IS THE OEDIPUS COPvIPLEX STILL T H E CORNERSTONE OF PSYCHOANALYSIS? THREE OBSTACLES TO ANSWERING T H E QUESTION

Current controversies about the centralig of tlie Oedipus coinplex in psjclioanabsis are d@cult to resolve unless we address three obstacles i n the ZLUJ of rational exainination. The first is that the Oedipus complex, Freud’s “sliibboletlr” of psjclioanaljsk, is politicalb controversial. Second is the great difficulo i n agreeing upon the definition and boundaries of the Oedipw coinplex, especial4 the necessa9 complexities introduced with the negative Oedipus coin~lex,female sexual$, the nature of the preoedipal, and counteroedipal fantasies and actions. The tliird obstacle involves basic questions of psjclioanaljtic epistemology our criteria f o r evidence to prove or disprove any particular proposition. I conclude that the awareness of these difficulties signifies a certain maturation in our thinking and that the coinplexity introduced by these obstacles can i n time provide the groundufork f o r a set of formulations that is richer and closer to the coniplexities and ainbigidies of tlie clinical situation.

I

Freud had begun to delineate a complex of affects, wishes, and defenses he would later designate “the Oedipus complex.” By 1920, he definitively asserted its centrality to psychoanalysis in a footnote to Three Essays otz the Theory of Sextdity (1905): “With the progress of psychoanalytic studies, the importance of the Oedipus complex has become more and more clearly evident; its recognition has become the shibboleth that distinguishes the adherents of psycho-analysis from its opponents” (p. 226). N THE LAST YEAKS OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

Clinical Associate Professor of Psychiatry, Harvard hiedical School (Cambridge Hospital); Training and Supervising Analyst, Boston Psychoanalytic Society and Institute. Expanded and revised version of a presentation at the panel on “The Oedipus Complex: A Reevaluation,” Annual hieeting of the American Psychoanalytic Association, Philadelphia, hlay 1, 1983. Accepted for publication December 12, 1989.

64 1

642

BENNETT SIhfON

The Oedipus Cotnfdex is an Arena of ConfEict within Ps-choanalysis Thus, the gauntlet is thrown down-to challenge the centrality of the Oedipus complex in the etiology and treatment of neurosis, and thus as the centerpiece of psychoanalysis, is an act equivalent to parricide (or, its variant in Freud’s thinking, fratricide). Yet, within 12 years, Freud himself would be raising questions about the centrality of the complex on account of the elaborations of the preoedipal phase that were emerging, especially with regard to analysis of women (Freud, 1931). He never wavered in his view of the Oedipus complex as the “shibboleth,” but, along with some of his followers, raised questions about the exact boundaries and nature of the relations between the oedipal and the preoedipal. In time, the question was raised as to whether or not an Oedipus complex was present in certain severely disturbed patients (see Symposium, 1952). Freud’s conviction about the centrality of the Oedipus complex was grounded in part in the momentous discoveries of his self-analysis (though, ironically, in recent years some have argued for the .importance of preoedipal elements in Freud’s “oedipal” reconstructions of his childhood [Blum, 19771). It was that analysis, along with the analysis of his patients during the last five years of the nineteenth century, that provided him with the data, the courage, and the single-mindedness to announce that (for everyone in the audience watching the play Oedipus Rex) “it is the fate of all of us, perhaps, to direct our first sexual impulses towards our mother and our first hatred and our first murderous wish against our father” (Freud, 1900, p. 262). (Another issue, decades later to be considered as problematic, is in the words “all of us,” which excludes women.) But it is clear that when Freud defended the centrality of the Oedipus complex he was defending his own hard-won understanding of himself. Opponents of Freud’s view of the Oedipus complex have several times started out with a cautious scouting of the turf and

T H E OEDIPUS COhiPLEX REVISITED

643

a tentatively signaled opposition, and later dcfinitively attacked, attempting to substitute a new theory, or new complex, for the

core theory of psychoanalysis. Other opponents have claimed they have remained loyal to the centrality of the Oedipus complex, but simply made it even more important by assigning an earlier date in development than did Freud. Jung, Adler, Sullivan, and Horney were among those who fit the first pattern, and more recently Kohut has discounted the centrality and universality of the Oedipus complex. The second pattern of opposition is exemplified by Otto Rank-at one point claiming intrauterine life as the origin of the Oedipus complex-and Melanie Klein-fixing the origins of the Oedipus complex in the first year of life. T h e question implicit in my introduction is: Do past and current challenges to Freud’s views on the Oedipus complex constitute a ritual enactment in a struggle for power within psychoanalysis and/or are they the carriers of important critiques of theory and practice within psychoanalysis? Thus, the first of the three obstacles to which the title refers is the necessity to take into account the histdry and sociology of group process within the psychoanalytic movement. There are two further obstacles to approaching the problem of the importance of the Oedipus complex in understanding psychopathology and treatment. One is that there has been a shifting notion of exactly what is the Oedipus complex. The other is an epistemological difficulty: the interplay of theoretical expectations, clinical observations, therapeutic conceptions, and even how and what one reports of clinical work produces a virtually impenetrable thicket. It becomes difficult, perhaps even impossible, to specify what constitutes the data relevant to whether or not the Oedipus complex is central. How can we move from the subjectivity of the psychoanalytic situation to the intersubjectivity of firm and agreed-upon knowledge? Or is it possible that the very nature of psychoanalytic knowledge makes such a move impossible?

644

BENNETT SIhiON

T h e question of the centrality of the Oedipus complex within psychoanalysis can be subdivided into several questions: 1. Is the oedipal phase (and let us assume for the moment that an oedipal phase entails an Oedipus complex) different in having a unique importance and complexity compared to other developmental phases, either before or after? Unique for normal character formation? Unique for psychopathology? Most analysts would agree with the formulation that the oedipal phase represents a kind of reworking and new synthesis of earlier “ingredients,” a metamorphosis and not just a linear extension, However, many analysts and most students of child development argue that early development (perhaps all development) is marked by recurrent metamorphoses of the “ingredients” of the personality and of the person. Wherein is the uniqueness of the oedipal phase? 2. In terms of understanding the origins of different kinds of psychopathology, the “classical” model is that neurosis and mild character disorders represent unresolved oedipal issues while more severe pathology represents unresolved issues from earlier phases. While once this seemed a neat (though controversial) resolution of problems in iheory and practice around the Oedipus complex (Symposium, 1952), today there are many forms of disagreement with that formula. 3. In terms of psychoanalytic treatment, the “classical” model, stated somewhat simplistically, holds that interpretation of oedipal conflicts is the essential activity of the analyst, while other kinds of analytic intervention or interpretation are intended to prepare the way for oedipal interpretation. Is this model valid? Here, too, there are serious disagreements about every aspect of this statement.

