Copyright 1991 by the American Psychological Association, Inc. 0022-3514/91/$3.00
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 1991, Vol. 61, No. 3, 413-426
Empathic Joy and the Empathy-Altruism Hypothesis C. Daniel Batson, Judy G. Batson, Jacqueline K. Slingsby, Kevin L. Harrell, Heli M. Peekna, and R. Matthew Todd
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University of Kansas Three experiments tested whether empathy evokes egoistic motivation to share vicariously in the victim's joy at improvement (the empathic-joy hypothesis) instead of altruistic motivation to increase the victim's welfare (the empathy-altruism hypothesis). In Experiment 1, Ss induced to feel either low or high empathy for a young woman in need were given a chance to help her. Some believed that if they helped they would receive feedback about her improvement; others did not. In Experiments 2 and 3, Ss induced to feel either low or high empathy were given a choice of getting update information about a needy person's condition. Before choosing, they were told the likelihood of the person's condition having improved—and of their experiencing empathic joy—was 20%, was 50%, or was 80%. Results of none of the experiments patterned as predicted by the empathic-joy hypothesis; instead, results of each were consistent with the empathy-altruism hypothesis.
aroused individuals will feel empathic joy at learning the other's need has been relieved, the empathy-altruism hypothesis claims that this joy is a consequence, not the goal, of relieving the need.
The empathy-altruism hypothesis, which claims that the prosocial motivation evoked by empathy is directed toward the ultimate goal of increasing the welfare of the person in need, has received considerable empirical support (see Batson, 1987a, 1991, for reviews). Smith, Keating, and Stotland (1989) recently proposed an intriguing new egoistic explanation of the apparent support for the empathy-altruism hypothesis. They suggested that empathically aroused individuals help to gain the good feeling of sharing vicariously in the needy person's joy at improvement: "It is proposed that the prospect of empathic joy, conveyed by feedback from the help recipient, is essential to the special tendency of empathic witnesses to help.. . . The empathically concerned witness to the distress of others helps in order to be happy" (Smith et al, 1989, p. 641). Individuals experiencing empathy for a person in need are especially motivated to gain the rewards of vicarious joy because "empathic concern reflects a broad-based sensitivity to the emotional state of the victim, which includes an enhanced sensitivity to vicarious joy and relief at the resolution of the help recipient's needs" (p. 642). As a result, "empathically concerned witnesses may find empathic joy more accessible and more satisfying than do their self-focused counterparts, helping more frequently for that reason" (p. 642). According to this empathic-joy hypothesis, the ultimate goal of the motivation to help evoked by empathy is to gain the rewarding experience of empathic joy; relief of the victim's need is simply instrumental to this end. In contrast, although the empathy-altruism hypothesis also predicts that empathically
Effect of Feedback on the Empathy-Helping Relationship To test their empathic-joy hypothesis against the empathyaltruism hypothesis, Smith et al. (1989) manipulated both empathy and expectation of feedback concerning the effect of one's helping efforts. They reasoned that if the empathic-joy hypothesis is correct, then the empathy-helping relationship should be found only when prospective helpers anticipate receiving feedback about the needy person's improvement: "When feedback is assured, the empathic person can expect to move from a state of empathic concern to empathic joy by helping, and we would expect the familiar positive relation between empathic concern and helping" (Smith et al, 1989, pp. 642-643). When prospective helpers do not anticipate receiving feedback, "helping is a goal-irrelevant response, and we would expect empathic witnesses to refuse to help as often as their nonempathic counterparts" (p. 643). If, on the other hand, the empathy-altruism hypothesis is correct, then the empathy-helping relationship should be found even in the no-feedback condition; helping can still relieve the other's need. In a 2 (low vs. high empathy) X 2 (no feedback vs. feedback) experimental design, Smith et al. (1989) had undergraduate subjects watch a videotape of a young woman having difficulty adjusting to college life. To manipulate empathy, some subjects were asked to adopt an objective perspective while watching (low-empathy condition), and others were asked to imagine how the young woman felt (high-empathy condition). These perspective-taking instructions were adapted from Stotland (1969), who had used both physiological and self-report measures to validate the effectiveness of such instructions in manipulating empathic feelings. (In subsequent studies of the em-
The reported research was supported by National Science Foundation Grants BNS-8507110 and BNS-8906723 for C. Daniel Batson as principal investigator. We thank Staci Kemerling for assistance making the videotape used in Experiment 2 and Jack Brehm for helpful comments on a draft. Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to C. Daniel Batson, Department of Psychology, University of Kansas, 426 Fraser Hall, Lawrence, Kansas 66045-2160. 413
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pathy-helping relationship, similar instructions were used successfully to manipulate empathy by Batson et al, 1989; Batson et al., 1988; Coke, Batson, & McDavis, 1978; Fultz, Batson, Fortenbach, McCarthy, & Varney, 1986; and Toi & Batson, 1982. In each of these studies, subjects in the high-empathy condition were more likely to help than subjects in the low-empathy condition.) After watching the videotape, subjects were given a chance to help the young woman by writing answers to questions she had about her problems. Feedback was manipulated by leading some subjects to believe that if they chose to help they would, at a second session, see another videotape of the young woman. This second video, made after she had read their answers to her questions and tried out their advice in her life, would report on the difference that their advice had made in her adjustment (feedback condition). Other subjects would also come back for a second session, but they were given no expectation of seeing another videotape of the young woman (no feedback condition). Conflicting Results Contrary to their predictions, Smith et al. (1989) found an empathy-helping relationship in both the feedback and nofeedback conditions of their experiment. This was the pattern predicted by the empathy-altruism hypothesis, not the empathic-joy hypothesis. Smith et al. chose to disregard these results and focused