention. (Simon, 1985, p. 300) In other words, even if the voter shares the analyst's vision of his or her self-interest, they do not necessarily have the same views of everything that may bear on it. This problem is frequently compounded when the model is applied to single out older voters as an electoral constituency. One common flaw is the tendency of analysts to focus on the voter's old-age characteristic to the exclusion of most other personal characteristics. Thus, the self-interest of a 67-yearold woman is perceived in terms of her "old-age interests," and not in terms of interests that may flow from such characteristics as her gender, race, ethnicity, religion, education, health, family status, economic condition, labor force participation, and soon — all of which are assumed to be important factors in shaping the self-interests of younger adults. But, in fact, it is these latter characteristics — not the old-age characteristic — that predict the political attitudes of older persons (Day, 1990; Hudson & Strate, 1985). A second common flaw is the failure of analysts to 603
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1981). This school of thought speculates that political solidarity among older persons will increase in the contexts of ongoing population aging and political mobilization efforts undertaken by old-age-based organizations such as the American Association of Retired Persons (AARP). Although the possibility of increased old-age political solidarity in the years ahead cannot be dismissed, there have been no indications of increasing cohesion in political attitudes expressed by contemporary older persons. Rather, an analysis of a number of national opinion surveys conducted during the 1970s and 1980s found that "older people are nearly indistinguishable from younger adults [both the middle-aged and younger categories] on most issues — including aging policy issues" (Day, 1990, p. 47). Moreover, as illustrated by AARP's role in endorsing the Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act of 1988, and opposing its repeal in 1989, the organization shows little sign of being able to mobilize cohesive political support from older persons, in this case from high-income elderly (Crystal, 1990; Holstein & Minkler, 1991). And although the ranks of older voters have changed somewhat due to birthdays and deaths since the presidential elections of the 1980s, the impact of these changes on the overall composition of such a large cohort should be minimal, to date.
Table 3. Percentage of Income of Aged Family Units, by Income Quintiles, from Different Sources of Income, 1989'
Income quintile, lowest to highest
Percentage of income Earnings
Social Security
Property
Pension
Other
1 2 3 4 5
2.0% 6.1 11.2 18.9 32.1
80.0% 72.3 55.5 37.2 15.9
4.1% 8.8 14.9 21.6 33.2
3.1% 7.1 15.4 19.7 17.1
10.8% 5.7 3.0 2.6 1.7
Top 5%
35.8
40.2
13.6
8.9
1.5
"Income adjusted for size of family unit and age of head. Source: Tabulations from Radner, 1991, p. 12.
dum proposition. Greater spending on schools is conventionally regarded as increasing their quality; when the local school system has a favorable reputation, the market value of homes is commonly assumed to be enhanced. Perspectives on the 1992 Election
In the context of what we know about the voting behavior of older persons in recent presidential elections, and the limitations of models used to focus on older persons as a significant electoral constituency, it is reasonable to assume that neither Bush nor Clinton will receive a significantly larger proportion of votes from older voters than from younger adults in the 1992 election. Yet there are several features of this particular campaign that are worthy of research. When Ross Perot was a potential independent candidate during the spring and early summer of 1992, journalists and pollsters actively attempted to probe the demographic base of his support as an "outsider." Although surveys showed that adults in various age groups supported the three candidates in more or less the same proportions, some age differences did show up in attitudes about American politics in general. Most notably, a poll released in July 1992 by the Times Mirror Center for the People and the Press (3,517 adults interviewed between May 28 and June 10, with sampling error of plus or minus two percentage points) found that about two-thirds of persons over 50 agreed with the statement: "We need new people in Washington even if they are not as effective as experienced politicians"; fewer than half of the respondents under the age of 30 shared this view (Rosenbaum, 1992). Political scientist Richard Niemi, an authority on the political attitudes of age-group cohorts, interpreted this finding by suggesting that older cohorts remember an era in which they perceived the nation to be in better condition and as preeminent economic power in the world (Rosenbaum, 1992). Following this .line of interpretation, Clinton might attract a disproportionate share of older voters if he is perceived by them as a "new" outsider who can restore an era of national prosperity and prominence. It will be worth tracking the extent to which this attitudinal difference persists through election day (among finer gradations of age groupings) and whether it is associated with voting patterns. If so, 604
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make distinctions among older persons with respect to the self-interests they have in relation to old-age issues. For instance, some older persons have a much greater stake in the maintenance and enhancement of the Old Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI) program than do others. As shown in Table 3, for the lowest income quintile of older persons, Social Security accounts for 80% of all income, whereas for the highest quintile, Social Security payments contribute 15.9% of income. Similarly, the percentage of black older persons with incomes below the poverty line is 30.8%; for white older persons it is 9.6% (Aging America, 1991, p. 53). Accordingly, 68.1% of black older persons feel we are spending "too little on Social Security," compared with 43.8% of white older persons who share this view (National Opinion Research Center, 1986-1991). Even when electoral analysts isolate specific social and economic characteristics among older voters, they commonly err by making unwarranted inferences regarding the self-interests that might flow from those characteristics. This type of error is especially evident in analyses of local referenda when (as is not the case with Social Security or Medicare policies) voters deal solely with issues rather than candidates (and the images and attachments that they may evoke). It is frequently reported, for instance, that older voters have been decisive in defeating local referenda propositions for increasing property taxes to support public schools. Yet, both meta-analyses (e.g., Chomitz, 1987) and specific studies (e.g., Button & Rosenbaum, 1989) show that old age is not a statistically significant variable associated with the distribution of votes in such referenda. What might account for this recurring discrepancy between perceptions and reality? Analysts of such referenda typically focus on older persons as consumers who own taxable property (primarily their own homes) but who do not have school-age children. The inference is that these older voters will reject a school financing proposition on the basis of a self-interested economic calculation; if the proposition passes they will have to pay higher taxes without receiving any increase or improvement in services relevant to them. An equally plausible perspective for applying the rational selfinterest model, however, would view older homeowners as investors. From this perspective one might infer that these older voters would favor the referen-
