Law and Human Behavior 2015, Vol. 39, No. 3, 281–293

© 2014 American Psychological Association 0147-7307/15/$12.00 http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/lhb0000116

Juveniles’ Miranda Comprehension: Understanding, Appreciation, and Totality of Circumstances Factors Heather Zelle, Christina L. Riggs Romaine, and Naomi E. S. Goldstein

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Drexel University This study examined juvenile justice-involved youths’ understanding and appreciation of the Miranda warnings’ rights to silence and legal counsel using the Miranda Rights Comprehension Instruments (Goldstein, Zelle, & Grisso, 2012). It also examined the relationships between totality of circumstances factors and understanding and appreciation of rights. Data were collected from 183 youths (140 boys) in pre- and postadjudication facilities in 2 states. Overall, youths demonstrated greater difficulty on measures of appreciation than understanding, with particular deficits in their abilities to comprehend the abstract concept of the right to silence. Results varied slightly by instrument, highlighting the importance of a multimodal assessment of these complex abilities. Examination of totality of circumstances factors identified relationships between some factors (e.g., age, verbal IQ, academic achievement) and Miranda comprehension, but revealed that other factors (e.g., gender, number of previous arrests) were not significantly related to Miranda understanding or appreciation. The findings support a nuanced conceptualization of Miranda rights comprehension that acknowledges the complexity of understanding and appreciating the warnings. Empirical analyses also support the continued use of some totality of circumstances factors and abandonment of others. Findings underscore the necessity of multimodal assessment and interpretation when conducting capacity to waive Miranda rights evaluations. Keywords: Miranda comprehension, juvenile justice, totality of circumstances, police interrogation, academic achievement

It is generally presumed that the U.S. public is knowledgeable about Miranda rights due to exposure through popular media (Nguyen, 2000; Rogers, 2008, 2011; Rogers et al., 2010). The Supreme Court seems to share this view, as suggested by recent decisions that have further tailored the application of Miranda so that a greater onus is placed on suspects to comprehend and assert their rights (e.g., Montejo v. Louisiana, 2009; Berghuis v. Thompkins, 2010; Maryland v. Shatzer, 2010; Florida v. Powell, 2011). Despite the appeal of an osmotically based knowledge of rights, research suggests that exposure has not improved our Miranda comprehension. Rogers and colleagues (2010, 2011) showed that both defendants and college students hold several misconceptions about Miranda rights. Compounding the disparity between presumed and actual Miranda knowledge are additional findings that warnings vary widely in terms of length and content difficulty (Rogers et al., 2007; Rogers et al., 2012; Rogers, Hazelwood, Sewell, Harrison, & Shuman, 2008), and methods of administration (e.g., oral, written, oral and written delivery) play a role in Miranda comprehension (Eastwood & Snook, 2010; Rogers, 2008). Thus, the warnings are not a simple set of sentences with which we are all thoroughly familiar, and there is room for improvement in how we operationally define the rights, as well as in how we assess the acceptability of a waiver.

The Miranda warnings, established by the United States Supreme Court in Miranda v. Arizona (1966), are procedural safeguards designed to provide due process protections against selfincrimination and police intimidation for suspects during custodial interrogations (for application to juveniles, see Kent v. United States, 1966; In Re Gault, 1967; Fare v. Michael C., 1979). A Miranda rights waiver is valid only if the suspect provides the waiver knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. In other words, a suspect must understand the basic meaning of the rights, appreciate the consequences of waiving the rights, and provide the waiver and statement free from police coercion (Brady v. United States, 1970; Escobedo v. Illinois, 1964; Johnson v. Zerbst, 1938).

This article was published Online First December 15, 2014. Heather Zelle, Christina L. Riggs Romaine, and Naomi E. S. Goldstein, Department of Psychology, Drexel University. Heather Zelle is now at the Institute of Law, Psychiatry, and Public Policy, University of Virginia. Christina L. Riggs Romaine is now at the Department of Psychology, Wheaton College. The authors received no financial support for the research and/or authorship of this article. We thank Tom Grisso, PhD, for his review of an early version of this article; Lois Oberlander Condie, PhD, for her role in initiating the revision of the Miranda instruments and her early work on the project; Robert Listenbee, JD, and the Philadelphia Defender Association for assistance with participant recruitment; and the many research assistants who helped with data collection and entry. Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Heather Zelle, Institute of Law, Psychiatry, and Public Policy, University of Virginia, PO Box 800660, Charlottesville, VA 22903. E-mail: zelle@ virginia.edu

Understanding and Appreciation of the Rights to Silence and Counsel Previous research has predominantly examined participants’ overall comprehension of the Miranda warnings, with few studies 281

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comparing comprehension of the individual rights. Yet, the Miranda rights embody several concepts, any of which are subject to miscomprehension. Research with adults, using the Canadian cautions to suspects, suggested that participants had the greatest difficulty with the right to counsel (e.g., Viljoen, Roesch, & Zapf, 2002). However, results are difficult to generalize because the study did not test the statistical significance of differences in comprehension, and the results were based on a sample that included adults with and without psychiatric disorders. Canadian students also had greater difficulty understanding the right to counsel than the right to silence (Abramovitch et al., 1993, 1995). However, Abramovitch and colleagues’ studies used unstandardized, unpublished measures with limited subsequent use and involved only youths in school settings. In addition to the distinction between the rights to silence and counsel, the field of forensic psychology has often considered the knowing and intelligent elements of the legal standard to correspond to two related but distinct types of comprehension, one reflecting a basic grasp of relevant concepts and one reflecting a more abstract grasp of how rights function (e.g., Grisso, 1998, 2003; Zelle et al., 2008). Practice among the courts, however, is more variable, with some courts interpreting knowing and intelligent to require only a basic understanding of the warnings (e.g., People v. Daoud, 2000; People v. Bernasco, 1990), whereas other courts require some level of appreciation of waiver consequences (e.g., Commonwealth v. DeJesus, 2001, People v. Young, 2006; State v. Stephenson, 1994). Additional study of understanding and appreciation of the rights to silence and counsel is important for clarifying an empirically sound “operational definition” of a knowing and intelligent waiver of the Miranda rights. To continue with only a coarse assessment of Miranda comprehension may mean that, for many people, fundamental errors regarding individual rights are masked by average comprehension of the rights as a collective whole.

Totality of Circumstances Legal precedent dictates that courts look to the totality of circumstances, which may have influenced a suspect’s ability to provide a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver, when determining the validity of a waiver (Miranda v. Arizona, 1966; Fare v. Michael C., 1979). Totality of circumstances factors typically are grouped into two broad categories—situational (e.g., length of interrogation, whether a parent was present) and suspect-specific (e.g., suspect’s age, prior arrest history; Grisso, 1981; Goldstein & Goldstein, 2010). Review of case law provides a variety of intuitive factors that are cited by judges when determining Miranda waiver validity. Age and intellectual functioning are among the most commonly cited (e.g., Fare v. Michael C., 1979), as is previous arrest history/ justice system involvement (e.g., Commonwealth v. Shipps, 1987; State v. Adorno, 1997; Walkinhawk v. Pliler, 2006). On occasion, a court will note the relevance of academic performance/special education when making its determination (e.g., Commonwealth v. Cox, 1996; State v. Perry, 1986). More recently, courts have begun to take notice of a suspect’s primary language if it is not English (e.g., Lerma v. State, 2005; People v. Kaiser, 2001). Across research studies, age, general intellectual abilities, cognitive development, attentional abilities, and socioeconomic status

have been associated with comprehension of Miranda rights (e.g., Goldstein et al., 2003; Redlich, Silverman, & Steiner, 2003; Viljoen & Roesch, 2005). In particular, age and IQ have consistently been the two strongest predictors of Miranda comprehension (e.g., Abramovitch et al., 1995; Colwell et al., 2005; Grisso, 1981; Goldstein et al., 2003; Viljoen & Roesch, 2005). On the other hand, “experience” factors, such as time spent with an attorney and prior arrest history, have been shown to be questionably related and unrelated to Miranda comprehension, respectively (Viljoen & Roesch, 2005). Little to no research has examined the relationship between specific cognitive abilities, academic achievement, or special education history and understanding and appreciation of Miranda rights. Miranda warnings are administered in oral and/or in written format, and waiver of rights involves the ability to express oneself orally. Nevertheless, research has not examined the relationship between reading comprehension abilities, listening comprehension abilities, and/or oral expressive abilities and Miranda comprehension.

