LOGIC AS A T O O L FOR CLINICAL T R A I N I N G IN SOCIAL WORK Steven I. Miller, Ph.D. Rosemarie B. Bogal, MSW.
The paper is an attempt to illustrate the usefulness of logic as a technique in the clinical training of mental health professionals. The specific concepts that are examined include the nature of deductive and inductive reasoning, hypothesis testing, necessary and sufficient conditions, "if-then" propositions, and the nature of clinical evidence. Knowledge and use of these concepts was tested in a tutorial program directed toward students who were beginning graduate studies in the field of social work. Some of the difficulties encountered by these students, especially in the clinical aspects of their training, were directly related to an inadequate understanding of these logical forms of reasoning. It is suggested that a portion of the clinical training in mental health fields be directed towards a deeper understanding and utilization of these basic concepts. A l t h o u g h the field of social work has e x p a n d e d in recent years into m a n y new areas, such as community-based treatment and, clinically, the use o f small-group techniques, there is still a vital need to reemphasize the conceptual and theoretical foundations of clinical training. T h e major assumption of this paper is that the core of professional training must be established in a theoretical context which forms the basis for eventual practice in the field. This reemphasis o f the basic theoretical-clinical approach to social work is necessary in an era in which the profession is coming u n d e r increased pressure f r o m private and public agencies. T h e need for a high degree o f professionalism is especially crucial w h e n the Federal Governm e n t decides to restrict or abolish badly n e e d e d funds. I f a profession cannot justify itself in terms of vigorous clinical training, the tendency is for outside agencies to look critically at the services that the profession is supposed to provide, a n d divert f u n d i n g to other professional bodies. T h e r e is no d o u b t that the level of theoretical-clinical training in most professional schools o f social work is high. One of the problems, however, is that students entering the professional school often do not have a good f o u n d a t i o n in certain basic concepts and approaches related to the field. All reprint queries should be addressed to Dr. Miller at Loyola University, Department of Educational Foundations, School of Education, 820 No. Michigan Ave., Chicago, Illinois 60611. 18
PSYCHIATRIC QUARTERLY, VOL. 49(1) 1977
19 Steven I. Miller and Rosemarie B. Bogal
T h e result is that much valuable time and effort is spent on acquiring these techniques and skills-time that could be better used in other ways by both instructors and students. This problem of providing specific theoretical insights that may be useful as a foundation for later clinical work was discussed in a previous paper by the present author (Miller & Miller, 1971). Here some additional perspectives are discussed that grew out of a federally funded project directed toward minority students accepted in the M.S.W. program. The project involved a specially designed tutoring program to assist students with the practical and conceptual problems they would encounter in their professional training. One problem encountered was the difficulty students had grasping the more abstract concepts in such areas as research and psychopathology. There were also specific problems in relating theoretical concepts and interpretations to casework. In identifying and analyzing the areas where the students were having the most difficulty, it was found that a lack of previous training in theoretical approaches (especially in the social sciences) was the basis for many of their problems. In regard to the areas where remedial work was necessary, three broad patterns began to emerge: 1. Difficulty in distinguishing between deductive and inductive forms of reasoning. 2. Difficulty in understanding the nature of "if, then" propositions and the terms "necessary and sufficient" conditions. 3. Difficulty in understanding the idea of "hypothesis formulation" and the nature and use of evidence. These conceptual problems are probably obstacles to many students entering the field of social work, not only to minority students. What is involved here is not ethnicity, but the quality of education a student has received. This, in turn, is often related to a person's socioeconomic status (Havighurst & Neugerten, 1967; Moynihan & Hosteller, 1972). Thus in the tutoring program many of the students were suffering from the handicap of a poor educational background. A specific curricular recommendation evolving from the tutoring project was that a remedial course be required at the beginning of the individual's professional training which would emphasize the development of certain skills and approaches related to the problem areas mentioned. This course would attempt to integrate these general theoretical approaches with the more concrete problems of concept formation, composition, grammar, verbal facility, and so on. In order to see how these approaches might be integrated into a more formal course structure, the following will be an attempt to explicate the underlying assumptions of these areas and relate them to actual social work practice. A student entering professional training in social work should have some elementary working knowledge of the principles of logic. This is not
20 Logic as a Tool in Training
to suggest that social workers become logicians or vice versa. However, an u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f the principal forms o f correct reasoning is needed. More specifically, the ability to draw valid conclusions f r o m certain types o f evidence is a useful skill that has direct applicability to clinical practice. O n e major difficulty students had was trying to distinguish the concepts o f " t r u t h " a n d "validity" as applied to deductive reasoning (Ennis, 1969a, pp. 7-11). T h u s in the syllogism, All professors of social work are competent therapists. John Smith is a professor of social work. Therefore, John Smith is a competent therapist. there was difficulty in trying to u n d e r s t a n d that the a r g u m e n t was a valid f o r m of reasoning, but that the premises might not be necessarily true. T h e validity of a deductive a r g u m e n t as Salmon (1963, pp. 18-30) states, "depends solely u p o n the relation between the premises and the conclusion." He goes on to say: Validity is a property of arguments, which are groups of statements, not of individual statements. Truth, on the other hand, is a property of individual statements, not of arguments. It is meaningless to call an argument "true" and it is meaningless to call a single statement "valid." A deductive argument is invalid if there is any possibility that the premises could be true and the conclusion false. T h e students failed to see that if one accepts the premises as "given," then the conclusion must necessarily follow, when one is employing the rules o f correct deductive reasoning. A crucial variable here for students to grasp is that deductive reasoning is based on a set body o f rules that d e a l with what is known as "class reasoning." One way of u n d e r s t a n d i n g class reasoning is t h r o u g h the use of set theory (Brennan, 1961; Kerlinger, 1965, pp. 67-78). T h a t is, one is asking: Is this (John Smith) included in that (class of competent therapist)?; or is he excluded f r o m the class, or is he partially included or partially excluded in terms of the largest class of objects? This notion of class reasoning in deduction can be a useful tool for the social work student. I f he is presented with a series of statements as to the supposed causes o f a client's problem, can he analyze the a r g u m e n t as to its truth and validity? T h u s is it valid to reason that the origins of neurotic behavior can be exhibited in certain patterns of client behavior, and that if he sees a client acting in a certain m a n n e r , can he t h e n conclude that the client is indeed neurotic? T h e conclusion is perfectly justifiable if he accepts, for example, the theoretical-conceptual (perhaps Freudian) f r a m e w o r k of u n d e r s t a n d i n g neurotic behavior. Deductive reasoning as a f r a m e w o r k fbr latter clinical training gives the student a basis for questioning and examining the theoreticalconceptual assumptions of, for instance, the psychopathological expla-
