Waste Management xxx (2014) xxx–xxx
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Landfill reduction experience in The Netherlands Heijo Scharff ⇑ NV Afvalzorg Holding, Nauerna 1, Assendelft 1566 PB, The Netherlands
a r t i c l e
i n f o
Article history: Received 28 December 2013 Accepted 18 May 2014 Available online xxxx Keywords: Zero landfill Diversion Reduction Circular economy
a b s t r a c t Modern waste legislation aims at resource efficiency and landfill reduction. This paper analyses more than 20 years of landfill reduction in the Netherlands. The combination of landfill regulations, landfill tax and landfill bans resulted in the desired landfill reduction, but also had negative effects. A fierce competition developed over the remaining waste to be landfilled. In 2013 the Dutch landfill industry generated €40 million of annual revenue, had €58 million annual costs and therefore incurred an annual loss of €18 million. It is not an attractive option to prematurely end business. There is a risk that Dutch landfill operators will not be able to fulfil the financial obligations for closure and aftercare. Contrary to the polluter pays principle the burden may end up with society. EU regulations prohibiting export of waste for disposal are in place. Strong differentials in landfill tax rate between nations have nevertheless resulted in transboundary shipment of waste and in non-compliance with the self-sufficiency and proximity principles. During the transformation from a disposal society to a recycling society, it is important to carefully plan required capacity and to guide the reorganisation of the landfill sector. At some point, it is no longer profitable to provide landfill services. It may be necessary for public organisations or the state to take responsibility for the continued operation of a ‘safety net’ in waste management. Regulations have created a financial incentive to pass on the burden of monitoring and controlling the impact of waste to future generations. To prevent this, it is necessary to revise regulations on aftercare and create incentives to actively stabilise landfills. Ó 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction European waste policy encourages recycling and recovery and discourages disposal. The European Waste Framework Directive (EC, 2008) defines recycling as ‘any recovery operation by which waste materials are reprocessed into products, materials or substances whether for the original or other purposes’. This does not include energy recovery, reprocessing into fuels or backfilling operations. The Waste Framework Directive defines recovery as ‘any operation the principal result of which is waste serving a useful purpose by replacing other materials which would otherwise have been used to fulfil a particular function, or waste being prepared to fulfil that function, in the plant or in the wider economy’. The Waste Framework Directive defines disposal as ‘any operation which is not recovery even where the operation has as a secondary consequence the reclamation of substances or energy’. Incineration with limited energy recovery and landfill fall under the definition of disposal. In order to promote the principles of self-sufficiency and proximity, the Waste Framework Directive demands Member ⇑ Tel.: +31 888010801; fax: +31 888010808. E-mail address: [email protected]
States to establish an integrated and adequate network of waste recovery and disposal installations. The European regulation on shipments of waste (EC, 2006) requires that export of waste for disposal should only be permitted when in accordance with the principles of proximity, priority for recovery and self-sufficiency at European Union and national levels. In other words if a European member state has sufficient landfill capacity, but limited recovery capacity, it would be acceptable to export waste to another country for recovery, but not for disposal. In various countries around the world waste policies aim at ‘zero waste’ and ‘resource efficiency’. For instance the Environment Action Programme to 2020 ‘Living well, within the limits of our planet’ (EC, 2012) of the European Commission aims to support ‘the shift towards an economy that is efficient in the way it uses all resources, decouples absolutely economic growth from resource and energy use and its environmental impacts, reduces greenhouse gas emissions, enhances competitiveness through efficiency and innovation and promotes greater energy security’. One of the waste management targets in the Environment Action Programme to 2020 is to ‘virtually eliminate landfilling by 2020’. This is a much stricter landfill diversion target than the current targets in Directive 1999/31/EC (EC, 1999) known as the Landfill Directive.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.wasman.2014.05.019 0956-053X/Ó 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Please cite this article in press as: Scharff, H. Landfill reduction experience in The Netherlands. Waste Management (2014), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/ j.wasman.2014.05.019
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The landfill reduction targets in the Landfill Directive require the EU Member States to reduce the landfilling of ‘biodegradable municipal waste’ to less than 35% of the amount produced in 1995. Waste data (e.g. EEA, 2009) indicate that some member states will have difficulties or will fail to achieve these targets. At the same time there is a group of member states (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Netherlands) that have already moved far beyond the targets of the EU Landfill Directive. Some of these member states landfill less than 5% of the total waste generated. It could be stated that they have already reached ‘virtual elimination of landfilling’. The experiences of these EU member states in achieving their low landfill rates are poorly documented in the open literature. The objective of this paper is to disclose some of the Dutch experience and allow other nations to avoid negative effects of an otherwise desired development. 2. Approach This paper provides an analysis of 20 years of landfill reduction policy in the Netherlands. Statistical data compiled by the Dutch national government have been used for the analysis. Two sources provided most of the information. The Werkgroep Afvalregistratie (working group on waste registration) is a cooperation between competent authorities and the waste management industry and led by the national government. Reporting that is required by law is completed with voluntary reporting and published annually. Recently the Ministry of Infrastructure and Environment has commissioned a ‘financial quick scan’ of the situation in the Dutch landfill industry (Hopstaken et al., 2013). The consultant employed has analysed official documents of the competent authorities and the annual financial reports of landfill operators. In addition the consultant has interviewed both competent authorities and landfill operators. During the interviews confidential financial information on landfill operation was shared with the consultant and aggregated. The aggregated information is described in a publicly available report (Hopstaken et al., 2013) and discussed in this paper. Individual landfills were not discussed and cannot be distinguished in the report. The report does however contain valuable and interesting data on the development of Dutch landfill operation in general. 3. Landfilling in The Netherlands 3.1. Landfilled amounts, landfill tax and landfill bans Currently the Netherlands landfills 1.5–2 million tonnes of waste annually (Fig. 1). This is only 2–3% of the total waste
generated – some 60 million tonnes per year. Essentially only wastes, for which no recycling or incineration option exists, are landfilled. Landfill bans were first introduced in 1995 and gradually extended to 64 waste categories. Today 61 are in force and 3 more will enter into force when recycling capacity becomes available. Landfill tax was first introduced in 1996 and gradually increased until it was abolished in 2012. It has to be emphasised that landfill tax has played a very important role in achieving the low landfilling rates. Currently Dutch policymakers argue that landfill taxes are no longer important. They state that the combination of landfill bans and available recycling capacity will enable the Netherlands to keep landfill rates low. In the Netherlands in 2011, there were two tax levels: €108 per tonne for ‘combustible waste’ and €16 per tonne for ‘non-combustible waste’. To make it simple the distinction was based on density. Anything lighter than 1,100 kg per m3 was considered ‘combustible waste’. The method used was to determine the weight of a load ((full lorry minus tare weight of lorry) on the weighbridge) and divide the weight of the load by the volume of the lorry or container. To that end all lorry and container volumes had to be determined by an independent, certified authority and clearly indicated on both sides of the lorry or container. The weighbridge operator could easily see the volume indication and enter it into the weighbridge computer and database. In reality not all containers were filled to the brim. The result being that even inorganic material like contaminated soil could administratively be considered ‘combustible’. This resulted in protests and court cases and made collection of the tax expensive. Data on development of the landfill tax, combustible waste landfilled and combustible waste exported are presented in Fig. 2. It seems that the announcement of landfill bans and taxes resulted in a decrease in landfill of combustible waste in the years prior to 1995. Between 1992 and 1995 alternative treatment capacity became available in anticipation of landfill bans and tax. Municipalities invested in separate collection, composting and incineration capacity. Between 1995 and 2001 landfill was relatively constant despite the increase in landfill tax. Then from 2001 to 2005 there was a strong reduction in landfill of combustible waste. At the same time a steep increase in export of combustible waste occured. This coincided with an increase of the tax rate from €64 to €80 per tonne. Export permits investigated by DWMA between 2002 and 2008 (DWMA, 2013) clarified that the bulk of the exported combustible waste was officially transported to Germany for recovery. In reality German recovery plants accepted the waste and sent it straight to landfill. It was more attractive to accept higher transport costs to Germany, where there was no landfill tax. The export of combustible waste then sharply dropped
Fig. 1. Development of landfilled waste in The Netherlands (Werkgroep Afvalregistratie 2013; DWMA, 2013).
