Brief Communication
INDIVIDUAL SEPARATENESS OR UNIVERSAL SCHEME? A Note on Neo-Darwinian vs. N o n - D a r w i n i a n
Evolutionary Social Science
Elias L. Khalil
Ohio State University, Mansfield, and University of Freiburg
KEYWORDS:Evolutionary anthropology; Evolutionary psychology; Essentialism; Population thinking.
Two competing evolutionary social theories seem to have crystallized in the past few years. One is broadly associated with evolutionary anthropology (see, e.g., articles by Boone, Hill and Kaplan, and Crook and Crook in Betzig et al. 1988), while the other is generally identified with evolutionary psychology (see, e.g., Symons 1989; Tooby and Cosmides 1990; and articles by Symons and by Cosmides and Tooby in Barkow et al. 1992). It should be clear that the proposed juxtaposition is a stylized reconstruction since the former is not limited to anthropologists, nor is the latter restricted to psychologists. At the apparent level, the difference between the two streams seems ReceivedApril 18, 1994;acceptedJuly 28, 1994. Address all correspondence to Elias L. Khalil, Department of Economics, Ohio State University at Mansfield, Mansfield, OH 44906. Copyright 9 1995 by Walter de Gruyter, Inc. New York Human Nature, Vol. 6, No., 1, pp. 91--94.
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to be about the relevant historical range of natural selection. Evolutionary anthropologists tend to maintain that natural selection has given humans mechanisms suited to maximize current fitness. In contrast, evolutionary psychologists generally stress the role of natural selection in giving humans mechanisms suited for maximizing ancestral fitness. I would like to argue, however, that the difference goes deeper than the issue of historical inertia. While both claim to trace their framework to the adaptationist neo-Darwinian legacy, I would maintain that, unlike evolutionary anthropology, evolutionary psychology is far from the core of neo-Darwinism. Stated tersely, while evolutionary anthropologists highlight "how different entities are," evolutionary psychologists emphasize "how similar entities are." Even though these focuses might arguably complement each other, the emphasis by the psychologists on the similarities is antithetical to the neo-Darwinian agenda. To remind ourselves, neo-Darwinism underscores individual differences as the motor behind evolutionary change. To elaborate, evolutionary anthropologists adhere more closely to the neo-Darwinian approach. They generally focus on the differences in the lifetime reproductive success among individuals in order to explain behavior in terms of ultimate causes of fitness maximization. In contrast, evolutionary psychologists discuss how individuals are similar in the w a y their approximating mechanisms operate. Such a similarity is explained as adaptation to ancestral environments. This entails the possibility that current behavior may not represent fitness optimization if the current environment differs from the ancestral environment. The difference between evolutionary anthropology and evolutionary psychology could be put in terms of what is more important: current adjustment or ancestral legacy? While the question of adaptational lag is important, it camouflages the different uses of the word "adaptation." As Lewontin (1984; see also Gould and Lewontin 1984) argues, the term "adaptation" in the neo-Darwinian agenda denotes optimization of traits according to selection forces without regard to underpinning schemes determined by taxa. But the word "adaptation" in the evolutionary psychology program seems to indicate the persistence of some innate decision rules or universal schemes. One of the main pillars of neo-Darwinism is the stress on individual differences (Khalil 1993a, 1993b). As opposed to Platonian "essentialism," Ernst Mayr (1982:47) characterizes neo-Darwinian thinking as "population thinking": "he who does not understand the uniqueness [i.e., separateness] of individuals is unable to understand the working of natural selection." To recall, variation among organisms, for neoDarwinians, is a crucial condition of natural selection. In contrast, the variation, for the essentialist program, is the improvisation of the uni-
Individual Separateness or Universal Scheme?
