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Measuring the phenomenology of autobiographical memory: A short form of the Memory Experiences Questionnaire a
Martina Luchetti & Angelina R. Sutin a
b
Department of Psychology, University of Bologna, Bologna, Italy
b
Department Behavioral Sciences and Social Medicine, Florida State University College of Medicine, Tallahassee, FL, USA Published online: 20 Apr 2015.
Click for updates To cite this article: Martina Luchetti & Angelina R. Sutin (2015): Measuring the phenomenology of autobiographical memory: A short form of the Memory Experiences Questionnaire, Memory, DOI: 10.1080/09658211.2015.1031679 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09658211.2015.1031679
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Memory, 2015 http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09658211.2015.1031679
Measuring the phenomenology of autobiographical memory: A short form of the Memory Experiences Questionnaire Martina Luchetti1 and Angelina R. Sutin2 1
Department of Psychology, University of Bologna, Bologna, Italy Department Behavioral Sciences and Social Medicine, Florida State University College of Medicine, Tallahassee, FL, USA
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2
(Received 9 January 2015; accepted 17 March 2015)
The Memory Experiences Questionnaire (MEQ) is a theoretically driven and empirically validated 63item self-report scale designed to measure 10 phenomenological qualities of autobiographical memories: Vividness, Coherence, Accessibility, Time Perspective, Sensory Details, Visual Perspective, Emotional Intensity, Sharing, Distancing and Valence. To develop a short form of the MEQ to use when time is limited, participants from two samples (N = 719; N = 352) retrieved autobiographical memories, rated the phenomenological experience of each memory and completed several scales measuring psychological distress. For each MEQ dimension, the number of items was reduced by one-half based on item content and item-total correlations. Each short-form scale had acceptable internal consistency (median alpha = .79), and, similar to the long-form version of the scales, the new short scales correlated with psychological distress in theoretically meaningful ways. The new short form of the MEQ has similar psychometric proprieties as the original long form and can be used when time is limited.
Keywords: Memory Experiences Questionnaire; Phenomenology; Autobiographical memory; Short-form development.
Autobiographical memories refer to events that are personally relevant—e.g., the first scientific publication for a young researcher—and include both episodic and semantic information about the self (Conway, 2005). Autobiographical memories vary on a number of qualities, such as how vividly images and emotions are re-experienced during recall (Rubin, Schrauf, & Greenberg, 2003). These phenomenological experiences are what allow individuals to travel back in time to consciously relive what happened in their past (Tulving, 2002) and are linked with important aspects of psychological functioning (Singer & Salovey, 1993).
Memory phenomenology varies across different types of memories and populations (D’Argembeau, Comblain, & Van der Linden, 2003; Montebarocci, Luchetti, & Sutin, 2014). Recent memories, for example, are typically perceived as vivid and emotionally intense compared to remote memories (Sutin & Robins, 2007), with individuals more likely to see the event in the memory through their own eyes rather than through the eyes of an outside observer (Eich, Handy, Holmes, Lerner, & McIsaac, 2011). Memories of meaningful life events (e.g., graduation day, marriage) tend to retain powerful phenomenological qualities over time. At the same time, phenomenology may also
Address correspondence to Martina Luchetti, Department of Psychology, University of Bologna, Viale Berti Pichat 5, Bologna 40127, Italy. E-mail: [email protected]
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LUCHETTI AND SUTIN
depend on individual differences. Phenomenology, for example, has been linked to relatively stable characteristics and psychological outcomes, such as personality traits (e.g., Rasmussen & Berntsen, 2010; Rubin & Siegler, 2004) and psychological distress (e.g., Robinaugh & McNally, 2010; Sutin & Gillath, 2009). There are several questionnaires available to assess phenomenology. Sutin and Robins (2007) developed the Memory Experiences Questionnaire (MEQ) to be a reliable, valid and comprehensive measure. To develop the MEQ, items were compiled from all of the commonly used measures of phenomenology at the time. Specifically, items were drawn from the Memory Characteristics Questionnaire (Johnson, Foley, Suengas, & Raye, 1988), the Autobiographical Memory Questionnaire (Rubin et al., 2003) and other single-item indicators often used in research on autobiographical memory. In addition, original items were created, where needed. Through a theoretical and empirical process, items were iteratively chosen to maximise coverage of the construct and have good psychometric properties. This process led to 63 items that assess 10 aspects of phenomenology: Vividness, Coherence, Accessibility, Time Perspective, Sensory Detail, Visual Perspective, Emotional Intensity, Sharing, Distancing and Valence. Some of these qualities (i.e., Visual Perspective and Distancing) were not assessed in earlier instruments. Since first developed, the full-length questionnaire or its individual scales have been used in several studies with student samples (e.g., Sutin & Robins, 2010; Sutin & Stockdale, 2011), community samples (e.g., Newby & Moulds, 2011a) and clinical populations (Newby & Moulds, 2011b; Werner-Seidler & Moulds, 2011). In addition to the MEQ, other scales have been recently developed with the aim to assess a similar set of phenomenological qualities (e.g., Boyacioglu & Akfirat, 2014). As such, there are a number of scales that vary in the number of dimensions and length that are available, and that testify researchers’ attempts toward a psychometrically sound assessment of phenomenology (Boyacioglu & Akfirat, 2014; Fitzgerald & Broadbridge, 2013; Sutin & Robins, 2007). Despite its comprehensiveness, the length of the MEQ poses some challenges. For example, studies of autobiographical memory commonly collect several memories; it thus places a significant burden on participants to complete the full 63 items for each memory. In addition, the length may be an issue in
specific populations when literacy, attention and cognition are limited (e.g., older adults, psychiatric patients). A number of studies have used shortened or modified versions (e.g., Grysman, Prabhakar, Anglin, & Hudson, 2013; Østby et al., 2012), as well as single items of the original scales (e.g., WernerSeidler & Moulds, 2012). A psychometrically sound short version of the MEQ would facilitate research on memory phenomenology. The first goal of this research is to validate such a measure. The second goal of this research is to examine the association between phenomenology and psychological distress in a non-clinical population. Memory phenomenology plays a key role in many clinical disorders. For example, individuals suffering from depression or trauma-related symptomatology tend to have limited access to specific event-knowledge information and tend to retrieve memories that are overgeneral (for reviews, see Sumner, 2012 and Williams et al., 2007). Such deficits have been associated with a worse course of depression (e.g., Hermans et al., 2008; see Sumner, Griffith, & Mineka, 2010), onset of subsequent depressive episodes (e.g., Kleim & Ehlers, 2008) and more severe posttraumatic stress symptoms (e.g., Kleim & Ehlers, 2008; Schönfeld, Ehlers, Böllinghaus, & Rief, 2007). Other phenomenological dimensions may also be associated with distress. The visual perspective through which people retrieve an event (i.e., from 1st person or 3rd person visual perspective) is associated with memory-related emotions (e.g., Valenti, Libby, & Eibach, 2011) and the integration of the event with broader selfknowledge. Retrieval of 1st person memories, for example, may be less frequent for specific clinical populations (e.g., patients with schizophrenia; Potheegadoo, Berna, Cuervo-Lombard, & Danion, 2013). Relatively few studies, however, have examined the association between distress and the full range of phenomenological dimensions in nonclinical samples. It should be noted, however, that the results tend to be similar across non-clinical and clinical populations, with the expected reduction in differences for some items in non-clinical populations (e.g., Rubin, Boals, & Berntsen, 2008 versus Rubin, Dennis, & Beckham, 2011). The present research uses data from two large samples of students (N = 719; N = 352) to address these aims. We first develop a short version of the MEQ that retains all 10 phenomenological dimensions and then examine how these dimensions are differentially associated with psychological distress. We sought to reduce the number of
A SHORT-FORM OF THE MEQ
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items from the original scales by one-half but maintain the content and psychometric qualities to be as close as possible to the full-length form. We selected items based on content and wording, and then assessed the internal consistency of the new scales and the correlation between each short scale and its full-length counterpart. We then examined the association between each of the 10 phenomenological dimensions measured with both the original and shortened MEQ and measures of psychological distress that are associated theoretically with memory phenomenology: depressive symptoms, trait anxiety and loneliness.
METHOD Participants and procedure Sample 1.1 A total of 719 students from a large public university participated (63.3% females; mean age = 19.9, range 17–46). Most of the participants (57.4%) were in their freshmen or sophomore year of college. Participants were asked to write about a general self-defining memory, and a subset of respondents (N = 546) also wrote about their earliest childhood memory. Sample 2. A total of 352 students from a large public university participated (74.7% females; mean age = 19.5, range 17–41). Most of the participants (68.1%) were in their freshmen or sophomore year of college. Participants were asked to write about a general self-defining memory and either a positive academic memory (N = 159) or a negative academic memory (N = 193).
Measures Memory phenomenology. For each memory, participants completed the original 63-item version of the MEQ. Participants rated each item from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). Coefficient alphas of the full-length scales showed good to excellent internal consistencies for each dimension (Table 1). Sample items for each of the 10 dimensions are listed below. 1
This sample partially overlaps with the sample reported in Sutin & Robins (2007).
