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The Journal of Social Psychology Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/vsoc20
Interpersonal Self-Deception and Personality Correlates J. Kenneth Monts
a b c
Rudy V. Nydegger
a b c
a
, Louis A. Zurcher Jr.
a b c
&
Department of Sociology , Rice University , USA
b
Department of Sociology , The University of Texas , Austin, USA c
Department of Psychology , Rice University , USA Published online: 01 Jul 2010.
To cite this article: J. Kenneth Monts , Louis A. Zurcher Jr. & Rudy V. Nydegger (1977) Interpersonal Self-Deception and Personality Correlates, The Journal of Social Psychology, 103:1, 91-99, DOI: 10.1080/00224545.1977.9713299 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00224545.1977.9713299
PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the “Content”) contained in the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensors make no representations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinions and views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors, and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content should not be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sources of information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or
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The Journal of Social Psychology, 1977, 103, 91-99.
INTERPERSONAL SELF-DECEPTION AND PERSONALITY CORRELATES* Department of Sociology, Rice University; Department of Sociology, The University of Texas at Austin; and Department of Psychology, Rice University
J. KENNETH MONTS, LOUIS
A. ZURCHER, JR., AND RUDY V. NYDEGGER
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SUMMARY
It was hypothesized that among intimately associated groups the following relationships would emerge: (a) the greater a person's insecurity, the greater his self-deception; (b) the greater a person's authoritarianism, the greater his self-deception; (c) the greater a person's set toward repression, the greater his self-deception; and (d) the greater a person's self-esteem, the greater his self-deception. To test these hypotheses 24 female and six male undergraduates were given the following test instruments: (a) a measure of interpersonal self-deception; (b) Maslow's scale on security-insecurity; (c) Katz et al. scale on Ego-Defensiveness which was derived from the California F Scale; (d) a repression-sensitization measure which employed the K and L scales of the MMPI; and (e) two measures of self-esteem. The results indicated that interpersonal self-deception is statistically significantly associated: (a) positively with repression-sensitization and one measure of selfesteem, and (b) negatively with insecurity and authoritarianism. These results were interpreted to indicate that personality both influences interpersonal self-deception, and is influenced by it.
A.
INTRODUCTION
Lewin's equation, B = (P,E), asserts that behavior is a function of the person (P) and the environment (E), and that P and E in this formula are interdependent variables (12). Dai points out that this equation should include the notion that it is not the environment per se, but rather the person's perception of that environment that is significant (5). Often, as symbolic interactionism and role theory inform, E's significant features are other people, and P's behavior is determined by his perception of them along with his perception of their perceptions of him. Tagiuri (23) or• Received in the Editorial Office, Provincetown, Massachusetts, on July 19, 1976. Copyright, 1977, by The Journal Press.
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ganized the factors influencing the perception of other people into three sets of variables, and the interaction among them: The attributes of the stimulus person, the nature of the interaction situation, and the characteristics of the perceiver. The same organization of factors likely holds for P's perception of others' perceptions of him. Despite the general recognition of the influence of personal characteristics on the perception of other persons and their perceptions". . . there has been little research devoted directly to this topic and, ... contributions to this area have been scattered and unsystematized" (19, p. 289). Tagiuri (24) has noted that there has been little success in demonstrating a consistent relationship between personality characteristics and person perception. This problem has likely been due to one or more of several problems: First, poor measurement devices; second, variables that did not relate well to the tasks at hand; third, generally weak experimental controls; and fourth, even when adequate controls were used, the results were so situation specific as to have extremely limited generalizability. Tagiuri (24, p. 435) has called for studies on S s " ... in the course of ordinary transactions with their environment . . . where people are truly interacting, and where observer and observed are simultaneously judge and object." Most of the research in this area has focused on the perception of others. The present study, however, addresses itself to self-perception and to a specific subset of that phenomenon: viz., interpersonal self-deception. There are two fundamental components to the definition of interpersonal self-deception: (a) P's systematic distortion of his perception of others' perceptions of him, and (b) the direct attributability of this distortion to defense mechanisms in the presence of threatening stimuli. Sullivan (22) anticipated this definition when he referred to the process "selective inattention" as a "security operation" by which "we fail to recognize the actual import of a good many things we see, hear, think, do, and say, not because there is anything the matter with our zones of interaction with others but because the process of inferential analysis is opposed by the self system" (22, p. 374). It is assumed that an unfavorable discrepancy between the way others define P and the way in which he wishes to be defined presents a threat to which P must adjust. Self-deception is one such mode of adjustment and can quite reasonably be expected to vary with personality factors. By personality we refer to the" ... relatively enduring patterning of a person's disposition to think, feel, and behave in certain ways" (19, p. 289). The purpose of this study is to test hypothesized associations between
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et al.
