bs_bs_banner
354
Commentary
companies entering the market. However if, as seems quite possible, the federal prohibition ends in the next decade, then cigarette companies, perhaps by now purveyors primarily of e-cigarettes, might well enter the market. Their history of successful manipulation of the political and regulatory process for more than 50 years, until the 2008 Tobacco Control Act gave the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regulatory powers, suggests that they will be formidable opponents of public health oriented restrictions. Can other states be persuaded to adopt radically different models, in particular not allowing private enterprise participation in the marijuana business? A ‘grow your own’ regime allowing for gifts to friends may be the only way to prevent promotion; of course, it would also deny states the revenues they would so very much like to have. Apart from a few experts, there has been little interest in pushing either this option or state monopoly. As Room suggests, this is a cause worth taking up. Declaration of interests None. Keywords Cannabis function, lotteries.
legalization,
governmental
PETER REUTER
School of Public Policy and Department of Criminology, University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742-1821, USA. E-mail: [email protected] References 1. Room R. Legalizing a market for cannabis for pleasure: Colorado, Washington, Uruguay and beyond. Addiction 2014; 109: 345–51. 2. Wisman J. D. State lotteries: using state power to fleece the poor. J Econ Issues 2006; XL: 953–66. 3. Livingstone C., Adams P. J. Harm promotion: observations on the symbiosis between government and private industries in Australasia for the development of highly accessible gambling markets. Addiction 2011; 106: 3–8. 4. Clotfelter C., Cook P., Edel J., Moore M. State Lotteries at the Turn of the Century: Report to the National Gambling Impact Study Commission (CD-ROM). Washington, DC: National Gambling Impact Study Commission; 1999. 5. Clotfelter C, Cook P. J. Selling Hope: State Lotteries in America. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; 1989. 6. Nguyen H., Reuter P. How risky is marijuana possession? Considering the role of age, race and gender. Crime Delinq 2012; 58: 879–910. 7. Galston W., Dionne E. J. The New Politics of Marijuana Legalization: Why Opinion is Changing. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution; 2013. 8. Large M., Sharma S., Compton M. T., Slade T., Nielssen O. Cannabis use and earlier onset of psychosis: a systematic meta-analysis. Arch Gen Psychiatry 2011; 68: 555–61. © 2014 Society for the Study of Addiction
NEW REGULATED MARKETS FOR RECREATIONAL CANNABIS: PUBLIC HEALTH OR PRIVATE PROFIT? We live in interesting times regarding cannabis policy, with legal, regulated schemes for recreational cannabis under construction or being implemented in Uruguay, Colorado and Washington. For many years, cannabis policy has been dominated by flawed criminalization schemes which are expensive to the public purse and criminalize large numbers of otherwise largely law-abiding citizens, without adequately addressing cannabis as a public health issue [1]. It is now exciting to see fully legal models being put in place so the evidence can start to accrue to inform future considerations of cannabis law reform elsewhere. Many around the world will be watching to see how these schemes unfold and what impacts they have, both positively and negatively, in terms of cannabis use and harm and the costs and benefits of these systems of control. There will be unintended consequences, and none of the schemes should be treated as the definitive litmus test of regulated availability schemes. Rather, we should deconstruct them and focus upon the nuanced detail. Room alerts us that there are reasons to be worried [2] with, importantly, the apparent loss of a public health focus by those drafting regulations in the two US states in particular. A similar concern was raised in an interview with Ethan Nadelman, one of the driving forces of cannabis legalization in the United States, which was published in Rolling Stone in July 2013. Expressing a preference for ‘the microbrewery or vineyard model’ over the ‘Marlboro-ization of marijuana’, he is quoted thus: ‘I’m concerned now, because I see at my meetings, more and more of them are coming from the marijuana industry, . . . Some care about the broader principles. Some are just in it for the money’ [3]. Observers of the tobacco and alcohol industries will not be surprised. To take just one issue, we know from the alcohol and tobacco experience that how advertising and promotion are handled is likely to be one of the determinants of rates of use and harm at a macro level, and particularly use by children [4]. Some of those in favour of a taxed and regulated model for cannabis have argued that ‘cannabis advertising and marketing of all kinds should be banned from the outset’ [5]. As Room has noted, advertising is banned in the government-regulated pharmacy sale model in Uruguay [2], but the Colorado and Washington private enterprise schemes fall far short of this. The Colorado Department of Revenue, Marijuana Enforcement Division ‘determined that in order to prevent advertising that has a high likelihood of reaching minors, it is appropriate to model the Retail Marijuana Advertising restrictions on this voluntary standard used by the alcohol industry’ [[6], pp. 107–8]. Consequently, Addiction, 109, 352–359