3
Psychological distress. Prior to the collection of the autobiographical memory data, parti‐ cipants completed the trait subscale of the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI, Form T; Spielberger, Gorsuch, Lushene, Vagg, & Jacobs, 1983), the Mini-Mood and Anxiety Symptom Questionnaire (Mini-MASQ; Casillas & Clark, 2000; Keogh & Reidy, 2000) and the revised UCLA Loneliness Scale (Russell, Peplau, & Cutrona, 1980). The 20-item STAI-T is designed specifically to measure trait aspects of anxiety; each item (e.g., “I am tense”) is rated on a 4-point response scale (from almost never to almost always). In both samples, the STAI-T had a mean of 2.1 (SD = 0.4). The 26-item MiniMASQ measures current symptoms of psychological distress, including non-specific symptoms of general distress (General Distress), symptoms of physiological hyperarousal (Anxious Arousal) and lack of positive affect (Anhedonic Depression); each item is rated on a 5-point response scale (from not at all to extremely). Respectively for Samples 1 and 2, general distress had a mean of 2.4 (SD = .9) and 2.1 (SD = 0.8), anxious arousal had a mean of 1.7 (SD = .8) and 1.6 (SD = 0.7), and anhedonic depression had a mean of 2.5 (SD = .9) and 2.7 (SD = 0.9). The UCLA Loneliness Scale is a 20-item unidimensional measure of loneliness, with a 4-point response scale (from never to always). Sample 1 had a mean of 2.0 (SD = 0.6) and Sample 2 had a mean of 2.0 (SD = 0.5). Across both samples, alphas for the distress measures were ≥.86 (median = .91).
The development of MEQ Short Form (MEQ-SF) On the basis of item content/wording and itemtotal correlations, the original MEQ scales were reduced to approximately one-half of the items. Since the original scales had good internal consistency, there was strong evidence that each of the items was a good marker of its respective construct. As such, when we selected items for the short form, we chose items that maximised the coverage of the domain content. Of note, we did not choose the items that would yield the highest internal consistency because that would have led to redundant items that did not adequately sample from around the domain. This approach resulted in a total of 31
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LUCHETTI AND SUTIN TABLE 1 Reliability of MEQ scales and long- and short-form correlations Sample 1 SDM
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α Vividness 6-item 0.85 3-item 0.70 r 0.93 Coherence 8-item 0.79 4-item 0.64 r 0.91 Accessibility 5-item 0.84 3-item 0.79 r 0.94 Time Perspective 6-item 0.85 3-item 0.68 r 0.96 Sensory Details 8-item 0.72 4-item 0.45 r 0.87 Visual Perspective 6-item 0.88 3-item 0.81 r 0.95 Emotional Intensity 6-item 0.85 3-item 0.81 r 0.95 Sharing 6-item 0.89 3-item 0.88 r 0.95 Distancing 6-item 0.88 3-item 0.86 r 0.95
Sample 2 ECM
SDM
P Ac
N Ac
M (SD)
α
M (SD)
α
M (SD)
α
M (SD)
α
M (SD)
4.1 (.7) 3.9 (.8)
0.90 0.77 0.96
3.3 (.9) 3.2 (.9)
0.87 0.74 0.94
4.0 (.8) 3.8 (.9)
0.87 0.74 0.93
3.9 (.7) 3.6 (.7)
0.81 0.68 0.93
3.8 (.7) 3.5 (.8)
4.0 (.7) 3.9 (.8)
0.78 0.58 0.91
3.7 (.7) 3.6 (.7)
0.81 0.67 0.92
3.9 (.8) 3.7 (.9)
0.82 0.68 0.92
4.1 (.7) 3.9 (.8)
0.81 0.67 0.93
3.9 (.7) 3.8 (.8)
3.9 (.9) 4.0 (.9)
0.86 0.81 0.95
3.6 (.9) 3.6 (1.0)
0.89 0.83 0.96
3.9 (1.0) 4.0 (1.0)
0.87 0.82 0.96
3.7 (.9) 3.8 (.9)
0.81 0.72 0.95
3.8 (.9) 3.8 (.9)
3.7 (.9) 3.7 (1.0)
0.85 0.68 0.96
2.7 (1.0) 2.7 (1.0)
0.89 0.79 0.97
3.7 (1.0) 3.6 (1.0)
0.82 0.64 0.96
3.7 (.8) 3.7 (.9)
0.80 0.58 0.95
3.6 (.8) 3.6 (.9)
3.5 (.7) 3.4 (.7)
0.73 0.51 0.88
3.0 (.7) 3.0 (.8)
0.80 0.61 0.91
3.6 (.7) 3.6 (.8)
0.72 0.55 0.88
3.3 (.6) 3.2 (.7)
0.74 0.41 0.86
3.3 (.7) 3.2 (.7)
3.7 (1.0) 3.6 (1.1)
0.88 0.85 0.95
3.3 (1.0) 3.2 (1.1)
0.90 0.85 0.96
3.7 (1.0) 3.6 (1.1)
0.92 0.88 0.96
3.6 (1.0) 3.6 (1.1)
0.89 0.80 0.95
3.7 (.9) 3.6 (1.0)
3.9 (.8) 3.9 (1.0)
0.86 0.83 0.95
3.0 (.9) 2.9 (1.0)
0.89 0.84 0.96
3.9 (.8) 3.9 (.9)
0.87 0.80 0.96
3.3 (.8) 3.1 (.9)
0.86 0.86 0.95
3.5 (.9) 3.4 (1.0)
2.9 (1.1) 2.8 (1.2)
0.89 0.86 0.96
2.5 (1.0) 2.4 (1.1)
0.90 0.87 0.96
3.0 (1.1) 2.9 (1.2)
0.90 0.87 0.96
2.7 (1.0) 2.6 (1.1)
0.84 0.79 0.94
2.5 (.9) 2.4 (1.0)
2.4 (.9) 2.4 (1.1)
0.86 0.82 0.94
2.9 (.8) 2.9 (.9)
0.88 0.86 0.94
2.3 (.9) 2.4 (1.0)
0.83 0.80 0.93
2.1 (.7) 2.0 (.8)
0.83 0.86 0.93
2.7 (.8) 2.7 (1.0)
Note: α = Cronbach’s alpha; M (SD), Mean (Standard Deviation); r, Pearson’s correlation coefficient; SDM, Self-Defining Memory; ECM, Earliest Childhood Memory; P Ac, Positive Academic Memory; N Ac, Negative Academic Memory. N = 719 selfdefining memory and N = 546 childhood memory of Sample 1; N = 352 self-defining memory, N = 159 positive and N = 193 negative memory. All correlations were significant (ps < .001).
items,2 with a balanced number of positively and negatively keyed items across the scales. Three items (1 reverse-scored) were chosen for Vividness (e.g., “My memory for this event is vivid”); words as “vivid”, “detailed” and “dim” were preferred to “clear”, “vague” and “sketchy”. 2
Only two items were selected for the Valence dimension. The original six items for Valence were so highly correlated that two items (1 reverse-scored) were sufficient for this domain.
Four items (2 reverse-scored) were chosen for Coherence; we maintained items that refer to the specificity of the information retrieved, i.e., “This memory is of an event that occurred once at a particular time and place, not a summary or merging of many similar or related events”. Three items (2 reverse-scored) were chosen for Accessibility (e.g., “I had to think for a while before I could recall this event”); we avoided colloquial expressions such “sprang to my mind” or “memory bank” that might be difficult to translate into
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A SHORT-FORM OF THE MEQ
other languages. Three items (1 reverse-scored) were selected for Time Perspective (e.g., “My memory for the year when the event took place is vague”), each referring respectively to the “year”, “day” and “hour” in which the experience took place. Four items (2 reverse-scored) that specifically measured sensory information were selected for Sensory Details (e.g., “I can hear it in my mind”); in this case, we excluded items that referred to emotional feelings (e.g., “I can feel now the emotions that I felt then”) to avoid content overlap with Emotional Intensity, as well as items with particular linguistic expressions. Three items were also selected for Visual Perspective (2 reverse-scored; e.g., “I view this memory as if I was an observer to the experience”) and Emotional Intensity (1 reversedscored; e.g., “This memory does not evoke strong emotions in me”); items with redundant wording were removed. Three items were chosen for Sharing (1 reverse-scored) and Distancing (1 reverse-scored); those items that best capture the frequency of rehearsal (e.g., “I have talked about this event many times”) and perceived psychological distance of the event (e.g., “that’s not me anymore”) were included in the Sharing and Distancing short scales, respectively. For Valence, we selected two items (1 reverse-scored) referring to the general emotional tone of the memory. The Appendix lists the items on each of the 10 short scales.3
RESULTS The results are presented in two parts: (1) the internal consistency of the short form of each MEQ scale and the correlations with their fulllength counterparts and (2) the correlations between the short and long MEQ scales and the self-report measures of psychological distress.