Tile Sociology of Knowledge about the Oediptls Coniplex within Psjchoanalysis-the Oedipus Cornplex Is a Hard Act to Follow The Oedipus complex as Freud defined it became the “shibboleth” of the movement; as such, belief in the Oedipus complex

T H E OEDIPUS COhlPLEX REVISITED

645

was easily equated with acceptance of Freud’s authority, and disagreement with rebellion. The first major rebel was Jung, and his rebellion was signaled by a contest between two books, each of which dealt with mythology, anthropology, group formation, the foundations of the psyche, and, latently, with the nature of the psychoanalytic movement: Freud’s Totem and Tuboo (19 13) and Jung’s “Transformations and Symbols of Libido” (1 9 12). As the Freud-Jung correspondence reveals (McGuire, 1974) the two men were discussing their respective books with each other. Freud proposed a primal myth of the origin of civilization-that of the “primal horde,” a myth of the origins of the Oedipus complex, the origins of guilt, and the beginnings of civilization. Jung’s book, drawing even more heavily on mythology and comparative religion, formulated a complex notion of the role of sacrifice in the worship of a Mithraic sun god, and the struggle of the “hero” to deliver himself from the mother while combatting a monstrous beast. Jung summed up his Mithraic studies in the conspicuously ambiguous formulation, “sexuality destroys itself.” This formulation turned out to be a major attack on Freud’s views on sexuality and the Oedipus complex, and Freud politely disrnis’sed all of Jung’s theories as “basically a part of the castration complex” (McGuire, 1974, pp. 332-338). Jung unconsciously identified with Julian the Apostate, the third-century Roman emperor, introducing Mithraic worship as an antidote to Christian ideas. Mithraism was to Christianity as Jung’s version of sexuality was to Freud’s. T h e conflict both in antiquity and between Freud and Jung was over two different mythic systems of father-son relationships, and those mythic ideas instantiated the burgeoning Freud-Jung split. While many authors have noted how Freud’s primal horde myth has little to do with primal history, whether of the psyche or of the horde, a few observers have felt that the myth is a bona fide version of the history and group dynamics of the psychoanalytic movement. It seems to me that the essay can be read in part as Freud’s vision or pre-vision of how he might be

646

B E N N E T T SIhION

overthrown, cannibalized, and then idealized as the totem animal for the psychoanalytic movement. As the split between Jung and’ Freud surfaced, widened, and then became irreparable, Jung proposed an oedipal theory of the split: Freud could not tolerate the attack on his authority by an upstart son. Jung later supplemented (perhaps supplanted) this theory of the split with a theory derived from his own work, i.e., that Freud could not deal with the idea of nzrminosity, and took refuge in “Freudian” formulations about libidinal conflicts and father-son rivalries. Thus the first major split within the psychoanalytic movement was in part over the issue of the validity of Freud’s version of the Oedipus complex. T h e split was at first explained both by Freud and Jung in terms of conflicts related to the complex, but was eventually explained by Jung with a nonoedipal or even antioedipal theory as to how psychoanalysis originated and, to some degree, how it functioned (or failed to function) in a group. I believe that something similar can be discerned with Adler. An attack on Freud’s theory of the Oedipus complex was in effect an attack on Freud’s authority, and eventually Adler devised a new view of how group process, including psychoanalytic group process, works-power motives, inferiority and superiority complexes, rather than oedipal complexes. More recently, Kohut’s attack on the unique and privileged position of the Oedipus complex has received much attention. His critique, in its most extreme form, is that the phenomena ascribed to the Oedipus complex are not universal and are not normal, but are, as it were, disintegration products of defective parent-child interactions, and the ensuing defective formation of self-objects. “Could it not b e . . .that the dramatic, conflictridden Oedipus complex of classical analysis, with its perception of a child whose aspirations are crumbling under the impact of castration fear, is not a primary maturational necessity but only the frequent result of frequently occurring failures from the side ofnarcissistically disturbed parents?” (Kohut, 1977, p. 247; see also pp. 220-248; Kohut, 1982; Basch in Panel, 1985).

T H E OEDIPUS COhlPLEX REVISITED

647

In Kohut’s work we find also both a revised view of Freud’s discovery of psychoanalysis and a revised .view of the group dynamics within the psychoanalytic movement (Kohut, 1976). For Kohut, too, the attack on the centrality of the Oedipus complex is associated with a critique of the “received,”i.e., oedipal, version of the origins of psychoanalysis. Kohut’s formulations on these matters involve self psychology interpretations, for example, designating the role of Fliess for Freud as a “selfobject.” One could argue that an oedipal interpretation of dissent within psychoanalysis would affirm not merely that dissent is a form of rebellion, but also predict that dissent would be associated with a revised theory of “birth” and origins of psychoanalysis and the psychoanalytic movement. The dissenting theories of Jung and Kohut, in this view, would represent a kind of “family romance” or “autochthonous birth” theory (I am my own parents; I am self-generated)-an attempt to avoid the narcissistic wounds that might come with acknowledging the role and potency of one’s parents in one’s being begotten and born. Such a formulation does not prove or disprove the validity of the Oedipus complex, but it does highlight the problem of the social and political dimensions of the arguments within psychoanalysis about the importance and centrality of the complex.

What Is the Oedipus Comnplex? Whether one is in position of defending or attacking the centrality of the Oedipus complex, it would be useful to know exactly what is the “complex” that makes up the Oedipus complex. I n brief, he or she who shoots at the Oedipus complex is shooting at a moving target, for its precise characterization has varied over’the course of psychoanalytic history. Even Sophocles’ Oedipus Rex, the “oedipal play” par excellence, has been progressively reinterpreted by psychoanalysts as illustrating or confirming (a) preoedipal factors; (b) counteroedipal problems,

