JYournal of medical ethics, I976, 2, 34-36
Analysis: An introduction to ethical concepts
Natural law
Three pictures of man In an ambitious attempt to integrate biology, Gerard J Hughes Heythrop College, University psychology and ethics, Thomas Hobbes regarded of London man as being, from one point of view, a pleasurepain machine. He then argued that ethics must therefore consist in the rational study of how the Definitions individual might best go about maximizing his The term 'natural law' has been used in the history pleasures and miniizing his pain. From this of philosophy to refer to a wide variety of different picture of man, he thought that it followed that views. Some of these are concerned with particular man had to be a moral egoist. But he was careful approaches to legislation in human society; others to point out that the enlightened egoist could not afford to be selfish, or unforgiving, or ungenerous are concerned with the connexion between moral philosophy and religious revelation. But those with or inconsiderate, and could not do without a state which I shall deal here are particular views within which enforced certain duties at law. In sharp contrast, Kant regards man as above all moral philosophy itself about the values and duties which we have, and the methods by which we might a rational agent, whose principal concerns are with justice and freedom. Moreover, while Kant does set about discovering them. not deny that the notion of happiness is required to make ultimate sense of morality, he resolutely Natural law theories refuses to interpret man's moral aims in terms Exactly which ethical theories can properly be simply of the satisfaction of physical or psychodescribed as natural law theories is perhaps a matter logical needs, stressing instead man's freedom and of terminology. I shall use the term to include all his autonomy as moral values which must above all those theories which share two basic assumptions: be respected. Kant's moral views differ from those first, that moral values and moral duties depend on of Hobbes precisely because they have quite the kind of being that man is; and secondly, that different pictures of what it is to be a human being in the first place. we can discover what man is by those processes of Yet a third picture of man is provided by Aristotle. rational and scientific reflexion which we employ in other areas of human knowledge. Each of these On this view, man is comparable to other living assumptions can, of course, be challenged. To the organisms, which flourish when, and only when, first, it might be retorted that no scientific de- each of their parts works properly and in harmony scription of man, however well elaborated, can ever with one another. Man is, of course, much more complex than a flower or an animal such as a dog; yield evaluative theories about what is good for him, nevertheless, man too wir flourish only when his or what he ought to do, or what an ideal man should be like. In short, one cannot derive an 'ought' from body, his emotions, and his intellect each is an 'is'. But the natural law philosopher would functioning as it should; and when man himself is simply reply to such an objection by saying that he functioning properly in a harmoniously organized can link morals to descriptions of man in a way society. This kind of functional approach to natural which carries conviction. A full discussion of this law is of particular importance, since, via Aquinas, problem (which afflicts other theories besides it was taken over by many Roman Catholic theonatural law theories) is beyond the scope of this logians, and developed into one of the most article; suffice it to say that the issue is currently influential of all natural law theories of ethics. I one over which there is considerable controversy. shall therefore examine it in somewhat more detail. To the second assumption, it might be replied that there is no one picture of man on which a A functional approach to natural law: The moral theory could (possibly) be based. And indeed concept of health in the history of moral philosophy there have been a bewildering variety of views each claiming to The analogy is perhaps seen at its best if we conpresent the picture of man and his morality. I shall sider a concept such as 'healthy'. To say of a man briefly mention two, and consider a third at some- that he is healthy is not just to describe his physical what greater length. condition - it is to say that he is in a desirable
Analysis 35 physical condition. Moreover, it is desirable just because it is the kind of condition it is. He is healthy just because each of the organs of his body is funct oning as it shou'ld, and in harmony with all the others. Each organ has a 'purpose', and if it fails in this purpose the body as a whole will not succeed in functioning so well. It might further be suggested that we might in principle be able to approach the matter the other way round. We might be able to say - for example, in the case of the fossil remains of some extinct animal - what it would have been like for that animal to function at its best by a careful examination of its various organs and so on. In a similar way, some natural law philosophers have argued that we can discover what human happiness consists in either by looking at happy people or by an examination of the various features of human nature in order to see their role or purpose in the functioning of the whole man. A functional analysis of health works reasonably well, I suggest, because it is comparatively easy to discover what the purpose of the various bodily organs is, and exactly how they interact with one another. Some organs have only one purpose, like the heart; others have more than one, such as the nose; and others again have purposes which are highly complex, like the brain or the endocrine glands. It is possible to give an uncontroversial account of what they are for. Moreover, to say that, other things being equal, it is preferable to be healthy than unhealthy is to say something which there is no point in challenging.