Please cite this article in press as: Scharff, H. Landfill reduction experience in The Netherlands. Waste Management (2014), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/ j.wasman.2014.05.019
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Fig. 2. Development of landfill tax, landfilled and exported combustible waste in The Netherlands (Werkgroep Afvalregistratie 2013; DWMA, 2013).
in 2005 when Germany implemented their own landfill ban for biodegradable waste. According to the Dutch Environmental Inspectorate (Marijnissen, 2010) waste trafficking became more attractive due to more stringent environmental regulations. Since 2005 the Inspectorate regularly checks truckloads from the Netherlands to Germany. In 2010 20% of road haulage to Germany involved waste transport (Marijnissen, 2010). Of the waste transport 7% of the freights was illegal. 13% was of the freights was breaking the law administratively, often an incorrect waste type or a mismatch between the destination (e.g. landfill or abandoned quarry) and the waste management operation (e.g. recovery) in the documents. The IMPEL-TFS Seaport II project, carried out by 13 European countries, representing 30 seaports, focused on the enforcement of waste shipment regulations (IMPEL, 2006). The project checked 3587 documents. 393 freights were physically checked. 240 freights dealt with waste. Almost half, i.e. 113 freights, turned out to be illegal either because an export ban to the destination was in place or the required permit was missing. Based on investigations EUROPOL (2011) has warned that ‘in the EU, the illegal trafficking of waste is particularly rising between countries in North West and North East Europe. Criminals are exploiting the high costs associated with legal waste management and are making substantial profits from illegal trafficking and disposal activities, circumventing environmental legislation’. Strong differentials in landfill tax and gate fees between nations result in transboundary shipment of waste and in non-compliance with the self-sufficiency and proximity principles. After 2007 the financial crisis led to a slow down in the Dutch economy. Less waste was produced and the incinerators had spare capacity. Previously waste incinerators refused certain wastes because they considered them ‘technically non-combustible’. Although there was a landfill ban for combustible wastes, with a special exemption (similar to a permit procedure) combustible waste could go to a landfill. When this happened, the high tax rate could be collected. Some examples were wood dust from saw mills, mattresses, styrofoam and other materials that burn well but are bulky with little weight. Since the invoice to the client was based on weight, and the capacity of the incinerator was limited thermally, high calorific but low mass material was less favourable for the incinerator. After 2008 a period of over-capacity began. Everything that was ‘combustible’ was actually incinerated. At the time, the import of waste for incineration was being debated in the Netherlands, but not yet accepted. Currently around a million tonnes of waste for incineration is imported each year from Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy and Switzerland, but mainly (50%) from the UK (Werkgroep Afvalregistratie, 2013). The amount of waste for incineration on the national market was limited. Therefore it was attractive to incinerate previously
landfilled waste and demand a tax return. A situation arose where the state was no longer collecting any revenue from the high tax rate but only from the low tax rate. The tax income was significantly reduced and the court cases continued. In addition some incinerators that had landfills within their own organisation started digging out combustible waste. The incineration fees had gone down to below €60 per tonne of waste. Since the tax was specifically linked to landfilled waste, the state could not refuse a tax return for waste, for which tax had been paid, but that was no longer in the landfill. Consequently the state was not only collecting less money, it was also paying out. In conclusion: it was better for the state to abandon the tax altogether. This resulted in objection by landfill operators that had plans to dig up waste and have it incinerated. The discussions and court cases have not yet come to an end. The recycling sector was opposed to abolishing the landfill tax. They were afraid that landfill would again become a cheap outlet for recyclable wastes. It was agreed that the development of landfill disposal would be tracked in detail. Since January 2012 the state produces monthly updates on the amounts of waste landfilled (Landelijk Afvalbeheerplan; 2013). Several aspects are of interest. It very quickly became clear that the abolition of landfill tax did not lead to the landfilling of combustible waste or biodegradable municipal waste (Fig. 2). The small peak in 2013 was actually caused by a large landfill remediation project. An old municipal waste landfill was excavated. The waste had a density of less than 1,100 kg per m3 and for that reason considered ‘combustible waste’. It was however not suitable for incineration and was therefore landfilled at a modern landfill. Previously the landfill tax was prohibitive for such remediation projects. In 2011 there was a strong decline in the amount of noncombustible waste landfilled (Fig. 3). This was mainly caused by the disposal of less contaminated soil and soil treatment residues. Project managers and treatment plant operators confirmed that the rumour of the upcoming abolition created an incentive to postpone projects or temporarily store residues. This is confirmed by the increase in 2012. Stockpiles were emptied and transported to landfill the minute the landfill tax was no longer due. The detailed monthly updates clearly indicate that no wastes were landfilled for which a sensible alternative existed. It is nevertheless possible that a new ‘equilibrium’ of landfilled non-combustible waste will occur at a level higher than in the years 2003–2009. Again this may be due to export. Although there was no clear increase in the landfill tax for non-combustible wastes, after 2002, the landfilling of noncombustible waste followed a similar development to combustible waste. Waste can only be exported after a permit has been issued. Official statistics on exported non-combustible waste have not been published. The permit data are also no longer accessible.
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Fig. 3. Development of landfill tax and landfilled incombustible waste in The Netherlands (Werkgroep Afvalregistratie 2013; DWMA, 2013).