21 Steven I. Miller and Rosemarie B. Bogal
nations o f h u m a n behavior. In the tutoring p r o g r a m m e n t i o n e d above, the d e v e l o p m e n t of logical reasoning skills could have been substantially improved. W h e t h e r the training in deductive logic is an i m p o r t a n t technique for the social work student is, o f course, an empirical question. However, observation o f the tutoring g r o u p indicated that indeed these techniques would have proved very useful as a basis ibr more advanced clinical work. In addition to a lack o f formal logical skills, the g r o u p had some difficulty in u n d e r s t a n d i n g the nature of inductive logic (Ennis, 1969b). Since the social-work professional is called u p o n (especially in a clinical setting) to generalize f r o m a variety of input information, the u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f the general nature of inductive reasoning becomes a vital analytical technique. T h e basic difference between the deductive and inductive approaches to truth is that, while a deductive a r g u m e n t is valid (correct) if the conclusion necessarily follows f r o m the premises, an inductive a r g u m e n t is always a probabilistic one. T h a t is, even if"our premises are true it is possible for o u r conclusion to be false. This of course is not possible in a deductive argument. T h e notion of "probabilistic" outcomes is especially i m p o r t a n t in terms of clinical practice. For instance, let us assume that the social-work student in a clinical setting comes in contact with x n u m b e r of clients that exhibit a similar f o r m of anxiety reaction. He then proceeds to construct the following argument: All clients exhibiting behaviors y can be labelled as persons having anxiety reactions (of some degree, i.e., strong, weak). Mr. Smith is exhibitng behavior y. Therefore, Mr. Smith is a victim of anxiety. Let us f u r t h e r say that the student has observed the behavior a n d assumed it to be the "cause" in 25% of the cases he has been exposed to. Can he then conclude that all of the clients he will see in the f u t u r e exhibiting this behavior pattern can be accurately diagnosed as having an "anxiety reaction?" Maybe he can. This t h e n is the basic dilemma in inductive reasoning: can one conclude on the basis of a given n u m b e r o f similar observations that the diagnosis is a correct one? This is sometimes referred to (Salmon, 1963, pp. 56-57) as the "fallacy o f insufficient statistics." This was one o f the serious problems e n c o u n t e r e d in the tutoring group. T h e following dialogue serves as an illustration: Tutor: Student: Tutor: Student:
John, I see you've written up the casework diagnosis you did on Mrs. Doe the other day. Yes, I have. I see that you concluded that Mrs. Doe's depression was a result of her poor self-concept that can, in turn, be traced to her parents showing more affection towards her younger sisters when they were growing up. Yes, that was my conclusion.
22 Logic as a Tool in Training
Tutor: Student: Tutor: Student: Tutor: Student: Tutor:
Student: Tutor: Student: Tutor:
Student:
How did you arrive at this conclusion? By talking with her about her early childhood experiences and what she thought about her parents. Is it possible, John, that you might have a very similar case in the future exhibiting the same characteristics? Yes. Would you conclude with the same diagnosis? Probably, yes. Would it be possible to have the same symptoms (depression) in a client with the similar family characteristics, but the symptoms being the result of some other factors? I'm not sure, maybe. Would it also be possible to have a client with a similar family situation but with different behavioral symptoms? Yes, I guess so. Well, then, can you be sure based on your observation that this was an accurate diagnosis? I still think so but I'm not as sure any more.
While the concern about inductive reasoning may appear to be an academic exercise, it does have value in that it forces the student to look m o r e closely at the clinical m e t h o d s he is employing a n d the conclusions he is drawing about his clients' behaviors. In the tutoring project, students had a tendency to overgeneralize on the basis of incomplete evidence. And, likewise, they would accept a limited n u m b e r o f observations on clients with similar problems as constituting the entire class of these problems. These difficulties resulted in an increased sense of ambiguity a n d anxiety on the part of some of the students. In terms of clinical training, some anxiety (if it is kept at manageable levels) might be a useful heuristic device to demonstrate to the beginning social work student that it is necessary to understand, at an increasingly sophisticated level, the complex relationships constantly evolving in the client-therapist relationship. In addition to grasping the general nature of deductive and inductive logic, two f u r t h e r i m p o r t a n t concepts should be mastered by the person entering professional training. These concepts, which are closely tied in with deductive a n d inductive reasoning, can be identified as "if, then" propositions and "necessary and sufficient" conditions (Berlo, 1960). It should be pointed out that these concepts often cause problems for students in almost all o f the social science areas. Yet, if they are mastered, they can be useful analytical techniques encompassing a variety of clinical situations. A part of the study of logic is concerned with the analysis of propositions that are called "conditionals." This f o r m of reasoning is also referred to as "sentence reasoning" because the a r g u m e n t (the premises) are stated as sente"nces (Salmon, 1963, pp. 21-52). This differs f r o m the more classical forms of deductive reasoning that, as was stated, deal with the idea of classes of objects. Sentence reasoning is called "conditional" because the major premise
23 Steven I. Miller and Rosemarie B. Bogal