The extension into the moral field Up to a point, it is not particularly difficult to extend this analogy into the moral field. Once it is admitted that the kind of being a man is can be taken as the basis of certain moral duties, it can be argued that it is immoral, other things being equal, to impede the natural functions of the various organs on which a man's health depends. People have a right to food, shelter and competent medical treatment precisely because they will not function so well if they are denied these things. One might even go further and argue that we have a duty to give people affection, support and a fairly clear role in society, since any great measure of deprivation in these areas produces neurosis or psychosis; and one could interpret these illnesses as failures to function properly on an emotional and social level. The boundaries here may be less sharply drawn, and the sense of 'function' less clearly defined than in biology and physiology. Nevertheless, we are clear about many instances of mental illness and about the wrongness of treating people in such a way that they become mentally ill; and the functional analogy is by no means entirely unhelpful, at least as a model. The difficulties arise when the analogy is extended
still further. One might wish to say that it is wrong for a man to be an expert housebreaker; but there is surely a clear sense in which, when he is engaged upon his trade, he is functioning extremely well his reflexes are sharp, he does not allow his feelings to cloud his judgment, his intelligence is working at a very high level. The general point is that man can use his body and his emotions and his mind for many different purposes, some of which are good and some bad. Man's body, mind and emotions cannot be said to be 'for' a purpose in the clear and uncontroversial (even if at times complex) sense in which his heart, or his endocrine glands, are 'for' a purpose in relation to his health. Hence, those natural law philosophers who have argued that sex is 'for' the procreation of children and the expression of love, but not just 'for' pleasure, have been criticized on the grounds that it is by no means as easy to say what sex is for in a human life as it might be to say what the heart is for in the human body; the functional analogy seems to break down at this point, just as it does if we try to argue that the sense of touch is not 'for' the cracking of safes. Even if we admit that human fulfilment is analogous to bodily health, the contribution of the various elements in a human life is much more difficult to assess than the contribution to the human body of properly functioning organs. New bases for moral judgments according to natural law Indeed, the very process of assessment itself seems to differ considerably from the way in which we might seek to discover the proper function of our bodily organs with respect to health, because 'health' itself is a comparatively clear concept and 'human fulfilment' is not. Hence, it is comparatively easy to determine when something has gone wrong with our health (even if we are not always in a position to say just what), and much more difficult to say when a person is, or is not, living a life of fulfilment. Critics of natural law theories would argue at this point that what is to count as fulfilment is simply not something which can be discovered by any kind of scientific method, nor is it something which can be ascertained independently of some moral commitment. At any rate it is clear that the three versions of natural law theory which we have given as illustrations here are each much too simple to be at all satisfactory. Most natural law philosophers now would insist that any picture of man which is going to be at all adequate as the basis for moral judgments will have to be elaborated by means of a whole range of enquiries, involving psychology, sociology, economics and political theory as well as biology and purely philosophical reflection. And they would admit that our knowledge of man in his society, and of the kinds of life in which men might find fulfilment, is in many respects very inadequate.
36 Gerard J Hughes
The natural law approach to moral philosophy, Suggestions for further reading then, is best regarded not as a complete specification of the moral life, but as a spirit and a method of Macquarrie, J Three Issues in Ethics. London, (M970). approach to be employed in discussing moral Midgley, L C (I968). Beyond Human Nature. Brigh problems. It insists that the starting point for ethics Young University Press. is knowledge of human nature; and that this O'Connor, D J (I968). Aquinas and Natural Law. knowledge is to be gained as scientifically and London, Macmillan. critically as possible before any attempt is made to base moral conclusions upon it.