Current Study We examined juveniles’ understanding and appreciation of Miranda rights by evaluating (a) the relative difficulty of each of the Miranda rights for juvenile justice-involved youths and (b) the validity of the suspect-related totality of circumstances factors considered in case law. Regarding the relative difficulty of each Miranda right, we predicted that youths would demonstrate greater difficulty with the right to silence warnings than the right to counsel warnings. Despite previous findings of adults’ greater difficulty understanding the right to counsel (Viljoen et al., 2002), we anticipated the opposite for youths given developmental research on their difficulties grasping abstract concepts and long-term, negative consequences (e.g., Baird & Fugelsang, 2004; Cauffman & Steinberg, 2012)—the warnings against self-incrimination appear to present more abstract concepts (e.g., statements can be used against you) that require imagination of long-term, negative outcomes than do the right to counsel warnings, which appear to present concrete information (e.g., you have the right to an appointed attorney). Regarding the totality of circumstances factors, we examined a number of specific factors derived from case law, evaluating their relationships with understanding and appreciation and, thus, their validity as totality of circumstances factors. We predicted that younger age and lower verbal IQ (VIQ) scores would be associated with poorer understanding and appreciation of rights based upon case law and previous research (e.g., Grisso, 1981; Viljoen & Roesch, 2005). Consistent with case law, but with little to no previous empirical examination, we expected English as a second language to be associated with poorer understanding and appreciation of rights. Questionably consistent with case law, but with little previous empirical examination, we expected that a history of special education would be associated with poorer understanding and appreciation of rights. Similarly, we expected that poor academic abilities, also deemed questionably consistent with case law due to judges’ rare consideration of academic achievement in written legal decisions, would be associated with poorer understanding and appreciation of rights. Inconsistent with case law but consistent with research (Cooper & Zapf, 2008; Grisso, 1980; Viljoen & Roesch, 2005), we expected

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that arrest history and history of giving statements to police would be unrelated to Miranda understanding and appreciation. Consistent with previous research (e.g., Grisso, 1981; Viljoen & Roesch, 2005), although irrelevant to case law, we expected that ethnicity would be unrelated to understanding and appreciation, and that youths who recalled discussing the Miranda warnings with their attorneys would demonstrate better understanding and appreciation of rights than those who had no recollection of such a conversation.

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Method Participants Participants were 183 youth (140 boys), who ranged in age from 12 to 19 years (M ⫽ 16.45, SD ⫽ 1.72). The sample was 46.4% (n ⫽ 85) Black or African American, 15.8% (n ⫽ 29) White or Caucasian, 15.8% (n ⫽ 29) Hispanic, and 1.6% (n ⫽ 3) Asian. An additional 11.5% (n ⫽ 21) of participants identified as being of another ethnicity (including bi- or multiracial), and 8.7% (n ⫽ 16) did not report ethnicity. The majority of youths (86.3%, n ⫽ 158) reported that English was their primary language; 4.9% (n ⫽ 9) reported speaking another primary language, and 8.7% (n ⫽ 16) did not report primary language. To obtain a broad sample of juveniles, we collected data from three sites: (a) a residential postadjudication facility in Massachusetts (n ⫽ 55), (b) a Philadelphia detention center (n ⫽ 113), and (c) a short-term holding facility for youths adjudicated delinquent and awaiting placement in the greater Philadelphia area (n ⫽ 16). Data were collected from the Massachusetts site between Fall 1999 and Summer 2000, and from the Pennsylvania sites between Summer 2004 and Fall 2006. At all three sites, parents/guardians were contacted for active consent for participants under 18 years of age. All youths were informed about the study and assented before participating. Youths, ages 18 and 19, provided informed consent to participate. An estimate of how many youths declined participation is unavailable. Researchers’ first contact with youths was through facility staff. Human subjects protections prevented us from obtaining reasons why youths were unavailable; therefore, an accurate count of how many youths declined participation, rather than being unavailable for recruitment (e.g., attending a hearing, placed on the medical unit), could not be obtained. Similarly, we could not always ascertain whether parents/guardians declined consent or simply were unreachable (e.g., inadvertent failure to return consent materials). Youths were included in the study if they were housed in one of the three facilities, and individuals were excluded if they or their parents/guardians refused participation, if they did not speak English fluently, exhibited severe developmental disabilities, or were experiencing florid psychotic symptoms at the time of assent/ consent or assessment. No youths met the exclusion criteria regarding English fluency, severe developmental disabilities, or presence of psychotic symptoms. Some demographic variables differed across sites: age†, F(2, 180) ⫽ 7.21, p ⬍ .001, ␩p2 ⫽ .07, gender, ␹2(2, N ⫽ 183) ⫽ 29.68, p ⬍ .001, V ⫽ .40, and ethnicity, ␹2(8, N ⫽ 183) ⫽ 51.04, p ⬍ .001, V ⫽ .39. (Throughout this article, the † symbol indicates analyses for which violations of the assumption of homogeneity of variance occurred.) Demographic variables of interest did not significantly differ: VIQ, F(2, 168) ⫽

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.72, p ⫽ .49, ␩p2 ⫽ .01, number of times arrested while controlling for age, F(2, 162) ⫽ 2.28, p ⫽ .11, ␩p2 ⫽ .03. See Goldstein et al. (2012) for additional details regarding participant enrollment. Participants’ reports of highest grade completed in school ranged from 5th to 12th (M ⫽ 8.83, SD ⫽ 1.62). Academic achievement, as measured by the Wechsler Individual Achievement Test (WIAT; The Psychological Corporation, 1992), varied across domains; on average, youths had fifth-grade reading abilities (Reading Comprehension raw score M ⫽ 23.76, SD ⫽ 5.97), third–fourth-grade listening skills (Listening Comprehension raw score M ⫽ 20.38, SD ⫽ 4.80), and 12th grade oral expressive skills (Oral Expression raw score M ⫽ 29.92, SD ⫽ 5.12). Approximately one third (36.1%, n ⫽ 60) of participants reported histories of placement in special education classes. Participants’ average VIQ score, assessed with the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (WASI; The Psychological Corporation, 1999), was 81.74 (SD ⫽ 12.08), with a range from 55 to 114. Because researchers were not permitted to review youths’ records to determine offense histories, we asked participants directly for that information, a method identified as reliable in previous research (Brame, Fagan, Piquero, Schubert, & Steinberg, 2004). Participants reported a mean of 4.69 arrests (SD ⫽ 3.50; range: 1–20) and 3.54 previous juvenile justice placements (SD ⫽ 2.8; range 0 –16), with reported age at first arrest ranging from 8 to 17 years (M ⫽ 13.23, SD ⫽ 1.68). Reported offenses ranged from truancy to attempted murder, with assault-related charges (e.g., assault and battery, assault and battery with a dangerous weapon) being the most frequently reported type of offense (reported by 30.5%, n ⫽ 51 of participants). Youth were asked several questions to assess their awareness and memory of the administration of the warnings. Forty-eight percent (n ⫽ 87) of youths reported they had been detained by police but never read their Miranda rights, 28.4% (n ⫽ 52) indicated they had been read their rights on one or two prior occasions, 7.1% (n ⫽ 13) on three to five prior occasions, and 8.2% (n ⫽ 15) on more than five prior occasions. Twenty percent (n ⫽ 37) of participants said that they recalled having discussed their Miranda rights with their attorneys. Forty-one percent (n ⫽ 24) of youths in Massachusetts reported that they had made statements to the police at some time in the past; we were not permitted to ask Pennsylvania participants for this information.

Measures Miranda Rights Comprehension Instruments. The Miranda Rights Comprehension Instruments (MRCI; Goldstein et al., 2012) are the revised version of Grisso’s (1998) Instruments for Assessing Understanding and Appreciation of Miranda Rights. The instruments utilize a statement of the Miranda warnings synthesized from a sample of 65 warnings from eight states, and they include sets of objective scoring criteria developed through consultation with experts. The warnings have a seventh-grade reading level, which is comparable to the average reading level of warnings reviewed in research (Rogers et al., 2007, 2008). The four instruments of the MRCI are described briefly here, including their estimates of internal consistency and interrater reliability (for additional details see Goldstein et al., 2011; Goldstein et al., 2012). Internal consistency of each component instrument was low—this was expected given that the instrument items were derived directly

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from Miranda warnings, which cover several distinct concepts; thus, items were not designed to be internally consistent. Interrater reliability was calculated using a one-way average measures ICC because each participant’s responses were scored by one of several research assistants at the time of test administration and scored a second time by another one of several research assistants. Comprehension of Miranda Vocabulary-II (CMV-II). The CMV-II assesses examinees’ understanding of legal vocabulary often used in Miranda warnings. Examinees are asked to define 16 words that are read to them and used in sentences. Responses are considered adequate, questionable, or inadequate, and scored 2, 1, or 0, respectively. Internal consistency of the CMV-II with this sample of juvenile justice youths was moderate (␣ ⫽ .75), and interrater reliability was excellent (ICC ⫽ .96). Comprehension of Miranda Rights-II (CMR-II). The CMR-II assesses an examinee’s understanding of the basic meaning of each of the five Miranda warnings. Examinees are asked to explain the meaning of each warning in their own words, and their answers are scored using standardized criteria. Responses are considered adequate, questionable, or inadequate, and scored 2, 1, or 0, respectively. Internal consistency of the CMR-II with this sample of juvenile justice youths was low (␣ ⫽ .58), and interrater reliability was excellent (ICC ⫽ .95). Comprehension of Miranda Rights–Recognition-II (CMR–R-II). The CMR–R-II assesses an examinee’s Miranda understanding, omitting the role of verbal expressive abilities in the assessment. The CMR–R-II presents three preconstructed sentences for each Miranda warning, and examinees must recognize whether each sentence has the same meaning as the Miranda warning. Correct responses receive 1 point, and incorrect responses receive 0 points. Internal consistency of the CMR–R-II with this sample of juvenile justice youths was low (␣ ⫽ .54). Interrater reliability is not applicable to the CMR–R-II because the scoring is wholly objective. Function of Rights in Interrogation (FRI). The FRI assesses an examinee’s appreciation of the significance of Miranda rights in interrogation and legal proceedings. Examinees are presented with four vignettes about legal proceedings, along with related illustrations. Examinees’ appreciation of the Nature of Interrogation (NI) subscale, Right to Counsel (RC) subscale, and Right to Silence (RS) subscale is assessed via 15 standardized questions. The scoring structure (i.e., 2, 1, and 0 point criteria) for the FRI parallels that of the CMV-II and CMR-II. Internal consistency of the FRI with this sample of juvenile justice youths was low (␣ ⫽ .54), and interrater reliability was very good (ICC ⫽ .87). Demographic questionnaire. Participants provided information about general demographic details, social environment (e.g., number of relatives, friends, or acquaintances in juvenile detention or adult jail/prison), legal history (e.g., age at first arrest), and Miranda history (e.g., recollection of discussing Miranda warning with lawyer). Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (WASI). The WASI is a standardized, psychometrically sound measure of intellectual functioning (The Psychological Corporation, 1999). For the current study, the two verbal subtests (Vocabulary and Similarities) were administered to obtain a measure of participants’ VIQ because verbal capacities are most relevant to Miranda understanding and appreciation (Colwell et al., 2005). Reliability and validity of the WASI are well established, and the instrument is