648

B E N N E T T SIhION

i.e., parental attitudes toward children; (c) the mind of the adopted child; (d) narcissistic issues (Edmunds and Ingber, 1977; Edmunds, 1985~1,1985b, 1988).’ Freud himself nowhere gives any systematic account of the Oedipus complex, although it is possible to derive a more or less systematic statement from his writings (see Laplanche and Pontalis, 1973, pp. 282-287). If we harken back to the first section of this paper, on the sociology of knowledge within the field of psychoanalysis, we can realize that there are certain “imperialistic” struggles over how much of observable psychoanalytic phenomena should be considered as oedipal, preoedipal, or as belonging primarily to the realm of self and selfobjects. T h e Oedipus complex, discovered and gradually elaborated by Freud for at least a decade before it was so named, was almost eventually elevated by Freud to the center of his theory of etiology and of treatment. Freud formulated this “parental complex” (overlapping terms are ‘‘nuclearcomplex’7i n d “father complex”) first on the basis of intertwined observations and inferences from his self-analysis (or his analysis with Fliess as a kind of analyst), from his study of Sophocles’ Oedipus Rex and Shakespeare’s Hamlet, and from his work with patients. His clinical work led to the discovery of “dreams of death of a loved one,” as well to the formulation and the later major qualifications of the “seduction theory.” The earliest and “simple” form of the “complex” consisted, more or less, of the little boy’s wishes for incest and patricide, wishes that must be repressed, transformed, or, as in Freud’s later language, undergo dissolution. As this “simple” form of the theory developed, it included castration anxiety, infantile amnesia, unconscious guilt, aspects of primal scene fantasies, and many symptomatic and characterological consequences of the failure to resolve the Oedipus complex. Don Juanism, “impotence of psychogenic origin,” “those wrecked by success,” phobias, and obsessional thoughts exemplify these phenomena. By 1923, in The Ego and the Id, the role of the newly named

THE OEDIPUS CObfPLEX REVISITED

649

superego (here, also called the “ego ideal”) was defined as “the heir of the Oedipus complex.” One fairly representative curreAt view of the Oedipus CUMplex is Loewald’s, “a psychoanalytic construct representing a fundamentally human problem: the initiation and entrance of the child into the adult world, into the moral order, into becoming an individual” (Sacks, paraphrasing Loewald in Panel, 1985). To flesh out Loewald’s statement we would have to specify the implications for arrested development of a failure to successfully negotiate this problem of initiation. As for the oedipal phase, the oedipal-age child comes to grips with triangularity in libidinal relationships, with incest prohibitions, with a more refined and differentiated sense of morality and authority, with the subsequent increased capacity for sublimation and neutralization, with a new and clearer sense of his or her own inner mental life, with the implications of the differences between the sexes and between the generations, with an increased awareness of and knowledge of her or his sexual feelings and functioning. Cognitive, affective, interpersonal, and intrapsychic maturation and development all contribute to the changes over the course of the oedipal phase of development (whose exact age boundaries are also a bit vague in the psychoanalytic literature). While such a notion is derivable from Freud’s writings, such a characterization is extremely complex and multilayered. It is far more complex than the early “parental complex” discussed by Freud. Four factors, or problems, have been the main contributors to the “complexification”of the Oedipus complex: (a) the idea of the negative Oedipus complex; (b) female sexuality and its development; (c) the acknowledgment of the preoedipal as itself a complex and structured stage (or stages); (d) the acknowledgment of “counteroedipal” feelings-ultimately raising a whole range of issues about the nature and quality of the “actual” relations between parents and children. T h e growing complexity of the concept of the Oedipus complex (and concomittantly of the oedipal phase [Abrams,

650

BENNETT SIhION

19841) has brought us to a point where the concept is so rich that it is in danger of losing its specificity and becoming the equivalent of almost all of development and of psychopathology. Per contram, the very complexity may afford us a larger measure of freedom in our clinical work, allowing us to hear and work with the usual clinical situation, which is full of ambiguities and uncertainties. Let us consider these complicating factors in detail.

The Negative Oed$us Complex In the Ego and the Id Freud (1923) wrote that it was often difficult to get a clear picture of the mixture of identifications presented by certain patients, a mixture which did not fit easily into his “classical” oedipal situation. Certain male homosexuals, for example, clearly seemed identified with the mother as the object of father’s sexual desire. To deal with his clinical awareness of the problem of “mixed” identifications, Freud posited the existence of a negative Oedipus complex-where the child identifies with the same-sex parent and views the opposite-sex parent as a rival. The positive plus the negative Oedipus complex add u p to “the complete Oedipus complex,” though Freud conceded that in some cases only one or the other form could be seen. Most forms are hybrid. Laplanche and Pontalis (1973), from whose discussion I have drawn heavily, summarize the problem: “In practice the whole range of hybrid cases stretches between -the two poles of the Oedipus complex. In each case the two coexist in dialectical relation to each other, and the task of the analyst is to ascertain what the different positions are which the patient takes up as he assumes and resolves his Oedipus complex” (p. 284). Thus, the first “stretching” of the theory preserves triangularity, but allows plasticity in the cast of characters, their interac: tions and identifications. But Laplanche and Pontalis are correct in introducing the word “dialectic.” In so doing, they suggest that the Oedipus complex is a process, as it were, and

THE OEDIPUS COMPLEX REVISITED

65 1

not just a product. I would extend this further to suggest that the process of negotiating among these dialectical shoals is one plausible definition of entering and leaving the oedipal stage, taking stage literally as “phase” and figuratively as the stage of a drama (in both senses of the word “stage”). Currently, the concept of the negative Oedipus complex is problematic, especially with regard to girls. Edgcumbe et al. (1976) argue that an examination of the theoretical concept and of clinical material from the Hampstead Index call into question both the value of the concept and the question of the existence of a discrete negative oedipal phase. They could find little clinical’evidence to support the notion of a distinct phase, especially a phase allegedly preceding the positive oedipal stage. When clinicians did occasionally refer to certain phenomena as belonging to the negative Oedipus complex, the authors found more parsimonious explanations in terms of preoedipal fixations. T h e tenor of their discussion seems to point to ansenormous complexity in the little girl’s vicissitudes of activity and passivity, male and female identifications, great variation in the degree to which envy, let alone specifically penis envy, are at all operative. This complexity mean’s not just that the individual preoedipal or negative oedipal issues are not easily pegged at a specific stage, but also suggests that the Oedipus complex period proper is more difficult to define precisely than has been hitherto believed. T h e role of the negative Oedipus complex in male homosexuality has been especially prominent in the literature, but here, too, that notion seems to be too simplistic to capture the complexity of individual cases and the variability from case to case. T h e negative Oedipus complex remains a rather general and only vaguely orienting concept in approaching the psychodynamics of male homosexuality. Blos (1985) emphasizes the concept of the negative Oedipus complex in relation to male adolescent formation of ego ideals, and to the resolution of late adolescent conflicts. He eschews the term “negative Oedipus complex” as misleading

652

B E N N E I T SIhiON

and pejorative, and prefers to use the cumbersome, but more accurate terminology of “isogender dyadic complex” and the “isogender triadic complex” (as well as the term “allogender” to go with dyadic and triadic). This is not merely a change in terminology, but an attempt to specify the complexity and detail of male-to-male relationship, both dyadic and triadic. He does not see the isogender dyadic relationship as being resolved with latency, but as persisting underground in intense form until the close of adolescence. He emphasizes the role of early male bonding in consolidating not only the male gender identity of the little boy, but also his sense of security, safety, and effectance. T h e concomitant wishes for closeness, tenderness, and even what can be called an erotized relationship with the father are not necessarily “feminine,” or a sign of unacceptable passivity. While I do not have the clinical experience needed to give a personal acceptance or rejection of Blos’s formulations, I find them interesting and compelling. They indicate a blurring of classic distinctions, especially the idea that dyadic relationships are normally resolved as a prerequisite for entering triadic ones.