instead on an internal analysis in which lowand high-empathy conditions were created by a median split on a measure of self-reported empathy minus self-reported distress. They justified this decision on the grounds that even though their perspective-taking manipulation of empathy had the expected significant effect on helping, it did not have a significant effect on self-reported empathy. In their internal analysis, using the self-report difference measure, Smith et al. found more helping in the high-relative-empathy condition than in the low-relative-empathy condition among subjects anticipating feedback, but not among subjects not anticipating feedback. This was the pattern predicted by the empathic-joy hypothesis, not the empathy-altruism hypothesis. To summarize the Smith et al. results, then, manipulated empathy produced the pattern predicted by the empathy-altruism hypothesis; a self-report difference measure produced the pattern predicted by the empathic-joy hypothesis. Which way of operationalizing empathy is to be preferred? In addition to the well-known reasons for preferring experimental manipulation over internal analysis when operationalizing an independent variable (Campbell & Stanley, 1963), we believe there are several specific reasons to doubt the appropriateness of a self-report difference measure for assessing empathy in the particular research procedure used by Smith et al. (1989). Concerns About the Smith et al. (1989) Self-Report Difference Measure of Empathy Smith et al. (1989) justified their use of the empathy-minusdistress difference measure by noting that such a measure had been used to operationalize empathy in several studies testing the empathy-altruism hypothesis (Batson, O'Quin, Fultz, Van-
derplas, & Isen, 1983; Toi & Batson, 1982). Smith et al. failed to note, however, that in both of these previous instances the selfreport difference measure was used to supplement information provided by experimental manipulation; self-reports and the manipulation produced parallel rather than contradictory results. Smith et al. (1989) also failed to note that there were two important differences between the need situation they used and the need situation used in the previous studies in which manipulated empathy and a self-report difference measure produced parallel results. First, in the previous studies, the victim's need was not one that participants shared; in the Smith et al. study, a number of the participants—who were university freshmen and sophomores—may have been experiencing at least some of the same problems adjusting to college as the young woman. It is easy to imagine that reports of empathy would be higher among participants who were themselves having similar problems and that these participants would be especially interested in learning whether their advice produced beneficial effects. After all, such information might be useful in their own coping efforts. Participants could get this information only in the feedback condition. Thus, at least some of the helping by high-relativeempathy/feedback subjects may actually have been directed toward self-help. Second, the previous studies involved situations in which the person in need was experiencing (Batson et al., 1983) or had experienced (Toi & Batson, 1982) physical discomfort or injury; the need situation used by Smith et al. involved a problem of personal adjustment. Contextual Variation in Self-Reports of Empathy and Distress Batson (1987a) and Batson et al. (1988) noted that self-report measures of vicarious emotion seem to be influenced by the context in which the measures are taken. Observing over closed-circuit TV as another undergraduate ostensibly reacts with discomfort to a series of electric shocks has produced the clearest factor-analytic differentiation between self-reports of empathy and personal distress; it has also produced the clearest evidence that these vicarious emotions evoke altruistic and egoistic motivation, respectively (Batson, 1987a; Batson et al., 1983). In contrast, hearing a pilot radio broadcast in which a college senior talks about her struggle to support her younger brother and sister after her parents were killed in an automobile accident has produced a far less clear factor-analytic differentiation and no evidence that reports of empathy and distress are associated with different forms of prosocial motivation; in response to this situation, reports of distress have been at least as strongly associated with a pattern of helping suggesting altruistic motivation as have reports of empathy (Batson et al., 1989; Batson etal, 1988). What are we to make of this contextual variation? Perhaps the nature of the prosocial motivation associated with the vicarious emotions of empathy and personal distress varies across situations; perhaps each sometimes evokes altruistic motivation and sometimes does not. Alternatively, and we think more likely, perhaps there is a measurement problem. Self-report ratings of emotion adjectives may be the best available measurements for assessing different vicarious emotions, but they are
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EMPATHIC JOY AND EMPATHY-ALTRUISM
far from perfect (Batson, 1987b). Self-presentation and response-set problems exist (Batson et al, 1988; Batson et al, 1983; Cialdini et al., 1987). Moreover, at least some emotion adjectives are likely to be interpreted differently depending on context. For example, when people observe another's physical discomfort, reports of distress are likely to reflect the degree to which they are distressed by this spectacle; when people hear about someone's struggles adjusting to a difficult situation, reports of distress are likely to reflect the degree to which they are distressed for this person. This latter form of distress reflects empathy rather than personal distress, as these terms have been defined in the empathy-altruism literature (see Batson, 1987a, 1991). In keeping with the proposed contextual distinction, it has been found that when people observe another's physical suffering, responses to the adjectives concerned and grieved are strongly associated with responses to adjectives such as alarmed, disturbed, and perturbed and not with adjectives such as sympathetic, compassionate, and tender (Batson, 1987a; Batson et al., 1983). When hearing about adjustment and coping problems, however, associations with the latter adjectives are strong (Batson, 1987b; Batson et al, 1989; Batson et al, 1988). These observations caution against reifying the empathy and distress indexes used in past research, assuming that they measure the same psychological state in response to every need situation. These observations also underscore the importance of having converging evidence from experimental manipulations of empathy when interpreting results that are based on self-reports, especially self-reports of empathy relative to distress.
