Psychopathology 2014;47:1–2 DOI: 10.1159/000356302
Published online: November 8, 2013
Editorial
It is now two years ago that I (S.C.H.) had the pleasure of taking over the editorship of Psychopathology. Since then, four fields of interest have lain within the scope of the journal: (1) experimental psychopathology, (2) developmental psychopathology, (3) the ‘interface between mind and brain’ and (4), following a long and successful tradition of this journal, phenomenology including the endorsement of philosophical perspectives. I am very glad to announce that, meanwhile, Kenneth Kendler (Richmond, Va., USA) is supporting this journal in the position of Honorary Consultant Editor and thus has followed Hagop Akiskal (San Diego, Calif., USA), whom I want to thank for his longstanding commitment to Psychopathology. In order to point out the particular significance the field of phenomenology has and will continue to have for this journal, Thomas Fuchs as the related Section Editor and I have decided to share the position of Editor-inChief in the future, and thus to give the journal the twofold expertise it needs to cover the whole scope of issues Psychopathology stands for. Starting now, Thomas Fuchs will represent the spectrum of phenomenological psychopathology and philosophy in psychiatry, whereas I will be responsible for all issues related to experimental psychopathology and its links to the field of development and © 2013 S. Karger AG, Basel 0254–4962/14/0471–0001$39.50/0 E-Mail [email protected] www.karger.com/psp
maturation – with Patrick McGorry as the responsible Section Editor – and to the field dealing with interactions between neuroscience and psychopathology, with Vittorio Gallese as Editor. I am thoroughly convinced that Thomas Fuchs, with his substantial scientific work and double career in psychiatry and philosophy, is the best expert internationally to represent this direction of Psychopathology. Some remarks may suffice to highlight the importance of philosophy in general and phenomenology in particular as foundations of psychopathology. Since Karl Jaspers’ pioneering work [1], the major task of philosophical approaches to mental illness has been the thorough investigation and analysis of subjective experience. This is all the more needed in times of criteriological and manualized diagnostic systems. The DSM-IV and DSM-5 as well as the ICD-10 are mainly conceived for purposes of reliability and, therefore, characterized by rather simple psychopathological concepts compatible with easily applicable data collection techniques. Consciousness and subjectivity, however, are virtually excluded on the theoretical level and undervalued on the pragmatic level. The more objective the information the psychiatrist tries to gain by decomposing subjective experience into measurable data and physiological correlates, the more he detaches him-
self from the patient’s perspective. Editorials of major psychiatric journals have deplored a decline in psychopathological expertise and the capacity for individualized assessment [2–4]. This has serious consequences for the validity of psychiatric diagnosis, for empirical research and, above all, for therapeutic purposes. For principal reasons, psychiatry cannot be transformed completely into a ‘natural science of mental disorders’. The main reason lies in the irreducible character of subjectivity itself. The experiential or 1st-person perspective cannot be translated into the observing or 3rdperson perspective without a significant loss of meaning. Therefore, phenomenology, by systematically studying the structures of subjective experience, has traditionally served as the foundation for psychopathology. Starting with 1st-person accounts of mental illness, phenomenology is by no means restricted to a mere description of symptoms, but proceeds to investigate the basic structures of abnormal experience in dimensions such as selfawareness, embodiment, spatiality, temporality and intersubjectivity. It also analyzes the constitutive processes
that build up subjective experience, such as the formation of perceptual meaning, temporal continuity or implicit bodily action. This allows us to detect the critical points where the constitution of self and world is vulnerable and open to deviation or derailment in mental illness. By gaining access to the basic, prereflective dimension of experience, the psychiatrist extends his scope of understanding beyond the psychology of the normal, and is able to include phenomena which could otherwise only be taken as bizarre products of the brain. Although phenomenology methodically suspends any assumptions about causal explanation, it provides a rich framework for the analysis of subjectivity and its disturbances in mental disorders which also leads to testable hypotheses about underlying neural mechanisms. Accordingly, it has recently entered into a constructive dialogue with cognitive neuroscience [5–10]. To further promote and extend this dialogue in the future will be one of the major aims of this journal. Prof. Sabine C. Herpertz, Heidelberg Prof. Thomas Fuchs, Heidelberg
References 1 Jaspers K: General Psychopathology, transl. Hoenig J, Hamilton MW. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1968. 2 Andreasen NC: DSM and the death of phenomenology in America: an example of unintended consequences. Schizophr Bull 2007; 33:108–112. 3 Hojaij CR: Reappraisal of dementia praecox: focus on clinical psychopathology. World J Biol Psychiatry 2000;1:43–54. 4 Mezzich JE: Psychiatry for the Person: articulating medicine’s science and humanism. World Psychiatry 2007;6:65–67.