o f the syllogism gives a condition for the o c c u r r e n c e o f s o m e t h i n g else. T h u s one could state a conditional in the following way: If John Doe is a graduate of a professional school of social work, then he will be able to do therapy. T h e conditional is m a d e u p o f two parts; the "if" part which sets the condition for the o c c u r r e n c e o f the " t h e n " part. T h u s , / f Mr. Doe has g r a d u a t e d f r o m a professional school o f social work, then we can assume he is capable o f d o i n g therapy. T h e "if' part o f the conditional is known, also, as the antecedent, while the " t h e n " part is called the "consequent." T h e standard f o r m o f a conditional is usually written as "if p, t h e n q" where the letters are c o n v e n i e n t designations for the two parts. As with s t a n d a r d forms o f deductive reasoning, there are valid and invalid forms o f conditionals (Ennis, 1969a, pp. 13-20). T h e r e are two valid and two invalid forms o f conditional sentence reasoning. In notational f o r m s they are: 1. I f p, t h e n q
P
q (valid); a f f i r m i n g the a n t e c e d e n t 2. I f p, t h e n q not q not p (valid); d e n y i n g the c o n s e q u e n t 3. I f p, t h e n q q p (invalid); a f f i r m i n g the c o n s e q u e n t 4. I f p, t h e n q not p not q (invalid); d e n y i n g the a n t e c e d e n t Using o u r original conditional: (1) I f Doe is a .graduate, then h e is a therapist. We a f f i r m he is a graduate, t h e r e f o r e we can conclude h e is a therapist. (2) I f he is a g r a d u a t e then, again, he must be a therapist. I f we say, o n the o t h e r h a n d , he is not a therapist, we can also conclude he is not a graduate. (3) H o w e v e r , if we affirm he is a therapist we c a n n o t assume he is a g r a d u a t e - - h e m a y not be a g r a d u a t e o f a professional school o f social work. (4) Likewise, if we say he is not a graduate, t h e n we c a n n o t say he is not a t h e r a p i s t - - h e could be a psychologist. In a clinical setting, we could have the following example: If x (manic-depression), then y (observable set of behaviors.) I f the social-work student is to follow the a r g u m e n t s above, he must first o f all have a working knowledge o f two additional concepts: necessary and sufficiem conditions. A sufficient condition is o n e in which t h e r e is e n o u g h (sufficient) evidence to draw a given conclusion: we d o not need
24 Logic as a Tool in Training
m o r e information. A necessary condition implies that b e f o r e we can draw a conclusion, we at least n e e d to have some i n f o r m a t i o n (evidence), but this i n f o r m a t i o n may not be e n o u g h (sufficient) for us to conclude with certainty that such-and-such is the case. Because o f space limitations, all the f o r m a l rules o f deductive reasoning could not be m e n t i o n e d . T h e s e conditional f o r m s were m e n t i o n e d because they illustrate the r e a s o n i n g process which is m o r e generally useful for social-work students. Again, the examples used are by no means indicative o f the complexity o f clinical training; they are m e r e l y used f o r illustrative purposes. In the above e x a m p l e we are saying that x is a sufficient condition for c o n c l u d i n g y. T h a t is, if we know x, we have all the evidence we n e e d to conclude y. T h e r e a s o n for assuming that x is a sufficient condition for y is that, presumably, we have a t h e o r y that establishes x as a sufficient "class" o f p h e n o m e n o n . For the relationships o f t h e o r y to hypothesis testing, see Dubin (1969). O n the o t h e r h a n d , b e f o r e we can conclude x it is necessary to u n d e r s t a n d y . T h a t is, we c a n n o t explain x, unlessy is present, that is,y is a necessary condition for the o c c u r r e n c e ofx. O n the o t h e r hand, y is not a sufficient condition because it is possible that x is being caused by some o t h e r factor, o r this factor in combination with others (Hempel, 1968). In combination with valid and invalid f o r m s o f conditional reasoning, the students most o f t e n b e c a m e t r a p p e d in examples o f the above type, that is, the fallacy o f affirming the consequent. While it was n o t practical to t u t o r the project students in the formal elements o f deductive and inductive logic, this particular logical fallacy was used as an e x a m p l e to d e m o n s t r a t e a c o m m o n p r o b l e m associated with b e g i n n i n g clinical study: Tutor:
Student: Tutor:
Student: Tutor: Student:
If you learn, in your professional training, that a client's particular behavior resembles the symptoms for a chronic anxiety reaction, is it justifiable to conclude that this is the client's actual problem? Probably. Could the client's behavior be caused by other factors? For example, is it possible that even though you know that a chronic anxiety reaction results in such-and-such behavior, that the behavior you see may be something else than this specific anxiety? Could it be that the behaviors may be a display of some other psychological problem? Yes. Then how do yo J know for sure that you are right in your diagnosis? Don't know for sure.
This t e n d e n c y to unwittingly c o m m i t the fallacy o f a f f i r m i n g the consequent, is a result, at least in part, o f not being able to u n d e r s t a n d two additional logical concepts; the notions o f hypothesis testing and evidence. T h e s e two ideas are most likely h a n d l e d adequately in the s t a n d a r d research courses o f f e r e d as p a r t o f the g r a d u a t e p r o g r a m in schools o f social work. O n e could m a k e the case, however, that the concepts could also be usefully i n t r o d u c e d in t u t o r i n g p r o g r a m s or in a general orientation course. T h e y could t h e n be e x p a n d e d u p o n in m o r e d e p t h in r e g u l a r research courses.
25 Steven I. Miller and Rosemarie B. Bogal
In the tutoring project, for instance, there was some difficulty in adequately grasping the idea of a hypothesis and how it is related to conditional reasoning in the broader framework of inductive logic. This is perhaps one of the most difficult concepts to introduce to students beginning clinical work, and, it could be argued, one of the most valuable. For the basis of any clinical technique is ultimately grounded in a conceptual scheme that deals with behavioral outcomes, and the evidence for concluding that the outcomes are capable of correct interpretation (Miller, 1971). The literature on hypothesis testing and evidence is vast and often technically complex (Blalock, 1972, pp. 109--116; Phillips, 1971). The purpose here is only to outline the general parameters of these ideas and try to integrate t h e m within the previously discussed framework. A hypothesis, in its most basic sense, is a conjectural statement concerning the relationship between two or more variables (Kerlinger, 1965, p. 14). It is a statement that attempts to predict the outcome of some future state of affairs. The important parts of a hypothesis are the variables themselves and the postulated relationship between them. A variable is a system of classification of some concept that we are interested in studying. It has four basic parts: (1) a name; (2) a verbal definition; (3) a set of categories; and (4) a procedure for carrying out the classification (Davis, 1971). Thus we might have (1) the term "introvert"; (2) a verbal definition, such as: a person who exhibits such-and-such behavioral characteristics (withdrawn, anxious, need to maintain his own individuality, etc.); (3) categories such as introvert, extrovert, or some other distinction; and (4) perhaps a personality test (or a clinical technique) by which one can sort people into the various categories. The idea of a hypothesis, moreover, reintroduces the concepts of "if, then" propositions and "necessary and sufficient conditions." In reality, a hypothesis is