Journal of Religion and Health, Vol. 14, No. 1, 1975
Kierkegaard's Conception of Evil A B R A H I M H. K H A N Evil is a central problem in the philosophy of religion to which m a n y writers in the field have devoted entire works. Kierkegaard, however, provides no such separate t r e a t m e n t . It might be thought, therefore, t h a t he has nothing of particular interest to say on the problem of evil. B u t his t r e a t m e n t of related issues, especially of suffering, reflects a definite u n d e r s t a n d i n g of evil. In fact, he discusses this problem within a context t h a t gives his discussions unusual depth. In this paper I a t t e m p t to articulate the conception of evil t h a t is present in and informs these discussions. If one is to u n d e r s t a n d Kierkegaard's t r e a t m e n t of suffering, he m u s t first u n d e r s t a n d t h a t Kierkegaard discusses it always from the various different stages or life orientations. There are three basic ones, which he calls the esthetic, the ethical, and the religious. E a c h with its own characteristics represents a particular philosophy of life. It is clear t h a t from Kierkegaard's esthetic point of view suffering has no significance for h u m a n existence. T h e focal point for this stage is pleasure and success. Hence its characteristic philosophy of life is t h a t fortune and the varying ways of experiencing the pleasurable are all t h a t is required for h u m a n existence. Accordingly, suffering has no esthetic value. It is identified as simply misfortune and tribulation in daily living, and is accepted as a difficulty t h a t "will soon cease to hinder, because it is a foreign e l e m e n t " to one's existence. 1 T h e esthetic view of life, therefore, pays no a t t e n t i o n to the reality of suffering. Consequently, it fails to consider the role of suffering in life. For it, suffering is, at best, a t h r e a t to h u m a n existence. From Kierkegaard's discussion of the ethical point of view, it is equally clear t h a t suffering is relevant to existence, but is considered an experience t h a t can be avoided by fulfilling the moral obligation of life. T h e characteristic philosophy for the ethical is t h a t d u t y and the performance of it are the goal of h u m a n existence. By conferring upon d u t y the status of the highest absolute, this philosophy dismisses the importance of the role of suffering in h u m a n existence. Consequently, Kierkegaard believes t h a t it does not help one to u n d e r s t a n d the importance of suffering itself for genuine h u m a n existence. 2 At the religious stage, however, Kierkegaard finds t h a t suffering is always essentially related to h u m a n existence. T h e characteristic philosophy of this Abrahim H. Khan, Ph.D., is a lecturer in the History of Religion, Faculty of Religious Studies, McGill University, Montreal, Canada, and a research assistant in the university's Philosophy Department. 63
64
Journal of Religion and Health
stage is that of establishing the proper relationship between oneself and the highest good, namely, an eternal happiness. The presence of suffering, according to this view, is an indication of the close and proper relation between oneself and the absolute and infinite goal of life. In fact, the willing acceptance of suffering is a characteristic feature of this philosophy of life, which, according to Kierkegaard, finds its full expression in Christianity. Consequently, Kierkegaard finds it necessary to distinguish between two forms of religious existence. He calls one Religiousness A, which is an existence characteristic of religious people who are not Christians. The other is Religiousness B, which is higher than the former and is exclusively the religiousness of those who are decisively Christians. 3 At this level of religiousness, Kierkegaard finds that suffering has a more profound meaning for existence. He shows that with respect to Religiousness B, suffering is not to be feared or avoided, but is in effect an essential and truly comforting experience that is proper for genuine human existence. For it is a "passage-way" to and the material for man's highest good, namely, an eternal happiness. This he shows by comparing suffering with sin. Quite the contrary to what is generally believed, suffering is definitely not a threat to man's existence, at least not in the sense that sin is. According to Kierkegaard, sin "is an eternal fall from the eternal," 4 whereas all of man's suffering is only temporal. But the real significance of suffering, to which Kierkegaard is always drawing his reader's attention, is that, unlike sin, it can comfort and restore in man the balance of his true self by awakening the eternal within him. The "rust of sin can consume the soul--or eternally destroy it," but suffering leaves no trace upon the soul and "purifies the soul by sanctifying it." 5 In effect, suffering not only comforts by recruiting hope, but bears a direct relation to one's existence. Simply stated, it is essential for human development. The Kierkegaardian literature indicates that, to be fully human, man must secure the eternal within him, for man is "compounded of the temporal and the eternal." 