There are indications that when the profiling of German landfills (that needed to be closed) became more important, it also became attractive to transport the non-combustible waste to Germany. For some ‘mineral’ wastes it was possible to obtain an export permit for the profiling of German landfills. This is considered to be a ‘recovery operation’. After abolition of the landfill tax, it is likely that the more expensive transport to Germany no longer outweighed the previous tax advantage. There are more examples that a ‘grey area’ between recovery and disposal exists. For instance in Germany, air pollution control residues from waste incineration and similar waste are disposed of in ‘underground storage’. This is a special category of landfill for hazardous waste in abandoned salt mines. The same hazardous wastes from other EU member states are ‘recovered’ in German ‘underground storage’. 3.2. Rate of return on landfill Between 1991 and 2005 the number of landfills in operation in the Netherlands reduced from 80 to 22. Since 2005 the number remained constant until 2013. In 2013 one landfill closed. With 50 million m3 of remaining landfill volume the operational landfills have insufficient financial provisions for capping and aftercare. Provisions have always been accrued on a per tonne basis. Consequently the operators cannot opt to end operations and close the landfills. There is no choice but to stay in business and try to accrue the financial provisions. Fierce competition over the remaining amount of waste was the result. 2005 was the first year that the gate fees for landfill started a steep decline (Fig. 4). In 2010 the average gate fee dropped below €18.5 per tonne. In some situations this is sufficient to cover the operational costs at best. In most cases it is insufficient. Landfill operation in the Netherlands is running at an annual loss. Hopstaken et al. (2013) calculated annual revenues of €40 million, €58 million annual costs and an annual loss of €18 million. Under competitive conditions 1.5– 2.0 million tonnes of waste per year is insufficient for remunerative operation of 22 landfills. The gate fee does not cover the total costs. The cost structure of the Dutch landfill industry can be derived from the data (Table 1). Three scenarios for the future have been developed, based on assumptions for development of gate fees and waste amounts (Fig. 5). Only the most optimistic scenario forecasts a positive result for landfill operation. And that positive result is not anticipated to occur before 2021. It could be argued that Dutch landfill operations are no longer compliant with Article 10 of the European Landfill Directive (EC, 1999): ‘Member States shall take measures to ensure that all of the costs involved in the setting up and operation of a landfill site,
including as far as possible the cost of the financial security or its equivalent referred to in Article 8(a)(iv), and the estimated costs of the closure and after-care of the site for a period of at least 30 years shall be covered by the price to be charged by the operator for the disposal of any type of waste in that site’. Uneconomic landfill operation also poses other problems. 84% of landfill operation is owned by public organisations (Hopstaken et al., 2013) 42% is owned by provinces and 42% is owned by municipalities. Since the waste that is currently landfilled is not municipal waste anymore, various public shareholders no longer see a need to continue landfill operation. In the current situation, however, they cannot find a buyer for their shares and are therefore forced to stay in business and incur a loss. Excess landfill capacity and bankruptcy of operators represents a huge cost to society. The Dutch provincial shareholders are at the same time responsible for aftercare of the landfills within their region. They can essentially choose to incur the loss as a shareholder in the company or as the aftercare organisation with insufficient provision for aftercare. Unless a major restructuring of the Dutch landfill industry is undertaken the losses seem unavoidable. 3.3. Risks for closure In the Netherlands financial provisions for capping are managed by the landfill operators. It is likely that various landfill operators are covering their losses by ‘eating’ into their financial provisions for capping. Strictly speaking this is forbidden. But the situation is not clear-cut. The money only needs to be fully available at the moment the construction works for the capping start. Due to reduced waste input, the moment for closure and capping will occur many years later than previously anticipated. Accumulation of interest over a longer time frame means that today the provision (net present value) can sometimes be smaller than it actually is. A well-founded reason for reducing the financial provision could therefore exist. 3.4. Risks for aftercare The Dutch law for aftercare of landfills was drafted in 1996 and was incorporated in the environmental law in 1998 (Ministerie van Volksgezondheid en Milieuhygiëne, 1979). In the Netherlands the competent authorities manage the financial provisions for aftercare. The landfill operator cannot access provisions that are accumulated. With the ‘aftercare checklist’ (a harmonised tool applied by all competent authorities) (Zegers and Boerboom, 2009) the competent authorities have calculated that €517 million is required at the moment that aftercare of the 22 operational landfills starts (Table 2). Since this is a financial obligation that starts
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Fig. 4. Development of landfill gate fees (Hopstaken et al., 2013).
Table 1 Calculated cost structure of Dutch landfill operation in 2013 (derived from Hopstaken et al. (2013). €/1.7 M tonne
€/tonne
Fixed costs Variable costs Personnel Indirect fixed costs Amortisation of landfill cells Amortisation of other assets Financial provision for closure and aftercare Interest for assets
€17,600,000 €9,900,000 €9,000,000 €11,900,000 €2,900,000 €1,800,000 €2,800,000 €2,400,000
€10.35 €5.82 €5.29 €7.00 €1.71 €1.06 €1.65 €1.41
Total costs
€58,300,000
€34.29
Revenues landfill Revenues landfill gas and rent
€33,000,000 €7,000,000
€19.41 €4.12
Net result
(€18,300,000)
(€10.76)
in the future, it is necessary to determine the net present value of that financial obligation. A decisive factor in the calculation of the net present value is the choice of the discount rate. If, for instance, it has been established that for a specific landfill the cost of carrying out 30 years of aftercare requires €3 per tonne of waste of financial provision at a discount rate of 3%, the impact can be calculated (Fig. 6) for a different time frame or a different interest rate. For instance 300 years of aftercare at a discount rate of 3% would require €5 per tonne of waste. At a 5% discount rate for more than 100 years of aftercare €3 per tonne of waste would be
required. 300 years of aftercare at a 1% discount rate would require €14,25 per tonne of waste. Dutch law does not foresee an end to aftercare. The landfill operator has to make annual payments to the competent authority that result in a financial provision sufficient for eternal aftercare and periodic replacement of the surface sealing. In 1998 a discount rate was determined based on long-term average interest rates and inflation over the period from 1950 to 1990. The discount rate was set at 3.06% (interest rate of 5.06% minus inflation of 2%). This was done in order to prevent competent authorities from adjusting the discount rate even when the return on the accumulated provision was temporarily below the discount rate. Regular adjustments would have caused much uncertainty for operators. In 2012 the competent authorities have accrued €115 million (Table 2). Under current market conditions there is a risk that a large portion of the additional €400 million required for aftercare will not be furnished by the landfill operators. Recently a competent authority announced that it would reduce the discount rate for determining the financial provision from 3.06% to 1.99%. The financial provision for the two landfills operated in this region was previously calculated to be €38 million. In the new situation it is increased by 58% to €60 million. One of the landfills was closed in December 2012 and has no means to generate the money. Hopstaken et al. (2013) have calculated that for all 22 landfills the required sum of money would increase from €517 to €1.225 million. Part of that money can be generated by means of accumulated interest. Hopstaken et al. (2013) estimate
Fig. 5. Forecasted net result of landfill in The Netherlands (Hopstaken et al., 2013).
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Table 2 Current and required financial provisions for aftercare (Hopstaken et al., 2013). Province
Provisions per 1.1.2012
Provisions required at closure
Zuid–Holland Noord–Holland Friesland Groningen Utrecht Drenthe Zeeland Flevoland Noord–Brabant Gelderland Overijssel Limburg
€22.255.000 €21.965.393 €5.214.636 €6.287.711 €2.593.372 €4.929.120 €5.834.000 €72.000 €12.866.195 €9.306.760 €10.711.534 €13.065.221
€38.078.000 €59.098.851 €6.352.923 €7.649.552 €7.225.037 €110.052.800 €11.000.000 €41.240.000 €109.917.000 €33.211.527 €52.582.046 €40.816.190
Total
€115.100.942
€517.223.926
that at least €535 million has to be generated from landfill operation. Another competent authority has announced a decrease in the discount rate from 3.06% to 1.6%. Landfills are typically operated for 10–20 years. After realising landfill reduction targets, as in the Netherlands, the operational phase is likely to be even longer. After operation, European legislation requires an aftercare period of at least 30 years. 50 years ago hardly any country in the world had landfill regulations. Environmental protection standards and regulations can change dramatically over several decades. If however the competent authority doesn0 t stick to the agreements that were made at the start of landfill operation, it will create serious problems for landfill operators. Article 13 (c) of the European Landfill Directive (EC, 1999) states: ‘after a landfill has been definitely closed, the operator shall be responsible for its maintenance, monitoring and control in the after-care phase for as long as may be required by the competent authority, . . .’. This is copied in many national regulations. It constitutes an ‘open end’ that is unacceptable in any other industry.
Dutch regulations do not foresee an end to aftercare. This is inherent to the philosophy of landfill containment or isolation. Isolation results in drying out of the waste body and degradation processes coming to a halt. After closure and construction of the surface sealing, the emission potential of the waste body remains more or less constant. Human health and the environment are only protected as long as the isolation measures are functional. The functional lifetime of any manmade construction is however limited. This implies that there can be no end to monitoring the effectiveness of the isolation measures. And since it is anticipated that the isolation fails, it is also necessary to have funding for repair and replacement of the isolation measures. This implies that the burden of aftercare, including a risk that the funding will not be sufficient and is passed on from generation to generation. This is clearly not in compliance with the definition of sustainable development. For that reason the Dutch landfill operators have investigated the feasibility of accelerated stabilisation of the waste body. In the framework of those investigations, a consultancy in co-operation with a university have investigated the financial implications and the potential cost savings of accelerated landfill stabilisation (Hopstaken et al., 2011). The consultant made assumptions that still need to be demonstrated at full scale. For the operational Dutch landfills, a potential saving of €75 to 83 million was estimated. However, there are uncertainties as to whether the environmental target values currently being developed can be met. Any aftercare cost reduction can only be refunded to the landfill operator many years after the investment and operational cost for landfill stabilisation have been made. Consequently many landfill operators are reluctant to invest in landfill stabilisation. In other countries that consider much shorter time frames for aftercare provision, the incentive for accelerated waste stabilisation is even smaller (Beaven et al., 2014). The practice of applying discount rates to future financial obligations makes postponing environmental measures on landfills more attractive than solving the problem in the present generation. Current landfill regulations requiring isolation measures and aftercare have created a financial incentive to pass on the burden of controlling the impact of waste to future generations.