a type of"if, then" statement. For we are saying: "If a person exhibits a set of behavioral characteristics x, then we can say he is something y (introverted, psychotic, neurotic, and so on)." In a general sense, then, we are saying that the behavioral characteristics x constitute a sufficient condition for y. And that y gives us the necessary condition. This broader idea of a hypothesis implies that (a) there is some "theory" that is capable of verification (i.e., the Freudian or Skinnerian theories of behavior), and (b) that there are predictable outcomes of these theories (i.e., one can, using Skinner, change behavior through the technique of "operant" conditioning). At the conceptual level of hypothesis formulation and testing, one accepts, at times almost a priori, that the theoretical basis is complete, deductively sound, and capable of producing accurate (true) predictions. The danger here, of course, is accepting the adequacy of the theory (Blalock, 1972, pp. 114-115). Thus it becomes crucial for the beginning student in his clinical training to critically examine the basis (logical, historical, and empirical) of the various theoretical approaches that will form the groundwork of his professional training. There is, however, another aspect of hypothesis formation that should be briefly examined before the idea of evidence is considered. This is the notion of a statistical hypothesis (McGuigan, 1960). A statistical hypothesis is
26 Logic as a Tool in Training
one which incorporates the ideas of "operationalization" and "probable outcomes." To operationalize means that one is capable of defining precisely how the variables are to be measured. That is, one is assuming that, using the previous example, there is some way to measure or to objectively evaluate the central concepts of Skinnerian behaviorism, and that there is some way in which one can sort (categorize) persons in reference to it. This necessity for criteria by which one can gather empirical evidence is crucial, for without it an adequate test of the hypothesis becomes virtually impossible. When an effort is made to test a hypothesis, two difficulties may be encountered. The first one involves the previously mentioned fallacy of affirming the consequent. In statistical inference this is called "making a Type-H error," or "the error of failing to reject a hypothesis when it is actually false." As mentioned, this was one of the common problems experienced by the tutoring group; that is, an hypothesis in which the supposed consequence is observed (or learned), and then the conclusion is reached that the antecedent factor was responsible for it. The statistical reasoning behind Type-I and Type-II errors is technically too complex for exposition here. It is, however, grounded in the general principles of inductive logic. The Type-I error, which beginning social work students should at least be aware of, is more complex but nevertheless vital to understand. In testing an hypothesis, the actual form is usually the following: "If x is true, theny will probably follow." (Blalock, 1972, p. 114.) The consequent is stated in probabilistic terms because the hypothesis is basically an inductive statement, and the inductive reasoning is concerned with gathering evidence that will support the hypothesis (Salmon, 1973). Because the hypothesis is probabilistic, there is the possibility that y may be false even when x is true. The risk here,, then, is rejecting a true hypothesis. That is, if we always (logically) reject x when y is false, then (when y is stated in probabilistic terms) we may make a mistake; an error ify is thought to be false and x is rejected. These underlying logical assumptions are closely connected with the idea of evidence. If nothing else, the social-work student beginning clinical practice should be taught to evaluate evidence. T h e adequacy of the evidence cited is especially vital in drawing accurate conclusions about client behavior. Thus the student should attempt to formulate the client's evidence for supporting or rejecting his hypothesis. Evidence, of course, is most basically related to the kind of observations that are made. As Stephens (1968) states: For a given hypothesis, there may be much evidence, little evidence, or none. How much evidence there is depends on how many supporting observer-reports are presented to the person who is asked to believe the hypothesis. Also the evidence may be strong or weak. The strength of the evidence is its degree of persuasiveness: how successful is it in dispelling doubts about the truth of the hypothesis. [p. 12] For the project students, the evidence condition posed some difficult problems, once they recognized the issue in a clinical setting:
27 Steven I. Miller and Rosemarie B. Boga!
Tutor: Student: Tutor: Student: Tutor: Student:
How do you know the diagnosis you have made is correct? What evidence do you have to support your conclusions? I talked in depth with the client, plus I appIied what I had learned in my course. Do you believe that what you learned is true? Yes, but it may be too theoretical. Well, in any case, how do you know it is true? Well, the instructors should know what they are talking about, and the material must be mostly true or they wouldn't teach it to us.
T h u s students were inclined, at least at this stage of their professional training, to rely on a r g u m e n t s from authority as the basis for confirming their observations. T h e form, as illustrated by Salmon (1963, p. 63) is: x asserts p therefore, p This is a fallacious f o r m of reasoning, of course, unless one can be sure that the source o f authority is a correct one. A f u r t h e r source of confusion was the a m o u n t o f evidence one needs for the confirmation o f an hypothesis. Students were not entirely clear on how m a n y observations were needed to conclude that something was the case. Again, the necessary a n d sufficient conditions could be utilized in such a case. This would illustrate that it is very difficult to d e t e r m i n e she sufficient condition(s) to explain a given p h e n o m e n o n . O n e should, however, try to d e t e r m i n e the necessary conditions for the behavior in question, while not f o r m i n g a hasty conclusion until more evidence comes to light. This, of course, does not answer the question of how m u c h evidence. T h e r e is no simple way to answer this. W h a t should be fostered, however, is the critical attitude which does not accept an explanation without the close examination o f underlying assumptions, and evidence that gives at least a "reasonable" basis for accepting the explanation.
SUMMARY Participation in a minority-group tutoring p r o g r a m for first-year social-work students revealed that there was a lack of adequate preparation into the logic of inquiry. Specifically, the students had difficulty in the areas of hypothesis formulation a n d u n d e r s t a n d i n g the nature of evidence. It m a y be profitable, then, to introduce social-work students (by way o f a course or informal seminars), into the following areas: (1) review o f deductive logic; (2) introduction to inductive logic; (3) the ideas o f "if, then" propositions and "necessary and sufficient" conditions; and (4) the ideas of hypothesis formulation a n d testing and the nature of the evidence condition, T r a i n i n g in these ideas would, hopefully, give the first-year socialwork student a body o f useful insights that may be t h e n fruitfully applied to the various aspects of clinical training.