MEQ-SF: Internal consistency coefficients and correlations with full-length scales Despite being much shorter, the scales remained internally consistent (Table 1). Across both 3
Of the items included in the short version of MEQ, 11 appear nearly verbatim to items in predated scales. Specifically, 9 items assessing Vividness, Time Perspective, Sharing and Valence originally appear in the MCQ (Johnson et al., 1988), and 2 additional items appear in the AMQ (Rubin et al., 2003).
5
samples, alpha reliabilities were generally above .70 (median = .79, range .41–.88). Similar to the full-length scales, and as expected, the alpha reliabilities for Coherence and Sensory Details were lower than for the other MEQ scales because of the breadth of these constructs. We next correlated each short scale with its fulllength counterpart; all correlations were high. With the exception of Sensory Details, all of the correlations between the short and full-length forms were ≥.91 (range = .91–.96). The Sensory Details scale had slightly lower correlations with its full-length counterpart across the memories (median r = .88, range = .86–.91) perhaps because the revised scale focused more on specific sensory experiences rather than emotional ones.
Associations of MEQ-SF and MEQ with psychological distress To further validate the short version of the MEQ and identify how phenomenology is associated with psychological distress, we next examined the associations between the short/long MEQ dimensions and symptoms of anxiety, depression and loneliness. Table 2 reports the correlation coefficients between the short form of the MEQ scales and each of the distress measures. The most consistent correlations across the two samples emerged for loneliness and anhedonic depression and the phenomenology of the general self-defining memory: participants who reported higher levels of loneliness and anhedonic depression reported that their memories were visually dim, incoherent, with a confused time perspective, fewer sensory details, and viewed from a 3rd person perspective. General distress was associated with retrieving general and childhood memories that were incoherent, inaccessible and psychologically distant; those with higher scores on general distress also tended to retrieve their general (but not childhood) memories as less vivid, less temporally clear and from an observer perspective. The phenomenological correlates of psychological distress were somewhat less clear for the valenced memories. In general, participants experiencing distress tended to rate their positively valenced memories as more from a 3rd person perspective (i.e., low Visual Perspective) and high in Distancing, and their negatively valenced memories as low in Accessibility.
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LUCHETTI AND SUTIN TABLE 2 MEQ-SF correlations with measures of distress
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Sample 1
Vividness (3 items) Trait Anxiety (STAI-T) General Distress (MASQ-GD) Anxious Arousal (MASQ-AA) Anhedonic Depression (MASQ-AD) Loneliness (UCLA-R) Coherence (4 items) Trait Anxiety (STAI-T) General Distress (MASQ-GD) Anxious Arousal (MASQ-AA) Anhedonic Depression (MASQ-AD) Loneliness (UCLA-R) Accessibility (3 items) Trait Anxiety (STAI-T) General Distress (MASQ-GD) Anxious Arousal (MASQ-AA) Anhedonic Depression (MASQ-AD) Loneliness (UCLA-R) Time Perspective (3 items) Trait Anxiety (STAI-T) General Distress (MASQ-GD) Anxious Arousal (MASQ-AA) Anhedonic Depression (MASQ-AD) Loneliness (UCLA-R) Sensory Details (4 items) Trait Anxiety (STAI-T) General Distress (MASQ-GD) Anxious Arousal (MASQ-AA) Anhedonic Depression (MASQ-AD) Loneliness (UCLA-R) Visual Perspective (3 items) Trait Anxiety (STAI-T) General Distress (MASQ-GD) Anxious Arousal (MASQ-AA) Anhedonic Depression (MASQ-AD) Loneliness (UCLA-R) Emotional Intensity (3 items) Trait Anxiety (STAI-T) General Distress (MASQ-GD) Anxious Arousal (MASQ-AA) Anhedonic Depression (MASQ-AD) Loneliness (UCLA-R) Sharing (3 items) Trait Anxiety (STAI-T) General Distress (MASQ-GD) Anxious Arousal (MASQ-AA) Anhedonic Depression (MASQ-AD) Loneliness (UCLA-R) Distancing (3 items) Trait Anxiety (STAI-T) General Distress (MASQ-GD) Anxious Arousal (MASQ-AA) Anhedonic Depression (MASQ-AD) Loneliness (UCLA-R)
Sample 2
SDM
ECM
SDM
–0.18** –0.12** –0.18** –0.17** –0.22**
–0.03 –0.04 0.02 –0.08 –0.10*
–0.07 –0.09 –0.08 –0.12* –0.13*
–0.10 –0.10 –0.02 –0.01 –0.01
–0.04 –0.07 –0.07 –0.09 –0.08
–0.17** –0.16** –0.16** –0.12** –0.23**
–0.22** –0.22** –0.18** –0.17** –0.22**
–0.08 –0.17** –0.13* –0.11* –0.15**
–0.18* –0.15 –0.27** –0.01 –0.09
–0.12 –0.13 –0.20** –0.09 –0.16*
–0.15** –0.13** –0.15** –0.12** –0.16**
–0.09* –0.10* –0.04 –0.11** –0.13**
–0.06 –0.13* –0.12* –0.07 –0.09
–0.14 –0.18* –0.07 –0.01 –0.17*
–0.15* –0.20** –0.19** –0.13 –0.26**
–0.15** –0.12** –0.11** –0.18** –0.17**
0.01 0.02 0.09* –0.12** –0.07
–0.01 –0.02 0.01 –0.11* –0.11*
–0.14 –0.08 –0.13 0.00 –0.12
–0.11 –0.11 –0.11 –0.15* –0.17*
–0.11* –0.07 –0.01 –0.14** –0.14**
0.01 0.02 0.08 –0.06 0.01
–0.02 –0.05 –0.02 –0.12** –0.13*
–0.07 –0.04 0.08 –0.10 0.04
–0.07 –0.05 0.10 –0.12 –0.10
–0.10* –0.10** –0.12** –0.12** –0.13**
–0.02 –0.05 –0.05 –0.09* –0.06
–0.16** –0.19** –0.19** –0.18** –0.18**
–0.10 –0.16* –0.21** –0.24** –0.03
–0.00 –0.13 –0.17* –0.03 –0.10
0.01 –0.04 –0.12** –0.10* –0.16**
0.11* 0.05 0.06 –0.07 0.00
0.09 0.03 –0.08 –0.09 –0.04
0.05 0.13 0.05 –0.00 –0.01
0.05 0.09 –0.03 –0.06 0.01
–0.09* –0.07 –0.06 –0.02 –0.03
0.00 –0.06 0.04 –0.02 –0.07
–0.04 –0.08 0.06 0.11* –0.07
–0.12 –0.08 0.03 0.14 –0.08
0.04 0.00 0.10 0.03 –0.07
0.07 0.10* –0.01 0.05 0.05
0.08 0.06 0.13* 0.05 0.09
0.21** 0.33** 0.26** –0.06 0.23**
–0.12 –0.10 –0.02 –0.11 –0.02
0.17** 0.12** 0.06 0.15** 0.17**
P Ac
N Ac
Note: SDM, Self-Defining Memory; ECM, Earliest Childhood Memory; P Ac, Positive Academic Memory; N Ac, Negative Academic Memory. N = 719 self-defining memory and N = 546 childhood memory of Sample 1; N = 352 self-defining memory, N = 159 positive and N = 193 negative academic memory. *p < .05. **p < .01.
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A SHORT-FORM OF THE MEQ
To examine whether the shortened MEQ scales had associations similar to their corresponding long form, we used Fisher’s r-to-z transformation and calculated the average difference between the transformed correlation coefficients of the long and short scales. Across memories, the median difference between the correlations was .01 for Time Perspective (range = .00–.05), Visual Perspective (range = .00–.05) and Sharing (range = .00–.04); .02 for Accessibility (range = .00–.04), Sensory Details (range = .00–.06) and Distancing (range = .00–.08); and .03 for Vividness (range = .00–.14), Coherence (range = .00–.06) and Emotional Intensity (range = .00–.08). As such, reducing the number of items did not alter substantially the correlates of the scales. And, despite the lower internal consistency, the correlations between the Sensory Details scale with the measures of distress were similar across the shortened and original versions, which suggest that the selected items sufficiently capture the elements of the construct.
