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Notes Toward a Theory of Values: Values as Psychological

W. W. MEISSNER,

S.J.

In a previous discussion of the problem of values, 1 it became apparent that the problem of values stands in a kind of conceptual middle-ground upon which the spectrum of social sciences seemed to converge, T h e concept of value offers itself as a potential bridging concept in terms of which the contributions of the various social sciences can, at least in part, be integrated. Intention In terms of the formulation of such an integrative concept, it seems clear that the primary location of the value-system is in the human psyche. It is essential, therefore, that the primary meaning of value be established in relation to the structure and function of the psychic apparatus. In the current phase of the analysis, we are directing attention specifically to a clarification of the conTHE REv. W. W. MEISSNER,S.J., M.D., an advanced candidate at the Boston Psychoanalytic Institute, is affiliated with the Massachusetts Mental Health Center in Boston. He spent a year during 1966-67 as research fellow at the Cambridge Center for Social Studies. His published works include Annotated Bibliography in Religion and Psychology, Group Dynamics in the Religious Life (1965), and Foundations for a Psychology of Grace (1966). His The Psychology of Authority will be published by Sheed & Ward this year. This is the second of a series of three articles. The first, subtitled "The Place of Values," was published in the April issue; the third, subtitled "Values as Cultural," will appear later.

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cept of value regarded from a psychological perspective. The analysis undertaken here is not intended, therefore, in any exclusive sense, but rather is proposed as a more or less tentative formulation aimed at further elaboration of the psychic mechanisms involved in the formation and structure of values. The intention is thus integrative and focuses on one aspect of an admittedly complex question. The extension to other aspects of the problem of values and attempts at more concise integration, one hopes, lie ahead. The initial problem, which presents itself in the theoretical approach to values, is the problem of definition. The literature is overburdened with a bewildering melange of definitions and approaches, most of which focus on one or other aspect of the valuing process or its derivatives. The many approaches make a contribution in that individually they often illumine a particular aspect of values. But I have not been able to satisfy myself that any of the respective formulae are suitable for the task at hand. Nor have I been able to achieve any confidence in the utility of any single formulation as a basis for further theory.

Value and preference The first group of definitions share a tendency to reduce the value process to behavioral terms. Dewey was the original proponent of this view, and more or less equated values with behavioral choices.2 A more elaborate formulation stresses the goal-oriented quality of the choice situation and thus regards values as emerging from preferential decisions that are expressed for certain "end-states," as well as "ends-in-view" that help to realize these endstates2 Perhaps the most developed formulation in which values are cast in terms of choice or preferential behavior is that of Charles Morris. 4 Morris distinguishes three varieties of value: 1) Operative values are what people actually chose; they are the "tendencies or dispositions of living beings to prefer one kind of object rather than another. ''~ 2) Conceived values are what people conceive as desirable or preferable. 3) Object values are "what is preferable (or desirable) regardless of whether it is in fact preferred or conceived as preferable. ''6 Thus, "preferential behavior would then define the

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value field, and the various employments of the term 'value' w o u l d be explicated not as referring to different entities but as delineating different aspects of the value field. ''7 It is immediately apparent, of course, that values are somehow related to choice behavior as determining influences. But values are not limited to preferential behavior since values are not infrequently found in conflict with preference. Thus, the operative sense of value is inadequate. T h e desirable, moreover, whether in conceptual terms (conceived value) or in actual terms (object value), preserving the obvious distinction of desirable vs. desired, does not seem to me to be an adequate object for conceptualizing values. One can say that values pertain to what is desirable in the sense that what man values he also sees as desirable, but the valuing is somehow antecedent to the desirability, and in fact determines it. T h e decisive quality of values and value-judgments, moreover, is not that of a "wish," but of an "ought." T h e distinction between the feeling of liking and the feeling of obligation is expressed by Kluckhohn in allied terms: A value is not just a preference but is a preference which is felt and/or considered to be justified--"morally" or by reasoning or by aesthetic judgments, usually by two or all three of these. Even if a value remains implicit, behavior with reference to this conception indicates an undertone of the desirable--not just the desired. The desirable is what is felt or thought proper to want. s T h e attempt is to bring the note of obligation within the purview of the desirable. As Barton commented: The conception of values as any and all preferences tends to go with the conception of values as implicit and manifested by observable choices in behavior. The conception of values as standards which we feel are justified, to which people should adhere, focusses attention on verbal statements, and particularly on verbalizations which distinguish internal feelings of "ought" from those of "liking." The "sense of obligation" or "sense of value" is what distinguishes "normative values" in this sense from "mere preferences. ''9 While these latter authors are in agreement that the definition of value must include the sense of obligation, it is questionable that the desirable is adequate to encompass this sense. T h e r e is a qualitative gap between what is desirable