Problem of Female Sexuality and Female Development Hand in glove with the first revision, the introduction of the concept of a negative Oedipus complex, there was the struggle to fit female development into some sort of symmetrical, or mirror, relation to the male oedipal story. (The later term, “Electra complex,” never really caught on.) Early on Freud recognized the problem of how to account for the little girl’s shift of erotic attachment (or partial shift) from mother to father. Freud’s account, or accounts, of the little girl’s sexual development was controversial almost from the beginning, as witnessed by.the papers by Horney and Jones in the late 1920’s. Freud’s 1924 formulations in “The Dissolution of the Oedipus Complex” posit a particular sequence, involving penis envy, anger at the mother, and a subsequent turn to the father. Freud

T H E OEDIPUS COhlPLEX REVISITED

653

added a little heeded caveat, namely, that he could be wrong about the universality of the sequence he posited, and suggested the possibility that further observation could show other pathways toward oedipal development and resolution (see also Freud, 1925). Disregarding Freud’s reservations, a “classical” position thus became defined and in large measure enshrined in much of the psychoanalytic literature in the late 1930’s, 19403, and 1950’s. In fact, each aspect of this theory, especially penis envy, clitoral primacy, and female castration anxiety, has been controverted by one author or another. Starting in the 1960’s, there have been continuing controversy and attempts at definitive revision of the scheme of female development. Critiques have focused primarily on the “phallocentric” thinking of earlier models and model-makers, especially Freud, and there has been particular emphasis on the notion of the girl’s primary female identity from the first year of life onward. Detailed child development observation has become much more important, though these data are hardly unequivocal and are themselves quite controvertible. A current trend, exemplified by Fast (1984), states that the process of differentiation and definition of male and female is lifelong for each person; there are stagespecific problems of differentiation at each stage in the life cycle. While there are specific issues of male-female self-definition at the oedipal phase, the oedipal phase is not unique in having such a developmental task. Overall it is clear that the psychoanalytic understanding of female sexuality, whether in relation to the Oedipus complex or in general, is in a state of considerable flux. Indeed, a comparable reassessment of thinking about male sexuality is clearly needed, and this has only just begun.

The Preoedija.1 T h e “preoedipal,” of course, was always present as part of the Oedipus complex formulation on psychopathology. T h e early

654

BENNETT SIhlON

stages, oral and anal, and the activities of the component instincts (such as looking and smelling) were preparation for the oedipal stage. But Freud himself began to think (in the 1930’s) that he had underestimated both the importance and the coinpZexity of the preoedipal period. He analogized this burgeoning analytic awareness of the preoedipal to Arthur Evan’s discovery of the Minoan civilization underlying classical Greek civilization-an enormously rich, complex, elaborate, and mysterious (also mother-goddess dominated) structure which must reshape thinking about the later structure.’ Thus while Freud (as have many later writers, e.g., Shapiro, 1977) insisted on the primacy of the oedipal over the preoedipal in understanding development of character and of psychopathology, he could no longer claim that the coinplex part of the oedipal stage was unique to that period of development. The most elaborate and “complex” formulation of a preoedipal sequence or stage is Margaret Mahler’s separation-individuation phase, complete with its four substages. The formulations of Mahler, her coworkers and students, posit considerable development of affective and cognitive capacities, self-object differentiation, self-definition, awareness of integration of body image and sexual sensations, awareness of the opposite sex, and evolving expressions of aggression and ambivalence, i.e., a multiplicity of sectors of the child are developing and as such this “preoedipal” period cannot be considered as any less rich and complex than the developments in the oedipal phase. This degree of complexity of both oedipal and preoedipal phases implies a practical difficulty-acknowledged by some clinicians-in neatly differentiating an oedipal from a preoedipal issue. In fact, since part and parcel of the psychoanalytic model is that the mind continually rewrites history, both progressively and regressively, there is considerable difficulty in ‘For a glimpse of Freud’s thinking in sfufunarcendi, see the material on his analysis of the poet H. D., both her retrospective accounts of the analysis and her contemporaneous reports in correspondence with her lesbian lover, Bryher in 1933 (correspondence currently in the collection of “Bryher” in the Beinecke Library at Yale University).

THE OEDIPUS COMPLEX REVISITED

655

making clean conceptual and therapeutic distinctions based on clinical material. Thus, we assume there are regressive versions of oedipal conflicts-an oral symptom that disguises an oedipal conflict, and that the oedipal-age -child may rewrite in more eroticized or differentiated terms his or her experience and memory (and fantasy) of earlier development.

The Counteroedifal Another development that has made the Oedipus complex even more complex is subsumed under the rubric “counteroedipal,” a term introduced into psychoanalytic discourse several decades ago (see Devereux, 1953, for the “Laius complex”). That term is shorthand for the parental wishes, desires, and behaviors toward the child, such as oedipal conflicts the parent experiences vis-ci-visthe child. Its proper mythic figure is Laius, who tried to kill his child Oedipus. Even with Freud’s discovery of the role of fantasies of seduction in contrast to actual seduction, Freud and other early analysts were aware of the importance of the nature of the parents and their interaction with the child in shaping the form and outcome of the Oedipus complex. One sees this largely in anecdotal or off-hand comments, often astute clinical observations, but actual seduction was certainly not accorded a central place in the theory. Abraham’s 1907 “The Experiencing of Sexual Traumas as a Form of Sexual Activity,” and a 1910 address, of which we only have the title, dealing with the criteria for distinguishing actual incest from incest fantasies, exemplify these concerns (Abraham, 1965, p. 504). I n his papers on female sexuality, Freud (e.g., 1931) again addressed the issue of seduction, but his discussions there were aimed not at alerting the clinician to the possible history of seduction, but rather to the more universal role of the mother as seducer‘in terms of her ordinary bodily care and tendance of the young child. Fenichel’s 1945 textbook, The Ps~choana~tic Theory of the Neuroses, speaks quite matter-of-factly about the importance of the actual behavior of the parents, including the