used extensively in clinical and research contexts (The Psychological Corporation, 1999). Wechsler Individual Achievement Test (WIAT). The WIAT is a standardized, psychometrically sound measure of academic achievement (The Psychological Corporation, 1992). For the current study, the Writing, Reading, and Language subtests were administered to obtain measures of participants’ verbal abilities. The WIAT’s reliability and validity are well establish, and the assessment tool has been used extensively in clinical and research contexts (The Psychological Corporation, 1992).

Procedures Youths were tested individually, onsite at the facilities. Administration of the test battery required approximately three hours and was conducted across two testing sessions by trained research assistants. Testing was split across two sessions in order to allow flexibility for facility scheduling and to provide participants with opportunities to rest. The testing sessions typically took place on separate days, but some participants chose to complete all measures in one day. Approximately 20% of youths completed the first, but not the second, testing session. Facility staff indicated that these youths had either been discharged from the facility since the previous testing session (usually, the previous day) or were unable to complete testing for unspecified reasons (e.g., declined, at a hearing). Youths received $15 gift certificates to a music store for their participation.

Method of Analysis Juveniles’ difficulty understanding and appreciating Miranda rights. Repeated-measures analyses of variance (ANOVA) were conducted to compare item and subscale scores within instruments. Post hoc analyses consisted of multiple t tests with Bonferronicorrected alpha values; Tukey’s HSD was considered for use, but because it is typically used for pairwise comparisons and our analyses did not include a between-subjects factor, we deemed its use inappropriate. In addition to inferential statistics, descriptive statistics are provided for those items for which participants produced the most errors. For instrument total scores, we report percentages of youths who met a more stringent “absolute criterion,” which was defined as responding with 2-point answers to all items within an instrument, as well as a less stringent absolute criterion, which was defined as responding with no 0-point answers to all items within an instrument. These absolute criteria were defined by Grisso (1998) as a way of providing descriptive anchors for score interpretation, and they should not be interpreted as statistically derived cutoff scores. Relationship with totality of circumstances factors. Paired t tests and ANOVAs were conducted to examine the relationships among categorical totality of circumstances factors (e.g., history of special education) and Miranda understanding and appreciation. Correlation and regression analyses were conducted to examine continuous factors (e.g., age). For continuous factors that were significant predictors of Miranda understanding and appreciation, supplemental one-factor ANOVAs also were conducted. Such analyses were repetitive, but were included because they provide results that are more “describable” (e.g., comparison of youths in

UNDERSTANDING AND APPRECIATING MIRANDA RIGHTS

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different IQ ranges on CMR-II scores) and are similar in format to Grisso’s (1981, 1998) presentation of his seminal findings. Tukey’s HSD was used for post hoc comparisons; however, violations of the assumption of homogeneity of variance occurred in some cases, which are noted in the results (marked with a † symbol). Dunnett’s post hoc test was used in those cases. Effect sizes are reported for all analyses. Interpretation of Cohen’s d used the following effect size norms: small ⫽ 0.2, medium ⫽ 0.5, large ⫽ 0.8 (Cohen, 1988). Interpretation of r used small ⫽ .1, medium ⫽ .3, large ⫽ .5 (Cohen, 1988). Partial eta-squared estimates were interpreted using small ⫽ .01, medium ⫽ .06, large ⫽ .14 (Field, 2005).

Results Descriptive and Preliminary Analyses No differences were observed between male and female participants on any of the MRCI measures, CMV-II: t(179) ⫽ .79, p ⫽ .43, d ⫽ 0.14, 95% confidence interval (CI) [⫺0.61, 0.88]; CMRII: t(179) ⫽ 1.10, p ⫽ .27, d ⫽ 0.20, 95% CI [⫺0.18, 0.57]; CMR–R-II: t(179) ⫽ 1.01, p ⫽ .32, d ⫽ 0.18, 95% CI [⫺0.12, 0.49]; FRI: t(167) ⫽ 1.06, p ⫽ .29, d ⫽ 0.19, 95% CI [⫺0.37, 0.75]. Although observed effect sizes were small, the female sample size was too small to produce sufficient power (obtained power ⫽ .21) to rule out meaningful gender differences. On a related note, gender-specific multiple regression analyses were not undertaken due to the insufficient size of the female subsample. Differences in MRCI measure scores were observed across sites; however, these differences appeared to reflect the age differences between facilities (i.e., only one site typically housed youths under age 14, and only one facility typically housed youths over age 18). When age was entered as a covariate, only CMR-II scores continued to differ significantly across sites, F(2, 181) ⫽ 4.36, p ⫽ .01, ␩p2 ⫽ .05.

Juveniles’ Difficulty Understanding and Appreciating Miranda Rights In this paper, results pertaining to the CMV-II are presented first, because vocabulary comprehension is a prerequisite for both understanding and appreciation (Zelle et al., 2008), followed by results related to the understanding measures (CMR-II and CMR– R-II) and then by results related to the appreciation measure (FRI). CMV-II. No participants gave adequate responses for all items, and the majority of participants gave at least one inadequate response on the CMV-II (see Table 1). As predicted, participants demonstrated greater difficulty defining some words than others, F(11, 2068) ⫽ 76.20, p ⬍ .001. ␩p2 ⫽ .30. See Table 2 for mean scores on each item. Given the large number of potential comparisons, we limited post hoc t tests by comparing each of the three words with the lowest mean scores to all other CMV-II items, and the critical alpha-level was adjusted to .001. Scores for consult were significantly lower than scores for each of the other CMV-II words, ps ⬍ .001, ds ⫽ 0.44 –2.77, 95% CIs [0.38, 0.50]–[2.73, 2.83], and scores for right were significantly lower than for all words, ps ⬍ .001, ds ⫽ 0.31–2.11, 95% CIs [0.24, 0.38]–[2.06, 2.17], except consult, used against, p ⫽ .05, d ⫽ 0.18, 95% CI [0.10, 0.27], entitled, p ⫽ .03, d ⫽ 0.20, 95% CI [.12, .28],

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Table 1 Percentages of Youth Meeting Absolute Criteria

CMV-II CMR-II CMR–R-II FRI NI subscale RC subscale RS subscale

% Meeting more stringent absolute criterion (2 points on all items)

% Meeting less stringent absolute criterion (0 points on no items)

0.0 11.6 7.7 3.6 65.7 33.1 11.2

7.7 30.9 94.5 9.5 82.2 60.9 14.8

Note. CMV-II ⫽ Comprehension of Miranda Vocabulary-II; CMR-II ⫽ Comprehension of Miranda Rights-II; CMR–R-II ⫽ Comprehension of Miranda Rights–Recognition-II; FRI ⫽ Function of Rights in Interrogation; NI ⫽ Nature of Interrogation; RC ⫽ Right to Counsel; RS ⫽ Right to Silence.