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and what is obligatory. If an object or action is "proper to want," it does not yet impose any obligation on him who wants. Value and need Another group of definitions point up the relationship between values and needs. Values in these terms are defined generically as needs or need-satisfying and are given a biological basis,x~ Thus Maslow sees biologically determined constitutional differences as preferenees in the ways in which an individual relates to himself, his culture, and his environment. These preferences are such as to generate values. 11 The entire hierarehy of values are responses to basic needs and are ultimately subordinated to the ultimate goal-value of selfactualization. Other authors speak of values as organized in terms of the need for fulfillment of individual capacities TM or even of the need for productive love of oneself and others. TM As Weisskopf astutely observed, such formulations already eontain an implicit value-judgment.~4 There is little room for doubt that valuation, as a psychological process, responds to basie needs at all levels of personality organization. But values are psychologically distinct from needs, in the first place, and not all needs can be regarded as giving rise to values. Thus, the basic nutritional need and its attendant sensations of hunger may give rise to specific forms of behavior calculated to satisfy the need, may create appetitive behavior with its physiological components, may intensify the desirability of certain edible objects, and may reinforee the wish-aspects of the organism's psychological state but none of this constitutes or gives rise to the value process. Appetitive, need-reducing, preferential behavior is not the equivalent of valuation. Value and motivation O t h e r theories have focused on the motivational aspect of values. Here we can place Gordon Allport and the other originators of the Study o~ Values15 who

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were essentially following the older view of SprangerY Allport sees values as beliefs upon which the individual acts by preference. Thus values serve the function of directing cognition and motivating behavior. Besides the obvious difficulty that values do not always motivate (e.g., impulsive behavior), there would seem to be a residual distinction between values and beliefs. Here again the two are closely related: beliefs of various kinds do embody and express values. But beliefs, whether religious or political or whatever kind they may be, carry the connotation of commitment to a cognitional system or understanding or conviction about something. The emphasis is primarily cognitional and implies cognitive assent, While values may be embedded in a system of beliefs (Tolman's belief-value matrix) 17, the belief organization of itself makes no commitment to a course of action and does not include any implication of obligation. As Kluckhohn puts it: "Values differ from ideas and beliefs by the feeling which attaches to values and by the commitment to action in situations involving possible alternatives. If you are committed to act on a belief, then there is a value element involved.''~8 The issue of motivation is a delicate one. There is no question that values are frequently a source of motivation--but not always. Further, not everything that motivates is a value. I think that the use of the term "value" in perceptual research, e.g., the intriguing studies of Bruner and Postman 19 on changes in perception as a function of estimates of "value," has highlighted some of the basic confusion in the use of the notion of value. "Value" in the Postman-Bruner type of study is really an estimate of objective value or desirability of an object. The values in question are undoubtedly motivating, but form a quite different category of intentionality from that which we are trying to delineate here. Value and cognition

Another important group of theories have emphasized the cognitive aspect of values. Smith, for example, refers to values as "conceptions of the desirable that are relevant to selective behavior. ''2~ Such conceptions may serve as