28
Logic as a Tool in Training
REFERENCES Berlo, D. K., (1960). The Process of Communication. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Chap. 10. Blalock, H. M, Jr., (1969). Theory Construction: From Verbal to Mathematical Formulations. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall. Blalock, H. M., Jr., (1971). Social Statistics. New York: McGraw-Hill. Brennan, J. G., (1961). A Handbook of Logic. New York: Harper and Row, pp. 13-25. Davis, J. A., (1971). Elementary Survey Analysis. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, pp. 9-10. Dubin, R., (1969). Theory Building. New York: Free Press, Chaps~ 1 and 9. Ennis, R. H., (1969). Logic in 7~aching. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, pp. 7-11. Ennis, R. H,, (1969). Ordinary Logic. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Halk Havighurst, R. J. and Neugarten, B. L., (1967). Society and Education, 3rd ed. Boston: Allyn and Bacon. Hempel, C. G., (1968). The logic of functional analysis, in Readings in the Philosophy of the Social Sciences, M. Brodbeck, ed. New York: Macmillan, pp. 179-210. Kerlinger, F. N., (1965). Foundations of Behavioral Research. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, pp. 67-78. McGuigan, F. J. (1960). Experimental Psychology: A Methodological Approach. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, pp. 27-42. Miller, S. I , (!971). Language analysis and counseling-guidance: some common dimensions. Couns. Values, 16 (Fall): 46-53. Miller, S. I. and Miller, P. H , (1971). Social work concepts and language analysis. Soc. Casework, 52: 142-147. Moynihan, D. P. and Mosteller, F., eds. (1972). On Equality of Educational Opportunity. New York: Vintage. Phillips, B. S., (1971). Social Research: Strategy and Tactics. New York: Macmillan, pp. 193-196. Salmon, W. C., (1963). Logic. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, pp. 18-30. Salmon, W. C., (1973). Confirmation. Sci. Am., 228 (May): 75-83. Stephens, W. M., (1968). Hypotheses and Evidence. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell.
The paper is an attempt to illustrate the usefulness of logic as a technique in the clinical training of mental health professionals. The specific concepts that are examined include the nature of deductive and inductive reasoning, hypothesis testing, necessary and sufficient conditions, "if-then" propositions, and the nature of clinical evidence. Knowledge and use of these concepts was tested in a tutorial program directed toward students who were beginning graduate studies in the field of social work. Some of the difficulties encountered by these students, especially in the clinical aspects of their training, were directly related to an inadequate understanding of these logical forms of reasoning. It is suggested that a portion of the clinical training in mental health fields be directed towards a deeper understanding and utilization of these basic concepts. A l t h o u g h the field of social work has e x p a n d e d in recent years into m a n y new areas, such as community-based treatment and, clinically, the use o f small-group techniques, there is still a vital need to reemphasize the conceptual and theoretical foundations of clinical training. T h e major assumption of this paper is that the core of professional training must be established in a theoretical context which forms the basis for eventual practice in the field. This reemphasis o f the basic theoretical-clinical approach to social work is necessary in an era in which the profession is coming u n d e r increased pressure f r o m private and public agencies. T h e need for a high degree o f professionalism is especially crucial w h e n the Federal Governm e n t decides to restrict or abolish badly n e e d e d funds. I f a profession cannot justify itself in terms of vigorous clinical training, the tendency is for outside agencies to look critically at the services that the profession is supposed to provide, a n d divert f u n d i n g to other professional bodies. T h e r e is no d o u b t that the level of theoretical-clinical training in most professional schools o f social work is high. One of the problems, however, is that students entering the professional school often do not have a good f o u n d a t i o n in certain basic concepts and approaches related to the field. All reprint queries should be addressed to Dr. Miller at Loyola University, Department of Educational Foundations, School of Education, 820 No. Michigan Ave., Chicago, Illinois 60611. 18
PSYCHIATRIC QUARTERLY, VOL. 49(1) 1977
19 Steven I. Miller and Rosemarie B. Bogal
T h e result is that much valuable time and effort is spent on acquiring these techniques and skills-time that could be better used in other ways by both instructors and students. This problem of providing specific theoretical insights that may be useful as a foundation for later clinical work was discussed in a previous paper by the present author (Miller & Miller, 1971). Here some additional perspectives are discussed that grew out of a federally funded project directed toward minority students accepted in the M.S.W. program. The project involved a specially designed tutoring program to assist students with the practical and conceptual problems they would encounter in their professional training. One problem encountered was the difficulty students had grasping the more abstract concepts in such areas as research and psychopathology. There were also specific problems in relating theoretical concepts and interpretations to casework. In identifying and analyzing the areas where the students were having the most difficulty, it was found that a lack of previous training in theoretical approaches (especially in the social sciences) was the basis for many of their problems. In regard to the areas where remedial work was necessary, three broad patterns began to emerge: 1. Difficulty in distinguishing between deductive and inductive forms of reasoning. 2. Difficulty in understanding the nature of "if, then" propositions and the terms "necessary and sufficient" conditions. 3. Difficulty in understanding the idea of "hypothesis formulation" and the nature and use of evidence. These conceptual problems are probably obstacles to many students entering the field of social work, not only to minority students. What is involved here is not ethnicity, but the quality of education a student has received. This, in turn, is often related to a person's socioeconomic status (Havighurst & Neugerten, 1967; Moynihan & Hosteller, 1972). Thus in the tutoring program many of the students were suffering from the handicap of a poor educational background. A specific curricular recommendation evolving from the tutoring project was that a remedial course be required at the beginning of the individual's professional training which would emphasize the development of certain skills and approaches related to the problem areas mentioned. This course would attempt to integrate these general theoretical approaches with the more concrete problems of concept formation, composition, grammar, verbal facility, and so on. In order to see how these approaches might be integrated into a more formal course structure, the following will be an attempt to explicate the underlying assumptions of these areas and relate them to actual social work practice. A student entering professional training in social work should have some elementary working knowledge of the principles of logic. This is not
20 Logic as a Tool in Training