interrogation, p ⫽ .30, d ⫽ 0.11, 95% CI [0.02, 0.19], and represent, p ⫽ .005, d ⫽ 0.25, 95% CI [0.17, 0.32]. Scores for interrogation also were significantly lower than scores for all CMV-II items, ps ⬍ .001, ds ⫽ 0.43–1.40, 95% CIs [0.34, 0.53]–[1.33, 1.48], except consult, right, statement, p ⫽ .14, d ⫽ 0.14, 95% CI [0.05, 0.23], represent, p ⫽ .25, d ⫽ 0.11, 95% CI [0.01, 0.20], entitled, p ⫽ .44, d ⫽ 0.07, 95% CI [⫺0.02, 0.17], and used against, p ⫽ .53, d ⫽ 0.06, 95% CI [⫺0.03, 0.16]. Notably, nearly half of participants incorrectly defined “right” as something one can choose to do, without recognizing that a right is protected and guaranteed, even after querying by the researcher. Understanding. CMR-II. Very few participants gave adequate responses for all items and over two thirds gave at least one inadequate response on the CMR-II (see Table 1). Youths’ understanding of the Miranda rights differed significantly by warning, F(4, 640) ⫽ 15.21, p ⬍ .001, ␩p2 ⫽ .08 (see Table 2). Post hoc analyses revealed that scores on the first warning (right to silence) were significantly lower than scores on the fourth (right to appointed attorney), t(180) ⫽ ⫺5.96, p ⬍ .001, d ⫽ 0.57, 95% CI [0.49, 0.65]. Scores on the fourth warning (right to appointed attorney) were significantly higher than scores on each of the other warnings, ps ⬍ .001, ds ⫽ 0.49 – 0.65, 95% CIs [0.43, 0.57]–[0.57, 0.74]. Twenty-eight percent (n ⫽ 52) of youths provided inadequate (0-point) interpretations of the right to silence, and 38.8% (n ⫽ 71) provided inadequate responses to the second warning, that a statement can be used in court. Seventeen percent (n ⫽ 31) provided inadequate interpretations of the right to an attorney, and 8.7% (n ⫽ 16) provided inadequate responses to the warning about the right to an appointed attorney. Forty-two percent (n ⫽ 77) of youths provided inadequate responses to the fifth warning about the continuation of rights. CMR–R-II. Very few participants gave correct responses on all items but the vast majority correctly identified at least one of three sentences for each warning on the CMR–R-II (see Table 1). Youths’ understanding differed significantly by warning, F(4, 720) ⫽ 27.70, p ⬍ .001, ␩p2 ⫽ .13 (see Table 2). Youths scored significantly lower on the first warning (right to silence) than on the second (statements can be used in court), t(180) ⫽ ⫺5.76, p ⬍ .001, d ⫽ 0.56, 95% CI [0.49, 0.63], and fifth (continuation of rights), t(180) ⫽ ⫺6.60, p ⬍ .001, d ⫽ 0.61, 95% CI [0.54, 0.69],

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Table 2 Average Item, Subscale, and Total Scores by MRCI Instrument

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M (SD) CMV-II item scores (N ⫽ 181) 1. Consult 2. Attorney 3. Questioning 4. Used Against 5. Right 6. Lawyer 7. Statement 8. Entitled 9. Afford 10. Advice 11. Interrogation 12. Remain 13. Appoint 14. Present 15. Confession 16. Represent Average total score (0–32) CMR-II subscale scores (N ⫽ 181) 1. Right to Silence 2. Statement Used in Court 3. Right to Attorney 4. Right to Appointed Attorney 5. Continuation of Rights Average total score (0–10) CMR–R-II subscale scores (N ⫽ 181) 1. Right to Silence 2. Statement Used in Court 3. Right to Attorney 4. Right to Appointed Attorney 5. Continuation of Rights Average total score (0–15) FRI subscale scores (N ⫽ 169) 1. Nature of Interrogation 2. Right to Counsel 3. Right to Silence Average total score (0–30)

0.54 (0.59) 1.36 (0.69) 1.92 (0.39) 0.96 (0.64) 0.81 (0.64) 1.29 (0.56) 1.01 (0.68) 0.96 (0.88) 1.81 (0.55) 1.36 (0.70) 0.90 (0.96) 1.89 (0.47) 1.29 (0.86) 1.83 (0.51) 1.35 (0.73) 0.99 (0.82) 20.24 (5.17) 1.18 (0.85) 1.09 (0.93) 1.27 (0.74) 1.61 (0.65) 1.11 (0.97) 6.26 (2.57) 2.23 (0.77) 2.60 (0.54) 2.21 (0.80) 2.12 (0.77) 2.66 (0.63) 11.82 (2.11) 9.22 (1.27) 8.25 (1.56) 6.09 (2.61) 23.55 (3.71)

Note. MRCI ⫽ Miranda Rights Comprehension Instruments; CMV-II ⫽ Comprehension of Miranda Vocabulary-II; SD ⫽ standard deviation; CMR-II ⫽ Comprehension of Miranda Rights-II; CMR–R-II ⫽ Comprehension of Miranda Rights–Recognition-II; FRI ⫽ Function of Rights in Interrogation.

but scores on the first warning did not differ significantly from those on the third (right to attorney before and during questioning), t(180) ⫽ .24, p ⫽ .81, d ⫽ 0.03, 95% CI [⫺0.11, 0.06], or fourth (right to appointed attorney), t(180) ⫽ 1.58, p ⫽ .12, d ⫽ 0.14, 95% CI [⫺0.22, ⫺0.06]. In fact, contrary to predictions, youths scored significantly lower on the third and fourth warnings than on the second, t(180) ⫽ ⫺5.41, p ⬍ .001, d ⫽ 0.57, 95% CI [0.50, 0.64]; t(180) ⫽ ⫺7.18, p ⬍ .001, d ⫽ 0.72, 95% CI [0.65, 0.79], respectively, and fifth, t(180) ⫽ ⫺7.15, p ⬍ .001, d ⫽ 0.63, 95% CI [0.55, 0.70]; t(180) ⫽ ⫺7.93, p ⬍ .001, d ⫽ 0.76, 95% CI [0.69, 0.84], respectively. On the third warning, nearly half (43.2%, n ⫽ 79) of the youths failed to distinguish between a lawyer and a social worker. On the fourth warning, 48.1% (n ⫽ 88) of participants believed that the appointment of a social worker was synonymous with the right to an appointed attorney for indigent defendants. Interestingly, the majority (53.0%, n ⫽ 97) of youths indicated that the sentence, “You should not say anything until the police ask you questions,”

was synonymous with the right to silence, demonstrating a similar misunderstanding to that seen on the CMR-II—that a right is an option that can be abrogated by authorities rather than a protected privilege. Appreciation. FRI. Only six participants gave adequate responses for all items, and most participants gave at least one inadequate response on the FRI (see Table 1). Youths’ appreciation differed significantly across subscales, F(2, 289) ⫽ 139.42, p ⬍.001, ␩p2 ⫽ .45 (see Table 2). Youths scored significantly lower on the RS subscale than on the NI, t(168) ⫽ ⫺14.50, p ⬍ .001, d ⫽ 1.53, 95% CI [1.32, 1.75], and RC, t(168) ⫽ ⫺10.48, p ⬍ .001, d ⫽ 1.00, 95% CI [0.78, 1.24], subscales. As predicted, youths obtained higher subscale total scores on the RC than on the RS subscale (see Table 2). Moreover, the most common errors in appreciation were all made in response to RS subscale items. Forty-four percent (n ⫽ 75 of the 169 youths who completed the FRI) of youths reported that negative consequences would occur (e.g., be found guilty or punished, detainment, judge would order that the suspect talk) if a judge discovered that the suspect would not talk to police. Furthermore, 59.8% (n ⫽ 101) of participants believed that if the suspect had not spoken to police, he would be required to talk in court. Notably, about half of the youths (48.8%, n ⫽ 39) who were able to adequately define the right to silence on the CMR-II believed, on the FRI, that the judge could force a youth defendant to talk about what he did wrong when he went to court for a hearing.

Relationship With Totality of Circumstances Factors Because age and IQ are the totality of circumstances factors that judges most commonly noted when deciding whether to suppress a confession (Grisso, 1981), we included these two variables in all analyses examining the relationships between totality of circumstances factors and MRCI scores. Age and VIQ correlated negatively in this sample but not so strongly as to suggest multicollinearity that would prevent entering the two variables simultaneously in a regression equation (see Table 3). VIQ correlated strongly with measures of academic achievement, however (see Table 3), making it statistically inappropriate to include both sets of variables simultaneously in analyses. Factors unrelated to Miranda comprehension in the current study. Upon initial analyses (including nonlinearity analyses and visual inspection of the data), there appeared to be a significant linear relationship between number of times arrested and CMV-II scores, r ⫽ .21, p ⫽ .006. However, when controlling for age and VIQ, CMV-II scores were not significantly associated with number of times arrested, R2 ⫽ .45, barr ⫽ 0.12, p ⫽ .054, bage ⫽ 0.18, p ⫽ .005, bVIQ ⫽ 0.65, p ⬍ .001, ƒ2 ⫽ .80, 95% CI [0.50, 1.26]. With the exception of the CMR–R-II, MRCI measure scores did not differ significantly between youths who recalled having heard about Miranda rights from their attorneys (20.2%, n ⫽ 37) and those who did not recall such a conversation (69.4%, n ⫽ 127), CMV-II: t(162) ⫽ ⫺.12, p ⫽ .90, d ⫽ 0.02, 95% CI [⫺0.74, 0.79]; CMR-II: t(162) ⫽ ⫺1.40, p ⫽ .16, d ⫽ 0.26, 95% CI [⫺0.13, 0.65]; FRI: t(162) ⫽ 1.19, p ⫽ .24, d ⫽ ⫺0.22, 95% CI [⫺0.79, 0.35]. On the CMR–R-II, youths who recalled discussing Miranda rights with their attorney scored significantly higher (M ⫽ 12.49, SD ⫽ 2.05) than peers who did not (M ⫽ 11.68, SD ⫽ 2.06),