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standards of behavior that have the capacity to generate motivation. Smith's formulation, however, suffers from the limitation that its object need be no more than the object of choice of any kind. While it is presumably correct to say that the value as such is primarily conceptual, it is a concept that embraces more than desirability or preferability. A value is somehow normative and normativity somehow embraces desirability, but also goes beyond it. If values are not normative, they are meaningless as standards of behavior. Perhaps the most significant attempt to crystallize the concept of value has come from Kluckhohn and his associates? ~ Their formulation comes closest of any of the available conceptions to the concept of value toward which this study is aiming. According to these authors, "A value is a conception, explicit or implicit, distinctive of an individual or characteristic of a group, of the desirable which influences selection from available modes, means and ends of action. ''=2 The value is, then, a code or standard that enjoys persistence through time and serves to organize a system of action. As a conception, values are not directly observable but can be inferred or abstracted from behavioral events, i.e., preferential behavior. Values are, however, experiential events capable of introspective and reflective identification. This point touches upon a basic methodological issue, which remains pertinent to the psychology of values, even though attempts to define values in terms of preferential behavior would seem to be abortive attempts to achieve premature closure on this issue. The point is that values are not only inferable from behavior, but that other direct evidences are availableY Values, then, are fundamentally ideas that formulate action commitments. T h e y are thus distinct from sentiment, emotion, drives, needs, motives but not divorced from them. T h e y are consistently associated with elements of approval and disapproval. They deal with "justified preference," which Kluckhohn uses to include moral and aesthetic aspects. They are not always consciously or explicitly operative, but may function implicitly. T h e y may be thus inferable from behavior and not actually introspected. T h e y are, however, always introspectable. Moreover--and this is a most significant point --values are always verbalizable, capable of abstraction and rationalization.

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This aspect of value clearly distinguishes it from mere preferences, instincts, needs, attitudes, and sentiments. The proper object of value is characterized as the "desirable." But, as Kluckhohn clearly intends, the object of values is not only what is desired or desirable, but what ought to be desired. The formula has some weakness here, since the necessary efforts to explain the term "desirable" so modify it that it no longer means "that which can be desired." The concept of value clearly includes a normative, as opposed to merely existential, note; and while the present formula is intended to recognize this aspect of valuation, I think the formula is deficient. Moreover, as I have hinted before, the relation between values and the desirable is ambiguous. Desirability introduces the motivational component to the notion of value. Here Kluckhohn distinguishes between cathexis, as a short-term, limited, and impulse-related affective state, and value as a long-term, broader canalization of impulses in terms of wider and perduring goals. Values thus define the limits of permissible impulse satisfaction in relation to personal goals and cultural requirements. Values may be regarded as serving an integrative function in the psychic economy, organizing affective and conceptual functions in the service of action. As Kluckhohn indicates, "Values may be defined as that aspect of motivation which is referable to standards, personal or cultural, that do not arise solely out of immediate tensions or situations. ''24 One can argue, of course, that what is valued is always desirable in some sense. Even in the case of negative values, the object may be desirable and rejected as a result of a value-judgment, but one can reasonably argue that the value is really dealing with the desirable, i.e., the situation it chooses in rejecting the rejected-desirable object. "Desirable" has clearly different connotations in these respective uses. But the subject-predicate relation of valuedesirable is not adequate to define the concept of value. The logical relation would also define pleasure, love, and more. To close the definition, one must also be able to say that the desirable is valuable. Here it is clear that not all desirable things or objects are valued. The man who impulsively snatches

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a piece of candy is acting in reference to a desirable (and, in fact, desired) object, but his action has nothing to do with his values. It is clear that values are action-oriented and that they are operative in situations where the individual has the option of selecting one course of action out of a variety of real alternatives. The real alternatives are the possible, rather than the realistic, ones. Selection of a very difficult goal may require extraordinary efforts that we might regard as "unrealistic," yet they are still in the realm of possibility, and may reflect the individual's values. The available courses of action may be real in that sense, but may not be alternative. The compulsive, for example, may follow a real course of action, but his neurosis may preclude real selection (he is not free) so that the courses of action are not real alternatives. Values, therefore, would not be operative. Values are substantially operative not merely in preferential behavior (which is always referable to the desirable), but only in such preferential behavior in which an actual selection is made among real alternatives on the basis of normative concepts.