bs_bs_banner
Commentaries
consistent with recommendations of the industry, the relevant regulations require that: ‘A Retail Marijuana Establishment shall not utilize television (or radio, or print) advertising unless the Retail Marijuana Establishment has reliable evidence that no more than 30 percent of the audience for the program (publication’s readership) on which the advertising is to air is reasonably expected to be under the age of 21’ [[6], p. 108]. Although there are restrictions on physical advertising under the Washington model [7], requirements regarding advertising in print and electronic media appear to be missing. We should not be surprised that the marijuana industry would lobby for treatment by the regulatory authority that would maximize its capacity to make money in a new, legal, recreational cannabis market. However, we should be concerned that regulatory authorities would adopt the voluntary standard of the Alcohol Industry with regard to marketing of this newly legal drug. Another fascinating aspect of the three models will be price. In Uruguay the head of the National Drugs Board, Julio Calzada, has been quoted as saying that the price of cannabis through pharmacies has been set at US$1 per gram, ‘to snatch the market away from the drug traffickers’ [8], whereas under the Washington scheme the average price at retail is estimated to be US$12 per gram before the application of a 25% excise tax [9], making it US$15 per gram. In Colorado the retail price will be set by the market, but Colorado regulators are embarking upon a survey of marijuana retailers to determine an average market rate on which to apply to grower-to-seller transfers in order to apply excise tax [10]. With contrasting models in Uruguay versus the Colorado and Washington schemes, there will be much to learn from the first 10 years of legal cannabis markets. One wonders whether the second decade will see the triumph of public health over private profit. Declaration of interests
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
355
-real-drug-czar-20130606 (accessed 27 July 2013). (Archived at http://www.webcitation.org/6MSy7St39 on 8 January 2014). Babor T., Caetano R., Casswell S., Edwards G., Giesbrecht N., Graham K. et al. Alcohol: No Ordinary Commodity—Research and Public Policy. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press; 2010. Wodak A. It’s time to tax. Of Substance 2013; 11: 10– 12. Available at: http://www.ofsubstance.org.au/images/ archive/pdf/OfSubstance_July_2013pdf (accessed 2 July 2013). (Archived at http://www.webcitation.org/ 6MSyVGMDl on 8 January 2014). Colorado Department of Revenue Medical Marijuana Enforcement Division (MMED). Permanent Rules Related to the Colorado Retail Marijuana Code. Denver, CO: Department of Revenue; 9 September 2013. Available at: http://www .colorado.gov/cs/Satellite?blobcol=urldata&blobheader= application%2Fpdf&blobkey=id&blobtable=MungoBlobs &blobwhere=1251883847085&ssbinary=true) (accessed 28 November 2013). (Archived at http://www.webcitation .org/6MSynTr5Z on 8 January 2014). Washington State Liquor Control Board. Chapter 314–55 WAC Marijuana Licenses, Application Process, Requirements, and Reporting. Olympia: Washington State Liquor Control Board; 2013. Available at: http://lcb.wa.gov/marijuana/ initiative_502_proposed_rules (accessed 3 December 2013). (Archived at http://www.webcitation.org/6MSzDbBi3 on 8 January 2014). Goni U. Uruguay sets price of legalised cannabis at $1 a gram. Guardian 23 October 2013. Available at: http:// www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/22/uruguay-legal -cannabis-1-dollar-gram (accessed 3 December 2013). (Archived at http://www.webcitation.org/6MSzVRewI on 8 January 2014). Washington State Liquor Control Board. FAQs on I-502. Olympia: Washington State Liquor Control Board. 2013. Available at: http://lcb.wa.gov/marijuana/faqs_i-502 (accessed 3 December 2013). (Archived at http://www .webcitation.org/6MSzmOgry on 8 January 2014). Ingold J. Colorado regulators want to know: How much does marijuana cost? Denver Post 14 November 2013. Available at: http://www.denverpost.com/marijuana/ ci_24523519/colorado-regulators-want-know-how-much -does-marijuana# (accessed 3 November 2013). (Archived at http://www.webcitation.org/6MT0CnbhM on 8 January 2014).