93
versal scheme during learning and development. This presents a challenge to evolutionary social theorists. While evolutionary psychologists call themselves Darwinian, they in fact tend to emphasize how similar entities are. It is true that they consider the similarities to be the product of natural selection, rather than the cause of selection. But the fact that they stress the similarities, at the expense of population genetics la neo-Darwinism, may indicate that they, in effect, consider the similarities to be of prime importance for the explanation of the process or cause of evolution. This would certainly be an anti-Darwinian idea. The proposed clarification should not be understood as the advocacy of neo-Darwinism in the social sciences. It is not a critique of evolutionary psychology or other approaches that promote developmental theories of evolution. To wit, the note would like to challenge evolutionary psychologists in case they are serious about emphasizing the importance of universal schemes in evolution. They might want to seek non-Darwinian theories openly which present differences as the outcome rather than the cause of evolution--like the structuralist approach of G. C. Webster and Brian Goodwin (1982).
E. L. Khalil is an assistant professorof economicsat Ohio State University,Mansfield, and Humboldt research fellow at the Institute for the Study of EconomicEvolution, University of Freiburg, Germany. He has several published articles on the foundation of economics, ethics and economics,ecologicaleconomics, and the theory of the firm. He acknowledges the comments of two anonymous referees.
REFERENCES Barkow, Jerome H., Leda Cosmides, and John Tooby, eds. 1992 The Adapted Mind: Evolutionary Psychology and the Generation of Culture. New York: Oxford University Press. Betzig, Laura, M. Borgerhoff-Mulder, and P. Turke, eds. 1988 Human Reproductive Behavior: A Darwinian Perspective. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Gould, Stephen Jay, and Richard C. Lewontin 1984 The Spandrels of San Marco and the Panglossian Paradigm: A Critique of the Adaptationist Programme. In Conceptual Issues in Evolutionary Biology: An Anthology, Elliott Sober, ed. Pp. 252-270. Cambridge, Massachusetts: M1T. (Originally published in the Proceedings of the Royal Society of London 205:581-598, 1979) ".(halil, Elias L. 1993a Neo-classical Economics and Neo-Darwinism: Clearing the Way for Historical Thinking. In Economics as Worldly Philosophy: Essays in Political and Historical Economics in Honour of Robert L. Heilbroner, Ron Blackwell,
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Human Nature, Vol. 6, No. 1, 1995
Jaspal Chatha, and Edward J. Nell, eds. Pp. 22-72. London: Macmillan; New York: St. Martin's Press. (Reprinted in Economics and Biology, Geoffrey M. Hodgson, ed. Aldershot, UK: Edward Elgar, 1994.) 1993b Is Nonlinear Dynamics the Alternative to the Selection Theory of Evolution? Journal of Social and Evolutionary Systems 16(4):489-500. Lewontin, Richard C. 1984 Adaptation. In Conceptual Issues in Evolutionary Biology: An Anthology, Elliot Sober, ed. Pp. 235-251. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press. Mayr, Ernst 1982 The Growth of Biological Thought: Diversity, Evolution, and Inheritance. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. Symons, Donald 1989 A Critique of Darwinian Anthropology. Ethology and Sociobiology 10:131-144. Tooby, John, and Leda Cosmides 1990 The Past Explains the Present: Emotional Adaptations and the Structure of Ancestral Environments. Ethology and Sociobiology 11:375-424. Webster, G. C., and Brian C. Goodwin 1982 The Origin of Species: A Structuralist Approach. Journal of Social and Biological Structures 5(1):15-47.
AMAURY TALBOT PRIZE FOR AFRICAN A N T H R O P L O G Y 1994 The Amaury Talbot prize, which is awarded annually, and has a value of approximately s will be awarded to the author, or authors, of the work which, in the opinion of the Judges, is the most valuable of the works of anthropological research relating to Africa which are submitted in the competition. Only works published during the calendar year 1994 are eligible for the award. Preference will be given to works relating in the first place to Nigeria, and in the second place to any other part of West Africa or to West Africa in general. Works relating to other regions of Africa are, however, elegible. All applications, together with two copies of the book, articles, or work in question, to be received by 31st March 1995 by the Trustees: Barclays Bank Trust Company Limited, Executorship and Trustee Service, Osbome Court, Gadbrook Park, Rudheath, Northwich, Cheshire, CW9 7UE, England. Please quote reference number 66/61/888. Entries will not be returned to candidates but will be at the disposal of the Judges.