Recapitulation If we may recapitulate the elements of the notion of value that would seem useful for further theorizing, it is apparent that value is a fairly complex notion. It would seem to include the following dimensions: 1) Values are intrapsycbic and nonobservab!e. They can be introspected and experienced. This does not consider the sociocultural aspect of values, nor does it exclude them. However one interprets or understands cultural values, they must be derivative from individual values. This is true even though individual values are preceded by cultural values. This will become an important point for considerations of interactions of culture and personality, and interactions of cultural and individual value-systems. Individual values, in any case, are never totally congruent with social values. It is precisely the idiosyncratic character of individual values that makes change in cultural values possible.

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2) Values are a perdurable, more or less permanent aspect of psychic organization, Unlike many of the psychic mechanisms with which values are allied (emotions, attitudes, sentiments, etc.), values are more or less constant features of psychic organization. They have a long developmental history, they have an elaborate root-system reaching into the most primitive levels of the mind, and they share in the more or less permanent cast of the personality--at all stages of the life cycle. This does not mean that individual values cannot change. The mechanisms and conditions of such change are not well understood, but if change does occur, it would seem to require significant insight and motivation. This has been a problem in therapy from the beginning. Also, the mechanisms of cultural value change are poorly understood. This characteristic of the values or value-system justifies consideration of values as a structural aspect of the psychic apparatus, and we can properly speak of value-structure as a more 6r less perduring cognitive organization underlying the multiple functions of value-judgments. Specifically, they are classifiable as structures of secondary autonomy as defined by Hartmann 25 and RapaportY ~ 3) Values are intentional structures. They are, therefore, concepts, ideas. The intentionality of values is clearly unacceptable to behavioristieally oriented approaches to valuation, both because of the inherent difficulties in definition and because of the implications of the notion that general ideas, goals, and purposes can influence the course of behavior. The further implication of the conceptual nature of values is that they are both verbalizable and rationalizable. Values can be formulated and articulated, they can be expressed and communicated, discussed, argued, and debated. They can be supported with reasons, integrated with beliefs, buttressed with the accoutrements of intelligence and reason. It is in terms of this dimension of values that the interaction of personal value-systems and philosophical or religious value-orientations can take place. The role of ethics in this regard deserves some comment. The science of ethics, or moral philosophy, is (or ought to be) a realistically based and empirical study of the foundation and sources of the moral obligations in

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terms of which human life is ordered. Further, the ethical argument reaches a conclusion that is expressed in terms of obligation. Ethics, then, is a science that formulates values. It is, therefore, quite distinct from the psychology of values, which concerns itself with the formation and structure of values and does not, strictly speaking, arrive at any "ought" conclusions. Psychology does not formulate values. It is well to keep the distinction between the conceptual processes involved in ethics and the conceptual processes involved in valuation clear. The former is an objective, affect-independent reasoning process; the latter is a subjective, affect-involved and personally committing cognitive process. The relevance of the one to the other and the relation between them deserves study. 4) Values are explicit or implicit. They are neither fully conscious nor unconscious. They are rarely explicit and conscious at the moment of selection, but they are capable of explicitation. Rather than regarding implicit values as unconscious, we should regard them as preconscious elements of the mental topography. 5) Values are action-oriented. They operate in contexts in which a specific course of action is being selected or in which available means or approaches to a course of action are being considered. Kluckhohn speaks of the "modes, means and ends of action." Values are pertinent in those areas of conduct in which the individual finds himself faced with a decision about something to be done. The value-system operates specifically at the level of decision, presumably secondarily influencing the level of action as well, but only actually influencing behavior in the decision process. The decision as such directs the course of individual action and may also direct the actions of other individuals on the social level. The point should also be made that not all human actions are value-related. The individual agent may be acting on a nondecisional basis (impulsive behavior, compulsive behavior, drug states, certain organic states including psychomotor epilepsy, etc.) in which case his behavior is independent of the value-system. He may also suspend the decision process in the carrying out of routine activities. He can, however, at any point interrupt these activities