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Table 3 Pearson r Correlations Between Miranda Instruments and Age, Verbal IQ, and Academic Achievement Verbal IQ

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Verbal IQ CMV-II CMR-II CMR–R-II FRI

Age

Reading Comprehension

Listening Comprehension

Oral Expression

r

95% CI

r

95% CI

r

95% CI

r

95% CI

r

95% CI

.62ⴱⴱⴱ .49ⴱⴱⴱ .50ⴱⴱⴱ .36ⴱⴱⴱ

[.37, .59] [.37, .60] [.38, .60] [.21, .49]

⫺.17ⴱ .08 .14 .13 .11

[⫺.32, ⫺.03] [⫺.07, .23] [⫺.01, .28] [⫺.01, .27] [⫺.04, .26]

.71ⴱⴱⴱ .62ⴱⴱⴱ .60ⴱⴱⴱ .45ⴱⴱⴱ .46ⴱⴱⴱ

[.62, .78] [.51, .71] [.48, .69] [.31, .57] [.32, .58]

.63ⴱⴱⴱ .59ⴱⴱⴱ .50ⴱⴱⴱ .34ⴱⴱⴱ .41ⴱⴱⴱ

[.51, .72] [.48, .69] [.36, .61] [.18, .47] [.27, .54]

.53ⴱⴱⴱ .42ⴱⴱⴱ .35ⴱⴱⴱ .34ⴱⴱⴱ .22ⴱⴱ

[.39, .64] [.27, .54] [.19, .49] [.18, .48] [.06, .37]

Note. CI ⫽ confidence interval; CMV-II ⫽ Comprehension of Miranda Vocabulary-II; SD ⫽ standard deviation; CMR-II ⫽ Comprehension of Miranda Rights-II; CMR–R-II ⫽ Comprehension of Miranda Rights–Recognition-II; FRI ⫽ Function of Rights in Interrogation. ⴱ p ⬍ .05. ⴱⴱ p ⬍ .01. ⴱⴱⴱ p ⬍ .001.

t(162) ⫽ ⫺2.11, p ⫽ .04, d ⫽ 0.39, 95% CI [0.08, 0.71]. However, scores on the MRCI measures did not differ significantly by whether youths had ever given statements to police, CMV-II: t(53) ⫽ ⫺1.28, p ⫽ .21, d ⫽ 0.36, 95% CI [⫺0.83, 1.54]; CMR-II: t(53) ⫽ ⫺1.03, p ⫽ .31, d ⫽ 0.29, 95% CI [⫺0.35, 0.93]; CMR–R-II: t(53) ⫽ ⫺1.66, p ⫽ .10, d ⫽ 0.46, 95% CI [⫺0.08, 1.01]; FRI: t(53) ⫽ 1.39, p ⫽ .17, d ⫽ ⫺0.39, 95% CI [⫺1.36, 0.59], nor by the number of times that youths reported having been detained and heard the Miranda warnings from police, CMV-II: F(4, 176) ⫽ 1.13, p ⫽ .35, ␩p2 ⫽ .03; CMR-II: F(4, 176) ⫽ 1.82, p ⫽ .13, ␩p2 ⫽ .04; CMR–R-II: F(4, 176) ⫽ .14, p ⫽ .97, ␩p2 ⬍ .01; FRI: F(4, 164) ⫽ 2.14, p ⫽ .08, ␩p2 ⫽ .05. Initially, there appeared to be significant differences by ethnicity for CMV-II, F(4, 162) ⫽ 4.17, p ⫽ .003, ␩p2 ⫽ .09, and CMR-II scores, F(4, 162) ⫽ 2.48, p ⫽ .046, ␩p2 ⫽ .06, with White participants scoring higher than Hispanic participants. However, this difference appeared to be due to differences in language, not ethnicity (see below for primary language results). After removing participants whose first language was not English, significant ethnic differences persisted only in CMV-II scores, F(4, 153) ⫽ 2.67, p ⫽ .03, ␩p2 ⫽ .07, and when VIQ was entered as a covariate, no significant differences were observed, F(4, 144) ⫽ 1.11, p ⫽ .36, ␩p2 ⫽ .03. The expected differences between youths with and without special education history were not observed, CMV-II: t(164) ⫽ 1.50, p ⫽ .14, d ⫽ 0.24, 95% CI [⫺0.53, 1.01]; CMR-II: t(164) ⫽ 1.61, p ⫽ .11, d ⫽ 0.26, 95% CI [⫺0.13, 0.65]; FRI: t(164) ⫽ .51, p ⫽ .61, d ⫽ 0.08, 95% CI [⫺0.48, 0.65]. Although participants who had not participated in special education (M ⫽ 12.07, SD ⫽ 2.05) recognized their rights better on the CMR–R-II than did those who reported a history of special education (M ⫽ 11.40, SD ⫽ 2.12), t(164) ⫽ 1.98, p ⫽ .048, d ⫽ 0.32, 95% CI [0.01, 0.64], this difference was not significant when controlling for age and VIQ, F(1, 153) ⫽ .58, p ⫽ .45, ␩p2 ⬍ .01. Factors related to Miranda comprehension in the current study. Age. Although age did not correlate significantly with CMV-II scores (see Table 3), regression analyses controlling for VIQ revealed that age was significantly associated with CMV-II scores, with older youths better understanding Miranda vocabulary (see Table 4). As would be expected given the lack of observed relationship between CMV-II scores and age alone, no significant differences in CMV-II scores were found when age was examined

categorically, F(2, 179) ⫽ .57, p ⫽ .57, ␩p2 ⬍ .01. Although age did not correlate significantly with either CMR-II or CMR–R-II scores (see Table 3), regression analyses controlling for VIQ indicated that age was significantly associated with both CMR-II and CMR–R-II scores (see Table 4). Older youths better understood the meaning of the Miranda rights. However, when examining age categorically, no significant age group differences were found, CMR-II: F(2, 179) ⫽ 2.78, p ⫽ .07, ␩p2 ⫽ .03; CMR–R-II: F(2, 179) ⫽ 1.68, p ⫽ .19, ␩p2 ⫽ .02. Although age did not correlate significantly with FRI scores (see Table 3), regression analyses controlling for VIQ revealed that age was significantly related to FRI scores (see Table 4). Age was not significantly related to the NI subscale, but was significantly related to both the RC and RS subscales, when controlling for VIQ (see Table 4). No significant age group differences were found, FRI: F(2, 168) ⫽ .90, p ⫽ .41, ␩p2 ⫽ .01; NI: F(2, 168) ⫽ .34, p ⫽ .71, ␩p2 ⬍ .01; RC: F(2, 168) ⫽ 1.18, p ⫽ .31, ␩p2 ⫽ .01; RS: F(2, 168) ⫽ 1.81, p ⫽ .17, ␩p2 ⫽ .02. Verbal IQ. VIQ scores correlated significantly with CMV-II scores (see Table 3), and regression analyses controlling for age revealed that VIQ was significantly related to CMV-II scores— youths with higher VIQ scores better understood Miranda vocabulary (see Table 4). Significant differences were found between VIQ groups, CMV-II: F(4, 169) ⫽ 24.73, p ⬍ .001, ␩p2 ⫽ .38 (see Table 5 for between group comparisons). VIQ scores also correlated significantly with both CMR-II and CMR–R-II scores (see Table 3). In regression analyses controlling for age, VIQ scores were significantly associated with scores on both measures (see Table 4). Significant differences were found between VIQ groups, CMR-II: F(4, 169) ⫽ 12.78, p ⬍ .001, ␩p2 ⫽ .24†; CMR–R-II: F(4, 169) ⫽ 12.94, p ⬍ .001, ␩p2 ⫽ .24 (see Table 5). Finally, VIQ correlated significantly with FRI total scores (see Table 3). Controlling for age, VIQ scores were significantly associated with FRI total scores (see Table 4). Significant differences were observed between VIQ groups, F(4, 157) ⫽ 6.24, p ⬍ .001, ␩p2 ⫽ .14 (see Table 5). Academic achievement. All three academic achievement scores correlated significantly with CMV-II scores (see Table 3). Regression analyses controlling for age and VIQ revealed that Listening Comprehension scores were significantly associated with CMV-II scores, but Reading Comprehension and Oral Expression scores were not (see Table 4). Performance on the CMV-II differed significantly by grade equivalent scores on Read-

ZELLE, RIGGS ROMAINE, AND GOLDSTEIN

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Table 4 Simultaneous Multiple Regression Values: Miranda Comprehension Regressed on Totality of Circumstances Factors