INDIVIDUAL SEPARATENESS OR UNIVERSAL SCHEME? A Note on Neo-Darwinian vs. N o n - D a r w i n i a n
Evolutionary Social Science
Elias L. Khalil
Ohio State University, Mansfield, and University of Freiburg
KEYWORDS:Evolutionary anthropology; Evolutionary psychology; Essentialism; Population thinking.
Two competing evolutionary social theories seem to have crystallized in the past few years. One is broadly associated with evolutionary anthropology (see, e.g., articles by Boone, Hill and Kaplan, and Crook and Crook in Betzig et al. 1988), while the other is generally identified with evolutionary psychology (see, e.g., Symons 1989; Tooby and Cosmides 1990; and articles by Symons and by Cosmides and Tooby in Barkow et al. 1992). It should be clear that the proposed juxtaposition is a stylized reconstruction since the former is not limited to anthropologists, nor is the latter restricted to psychologists. At the apparent level, the difference between the two streams seems ReceivedApril 18, 1994;acceptedJuly 28, 1994. Address all correspondence to Elias L. Khalil, Department of Economics, Ohio State University at Mansfield, Mansfield, OH 44906. Copyright 9 1995 by Walter de Gruyter, Inc. New York Human Nature, Vol. 6, No., 1, pp. 91--94.
91
1045-6767/95/$1.00+.10
92
Human Nature, Vol. 6, No. 1, 1995
to be about the relevant historical range of natural selection. Evolutionary anthropologists tend to maintain that natural selection has given humans mechanisms suited to maximize current fitness. In contrast, evolutionary psychologists generally stress the role of natural selection in giving humans mechanisms suited for maximizing ancestral fitness. I would like to argue, however, that the difference goes deeper than the issue of historical inertia. While both claim to trace their framework to the adaptationist neo-Darwinian legacy, I would maintain that, unlike evolutionary anthropology, evolutionary psychology is far from the core of neo-Darwinism. Stated tersely, while evolutionary anthropologists highlight "how different entities are," evolutionary psychologists emphasize "how similar entities are." Even though these focuses might arguably complement each other, the emphasis by the psychologists on the similarities is antithetical to the neo-Darwinian agenda. To remind ourselves, neo-Darwinism underscores individual differences as the motor behind evolutionary change. To elaborate, evolutionary anthropologists adhere more closely to the neo-Darwinian approach. They generally focus on the differences in the lifetime reproductive success among individuals in order to explain behavior in terms of ultimate causes of fitness maximization. In contrast, evolutionary psychologists discuss how individuals are similar in the w a y their approximating mechanisms operate. Such a similarity is explained as adaptation to ancestral environments. This entails the possibility that current behavior may not represent fitness optimization if the current environment differs from the ancestral environment. The difference between evolutionary anthropology and evolutionary psychology could be put in terms of what is more important: current adjustment or ancestral legacy? While the question of adaptational lag is important, it camouflages the different uses of the word "adaptation." As Lewontin (1984; see also Gould and Lewontin 1984) argues, the term "adaptation" in the neo-Darwinian agenda denotes optimization of traits according to selection forces without regard to underpinning schemes determined by taxa. But the word "adaptation" in the evolutionary psychology program seems to indicate the persistence of some innate decision rules or universal schemes. One of the main pillars of neo-Darwinism is the stress on individual differences (Khalil 1993a, 1993b). As opposed to Platonian "essentialism," Ernst Mayr (1982:47) characterizes neo-Darwinian thinking as "population thinking": "he who does not understand the uniqueness [i.e., separateness] of individuals is unable to understand the working of natural selection." To recall, variation among organisms, for neoDarwinians, is a crucial condition of natural selection. In contrast, the variation, for the essentialist program, is the improvisation of the uni-
Individual Separateness or Universal Scheme?