None declared. SIMON LENTON
National Drug Research Institute, Faculty of Health Sciences, Curtin University, Perth, Western Australia, Australia. E-mail: [email protected] References 1. Room R., Fischer B., Hall W., Lenton S., Reuter P. Cannabis Policy: Moving Beyond Stalemate. New York: Oxford University Press; 2010. 2. Room R. Legalizing a market for cannabis for pleasure: Colorado, Washington, Uruguay and beyond. Addiction 2014; 109: 345–51. 3. Dickinson T. Ethan Nadelmann: the real drug czar. Rolling Stone 6 June 2013. Available at: http://www .rollingstone.com/culture/news/ethan-nadelmann-the © 2014 Society for the Study of Addiction
TREATIES (PROBABLY) NOT AN IMPEDIMENT TO ‘LEGAL’ CANNABIS IN WASHINGTON AND COLORADO Voters in two states, Colorado and Washington, passed ballot initiatives in 2013 that made legal the cultivation, sale and recreational use of marijuana (with provisions for regulation and taxation to be determined). Marijuana remains illegal—a Schedule I controlled substance— under federal law. The tension between state and federal laws remains unresolved, in both principle and practice. Room [1] criticizes the designated regulatory agencies in Washington and Colorado (and similarly Uruguay, which legalized marijuana in December 2013) for ‘losing sight of the public health agenda’, as relatively little Addiction, 109, 352–359
This document is a scanned copy of a printed document. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material.
354
Commentary
companies entering the market. However if, as seems quite possible, the federal prohibition ends in the next decade, then cigarette companies, perhaps by now purveyors primarily of e-cigarettes, might well enter the market. Their history of successful manipulation of the political and regulatory process for more than 50 years, until the 2008 Tobacco Control Act gave the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regulatory powers, suggests that they will be formidable opponents of public health oriented restrictions. Can other states be persuaded to adopt radically different models, in particular not allowing private enterprise participation in the marijuana business? A ‘grow your own’ regime allowing for gifts to friends may be the only way to prevent promotion; of course, it would also deny states the revenues they would so very much like to have. Apart from a few experts, there has been little interest in pushing either this option or state monopoly. As Room suggests, this is a cause worth taking up. Declaration of interests None. Keywords Cannabis function, lotteries.