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specific personality characteristics and the tendency to engage in interpersonal self-deception. Further, the research design attempts to avoid some of the methodological weaknesses of earlier research by studying Ss in natural, intimately associated groups. Hypothesis 1: Among intimately associated groups, the greater P's insecurity, the greater his self-deception. Maslow (13) was the most persistent proponent of security-insecurity as a fruitful psychological construct. Of relevance to the current work, he states that the insecure person will hide from himself as long as possible the conscious recognition of rejection, loss of love or respect, and may completely overlook a slight, a snub, or even a rejection. Hypothesis 2: Among intimately associated groups, the greater P's authoritarianism, the greater his self-deception. Adorno et al. (1) imply that high authoritarians rigidly define which attitudes and emotions are appropriate to which situation, and tend to suppress or deny those which are incompatible with the self-conception. Harvey (9) found that authoritarianism was related negatively to changes in self-ratings and positively with the tendency to distort unfavorable ratings in the more favorable direction when recalling them. Hypothesis 3: Among intimately associated groups, the greater P's repression set, the greater his self-deception. It has been shown that people are consistent in their use of repression or sensitization across varying threatening situations (1, 11, 20, 21). Thus, if the interpersonal context of intimately associated groups presents threatening stimuli in the form of others' definitions, a mental set toward repression or sensitization would probably be important in determining mode of adjustment. Repressors are defined as those who tend to use avoidance, denial, and repression of potential threat and conflict as a primary mode of adjustment to threatening stimuli. Sensitizers are defined as those who are alerted to and perhaps overinterpret potential threat and conflict, and who use intellectual and obsessive defenses as primary modes of adjustment. Hypothesis 4: Among intimately associated groups, the greater P's selfesteem, the greater his self-deception. Two lines of reasoning generate opposite predictions in the case of self-esteem and self-deception. Cohen (4) reported that persons of high self-esteem take on a defensive mode early in life that allows for a strong self-protective facade. They generally rely upon avoidance types of defenses that permit the person to organize a cohesive and encapsulated self-picture. On the other hand, Rosenberg (18) depicts a person with high self-esteem as one who recognizes his limitations and also
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expects to grow and improve. This suggests that self-esteem should be correlated negatively with self-deception.
B.
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1.
METHOD
Subjects
Structured questionnaires were administered individually but simultaneously to each member of three groups of students in their living quarters at the University of Texas at Austin. Group I was an entire wing (nine girls) of a large modern dormitory which provided lodging, dining, recreational, and classroom facilities. The wing coordinator reported that the nine girls had been together for seven months and were close acquaintances. Group II was a small "clique" of 10 girls who had lived together in a sorority house and who had been interacting on a steady basis for seven months. Group I was mostly freshmen and Group IT mostly sophomores. Group ITI comprised a friendship group of six male and five female upperclassmen who had interacted on a steady basis for nearly two years. For the data analysis the groups were analytically broken down into 262 dyads. Seventy-two were from Group I (9 X 8), 90 were from Group II (10 X 9), and 100 from Group ITI (10 dyads were eliminated from the analysis of this group because of incomplete questionnaire response). 2.
Measures
a. Interpersonal Self-Deception. A modification of Bill's Index of Adjustment and Values (2) served as a basic format for the perception forms. The following modifications were made: (a) The IAV list of 124 trait-words was replaced by seven factored trait-words. Parker and Veldman (16) conducted a factor analysis of Gough's 300-item Adjective Check List and extracted seven major orthogonal factors of self-perception using a sample of 5017 university freshmen. The seven factors were labeled social warmth, social abrasiveness, ego organization, introversion/extroversion, neurotic anxiety, individualism, and social attractiveness. The seven trait-words used in this study (kind, irresponsible, efficient, quiet, tense, individualistic, sophisticated) were selected from each factor according to which had the greatest item-total correlation. (b) An other-perception form using the IAV format was included in which respondents were asked to assess one another in the group on the same trait-words. (c) A reflected-self-perception form was included in which the respondent was asked to report how he thought each other would assess him on each trait-word.
J.
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The formula ~
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i. (lOp -
et al.