3.5. Long-term emission potential 4. Conclusions and recommendations The status quo in the scientific community is that periods of many decades for gas, and many centuries for leachate, are the most realistic expectation for the duration of aftercare (e.g. Heyer et al., 2007; Laner et al., 2012; Beaven et al., 2014).
The combination of landfill regulations, landfill tax and landfill bans in the Netherlands has resulted in the desired landfill reduction, but had negative effects at the same time.
Fig. 6. Dependence of aftercare requirement on timeframe and discount rate.
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A fierce competition developed over the remaining waste to be landfilled. Landfill operators partly compensated the higher costs for their clients by reducing the gate fees. In 2013 the Dutch landfill industry generated €40 million of annual revenue, had €58 million annual costs and therefore incurred an annual loss of €18 million. Since the landfill void has not been filled, the costs for closure and aftercare have not yet been generated, but need to be paid upon closure. Consequently it is not an attractive option to prematurely end business. Due to the reduction of waste sent to landfill, there is a risk that Dutch landfill operators will not be able to fulfil their financial obligations for closure and aftercare. Contrary to the polluter pays principle, a burden of €0.5 billion for 22 landfills may fall on society. EU regulations prohibiting export of waste for disposal are in place. Strong differentials in landfill tax rate between nations have nevertheless resulted in transboundary shipment of waste and in non-compliance with the self-sufficiency and proximity principles. During the transformation from a disposal society to a recycling society, it is important to carefully plan required capacity and to guide the reorganisation of the landfill sector. Scarcity of landfill void could reduce the decline in gate fees. This is important in order to prevent undesired side effects such as wastes being disposed abroad and huge cost to society instead of the polluter. At some point, as currently in the Netherlands, it is likely that it will no longer be profitable to provide landfill services. Only a restructuring of the Dutch landfill industry can change the current loss-making operation. It may be necessary for public organisations or the state to take responsibility for the continued operation of a ‘safety net’ in waste management. Regulations, requiring isolation measures and aftercare in combination with the practice of applying discount rates, have created a financial incentive to pass on the burden of monitoring and controlling the impact of waste to future generations. The current regulations in most countries in the world are unclear about the actual length of aftercare. This creates an unacceptable financial uncertainty for landfill operators and a large risk for society. It is necessary to revise regulations and provide more clarity on the aftercare of landfills. Small amounts of waste that require landfilling will continue to arise. It is in the interest of society to have continued access to landfills as sink for hazardous substances and as an essential element of an ecologically safe circular economy. It is also in the interest of society that these landfills are either intrinsically safe or adequately managed to prevent impact for a very long timeframe, perhaps several centuries. Landfill operators should be stimulated by means of appropriate regulations to stabilise the waste body as much as possible to guarantee the lowest possible emission potential and transfer the smallest possible burden to future generations. This requires financial incentives are implemented to either encourage waste stabilisation or discourage isolation and aftercare.
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Acknowledgements The author acknowledges fruitful discussions and exchange of information in various working groups on Sustainable Landfill Management of the Dutch Waste Management Association, the Dutch Ministry for Infrastructure and Environment and the International Waste Working Group. The views expressed in this paper are those of the author only, and are not intended to represent those of any other person or organisation. References Beaven, R.P., Knox, K., Gronow, J.R., Hjelmar, O., Greedy, D., Scharff, H., 2014. A new economic instrument for financing landfill aftercare. Waste Management 34, 1191–1198. DWMA, 2013. Dutch Waste Management Association, personal communication, landfill estimates for 2013–2015 based on operator inquiry. EEA, 2009. Diverting waste from landfill, effectiveness of waste-management policies in the European union, Report No 7/2009. Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg, ISBN 978-92-9167-998-0. EC, 1999. Council Directive 1999/31/EC of 26 April 1999 on the landfill of waste. Official Journal of the European Communities, L182/1. EC, 2006. Regulation (EC) No 1013/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2006 on shipments of waste. Official Journal of the European Communities, L190/3. EC, 2008. Directive 2008/98/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 19 November 2008 on waste and repealing certain directives. Official Journal of the European Communities, L312/3. EC, 2012. Proposal for a decision of the European parliament and of the council on a general union environment action programme to 2020 ‘‘living well, within the limits of our planet’’, COM(2012) 710 final. Brussels, Belgium. EUROPOL, 2011. OC-SCAN Policy Brief for Threat Notice 008-2011, File nr. 2521-88. https://www.europol.europa.eu/content/simplenews/europol-warns-increaseillegal-waste-dumping-1055 08.04.2014. Heyer, K-U., Hupe, K., Stegmann, R., Wiland, A., 2007. Landfill aftercare – options for action, duration, costs and quantitative criteria regarding the release from aftercare. In: Proceedings of Sardinia 2007, Eleventh International Waste Management and Landfill Symposium. S. Margherita di Pula, Italy. Hopstaken, C.F., van der Maesen, M., van der Schalk, A., van der Zee, F.A., de Jong, J.M., 2011. Economische Verkenning introductie Duurzaam Stortbeheer, Inzicht in de economische effecten en het besparingspotentieel. SEOR-Erasmus Universiteit/FFact, Rotterdam/Delft, Netherlands, in Dutch. Hopstaken, C.F., van der Schalk, F.A., de Jong, J.M., 2013. Financial quick scan modernisation landfill sector, commissioned by the Ministry of Infrastructure and Environment. SEOR-Erasmus Universiteit/FFact, Rotterdam/Delft, Netherlands, in Dutch. IMPEL, 2006, IMPEL-TFS SEAPORT PROJECT II: ‘International cooperation in enforcement hitting illegal waste shipments’, 110643/CE6/0M9/000398, http://impel.eu/projects/seaport-project-ii/, 08.04.2014. Landelijk Afvalbeheerplan, 2013. http://www.lap2.nl/sn_documents/files/06%20 Nieuws/2013-08-30%20OntwikkelingenStorten_jun2013_bijlage.pdf, (in Dutch). Laner, D., Fellner, J., Brunner, P.H., 2012. Site-specific criteria for the completion of landfill aftercare. Waste Manage. Res. Supp. 30 (9), 88–99. Marijnissen, H., 2010. Afvaltransport rijdt in digitale fuik, Trouw (newspaper article in Dutch), http://www.trouw.nl/tr/nl/4324/Nieuws/article/detail/1105923/ 2010/06/ 03/Afvaltransport-rijdt-in-digitale-fuik.dhtml, 08.04.2014. Ministerie van Volksgezondheid en Milieuhygiëne, 1979. Wet van 13 juni 1979, houdende regelen met betrekking tot een aantal algemene onderwerpen op het gebied van de milieuhygiëne, http://wetten.overheid.nl/. Werkgroep Afvalregistratie, 2013. Afvalverwerking in Nederland – Gegevens 2012. Rijkswaterstaat, Utrecht, Nederland, Agentschap NL, ISBN 978-94-91750-03-8, in Dutch. Zegers, D., Boerboom, R., 2009. IPO-checklist 2008 stortplaatsen – checklist nazorgplannen stortplaatsen. Nijmegen, Royal Haskoning, in Dutch.