Analysis: An introduction to ethical concepts
Natural law
Three pictures of man In an ambitious attempt to integrate biology, Gerard J Hughes Heythrop College, University psychology and ethics, Thomas Hobbes regarded of London man as being, from one point of view, a pleasurepain machine. He then argued that ethics must therefore consist in the rational study of how the Definitions individual might best go about maximizing his The term 'natural law' has been used in the history pleasures and miniizing his pain. From this of philosophy to refer to a wide variety of different picture of man, he thought that it followed that views. Some of these are concerned with particular man had to be a moral egoist. But he was careful approaches to legislation in human society; others to point out that the enlightened egoist could not afford to be selfish, or unforgiving, or ungenerous are concerned with the connexion between moral philosophy and religious revelation. But those with or inconsiderate, and could not do without a state which I shall deal here are particular views within which enforced certain duties at law. In sharp contrast, Kant regards man as above all moral philosophy itself about the values and duties which we have, and the methods by which we might a rational agent, whose principal concerns are with justice and freedom. Moreover, while Kant does set about discovering them. not deny that the notion of happiness is required to make ultimate sense of morality, he resolutely Natural law theories refuses to interpret man's moral aims in terms Exactly which ethical theories can properly be simply of the satisfaction of physical or psychodescribed as natural law theories is perhaps a matter logical needs, stressing instead man's freedom and of terminology. I shall use the term to include all his autonomy as moral values which must above all those theories which share two basic assumptions: be respected. Kant's moral views differ from those first, that moral values and moral duties depend on of Hobbes precisely because they have quite the kind of being that man is; and secondly, that different pictures of what it is to be a human being in the first place. we can discover what man is by those processes of Yet a third picture of man is provided by Aristotle. rational and scientific reflexion which we employ in other areas of human knowledge. Each of these On this view, man is comparable to other living assumptions can, of course, be challenged. To the organisms, which flourish when, and only when, first, it might be retorted that no scientific de- each of their parts works properly and in harmony scription of man, however well elaborated, can ever with one another. Man is, of course, much more complex than a flower or an animal such as a dog; yield evaluative theories about what is good for him, nevertheless, man too wir flourish only when his or what he ought to do, or what an ideal man should be like. In short, one cannot derive an 'ought' from body, his emotions, and his intellect each is an 'is'. But the natural law philosopher would functioning as it should; and when man himself is simply reply to such an objection by saying that he functioning properly in a harmoniously organized can link morals to descriptions of man in a way society. This kind of functional approach to natural which carries conviction. A full discussion of this law is of particular importance, since, via Aquinas, problem (which afflicts other theories besides it was taken over by many Roman Catholic theonatural law theories) is beyond the scope of this logians, and developed into one of the most article; suffice it to say that the issue is currently influential of all natural law theories of ethics. I one over which there is considerable controversy. shall therefore examine it in somewhat more detail. To the second assumption, it might be replied that there is no one picture of man on which a A functional approach to natural law: The moral theory could (possibly) be based. And indeed concept of health in the history of moral philosophy there have been a bewildering variety of views each claiming to The analogy is perhaps seen at its best if we conpresent the picture of man and his morality. I shall sider a concept such as 'healthy'. To say of a man briefly mention two, and consider a third at some- that he is healthy is not just to describe his physical what greater length. condition - it is to say that he is in a desirable
Analysis 35 physical condition. Moreover, it is desirable just because it is the kind of condition it is. He is healthy just because each of the organs of his body is funct oning as it shou'ld, and in harmony with all the others. Each organ has a 'purpose', and if it fails in this purpose the body as a whole will not succeed in functioning so well. It might further be suggested that we might in principle be able to approach the matter the other way round. We might be able to say - for example, in the case of the fossil remains of some extinct animal - what it would have been like for that animal to function at its best by a careful examination of its various organs and so on. In a similar way, some natural law philosophers have argued that we can discover what human happiness consists in either by looking at happy people or by an examination of the various features of human nature in order to see their role or purpose in the functioning of the whole man. A functional analysis of health works reasonably well, I suggest, because it is comparatively easy to discover what the purpose of the various bodily organs is, and exactly how they interact with one another. Some organs have only one purpose, like the heart; others have more than one, such as the nose; and others again have purposes which are highly complex, like the brain or the endocrine glands. It is possible to give an uncontroversial account of what they are for. Moreover, to say that, other things being equal, it is preferable to be healthy than unhealthy is to say something which there is no point in challenging.