6 He has within him something eternal, which he can lose. To "lose the eternal temporally" is to sin, 7 and hence to deny oneself full human development. But suffering by itself cannot effect the development necessary for a genuine humanity. Kierkegaard insists that Eternity must aid. He holds that it is only with Eternity's aid that all of life's suffering can become a moment when compared with the vastness of Eternity. This moment of suffering, which he calls "the 'once' of suffering," is in effect a "passage-way" to an eternal triumph. That is, when viewed correctly, suffering effects such a transformation in a man's life that he is brought closer in conformity with an eternal happiness. The lines below underscore the significance of the "once" of suffering, and hence the need for Eternity's help: The "once" of suffering is the instant, that of triumph, eternity; . . . an eternal enduring triumph. 8
Kierkegaard's Conception of Evil
65
The "once" of suffering is a passage-way which leaves no trace at all upon the soul . . . . which purifies the soul by sanctifying it, so that purity remains as the trace left by the passage-way. 9 Kierkegaard holds t h a t the experience of suffering thus is neither harsh nor terrible, but is in fact an occasion for joy. T h e only thing t h a t is capable of being a blessed and eternal r e m e m b r a n c e is having experienced suffering " o n c e . " This is a joyous suffering because it is really the material for m a n ' s highest happiness. Kierkegaard underscores the profit of suffering " o n c e " by pointing out t h a t the opposite to an eternal happiness is an encounter with the horror of nothingness eternally, and t h a t to avoid the suffering is to be plagued eternally by this emptiness and to be t o r m e n t e d by the t h o u g h t t h a t one has wasted his life on things t h a t cannot be r e m e m b e r e d eternally. 10 T h e e n j o y m e n t of the pleasurable and sensual is not a real joy, since it is only temporal; such " e n j o y m e n t is agreeable in the instant, but like the vacuous instant it is not material for an eternal r e m e m b r a n c e , and for an eternal r e m e m b r a n c e it simply does not exist." 11 In comparison to an eternity of nothingness, the " o n c e " of suffering is indeed a comfort and occasion of real joy. This is Kierkegaard's "Gospel of Suffering," or the good news of suffering. T h a t is, suffering with E t e r n i t y ' s aid is a comfort and real joy. This interpretation of suffering indicates t h a t evil is essential for a true h u m a n development. T h a t is, evil is not merely disciplinary or instrumental, b u t is the occasion whereby a m a n learns to look at his earthly conflicts and tribulations with respect to eternity and thereby comes to have hope t h a t Everything can and will become better, when he becomes better, more industrious, more prayerful, more devoted, more sincere in his love, more ardent in spirit. 12 In this way he comes to conquer sin and to restore the divine balance of his true self. Evil, when not confused with sin--for Kierkegaard holds t h a t although there is an infinite distinction between suffering and sin, both are confusingly called evil13--must certainly mean hope and victory. For without it m a n would experience the horror of nothingness; he would never know t h a t " w h a t the strife is waged for is always to save his own soul" 14 from the danger of sin. When one understands, as Kierkegaard does, t h a t evil plays an essential role in the restoration of our true h u m a n i t y , then evil is no longer a problem. T h e " p r o b l e m of evil" as traditionally understood arises from seeing suffering from an esthetic point of view. Misfortune and tribulations of daily living, c o m m o n l y referred to as evil, are a t h r e a t to existence only for one whose goal of life is temporal instead of eternal. B u t the m o m e n t suffering is seen from the point of view of Religiousness B, the " p r o b l e m of evil" is dissolved. According to Kierkegaard's conception of evil, we m u s t no longer consider the existence of evil in any way an objection to religious belief. Instead, it is one more warrant of confidence for theology.
Journal of Religion and Health
66
References 1. Kierkegaard, S., Concluding Unscientific Postscript, trans. D. F. Swenson a n d W. Lowrie. Princeton, Princeton Univ. Press, 1968, p. 388. 2. Ibid., pp. 255 f., 400. 3. Ibid., pp. 495, 496. 4. - - , Christian Discourses, trans. W. Lowrie. Princeton, Princeton Univ. Press, 1971, p. 108
5. 6. 7. 8. 9.
Ibid. Ibid., Ibid., Ibid., Ibid.,
p. p. p. p.
146. 148. 103. 108.
10. - - , Attack upon Christendom, trans. W. Lowrie. Princeton, P r i n c e t o n Univ. Press, 1972, pp. 248, 249. 11. - - , Christian Discourses, op. cit., p. 110. 12. - - , The Gospel of Suffering, trans. D. F. Swenson a n d L. M. Swenson. Minneapolis, A u g s b u r g P u b l i s h i n g House, 1948, p. 79. 13. - - , Christian Discourses, op. cir., p. 108; see also p. 204. 14. Ibid., p. 146.