2
5 Mishara AL, Parnas J, Naudin J: Forging the links between phenomenology, cognitive neuroscience, and psychopathology: the emergence of a new discipline. Curr Opin Psychiatry 1998;11:567–573. 6 Fuchs T: The challenge of neuroscience: psychiatry and phenomenology today. Psychopathology 2002;35:319–326. 7 Gallagher S: Neurocognitive models of schizophrenia: a neurophenomenological critique. Psychopathology 2004;37:8–19.
Psychopathology 2014;47:1–2 DOI: 10.1159/000356302
8 Gallagher S, Zahavi D: The Phenomenological Mind: An Introduction to Philosophy of Mind and Cognitive Science. London, Routledge, 2008. 9 Gallagher S, Schmicking D (eds): Handbook of Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences. Dordrecht, Springer, 2010. 10 Kendler K, Parnas J (eds): Philosophical Issues in Psychiatry: Explanation, Phenomenology and Nosology. Baltimore, Johns Hopkins UP, 2008.
Editorial
Copyright: S. Karger AG, Basel 2013. Reproduced with the permission of S. Karger AG, Basel. Further reproduction or distribution (electronic or otherwise) is prohibited without permission from the copyright holder.
Published online: November 8, 2013
Editorial
It is now two years ago that I (S.C.H.) had the pleasure of taking over the editorship of Psychopathology. Since then, four fields of interest have lain within the scope of the journal: (1) experimental psychopathology, (2) developmental psychopathology, (3) the ‘interface between mind and brain’ and (4), following a long and successful tradition of this journal, phenomenology including the endorsement of philosophical perspectives. I am very glad to announce that, meanwhile, Kenneth Kendler (Richmond, Va., USA) is supporting this journal in the position of Honorary Consultant Editor and thus has followed Hagop Akiskal (San Diego, Calif., USA), whom I want to thank for his longstanding commitment to Psychopathology. In order to point out the particular significance the field of phenomenology has and will continue to have for this journal, Thomas Fuchs as the related Section Editor and I have decided to share the position of Editor-inChief in the future, and thus to give the journal the twofold expertise it needs to cover the whole scope of issues Psychopathology stands for. Starting now, Thomas Fuchs will represent the spectrum of phenomenological psychopathology and philosophy in psychiatry, whereas I will be responsible for all issues related to experimental psychopathology and its links to the field of development and © 2013 S. Karger AG, Basel 0254–4962/14/0471–0001$39.50/0 E-Mail [email protected] www.karger.com/psp
maturation – with Patrick McGorry as the responsible Section Editor – and to the field dealing with interactions between neuroscience and psychopathology, with Vittorio Gallese as Editor. I am thoroughly convinced that Thomas Fuchs, with his substantial scientific work and double career in psychiatry and philosophy, is the best expert internationally to represent this direction of Psychopathology. Some remarks may suffice to highlight the importance of philosophy in general and phenomenology in particular as foundations of psychopathology. Since Karl Jaspers’ pioneering work [1], the major task of philosophical approaches to mental illness has been the thorough investigation and analysis of subjective experience. This is all the more needed in times of criteriological and manualized diagnostic systems. The DSM-IV and DSM-5 as well as the ICD-10 are mainly conceived for purposes of reliability and, therefore, characterized by rather simple psychopathological concepts compatible with easily applicable data collection techniques. Consciousness and subjectivity, however, are virtually excluded on the theoretical level and undervalued on the pragmatic level. The more objective the information the psychiatrist tries to gain by decomposing subjective experience into measurable data and physiological correlates, the more he detaches him-