656

BENNETT SIhlON

implications of their socioeconomic status. It should be noted, however, that such comments occupy a miniscule amount of space in his book compared to the rest of his discussion of sexuality and sexual development. It seems to me largely a post-World War I1 phenomenon that counteroedipal aspects of the Oedipus complex become more prominent in psychoanalytic thinking. I believe that child observation and child analysis, work with acting-out adolescents (including in clinics associated with courts) psychotherapeutic work with schizophrenics, the beginning of family therapy, and anthropological studies all played a role in highlighting this dimension of the Oedipus complex. By the late 1960’sand early 1970’s,a confluence of writings on child abuse (the “discovery” of the battered child syndrome) and on incest (e.g., Kaufman et al., 1954; Russell, 1986) brought issues of parental behavior into the public eye, as well as into psychoanalytic thinking. The controversy stirred up by Jeffrey Masson’s attacks on Freud for “abandoning” the seduction theory has ended up being a stimulus for even greater awareness among clinicians in general, and psychoanalysts too, of the importance of the role of parental seduction and abuse. Spiro’s 1982 Oedipus in the Trobriands presents an important reassessment of the famous Jones-Malinowski debate (and a reassessment of Malinowski’s data) on the universality of the Oedipus complex. His term for the “counteroedipal” constellation is “the complementary Oedipus complex,” and he points out (p. 6) that between 1953 and 1963: “four different scholars from separate disciplines, each working independently of the other, published papers on the need to redress an imbalance in Freud’s treatment of the Oedipus complex (Devereux, 1953; Lessa, 1956; Herskovits and Herskovitz, 1963; Mandler, 1963).” The most extreme forms of the “counteroedipal” theory include the views, more or less explicit, that someone else, or some other “entity,” that is, other than the child, “causes” or “induces” the Oedipus complex. Thus, the parents create the

T H E OEDIPUS COhlPLEX REVISITED

657

Oedipus complex in the child; at the least, it is parental desire that creates it, and at most, it is parental pathology. Another variant is that society creates it-it is not universal, but only certain sociopolitical forms, e.g., a patriarchal culture, create the Oedipus complex. Or, it is the psychoanalysts who have created it out of whole cloth, fabricated a theory, and impose it on patients persistently and relentlessly, finally inducing an Oedipus complex in the patient-the patient becomes rebellious toward and fearful of the analyst. While these statements are almost caricatures of an understanding of the Oedipus complex, they also do reflect a bonafide problem in theory-namely how to describe the intermeshed role of influences from inside and from outside of the child in the genesis of the complex, or, in simpler terms, when we speak of “a child’s Oedipus complex,” whose complex are we talking about? Laplanche and Pontalis (1973) provide one way of conceptualizing the problem of “inside” and “outside” as follows: It should be pointed out that in concentrating on the triangular relationship itself, we are led to assign an essential role in the constitution of a given Oedipus complex to the other poles of this relationship-the unconscious desires of both parents, seduction, and the relations between the parents-as well as to the subject and his instincts. It is the different types of relations between the three poi‘nts of the triange which-at least as much as any parental image-are destined to be internalized and to survive in the structure of the personality [p. 2861. Thus, the quality of the interactions must be taken into account, and these interactions are internalized and help shape symptom and character. But it is not only internalization of parental interaction, but also ongoing interactions, even in adult life, that, in complex ways, perpetuate, reinforce, or, with some luck, help undo the power of earlier internalizations. A small but growing number of psychoanalysts who trained in family therapy have contributed to the clarification of the

658

BENNETT SIhlON

problem of the relative importance of forces “inside” and “outside” of the child (see Reiss, 1981). Scharff and Scharff (1987) offer a particularly lucid framework, emph’asizing the complementary roles of how the parents create the child, including creating the child’s complex, and of how the child creates the parents. Within this “field theory” (or, in their terms, an objectrelations theory), one can see how it might be difficult to determine exactly where, or inside of whom a particular Oedipus complex is located. It exists in a field of forces, both within the child and within the family system, as it were. Any one person’s (or any one family member’s) Oedipus complex is a somewhat arbitrary construct, a localization of iron filings within a magnetic field. If you shift the relative positions of the magnets or distances of the magnet from the iron filings, or the strength of the magnetic field, you get corresponding rearrangements of the iron filings. Their characterization of oedipal development as experienced by the child emphasizes the stabilizing role of the parental couple, in the face of the child’s “genital sexualization of triangular relationships.” This.occurs because of the concurrence of a new cognitive step in understanding genital differences in the phallic stage, a new sexualization of the genitals, and a shift of interest to triads and their vicissitudes. Suddenly, the child can no longer ignore the triangular implications of his or her wishes, feelings, and actions, because cognitive advancement makes this recognition inevitable. . . . The sexual energizing makes the child’s splitting of the parental pair occur, if at all possible, along sexual lines, but this does not produce pure gain for the child, even in fantasy. Not only is there the threatened retaliation and loss of the good parts of the rejected parent but there is the threat of the loss of the combined protecting and containing parental image-essentially, the loss of the internalized family unit. . . .The loss of the opposite-sex parent presents the child with the threat of the loss of the

THE OEDIPUS COhiPLEX REVISITED

659

couple as a container, and therefore of the keystone of the family’s holding capacity [pp. 114-1 151. T h e exposition by these authors represents an advance in bringing together the intrapsychic and intcrpersonal dimensions of family life, in this instance, in regard to the oedipalage child. They also articulate more clearly than many psychoanalytic authors the parental factors that allow for a better resolution of the Oedipus complex, including the importance for the child of a solid sexual relationship between the parents. Their framework is quite valuable theoretically for conceptualizing both individual psychotherapeutic and psychoanalytic therapy and for family therapy, and, apparently, in their hands, quite useful therapeutically. Still, there are many tangles left in our attempt to understand both theoretically and clinically the interplay of the child’s psyche and the psyches of the other members of the family. These considerations lead us to a djscussion of the last of the three obstacles toward clarifying our initial question about the centrality of the Oedipus complex-the nature of the clinical and observational evidence that might possibly resolve some of the ‘controversies.