legalization,
governmental
PETER REUTER
School of Public Policy and Department of Criminology, University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742-1821, USA. E-mail: [email protected] References 1. Room R. Legalizing a market for cannabis for pleasure: Colorado, Washington, Uruguay and beyond. Addiction 2014; 109: 345–51. 2. Wisman J. D. State lotteries: using state power to fleece the poor. J Econ Issues 2006; XL: 953–66. 3. Livingstone C., Adams P. J. Harm promotion: observations on the symbiosis between government and private industries in Australasia for the development of highly accessible gambling markets. Addiction 2011; 106: 3–8. 4. Clotfelter C., Cook P., Edel J., Moore M. State Lotteries at the Turn of the Century: Report to the National Gambling Impact Study Commission (CD-ROM). Washington, DC: National Gambling Impact Study Commission; 1999. 5. Clotfelter C, Cook P. J. Selling Hope: State Lotteries in America. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; 1989. 6. Nguyen H., Reuter P. How risky is marijuana possession? Considering the role of age, race and gender. Crime Delinq 2012; 58: 879–910. 7. Galston W., Dionne E. J. The New Politics of Marijuana Legalization: Why Opinion is Changing. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution; 2013. 8. Large M., Sharma S., Compton M. T., Slade T., Nielssen O. Cannabis use and earlier onset of psychosis: a systematic meta-analysis. Arch Gen Psychiatry 2011; 68: 555–61. © 2014 Society for the Study of Addiction
NEW REGULATED MARKETS FOR RECREATIONAL CANNABIS: PUBLIC HEALTH OR PRIVATE PROFIT? We live in interesting times regarding cannabis policy, with legal, regulated schemes for recreational cannabis under construction or being implemented in Uruguay, Colorado and Washington. For many years, cannabis policy has been dominated by flawed criminalization schemes which are expensive to the public purse and criminalize large numbers of otherwise largely law-abiding citizens, without adequately addressing cannabis as a public health issue [1]. It is now exciting to see fully legal models being put in place so the evidence can start to accrue to inform future considerations of cannabis law reform elsewhere. Many around the world will be watching to see how these schemes unfold and what impacts they have, both positively and negatively, in terms of cannabis use and harm and the costs and benefits of these systems of control. There will be unintended consequences, and none of the schemes should be treated as the definitive litmus test of regulated availability schemes. Rather, we should deconstruct them and focus upon the nuanced detail. Room alerts us that there are reasons to be worried [2] with, importantly, the apparent loss of a public health focus by those drafting regulations in the two US states in particular. A similar concern was raised in an interview with Ethan Nadelman, one of the driving forces of cannabis legalization in the United States, which was published in Rolling Stone in July 2013. Expressing a preference for ‘the microbrewery or vineyard model’ over the ‘Marlboro-ization of marijuana’, he is quoted thus: ‘I’m concerned now, because I see at my meetings, more and more of them are coming from the marijuana industry, . . . Some care about the broader principles. Some are just in it for the money’ [3]. Observers of the tobacco and alcohol industries will not be surprised. To take just one issue, we know from the alcohol and tobacco experience that how advertising and promotion are handled is likely to be one of the determinants of rates of use and harm at a macro level, and particularly use by children [4]. Some of those in favour of a taxed and regulated model for cannabis have argued that ‘cannabis advertising and marketing of all kinds should be banned from the outset’ [5]. As Room has noted, advertising is banned in the government-regulated pharmacy sale model in Uruguay [2], but the Colorado and Washington private enterprise schemes fall far short of this. The Colorado Department of Revenue, Marijuana Enforcement Division ‘determined that in order to prevent advertising that has a high likelihood of reaching minors, it is appropriate to model the Retail Marijuana Advertising restrictions on this voluntary standard used by the alcohol industry’ [[6], pp. 107–8]. Consequently, Addiction, 109, 352–359
bs_bs_banner
Commentaries