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511 - IR5 - 511)/7, as applied to data
obtained from the self-perception, other-perception, and reflected-selfperception forms, was taken to be a measure of interpersonal selfdeception. 51 designates the value P assigns as his self-ideal for that particular trait-word, OP designates the value that other assigns P for that particular trait, and R5 is the value that P imputes to other as having assigned P on that trait. The use of 51 in the formula is to control for a certain type of discrepancy. Theoretically, the only type of discrepancy which is meaningful in terms of self-deception is that which indicates P overestimates others' perception of him. For example, if other assesses Pas "seldom irresponsible," 1; P wants to be "seldom irresponsible," 1; and P perceives other as perceiving P as "irresponsible about half the time," 3; then, the resulting equation, 3 = 0 - 2 = - 2, indicates discrepancy, but no self-deception. Thus, 51 works to control for either "humility" on P's part or "generosity" on other's part, and gives a high score only when P has overestimated other's perception. K designates a correctional factor which is unique for each individual and is defined as the "obtuseness" index. The theoretical reasoning behind the use of this factor is the following: Some of the discrepancy between P's reflected self and others' definitions of P may not be due at all to self-deception. Rather, the discrepancy may be due simply to "innocent misperception": i.e., simple failure to recognize the cues of others which is in no way attributable to defensiveness. Thus, for each individual, an obtuseness score is calculated to correct for any general inability to recognize normally recognizable cues. In order to calculate the correctional factor, it was first decided that the self-deception with which this study is concerned is ego-referent; i.e., P deceives himself regarding his own traits ["defensive practices" rather than "protective practices" in Goffman's (7) terms]. Thus, any general obtuseness should show in the accuracy of P's perceptions of others. The computation of the measure follows this procedure: (a) determining the mean score on each particular trait for each particular other, excluding P's and the particular other's self-assigned values; (b) subtracting P's assigned value of the trait (for that other) from this mean, and taking the absolute value; (c) summing this discrepancy for all seven traits for the particular other; (d) repeating this process for each of the remaining others: and, finally, (e) summing these mean misperception scores for all the others and dividing by N - 1, with N being the number of members in the group. Presumably, a high score indicates high obtuseness and low perspicacity. By multiplying
11 - 11 - I
11
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the reciprocal of this constant to the discrepancy between P's reflected self and the actual definitions by others, a correction for "innocent misperception" is obtained which yields a more valid index of self-deception. b. Security-Insecurity. The original scale was constructed by Maslow (13) and consisted of 75 questions to which the respondent indicates "yes" or "no." Weights were assigned to each response on the basis of a factor analysis. c. Authoritarianism. Katz et al. (10) derived an Ego Defensive Scale from the California F Scale which was comprised of items of the following categories: Authoritarian aggression, anti-intraception, superstition and stereotype, destructiveness and cynicism, projectivity, and sex. The respondent indicates his agreement or disagreement with a specific item on a scale of one to six, and the sum represents his degree of authoritarianism. d. Repression-Sensitization. Remission-sensitization was measured by using the K and L Scales of the MMPI. This has been employed by Page and Markowitz (15) and Gordon (8). Their results suggest construct validity. e. Self-Esteem. Two measures of self-esteem were used. Rosenberg's Self-Esteem scale (18) and an ad hoc instrument devised by the authors, involved summing the absolute differences between how the S would like to see himself (self-ideal) regarding each trait-word, and how he actually sees himself, and then dividing by 7. High self-esteem is assumed to be indicated by a low mean difference between how the S rated himself and how he would like to rate himself.
C.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Insecurity was significantly correlated with self-deception (r = . 17, P < .05, df = 1, 260) but in the opposite direction from that specified by Hypothesis I-the greater the insecurity, the less the self-deception. This finding is surprising, but explicable, if the direction of causality is intuitively reversed. Since the correlational technique does not specify causal direction, it could be interpreted to indicate that self-deception, by way of producing a more orderly and congruent reflected self-image among acquaintances, enhances security feelings. Support is lent to this interpretation by the correlation (.77) between security and repression-sensitization, and correlations (.65 and .68) between security-insecurity and the two self-esteem measures. The association (r = -.20, P < .05) between authoritarianism and self-deception is also the reverse of that indicated in Hypothesis 2. The
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finding indicates the greater the authoritarianism, the less the selfdeception. Two possible interpretations are suggested: (a) The Ego Defensiveness section of the California F Scale simply does not measure what it should measure for this sample. Support for this contention is suggested when it is noted that authoritarianism correlated -.37 with repressionsensitization in this study, while all other studies indicate the opposite [Byrne (3), using different scales found a .40 correlation in the opposite direction]. Of course the validity of the R-S scale could be doubted, but it is attested to by the -.56 correlation with discrepancy between selfconception and self-ideal (Byrne's finding was .62 in the same direction). Furthermore, the inapplicability of the scale to this sample is suggested by the fact that 68.26% of the 5s gave a mean response (for each item of the scale) between 2.16 and 3.12-anything below four indicates a nonauthoritarian response. This suggests that very few Ss were authoritarian according to the California F scale, and that the findings pertain simply to the more authoritarian of the nonauthoritarians. (b) Perhaps authoritarianism is not the proper concept to link to interpersonal selfdeception. The concept was intended to denote an enduring psychological set which predisposed an individual toward a rigid self-image-that is, a mental set which would acknowledge only a narrow range of reflected self-images. Several rigidity scales are suggested in the literature (14, 17, 25), and might have been more appropriate measures. The correlation (.20) between repression-sensitization and interpersonal self-deception is both significant (p < .05) and in accord with Hypothesis 3. This indicates that a psychological set toward the repression of threatening stimuli operates in interpersonal settings, such that individuals with repressive sets tend to distort their perception of others' definitions when these definitions are unfavorably incongruent with self-perception. The correlation between interpersonal self-deception and self-esteem is as equivocal as was Hypothesis 4. By employing the measure based upon differences between self-perception and self-ideal, the correlation (r = -.27) is significant (p < .05) and in the hypothesized direction. This finding lends support to the hypothesis that high self-esteemers tend to be high interpersonal self-deceivers. Rosenberg's scale yielded no significant correlation, (.05), with selfdeception. A sample standard deviation of 5.87 along with a mean of 42.89 suggests, as in the case of authoritarianism, a lack of variability in the sample and, perhaps, that the scale fails to discriminate what differences in self-esteem exist.