The extension into the moral field Up to a point, it is not particularly difficult to extend this analogy into the moral field. Once it is admitted that the kind of being a man is can be taken as the basis of certain moral duties, it can be argued that it is immoral, other things being equal, to impede the natural functions of the various organs on which a man's health depends. People have a right to food, shelter and competent medical treatment precisely because they will not function so well if they are denied these things. One might even go further and argue that we have a duty to give people affection, support and a fairly clear role in society, since any great measure of deprivation in these areas produces neurosis or psychosis; and one could interpret these illnesses as failures to function properly on an emotional and social level. The boundaries here may be less sharply drawn, and the sense of 'function' less clearly defined than in biology and physiology. Nevertheless, we are clear about many instances of mental illness and about the wrongness of treating people in such a way that they become mentally ill; and the functional analogy is by no means entirely unhelpful, at least as a model. The difficulties arise when the analogy is extended
still further. One might wish to say that it is wrong for a man to be an expert housebreaker; but there is surely a clear sense in which, when he is engaged upon his trade, he is functioning extremely well his reflexes are sharp, he does not allow his feelings to cloud his judgment, his intelligence is working at a very high level. The general point is that man can use his body and his emotions and his mind for many different purposes, some of which are good and some bad. Man's body, mind and emotions cannot be said to be 'for' a purpose in the clear and uncontroversial (even if at times complex) sense in which his heart, or his endocrine glands, are 'for' a purpose in relation to his health. Hence, those natural law philosophers who have argued that sex is 'for' the procreation of children and the expression of love, but not just 'for' pleasure, have been criticized on the grounds that it is by no means as easy to say what sex is for in a human life as it might be to say what the heart is for in the human body; the functional analogy seems to break down at this point, just as it does if we try to argue that the sense of touch is not 'for' the cracking of safes. Even if we admit that human fulfilment is analogous to bodily health, the contribution of the various elements in a human life is much more difficult to assess than the contribution to the human body of properly functioning organs. New bases for moral judgments according to natural law Indeed, the very process of assessment itself seems to differ considerably from the way in which we might seek to discover the proper function of our bodily organs with respect to health, because 'health' itself is a comparatively clear concept and 'human fulfilment' is not. Hence, it is comparatively easy to determine when something has gone wrong with our health (even if we are not always in a position to say just what), and much more difficult to say when a person is, or is not, living a life of fulfilment. Critics of natural law theories would argue at this point that what is to count as fulfilment is simply not something which can be discovered by any kind of scientific method, nor is it something which can be ascertained independently of some moral commitment. At any rate it is clear that the three versions of natural law theory which we have given as illustrations here are each much too simple to be at all satisfactory. Most natural law philosophers now would insist that any picture of man which is going to be at all adequate as the basis for moral judgments will have to be elaborated by means of a whole range of enquiries, involving psychology, sociology, economics and political theory as well as biology and purely philosophical reflection. And they would admit that our knowledge of man in his society, and of the kinds of life in which men might find fulfilment, is in many respects very inadequate.
36 Gerard J Hughes
The natural law approach to moral philosophy, Suggestions for further reading then, is best regarded not as a complete specification of the moral life, but as a spirit and a method of Macquarrie, J Three Issues in Ethics. London, (M970). approach to be employed in discussing moral Midgley, L C (I968). Beyond Human Nature. Brigh problems. It insists that the starting point for ethics Young University Press. is knowledge of human nature; and that this O'Connor, D J (I968). Aquinas and Natural Law. knowledge is to be gained as scientifically and London, Macmillan. critically as possible before any attempt is made to base moral conclusions upon it.