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by subjecting them to decisional organization and, in some instances, valuation. The former kind of nondecisional action is more resistant to decision and/or value. On a decisional level, moreover, the individual may decide upon a course of action that is consistent with the value standard, or he may decide to follow a course of action that violates the value standard. Thus we can speak of action as value-independent (nondecisional) or as value-dependent. Both of these categorizations might also be subdivided on a positivenegative basis as follows: Independent: positively negatively Dependent:

actions resistant to valuation actions not related to values but potentially relatable positively - - actions congruent with valuation negatively- actions incongruent with valuation

Value-dependent actions are always the result of a positive decision. 6) Values are goal-oriented. The decisional process in value-dependent situations involves a reference to objectives, purposes, ends, and goals. The value, therefore, has a telie dimension that sets it in relation to purposefully organized or organizable contexts of human activity. This vectorial quality of the value-system has a channelling effect in so far as it organizes or tends to organize the various drive-derivative aspects of personality and direct them toward specific goals. The goals in question enjoy varying degrees of importance, breadth, and extent of influence, and are determined by personal and cultural influences. Specifically, values are directive influences towards those goals that are more general and reflect the long-run organization and direction of the personality. The perdurability and quasi-permanence of values is an important consideration here. In consequence, not all goal-directed behavior can be said to be value-dependent. Preferential behavior of all kinds can be related to specific goals (satisfaction, tension-reduction), but valuation and preferential behavior are not coextensive. 7) Values are biologically derived. This point is a slippery one, but nonetheless valid. The relationship between values and biological needs is a difficult one, but it is one that deserves further exploration. Values are un-

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doubtedly important dimensions of personality organization. But the mental apparatus, even in its highly organized and elaborate forms of structure, is not divorced from the vital stratum of the mind. The value system, then, is built upon a biological substratum that is continually active. The valuestructure is both a response to fundamental needs of the organism and a directive influence towards goal-satisfactions that meet and correspond to these needs. The needs that are specifically in question are not the primary biologically dependent needs of the organism for food, sleep, sex, etc. They derive from the total organization of the human organism as a biopsychological entity. The needs for self-actuahzation (Maslow) or self-productive love (Fromm), for example, are needs of the total organism. They are, therefore, not independent of basically biological forces. Hence, values, in some poorly-defined and as yet ill-understood fashion, serve an adaptational function. They are on the one hand derivative from primary instinctual forces and biologically determined needs of the organism, and on the other hand they operate to organize and integrate the capacities of the organism for higher-order goal-directed behavior that satisfies fundamental needs of the total organism. 8) Values are motivational. They are not directly and of themselves sources of motivation, but they serve often an organizational and directive function in the channelling of energies. Kluckhohn comments, for example, that "value may be defined as that aspect of motivation which is referable to standards, personal or cultural, that do not arise solely out of immediate tensions or situations. ''27 Values are not the sources of energy, but they do perform a directive and integrative function. Specifically, values are operative in the integration of cognitive and affective dimensions of the personality. This important dimension of values has been underlined by the use of the term "desirable" in defining values. Values integrate the cognitive and the cathectic. Burthe investment of objects with energy implied in the notion of cathexis is not value-dependent unless the cathexis is directed and channelled in terms of more or less long-term goals. The channelling, moreover, is cognitional and decisional. Values, therefore,

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set limits on impulse gratification of all kinds in relation to an organized system of personal and cultural goals and standards. Further, and this is a most important aspect, they organize, direct, and integrate these same impulses, whether libidinal or aggressive, to adaptational ends. The intrapsychic value-system, therefore, is an adaptive structure i n the more elaborative levels of the mental apparatus, but it has close ties with the fundamental driving forces of human nature that derive from more primitive, energic levels of the mental organization. If we are to regard values, then, as concepts (see above), we must also add that they are concepts that have a dynamic function in the mental economy, and that their distinctive characteristic, as concepts, is that they are related to more primary, affective, and motivational forces of the psychic. 9) Values are Selective or decisional. Enough has been said on this aspect of values. I would only add that there may be some question about conformity to accepted values already established culturally. Action may be determined by values without an actual decision process being immediately related to it. Thus values can be implicit, but they are always capable of exphcitation. The further sticky problem lies at the level of the relation between individual and cultural values: Is the individual's participation in the cultural value-system always dependent on a decisional process in the individual? The value-system certainly has a developmental history that parallels psychic development as well as the enculturation of the personality. It would not seem reasonable to regard the developmental process as progressing on the basis of sequential decisions. The emerging individual does not make, and is really not capable of making, decisions about available directions of development until he evolves a personal decision-making capacity. He then becomes gradually capable of injecting himself into the complex interaction of developmental influences and giving the whole the stamp of his own individuality. This is very close to Erikson's concept of identity-formation as an active, dynamic intervention of the ego in a self-determining synthetic process. Value-formation, as I see it at the moment, must involve such a person-