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The present study focused upon the relationship between personality variables and one defense mechanism-the distortion of P's perception of others' perceptions of him. Though certainly not conclusive, the interpretation of the results suggests that personality both influenced the operation of defense mechanisms and was influenced by them: i.e., not only did certain personality characteristics predispose a person to self-deceive in interpersonal contexts, but interpersonal self-deception may have been instrumental in fostering certain personality characteristics. Interpersonal selfdeception is interpreted as enhancing security and self-esteem. Repressors, as predicted, tended to engage in interpersonal self-deception more than sensitizers, and authoritarians tended to self-deceive interpersonally less than nonauthoritarians. REFERENCES
5.
ADORNO, T. W., FRENKEL-BRUNSWIK, E., LEVINSON, D., & SANFORD, N. The Authortarian Personality. New York: Wiley, 1964. BILLS, R., VANCE, E., & McLEAN, O. An index of adjustment and values. J. Consult. Psychol., 1951,15,257-261. BYRNE, D. The repression-sensitization scale: Rationale, reliability, and validity. J. Abn. & Soc. Psychol., 1961, 62, 349-355. COHEN, A. Some implications of self-esteem for social influence. In C. Hovland & I. janis (Eds.), Personality Persuasibility (Vol. III). New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1968. DAI, B. A sociopsychiatric approach to personality organization. Amer. Sociolog. Reu.,
6.
ERIKSEN, C. Individual differences in defensive forgetting. J. Exper, Psyrhol., 1952,44,
i.
GOFFMAN, E. On face-work: An analysis of ritual elements in social interaction. Psychiatry, 1955, 18, 213-231. GORDON, J. Interpersonal predictions of repressors and sensitizers. J. Personal., 1957,
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1952, 17, 44-49. 442-446.
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25, 686-698.
9. 10. 11. 12. 13.
HARVEY, O. Personality factors in resolution of conceptual incongruities. 1. Abnorm. & Soc. Psyrhol.; 1962.25.336-352. KATZ, D., & MCCLINTOCK, C. The measurement of ego defense as related to attitude change. 1. Personal.; 1957,25. 165-171. LAZARUS, R., ERICKSEN, C., & FONDA, C. Personality dynamics and auditory perceptual recognition. J. Abn. & Soc. Psychol., 1951, 19, 471-482. LEWIN, K. Field Theory in Social Science. New York: Harper & Row, 1951. MASLOW, A. The dynamics of psychological security-insecurity. Charac. & Personal., 1942, 10,331-344.
14. 15. 16.
17.
MERESKO, R., RUBIN, M., SHONTZ, F., & MORROW, W. Rigidity of attitudes regarding personal habits and its ideological correlates. J. Abn. & Soc. Psychol.; 1954,49,89-93. PAGE, H., & MARKOWITZ, G. The relationship of defensiveness to rating scale bias. J. of Psychol., 1955,40,431-435. PARKER, G., & VELDMAN, D. Factor analytic studies of the Adjective Check List. Proceedings, 75th Annual Convention. Washington: American Psychological Association, 1967. pp. 211-212. REHFISCH, j. A scale for personality rigidity. J. Consult. Psychol.; 1958, 22, 10-15.