to suggest that social workers become logicians or vice versa. However, an u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f the principal forms o f correct reasoning is needed. More specifically, the ability to draw valid conclusions f r o m certain types o f evidence is a useful skill that has direct applicability to clinical practice. O n e major difficulty students had was trying to distinguish the concepts o f " t r u t h " a n d "validity" as applied to deductive reasoning (Ennis, 1969a, pp. 7-11). T h u s in the syllogism, All professors of social work are competent therapists. John Smith is a professor of social work. Therefore, John Smith is a competent therapist. there was difficulty in trying to u n d e r s t a n d that the a r g u m e n t was a valid f o r m of reasoning, but that the premises might not be necessarily true. T h e validity of a deductive a r g u m e n t as Salmon (1963, pp. 18-30) states, "depends solely u p o n the relation between the premises and the conclusion." He goes on to say: Validity is a property of arguments, which are groups of statements, not of individual statements. Truth, on the other hand, is a property of individual statements, not of arguments. It is meaningless to call an argument "true" and it is meaningless to call a single statement "valid." A deductive argument is invalid if there is any possibility that the premises could be true and the conclusion false. T h e students failed to see that if one accepts the premises as "given," then the conclusion must necessarily follow, when one is employing the rules o f correct deductive reasoning. A crucial variable here for students to grasp is that deductive reasoning is based on a set body o f rules that d e a l with what is known as "class reasoning." One way of u n d e r s t a n d i n g class reasoning is t h r o u g h the use of set theory (Brennan, 1961; Kerlinger, 1965, pp. 67-78). T h a t is, one is asking: Is this (John Smith) included in that (class of competent therapist)?; or is he excluded f r o m the class, or is he partially included or partially excluded in terms of the largest class of objects? This notion of class reasoning in deduction can be a useful tool for the social work student. I f he is presented with a series of statements as to the supposed causes o f a client's problem, can he analyze the a r g u m e n t as to its truth and validity? T h u s is it valid to reason that the origins of neurotic behavior can be exhibited in certain patterns of client behavior, and that if he sees a client acting in a certain m a n n e r , can he t h e n conclude that the client is indeed neurotic? T h e conclusion is perfectly justifiable if he accepts, for example, the theoretical-conceptual (perhaps Freudian) f r a m e w o r k of u n d e r s t a n d i n g neurotic behavior. Deductive reasoning as a f r a m e w o r k fbr latter clinical training gives the student a basis for questioning and examining the theoreticalconceptual assumptions of, for instance, the psychopathological expla-
21 Steven I. Miller and Rosemarie B. Bogal
nations o f h u m a n behavior. In the tutoring p r o g r a m m e n t i o n e d above, the d e v e l o p m e n t of logical reasoning skills could have been substantially improved. W h e t h e r the training in deductive logic is an i m p o r t a n t technique for the social work student is, o f course, an empirical question. However, observation o f the tutoring g r o u p indicated that indeed these techniques would have proved very useful as a basis ibr more advanced clinical work. In addition to a lack o f formal logical skills, the g r o u p had some difficulty in u n d e r s t a n d i n g the nature of inductive logic (Ennis, 1969b). Since the social-work professional is called u p o n (especially in a clinical setting) to generalize f r o m a variety of input information, the u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f the general nature of inductive reasoning becomes a vital analytical technique. T h e basic difference between the deductive and inductive approaches to truth is that, while a deductive a r g u m e n t is valid (correct) if the conclusion necessarily follows f r o m the premises, an inductive a r g u m e n t is always a probabilistic one. T h a t is, even if"our premises are true it is possible for o u r conclusion to be false. This of course is not possible in a deductive argument. T h e notion of "probabilistic" outcomes is especially i m p o r t a n t in terms of clinical practice. For instance, let us assume that the social-work student in a clinical setting comes in contact with x n u m b e r of clients that exhibit a similar f o r m of anxiety reaction. He then proceeds to construct the following argument: All clients exhibiting behaviors y can be labelled as persons having anxiety reactions (of some degree, i.e., strong, weak). Mr. Smith is exhibitng behavior y. Therefore, Mr. Smith is a victim of anxiety. Let us f u r t h e r say that the student has observed the behavior a n d assumed it to be the "cause" in 25% of the cases he has been exposed to. Can he then conclude that all of the clients he will see in the f u t u r e exhibiting this behavior pattern can be accurately diagnosed as having an "anxiety reaction?" Maybe he can. This t h e n is the basic dilemma in inductive reasoning: can one conclude on the basis of a given n u m b e r o f similar observations that the diagnosis is a correct one? This is sometimes referred to (Salmon, 1963, pp. 56-57) as the "fallacy o f insufficient statistics." This was one o f the serious problems e n c o u n t e r e d in the tutoring group. T h e following dialogue serves as an illustration: Tutor: Student: Tutor: Student:
John, I see you've written up the casework diagnosis you did on Mrs. Doe the other day. Yes, I have. I see that you concluded that Mrs. Doe's depression was a result of her poor self-concept that can, in turn, be traced to her parents showing more affection towards her younger sisters when they were growing up. Yes, that was my conclusion.
22 Logic as a Tool in Training
Tutor: Student: Tutor: Student: Tutor: Student: Tutor:
Student: Tutor: Student: Tutor:
Student:
How did you arrive at this conclusion? By talking with her about her early childhood experiences and what she thought about her parents. Is it possible, John, that you might have a very similar case in the future exhibiting the same characteristics? Yes. Would you conclude with the same diagnosis? Probably, yes. Would it be possible to have the same symptoms (depression) in a client with the similar family characteristics, but the symptoms being the result of some other factors? I'm not sure, maybe. Would it also be possible to have a client with a similar family situation but with different behavioral symptoms? Yes, I guess so. Well, then, can you be sure based on your observation that this was an accurate diagnosis? I still think so but I'm not as sure any more.