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Landfill reduction experience in The Netherlands Heijo Scharff ⇑ NV Afvalzorg Holding, Nauerna 1, Assendelft 1566 PB, The Netherlands
a r t i c l e
i n f o
Article history: Received 28 December 2013 Accepted 18 May 2014 Available online xxxx Keywords: Zero landfill Diversion Reduction Circular economy
a b s t r a c t Modern waste legislation aims at resource efficiency and landfill reduction. This paper analyses more than 20 years of landfill reduction in the Netherlands. The combination of landfill regulations, landfill tax and landfill bans resulted in the desired landfill reduction, but also had negative effects. A fierce competition developed over the remaining waste to be landfilled. In 2013 the Dutch landfill industry generated €40 million of annual revenue, had €58 million annual costs and therefore incurred an annual loss of €18 million. It is not an attractive option to prematurely end business. There is a risk that Dutch landfill operators will not be able to fulfil the financial obligations for closure and aftercare. Contrary to the polluter pays principle the burden may end up with society. EU regulations prohibiting export of waste for disposal are in place. Strong differentials in landfill tax rate between nations have nevertheless resulted in transboundary shipment of waste and in non-compliance with the self-sufficiency and proximity principles. During the transformation from a disposal society to a recycling society, it is important to carefully plan required capacity and to guide the reorganisation of the landfill sector. At some point, it is no longer profitable to provide landfill services. It may be necessary for public organisations or the state to take responsibility for the continued operation of a ‘safety net’ in waste management. Regulations have created a financial incentive to pass on the burden of monitoring and controlling the impact of waste to future generations. To prevent this, it is necessary to revise regulations on aftercare and create incentives to actively stabilise landfills. Ó 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction European waste policy encourages recycling and recovery and discourages disposal. The European Waste Framework Directive (EC, 2008) defines recycling as ‘any recovery operation by which waste materials are reprocessed into products, materials or substances whether for the original or other purposes’. This does not include energy recovery, reprocessing into fuels or backfilling operations. The Waste Framework Directive defines recovery as ‘any operation the principal result of which is waste serving a useful purpose by replacing other materials which would otherwise have been used to fulfil a particular function, or waste being prepared to fulfil that function, in the plant or in the wider economy’. The Waste Framework Directive defines disposal as ‘any operation which is not recovery even where the operation has as a secondary consequence the reclamation of substances or energy’. Incineration with limited energy recovery and landfill fall under the definition of disposal. In order to promote the principles of self-sufficiency and proximity, the Waste Framework Directive demands Member ⇑ Tel.: +31 888010801; fax: +31 888010808. E-mail address: [email protected]
States to establish an integrated and adequate network of waste recovery and disposal installations. The European regulation on shipments of waste (EC, 2006) requires that export of waste for disposal should only be permitted when in accordance with the principles of proximity, priority for recovery and self-sufficiency at European Union and national levels. In other words if a European member state has sufficient landfill capacity, but limited recovery capacity, it would be acceptable to export waste to another country for recovery, but not for disposal. In various countries around the world waste policies aim at ‘zero waste’ and ‘resource efficiency’. For instance the Environment Action Programme to 2020 ‘Living well, within the limits of our planet’ (EC, 2012) of the European Commission aims to support ‘the shift towards an economy that is efficient in the way it uses all resources, decouples absolutely economic growth from resource and energy use and its environmental impacts, reduces greenhouse gas emissions, enhances competitiveness through efficiency and innovation and promotes greater energy security’. One of the waste management targets in the Environment Action Programme to 2020 is to ‘virtually eliminate landfilling by 2020’. This is a much stricter landfill diversion target than the current targets in Directive 1999/31/EC (EC, 1999) known as the Landfill Directive.
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The landfill reduction targets in the Landfill Directive require the EU Member States to reduce the landfilling of ‘biodegradable municipal waste’ to less than 35% of the amount produced in 1995. Waste data (e.g. EEA, 2009) indicate that some member states will have difficulties or will fail to achieve these targets. At the same time there is a group of member states (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Netherlands) that have already moved far beyond the targets of the EU Landfill Directive. Some of these member states landfill less than 5% of the total waste generated. It could be stated that they have already reached ‘virtual elimination of landfilling’. The experiences of these EU member states in achieving their low landfill rates are poorly documented in the open literature. The objective of this paper is to disclose some of the Dutch experience and allow other nations to avoid negative effects of an otherwise desired development. 2. Approach This paper provides an analysis of 20 years of landfill reduction policy in the Netherlands. Statistical data compiled by the Dutch national government have been used for the analysis. Two sources provided most of the information. The Werkgroep Afvalregistratie (working group on waste registration) is a cooperation between competent authorities and the waste management industry and led by the national government. Reporting that is required by law is completed with voluntary reporting and published annually. Recently the Ministry of Infrastructure and Environment has commissioned a ‘financial quick scan’ of the situation in the Dutch landfill industry (Hopstaken et al., 2013). The consultant employed has analysed official documents of the competent authorities and the annual financial reports of landfill operators. In addition the consultant has interviewed both competent authorities and landfill operators. During the interviews confidential financial information on landfill operation was shared with the consultant and aggregated. The aggregated information is described in a publicly available report (Hopstaken et al., 2013) and discussed in this paper. Individual landfills were not discussed and cannot be distinguished in the report. The report does however contain valuable and interesting data on the development of Dutch landfill operation in general. 3. Landfilling in The Netherlands 3.1. Landfilled amounts, landfill tax and landfill bans Currently the Netherlands landfills 1.5–2 million tonnes of waste annually (Fig. 1). This is only 2–3% of the total waste
generated – some 60 million tonnes per year. Essentially only wastes, for which no recycling or incineration option exists, are landfilled. Landfill bans were first introduced in 1995 and gradually extended to 64 waste categories. Today 61 are in force and 3 more will enter into force when recycling capacity becomes available. Landfill tax was first introduced in 1996 and gradually increased until it was abolished in 2012. It has to be emphasised that landfill tax has played a very important role in achieving the low landfilling rates. Currently Dutch policymakers argue that landfill taxes are no longer important. They state that the combination of landfill bans and available recycling capacity will enable the Netherlands to keep landfill rates low. In the Netherlands in 2011, there were two tax levels: €108 per tonne for ‘combustible waste’ and €16 per tonne for ‘non-combustible waste’. To make it simple the distinction was based on density. Anything lighter than 1,100 kg per m3 was considered ‘combustible waste’. The method used was to determine the weight of a load ((full lorry minus tare weight of lorry) on the weighbridge) and divide the weight of the load by the volume of the lorry or container. To that end all lorry and container volumes had to be determined by an independent, certified authority and clearly indicated on both sides of the lorry or container. The weighbridge operator could easily see the volume indication and enter it into the weighbridge computer and database. In reality not all containers were filled to the brim. The result being that even inorganic material like contaminated soil could administratively be considered ‘combustible’. This resulted in protests and court cases and made collection of the tax expensive. Data on development of the landfill tax, combustible waste landfilled and combustible waste exported are presented in Fig. 2. It seems that the announcement of landfill bans and taxes resulted in a decrease in landfill of combustible waste in the years prior to 1995. Between 1992 and 1995 alternative treatment capacity became available in anticipation of landfill bans and tax. Municipalities invested in separate collection, composting and incineration capacity. Between 1995 and 2001 landfill was relatively constant despite the increase in landfill tax. Then from 2001 to 2005 there was a strong reduction in landfill of combustible waste. At the same time a steep increase in export of combustible waste occured. This coincided with an increase of the tax rate from €64 to €80 per tonne. Export permits investigated by DWMA between 2002 and 2008 (DWMA, 2013) clarified that the bulk of the exported combustible waste was officially transported to Germany for recovery. In reality German recovery plants accepted the waste and sent it straight to landfill. It was more attractive to accept higher transport costs to Germany, where there was no landfill tax. The export of combustible waste then sharply dropped
Fig. 1. Development of landfilled waste in The Netherlands (Werkgroep Afvalregistratie 2013; DWMA, 2013).