Kierkegaard's Conception of Evil A B R A H I M H. K H A N Evil is a central problem in the philosophy of religion to which m a n y writers in the field have devoted entire works. Kierkegaard, however, provides no such separate t r e a t m e n t . It might be thought, therefore, t h a t he has nothing of particular interest to say on the problem of evil. B u t his t r e a t m e n t of related issues, especially of suffering, reflects a definite u n d e r s t a n d i n g of evil. In fact, he discusses this problem within a context t h a t gives his discussions unusual depth. In this paper I a t t e m p t to articulate the conception of evil t h a t is present in and informs these discussions. If one is to u n d e r s t a n d Kierkegaard's t r e a t m e n t of suffering, he m u s t first u n d e r s t a n d t h a t Kierkegaard discusses it always from the various different stages or life orientations. There are three basic ones, which he calls the esthetic, the ethical, and the religious. E a c h with its own characteristics represents a particular philosophy of life. It is clear t h a t from Kierkegaard's esthetic point of view suffering has no significance for h u m a n existence. T h e focal point for this stage is pleasure and success. Hence its characteristic philosophy of life is t h a t fortune and the varying ways of experiencing the pleasurable are all t h a t is required for h u m a n existence. Accordingly, suffering has no esthetic value. It is identified as simply misfortune and tribulation in daily living, and is accepted as a difficulty t h a t "will soon cease to hinder, because it is a foreign e l e m e n t " to one's existence. 1 T h e esthetic view of life, therefore, pays no a t t e n t i o n to the reality of suffering. Consequently, it fails to consider the role of suffering in life. For it, suffering is, at best, a t h r e a t to h u m a n existence. From Kierkegaard's discussion of the ethical point of view, it is equally clear t h a t suffering is relevant to existence, but is considered an experience t h a t can be avoided by fulfilling the moral obligation of life. T h e characteristic philosophy for the ethical is t h a t d u t y and the performance of it are the goal of h u m a n existence. By conferring upon d u t y the status of the highest absolute, this philosophy dismisses the importance of the role of suffering in h u m a n existence. Consequently, Kierkegaard believes t h a t it does not help one to u n d e r s t a n d the importance of suffering itself for genuine h u m a n existence. 2 At the religious stage, however, Kierkegaard finds t h a t suffering is always essentially related to h u m a n existence. T h e characteristic philosophy of this Abrahim H. Khan, Ph.D., is a lecturer in the History of Religion, Faculty of Religious Studies, McGill University, Montreal, Canada, and a research assistant in the university's Philosophy Department. 63
64
Journal of Religion and Health
stage is that of establishing the proper relationship between oneself and the highest good, namely, an eternal happiness. The presence of suffering, according to this view, is an indication of the close and proper relation between oneself and the absolute and infinite goal of life. In fact, the willing acceptance of suffering is a characteristic feature of this philosophy of life, which, according to Kierkegaard, finds its full expression in Christianity. Consequently, Kierkegaard finds it necessary to distinguish between two forms of religious existence. He calls one Religiousness A, which is an existence characteristic of religious people who are not Christians. The other is Religiousness B, which is higher than the former and is exclusively the religiousness of those who are decisively Christians. 3 At this level of religiousness, Kierkegaard finds that suffering has a more profound meaning for existence. He shows that with respect to Religiousness B, suffering is not to be feared or avoided, but is in effect an essential and truly comforting experience that is proper for genuine human existence. For it is a "passage-way" to and the material for man's highest good, namely, an eternal happiness. This he shows by comparing suffering with sin. Quite the contrary to what is generally believed, suffering is definitely not a threat to man's existence, at least not in the sense that sin is. According to Kierkegaard, sin "is an eternal fall from the eternal," 4 whereas all of man's suffering is only temporal. But the real significance of suffering, to which Kierkegaard is always drawing his reader's attention, is that, unlike sin, it can comfort and restore in man the balance of his true self by awakening the eternal within him. The "rust of sin can consume the soul--or eternally destroy it," but suffering leaves no trace upon the soul and "purifies the soul by sanctifying it." 5 In effect, suffering not only comforts by recruiting hope, but bears a direct relation to one's existence. Simply stated, it is essential for human development. The Kierkegaardian literature indicates that, to be fully human, man must secure the eternal within him, for man is "compounded of the temporal and the eternal." 