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al decisional moment at some point in the developmental history. The process is obviously subject to all degrees of organization. The failure of the process is correlative to the failure of personality integration. Utterly conforming behavior, therefore, without decisional involvement--even if it is consistent with the value-system and orientation indigenous to the culture--must be regarded as value-consistent behavior, without being value-dependent. Whether such a situation is really possible is another question. 10) Values are normative. This is perhaps the most central and decisive note of the concept of value. The normative includes the notion of obligation. As normative concepts, values impose or propose an obligation, "Obligation" and its correlative "ought" are strong words. Needless to say, values do not always impose the strongest sense of obligation. Values, rather, share in degrees of "requiredness ''28 that place a demand on the person at almost any level of intensity. Many values are better expressed by a "should" than an "ought." It is not at all clear where the normative or required aspect of value stems from. This is a most problematic area of concern for the theory of values. Ultimately, I do not believe that the understanding of this aspect of values will be captured in any simplified formula. The forces at work are multiple and include psychological, social, and cultural factors. There is also the pertinent issue of what Vivas calls the "ontic status of value," the reality of values antecedent to our discovery of them. 29

Values and psy chic organization W e have conceptualized values as conscious or preconscious structural elements in the mental apparatus, This, along with their relation to judgmental functions, puts them in the category of ego-structures. The development and formation of value-structures is a vital part of the understanding of ego-development. Further, we can suggest that values share in the derivation of other ego-structures from pregenital levels of development . . . . . Moreover, in so far as values are inherently normative, they are in some

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sense dependent on or reflect superego functions. As Brierley commented, "But psycho-analysis shows that personal morality is the result of superego development through which cultural standards are individualized and operate as mental controls of instinct. ''~~ How ego and superego collaborate in the formation of values and in the operation of the value function is not at all clear. The question involves complex metapsychological considerations that touch on some of the most fundamental issues in the understanding of psychic structure. One can also cast the problem in a developmental perspective. Where do values become operative in personality functioning? What aspects of the psychic organization at various stages of development are pertinent for understanding formation of values? These are difficult questions. I would only suggest at this point that the developmental phase most closely related to value-formation is adolescence. Value-formation in a sense parallels and reflects the personality organization. Vivas, in fact, speaks of personality as "an integration of values" whose "growth is a growth in the values men recognize and from which they Select some for espousal. ''al T h e vicissitudes of value-formation, then, are the vicissitudes of personality in all its structural complexity and vital dynamism. If this effort has failed to achieve a definition of value, it has not thereby failed to articulate a concept of value. The concept may, I hope, serve as a basis for further exploration. The concept articulated here is essentially a psychological one that may give us access to a partial understanding of valuefunction in the psychic economy. It has, however, other dimensions that lie beyond our present scope. W e must keep both our concepts and our minds open to the possibilities of fuller understanding as other perspectives--social, cultural, economic, religious--can be brought to bear o n the problem. At least, the examination of the concept of value makes it clear that the problem of value is relevant to the concerns of psychoanalysis. W e may hope, then, that an analytic theory of value that will serve the purposes of further integration and understanding can be developed.