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Fig. 2. Development of landfill tax, landfilled and exported combustible waste in The Netherlands (Werkgroep Afvalregistratie 2013; DWMA, 2013).
in 2005 when Germany implemented their own landfill ban for biodegradable waste. According to the Dutch Environmental Inspectorate (Marijnissen, 2010) waste trafficking became more attractive due to more stringent environmental regulations. Since 2005 the Inspectorate regularly checks truckloads from the Netherlands to Germany. In 2010 20% of road haulage to Germany involved waste transport (Marijnissen, 2010). Of the waste transport 7% of the freights was illegal. 13% was of the freights was breaking the law administratively, often an incorrect waste type or a mismatch between the destination (e.g. landfill or abandoned quarry) and the waste management operation (e.g. recovery) in the documents. The IMPEL-TFS Seaport II project, carried out by 13 European countries, representing 30 seaports, focused on the enforcement of waste shipment regulations (IMPEL, 2006). The project checked 3587 documents. 393 freights were physically checked. 240 freights dealt with waste. Almost half, i.e. 113 freights, turned out to be illegal either because an export ban to the destination was in place or the required permit was missing. Based on investigations EUROPOL (2011) has warned that ‘in the EU, the illegal trafficking of waste is particularly rising between countries in North West and North East Europe. Criminals are exploiting the high costs associated with legal waste management and are making substantial profits from illegal trafficking and disposal activities, circumventing environmental legislation’. Strong differentials in landfill tax and gate fees between nations result in transboundary shipment of waste and in non-compliance with the self-sufficiency and proximity principles. After 2007 the financial crisis led to a slow down in the Dutch economy. Less waste was produced and the incinerators had spare capacity. Previously waste incinerators refused certain wastes because they considered them ‘technically non-combustible’. Although there was a landfill ban for combustible wastes, with a special exemption (similar to a permit procedure) combustible waste could go to a landfill. When this happened, the high tax rate could be collected. Some examples were wood dust from saw mills, mattresses, styrofoam and other materials that burn well but are bulky with little weight. Since the invoice to the client was based on weight, and the capacity of the incinerator was limited thermally, high calorific but low mass material was less favourable for the incinerator. After 2008 a period of over-capacity began. Everything that was ‘combustible’ was actually incinerated. At the time, the import of waste for incineration was being debated in the Netherlands, but not yet accepted. Currently around a million tonnes of waste for incineration is imported each year from Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy and Switzerland, but mainly (50%) from the UK (Werkgroep Afvalregistratie, 2013). The amount of waste for incineration on the national market was limited. Therefore it was attractive to incinerate previously
landfilled waste and demand a tax return. A situation arose where the state was no longer collecting any revenue from the high tax rate but only from the low tax rate. The tax income was significantly reduced and the court cases continued. In addition some incinerators that had landfills within their own organisation started digging out combustible waste. The incineration fees had gone down to below €60 per tonne of waste. Since the tax was specifically linked to landfilled waste, the state could not refuse a tax return for waste, for which tax had been paid, but that was no longer in the landfill. Consequently the state was not only collecting less money, it was also paying out. In conclusion: it was better for the state to abandon the tax altogether. This resulted in objection by landfill operators that had plans to dig up waste and have it incinerated. The discussions and court cases have not yet come to an end. The recycling sector was opposed to abolishing the landfill tax. They were afraid that landfill would again become a cheap outlet for recyclable wastes. It was agreed that the development of landfill disposal would be tracked in detail. Since January 2012 the state produces monthly updates on the amounts of waste landfilled (Landelijk Afvalbeheerplan; 2013). Several aspects are of interest. It very quickly became clear that the abolition of landfill tax did not lead to the landfilling of combustible waste or biodegradable municipal waste (Fig. 2). The small peak in 2013 was actually caused by a large landfill remediation project. An old municipal waste landfill was excavated. The waste had a density of less than 1,100 kg per m3 and for that reason considered ‘combustible waste’. It was however not suitable for incineration and was therefore landfilled at a modern landfill. Previously the landfill tax was prohibitive for such remediation projects. In 2011 there was a strong decline in the amount of noncombustible waste landfilled (Fig. 3). This was mainly caused by the disposal of less contaminated soil and soil treatment residues. Project managers and treatment plant operators confirmed that the rumour of the upcoming abolition created an incentive to postpone projects or temporarily store residues. This is confirmed by the increase in 2012. Stockpiles were emptied and transported to landfill the minute the landfill tax was no longer due. The detailed monthly updates clearly indicate that no wastes were landfilled for which a sensible alternative existed. It is nevertheless possible that a new ‘equilibrium’ of landfilled non-combustible waste will occur at a level higher than in the years 2003–2009. Again this may be due to export. Although there was no clear increase in the landfill tax for non-combustible wastes, after 2002, the landfilling of noncombustible waste followed a similar development to combustible waste. Waste can only be exported after a permit has been issued. Official statistics on exported non-combustible waste have not been published. The permit data are also no longer accessible.
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Fig. 3. Development of landfill tax and landfilled incombustible waste in The Netherlands (Werkgroep Afvalregistratie 2013; DWMA, 2013).
There are indications that when the profiling of German landfills (that needed to be closed) became more important, it also became attractive to transport the non-combustible waste to Germany. For some ‘mineral’ wastes it was possible to obtain an export permit for the profiling of German landfills. This is considered to be a ‘recovery operation’. After abolition of the landfill tax, it is likely that the more expensive transport to Germany no longer outweighed the previous tax advantage. There are more examples that a ‘grey area’ between recovery and disposal exists. For instance in Germany, air pollution control residues from waste incineration and similar waste are disposed of in ‘underground storage’. This is a special category of landfill for hazardous waste in abandoned salt mines. The same hazardous wastes from other EU member states are ‘recovered’ in German ‘underground storage’. 3.2. Rate of return on landfill Between 1991 and 2005 the number of landfills in operation in the Netherlands reduced from 80 to 22. Since 2005 the number remained constant until 2013. In 2013 one landfill closed. With 50 million m3 of remaining landfill volume the operational landfills have insufficient financial provisions for capping and aftercare. Provisions have always been accrued on a per tonne basis. Consequently the operators cannot opt to end operations and close the landfills. There is no choice but to stay in business and try to accrue the financial provisions. Fierce competition over the remaining amount of waste was the result. 2005 was the first year that the gate fees for landfill started a steep decline (Fig. 4). In 2010 the average gate fee dropped below €18.5 per tonne. In some situations this is sufficient to cover the operational costs at best. In most cases it is insufficient. Landfill operation in the Netherlands is running at an annual loss. Hopstaken et al. (2013) calculated annual revenues of €40 million, €58 million annual costs and an annual loss of €18 million. Under competitive conditions 1.5– 2.0 million tonnes of waste per year is insufficient for remunerative operation of 22 landfills. The gate fee does not cover the total costs. The cost structure of the Dutch landfill industry can be derived from the data (Table 1). Three scenarios for the future have been developed, based on assumptions for development of gate fees and waste amounts (Fig. 5). Only the most optimistic scenario forecasts a positive result for landfill operation. And that positive result is not anticipated to occur before 2021. It could be argued that Dutch landfill operations are no longer compliant with Article 10 of the European Landfill Directive (EC, 1999): ‘Member States shall take measures to ensure that all of the costs involved in the setting up and operation of a landfill site,
including as far as possible the cost of the financial security or its equivalent referred to in Article 8(a)(iv), and the estimated costs of the closure and after-care of the site for a period of at least 30 years shall be covered by the price to be charged by the operator for the disposal of any type of waste in that site’. Uneconomic landfill operation also poses other problems. 84% of landfill operation is owned by public organisations (Hopstaken et al., 2013) 42% is owned by provinces and 42% is owned by municipalities. Since the waste that is currently landfilled is not municipal waste anymore, various public shareholders no longer see a need to continue landfill operation. In the current situation, however, they cannot find a buyer for their shares and are therefore forced to stay in business and incur a loss. Excess landfill capacity and bankruptcy of operators represents a huge cost to society. The Dutch provincial shareholders are at the same time responsible for aftercare of the landfills within their region. They can essentially choose to incur the loss as a shareholder in the company or as the aftercare organisation with insufficient provision for aftercare. Unless a major restructuring of the Dutch landfill industry is undertaken the losses seem unavoidable. 3.3. Risks for closure In the Netherlands financial provisions for capping are managed by the landfill operators. It is likely that various landfill operators are covering their losses by ‘eating’ into their financial provisions for capping. Strictly speaking this is forbidden. But the situation is not clear-cut. The money only needs to be fully available at the moment the construction works for the capping start. Due to reduced waste input, the moment for closure and capping will occur many years later than previously anticipated. Accumulation of interest over a longer time frame means that today the provision (net present value) can sometimes be smaller than it actually is. A well-founded reason for reducing the financial provision could therefore exist. 3.4. Risks for aftercare The Dutch law for aftercare of landfills was drafted in 1996 and was incorporated in the environmental law in 1998 (Ministerie van Volksgezondheid en Milieuhygiëne, 1979). In the Netherlands the competent authorities manage the financial provisions for aftercare. The landfill operator cannot access provisions that are accumulated. With the ‘aftercare checklist’ (a harmonised tool applied by all competent authorities) (Zegers and Boerboom, 2009) the competent authorities have calculated that €517 million is required at the moment that aftercare of the 22 operational landfills starts (Table 2). Since this is a financial obligation that starts
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Fig. 4. Development of landfill gate fees (Hopstaken et al., 2013).
