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Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (requiring parties to protect public health policies from tobacco industry interference) [7]. However, at the World Health Assembly 1 month later, Chan drew a clear distinction between a pariah tobacco industry and ‘other industries that have a role to play in reducing the risks for NCDs’— for which she did not exclude cooperation [8]. The example of Drinkaware serves to reiterate the negligible contribution that the alcohol industry can be expected to make to efforts to reduce risks for NCDs, and the dangers inherent in pursuing such cooperation. It does so at a time of major significance to the future of global health governance. The first WHO discussion paper on the Global Coordinating Mechanism for NCDs [9] anticipates continuing ‘dialogue with the private sector on how they can best contribute to the reduction of alcohol-related harm’. Simultaneously, the ongoing process of reforming WHO [10] is centred on redefining the terms of its engagement with non-state actors. While the practice of excluding the tobacco industry is reiterated, the relevant discussion paper [11] makes no reference to alcohol. The WHO is committed to improving transparency, strengthening due diligence and managing risks of engagement, yet the outcome of the above processes could actually increase scope for interactions with the alcohol industry. The recent informal consultation in Geneva included among its participants representatives of SAB Miller, the Global Alcohol Producers Group and the Consumer Goods Forum, whose members include Diageo, Heineken and SAB Miller. If the misguided assumptions of collaboration that underpin the Public Health Responsibility Deal are not to be replicated internationally, it is crucial that initiatives such as Drinkaware are recognized as not merely suboptimal, but as actively obstructing evidence-based health policy.

3. Jernigan D. H. Global alcohol producers, science, and policy: the case of the International Center for Alcohol Policies. Am J Public Health 2012; 102: 80–9. 4. Anderson P. The beverage alcohol industry’s social aspects organizations: a public health warning. Addiction 2004; 99: 1376–7. 5. Limb M. Public health body quits responsibility deal over government’s failure to act on tobacco and alcohol. BMJ 2013; 347: f4590. 6. Chan M. Letter in response to Gornall J. Doctors and the alcohol industry: an unhealthy mix? (11 April 2013). BMJ 2013; 346: f1889. 7. World Health Organization (WHO). Guidelines for Implementation of Article 5.3 of the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control. Geneva: WHO; 2008. 8. Chan M. Address to the Sixty-sixth World Health Assembly, Geneva, Switzerland (20 May 2013). 2013b. Available at: http://www.who.int/dg/speeches/2013/world_health _assembly_20130520/en/ (accessed 24 October 2013). Archived at http://www.webcitation.org/6MfU7yC8y on 16 January 2014. 9. World Health Organization (WHO). Draft terms of reference for a global coordination mechanism for the prevention and control of noncommunicable diseases. First WHO Discussion Paper (23 July 2013). Geneva: WHO, 2013. Available at: http://www.who.int/nmh/events/ncd_coordination _mechanism/en/ (accessed 24 October 2013). Archived at http://www.webcitation.org/6MfUUyUrf on 16 January 2014. 10.World Health Organization (WHO). WHO governance reform: report by the Secretariat. Executive Board 133rd session, provisional agenda item 5. EB133/16, 17 May 2013. Geneva: WHO, 2013. Available at: http://apps.who.int/gb/ ebwha/pdf_files/EB133/B133_16-en.pdf (accessed 24 October 2013). Archived at http://www.webcitation.org/ 6MfUgHMwN on 16 January 2014. 11.World Health Organization (WHO). WHO’s engagement with non-State actors. Discussion paper for the informal consultation with Member States and non-State actors, 17–18 October 2013 (8 October 2013). Geneva: WHO, 2013. Available at: http://www.who.int/about/who _reform/NonStateActor_discussion_paper.pdf (accessed 24 October 2013). Archived at http://www.webcitation.org/ 6MfUoqZXm on 16 January 2014.

Declaration of interests None. JEFF COLLIN & SARAH HILL

Global Public Health Unit, Social Policy, School of Social and Political Science, University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh EH8 9LD, UK. E-mail: [email protected]

References 1. McCambridge J., Kypri K., Miller P., Hawkins B., Hastings G. Be aware of Drinkaware. Addiction 2014; 109: 519– 24. 2. Fooks G., Gilmore A., Collin J., Holden C., Lee K. The limits of Corporate Social Responsibility: techniques of neutralization, stakeholder management and political CSR. J Bus Ethics 2013; 112: 283–99. © 2014 Society for the Study of Addiction

FROM TOBACCO CONTROL TO ALCOHOL POLICY The commentators are broadly in agreement with each other and with us, adding powerful and timely arguments to the high stakes challenge of arresting alcohol industry influence in the United Kingdom. They underline that this is also a global challenge, and that there are clear similarities between the case of alcohol and other unhealthy industries. It is important and welcome that those who have led the debate on tobacco control see the need to study and restrain corporate power more widely; they bring a wealth of experience, and have no illusions about the corporation’s determination to protect its own Addiction, 109, 525–529