DISCUSSION We present a 31-item version of the MEQ that retains all 10 phenomenological dimensions of the original scale. For each phenomenological dimension, the number of items was reduced by approximately one-half based on item content and item-total correlations. Each short-form scale had acceptable internal consistency (median alpha = .79), and each scale was highly correlated with its corresponding long-form scale (median r = .95). Moreover, correlations with measures of psychological distress showed largely similar associations with both the short and long forms of MEQ scales. Thus, the short form of the MEQ (MEQ-SF) is a theoretically driven, psychometrically sound measure of phenomenology. In addition to establishing the psychometric properties of the short form, our second goal was to examine how phenomenology is associated with psychological distress in a non-clinical population. Perhaps of greatest note, loneliness had the most consistent associations with phenomenology. Memories from early adulthood often have themes of intimacy/isolation (Conway & Holmes, 2004), and the phenomenology of such memories likely reflects the social difficulties associated with loneliness. Those who feel lonely may experience difficulties in social interactions and rely less on autobiographical memories in establishing and maintaining social relationships, reporting less
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intense memory phenomenology (i.e., less coherent, detailed, vivid, temporally clear memories and viewed from an observed perspective). For instance, sharing emotional details of a memory with a person may lead to more intimacy with that person; lacking in such social autobiographical telling may lead to impoverished relationships. Social isolation has been associated with poor cognitive function (Cacioppo & Hawkley, 2009), and it may be that cognitive deficits associated with loneliness also reduce phenomenology. Loneliness, however, was primarily unrelated to the Sharing dimension of the MEQ. The conversation/rehearsal frequency measured by the Sharing scale does not correspond exactly to a social (bonding) use of memories (Harris, Rasmussen, & Berntsen, 2014), which may be more likely related to perceived loneliness. Perhaps individuals experiencing loneliness try to share their memories with others but are unable to retrieve the phenomenologically rich memories that promote social connection. The MEQ dimensions had the expected theoretical associations with the other indices of distress. Consistent with the literature on depression and overgeneral memory (Sumner, 2012), the Coherence scale was associated consistently with greater distress. Coherence refers to retrieving the memory with an organised sequence of events that are not blended or merged. As such, participants who reported more symptoms of anxiety and depression subjectively experienced their memories as less coherent. A generic (vs. specific) retrieval style may play a role in developing and maintaining psychological distress, although findings may vary on the basis of the clinical relevance of symptoms (see Sumner, Griffith, & Mineka, 2010; e.g., Watson, Berntsen, Kuyken, & Watkins, 2013). Our results suggest that even individuals suffering from minor symptoms of distress but who do not necessarily meet the clinical definition of depression or anxiety are still vulnerable to incoherent memories. Of note, the pattern of correlations tended to be similar across the different measures of distress, which suggests that a general feeling of distress (versus specific manifestation) is associated with less phenomenologically intense memories. Across both samples, Visual Perspective was related consistently with current general distress, trait anxiety and loneliness, but only for the general memory. Specifically, individuals who reported distress tended to retrieve their general self-defining memories from the prospective of an
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external observer. Previous studies suggest that both currently and previously depressed adults are less likely to retrieve memories from a 1st person perspective (Bergouignan et al., 2008; Lemogne et al., 2006), especially when the memory is positively valenced. In contrast to the other types of distress that were only associated with an observer perspective in the general memory, symptoms of anxiety were associated with an observer perspective across all of the memories. Individuals suffering from anxiety tend to retrieve memories from a 3rd person perspective, especi‐ ally memories congruent with their anxiety (e.g., memories of social situation for social phobics; D’Argembeau, Van der Linden, d’Acremont, & Mayers, 2006). This association may extend to more mild forms of anxiety. Anxiety may lead to greater vigilance of the self, even in the retrieval of memories. Individuals high in anxiety may thus tend to retrieve their memories from an observer perspective in order to monitor the self. Though less explored, visual perspective is a relatively stable feature of phenomenology (Siedlecki, 2015) that is associated with emotional reactivity to past events. And, as such, it may serve a distancing function (for a review Sutin & Robins, 2008). An interesting pattern emerged for the phenomenological correlates of valenced memories versus unconstrained memories. Specifically, the phenomenological correlates of distress were more consistent and pronounced in the general self-defining memory than in the academic memory that was constrained by valence as well as domain. Though distress has a general effect on autobiographical memory (Rubin et al., 2008, 2011), in the present study, it appears more strongly related to phenomenology when the individual chooses what experience to recall, without any restriction on valence or domain. It may be somewhat easier for the individual to retrieve a memory when they are guided to a more specific event (e.g., a positive academic memory). Still, as to be expected, individuals who reported distress had positive memories that were more distanced from the self, presumably because positive memories are less consistent with their negative self views. In sum, despite its reduced length, the MEQ-SF preserves the psychometric proprieties of the original questionnaire and shows the expected associations with measures of psychological distress. The availability of a short form of the MEQ provides several advantages. First, it takes less
time to administer, which is critical when time is short and/or when multiple memories are assessed. Second, a shorter, more readable version of the MEQ is useful for populations that may be particularly difficult to test. Third, all 10 phenomenological dimensions can be assessed without having to rely on single items or having to choose between the scales. The short form of the MEQ will help facilitate research on memory phenomenology, in general, and its relation to psychological distress in particular.
DISCLOSURE STATEMENT No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.
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autobiographical memory recall is less frequent among patients with schizophrenia. Schizophrenia Research, 150, 88–92. doi:10.1016/j.schres.2013.07.035 Rasmussen, A. S., & Berntsen, D. (2010). Personality traits and autobiographical memory: Openness is positively related to the experience and usage of recollections. Memory, 18, 774–786. doi:10.1080/ 09658211.2010.514270 Robinaugh, D. J., & McNally, R. J. (2010). Autobiographical memory for shame or guilt provoking events: Association with psychological symptoms. Behavior Research and Therapy, 48, 646–652. doi:10.1016/j.brat.2010.03.017 Rubin, D. C., Boals, A., & Berntsen, D. (2008). Memory in posttraumatic stress disorder: Properties of voluntary and involuntary, traumatic and non-traumatic autobiographical memories in people with and without PTSD symptoms. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 137, 591–614. doi:10.1037/ a0013165 Rubin, D. C., Dennis, M. F., & Beckham J. C. (2011). Autobiographical memory for stressful events: The role of autobiographical memory in posttraumatic stress disorder. Consciousness and Cognition, 20, 840–856. doi:10.1016/j.concog.2011.03.015 Rubin, D. C., Schrauf, R. W., & Greenberg, D. L. (2003). Belief and recollection of autobiographical memories. Memory and Cognition, 31, 887–901. doi:10.3758/BF03196443 Rubin, D. C., & Siegler, I. C. (2004). Facets of personality and the phenomenology of autobiographical memory. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 18, 913–930. doi:10.1002/acp.1038 Russell, D., Peplau, L. A., & Cutrona, C. E. (1980). The revised UCLA loneliness scale: Concurrent and discriminant validity evidence. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 39, 472–480. doi:10.1037/ 0022-3514.39.3.472 Schönfeld, S., Ehlers, A., Bollinghaus, I., & Rief, W. (2007). Overgeneral memory and suppression of trauma memories in post-traumatic stress disorder. Memory, 15, 339–352. doi:10.1080/09658210701256571 Siedlecki, K. L. (2015). Visual perspective in autobiographical memories: Reliability, consistency, and relationship to objective memory performance. Memory, 23, 306–316. doi:10.1080/09658211.2014.885054 Singer, J. A., & Salovey, P. (1993). The remembered self. New York, NY: The Free Press. Spielberger, C. D., Gorsuch, R. L., Lushene, R., Vagg, P. R., & Jacobs, G. A. (1983). Manual for the stateTrait Anxiety Inventory (Form Y). Palo Alto, CA: Mind Garden. Sumner, J. A. (2012). The mechanisms underlying overgeneral autobiographicalmemory: An evaluative review of evidence for the CaR-FA-X model. Clinical Psychology Review, 32, 34–48. doi:10.1016/j. cpr.2011.10.003 Sumner, J. A., Griffith, J. W., & Mineka, S. (2010). Overgeneral autobiographical memory as a predictor of the course of depression: A meta-analysis. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 48, 614–625. doi:10.1016/j.brat.2010.03.013 Sutin, A. R., & Gillath, O. (2009). Autobiographical memory phenomenology and content mediate
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attachment style and psychological distress. Journal of Counseling Psychology, 56, 351–364. doi:10.1037/ a0014917 Sutin, A. R., & Robins, R. W. (2007). The phenomenology of autobiographical memory: The Memory Experiences Questionnaire. Memory, 15, 390–411. doi:10.1080/09658210701256654 Sutin, A. R., & Robins, R. W. (2008). When the “I” looks at the “Me”: Autobiographical memory, visual perspective, and the self. Consciousness and Cognition, 17, 1386–1397. doi:10.1016/j.concog.2008.09.001 Sutin, A. R., & Robins, R. W. (2010). Correlates and phenomenology of first and third person memories. Memory, 18, 625–637. doi:10.1080/09658211.2010.4 97765 Sutin, A. R., & Stockdale, G. D. (2011). Trait dissociation and the subjective affective, motivational, and phenomenological experience of self-defining memories. Journal of Personality, 79, 939–964. doi:10.1111/j. 1467-6494.2010.00708.x Tulving, E. (2002). Episodic memory: From mind to brain. Annual Review of Psychology, 53, 1–25. doi:10.1146/annurev.psych.53.100901.135114 Valenti, G., Libby, L. K., & Eibach, R. P. (2011). Looking back with regret: Visual perspective in memory images differentially affects regret for actions and inactions. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 47, 730–737. doi:10.1016/j.jesp. 2011.02.008 Watson, L. A., Berntsen, D., Kuyken, W., & Watkins, E. R. (2013). Involuntary and voluntary autobiographical memory specificity as a function of depression. Journal of Behavior Therapy and Experimental Psychiatry, 44, 7–13. doi:10.1016/j.jbtep.2012.06.001 Werner-Seidler, A., & Moulds, M. L. (2011). Autobiographical memory characteristics in depression vulnerability: Formerly depressed individuals recall less vivid positive memories. Cognition & Emotion, 25, 1087–1103. doi:10.1080/02699931.2010.531007 Werner-Seidler, A., & Moulds, M. L. (2012). Characteristics of self-defining memory in depression vulnerability. Memory, 20, 935–948. doi:10.1080/0965821 1.2012.712702 Williams, J. M. G., Barnhofer, T., Crane, C., Herman, D., Raes, F., Watkins, E., & Dalgleish, T. (2007). Autobiographical memory specificity and emotional disorder. Psychological Bulletin, 133, 122–148. doi:10.1037/0033-2909.133.1.122
APPENDIX A Memory Experiences Questionnaire – Short Form (MEQ–SF) VIVIDNESS 1. My memory for this event is very vivid. 2. My memory for this event is very detailed. 3. My memory for this event is dim (R).