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ROSENBERG, M. Society and the Adolescent Self-Image. Princeton, N.].: Princeton Univ. Press, 1965. 19. SCHRAUGER, S., & ALTROCCHI, J. The personality of the perceiver as a factor in person perception. Psych oJ. Bull., 1964, 62, 298-308. 20. SPENCE, D. A new look at vigilance and defense. J. Abn. & Soc. Psychol., 1957, 54, 103-108. 21. STEIN, K. Perceptual defense and perceptual sensitization under neutral and involved conditions. J. Personal., 1953, 21, 467-478. 22. SULLIVAN, H. S. The Interpersonal Theory of Psychiatry. New York: Norton, 1953. 23. TAGUlRI, R. Introduction. In R. Taguiri & L. Petrullo (Eds.), Person Perception and Interpersonal Behavior. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford Univ. Press, 1958. 24. - - - . Person perception. In G. Lindzey & E. Aronson (Eds.), The Handbook of Social Psychology (Vol. ill, 2nd ed.). Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1969. 25. WESLEY, E. Perseverative behavior, manifest anxiety, and rigidity. J. Abn. & Soc. Psychol., 1953, 48, 129-134.
Department of Sociology Rice University Houston, Texas 77001
The Journal of Social Psychology Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/vsoc20
Interpersonal Self-Deception and Personality Correlates J. Kenneth Monts
a b c
Rudy V. Nydegger
a b c
a
, Louis A. Zurcher Jr.
a b c
&
Department of Sociology , Rice University , USA
b
Department of Sociology , The University of Texas , Austin, USA c
Department of Psychology , Rice University , USA Published online: 01 Jul 2010.
To cite this article: J. Kenneth Monts , Louis A. Zurcher Jr. & Rudy V. Nydegger (1977) Interpersonal Self-Deception and Personality Correlates, The Journal of Social Psychology, 103:1, 91-99, DOI: 10.1080/00224545.1977.9713299 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00224545.1977.9713299
PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the “Content”) contained in the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensors make no representations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinions and views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors, and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content should not be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sources of information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or
indirectly in connection with, in relation to or arising out of the use of the Content.
Downloaded by [University of Glasgow] at 03:33 30 December 2014
This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions
The Journal of Social Psychology, 1977, 103, 91-99.
INTERPERSONAL SELF-DECEPTION AND PERSONALITY CORRELATES* Department of Sociology, Rice University; Department of Sociology, The University of Texas at Austin; and Department of Psychology, Rice University
J. KENNETH MONTS, LOUIS
A. ZURCHER, JR., AND RUDY V. NYDEGGER
Downloaded by [University of Glasgow] at 03:33 30 December 2014
SUMMARY
It was hypothesized that among intimately associated groups the following relationships would emerge: (a) the greater a person's insecurity, the greater his self-deception; (b) the greater a person's authoritarianism, the greater his self-deception; (c) the greater a person's set toward repression, the greater his self-deception; and (d) the greater a person's self-esteem, the greater his self-deception. To test these hypotheses 24 female and six male undergraduates were given the following test instruments: (a) a measure of interpersonal self-deception; (b) Maslow's scale on security-insecurity; (c) Katz et al. scale on Ego-Defensiveness which was derived from the California F Scale; (d) a repression-sensitization measure which employed the K and L scales of the MMPI; and (e) two measures of self-esteem. The results indicated that interpersonal self-deception is statistically significantly associated: (a) positively with repression-sensitization and one measure of selfesteem, and (b) negatively with insecurity and authoritarianism. These results were interpreted to indicate that personality both influences interpersonal self-deception, and is influenced by it.
A.
INTRODUCTION
Lewin's equation, B = (P,E), asserts that behavior is a function of the person (P) and the environment (E), and that P and E in this formula are interdependent variables (12). Dai points out that this equation should include the notion that it is not the environment per se, but rather the person's perception of that environment that is significant (5). Often, as symbolic interactionism and role theory inform, E's significant features are other people, and P's behavior is determined by his perception of them along with his perception of their perceptions of him. Tagiuri (23) or• Received in the Editorial Office, Provincetown, Massachusetts, on July 19, 1976. Copyright, 1977, by The Journal Press.