consistent with recommendations of the industry, the relevant regulations require that: ‘A Retail Marijuana Establishment shall not utilize television (or radio, or print) advertising unless the Retail Marijuana Establishment has reliable evidence that no more than 30 percent of the audience for the program (publication’s readership) on which the advertising is to air is reasonably expected to be under the age of 21’ [[6], p. 108]. Although there are restrictions on physical advertising under the Washington model [7], requirements regarding advertising in print and electronic media appear to be missing. We should not be surprised that the marijuana industry would lobby for treatment by the regulatory authority that would maximize its capacity to make money in a new, legal, recreational cannabis market. However, we should be concerned that regulatory authorities would adopt the voluntary standard of the Alcohol Industry with regard to marketing of this newly legal drug. Another fascinating aspect of the three models will be price. In Uruguay the head of the National Drugs Board, Julio Calzada, has been quoted as saying that the price of cannabis through pharmacies has been set at US$1 per gram, ‘to snatch the market away from the drug traffickers’ [8], whereas under the Washington scheme the average price at retail is estimated to be US$12 per gram before the application of a 25% excise tax [9], making it US$15 per gram. In Colorado the retail price will be set by the market, but Colorado regulators are embarking upon a survey of marijuana retailers to determine an average market rate on which to apply to grower-to-seller transfers in order to apply excise tax [10]. With contrasting models in Uruguay versus the Colorado and Washington schemes, there will be much to learn from the first 10 years of legal cannabis markets. One wonders whether the second decade will see the triumph of public health over private profit. Declaration of interests
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
355
-real-drug-czar-20130606 (accessed 27 July 2013). (Archived at http://www.webcitation.org/6MSy7St39 on 8 January 2014). Babor T., Caetano R., Casswell S., Edwards G., Giesbrecht N., Graham K. et al. Alcohol: No Ordinary Commodity—Research and Public Policy. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press; 2010. Wodak A. It’s time to tax. Of Substance 2013; 11: 10– 12. Available at: http://www.ofsubstance.org.au/images/ archive/pdf/OfSubstance_July_2013pdf (accessed 2 July 2013). (Archived at http://www.webcitation.org/ 6MSyVGMDl on 8 January 2014). Colorado Department of Revenue Medical Marijuana Enforcement Division (MMED). Permanent Rules Related to the Colorado Retail Marijuana Code. Denver, CO: Department of Revenue; 9 September 2013. Available at: http://www .colorado.gov/cs/Satellite?blobcol=urldata&blobheader= application%2Fpdf&blobkey=id&blobtable=MungoBlobs &blobwhere=1251883847085&ssbinary=true) (accessed 28 November 2013). (Archived at http://www.webcitation .org/6MSynTr5Z on 8 January 2014). Washington State Liquor Control Board. Chapter 314–55 WAC Marijuana Licenses, Application Process, Requirements, and Reporting. Olympia: Washington State Liquor Control Board; 2013. Available at: http://lcb.wa.gov/marijuana/ initiative_502_proposed_rules (accessed 3 December 2013). (Archived at http://www.webcitation.org/6MSzDbBi3 on 8 January 2014). Goni U. Uruguay sets price of legalised cannabis at $1 a gram. Guardian 23 October 2013. Available at: http:// www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/22/uruguay-legal -cannabis-1-dollar-gram (accessed 3 December 2013). (Archived at http://www.webcitation.org/6MSzVRewI on 8 January 2014). Washington State Liquor Control Board. FAQs on I-502. Olympia: Washington State Liquor Control Board. 2013. Available at: http://lcb.wa.gov/marijuana/faqs_i-502 (accessed 3 December 2013). (Archived at http://www .webcitation.org/6MSzmOgry on 8 January 2014). Ingold J. Colorado regulators want to know: How much does marijuana cost? Denver Post 14 November 2013. Available at: http://www.denverpost.com/marijuana/ ci_24523519/colorado-regulators-want-know-how-much -does-marijuana# (accessed 3 November 2013). (Archived at http://www.webcitation.org/6MT0CnbhM on 8 January 2014).
None declared. SIMON LENTON
National Drug Research Institute, Faculty of Health Sciences, Curtin University, Perth, Western Australia, Australia. E-mail: [email protected] References 1. Room R., Fischer B., Hall W., Lenton S., Reuter P. Cannabis Policy: Moving Beyond Stalemate. New York: Oxford University Press; 2010. 2. Room R. Legalizing a market for cannabis for pleasure: Colorado, Washington, Uruguay and beyond. Addiction 2014; 109: 345–51. 3. Dickinson T. Ethan Nadelmann: the real drug czar. Rolling Stone 6 June 2013. Available at: http://www .rollingstone.com/culture/news/ethan-nadelmann-the © 2014 Society for the Study of Addiction
TREATIES (PROBABLY) NOT AN IMPEDIMENT TO ‘LEGAL’ CANNABIS IN WASHINGTON AND COLORADO Voters in two states, Colorado and Washington, passed ballot initiatives in 2013 that made legal the cultivation, sale and recreational use of marijuana (with provisions for regulation and taxation to be determined). Marijuana remains illegal—a Schedule I controlled substance— under federal law. The tension between state and federal laws remains unresolved, in both principle and practice. Room [1] criticizes the designated regulatory agencies in Washington and Colorado (and similarly Uruguay, which legalized marijuana in December 2013) for ‘losing sight of the public health agenda’, as relatively little Addiction, 109, 352–359
This document is a scanned copy of a printed document. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material.