self from the patient’s perspective. Editorials of major psychiatric journals have deplored a decline in psychopathological expertise and the capacity for individualized assessment [2–4]. This has serious consequences for the validity of psychiatric diagnosis, for empirical research and, above all, for therapeutic purposes. For principal reasons, psychiatry cannot be transformed completely into a ‘natural science of mental disorders’. The main reason lies in the irreducible character of subjectivity itself. The experiential or 1st-person perspective cannot be translated into the observing or 3rdperson perspective without a significant loss of meaning. Therefore, phenomenology, by systematically studying the structures of subjective experience, has traditionally served as the foundation for psychopathology. Starting with 1st-person accounts of mental illness, phenomenology is by no means restricted to a mere description of symptoms, but proceeds to investigate the basic structures of abnormal experience in dimensions such as selfawareness, embodiment, spatiality, temporality and intersubjectivity. It also analyzes the constitutive processes
that build up subjective experience, such as the formation of perceptual meaning, temporal continuity or implicit bodily action. This allows us to detect the critical points where the constitution of self and world is vulnerable and open to deviation or derailment in mental illness. By gaining access to the basic, prereflective dimension of experience, the psychiatrist extends his scope of understanding beyond the psychology of the normal, and is able to include phenomena which could otherwise only be taken as bizarre products of the brain. Although phenomenology methodically suspends any assumptions about causal explanation, it provides a rich framework for the analysis of subjectivity and its disturbances in mental disorders which also leads to testable hypotheses about underlying neural mechanisms. Accordingly, it has recently entered into a constructive dialogue with cognitive neuroscience [5–10]. To further promote and extend this dialogue in the future will be one of the major aims of this journal. Prof. Sabine C. Herpertz, Heidelberg Prof. Thomas Fuchs, Heidelberg
References 1 Jaspers K: General Psychopathology, transl. Hoenig J, Hamilton MW. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1968. 2 Andreasen NC: DSM and the death of phenomenology in America: an example of unintended consequences. Schizophr Bull 2007; 33:108–112. 3 Hojaij CR: Reappraisal of dementia praecox: focus on clinical psychopathology. World J Biol Psychiatry 2000;1:43–54. 4 Mezzich JE: Psychiatry for the Person: articulating medicine’s science and humanism. World Psychiatry 2007;6:65–67.
2
5 Mishara AL, Parnas J, Naudin J: Forging the links between phenomenology, cognitive neuroscience, and psychopathology: the emergence of a new discipline. Curr Opin Psychiatry 1998;11:567–573. 6 Fuchs T: The challenge of neuroscience: psychiatry and phenomenology today. Psychopathology 2002;35:319–326. 7 Gallagher S: Neurocognitive models of schizophrenia: a neurophenomenological critique. Psychopathology 2004;37:8–19.
Psychopathology 2014;47:1–2 DOI: 10.1159/000356302
8 Gallagher S, Zahavi D: The Phenomenological Mind: An Introduction to Philosophy of Mind and Cognitive Science. London, Routledge, 2008. 9 Gallagher S, Schmicking D (eds): Handbook of Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences. Dordrecht, Springer, 2010. 10 Kendler K, Parnas J (eds): Philosophical Issues in Psychiatry: Explanation, Phenomenology and Nosology. Baltimore, Johns Hopkins UP, 2008.
Editorial
Copyright: S. Karger AG, Basel 2013. Reproduced with the permission of S. Karger AG, Basel. Further reproduction or distribution (electronic or otherwise) is prohibited without permission from the copyright holder.