What Kinds of Evidence Can Decide Questions about the Oedipus Co?nj!dex? I n a 197’7article on severe character pathology, Shapiro argues that even here the Oedipus complex is critical in the genesis (along with other factors) and its resolution is indispensable for successful analysis of such pathology. He makes an argument for maintaining a critical role for the Oedipus complex in pathogenesis, in the analyst’s thinking, and in the approach to the analysis. “As such, the Oedipus complex remains the most important tool for progress in analytic work. It provides a vehicle to demonstrate to patients in a convincing manner how they continue to make their own future on the basis of past reformulations of a reality that they re-experience daily” (p.

660

BENNETT SIMON

577). He maintains that “the oedipus is at the center of severe ego pathology as well as neurosis” (Shapiro, 1981, p. 17). He further argues for the unique structuralizing and developmental significance of the oedipal phase. To my thinking, the uniqueness of the oedipal phase lies in the particular reorganizations and new syntheses that emerge, not that it is a major reorganization per se, for each developmental stage can be seen as a metamorphosis. On the question of what evidence is there to verify or refute propositions about the Oedipus complex, Shapiro (1977) concedes that “verification in a scientific sense has always been a problem” (p. 576). All of the questions ever raised about verification of analytic propositions either I have been or could be raised about the evidence for the importance, or even the existence of the Oedipus complex. From the point of view of decisive evidence, it is therefore still moot, as to whether one transformative stage should be given priority over any other as the keystone of development and psyehopathology. Pine, writing a few years later (1985, pp. 164-165), takes a position diametrically opposed to Shapiro’s. He argues that certain features of the clinical psychoanalytic enterprise (especially its reliance on verbalization and symbolization) tilt the clinical evidence, assigning an exaggerated importance to interpretation, and, concomitantly, then yielding a deceptively circular confirmation of the centrality of the Oedipus complex. He considers that there is a certain kind of “natural fit” between the analytic method of interpretation and oedipal-level pathology and that this fit contributes to masking the crucial role of preoedipal deformations. Having argued for why clinical analytic work is not an unequivocally valid source of evidence on the centrality of the Oedipus complex, he goes on to make another claim for which there is little solid evidence available. He says that if development proceeds well for the child until the beginning of the oedipal phase, he doubts that there will be pathology during that phase, “barring specific, focused acting out of the parents during the child’s oedipal age or specific

T H E OEDIPUS COhIPLEX REVISITED

66 1

trauma at that time”-two rather large (and vaguely defined conditions). Similarly difficult to prove or disprove is Pine’s claim that if someone (presumably an adult) demonstrates pathology referrable to the oedipal stage, there must have been significant preoedipal pathology. It is my impression in reviewing these opposing views of Shapiro and Pine (both of whom are experienced child researchers and clinicians), as well as those of others who engage in controversy about the centrality of the Oedipus complex, that most authors end up conceding points to the others. But at this time in our field the evidence for deciding between Shapiro and Pine is limited at best. We are thus thrown back on several fundamental problems in psychoanalytic epistemology. The foremost is the concern that our theoretical scheme, insofar as it guides our interpretations and interventions, skews, or even “creates” the data. We can only see what we want to see, what our theories tell us to see. In brief, psychoanalysts are not exempt from the tendencies that psychoanalysis itself has discovered to motivated, selfserving distortions and perceptions! “Clinical experience” is the ultimate court of appeal to most practitioners, but the diversity of opinion among analysts about what is their clinical experience, o r what their clinical experience teaches them, makes this body of data a controvertible source of confirmation. Insofar as this is indeed a worrisome problem-and I believe it is a danger of unknown but substantial proportion-one must look to methods of verification of psychoanalytic propositions that can be done by observers who are not primary participants in the clinical psychoanalytic treatment setting. Analysts are too easily subject to falling back on their bedrock beliefs and experience. This bedrock is a composite of the individual analyst’s character and style, his or her experience as clinician, the analyst’s experience as a patient in analysis, and transferences, resolved and unresolved to his or her personal analyst and the major teachers in training, and powerful institutional and group allegiances. The arguments raised by Griinbaum (1984)

662

BENNETT SIMON

about circular confirmations, the “contamination” of clinical observation by the biases of the analyst, the pitfalls of the “tally argument,” I believe have a certain co’gency and cannot remain unaddressed. At the same time, the “feel” and “fit” of a psychoanalytic proposition or position in an argument cannot be ignored as one source of evidence, as one part of confirmation and disconfirmation. There are two methods of attempting to arrive at confirmation or disconfirmation of psychoanalytic propositions that 1will mention briefly. The first of these is studies of child development, whether cross-sectional or longitudinal. I believe the yield of such studies over the last 40 to 50 years has been most interesting, and, in the long run, important (see Sears, 1943, and Blum, 1953, especially pp. 113-126 for summaries of earlier work). But it is fair to say that such studies have definitely not stilled controversy and successfully settled many issues in psychoanalysis. As I read the debates about the place and value of psychoanalytically informed child development research, I find that tlie research has in general made things more complicated, more intricate, and so far less amenable to relatively simple psychoanalytic theorizing. Furthermore, much of this research is subject to a variety of criticisms, by both analysts and child development researchers who have no interest in analysis. One recurrent criticism is that a considerable amount of inference and interpretation is typically necessary to make sense of the observations. Related is that there are major, perhaps insurmountable, problems of selection of what and when to observe, and from whose viewpoint, child, parent, experimenter? In principle, I believe such criticism can be dealt with constructively in this line of research, and that the criticism represents a relative, not an absolute, obstacle in research. In practice, these problems have proven formidable. Overall, it is my impression that especially in the last 15 or so years, research on infants has advanced much further than research on oedipal-age children. With regard to systematic research on the Oedipus complex, I can cite one example, the

T H E OEDIPUS COhIPLEX REVISITED

663

work of Henri Parens et al. (1976), on the sequencing of steps involved in the little girl's entrance into the oedipal phase. Their detailed longitudinal study of' three girls suggests very strongly that these girls, in their second and third year of life, demonstrated three different pathways of elitmiice into the oedipal phase, and that only one showed something like the path (tentatively) posited by Freud in 1925-penis envy and castration anxiety, leading to anger at the mother for not providing a penis, and then the turn toward the father, with the wish to have a baby with the father as compensation for the never-tobe-gotten penis. The researchers tried to specify their criteria for entrance into the oedipal phase, and hoped their research design allowed them to discern and measure the occurrence of events that met or failed to meet these criteria. While not in a position to evaluate the quality, let alone the replicability of their research, I do find the attempt interesting and appealing. Can adequate longitudinal research into adult life evkr be mounted to track the fate of children who enter and leave the oedipal phase by different pathways, who experience oedipalphase conflicts of different intensities and durations? I doubt whether within our lifetime or of the next generation of analysts we shall see a great deal of such data. The difficulties, practical and conceptual, of such research are well known (see Shapiro, 1981, for the conceptual difficulties in psychoanalytic child observation research) and I believe we can at best look to such research to sharpen our questions, make us more sceptical about propositions we have always taken for granted, and make us more open-minded observers and clinicians. If observation within our own culture is so difficult, it is not surprising that cross-cultural research on the Oedipus complex is an even more problematic enterprise. Some of the controversy in that field has, to my reading, been generated. by inadequate definitions of what is the Oedipus complex, or the oedipal phase, and by the attendant difficulty of collecting the relevant child development data in a systematicway. Hartmann,