Table 1 Calculated cost structure of Dutch landfill operation in 2013 (derived from Hopstaken et al. (2013). €/1.7 M tonne
€/tonne
Fixed costs Variable costs Personnel Indirect fixed costs Amortisation of landfill cells Amortisation of other assets Financial provision for closure and aftercare Interest for assets
€17,600,000 €9,900,000 €9,000,000 €11,900,000 €2,900,000 €1,800,000 €2,800,000 €2,400,000
€10.35 €5.82 €5.29 €7.00 €1.71 €1.06 €1.65 €1.41
Total costs
€58,300,000
€34.29
Revenues landfill Revenues landfill gas and rent
€33,000,000 €7,000,000
€19.41 €4.12
Net result
(€18,300,000)
(€10.76)
in the future, it is necessary to determine the net present value of that financial obligation. A decisive factor in the calculation of the net present value is the choice of the discount rate. If, for instance, it has been established that for a specific landfill the cost of carrying out 30 years of aftercare requires €3 per tonne of waste of financial provision at a discount rate of 3%, the impact can be calculated (Fig. 6) for a different time frame or a different interest rate. For instance 300 years of aftercare at a discount rate of 3% would require €5 per tonne of waste. At a 5% discount rate for more than 100 years of aftercare €3 per tonne of waste would be
required. 300 years of aftercare at a 1% discount rate would require €14,25 per tonne of waste. Dutch law does not foresee an end to aftercare. The landfill operator has to make annual payments to the competent authority that result in a financial provision sufficient for eternal aftercare and periodic replacement of the surface sealing. In 1998 a discount rate was determined based on long-term average interest rates and inflation over the period from 1950 to 1990. The discount rate was set at 3.06% (interest rate of 5.06% minus inflation of 2%). This was done in order to prevent competent authorities from adjusting the discount rate even when the return on the accumulated provision was temporarily below the discount rate. Regular adjustments would have caused much uncertainty for operators. In 2012 the competent authorities have accrued €115 million (Table 2). Under current market conditions there is a risk that a large portion of the additional €400 million required for aftercare will not be furnished by the landfill operators. Recently a competent authority announced that it would reduce the discount rate for determining the financial provision from 3.06% to 1.99%. The financial provision for the two landfills operated in this region was previously calculated to be €38 million. In the new situation it is increased by 58% to €60 million. One of the landfills was closed in December 2012 and has no means to generate the money. Hopstaken et al. (2013) have calculated that for all 22 landfills the required sum of money would increase from €517 to €1.225 million. Part of that money can be generated by means of accumulated interest. Hopstaken et al. (2013) estimate
Fig. 5. Forecasted net result of landfill in The Netherlands (Hopstaken et al., 2013).
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Table 2 Current and required financial provisions for aftercare (Hopstaken et al., 2013). Province
Provisions per 1.1.2012
Provisions required at closure
Zuid–Holland Noord–Holland Friesland Groningen Utrecht Drenthe Zeeland Flevoland Noord–Brabant Gelderland Overijssel Limburg
€22.255.000 €21.965.393 €5.214.636 €6.287.711 €2.593.372 €4.929.120 €5.834.000 €72.000 €12.866.195 €9.306.760 €10.711.534 €13.065.221
€38.078.000 €59.098.851 €6.352.923 €7.649.552 €7.225.037 €110.052.800 €11.000.000 €41.240.000 €109.917.000 €33.211.527 €52.582.046 €40.816.190
Total
€115.100.942
€517.223.926
that at least €535 million has to be generated from landfill operation. Another competent authority has announced a decrease in the discount rate from 3.06% to 1.6%. Landfills are typically operated for 10–20 years. After realising landfill reduction targets, as in the Netherlands, the operational phase is likely to be even longer. After operation, European legislation requires an aftercare period of at least 30 years. 50 years ago hardly any country in the world had landfill regulations. Environmental protection standards and regulations can change dramatically over several decades. If however the competent authority doesn0 t stick to the agreements that were made at the start of landfill operation, it will create serious problems for landfill operators. Article 13 (c) of the European Landfill Directive (EC, 1999) states: ‘after a landfill has been definitely closed, the operator shall be responsible for its maintenance, monitoring and control in the after-care phase for as long as may be required by the competent authority, . . .’. This is copied in many national regulations. It constitutes an ‘open end’ that is unacceptable in any other industry.
Dutch regulations do not foresee an end to aftercare. This is inherent to the philosophy of landfill containment or isolation. Isolation results in drying out of the waste body and degradation processes coming to a halt. After closure and construction of the surface sealing, the emission potential of the waste body remains more or less constant. Human health and the environment are only protected as long as the isolation measures are functional. The functional lifetime of any manmade construction is however limited. This implies that there can be no end to monitoring the effectiveness of the isolation measures. And since it is anticipated that the isolation fails, it is also necessary to have funding for repair and replacement of the isolation measures. This implies that the burden of aftercare, including a risk that the funding will not be sufficient and is passed on from generation to generation. This is clearly not in compliance with the definition of sustainable development. For that reason the Dutch landfill operators have investigated the feasibility of accelerated stabilisation of the waste body. In the framework of those investigations, a consultancy in co-operation with a university have investigated the financial implications and the potential cost savings of accelerated landfill stabilisation (Hopstaken et al., 2011). The consultant made assumptions that still need to be demonstrated at full scale. For the operational Dutch landfills, a potential saving of €75 to 83 million was estimated. However, there are uncertainties as to whether the environmental target values currently being developed can be met. Any aftercare cost reduction can only be refunded to the landfill operator many years after the investment and operational cost for landfill stabilisation have been made. Consequently many landfill operators are reluctant to invest in landfill stabilisation. In other countries that consider much shorter time frames for aftercare provision, the incentive for accelerated waste stabilisation is even smaller (Beaven et al., 2014). The practice of applying discount rates to future financial obligations makes postponing environmental measures on landfills more attractive than solving the problem in the present generation. Current landfill regulations requiring isolation measures and aftercare have created a financial incentive to pass on the burden of controlling the impact of waste to future generations.