While the concern about inductive reasoning may appear to be an academic exercise, it does have value in that it forces the student to look m o r e closely at the clinical m e t h o d s he is employing a n d the conclusions he is drawing about his clients' behaviors. In the tutoring project, students had a tendency to overgeneralize on the basis of incomplete evidence. And, likewise, they would accept a limited n u m b e r o f observations on clients with similar problems as constituting the entire class of these problems. These difficulties resulted in an increased sense of ambiguity a n d anxiety on the part of some of the students. In terms of clinical training, some anxiety (if it is kept at manageable levels) might be a useful heuristic device to demonstrate to the beginning social work student that it is necessary to understand, at an increasingly sophisticated level, the complex relationships constantly evolving in the client-therapist relationship. In addition to grasping the general nature of deductive and inductive logic, two f u r t h e r i m p o r t a n t concepts should be mastered by the person entering professional training. These concepts, which are closely tied in with deductive a n d inductive reasoning, can be identified as "if, then" propositions and "necessary and sufficient" conditions (Berlo, 1960). It should be pointed out that these concepts often cause problems for students in almost all o f the social science areas. Yet, if they are mastered, they can be useful analytical techniques encompassing a variety of clinical situations. A part of the study of logic is concerned with the analysis of propositions that are called "conditionals." This f o r m of reasoning is also referred to as "sentence reasoning" because the a r g u m e n t (the premises) are stated as sente"nces (Salmon, 1963, pp. 21-52). This differs f r o m the more classical forms of deductive reasoning that, as was stated, deal with the idea of classes of objects. Sentence reasoning is called "conditional" because the major premise
23 Steven I. Miller and Rosemarie B. Bogal
o f the syllogism gives a condition for the o c c u r r e n c e o f s o m e t h i n g else. T h u s one could state a conditional in the following way: If John Doe is a graduate of a professional school of social work, then he will be able to do therapy. T h e conditional is m a d e u p o f two parts; the "if" part which sets the condition for the o c c u r r e n c e o f the " t h e n " part. T h u s , / f Mr. Doe has g r a d u a t e d f r o m a professional school o f social work, then we can assume he is capable o f d o i n g therapy. T h e "if' part o f the conditional is known, also, as the antecedent, while the " t h e n " part is called the "consequent." T h e standard f o r m o f a conditional is usually written as "if p, t h e n q" where the letters are c o n v e n i e n t designations for the two parts. As with s t a n d a r d forms o f deductive reasoning, there are valid and invalid forms o f conditionals (Ennis, 1969a, pp. 13-20). T h e r e are two valid and two invalid forms o f conditional sentence reasoning. In notational f o r m s they are: 1. I f p, t h e n q
P
q (valid); a f f i r m i n g the a n t e c e d e n t 2. I f p, t h e n q not q not p (valid); d e n y i n g the c o n s e q u e n t 3. I f p, t h e n q q p (invalid); a f f i r m i n g the c o n s e q u e n t 4. I f p, t h e n q not p not q (invalid); d e n y i n g the a n t e c e d e n t Using o u r original conditional: (1) I f Doe is a .graduate, then h e is a therapist. We a f f i r m he is a graduate, t h e r e f o r e we can conclude h e is a therapist. (2) I f he is a g r a d u a t e then, again, he must be a therapist. I f we say, o n the o t h e r h a n d , he is not a therapist, we can also conclude he is not a graduate. (3) H o w e v e r , if we affirm he is a therapist we c a n n o t assume he is a g r a d u a t e - - h e m a y not be a g r a d u a t e o f a professional school o f social work. (4) Likewise, if we say he is not a graduate, t h e n we c a n n o t say he is not a t h e r a p i s t - - h e could be a psychologist. In a clinical setting, we could have the following example: If x (manic-depression), then y (observable set of behaviors.) I f the social-work student is to follow the a r g u m e n t s above, he must first o f all have a working knowledge o f two additional concepts: necessary and sufficiem conditions. A sufficient condition is o n e in which t h e r e is e n o u g h (sufficient) evidence to draw a given conclusion: we d o not need
24 Logic as a Tool in Training
m o r e information. A necessary condition implies that b e f o r e we can draw a conclusion, we at least n e e d to have some i n f o r m a t i o n (evidence), but this i n f o r m a t i o n may not be e n o u g h (sufficient) for us to conclude with certainty that such-and-such is the case. Because o f space limitations, all the f o r m a l rules o f deductive reasoning could not be m e n t i o n e d . T h e s e conditional f o r m s were m e n t i o n e d because they illustrate the r e a s o n i n g process which is m o r e generally useful for social-work students. Again, the examples used are by no means indicative o f the complexity o f clinical training; they are m e r e l y used f o r illustrative purposes. In the above e x a m p l e we are saying that x is a sufficient condition for c o n c l u d i n g y. T h a t is, if we know x, we have all the evidence we n e e d to conclude y. T h e r e a s o n for assuming that x is a sufficient condition for y is that, presumably, we have a t h e o r y that establishes x as a sufficient "class" o f p h e n o m e n o n . For the relationships o f t h e o r y to hypothesis testing, see Dubin (1969). O n the o t h e r h a n d , b e f o r e we can conclude x it is necessary to u n d e r s t a n d y . T h a t is, we c a n n o t explain x, unlessy is present, that is,y is a necessary condition for the o c c u r r e n c e ofx. O n the o t h e r hand, y is not a sufficient condition because it is possible that x is being caused by some o t h e r factor, o r this factor in combination with others (Hempel, 1968). In combination with valid and invalid f o r m s o f conditional reasoning, the students most o f t e n b e c a m e t r a p p e d in examples o f the above type, that is, the fallacy o f affirming the consequent. While it was n o t practical to t u t o r the project students in the formal elements o f deductive and inductive logic, this particular logical fallacy was used as an e x a m p l e to d e m o n s t r a t e a c o m m o n p r o b l e m associated with b e g i n n i n g clinical study: Tutor:
Student: Tutor:
Student: Tutor: Student:
If you learn, in your professional training, that a client's particular behavior resembles the symptoms for a chronic anxiety reaction, is it justifiable to conclude that this is the client's actual problem? Probably. Could the client's behavior be caused by other factors? For example, is it possible that even though you know that a chronic anxiety reaction results in such-and-such behavior, that the behavior you see may be something else than this specific anxiety? Could it be that the behaviors may be a display of some other psychological problem? Yes. Then how do yo J know for sure that you are right in your diagnosis? Don't know for sure.
This t e n d e n c y to unwittingly c o m m i t the fallacy o f a f f i r m i n g the consequent, is a result, at least in part, o f not being able to u n d e r s t a n d two additional logical concepts; the notions o f hypothesis testing and evidence. T h e s e two ideas are most likely h a n d l e d adequately in the s t a n d a r d research courses o f f e r e d as p a r t o f the g r a d u a t e p r o g r a m in schools o f social work. O n e could m a k e the case, however, that the concepts could also be usefully i n t r o d u c e d in t u t o r i n g p r o g r a m s or in a general orientation course. T h e y could t h e n be e x p a n d e d u p o n in m o r e d e p t h in r e g u l a r research courses.