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References 1. Meissner, S. J., W. W., "Notes Toward a Theory of Values: The Place of Values," ]. Religian and Health, 1970, 9, 123-137. 2. Dewey, J., Theory of Valuation. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1939. 3. Woodruff, A. D., "Personal Values and the Direction of Behavior," Sch. Rev., 1942, )'0, 32-42. ~ and DiVesta. F. J., "The Relationship between Values, Concepts and Attitudes," Educ. Psychol, Meas., 1948, 8, 645-659. 4; Morris, C. W., "Axiology as the Science of Preferential Behavior." In Lepley, R., ed., Value: A Co-operative Inquiry. New York, Columbia University Press, 1949, pp. 211'222. , Varieties of Human Value. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1956. 5. ~ , Varieties of Human Value, op. air,, p. 10, 6. lbid, p. 11, 7. Ibid. 8. Kluckhohn, C., et al., "Values and Value-Orientations in the Theory of Acfon: A n Exploration in Definition and Classification," In Parsons, T., and Shils, E. A., eds., Toward a General Theory of Action. New York, Harper & Row, 1962, 388433 (p. 396). 9. Barton, A. H., "Measuring the Values of Individuals." In Review of Recent Research Bearing on Religious and Character Formations, Religious Education, 1962, supp. (July.August), 62-97 (p. 65). I0. Mace, C. A., "Homeostasis, Needs and Values," Brit. J. PsychoL, 1953, 44, 200210. Maslow, A. H., Motivation and Personality. N e w York, Harper & Row, 1954. , "Defi~ency Motivation and Growth Motivation." In Jones, M. R., ed., Nebraska Symposium on Motivation. Lincoln, University of Nebraska Press, 1955, pp. 1-31. 11. Maslow, "Psychological Data and Value Theory." In , ed., N e w Knowledge in Human Values. New York, Harper & Row, 1959, pp. 119-136. 12. Goldstein, K, "Health as Value." In Maslow, ed., op. cit., pp. 178-188. 13. Fromm, E., Man for Himself. New York, Rinehart, 1947. 9 14. Weisskopf, W. A ,. "Comment" . . In . Maslow, . ed, op cit, pp. 199-223. 15. Allport, G. W., et al., A Study of Values, rev. ed. Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1951. Cantril, H., and Allport, "Recent Applications of the Study of Values," J. Abn. Soc. Psychol., 1933, 28, 259-273. Vernon, P. E., and Allport, "A Test for Personal Values," ]. Abn. Soc. Psychol., 1931, 26, 233-248. 16. Spranger, E., Types of Men. Halle, Niemezis, 1928. !7 "l~olman, E. C., "A Psychological Model." In Parsons and Shils, eds., op. cir. (note 8), pp. 279-361. 18, Kluckhohn et al., op.,cit., p. 432. 19. Postman, L., et al., Personal Values as Selective Factors in Perception," J. Abn. Soc. Psych.ol., 1948, 43, 142-154. 20. Smith, M. B., "Personal Values in the Study of Lives." In White, R. W., ed., The Study of Lives, New York, Atherton Press, 1963, pp. 325-347.

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21. Kluckhohn et al., op, cit. 22. Ibid.,p. 395. 23. Meissner,. S. J,. W .W , ."The . Implications of,,Experience for Psycholo.gicai Theory," Phd. Phen. Res., 1966, 26, 503-528: - , The Operational Principle and Meaning in Psychoanalysis," Psychoanal. Quart., 1966, 3Y, 233-255, 24. Kluckhohn et al., op. tit., p. 425, 25. Hartmann, H., Ego Psychology and the Problem of Adaptation, New York, Inter. Univ. Press, 1958. 26. Rapaport, D., "The Structure of Psychoanalytic Theory: A Systematizing Attempt." In Koch, S., ed., Psychology: A Study of a Science, Vol. 3. New York, McGraw-Hill, 1959, pp. 55-183. 27. Kluckhohn et al., op. cit., p. 425. 28. Vivas, E., The Moral Life and the Ethical Life. Chicago, Regnery, 1963. 29. Ibid. 30. Brierley, M., "Notes on Psychoanalysis and Integrative Living," Int. 1. PsychoanaI., 1947, 28, 57-105. 31. Vivas, op. cit., pp. 61-62.

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