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R2a Agec CMV-II CMR-II CMR–R-II FRI NI RC RS Verbal IQd CMV-II CMR-II CMR–R-II FRI NI RC RS Reading Comprehensione CMV-II CMR-II CMR–R-II FRI NI RC RS Listening Comprehensione CMV-II CMR-II CMR–R-II FRI NI RC RS Oral Expressione CMV-II CMR-II CMR–R-II FRI NI RC RS

b

SEb

Predictor f 2b

.43 .31 .30 .16 .01 .04 .24

.64ⴱⴱ .40ⴱⴱ .28ⴱⴱ .44ⴱ ⫺.05 .15 .34ⴱⴱ

.18 .10 .08 .17 .06 .07 .11

.13 .10 .08 .04 ⬍.01 .02 .06

.43 .31 .30 .16 .01 .04 .24

.28ⴱⴱ .12ⴱⴱ .09ⴱⴱ .13ⴱⴱ ⫺.01 .02ⴱ .11ⴱⴱ

.03 .01 .01 .02 .01 .01 .02

.73 .41 .41 .18 ⬍.01 .03 .30

.52 .44 .30 .25 .07 .07 .35

.07 .06ⴱⴱ .03 .07ⴱ ⫺.01 .02 .06ⴱⴱ

.03 .02 .02 .03 .01 .02 .02

.05 .07 .02 .03 ⬍.01 .02 .06

.52 .44 .30 .25 .07 .07 .35

.09ⴱⴱ .03 ⬍⫺.01 .06 .02 ⬍.01 .03

.03 .02 .02 .03 .01 .01 .02

.06 .03 ⬍.01 .03 .03 ⬍.01 .02

.52 .44 .30 .25 .07 .07 .35

.04 .02 .03 .01 ⫺.03ⴱ .01 .02

.03 .02 .02 .03 .01 .01 .02

.01 .01 .05 ⬍.01 .04 .01 .01

Note. CMV-II ⫽ Comprehension of Miranda Vocabulary-II; CMR-II ⫽ Comprehension of Miranda Rights-II; CMR–R-II ⫽ Comprehension of Miranda Rights–Recognition-II; FRI ⫽ Function of Rights in Interrogation; NI ⫽ Nature of Interrogation; RC ⫽ Right to Counsel; RS ⫽ Right to Silence. a Variance accounted for by full model. b Cohen (1988) defined: ƒ2 ⫽ .02 small, ƒ2 ⫽ .15 medium, ƒ2 ⫽ .35 large. c IQ also entered as predictor variable. d Age also entered as predictor. e Age, IQ, and all 3 subtest (Reading Comprehension, Listening Comprehension, and Oral Expression) scores were entered as predictors. ⴱ p ⬍ .05. ⴱⴱ p ⬍ .01.

ing Comprehension, F(4, 142) ⫽ 19.57, p ⬍ .001, ␩p2 ⫽ .36†, Listening Comprehension, F(5, 140) ⫽ 13.67, p ⬍ .001, ␩p2 ⫽ .34, and Oral Expression, F(5, 138) ⫽ 7.46, p ⬍ .001, ␩p2 ⫽ .22†(see Table 5). All three academic achievement scores correlated significantly with both CMR-II and CMR–R-II scores (see Table 3). Regression analyses controlling for age and VIQ scores revealed that Reading Comprehension scores were significantly associated with CMR-II scores, but not with CMR–R-II scores. Listening Comprehension and Oral Expression scores were not significantly associated with

CMR-II or CMR–R-II scores (see Table 4). Performance on the CMR-II differed significantly by Reading Comprehension, F(4, 142) ⫽ 19.47, p ⬍ .001, ␩p2 ⫽ .36, Listening Comprehension, F(5, 140) ⫽ 14.02, p ⬍ .001, ␩p2 ⫽ .34, and Oral Expression, F(5, 138) ⫽ 5.78, p ⬍ .001, ␩p2 ⫽ .18, grade equivalents (see Table 5). Performance on the CMR–R-II also differed by Reading Comprehension, F(4, 142) ⫽ 10.21, p ⬍ .001, ␩p2 ⫽ .23†, Listening Comprehension, F(5, 140) ⫽ 4.67, p ⫽ .001, ␩p2 ⫽ .15, and Oral Expression, F(5, 138) ⫽ 6.04, p ⬍ .001, ␩p2 ⫽ .19, grade equivalent scores (see Table 5). All three academic achievement scores correlated significantly with FRI scores (see Table 3). Regression analyses controlling for age and VIQ scores revealed that Reading Comprehension scores were significantly associated with FRI total scores and with scores on the RS subscale. Oral Expression scores were not significantly associated with FRI total scores, but were significantly associated with scores on the NI subscale. Listening Comprehension scores were not significantly associated with FRI total scores or with any subscale scores (see Table 4). FRI total scores differed significantly by Reading Comprehension, F(4, 142) ⫽ 10.50, p ⬍ .001, ␩p2 ⫽ .23, and Listening Comprehension, F(5, 140) ⫽ 6.51, p ⬍ .001, ␩p2 ⫽ .19, grade equivalent scores, but not by Oral Expression grade equivalent scores, F(5, 138) ⫽ 2.11, p ⫽ .07, ␩p2 ⫽ .07 (see Table 5). Primary language. Only nine participants reported that English was not their primary language, but analyses were carried out as planned in order to provide exploratory results. Youths whose first language was English scored significantly higher on the CMV-II, t(165) ⫽ 3.48, p ⬍ .001, d ⫽ 1.20, 95% CI [0.45, 1.94], CMR-II, t(165) ⫽ 2.26, p ⫽ .03, d ⫽ 0.78, 95% CI [0.40, 1.17], and CMR–R-II, t(165) ⫽ 2.58, p ⫽ .01, d ⫽ 0.88, 95% CI [0.58, 1.20]. FRI scores did not differ significantly by primary language, t(165) ⫽ .74, p ⫽ .46, d ⫽ 0.26, 95% CI [⫺0.31, 0.82]. When VIQ was entered as a covariate, however, the relationship between primary language and MRCI scores was no longer significant, CMV-II: F(1, 155) ⫽ 1.08, p ⫽ .30, ␩p2 ⬍ .01; CMR-II: F(1, 155) ⬍ .01, p ⫽ .93, ␩p2 ⬍ .01; CMR–R-II: F(1, 155) ⫽ .39, p ⫽ .54, ␩p2 ⬍ .01.

Discussion The current study provides the first direct comparison of youths’ understanding and appreciation of the right to silence and right to counsel in a juvenile justice sample. In addition, results examined the relationships between commonly cited totality of circumstances factors and understanding and appreciation of Miranda rights.

Juveniles’ Miranda Comprehension Overall, results indicated that the vast majority of youths struggled with multiple words that are common within Miranda warnings, which is consistent with previous research examining ability to define relevant words (e.g., Grisso, 1981) and the difficult Miranda warnings language used in jurisdictions across the United States (e.g., Rogers et al., 2008). It appears that youths are at risk for miscomprehending the warnings, even before they consider the warnings as whole statements, simply because the individual words in the warnings are too complex.

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Table 5 Statistical Significance, Effect Size (Cohen’s d), and 95% Confidence Intervals for Post Hoc Between Group Comparisons of Totality of Circumstances Factors on Each Miranda Rights Comprehension Instrument Verbal IQ ⱕ70

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CMV-II CMR-II CMR–R-II FRI

71– 80

81–90

ⱖ101

91–100

M

SD

N

M

SD

N

M

SD

N

M

SD

N

M

SD

N

14.63 4.33 10.37 21.66

4.68 2.62 1.97 4.06

30 30 30 29

19.70 5.88 11.39 23.15

4.15 2.26 1.92 3.33

56 56 56 50

21.46 6.68 12.24 23.49

3.81 2.41 1.88 3.79

50 50 50 48

23.96 8.22 13.26 26.32

3.43 1.54 1.45 2.79

23 23 23 22

25.36 8.27 13.82 25.59

4.32 1.62 1.33 3.71

11 11 11 9

71–80

ⱕ70 CMV-II CMR-II CMR–R-II FRI 71–80 CMV-II CMR-II CMR–R-II FRI 81–90 CMV-II CMR-II CMR–R-II FRI

81–90

ⱖ101

91–100

d

95% CI

d

95% CI

d

95% CI

d

95% CI

1.18 0.66 0.53 0.42

[0.28, 2.09]ⴱⴱⴱ [0.16, 1.16] [0.13, 0.94] [⫺.37, 1.20]

1.67 0.96 0.99 0.48

[0.77, 2.56]ⴱⴱⴱ [0.42, 1.50]ⴱⴱ [0.58, 1.40]ⴱⴱⴱ [⫺0.38, 1.33]

2.27 1.79 1.67 1.33

[1.17, [1.20, [1.20, [0.37,

3.38]ⴱⴱⴱ 2.37]ⴱⴱⴱ 2.14]ⴱⴱⴱ 2.29]ⴱⴱⴱ

2.40 1.68 1.94 1.01

[1.03, 3.77]ⴱⴱⴱ [0.96, 2.40]ⴱⴱⴱ [1.39, 2.48]ⴱⴱⴱ [⫺0.22, 2.25]ⴱ

0.45 0.35 0.45 0.10

[⫺0.31, 1.20] [⫺0.09, 0.79] [0.09, 0.81] [⫺0.60, 0.80]

1.09 1.14 1.05 1.01

[0.23, [0.69, [0.66, [0.29,

1.95]ⴱⴱⴱ 1.59]ⴱⴱⴱ 1.45ⴱⴱ 1.74]ⴱⴱ

1.38 1.12 1.34 0.73

[0.39, 2.36]ⴱⴱⴱ [0.60, 1.63]ⴱⴱ [0.91, 1.77]ⴱⴱ [⫺0.12, 1.58]