664

B E N N E T T SIhION

Kris and Loeivenstein (1964, especially pp. 96-100) briefly reviewed some of the methodological and conceptual problems in such research. Their assumption, dr perhaps their hope, was that the sophisticated conceptual apparatus of ego psychology would help clear up the muddle in crosscultural investigation of the Oedipus complex. Parsons’ (1964) classic paper is still an invaluable discussion of how to pose the question, and the kinds of data that might provide an answer. To date, the question of the cultural universality of the Oedipus complex has not been definitively answered. However, some important more recent research on sexuality and development of sexual and gender identity in other cultures has proven extremely thought-provoking, including in regard to issues about the Oedipus complex, again mostly by enlarging our sense of the-richness and complexity of development, rather than by confirming and reconfirming some psychoanalytic propositions. Prominent among the studies that illustrate this trend are those of Herdt (1981, 1987, 1989) on the Sambia in New Guinea, a tribe where adult male homosexuality is regarded as the norm, along with expectations of marriage and heterosexuality (see also Lidz and Lidz, 1984, for what I consider premature theoretical closure on Herdt’s data). Herdt’s own data on the Sambia, and his compilation of other anthropologists’ data on Melanesian ritual homosexuality, begin to specify details of parent-child interaction, especially father-child interaction in a manner that has already confounded several current hypotheses in crosscultural studies. His 1988 paper disputes the regnant theory that father absence is the necessary precondition for such ritual homosexuality. Rather, a certain kind of father presence-a physical proximity but a sharp territorial and psychological separation-seems to be the concomitant of such practices. Moreover, it is clear that crosscultural studies, while immensely valuable for psychoanalysis, do not provide examples of “clean observation,” free of theory. Spiro, in his Oedipus in the Trobriaizds (1982), makes a very strong case for the universality of the Oedipus complex, but his arguments are very intricate

T H E OEDIPUS COhlPLEX REVISITED

665

and the enmeshment of theory, inference, and observation is about as complex as is involved with using the clinical situation to confirm or refute hypotheses abdut the Oedipus complex. He, too, has been criticized from a number of sources, including one that seems to refute the validity of some of the primary data he has invoked (Weiner, 1985). T h e second source for possible confirmation or disconfirmation of propositions about the centrality of the Oedipus complex is systematic study of audio- and videotapes of psychotherapy and psychoanalytic treatment. At this juncture in psychoanalytic research certain clinical psychoanalytic propositions about individual cases can be affirmed or can be falsified, or, if not falsified, so weakly confirmed that their validity and utility is minimal (see Dahl, 1983, pp. 53-56 on weak and strong confirmation). While there have been many exciting developments in systematic research psychotherapy and psychoanalysis, it is not yet at a stage where very complex propositions about the Oedipus complex can be systematically tested. However, there are methods available that could be applied to clinical material to ascertain questions such as, “Is the analyst systematically interpreting one kind of conflict over another?” or, “What is the short-term impact on the patient of the therapist’s preference for interpreting preoedipal aspects of a conflict or symptom rather than oedipal aspects?” Over time, as research wisdom and experience accumulates and new researchers can build on what the previous generation has accomplished, more complex and refined hypotheses can be articulated and tested. In conclusion, I am reminded of the old Chinese curse, “May you live in interesting times!” and I believe that in the realm of the ascertaining of truth in psychoanalysis we do live in such times. We now know so much more about what we do not know, we know so much more that has not yet been comfortably assimilated into neat paradigms for understanding development or treatment, that we are at a time of fructifying confusion and disagreement. The Oedipus complex clearly has waned in popularity and credibility, both within psychoanalysis

666

BENNETI’ SIhiON

and within the culture at large. We have the opportunity to gradually sort out literal truth, metaphor, creative error, and just plain error in our thinking about’this “shibboleth” of psychoanalysis. The kinds of attitudes-reasoning, thinking, argumentation, researching, checking and refining, tolerance of uncertainty, but not being paralyzed by uncertainty-that are called for in this paper are equivalent to what psychoanalysis assumes grows out of the resolution of the Oedipus complex (cf. Cavell, 1988). There is thus a parallel between the process being studied and mental and emotional tools needed to study the process. One can, accordingly, find grounds for both hope and despair in.the complexity and in the difficulty of answering such a basic question about psychoanalysis. My own resolution runs as follows: W e can have a neat and comfortable theory, but one that runs the danger of requiring that the analytic couch become a procrustean bed. Or, we can have an unwieldy and conglomerate theory, awkward to handle and not entirely smooth and consistent, but that allows greater freedom to analyst and patient in seeing and learning what is in fact there and operative. Each option has its assets and debits, but my preference, my vote, is for the latter. One goal of this paper has been to help clarify the psychopolitics of the Oedipus complex, the unresolved issues of authority within psychoanalysis. Psychoanalysis has definitely entered its oedipal phase, and it is smack in the middle of an only very partially resolved Oedipus complex. The question is: can it emerge from its oedipal phase and resolve its Oedipus complex (see also Shapiro, 1981, pp. &9)? REFERENCES ABRAHAM. K. (1965). Selected Papers of Karl Abraham, trans. D. Bryan & A. Strachey. London: Hogarth Press. ABRAhlS, S. (1984). Fantasy and reality in the oedipal phase. Psjchoanal. Study Child, 39:83-100. BLOS,P. (1985). Son and Father: Before niid Bejotid the Oedipus Complex. New York: Free Press.