3.5. Long-term emission potential 4. Conclusions and recommendations The status quo in the scientific community is that periods of many decades for gas, and many centuries for leachate, are the most realistic expectation for the duration of aftercare (e.g. Heyer et al., 2007; Laner et al., 2012; Beaven et al., 2014).
The combination of landfill regulations, landfill tax and landfill bans in the Netherlands has resulted in the desired landfill reduction, but had negative effects at the same time.
Fig. 6. Dependence of aftercare requirement on timeframe and discount rate.
Please cite this article in press as: Scharff, H. Landfill reduction experience in The Netherlands. Waste Management (2014), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/ j.wasman.2014.05.019
H. Scharff / Waste Management xxx (2014) xxx–xxx
A fierce competition developed over the remaining waste to be landfilled. Landfill operators partly compensated the higher costs for their clients by reducing the gate fees. In 2013 the Dutch landfill industry generated €40 million of annual revenue, had €58 million annual costs and therefore incurred an annual loss of €18 million. Since the landfill void has not been filled, the costs for closure and aftercare have not yet been generated, but need to be paid upon closure. Consequently it is not an attractive option to prematurely end business. Due to the reduction of waste sent to landfill, there is a risk that Dutch landfill operators will not be able to fulfil their financial obligations for closure and aftercare. Contrary to the polluter pays principle, a burden of €0.5 billion for 22 landfills may fall on society. EU regulations prohibiting export of waste for disposal are in place. Strong differentials in landfill tax rate between nations have nevertheless resulted in transboundary shipment of waste and in non-compliance with the self-sufficiency and proximity principles. During the transformation from a disposal society to a recycling society, it is important to carefully plan required capacity and to guide the reorganisation of the landfill sector. Scarcity of landfill void could reduce the decline in gate fees. This is important in order to prevent undesired side effects such as wastes being disposed abroad and huge cost to society instead of the polluter. At some point, as currently in the Netherlands, it is likely that it will no longer be profitable to provide landfill services. Only a restructuring of the Dutch landfill industry can change the current loss-making operation. It may be necessary for public organisations or the state to take responsibility for the continued operation of a ‘safety net’ in waste management. Regulations, requiring isolation measures and aftercare in combination with the practice of applying discount rates, have created a financial incentive to pass on the burden of monitoring and controlling the impact of waste to future generations. The current regulations in most countries in the world are unclear about the actual length of aftercare. This creates an unacceptable financial uncertainty for landfill operators and a large risk for society. It is necessary to revise regulations and provide more clarity on the aftercare of landfills. Small amounts of waste that require landfilling will continue to arise. It is in the interest of society to have continued access to landfills as sink for hazardous substances and as an essential element of an ecologically safe circular economy. It is also in the interest of society that these landfills are either intrinsically safe or adequately managed to prevent impact for a very long timeframe, perhaps several centuries. Landfill operators should be stimulated by means of appropriate regulations to stabilise the waste body as much as possible to guarantee the lowest possible emission potential and transfer the smallest possible burden to future generations. This requires financial incentives are implemented to either encourage waste stabilisation or discourage isolation and aftercare.
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Acknowledgements The author acknowledges fruitful discussions and exchange of information in various working groups on Sustainable Landfill Management of the Dutch Waste Management Association, the Dutch Ministry for Infrastructure and Environment and the International Waste Working Group. The views expressed in this paper are those of the author only, and are not intended to represent those of any other person or organisation. References Beaven, R.P., Knox, K., Gronow, J.R., Hjelmar, O., Greedy, D., Scharff, H., 2014. A new economic instrument for financing landfill aftercare. Waste Management 34, 1191–1198. DWMA, 2013. Dutch Waste Management Association, personal communication, landfill estimates for 2013–2015 based on operator inquiry. EEA, 2009. Diverting waste from landfill, effectiveness of waste-management policies in the European union, Report No 7/2009. Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg, ISBN 978-92-9167-998-0. EC, 1999. Council Directive 1999/31/EC of 26 April 1999 on the landfill of waste. Official Journal of the European Communities, L182/1. EC, 2006. Regulation (EC) No 1013/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2006 on shipments of waste. Official Journal of the European Communities, L190/3. EC, 2008. Directive 2008/98/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 19 November 2008 on waste and repealing certain directives. Official Journal of the European Communities, L312/3. EC, 2012. Proposal for a decision of the European parliament and of the council on a general union environment action programme to 2020 ‘‘living well, within the limits of our planet’’, COM(2012) 710 final. Brussels, Belgium. EUROPOL, 2011. OC-SCAN Policy Brief for Threat Notice 008-2011, File nr. 2521-88. https://www.europol.europa.eu/content/simplenews/europol-warns-increaseillegal-waste-dumping-1055 08.04.2014. Heyer, K-U., Hupe, K., Stegmann, R., Wiland, A., 2007. Landfill aftercare – options for action, duration, costs and quantitative criteria regarding the release from aftercare. In: Proceedings of Sardinia 2007, Eleventh International Waste Management and Landfill Symposium. S. Margherita di Pula, Italy. Hopstaken, C.F., van der Maesen, M., van der Schalk, A., van der Zee, F.A., de Jong, J.M., 2011. Economische Verkenning introductie Duurzaam Stortbeheer, Inzicht in de economische effecten en het besparingspotentieel. SEOR-Erasmus Universiteit/FFact, Rotterdam/Delft, Netherlands, in Dutch. Hopstaken, C.F., van der Schalk, F.A., de Jong, J.M., 2013. Financial quick scan modernisation landfill sector, commissioned by the Ministry of Infrastructure and Environment. SEOR-Erasmus Universiteit/FFact, Rotterdam/Delft, Netherlands, in Dutch. IMPEL, 2006, IMPEL-TFS SEAPORT PROJECT II: ‘International cooperation in enforcement hitting illegal waste shipments’, 110643/CE6/0M9/000398, http://impel.eu/projects/seaport-project-ii/, 08.04.2014. Landelijk Afvalbeheerplan, 2013. http://www.lap2.nl/sn_documents/files/06%20 Nieuws/2013-08-30%20OntwikkelingenStorten_jun2013_bijlage.pdf, (in Dutch). Laner, D., Fellner, J., Brunner, P.H., 2012. Site-specific criteria for the completion of landfill aftercare. Waste Manage. Res. Supp. 30 (9), 88–99. Marijnissen, H., 2010. Afvaltransport rijdt in digitale fuik, Trouw (newspaper article in Dutch), http://www.trouw.nl/tr/nl/4324/Nieuws/article/detail/1105923/ 2010/06/ 03/Afvaltransport-rijdt-in-digitale-fuik.dhtml, 08.04.2014. Ministerie van Volksgezondheid en Milieuhygiëne, 1979. Wet van 13 juni 1979, houdende regelen met betrekking tot een aantal algemene onderwerpen op het gebied van de milieuhygiëne, http://wetten.overheid.nl/. Werkgroep Afvalregistratie, 2013. Afvalverwerking in Nederland – Gegevens 2012. Rijkswaterstaat, Utrecht, Nederland, Agentschap NL, ISBN 978-94-91750-03-8, in Dutch. Zegers, D., Boerboom, R., 2009. IPO-checklist 2008 stortplaatsen – checklist nazorgplannen stortplaatsen. Nijmegen, Royal Haskoning, in Dutch.
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