93
versal scheme during learning and development. This presents a challenge to evolutionary social theorists. While evolutionary psychologists call themselves Darwinian, they in fact tend to emphasize how similar entities are. It is true that they consider the similarities to be the product of natural selection, rather than the cause of selection. But the fact that they stress the similarities, at the expense of population genetics la neo-Darwinism, may indicate that they, in effect, consider the similarities to be of prime importance for the explanation of the process or cause of evolution. This would certainly be an anti-Darwinian idea. The proposed clarification should not be understood as the advocacy of neo-Darwinism in the social sciences. It is not a critique of evolutionary psychology or other approaches that promote developmental theories of evolution. To wit, the note would like to challenge evolutionary psychologists in case they are serious about emphasizing the importance of universal schemes in evolution. They might want to seek non-Darwinian theories openly which present differences as the outcome rather than the cause of evolution--like the structuralist approach of G. C. Webster and Brian Goodwin (1982).
E. L. Khalil is an assistant professorof economicsat Ohio State University,Mansfield, and Humboldt research fellow at the Institute for the Study of EconomicEvolution, University of Freiburg, Germany. He has several published articles on the foundation of economics, ethics and economics,ecologicaleconomics, and the theory of the firm. He acknowledges the comments of two anonymous referees.
REFERENCES Barkow, Jerome H., Leda Cosmides, and John Tooby, eds. 1992 The Adapted Mind: Evolutionary Psychology and the Generation of Culture. New York: Oxford University Press. Betzig, Laura, M. Borgerhoff-Mulder, and P. Turke, eds. 1988 Human Reproductive Behavior: A Darwinian Perspective. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Gould, Stephen Jay, and Richard C. Lewontin 1984 The Spandrels of San Marco and the Panglossian Paradigm: A Critique of the Adaptationist Programme. In Conceptual Issues in Evolutionary Biology: An Anthology, Elliott Sober, ed. Pp. 252-270. Cambridge, Massachusetts: M1T. (Originally published in the Proceedings of the Royal Society of London 205:581-598, 1979) ".(halil, Elias L. 1993a Neo-classical Economics and Neo-Darwinism: Clearing the Way for Historical Thinking. In Economics as Worldly Philosophy: Essays in Political and Historical Economics in Honour of Robert L. Heilbroner, Ron Blackwell,
94
Human Nature, Vol. 6, No. 1, 1995
Jaspal Chatha, and Edward J. Nell, eds. Pp. 22-72. London: Macmillan; New York: St. Martin's Press. (Reprinted in Economics and Biology, Geoffrey M. Hodgson, ed. Aldershot, UK: Edward Elgar, 1994.) 1993b Is Nonlinear Dynamics the Alternative to the Selection Theory of Evolution? Journal of Social and Evolutionary Systems 16(4):489-500. Lewontin, Richard C. 1984 Adaptation. In Conceptual Issues in Evolutionary Biology: An Anthology, Elliot Sober, ed. Pp. 235-251. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press. Mayr, Ernst 1982 The Growth of Biological Thought: Diversity, Evolution, and Inheritance. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. Symons, Donald 1989 A Critique of Darwinian Anthropology. Ethology and Sociobiology 10:131-144. Tooby, John, and Leda Cosmides 1990 The Past Explains the Present: Emotional Adaptations and the Structure of Ancestral Environments. Ethology and Sociobiology 11:375-424. Webster, G. C., and Brian C. Goodwin 1982 The Origin of Species: A Structuralist Approach. Journal of Social and Biological Structures 5(1):15-47.
AMAURY TALBOT PRIZE FOR AFRICAN A N T H R O P L O G Y 1994 The Amaury Talbot prize, which is awarded annually, and has a value of approximately s will be awarded to the author, or authors, of the work which, in the opinion of the Judges, is the most valuable of the works of anthropological research relating to Africa which are submitted in the competition. Only works published during the calendar year 1994 are eligible for the award. Preference will be given to works relating in the first place to Nigeria, and in the second place to any other part of West Africa or to West Africa in general. Works relating to other regions of Africa are, however, elegible. All applications, together with two copies of the book, articles, or work in question, to be received by 31st March 1995 by the Trustees: Barclays Bank Trust Company Limited, Executorship and Trustee Service, Osbome Court, Gadbrook Park, Rudheath, Northwich, Cheshire, CW9 7UE, England. Please quote reference number 66/61/888. Entries will not be returned to candidates but will be at the disposal of the Judges.