0.69 0.72 0.59 0.82

[⫺0.15, 1.52] [0.22, 1.21]ⴱ [0.19, 0.99] [0.01, 1.63]ⴱ

1.02 0.70 0.89 0.57

[0.05, 1.98]ⴱ [0.14, 1.27] [0.45, 1.34] [⫺0.40, 1.53]

Reading Comprehension K–2nd

CMV-II CMR-II CMR–R-II FRI

3rd–4th

7th–8th

11th–12th⫹

M

SD

N

M

SD

N

M

SD

N

M

SD

N

M

SD

N

14.63 3.44 9.94 21.19

5.25 2.37 1.39 3.12

16 16 16 16

17.92 5.48 11.42 22.20

4.75 2.48 2.08 3.85

48 48 48 48

21.17 6.63 12.34 24.07

3.42 1.96 2.00 3.23

35 35 35 35

23.50 8.20 13.35 26.03

3.00 1.47 1.23 2.49

20 20 20 20

24.13 8.38 12.79 26.15

4.01 1.64 1.82 3.07

24 24 24 24

3rd–4th

K–2nd CMV-II CMR-II CMR–R-II FRI 3rd–4th CMV-II CMR-II CMR–R-II FRI 5th–6th CMV-II CMR-II CMR–R-II FRI

5th–6th

5th–6th

7th–8th

d

95% CI

d

95% CI

0.69 0.85 0.77 0.28

[⫺0.49, 1.86] [0.25, 1.44]ⴱⴱ [0.31, 1.24]ⴱ [⫺0.61, 1.17]

1.64 1.55 1.33 0.92

[0.55, [0.99, [0.84, [0.06,

0.78 0.51 0.46 0.53

[⫺0.13, 1.68]ⴱⴱ [0.03, 1.00] [0.02, 0.89] [⫺0.24, 1.29]

2.73]ⴱⴱ 2.12]ⴱⴱⴱ 1.83]ⴱⴱⴱ 1.78]ⴱ

d

11th–12th⫹

95% CI

d

95% CI

2.20 2.55 2.69 1.79

[0.89, [1.94, [2.28, [0.90,

3.52]ⴱⴱⴱ 3.16]ⴱⴱⴱ 3.11]ⴱⴱⴱ 2.67]ⴱⴱⴱ

2.15 2.59 1.76 1.65

[0.78, [1.99, [1.26, [0.71,

3.52]ⴱⴱⴱ 3.18]ⴱⴱⴱ 2.26]ⴱⴱⴱ 2.58]ⴱⴱⴱ

1.31 1.23 1.05 1.11

[0.30, [0.71, [0.61, [0.28,

2.32]ⴱⴱⴱ 1.76]ⴱⴱⴱ 1.48]ⴱⴱⴱ 1.93]ⴱⴱⴱ

1.39 1.31 0.70 1.11

[0.36, [0.80, [0.24, [0.29,

2.42]ⴱⴱⴱ 1.82]ⴱⴱⴱ 1.15] 1.93]ⴱⴱⴱ

0.73 0.89 0.58 0.67

[⫺0.13, 1.57] [0.42, 1.36] [0.13, 1.04] [⫺0.11, 1.44]

0.82 0.97 0.24 0.67

[⫺0.10, 1.74]ⴱ [0.51, 1.43]ⴱ [0.25, 0.72] [⫺0.13, 1.46] (table continues)

ZELLE, RIGGS ROMAINE, AND GOLDSTEIN

290 Table 5 (continued)

Listening Comprehension K–2nd

CMV-II CMR-II CMR–R-II FRI

3rd–4th

9th–10th

11th–12th⫹

SD

N

M

SD

N

M

SD

N

M

SD

N

M

SD

N

M

SD

N

15.51 4.05 10.76 21.26

5.15 2.51 2.18 3.69

37 37 37 37

21.09 6.84 12.18 24.13

3.91 2.04 1.89 3.44

67 67 67 67

21.41 7.41 12.23 24.58

4.47 2.09 2.09 3.44

22 22 22 22

24.00 7.50 13.00 27.75

1.63 1.29 1.41 2.06

4 4 4 4

25.40 8.80 12.80 25.80

2.88 1.30 1.92 1.92

5 5 5 5

25.50 9.17 14.00 26.50

3.51 1.33 1.27 3.13

6 6 6 6

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7th–8th

M

3rd–4th

K–2nd CMV-II CMR-II CMR–R-II FRI

5th–6th

1.28 1.27 0.72 0.82

5th–6th

95% CI [0.45, [0.85, [0.34, [0.15,

d

2.12]ⴱⴱⴱ 1.69]ⴱⴱⴱ 1.10]ⴱⴱ 1.49]ⴱⴱ

7th–8th

95% CI

1.26 1.45 0.70 0.94

[0.36, [0.85, [0.16, [0.04,

d

2.16]ⴱⴱⴱ 2.04]ⴱⴱⴱ 1.24] 1.84]ⴱⴱ

9th–10th

95% CI

1.75 1.45 1.08 1.85

[0.27, [0.72, [0.44, [0.78,

d

3.24]ⴱⴱ 2.18]ⴱ 1.71] 2.93]ⴱⴱ

2.04 2.01 0.97 1.31

11th–12th⫹

95% CI [0.57, [1.30, [0.33, [0.26,

d

3.51]ⴱⴱⴱ 2.73]ⴱⴱⴱ 1.61] 2.36]

95% CI

2.06 2.19 1.59 1.48

[0.60, [1.49, [0.98, [0.42,

3.51]ⴱⴱⴱ 2.89]ⴱⴱⴱ 2.20]ⴱⴱ 2.54]ⴱⴱ

Oral Expression K–2nda

CMV-II CMR-II CMR–R-II FRI

3rd–4th

7th–8th

9th–10th

11th–12th⫹

M

SD

N

M

SD

N

M

SD

N

M

SD

N

M

SD

N

M

SD

N

10.50 1.00 9.50 18.50

3.54 1.41 .71 2.12

2 2 2 2

14.90 5.20 10.70 22.00

3.81 2.49 2.06 1.70

10 10 10 10

17.68 4.91 10.50 23.17

6.31 2.47 2.04 3.73

22 22 22 22

20.00 6.00 12.43 22.48

5.13 3.16 2.57 3.98

7 7 7 7

21.00 6.75 11.50 23.13

4.66 2.92 2.14 5.14

8 8 8 8

21.58 7.06 12.56 24.37

4.12 2.23 1.79 3.66

90 90 90 90

3rd–4th d 3rd–4th CMV-II CMR-II CMR–R-II 5th–6th CMV-II CMR-II CMR–R-II

5th–6th

95% CI

5th–6th

7th–8th

9th–10th

11th–12th⫹

d

95% CI

d

95% CI

d

95% CI

d

95% CI

0.51 ⫺0.12 ⫺0.10

[⫺1.40, 2.41] [⫺0.95, .71] [⫺0.79, .59]

1.24 0.31 0.81

[⫺0.72, 3.20] [⫺0.93, 1.55] [⫺0.21, 1.83]

1.54 0.61 0.41

[⫺0.29, 3.37] [⫺0.56, 1.78] [⫺0.51, 1.32]

1.65 0.83 1.03

[0.86, 2.44]ⴱⴱ [0.40, 1.27] [0.68, 1.39]ⴱ

0.40 0.43 0.92

[⫺1.74, 2.53] [⫺0.50, 1.36] [0.16, 1.68]

0.58 0.74 0.50

[1.48, 2.63] [⫺0.16, 1.63] [⫺0.21, 1.22]

0.85 0.95 1.13

[0.004, 1.70] [0.53, 1.37]ⴱⴱ [0.79, 1.47]ⴱⴱⴱ

Note. SD ⫽ standard deviation; CMV-II ⫽ Comprehension of Miranda Vocabulary-II; CMR-II ⫽ Comprehension of Miranda Rights-II; CMR–R-II ⫽ Comprehension of Miranda Rights–Recognition-II; FRI ⫽ Function of Rights in Interrogation; CI ⫽ confidence interval; K ⫽ kindergarten. Given the variation among group sample sizes, Ns were accounted for in effect size and confidence interval calculations. Effect sizes and confidence intervals for age groups and some academic achievement groups are not included because no between-group differences were statistically significant. a Because only two participants scored in the K–2nd-grade level of Oral Expression, no group differences were calculated. ⴱ p ⬍ .05. ⴱⴱ p ⬍ .01. ⴱⴱⴱ p ⬍ .001.

The majority of youths demonstrated difficulty understanding at least one Miranda warning. Across the two understanding measures, different aspects of misunderstanding were revealed. On one instrument, youths had more trouble paraphrasing the right to silence than the right to counsel. On the other, however, they evidenced a key misunderstanding of the role of an attorney, equating social workers with defense counsel. Importantly, many youths failed to recognize that rights are protected privileges, a critically foundational concept, across both understanding instruments. As expected, youths struggled more with appreciation than understanding of rights, and they demonstrated greater difficulty appreciating the right to silence than the right to counsel. Misconceptions about the breadth of the right to silence may lead a youthful suspect to waive the right to silence based on the erro-

neous belief that remaining silent will be futile or have negative consequences—after all, why should a youth put forth the effort of asserting rights if he thinks he will be forced to talk later anyway? In addition, although youths may understand the availability of an attorney, many youths failed to grasp the attorney’s role as a personal advocate. Such a deficit in appreciation could undermine assertion of the right to counsel. In sum, results confirm that individuals may have different degrees of comprehension across the Miranda warnings, and discrepancies between understanding and appreciation further underscore the nuanced nature of Miranda comprehension. Previous research suggests that youths demonstrate poorer Miranda comprehension than adults (e.g., Grisso, 1981, 1998), and the current study suggests that their patterns of misunderstanding also seem to differ from those observed with adult samples (e.g., Viljoen et al., 2002).