91
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ganized the factors influencing the perception of other people into three sets of variables, and the interaction among them: The attributes of the stimulus person, the nature of the interaction situation, and the characteristics of the perceiver. The same organization of factors likely holds for P's perception of others' perceptions of him. Despite the general recognition of the influence of personal characteristics on the perception of other persons and their perceptions". . . there has been little research devoted directly to this topic and, ... contributions to this area have been scattered and unsystematized" (19, p. 289). Tagiuri (24) has noted that there has been little success in demonstrating a consistent relationship between personality characteristics and person perception. This problem has likely been due to one or more of several problems: First, poor measurement devices; second, variables that did not relate well to the tasks at hand; third, generally weak experimental controls; and fourth, even when adequate controls were used, the results were so situation specific as to have extremely limited generalizability. Tagiuri (24, p. 435) has called for studies on S s " ... in the course of ordinary transactions with their environment . . . where people are truly interacting, and where observer and observed are simultaneously judge and object." Most of the research in this area has focused on the perception of others. The present study, however, addresses itself to self-perception and to a specific subset of that phenomenon: viz., interpersonal self-deception. There are two fundamental components to the definition of interpersonal self-deception: (a) P's systematic distortion of his perception of others' perceptions of him, and (b) the direct attributability of this distortion to defense mechanisms in the presence of threatening stimuli. Sullivan (22) anticipated this definition when he referred to the process "selective inattention" as a "security operation" by which "we fail to recognize the actual import of a good many things we see, hear, think, do, and say, not because there is anything the matter with our zones of interaction with others but because the process of inferential analysis is opposed by the self system" (22, p. 374). It is assumed that an unfavorable discrepancy between the way others define P and the way in which he wishes to be defined presents a threat to which P must adjust. Self-deception is one such mode of adjustment and can quite reasonably be expected to vary with personality factors. By personality we refer to the" ... relatively enduring patterning of a person's disposition to think, feel, and behave in certain ways" (19, p. 289). The purpose of this study is to test hypothesized associations between
Downloaded by [University of Glasgow] at 03:33 30 December 2014
J.
KENNETH MONTS
et al.
93
specific personality characteristics and the tendency to engage in interpersonal self-deception. Further, the research design attempts to avoid some of the methodological weaknesses of earlier research by studying Ss in natural, intimately associated groups. Hypothesis 1: Among intimately associated groups, the greater P's insecurity, the greater his self-deception. Maslow (13) was the most persistent proponent of security-insecurity as a fruitful psychological construct. Of relevance to the current work, he states that the insecure person will hide from himself as long as possible the conscious recognition of rejection, loss of love or respect, and may completely overlook a slight, a snub, or even a rejection. Hypothesis 2: Among intimately associated groups, the greater P's authoritarianism, the greater his self-deception. Adorno et al. (1) imply that high authoritarians rigidly define which attitudes and emotions are appropriate to which situation, and tend to suppress or deny those which are incompatible with the self-conception. Harvey (9) found that authoritarianism was related negatively to changes in self-ratings and positively with the tendency to distort unfavorable ratings in the more favorable direction when recalling them. Hypothesis 3: Among intimately associated groups, the greater P's repression set, the greater his self-deception. It has been shown that people are consistent in their use of repression or sensitization across varying threatening situations (1, 11, 20, 21). Thus, if the interpersonal context of intimately associated groups presents threatening stimuli in the form of others' definitions, a mental set toward repression or sensitization would probably be important in determining mode of adjustment. Repressors are defined as those who tend to use avoidance, denial, and repression of potential threat and conflict as a primary mode of adjustment to threatening stimuli. Sensitizers are defined as those who are alerted to and perhaps overinterpret potential threat and conflict, and who use intellectual and obsessive defenses as primary modes of adjustment. Hypothesis 4: Among intimately associated groups, the greater P's selfesteem, the greater his self-deception. Two lines of reasoning generate opposite predictions in the case of self-esteem and self-deception. Cohen (4) reported that persons of high self-esteem take on a defensive mode early in life that allows for a strong self-protective facade. They generally rely upon avoidance types of defenses that permit the person to organize a cohesive and encapsulated self-picture. On the other hand, Rosenberg (18) depicts a person with high self-esteem as one who recognizes his limitations and also
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expects to grow and improve. This suggests that self-esteem should be correlated negatively with self-deception.
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1.
METHOD
Subjects
Structured questionnaires were administered individually but simultaneously to each member of three groups of students in their living quarters at the University of Texas at Austin. Group I was an entire wing (nine girls) of a large modern dormitory which provided lodging, dining, recreational, and classroom facilities. The wing coordinator reported that the nine girls had been together for seven months and were close acquaintances. Group II was a small "clique" of 10 girls who had lived together in a sorority house and who had been interacting on a steady basis for seven months. Group I was mostly freshmen and Group IT mostly sophomores. Group ITI comprised a friendship group of six male and five female upperclassmen who had interacted on a steady basis for nearly two years. For the data analysis the groups were analytically broken down into 262 dyads. Seventy-two were from Group I (9 X 8), 90 were from Group II (10 X 9), and 100 from Group ITI (10 dyads were eliminated from the analysis of this group because of incomplete questionnaire response). 2.