COHERENCE 1. The order of events in the memory is clear. 2. This memory is of an event that occurred once at a particular time and place, not a summary or merging of many similar or related events. 3. This memory comes back to me in bits and pieces, not as a logical, coherent story (R). 4. This memory is a blending of many similar, related events rather than a specific memory about a particular event (R). ACCESSIBILITY 1. This memory was easy for me to recall. 2. It was difficult for me to think of this memory (R). 3. I had to think for a while before I could recall this event (R). TIME PERSPECTIVE 1. My memory for the day when the event took place is clear. 2. My memory for the hour when the event took place is clear. 3. My memory for the year when the event took place is vague (R). SENSORY DETAILS 1. As I remember the event, I can hear it in my mind. 2. When I recall this event, I think the same things I thought when the event originally happened. 3. My memory for this event does not involve a lot of sensory information (sounds, smells, tastes, etc.) (R). 4. As I remember the event, I have a difficult time recalling the particular physical reactions and sensations I had during the experience (R). VISUAL PERSPECTIVE 1. In my memory, I see this experience through my own eyes. 2. I view this memory as if I was an observer to the experience (R). 3. As I remember this event, I feel like an observer watching myself (R).
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EMOTIONAL INTENSITY
DISTANCING
1. My emotions are very intense concerning this event. 2. The memory of this event evokes powerful emotions. 3. This memory does not evoke strong emotions in me (R).
1. I feel like the person in this memory is a different person than who I am today. 2. When I recall this memory, I think, “that’s not me anymore.” 3. I feel like I am the same person in the memory as I am today (R).
SHARING
VALENCE
1. Since it happened, I have talked about this event many times. 2. I frequently think about or talk about this event with others. 3. I rarely tell others about this memory (R).
1. The overall tone of the memory is positive. 2. The overall tone of the memory is negative (R).
Memory Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/pmem20
Measuring the phenomenology of autobiographical memory: A short form of the Memory Experiences Questionnaire a
Martina Luchetti & Angelina R. Sutin a
b
Department of Psychology, University of Bologna, Bologna, Italy
b
Department Behavioral Sciences and Social Medicine, Florida State University College of Medicine, Tallahassee, FL, USA Published online: 20 Apr 2015.
Click for updates To cite this article: Martina Luchetti & Angelina R. Sutin (2015): Measuring the phenomenology of autobiographical memory: A short form of the Memory Experiences Questionnaire, Memory, DOI: 10.1080/09658211.2015.1031679 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09658211.2015.1031679
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Memory, 2015 http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09658211.2015.1031679
Measuring the phenomenology of autobiographical memory: A short form of the Memory Experiences Questionnaire Martina Luchetti1 and Angelina R. Sutin2 1
Department of Psychology, University of Bologna, Bologna, Italy Department Behavioral Sciences and Social Medicine, Florida State University College of Medicine, Tallahassee, FL, USA
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2
(Received 9 January 2015; accepted 17 March 2015)
The Memory Experiences Questionnaire (MEQ) is a theoretically driven and empirically validated 63item self-report scale designed to measure 10 phenomenological qualities of autobiographical memories: Vividness, Coherence, Accessibility, Time Perspective, Sensory Details, Visual Perspective, Emotional Intensity, Sharing, Distancing and Valence. To develop a short form of the MEQ to use when time is limited, participants from two samples (N = 719; N = 352) retrieved autobiographical memories, rated the phenomenological experience of each memory and completed several scales measuring psychological distress. For each MEQ dimension, the number of items was reduced by one-half based on item content and item-total correlations. Each short-form scale had acceptable internal consistency (median alpha = .79), and, similar to the long-form version of the scales, the new short scales correlated with psychological distress in theoretically meaningful ways. The new short form of the MEQ has similar psychometric proprieties as the original long form and can be used when time is limited.
Keywords: Memory Experiences Questionnaire; Phenomenology; Autobiographical memory; Short-form development.
Autobiographical memories refer to events that are personally relevant—e.g., the first scientific publication for a young researcher—and include both episodic and semantic information about the self (Conway, 2005). Autobiographical memories vary on a number of qualities, such as how vividly images and emotions are re-experienced during recall (Rubin, Schrauf, & Greenberg, 2003). These phenomenological experiences are what allow individuals to travel back in time to consciously relive what happened in their past (Tulving, 2002) and are linked with important aspects of psychological functioning (Singer & Salovey, 1993).
Memory phenomenology varies across different types of memories and populations (D’Argembeau, Comblain, & Van der Linden, 2003; Montebarocci, Luchetti, & Sutin, 2014). Recent memories, for example, are typically perceived as vivid and emotionally intense compared to remote memories (Sutin & Robins, 2007), with individuals more likely to see the event in the memory through their own eyes rather than through the eyes of an outside observer (Eich, Handy, Holmes, Lerner, & McIsaac, 2011). Memories of meaningful life events (e.g., graduation day, marriage) tend to retain powerful phenomenological qualities over time. At the same time, phenomenology may also
Address correspondence to Martina Luchetti, Department of Psychology, University of Bologna, Viale Berti Pichat 5, Bologna 40127, Italy. E-mail: [email protected]
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depend on individual differences. Phenomenology, for example, has been linked to relatively stable characteristics and psychological outcomes, such as personality traits (e.g., Rasmussen & Berntsen, 2010; Rubin & Siegler, 2004) and psychological distress (e.g., Robinaugh & McNally, 2010; Sutin & Gillath, 2009). There are several questionnaires available to assess phenomenology. Sutin and Robins (2007) developed the Memory Experiences Questionnaire (MEQ) to be a reliable, valid and comprehensive measure. To develop the MEQ, items were compiled from all of the commonly used measures of phenomenology at the time. Specifically, items were drawn from the Memory Characteristics Questionnaire (Johnson, Foley, Suengas, & Raye, 1988), the Autobiographical Memory Questionnaire (Rubin et al., 2003) and other single-item indicators often used in research on autobiographical memory. In addition, original items were created, where needed. Through a theoretical and empirical process, items were iteratively chosen to maximise coverage of the construct and have good psychometric properties. This process led to 63 items that assess 10 aspects of phenomenology: Vividness, Coherence, Accessibility, Time Perspective, Sensory Detail, Visual Perspective, Emotional Intensity, Sharing, Distancing and Valence. Some of these qualities (i.e., Visual Perspective and Distancing) were not assessed in earlier instruments. Since first developed, the full-length questionnaire or its individual scales have been used in several studies with student samples (e.g., Sutin & Robins, 2010; Sutin & Stockdale, 2011), community samples (e.g., Newby & Moulds, 2011a) and clinical populations (Newby & Moulds, 2011b; Werner-Seidler & Moulds, 2011). In addition to the MEQ, other scales have been recently developed with the aim to assess a similar set of phenomenological qualities (e.g., Boyacioglu & Akfirat, 2014). As such, there are a number of scales that vary in the number of dimensions and length that are available, and that testify researchers’ attempts toward a psychometrically sound assessment of phenomenology (Boyacioglu & Akfirat, 2014; Fitzgerald & Broadbridge, 2013; Sutin & Robins, 2007). Despite its comprehensiveness, the length of the MEQ poses some challenges. For example, studies of autobiographical memory commonly collect several memories; it thus places a significant burden on participants to complete the full 63 items for each memory. In addition, the length may be an issue in
specific populations when literacy, attention and cognition are limited (e.g., older adults, psychiatric patients). A number of studies have used shortened or modified versions (e.g., Grysman, Prabhakar, Anglin, & Hudson, 2013; Østby et al., 2012), as well as single items of the original scales (e.g., WernerSeidler & Moulds, 2012). A psychometrically sound short version of the MEQ would facilitate research on memory phenomenology. The first goal of this research is to validate such a measure. The second goal of this research is to examine the association between phenomenology and psychological distress in a non-clinical population. Memory phenomenology plays a key role in many clinical disorders. For example, individuals suffering from depression or trauma-related symptomatology tend to have limited access to specific event-knowledge information and tend to retrieve memories that are overgeneral (for reviews, see Sumner, 2012 and Williams et al., 2007). Such deficits have been associated with a worse course of depression (e.g., Hermans et al., 2008; see Sumner, Griffith, & Mineka, 2010), onset of subsequent depressive episodes (e.g., Kleim & Ehlers, 2008) and more severe posttraumatic stress symptoms (e.g., Kleim & Ehlers, 2008; Schönfeld, Ehlers, Böllinghaus, & Rief, 2007). Other phenomenological dimensions may also be associated with distress. The visual perspective through which people retrieve an event (i.e., from 1st person or 3rd person visual perspective) is associated with memory-related emotions (e.g., Valenti, Libby, & Eibach, 2011) and the integration of the event with broader selfknowledge. Retrieval of 1st person memories, for example, may be less frequent for specific clinical populations (e.g., patients with schizophrenia; Potheegadoo, Berna, Cuervo-Lombard, & Danion, 2013). Relatively few studies, however, have examined the association between distress and the full range of phenomenological dimensions in nonclinical samples. It should be noted, however, that the results tend to be similar across non-clinical and clinical populations, with the expected reduction in differences for some items in non-clinical populations (e.g., Rubin, Boals, & Berntsen, 2008 versus Rubin, Dennis, & Beckham, 2011). The present research uses data from two large samples of students (N = 719; N = 352) to address these aims. We first develop a short version of the MEQ that retains all 10 phenomenological dimensions and then examine how these dimensions are differentially associated with psychological distress. We sought to reduce the number of
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items from the original scales by one-half but maintain the content and psychometric qualities to be as close as possible to the full-length form. We selected items based on content and wording, and then assessed the internal consistency of the new scales and the correlation between each short scale and its full-length counterpart. We then examined the association between each of the 10 phenomenological dimensions measured with both the original and shortened MEQ and measures of psychological distress that are associated theoretically with memory phenomenology: depressive symptoms, trait anxiety and loneliness.