UNDERSTANDING AND APPRECIATING MIRANDA RIGHTS

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Totality of Circumstances Results consistent with previous research. Factors related to Miranda understanding and appreciation. As predicted, age and VIQ were associated with understanding and appreciation, further supporting the long-established association between these key totality of circumstances factors and Miranda comprehension (e.g., Abramovitch et al., 1995; Grisso, 1981; Viljoen & Roesch, 2005). Interestingly, though, the current study’s evaluation of understanding and appreciation as distinct constructs resulted in more nuanced findings than seen in previous research. Age and VIQ related significantly to understanding and appreciation, but the relationship of each of these totality-ofcircumstances factors with understanding appears more substantial than with appreciation. This difference further supports the treatment of the two comprehension components as separate but related constructs and lends credence to the idea that appreciation of Miranda rights may be a more complex capacity that requires additional abilities beyond those required for mere understanding. Age did not demonstrate as strong a relationship with Miranda comprehension in many analyses that examined it alone, suggesting that it should be used in conjunction with other factors. There was wide variability in understanding and appreciation among adolescents, such that age alone may not be the best indicator of comprehension abilities. Youths may struggle with Miranda rights because of developmental limitations in their abilities to think abstractly about complicated concepts (Baird & Fugelsang, 2004), such as rights, and to appreciate the potential long-term implications (Cauffman & Steinberg, 2012) of decisions, such as choosing to respond to police questions or remain silent. Researchers have suggested that maturation of several areas of the brain (e.g., prefrontal cortex) is required before youths can imagine outcomes of actions, understand consequences (Baird & Fugelsang, 2004), and prioritize long-term outcomes of decisions over short-term gains (Cauffman, Steinberg, & Piquero, 2005). Results from this study, as well as from others (Ruck, Keating, Abramovitch, & Koegl, 1998), are consistent with this hypothesis as they demonstrate the ways in which youths tend to define rights in concrete, rather than abstract, terms. Taken together, these considerations suggest that fine-grain totality of circumstances factors (e.g., risk perception, perspective taking, processing speed, listening comprehension) may provide better guides for accurately assessing Miranda comprehension than merely relying on the gross proxy of age. Factors not related to Miranda understanding and appreciation. As expected, no significant relationship was found between gender, ethnicity, or number of previous arrests and understanding and appreciation scores. The only relationship we observed was between recollection of discussing Miranda rights with an attorney and better recognition of the meaning of the rights. No benefit of discussing the rights with an attorney was evidenced in abilities to paraphrase rights or appreciate rights. Results largely support earlier research (Grisso, 1981) demonstrating little to no direct relationship between arrest history/experience and Miranda comprehension. Results inconsistent with previous research. Although special education history was not related to Miranda comprehension in this study, previous analysis of the Massachusetts subset of this data identified a significant relationship between history of special

291

education and Miranda rights comprehension scores (Goldstein et al., 2003). Given the wide variety of reasons (e.g., disruptive behavior, impulsivity, learning disabilities, mental health diagnoses) for placement in special education programming and variability across state regulations (e.g., Garda, 2006; Weber, 2009), it may be that special education is too variable a factor to demonstrate a consistent relationship with Miranda comprehension. This relationship should be explored further in future research. Novel totality of circumstances factors. Results suggest that academic achievement may add predictive power to the assessment of Miranda understanding and appreciation, beyond that provided by age and IQ. Similarly, primary language was associated with Miranda understanding; however, given the small number of participants who spoke English as a second language, these results should be considered preliminary in nature and should merely serve as the basis for future research.

Implications Implications for judges and attorneys. Historically, the totality of circumstances test has been an intuitively constructed test that seeks convergent evidence of Miranda waiver validity from multiple sources of information (Fare v. Michael C., 1979; Miranda v. Arizona, 1966). The availability of research examining totality of circumstances factors, including the current study’s evaluation of many suspect-related factors, provides judges with the means to refine the totality of the circumstances test to include only empirically supported factors (for a summary of such factors, see Goldstein & Goldstein, 2010). Doing so will increase the validity of the totality of circumstances test, as well as promote the reliable application of factors across jurisdictions and cases. In addition, the current study provided further support for the use of multiple factors, as no one factor accounted for the range in youths’ understanding and appreciation of rights. Implications for instrument use. This was the first study examining juvenile justice-involved youths’ understanding and appreciation of rights using the revised version of the Miranda instruments. Results suggest that interpretation of MRCI scores should go beyond total scores to the examination of item-level and cross-instrument errors. The current study demonstrated the discontinuity that can occur between understanding and appreciation of related items (e.g., knowing that one can obtain a lawyer but not grasping what a lawyer is or does). Item-level interpretation can provide clearer, more descriptive information about an individual’s deficits. In addition, examination of item-score frequencies and averages demonstrated specific areas and concepts with which youths typically struggled. Results also support the importance of administering more than one Miranda measure during an evaluation and, particularly, the importance of administering the appreciation measure with at least one understanding measure. Adequate scores on an understanding measure may not reveal appreciation deficits, or vice versa. Moreover, within the understanding construct, misunderstanding is better examined using multiple methods of assessment, as some errors are highlighted when individuals are asked to use verbal expressive skills, and other errors are highlighted when individuals are asked to use nonexpressive, recognition skills. The current study also supports the administration of additional instruments for relevant totality of circumstances factors, such as measures of IQ or

ZELLE, RIGGS ROMAINE, AND GOLDSTEIN

292

academic achievement. Good assessment practice seeks convergent validity, as well as dis-confirmatory results, through the evaluation of relevant factors.

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Limitations Restricted access to some information presented one limitation to the current study. History of special education and recall of discussing Miranda rights with an attorney were based upon self-report by youths. The number of individuals whose primary language was not English was small, and results may not be representative. Genderspecific analyses were limited, as well, because of the limited availability of female participants. In addition, insufficient access to a sample of 10- to 12-year-old juvenile justice-involved youths may have inhibited the production of the strong, direct relationships between age and comprehension observed in prior studies (Colwell et al., 2005; Grisso, 1981; Viljoen & Roesch, 2005). Analyses comparing differences between sites also were limited because both pre- and postadjudication juveniles were housed in detention facilities. Comparison of preadjudication juveniles (who would presumably be similar to custodial suspects) to postadjudication juveniles (whose proceedings and adjudication may have occurred some time ago) could provide information about whether Miranda abilities are relatively consistent or vary across situations or time. We did not have access to juveniles’ statuses, however. Further, interpretations of justice-involved youths will be improved through comparison with community youths (as well as with justice-involved and community adults). Results from a community sample are included in the revised MRCI manual (Goldstein et al., 2012), but were not included here due to the length and depth of this manuscript. Finally, the study was limited by measure choices. Results would be supported by measurement with an independent set of Miranda measures; however, Rogers and colleagues (2013) published the Standardized Assessment of Miranda Abilities late last year, so they were unavailable for data collection. The current study examined only verbal IQ as a measure of intellectual functioning because of time constraints; however, future studies should assess other aspects of intelligence (e.g., working memory) that may be relevant to Miranda comprehension.

Conclusion Despite being established over four and a half decades ago, the Miranda warnings continue to be a prevalent issue in practice and research. Results from the current study add to the evolving literature that parses the seemingly simple Miranda v. Arizona (1966) holding. There is room for improvement in both the conceptualization of Miranda comprehension and the parameters of the totality of circumstances standard. The Supreme Court has recently revisited Miranda, resulting in opinions that place greater onus on suspects to comprehend and assert their rights (e.g., Maryland v. Shatzer, 2010; Berghuis v. Thompkins, 2010). Yet, research continues to suggest that understanding and appreciating the different parts of the warnings are more complex undertakings than presumed. Research results also continue to suggest that some totality of circumstances factors should be discarded and others added. Results from the current study point to novel empirically supported indicators and suggest that additional investigation of developmen-

tal factors is needed. The Supreme Court has come to accept the relevance of research concerning developmental maturity (e.g., J. D. B. v. North Carolina, 2011), and future research should examine this area further so that it can be incorporated into practice with confidence. Miranda capacity evaluations and determinations are retrospective, after all, so further developing the standards will allow for more accurate and consistent application of established and novel factors.

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Received March 24, 2014 Revision received November 6, 2014 Accepted November 14, 2014 䡲

Juveniles' Miranda comprehension: Understanding, appreciation, and totality of circumstances factors.

This study examined juvenile justice-involved youths' understanding and appreciation of the Miranda warnings' rights to silence and legal counsel usin...
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