Measures
a. Interpersonal Self-Deception. A modification of Bill's Index of Adjustment and Values (2) served as a basic format for the perception forms. The following modifications were made: (a) The IAV list of 124 trait-words was replaced by seven factored trait-words. Parker and Veldman (16) conducted a factor analysis of Gough's 300-item Adjective Check List and extracted seven major orthogonal factors of self-perception using a sample of 5017 university freshmen. The seven factors were labeled social warmth, social abrasiveness, ego organization, introversion/extroversion, neurotic anxiety, individualism, and social attractiveness. The seven trait-words used in this study (kind, irresponsible, efficient, quiet, tense, individualistic, sophisticated) were selected from each factor according to which had the greatest item-total correlation. (b) An other-perception form using the IAV format was included in which respondents were asked to assess one another in the group on the same trait-words. (c) A reflected-self-perception form was included in which the respondent was asked to report how he thought each other would assess him on each trait-word.
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The formula ~
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511 - IR5 - 511)/7, as applied to data
obtained from the self-perception, other-perception, and reflected-selfperception forms, was taken to be a measure of interpersonal selfdeception. 51 designates the value P assigns as his self-ideal for that particular trait-word, OP designates the value that other assigns P for that particular trait, and R5 is the value that P imputes to other as having assigned P on that trait. The use of 51 in the formula is to control for a certain type of discrepancy. Theoretically, the only type of discrepancy which is meaningful in terms of self-deception is that which indicates P overestimates others' perception of him. For example, if other assesses Pas "seldom irresponsible," 1; P wants to be "seldom irresponsible," 1; and P perceives other as perceiving P as "irresponsible about half the time," 3; then, the resulting equation, 3 = 0 - 2 = - 2, indicates discrepancy, but no self-deception. Thus, 51 works to control for either "humility" on P's part or "generosity" on other's part, and gives a high score only when P has overestimated other's perception. K designates a correctional factor which is unique for each individual and is defined as the "obtuseness" index. The theoretical reasoning behind the use of this factor is the following: Some of the discrepancy between P's reflected self and others' definitions of P may not be due at all to self-deception. Rather, the discrepancy may be due simply to "innocent misperception": i.e., simple failure to recognize the cues of others which is in no way attributable to defensiveness. Thus, for each individual, an obtuseness score is calculated to correct for any general inability to recognize normally recognizable cues. In order to calculate the correctional factor, it was first decided that the self-deception with which this study is concerned is ego-referent; i.e., P deceives himself regarding his own traits ["defensive practices" rather than "protective practices" in Goffman's (7) terms]. Thus, any general obtuseness should show in the accuracy of P's perceptions of others. The computation of the measure follows this procedure: (a) determining the mean score on each particular trait for each particular other, excluding P's and the particular other's self-assigned values; (b) subtracting P's assigned value of the trait (for that other) from this mean, and taking the absolute value; (c) summing this discrepancy for all seven traits for the particular other; (d) repeating this process for each of the remaining others: and, finally, (e) summing these mean misperception scores for all the others and dividing by N - 1, with N being the number of members in the group. Presumably, a high score indicates high obtuseness and low perspicacity. By multiplying
11 - 11 - I
11
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the reciprocal of this constant to the discrepancy between P's reflected self and the actual definitions by others, a correction for "innocent misperception" is obtained which yields a more valid index of self-deception. b. Security-Insecurity. The original scale was constructed by Maslow (13) and consisted of 75 questions to which the respondent indicates "yes" or "no." Weights were assigned to each response on the basis of a factor analysis. c. Authoritarianism. Katz et al. (10) derived an Ego Defensive Scale from the California F Scale which was comprised of items of the following categories: Authoritarian aggression, anti-intraception, superstition and stereotype, destructiveness and cynicism, projectivity, and sex. The respondent indicates his agreement or disagreement with a specific item on a scale of one to six, and the sum represents his degree of authoritarianism. d. Repression-Sensitization. Remission-sensitization was measured by using the K and L Scales of the MMPI. This has been employed by Page and Markowitz (15) and Gordon (8). Their results suggest construct validity. e. Self-Esteem. Two measures of self-esteem were used. Rosenberg's Self-Esteem scale (18) and an ad hoc instrument devised by the authors, involved summing the absolute differences between how the S would like to see himself (self-ideal) regarding each trait-word, and how he actually sees himself, and then dividing by 7. High self-esteem is assumed to be indicated by a low mean difference between how the S rated himself and how he would like to rate himself.