METHOD Participants and procedure Sample 1.1 A total of 719 students from a large public university participated (63.3% females; mean age = 19.9, range 17–46). Most of the participants (57.4%) were in their freshmen or sophomore year of college. Participants were asked to write about a general self-defining memory, and a subset of respondents (N = 546) also wrote about their earliest childhood memory. Sample 2. A total of 352 students from a large public university participated (74.7% females; mean age = 19.5, range 17–41). Most of the participants (68.1%) were in their freshmen or sophomore year of college. Participants were asked to write about a general self-defining memory and either a positive academic memory (N = 159) or a negative academic memory (N = 193).
Measures Memory phenomenology. For each memory, participants completed the original 63-item version of the MEQ. Participants rated each item from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). Coefficient alphas of the full-length scales showed good to excellent internal consistencies for each dimension (Table 1). Sample items for each of the 10 dimensions are listed below. 1
This sample partially overlaps with the sample reported in Sutin & Robins (2007).
3
Psychological distress. Prior to the collection of the autobiographical memory data, parti‐ cipants completed the trait subscale of the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI, Form T; Spielberger, Gorsuch, Lushene, Vagg, & Jacobs, 1983), the Mini-Mood and Anxiety Symptom Questionnaire (Mini-MASQ; Casillas & Clark, 2000; Keogh & Reidy, 2000) and the revised UCLA Loneliness Scale (Russell, Peplau, & Cutrona, 1980). The 20-item STAI-T is designed specifically to measure trait aspects of anxiety; each item (e.g., “I am tense”) is rated on a 4-point response scale (from almost never to almost always). In both samples, the STAI-T had a mean of 2.1 (SD = 0.4). The 26-item MiniMASQ measures current symptoms of psychological distress, including non-specific symptoms of general distress (General Distress), symptoms of physiological hyperarousal (Anxious Arousal) and lack of positive affect (Anhedonic Depression); each item is rated on a 5-point response scale (from not at all to extremely). Respectively for Samples 1 and 2, general distress had a mean of 2.4 (SD = .9) and 2.1 (SD = 0.8), anxious arousal had a mean of 1.7 (SD = .8) and 1.6 (SD = 0.7), and anhedonic depression had a mean of 2.5 (SD = .9) and 2.7 (SD = 0.9). The UCLA Loneliness Scale is a 20-item unidimensional measure of loneliness, with a 4-point response scale (from never to always). Sample 1 had a mean of 2.0 (SD = 0.6) and Sample 2 had a mean of 2.0 (SD = 0.5). Across both samples, alphas for the distress measures were ≥.86 (median = .91).
The development of MEQ Short Form (MEQ-SF) On the basis of item content/wording and itemtotal correlations, the original MEQ scales were reduced to approximately one-half of the items. Since the original scales had good internal consistency, there was strong evidence that each of the items was a good marker of its respective construct. As such, when we selected items for the short form, we chose items that maximised the coverage of the domain content. Of note, we did not choose the items that would yield the highest internal consistency because that would have led to redundant items that did not adequately sample from around the domain. This approach resulted in a total of 31
4
LUCHETTI AND SUTIN TABLE 1 Reliability of MEQ scales and long- and short-form correlations Sample 1 SDM
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α Vividness 6-item 0.85 3-item 0.70 r 0.93 Coherence 8-item 0.79 4-item 0.64 r 0.91 Accessibility 5-item 0.84 3-item 0.79 r 0.94 Time Perspective 6-item 0.85 3-item 0.68 r 0.96 Sensory Details 8-item 0.72 4-item 0.45 r 0.87 Visual Perspective 6-item 0.88 3-item 0.81 r 0.95 Emotional Intensity 6-item 0.85 3-item 0.81 r 0.95 Sharing 6-item 0.89 3-item 0.88 r 0.95 Distancing 6-item 0.88 3-item 0.86 r 0.95
Sample 2 ECM
SDM
P Ac
N Ac
M (SD)
α
M (SD)
α
M (SD)
α
M (SD)
α
M (SD)
4.1 (.7) 3.9 (.8)
0.90 0.77 0.96
3.3 (.9) 3.2 (.9)
0.87 0.74 0.94
4.0 (.8) 3.8 (.9)
0.87 0.74 0.93
3.9 (.7) 3.6 (.7)
0.81 0.68 0.93
3.8 (.7) 3.5 (.8)
4.0 (.7) 3.9 (.8)
0.78 0.58 0.91
3.7 (.7) 3.6 (.7)
0.81 0.67 0.92
3.9 (.8) 3.7 (.9)
0.82 0.68 0.92
4.1 (.7) 3.9 (.8)
0.81 0.67 0.93
3.9 (.7) 3.8 (.8)
3.9 (.9) 4.0 (.9)
0.86 0.81 0.95
3.6 (.9) 3.6 (1.0)
0.89 0.83 0.96
3.9 (1.0) 4.0 (1.0)
0.87 0.82 0.96
3.7 (.9) 3.8 (.9)
0.81 0.72 0.95
3.8 (.9) 3.8 (.9)
3.7 (.9) 3.7 (1.0)
0.85 0.68 0.96
2.7 (1.0) 2.7 (1.0)
0.89 0.79 0.97
3.7 (1.0) 3.6 (1.0)
0.82 0.64 0.96
3.7 (.8) 3.7 (.9)
0.80 0.58 0.95
3.6 (.8) 3.6 (.9)
3.5 (.7) 3.4 (.7)
0.73 0.51 0.88
3.0 (.7) 3.0 (.8)
0.80 0.61 0.91
3.6 (.7) 3.6 (.8)
0.72 0.55 0.88
3.3 (.6) 3.2 (.7)
0.74 0.41 0.86
3.3 (.7) 3.2 (.7)
3.7 (1.0) 3.6 (1.1)
0.88 0.85 0.95
3.3 (1.0) 3.2 (1.1)
0.90 0.85 0.96
3.7 (1.0) 3.6 (1.1)
0.92 0.88 0.96
3.6 (1.0) 3.6 (1.1)
0.89 0.80 0.95
3.7 (.9) 3.6 (1.0)
3.9 (.8) 3.9 (1.0)
0.86 0.83 0.95
3.0 (.9) 2.9 (1.0)
0.89 0.84 0.96
3.9 (.8) 3.9 (.9)
0.87 0.80 0.96
3.3 (.8) 3.1 (.9)
0.86 0.86 0.95
3.5 (.9) 3.4 (1.0)
2.9 (1.1) 2.8 (1.2)
0.89 0.86 0.96
2.5 (1.0) 2.4 (1.1)
0.90 0.87 0.96
3.0 (1.1) 2.9 (1.2)
0.90 0.87 0.96
2.7 (1.0) 2.6 (1.1)
0.84 0.79 0.94
2.5 (.9) 2.4 (1.0)
2.4 (.9) 2.4 (1.1)
0.86 0.82 0.94
2.9 (.8) 2.9 (.9)
0.88 0.86 0.94
2.3 (.9) 2.4 (1.0)
0.83 0.80 0.93
2.1 (.7) 2.0 (.8)
0.83 0.86 0.93
2.7 (.8) 2.7 (1.0)
Note: α = Cronbach’s alpha; M (SD), Mean (Standard Deviation); r, Pearson’s correlation coefficient; SDM, Self-Defining Memory; ECM, Earliest Childhood Memory; P Ac, Positive Academic Memory; N Ac, Negative Academic Memory. N = 719 selfdefining memory and N = 546 childhood memory of Sample 1; N = 352 self-defining memory, N = 159 positive and N = 193 negative memory. All correlations were significant (ps < .001).
items,2 with a balanced number of positively and negatively keyed items across the scales. Three items (1 reverse-scored) were chosen for Vividness (e.g., “My memory for this event is vivid”); words as “vivid”, “detailed” and “dim” were preferred to “clear”, “vague” and “sketchy”. 2
Only two items were selected for the Valence dimension. The original six items for Valence were so highly correlated that two items (1 reverse-scored) were sufficient for this domain.