THE OEDIPUS COMPLEX REVISITED

667

H. P. (1977). The Prototype of preoedipal reconstruction. J . Amer. Psjchoanal. Assn., 25:757-786. BLuhf, G . S. (1953). Psjchoana&k Theories of Personality. New York: AlcGrawHill. hi. A. (1988). Interpretation, psychoanalysis. and the philosophy of CAVELL, mind. J . Atner. Psjclioanal. Assn., 36:859-880. DAHL.H. (1983). On the definition and measurement of wishes. In Etnpirical Studies of Psyhoanabtic Theories, Vol. 1, ed. J. hlasling. Hillsdale, N. J.: Analytic Press, pp. 39-67. DEVEREUX. G . (1953). Why Oedipus killed L a b : a note on the complementary Oedipus complex. Int. J. Psjchoanal., 34: 132-14 1. EDWJNDS. L. (1985a). Freud and the father: Oedipus complex and Oedipus myth. Ps~choanal.Contemp. Thought, 8:87-102. (1985b). Oedipus: The Aizcietil Legend and Its Later Analogs. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press. (1988). T h e body of oedipus. Psjchoanal. Rev., 75:5 1-66. 8. INGBER,R. (1977). Psychoanalytical writings on the Oedipus legend: a bibliography. Amer. Imago, 34:374-386. EDGCUIIBE. R. et a]. (1976). Some comments on the concept of the negativc oedipal phase in girls. Ps~clioanal.Study Child, 31:35-61. FAST. I. (1984). Gender Identity A differentiation Model. Hillsdale, N . J.: ErIbaum. FENICHEL, 0. (1945). The Psjchoanabtic The09 of the Neuroses. Neiv York: Norton. FREUD,S. (1900).Tiie interpretation of drearm. S . E. 4 8.5. (1905). Three essays on the theory of sexuality. S. E., 7. (1913). Totem and taboo. S. E., 13. (1923). T h e ego and the id. S. E., 19. (1924). The dissolution of the oedipus complex. S. E., 19. (1925). Some psychical consequences of the anatomical distinction between the sexes. S. E., 19. (1931). Female Sexuality, S. E.. 21. GRWNBAUL!, A. (1984). The Foundafions of Psyhoanat$k. Berkeley, Calif.: Univ. California Press. JUNG, C. G. (1912). “On the Psychology of the Unconscious.” In Collected Works, 7. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1953, pp. 3-119. HARThIANN. H., I(RIS.E. 8- LOEWENSTEIN, R. hl. (1964). Some psychoanalytic comments on “culture and personality.” In Papers on Psjchoanal@ Psjcholoo. Psjchol. Issues, hlonogr. 14. Neiv York: Int. Univ. Press, pp. 86-1 16. HERDT,G. (1981). Cuardiaiu of the Flute: Idiom of Afasculinify New York: AlcGraw-Hill. (1987). The Sambia: Ritual and Gender in New Guinea. New York: Holt, Reinhart & Winston. (1989): Father presence: the case of paternal deprivation and ritual homosexuality reconsidered. Ethos, 18:326370. HERMAN. J. (1981). Father-Daughter Incest. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press. HERSKOVITS, AX. 8- HERSKOVITS, F. (1958). Sibling rivalry, the Oedipus complex, and myth. J. Amer. Folklore, 71:l-15. BLULI.

-

668

BENNETT SIhiON

KAUFhIAN, I., PECK,A. & TAGIURI, c. (1954). T h e family constellation and overt incestuous relations between father and daughter. Amer. J. Orthopsjchiat., 24:2 6 6 2 7 9. KOHUT. H. (1976). Creativeness, charisma, group psychology: reflections on the self-analysis of Freud. I n Freud: The Fusion of Science and Humanbm. The Ititellecfual History of Psjchoanalyis, ed. J. E. Gedo 8- G. H. Pollock. Psyhol. Issues, Monogr. 34/35. Neiv York: Int. Univ. Press, pp. 379425. (1977). The Restoration oftfie Self. Neiv York: Int. Univ. Press. (1982). Introspection, empathy, and the semi-circle of mental health. Int. J. Psyiioanal., 63:395408. LAPLAXCHE. J. 8: PONTALIS. J.-B. (1973). The Language of Psychoana~sis.New York: Norton, pp. 282-287. LESSA,IV. A. (1956). Oedipus-type tales in Oceania. J. Amer. Folklore, 6963-73. LIDZ.T. 8; LIDZ,R. (1984). Oedipus in the stone age.1. Atner. Psjchoanal. Assn., 32 :5 07-528. hfANDLER. G. ‘(1963). Parent a n d child in the development of the Oedipus complex. J. Neru. Alenf. Dk.,136~227-235. hfCGUIKE. IV., Ed. (1974). The Correspondence between Sigmund Freud and C. G . Jung. Princeton, N.J.:Princeton Univ. Press. PANEL(1985). T h e Oedipus complex revisited. J. Amer. Psjchoanal. Assti., 33:201-216. PARENS, H., POLLOCK, L., STERN. J., 8- KRA~IEK, S. (1976). O n the girl’s entry into the Oedipus comp1ex.J. Amer. Psjchoanal. Assti., 24(Suppl.):79-107. PARSOSS.A. (1964). Is the Oedipus complex universal? T h e Jones-hlalinowski debate revisited and a south Italian ‘Nuclear Complex.’ I n Psjchoanal. Study Sociefj, Vol. 3 , ed. IV. hluensterberger 8r S. Axelrad. New York: Int. Univ. Press, pp. 278-328. PINE.F. (1985). Developmental Tfieov and Clinical Process. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press. KEISS. D. (198 1). The Family’s Comtrucfion of Real$. Cambridge, hlass.: Harvard Univ. Press. RUSSELL.D. E. H. (1986). The Secref Trauma: Incest in fhe Lives .f Girls and Women. Neiv York: Basic Books. SCHAKFF, D. E. 8: SCHARFF. J. S. (1987). Object Relations Fainib Therapy. Northvale, N.J.: Aronson. SEARS, K. R. (1943). Survey of Objective Studies of Psjchoanaljtic Concepts. Bulletin 5 1 , Social Science Research Council, Neiv York. SHAPIRO. T. (1977). Oedipal distortions in severe character pathologies: developmental and theoretical considerations. Psjrhonnal. Q., 46:559-579. (1981). O n the quest for the origins of conflict. Psjclioanal. Q., 50: 1-21. SPIRO.hi. E. (1982). Oedipus in the Trobriands. Chicago: Univ. Chicago Press. SYMPOSIUM (1952). Re-evaluation of the role of the Oedipus complex. Int. J. Psjchoallal., 33:335-354. ~ V E I N E R ,A. B. (1985). Oedipus and ancestors. Review of Oedipus in the Trobriands by hi. E. Spiro. Amer. Etfinol., 758-761.

I70 Cfiesinul Street Newton. hlA 021 65