C.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Insecurity was significantly correlated with self-deception (r = . 17, P < .05, df = 1, 260) but in the opposite direction from that specified by Hypothesis I-the greater the insecurity, the less the self-deception. This finding is surprising, but explicable, if the direction of causality is intuitively reversed. Since the correlational technique does not specify causal direction, it could be interpreted to indicate that self-deception, by way of producing a more orderly and congruent reflected self-image among acquaintances, enhances security feelings. Support is lent to this interpretation by the correlation (.77) between security and repression-sensitization, and correlations (.65 and .68) between security-insecurity and the two self-esteem measures. The association (r = -.20, P < .05) between authoritarianism and self-deception is also the reverse of that indicated in Hypothesis 2. The
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finding indicates the greater the authoritarianism, the less the selfdeception. Two possible interpretations are suggested: (a) The Ego Defensiveness section of the California F Scale simply does not measure what it should measure for this sample. Support for this contention is suggested when it is noted that authoritarianism correlated -.37 with repressionsensitization in this study, while all other studies indicate the opposite [Byrne (3), using different scales found a .40 correlation in the opposite direction]. Of course the validity of the R-S scale could be doubted, but it is attested to by the -.56 correlation with discrepancy between selfconception and self-ideal (Byrne's finding was .62 in the same direction). Furthermore, the inapplicability of the scale to this sample is suggested by the fact that 68.26% of the 5s gave a mean response (for each item of the scale) between 2.16 and 3.12-anything below four indicates a nonauthoritarian response. This suggests that very few Ss were authoritarian according to the California F scale, and that the findings pertain simply to the more authoritarian of the nonauthoritarians. (b) Perhaps authoritarianism is not the proper concept to link to interpersonal selfdeception. The concept was intended to denote an enduring psychological set which predisposed an individual toward a rigid self-image-that is, a mental set which would acknowledge only a narrow range of reflected self-images. Several rigidity scales are suggested in the literature (14, 17, 25), and might have been more appropriate measures. The correlation (.20) between repression-sensitization and interpersonal self-deception is both significant (p < .05) and in accord with Hypothesis 3. This indicates that a psychological set toward the repression of threatening stimuli operates in interpersonal settings, such that individuals with repressive sets tend to distort their perception of others' definitions when these definitions are unfavorably incongruent with self-perception. The correlation between interpersonal self-deception and self-esteem is as equivocal as was Hypothesis 4. By employing the measure based upon differences between self-perception and self-ideal, the correlation (r = -.27) is significant (p < .05) and in the hypothesized direction. This finding lends support to the hypothesis that high self-esteemers tend to be high interpersonal self-deceivers. Rosenberg's scale yielded no significant correlation, (.05), with selfdeception. A sample standard deviation of 5.87 along with a mean of 42.89 suggests, as in the case of authoritarianism, a lack of variability in the sample and, perhaps, that the scale fails to discriminate what differences in self-esteem exist.
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The present study focused upon the relationship between personality variables and one defense mechanism-the distortion of P's perception of others' perceptions of him. Though certainly not conclusive, the interpretation of the results suggests that personality both influenced the operation of defense mechanisms and was influenced by them: i.e., not only did certain personality characteristics predispose a person to self-deceive in interpersonal contexts, but interpersonal self-deception may have been instrumental in fostering certain personality characteristics. Interpersonal selfdeception is interpreted as enhancing security and self-esteem. Repressors, as predicted, tended to engage in interpersonal self-deception more than sensitizers, and authoritarians tended to self-deceive interpersonally less than nonauthoritarians. REFERENCES
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ROSENBERG, M. Society and the Adolescent Self-Image. Princeton, N.].: Princeton Univ. Press, 1965. 19. SCHRAUGER, S., & ALTROCCHI, J. The personality of the perceiver as a factor in person perception. Psych oJ. Bull., 1964, 62, 298-308. 20. SPENCE, D. A new look at vigilance and defense. J. Abn. & Soc. Psychol., 1957, 54, 103-108. 21. STEIN, K. Perceptual defense and perceptual sensitization under neutral and involved conditions. J. Personal., 1953, 21, 467-478. 22. SULLIVAN, H. S. The Interpersonal Theory of Psychiatry. New York: Norton, 1953. 23. TAGUlRI, R. Introduction. In R. Taguiri & L. Petrullo (Eds.), Person Perception and Interpersonal Behavior. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford Univ. Press, 1958. 24. - - - . Person perception. In G. Lindzey & E. Aronson (Eds.), The Handbook of Social Psychology (Vol. ill, 2nd ed.). Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1969. 25. WESLEY, E. Perseverative behavior, manifest anxiety, and rigidity. J. Abn. & Soc. Psychol., 1953, 48, 129-134.
Department of Sociology Rice University Houston, Texas 77001