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political feasibility of efforts to dismantle the old age welfare state in the years ahead. Also worthwhile would be detailed state-level analyses of special efforts to mobilize and appeal to older voters. "Senior citizens" have customarily been one of the prime targets of campaign efforts focused on critical states with large blocs of electoral votes, because of their aggregate numerical importance, and the relative ease with which they can be accessed through formal and informal age-segregated residential enclaves and through preexisting organizational and programmatic mechanisms such as local AARP chapters, senior centers, "golden age" clubs, and congregate meal sites. A state-by-state postelection analysis of voting by age groups, along with detailed attention to local campaign activities targeted at older voters, would throw substantial light on whether efforts to mobilize a "senior vote" yield any significant results. Moreover, in light of the general neglect of older persons in 1992 campaign rhetoric, it would be interesting to find out whether such local appeals to older voters focused on improving and/or defending old-age policies. These various lines of inquiry, of course, would hardly confirm or undermine the current stereotype of greedy geezers who effectively use their political power to further their self-interests at the expense of younger and future generations. The politics of aging includes much more than presidential campaigns and elections, such as: congressional, state, and local elections; lobbying efforts by AARP, the National Committee to Preserve Social Security and Medicare, and some 30 other old-age-based interest groups that wield an "electoral bluff" of cohesive old-age voting; ad hoc expressions of support and protest (such as the objections to the Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act of 1988); former leaders like President Franklin D. Roosevelt and career public servant Wilbur J. Cohen who, as a matter of general social reform, were the architects of specific policies on aging such as Social Security and Medicare; and all-purpose "champions of the aged" such as Congressman Claude Pepper. Nonetheless, the perception that older voters are an important force to be reckoned with in presidential politics has, until now, been a major element in shaping perceptions of Washington political cognoscenti regarding the feasibility of major changes in policies on aging. The behavior of older voters in the 1992 presidential election may tell us something about how far, and how soon, proponents of generational equity will be able to move toward dismantling the old age welfare state. References Aging America: Trends and projections. (1991). Washington, DC: U.S. Senate Special Committee on Aging, American Association of Retired Persons, Federal Council on the Aging, and U.S. Administration on Aging. Bass,S. A., Kutza, E. A., & Torres-Gil, F. M. (Eds.). (1990). Diversity in aging: Challenges facing planners and policymakers in the 1990s. Clenview, IL: Scott, Foresman. Bengtson, V. L, & Cutler, N. E. (1976). Generations and intergenerational relations: Perspectives on age groups and social change. In R. H. Binstock & E. Shanas (Eds.), Handbook of aging and the social sciences (pp. 130-159). New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold.
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this development could usefully update and refine a substantial body of survey research on political attitudes that indicates that party identification has been more stable among the voter cohorts that are now old than among those that have followed (Wallace & Williamson, 1992). With respect to issues and causes, the 1992 campaign has been remarkable for its lack of specific rhetorical appeals to older voters. In contrast to other campaigns in recent decades, the litanies of issues and causes recited by the candidates — the deficit, taxes, the economy, jobs, children, family values, education, health care, drugs, homelessness, abortion, the environment, and so on — have so far not included specific attention to the needs of senior citizens. Even when previous presidential campaigns have invested relatively little money and activity in wooing older voters, the issues of aging have at least been the subject of prominent rhetorical flourishes (see, e.g., Riemer & Binstock, 1978). It would be useful to learn, from interviews with campaign officials, why the traditional senior citizen sound bites have been omitted. Has the intergenerational equity construct ascended to the extent that political advisors believe that appeals to older persons will alienate younger voters? Do they feel that it is unseemly to appeal to greedy geezers? Do they think that few older persons need governmental help? Or have they observed that older persons vote about the same as younger persons and are not worth a special appeal? For the first time, the issue of intergenerational equity has been raised, explicitly, as part of a presidential campaign. In her July 13 keynote speech to the 1992 Democratic convention, former Congresswoman Barbara Jordan asserted that federal mandatory entitlement programs (read Social Security and Medicare) must be cut by implementing measures of "generational equity." The next evening, in a television interview with Robin McNeil of the Public Broadcasting System, Governor Clinton said that he would probably seek "fuller taxation of Social Security benefits." On the other hand, neither of these statements was subsequently picked up by the national press. In fact, in a postconvention commentary, the editor-in-chief of the Washington Monthly chastised Clinton and Senator Al Gore for not challenging "the greedy geezers to give up benefits that they don't need" (Peters, 1992). Although the intergenerational equity theme has not been especially prominent, researchers could determine the extent to which older voters were aware of it and whether it was associated with their electoral behavior. If the trend of hostile public discourse toward older persons and programs on aging continues to flourish and intensify, at some point older persons may respond politically. The old-age group political consciousness posited by Bengtson and Cutler (1976) some years ago could manifest itself as a protective reaction to an antagonistic milieu. Whether and when such a reaction will take place are matters of conjecture. But an early reading on such a possibility would shed some light on the
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