Commentaries

interests [1,2]. Collin & Hill [3] make a strong case for non-engagement, arguing that national-level decisions about collaborations with industry must take into account the global ramifications of these decisions. Similarly, Moodie [4] supports the need for clear leadership by the World Health Organization (WHO). The alcohol industry retains a respectability that big tobacco has lost, and appears to still have a high level of influence in the United Kingdom [5]. This, perhaps, explains why prominent figures in the alcohol field work with Drinkaware. This cooperation continues even after the minimum unit pricing (MUP) debacle [6], and the withdrawals of support for the collaborative Responsibility Deal approach to public health policy [7,8]. As Daube [9] emphasizes, a vicious circle is at play: engagement by the public health community underpins Drinkaware’s spurious claims of independence, leading to increased credibility for industry engagement in the policy process, and policy becoming more industryfriendly. Specifically, the UK government has decided not to proceed with the planned implementation of MUP, after a consultation supposedly on the level at which it was to be set [8]. The UK government’s alcohol strategy is now devoid of both substance and strategic direction [10,11]. There is an urgent need for debate about how this can be rectified. Compared with big tobacco, we know far less about the alcohol industry, and there is an obvious need to strengthen this evidence base [12]. It is interesting that the tobacco industry usually refers only to the producer organizations, whereas retailers are included in our definition of the alcohol industry [13]. Similarities and differences between the activities of the two industries are a fruitful target for study and we should avoid concluding that they are identical twins on current evidence, however many similarities there may appear to be. Moodie [4] suggests that public health research capacity needs to be enhanced to address these issues and we also suggest that greater capacity for dissemination and advocacy of research findings is essential. Careful attention should be given to the formation of new alliances within and beyond the field of public health. We agree, too, that it is important to look beyond the activities of specific industries, and suggest that considerations of the alcohol industry take place in the context of broader thinking about the impact of corporate power on public health and societal wellbeing [2,14]. There is much we can learn not just from tobacco control research but also from other disciplines and literatures.

Declaration of interests None. © 2014 Society for the Study of Addiction

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JIM McCAMBRIDGE 1, KYPROS KYPRI 2, PETER MILLER 3, BEN HAWKINS 4 & GERARD HASTINGS 5

London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, 15–17 Tavistock Place, London WC1H 9HS,1 School of Medicine and Public Health, University of Newcastle, Newcastle, NSW, Australia,2 School of Psychology, Deakin University, Melbourne, Vic., Australia,3 Global Health and Development, London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, London, UK4 and Institute for Social Marketing, University of Stirling, Stirling, UK5. E-mail: [email protected] References 1. Moodie R., Stuckler D., Monteiro C., Sheron N., Neal B., Thamarangsi T. et al. Profits and pandemics: prevention of harmful effects of tobacco, alcohol, and ultra-processed food and drink industries. Lancet 2013; 381: 670–9. 2. Hastings G. Why corporate power is a public health priority. BMJ 2012; 345: e5124. 3. Collin J., Hill S. Implications for global health governance. Addiction 2014; 109: 527–8. 4. Moodie R. Big Alcohol: the vector of an industrial epidemic. Addiction 2014; 109: 525–6. 5. McCambridge J., Hawkins B., Holden C. Vested Interests in Addiction Research and Policy. The challenge corporate lobbying poses to reducing society’s alcohol problems: insights from UK evidence on minimum unit pricing. Addiction 2014; 109: 199–205. 6. New Statesman. Sarah Wollaston: Cameron Has Caved in to Lobbyists on Minimum Alcohol Pricing. 2013. Available at: http://www.newstatesman.com/politics/2013/05/sarah -wollaston-cameron-has-caved-lobbyists-minimum-alcohol -pricing (accessed 8 October 2013) (Archived at: http:// www.webcitation.org/6KDfr1BTc on 8 October 2013). 7. O’Dowd A. BMA and other health bodies walk out of “half hearted” national alcohol plan. BMJ 2011; 342: d1659. 8. Cancer Research UK, Faculty of Public Health (FoPH), UK Health Forum, Sheron N. NGOs Pull Out of Government’s Alcohol Network of the Responsibility Deal. Faculty of Public Health website; 2013. Available at: http://www.fph.org.uk/ ngos_pull_out_of_government’s_alcohol_network_of_the _responsibility_deal (accessed 12 January 2014) (Archived at: http://www.webcitation.org/6LFCyCBEX on 12 January 2014). 9. Daube M. Protecting their paymasters. Addiction 2014; 109: 526–7. 10. McCambridge J. Dealing responsibly with the alcohol industry in London. Alcohol Alcohol 2012; 47: 635–7. 11. McCambridge J. A user’s guide to the 2012 Alcohol Strategy for England and Wales: a commentary on the commentaries. Drugs (Abingdon, UK) 2012; 19: 377–8. 12. Hawkins B., Holden C., McCambridge J. Alcohol industry influence on UK alcohol policy: a new research agenda for public health. Crit Public Health 2012; 22: 297–305. 13. Jernigan D. H. The global alcohol industry: an overview. Addiction 2009; 104: 6–12. 14. Babor T. F., Robaina K. Public health, academic medicine, and the alcohol industry’s corporate social responsibility activities. Am J Public Health 2013; 103: 206–14. Addiction, 109, 525–529

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From tobacco control to alcohol policy.

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