Four items (2 reverse-scored) were chosen for Coherence; we maintained items that refer to the specificity of the information retrieved, i.e., “This memory is of an event that occurred once at a particular time and place, not a summary or merging of many similar or related events”. Three items (2 reverse-scored) were chosen for Accessibility (e.g., “I had to think for a while before I could recall this event”); we avoided colloquial expressions such “sprang to my mind” or “memory bank” that might be difficult to translate into
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A SHORT-FORM OF THE MEQ
other languages. Three items (1 reverse-scored) were selected for Time Perspective (e.g., “My memory for the year when the event took place is vague”), each referring respectively to the “year”, “day” and “hour” in which the experience took place. Four items (2 reverse-scored) that specifically measured sensory information were selected for Sensory Details (e.g., “I can hear it in my mind”); in this case, we excluded items that referred to emotional feelings (e.g., “I can feel now the emotions that I felt then”) to avoid content overlap with Emotional Intensity, as well as items with particular linguistic expressions. Three items were also selected for Visual Perspective (2 reverse-scored; e.g., “I view this memory as if I was an observer to the experience”) and Emotional Intensity (1 reversedscored; e.g., “This memory does not evoke strong emotions in me”); items with redundant wording were removed. Three items were chosen for Sharing (1 reverse-scored) and Distancing (1 reverse-scored); those items that best capture the frequency of rehearsal (e.g., “I have talked about this event many times”) and perceived psychological distance of the event (e.g., “that’s not me anymore”) were included in the Sharing and Distancing short scales, respectively. For Valence, we selected two items (1 reverse-scored) referring to the general emotional tone of the memory. The Appendix lists the items on each of the 10 short scales.3
RESULTS The results are presented in two parts: (1) the internal consistency of the short form of each MEQ scale and the correlations with their fulllength counterparts and (2) the correlations between the short and long MEQ scales and the self-report measures of psychological distress.
MEQ-SF: Internal consistency coefficients and correlations with full-length scales Despite being much shorter, the scales remained internally consistent (Table 1). Across both 3
Of the items included in the short version of MEQ, 11 appear nearly verbatim to items in predated scales. Specifically, 9 items assessing Vividness, Time Perspective, Sharing and Valence originally appear in the MCQ (Johnson et al., 1988), and 2 additional items appear in the AMQ (Rubin et al., 2003).
5
samples, alpha reliabilities were generally above .70 (median = .79, range .41–.88). Similar to the full-length scales, and as expected, the alpha reliabilities for Coherence and Sensory Details were lower than for the other MEQ scales because of the breadth of these constructs. We next correlated each short scale with its fulllength counterpart; all correlations were high. With the exception of Sensory Details, all of the correlations between the short and full-length forms were ≥.91 (range = .91–.96). The Sensory Details scale had slightly lower correlations with its full-length counterpart across the memories (median r = .88, range = .86–.91) perhaps because the revised scale focused more on specific sensory experiences rather than emotional ones.
Associations of MEQ-SF and MEQ with psychological distress To further validate the short version of the MEQ and identify how phenomenology is associated with psychological distress, we next examined the associations between the short/long MEQ dimensions and symptoms of anxiety, depression and loneliness. Table 2 reports the correlation coefficients between the short form of the MEQ scales and each of the distress measures. The most consistent correlations across the two samples emerged for loneliness and anhedonic depression and the phenomenology of the general self-defining memory: participants who reported higher levels of loneliness and anhedonic depression reported that their memories were visually dim, incoherent, with a confused time perspective, fewer sensory details, and viewed from a 3rd person perspective. General distress was associated with retrieving general and childhood memories that were incoherent, inaccessible and psychologically distant; those with higher scores on general distress also tended to retrieve their general (but not childhood) memories as less vivid, less temporally clear and from an observer perspective. The phenomenological correlates of psychological distress were somewhat less clear for the valenced memories. In general, participants experiencing distress tended to rate their positively valenced memories as more from a 3rd person perspective (i.e., low Visual Perspective) and high in Distancing, and their negatively valenced memories as low in Accessibility.
6
LUCHETTI AND SUTIN TABLE 2 MEQ-SF correlations with measures of distress
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Sample 1
Vividness (3 items) Trait Anxiety (STAI-T) General Distress (MASQ-GD) Anxious Arousal (MASQ-AA) Anhedonic Depression (MASQ-AD) Loneliness (UCLA-R) Coherence (4 items) Trait Anxiety (STAI-T) General Distress (MASQ-GD) Anxious Arousal (MASQ-AA) Anhedonic Depression (MASQ-AD) Loneliness (UCLA-R) Accessibility (3 items) Trait Anxiety (STAI-T) General Distress (MASQ-GD) Anxious Arousal (MASQ-AA) Anhedonic Depression (MASQ-AD) Loneliness (UCLA-R) Time Perspective (3 items) Trait Anxiety (STAI-T) General Distress (MASQ-GD) Anxious Arousal (MASQ-AA) Anhedonic Depression (MASQ-AD) Loneliness (UCLA-R) Sensory Details (4 items) Trait Anxiety (STAI-T) General Distress (MASQ-GD) Anxious Arousal (MASQ-AA) Anhedonic Depression (MASQ-AD) Loneliness (UCLA-R) Visual Perspective (3 items) Trait Anxiety (STAI-T) General Distress (MASQ-GD) Anxious Arousal (MASQ-AA) Anhedonic Depression (MASQ-AD) Loneliness (UCLA-R) Emotional Intensity (3 items) Trait Anxiety (STAI-T) General Distress (MASQ-GD) Anxious Arousal (MASQ-AA) Anhedonic Depression (MASQ-AD) Loneliness (UCLA-R) Sharing (3 items) Trait Anxiety (STAI-T) General Distress (MASQ-GD) Anxious Arousal (MASQ-AA) Anhedonic Depression (MASQ-AD) Loneliness (UCLA-R) Distancing (3 items) Trait Anxiety (STAI-T) General Distress (MASQ-GD) Anxious Arousal (MASQ-AA) Anhedonic Depression (MASQ-AD) Loneliness (UCLA-R)
Sample 2
SDM
ECM
SDM
–0.18** –0.12** –0.18** –0.17** –0.22**
–0.03 –0.04 0.02 –0.08 –0.10*
–0.07 –0.09 –0.08 –0.12* –0.13*
–0.10 –0.10 –0.02 –0.01 –0.01
–0.04 –0.07 –0.07 –0.09 –0.08
–0.17** –0.16** –0.16** –0.12** –0.23**
–0.22** –0.22** –0.18** –0.17** –0.22**
–0.08 –0.17** –0.13* –0.11* –0.15**
–0.18* –0.15 –0.27** –0.01 –0.09
–0.12 –0.13 –0.20** –0.09 –0.16*
–0.15** –0.13** –0.15** –0.12** –0.16**
–0.09* –0.10* –0.04 –0.11** –0.13**
–0.06 –0.13* –0.12* –0.07 –0.09
–0.14 –0.18* –0.07 –0.01 –0.17*
–0.15* –0.20** –0.19** –0.13 –0.26**
–0.15** –0.12** –0.11** –0.18** –0.17**
0.01 0.02 0.09* –0.12** –0.07
–0.01 –0.02 0.01 –0.11* –0.11*
–0.14 –0.08 –0.13 0.00 –0.12
–0.11 –0.11 –0.11 –0.15* –0.17*
–0.11* –0.07 –0.01 –0.14** –0.14**
0.01 0.02 0.08 –0.06 0.01
–0.02 –0.05 –0.02 –0.12** –0.13*
–0.07 –0.04 0.08 –0.10 0.04
–0.07 –0.05 0.10 –0.12 –0.10
–0.10* –0.10** –0.12** –0.12** –0.13**
–0.02 –0.05 –0.05 –0.09* –0.06
–0.16** –0.19** –0.19** –0.18** –0.18**
–0.10 –0.16* –0.21** –0.24** –0.03
–0.00 –0.13 –0.17* –0.03 –0.10
0.01 –0.04 –0.12** –0.10* –0.16**
0.11* 0.05 0.06 –0.07 0.00
0.09 0.03 –0.08 –0.09 –0.04
0.05 0.13 0.05 –0.00 –0.01
0.05 0.09 –0.03 –0.06 0.01
–0.09* –0.07 –0.06 –0.02 –0.03
0.00 –0.06 0.04 –0.02 –0.07
–0.04 –0.08 0.06 0.11* –0.07
–0.12 –0.08 0.03 0.14 –0.08
0.04 0.00 0.10 0.03 –0.07
0.07 0.10* –0.01 0.05 0.05
0.08 0.06 0.13* 0.05 0.09
0.21** 0.33** 0.26** –0.06 0.23**
–0.12 –0.10 –0.02 –0.11 –0.02
0.17** 0.12** 0.06 0.15** 0.17**
P Ac
N Ac
Note: SDM, Self-Defining Memory; ECM, Earliest Childhood Memory; P Ac, Positive Academic Memory; N Ac, Negative Academic Memory. N = 719 self-defining memory and N = 546 childhood memory of Sample 1; N = 352 self-defining memory, N = 159 positive and N = 193 negative academic memory. *p < .05. **p < .01.