6 He has within him something eternal, which he can lose. To "lose the eternal temporally" is to sin, 7 and hence to deny oneself full human development. But suffering by itself cannot effect the development necessary for a genuine humanity. Kierkegaard insists that Eternity must aid. He holds that it is only with Eternity's aid that all of life's suffering can become a moment when compared with the vastness of Eternity. This moment of suffering, which he calls "the 'once' of suffering," is in effect a "passage-way" to an eternal triumph. That is, when viewed correctly, suffering effects such a transformation in a man's life that he is brought closer in conformity with an eternal happiness. The lines below underscore the significance of the "once" of suffering, and hence the need for Eternity's help: The "once" of suffering is the instant, that of triumph, eternity; . . . an eternal enduring triumph. 8
Kierkegaard's Conception of Evil
65
The "once" of suffering is a passage-way which leaves no trace at all upon the soul . . . . which purifies the soul by sanctifying it, so that purity remains as the trace left by the passage-way. 9 Kierkegaard holds t h a t the experience of suffering thus is neither harsh nor terrible, but is in fact an occasion for joy. T h e only thing t h a t is capable of being a blessed and eternal r e m e m b r a n c e is having experienced suffering " o n c e . " This is a joyous suffering because it is really the material for m a n ' s highest happiness. Kierkegaard underscores the profit of suffering " o n c e " by pointing out t h a t the opposite to an eternal happiness is an encounter with the horror of nothingness eternally, and t h a t to avoid the suffering is to be plagued eternally by this emptiness and to be t o r m e n t e d by the t h o u g h t t h a t one has wasted his life on things t h a t cannot be r e m e m b e r e d eternally. 10 T h e e n j o y m e n t of the pleasurable and sensual is not a real joy, since it is only temporal; such " e n j o y m e n t is agreeable in the instant, but like the vacuous instant it is not material for an eternal r e m e m b r a n c e , and for an eternal r e m e m b r a n c e it simply does not exist." 11 In comparison to an eternity of nothingness, the " o n c e " of suffering is indeed a comfort and occasion of real joy. This is Kierkegaard's "Gospel of Suffering," or the good news of suffering. T h a t is, suffering with E t e r n i t y ' s aid is a comfort and real joy. This interpretation of suffering indicates t h a t evil is essential for a true h u m a n development. T h a t is, evil is not merely disciplinary or instrumental, b u t is the occasion whereby a m a n learns to look at his earthly conflicts and tribulations with respect to eternity and thereby comes to have hope t h a t Everything can and will become better, when he becomes better, more industrious, more prayerful, more devoted, more sincere in his love, more ardent in spirit. 12 In this way he comes to conquer sin and to restore the divine balance of his true self. Evil, when not confused with sin--for Kierkegaard holds t h a t although there is an infinite distinction between suffering and sin, both are confusingly called evil13--must certainly mean hope and victory. For without it m a n would experience the horror of nothingness; he would never know t h a t " w h a t the strife is waged for is always to save his own soul" 14 from the danger of sin. When one understands, as Kierkegaard does, t h a t evil plays an essential role in the restoration of our true h u m a n i t y , then evil is no longer a problem. T h e " p r o b l e m of evil" as traditionally understood arises from seeing suffering from an esthetic point of view. Misfortune and tribulations of daily living, c o m m o n l y referred to as evil, are a t h r e a t to existence only for one whose goal of life is temporal instead of eternal. B u t the m o m e n t suffering is seen from the point of view of Religiousness B, the " p r o b l e m of evil" is dissolved. According to Kierkegaard's conception of evil, we m u s t no longer consider the existence of evil in any way an objection to religious belief. Instead, it is one more warrant of confidence for theology.
Journal of Religion and Health
66
References 1. Kierkegaard, S., Concluding Unscientific Postscript, trans. D. F. Swenson a n d W. Lowrie. Princeton, Princeton Univ. Press, 1968, p. 388. 2. Ibid., pp. 255 f., 400. 3. Ibid., pp. 495, 496. 4. - - , Christian Discourses, trans. W. Lowrie. Princeton, Princeton Univ. Press, 1971, p. 108
5. 6. 7. 8. 9.
Ibid. Ibid., Ibid., Ibid., Ibid.,
p. p. p. p.
146. 148. 103. 108.
10. - - , Attack upon Christendom, trans. W. Lowrie. Princeton, P r i n c e t o n Univ. Press, 1972, pp. 248, 249. 11. - - , Christian Discourses, op. cit., p. 110. 12. - - , The Gospel of Suffering, trans. D. F. Swenson a n d L. M. Swenson. Minneapolis, A u g s b u r g P u b l i s h i n g House, 1948, p. 79. 13. - - , Christian Discourses, op. cir., p. 108; see also p. 204. 14. Ibid., p. 146.