25 Steven I. Miller and Rosemarie B. Bogal
In the tutoring project, for instance, there was some difficulty in adequately grasping the idea of a hypothesis and how it is related to conditional reasoning in the broader framework of inductive logic. This is perhaps one of the most difficult concepts to introduce to students beginning clinical work, and, it could be argued, one of the most valuable. For the basis of any clinical technique is ultimately grounded in a conceptual scheme that deals with behavioral outcomes, and the evidence for concluding that the outcomes are capable of correct interpretation (Miller, 1971). The literature on hypothesis testing and evidence is vast and often technically complex (Blalock, 1972, pp. 109--116; Phillips, 1971). The purpose here is only to outline the general parameters of these ideas and try to integrate t h e m within the previously discussed framework. A hypothesis, in its most basic sense, is a conjectural statement concerning the relationship between two or more variables (Kerlinger, 1965, p. 14). It is a statement that attempts to predict the outcome of some future state of affairs. The important parts of a hypothesis are the variables themselves and the postulated relationship between them. A variable is a system of classification of some concept that we are interested in studying. It has four basic parts: (1) a name; (2) a verbal definition; (3) a set of categories; and (4) a procedure for carrying out the classification (Davis, 1971). Thus we might have (1) the term "introvert"; (2) a verbal definition, such as: a person who exhibits such-and-such behavioral characteristics (withdrawn, anxious, need to maintain his own individuality, etc.); (3) categories such as introvert, extrovert, or some other distinction; and (4) perhaps a personality test (or a clinical technique) by which one can sort people into the various categories. The idea of a hypothesis, moreover, reintroduces the concepts of "if, then" propositions and "necessary and sufficient conditions." In reality, a hypothesis is a type of"if, then" statement. For we are saying: "If a person exhibits a set of behavioral characteristics x, then we can say he is something y (introverted, psychotic, neurotic, and so on)." In a general sense, then, we are saying that the behavioral characteristics x constitute a sufficient condition for y. And that y gives us the necessary condition. This broader idea of a hypothesis implies that (a) there is some "theory" that is capable of verification (i.e., the Freudian or Skinnerian theories of behavior), and (b) that there are predictable outcomes of these theories (i.e., one can, using Skinner, change behavior through the technique of "operant" conditioning). At the conceptual level of hypothesis formulation and testing, one accepts, at times almost a priori, that the theoretical basis is complete, deductively sound, and capable of producing accurate (true) predictions. The danger here, of course, is accepting the adequacy of the theory (Blalock, 1972, pp. 114-115). Thus it becomes crucial for the beginning student in his clinical training to critically examine the basis (logical, historical, and empirical) of the various theoretical approaches that will form the groundwork of his professional training. There is, however, another aspect of hypothesis formation that should be briefly examined before the idea of evidence is considered. This is the notion of a statistical hypothesis (McGuigan, 1960). A statistical hypothesis is
26 Logic as a Tool in Training
one which incorporates the ideas of "operationalization" and "probable outcomes." To operationalize means that one is capable of defining precisely how the variables are to be measured. That is, one is assuming that, using the previous example, there is some way to measure or to objectively evaluate the central concepts of Skinnerian behaviorism, and that there is some way in which one can sort (categorize) persons in reference to it. This necessity for criteria by which one can gather empirical evidence is crucial, for without it an adequate test of the hypothesis becomes virtually impossible. When an effort is made to test a hypothesis, two difficulties may be encountered. The first one involves the previously mentioned fallacy of affirming the consequent. In statistical inference this is called "making a Type-H error," or "the error of failing to reject a hypothesis when it is actually false." As mentioned, this was one of the common problems experienced by the tutoring group; that is, an hypothesis in which the supposed consequence is observed (or learned), and then the conclusion is reached that the antecedent factor was responsible for it. The statistical reasoning behind Type-I and Type-II errors is technically too complex for exposition here. It is, however, grounded in the general principles of inductive logic. The Type-I error, which beginning social work students should at least be aware of, is more complex but nevertheless vital to understand. In testing an hypothesis, the actual form is usually the following: "If x is true, theny will probably follow." (Blalock, 1972, p. 114.) The consequent is stated in probabilistic terms because the hypothesis is basically an inductive statement, and the inductive reasoning is concerned with gathering evidence that will support the hypothesis (Salmon, 1973). Because the hypothesis is probabilistic, there is the possibility that y may be false even when x is true. The risk here,, then, is rejecting a true hypothesis. That is, if we always (logically) reject x when y is false, then (when y is stated in probabilistic terms) we may make a mistake; an error ify is thought to be false and x is rejected. These underlying logical assumptions are closely connected with the idea of evidence. If nothing else, the social-work student beginning clinical practice should be taught to evaluate evidence. T h e adequacy of the evidence cited is especially vital in drawing accurate conclusions about client behavior. Thus the student should attempt to formulate the client's evidence for supporting or rejecting his hypothesis. Evidence, of course, is most basically related to the kind of observations that are made. As Stephens (1968) states: For a given hypothesis, there may be much evidence, little evidence, or none. How much evidence there is depends on how many supporting observer-reports are presented to the person who is asked to believe the hypothesis. Also the evidence may be strong or weak. The strength of the evidence is its degree of persuasiveness: how successful is it in dispelling doubts about the truth of the hypothesis. [p. 12] For the project students, the evidence condition posed some difficult problems, once they recognized the issue in a clinical setting:
27 Steven I. Miller and Rosemarie B. Boga!
Tutor: Student: Tutor: Student: Tutor: Student:
How do you know the diagnosis you have made is correct? What evidence do you have to support your conclusions? I talked in depth with the client, plus I appIied what I had learned in my course. Do you believe that what you learned is true? Yes, but it may be too theoretical. Well, in any case, how do you know it is true? Well, the instructors should know what they are talking about, and the material must be mostly true or they wouldn't teach it to us.
T h u s students were inclined, at least at this stage of their professional training, to rely on a r g u m e n t s from authority as the basis for confirming their observations. T h e form, as illustrated by Salmon (1963, p. 63) is: x asserts p therefore, p This is a fallacious f o r m of reasoning, of course, unless one can be sure that the source o f authority is a correct one. A f u r t h e r source of confusion was the a m o u n t o f evidence one needs for the confirmation o f an hypothesis. Students were not entirely clear on how m a n y observations were needed to conclude that something was the case. Again, the necessary a n d sufficient conditions could be utilized in such a case. This would illustrate that it is very difficult to d e t e r m i n e she sufficient condition(s) to explain a given p h e n o m e n o n . O n e should, however, try to d e t e r m i n e the necessary conditions for the behavior in question, while not f o r m i n g a hasty conclusion until more evidence comes to light. This, of course, does not answer the question of how m u c h evidence. T h e r e is no simple way to answer this. W h a t should be fostered, however, is the critical attitude which does not accept an explanation without the close examination o f underlying assumptions, and evidence that gives at least a "reasonable" basis for accepting the explanation.
SUMMARY Participation in a minority-group tutoring p r o g r a m for first-year social-work students revealed that there was a lack of adequate preparation into the logic of inquiry. Specifically, the students had difficulty in the areas of hypothesis formulation a n d u n d e r s t a n d i n g the nature of evidence. It m a y be profitable, then, to introduce social-work students (by way o f a course or informal seminars), into the following areas: (1) review o f deductive logic; (2) introduction to inductive logic; (3) the ideas o f "if, then" propositions and "necessary and sufficient" conditions; and (4) the ideas of hypothesis formulation a n d testing and the nature of the evidence condition, T r a i n i n g in these ideas would, hopefully, give the first-year socialwork student a body o f useful insights that may be t h e n fruitfully applied to the various aspects of clinical training.
28
Logic as a Tool in Training
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