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A SHORT-FORM OF THE MEQ
To examine whether the shortened MEQ scales had associations similar to their corresponding long form, we used Fisher’s r-to-z transformation and calculated the average difference between the transformed correlation coefficients of the long and short scales. Across memories, the median difference between the correlations was .01 for Time Perspective (range = .00–.05), Visual Perspective (range = .00–.05) and Sharing (range = .00–.04); .02 for Accessibility (range = .00–.04), Sensory Details (range = .00–.06) and Distancing (range = .00–.08); and .03 for Vividness (range = .00–.14), Coherence (range = .00–.06) and Emotional Intensity (range = .00–.08). As such, reducing the number of items did not alter substantially the correlates of the scales. And, despite the lower internal consistency, the correlations between the Sensory Details scale with the measures of distress were similar across the shortened and original versions, which suggest that the selected items sufficiently capture the elements of the construct.
DISCUSSION We present a 31-item version of the MEQ that retains all 10 phenomenological dimensions of the original scale. For each phenomenological dimension, the number of items was reduced by approximately one-half based on item content and item-total correlations. Each short-form scale had acceptable internal consistency (median alpha = .79), and each scale was highly correlated with its corresponding long-form scale (median r = .95). Moreover, correlations with measures of psychological distress showed largely similar associations with both the short and long forms of MEQ scales. Thus, the short form of the MEQ (MEQ-SF) is a theoretically driven, psychometrically sound measure of phenomenology. In addition to establishing the psychometric properties of the short form, our second goal was to examine how phenomenology is associated with psychological distress in a non-clinical population. Perhaps of greatest note, loneliness had the most consistent associations with phenomenology. Memories from early adulthood often have themes of intimacy/isolation (Conway & Holmes, 2004), and the phenomenology of such memories likely reflects the social difficulties associated with loneliness. Those who feel lonely may experience difficulties in social interactions and rely less on autobiographical memories in establishing and maintaining social relationships, reporting less
7
intense memory phenomenology (i.e., less coherent, detailed, vivid, temporally clear memories and viewed from an observed perspective). For instance, sharing emotional details of a memory with a person may lead to more intimacy with that person; lacking in such social autobiographical telling may lead to impoverished relationships. Social isolation has been associated with poor cognitive function (Cacioppo & Hawkley, 2009), and it may be that cognitive deficits associated with loneliness also reduce phenomenology. Loneliness, however, was primarily unrelated to the Sharing dimension of the MEQ. The conversation/rehearsal frequency measured by the Sharing scale does not correspond exactly to a social (bonding) use of memories (Harris, Rasmussen, & Berntsen, 2014), which may be more likely related to perceived loneliness. Perhaps individuals experiencing loneliness try to share their memories with others but are unable to retrieve the phenomenologically rich memories that promote social connection. The MEQ dimensions had the expected theoretical associations with the other indices of distress. Consistent with the literature on depression and overgeneral memory (Sumner, 2012), the Coherence scale was associated consistently with greater distress. Coherence refers to retrieving the memory with an organised sequence of events that are not blended or merged. As such, participants who reported more symptoms of anxiety and depression subjectively experienced their memories as less coherent. A generic (vs. specific) retrieval style may play a role in developing and maintaining psychological distress, although findings may vary on the basis of the clinical relevance of symptoms (see Sumner, Griffith, & Mineka, 2010; e.g., Watson, Berntsen, Kuyken, & Watkins, 2013). Our results suggest that even individuals suffering from minor symptoms of distress but who do not necessarily meet the clinical definition of depression or anxiety are still vulnerable to incoherent memories. Of note, the pattern of correlations tended to be similar across the different measures of distress, which suggests that a general feeling of distress (versus specific manifestation) is associated with less phenomenologically intense memories. Across both samples, Visual Perspective was related consistently with current general distress, trait anxiety and loneliness, but only for the general memory. Specifically, individuals who reported distress tended to retrieve their general self-defining memories from the prospective of an
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8
LUCHETTI AND SUTIN
external observer. Previous studies suggest that both currently and previously depressed adults are less likely to retrieve memories from a 1st person perspective (Bergouignan et al., 2008; Lemogne et al., 2006), especially when the memory is positively valenced. In contrast to the other types of distress that were only associated with an observer perspective in the general memory, symptoms of anxiety were associated with an observer perspective across all of the memories. Individuals suffering from anxiety tend to retrieve memories from a 3rd person perspective, especi‐ ally memories congruent with their anxiety (e.g., memories of social situation for social phobics; D’Argembeau, Van der Linden, d’Acremont, & Mayers, 2006). This association may extend to more mild forms of anxiety. Anxiety may lead to greater vigilance of the self, even in the retrieval of memories. Individuals high in anxiety may thus tend to retrieve their memories from an observer perspective in order to monitor the self. Though less explored, visual perspective is a relatively stable feature of phenomenology (Siedlecki, 2015) that is associated with emotional reactivity to past events. And, as such, it may serve a distancing function (for a review Sutin & Robins, 2008). An interesting pattern emerged for the phenomenological correlates of valenced memories versus unconstrained memories. Specifically, the phenomenological correlates of distress were more consistent and pronounced in the general self-defining memory than in the academic memory that was constrained by valence as well as domain. Though distress has a general effect on autobiographical memory (Rubin et al., 2008, 2011), in the present study, it appears more strongly related to phenomenology when the individual chooses what experience to recall, without any restriction on valence or domain. It may be somewhat easier for the individual to retrieve a memory when they are guided to a more specific event (e.g., a positive academic memory). Still, as to be expected, individuals who reported distress had positive memories that were more distanced from the self, presumably because positive memories are less consistent with their negative self views. In sum, despite its reduced length, the MEQ-SF preserves the psychometric proprieties of the original questionnaire and shows the expected associations with measures of psychological distress. The availability of a short form of the MEQ provides several advantages. First, it takes less
time to administer, which is critical when time is short and/or when multiple memories are assessed. Second, a shorter, more readable version of the MEQ is useful for populations that may be particularly difficult to test. Third, all 10 phenomenological dimensions can be assessed without having to rely on single items or having to choose between the scales. The short form of the MEQ will help facilitate research on memory phenomenology, in general, and its relation to psychological distress in particular.
DISCLOSURE STATEMENT No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.
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APPENDIX A Memory Experiences Questionnaire – Short Form (MEQ–SF) VIVIDNESS 1. My memory for this event is very vivid. 2. My memory for this event is very detailed. 3. My memory for this event is dim (R).
COHERENCE 1. The order of events in the memory is clear. 2. This memory is of an event that occurred once at a particular time and place, not a summary or merging of many similar or related events. 3. This memory comes back to me in bits and pieces, not as a logical, coherent story (R). 4. This memory is a blending of many similar, related events rather than a specific memory about a particular event (R). ACCESSIBILITY 1. This memory was easy for me to recall. 2. It was difficult for me to think of this memory (R). 3. I had to think for a while before I could recall this event (R). TIME PERSPECTIVE 1. My memory for the day when the event took place is clear. 2. My memory for the hour when the event took place is clear. 3. My memory for the year when the event took place is vague (R). SENSORY DETAILS 1. As I remember the event, I can hear it in my mind. 2. When I recall this event, I think the same things I thought when the event originally happened. 3. My memory for this event does not involve a lot of sensory information (sounds, smells, tastes, etc.) (R). 4. As I remember the event, I have a difficult time recalling the particular physical reactions and sensations I had during the experience (R). VISUAL PERSPECTIVE 1. In my memory, I see this experience through my own eyes. 2. I view this memory as if I was an observer to the experience (R). 3. As I remember this event, I feel like an observer watching myself (R).
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A SHORT-FORM OF THE MEQ
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EMOTIONAL INTENSITY
DISTANCING
1. My emotions are very intense concerning this event. 2. The memory of this event evokes powerful emotions. 3. This memory does not evoke strong emotions in me (R).
1. I feel like the person in this memory is a different person than who I am today. 2. When I recall this memory, I think, “that’s not me anymore.” 3. I feel like I am the same person in the memory as I am today (R).
SHARING
VALENCE
1. Since it happened, I have talked about this event many times. 2. I frequently think about or talk about this event with others. 3. I rarely tell others about this memory (R).
1. The overall tone of the memory is positive. 2. The overall tone of the memory is negative (R).