Reevaluating the Smith et al. (1989) Results Reflecting on the Smith et al. (1989) procedure in light of these measurement issues, we would suggest that in need situations such as the one they used, in which participants are led to anticipate hearing about someone in need and are then presented with a rather stereotypic, not physically disturbing, need situation, reports of empathic concern are apt to be contaminated by the desire to present oneself as empathic. Moreover, reports of distress are apt to reflect distress for the person in need (as opposed to being distressed by the need) and may be as appropriate, if not more appropriate, indicators of true empathic feeling than the self-presentation-contaminated reports of empathy. In such situations, using self-reported empathy minus distress to assess empathy may be quite inappropriate. If, as seems likely, the distress adjectives are less contaminated with selfpresentation than the empathy adjectives, then it may remove the empathy from the empathy index, leaving a relatively pure index of desire for positive self-presentation (Jones & Pittman, 1982). Such a desire could easily evoke an egoistic motive to look good, a motive that would lead to increased helping especially in the presence of feedback (when one could anticipate social rewards for one's goodness in the form of thanks from the young woman), producing precisely the pattern of helping that Smith et al. (1989) found using their difference measure. Interestingly, when self-reported empathy alone was used to create
low- and high-empathy conditions in the Smith et al. study (rather than the difference measure subtracting distress), helping responses showed the empathy main effect predicted by the empathy-altruism hypothesis, although the effect was considerably weaker than for the experimental manipulation of empathy. Given these problems with interpretation of the Smith et al. (1989) self-report difference measure, we believe the experimental manipulation was the better operationalization of empathy in their study. And if it was, then their results support the empathy-altruism hypothesis, not the empathic-joy hypothesis. But, because of the interpretational ambiguities, we do not place much confidence in this conclusion. A more appropriate conclusion seems to be that the empathic-joy hypothesis needs further testing.
Present Research To test the empathic-joy hypothesis further, we conducted three experiments. In the first, we used an Empathy X Feedback design much like the one Smith et al. (1989) used. In Experiments 2 and 3, we used a quite different procedure; subjects were presented with a person in need and given no chance to help. Instead, they were given a choice of whether to hear a second, update interview with this person or an interview with someone else. Before making this choice, subjects received information on the likelihood that the needy person's situation would be substantially improved by the time of the second interview. We reasoned that if empathically aroused individuals are egoistically motivated to gain empathic joy, then their desire to hear from the needy person again should be a direct function of the likelihood of obtaining empathic joy, which should in turn be a direct function of the likelihood that the needy person would be better. If, on the other hand, empathically aroused individuals are altruistically concerned for the needy person's welfare, then, analogous to the reasoning and research of Clark, Mills, and Powell (1986) indicating that people in a communal relationship keep track of one another's needs even when no opportunity to help exists, we reasoned that high-empathy individuals would be more interested than low-empathy individuals to hear how the needy person was doing. Moreover, because altruistically motivated individuals are concerned for the needy person's welfare and not their own, the interest of highempathy individuals should not be a direct function of the likelihood that the person would be better. Like a mother who anxiously awaits news about her injured child even though the prognosis is poor, altruistically motivated individuals should want to hear how the needy person is doing even when the chances of improvement are not great. Experiment 1 Experiment 1 was a conceptual replication of Smith et al.'s (1989) Empathy X Feedback design, with two major modifications. First, the victim's need was one that our undergraduate subjects were not likely to have themselves and one that had been used in previous studies to provide evidence for the empathy-altruism hypothesis. The need situation we would have
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preferred to use was the shock procedure employed by Batson et al. (1983) because it was in response to this situation that self-report indexes of empathy and personal distress had been found to be most valid, and a difference measure such as the one Smith et al. used had been found to be most appropriate. Unfortunately, we could not think of a plausible way to vary feedback in a situation in which helping involved agreeing to take shocks in another person's place. Therefore, we turned instead to the broadcast procedure introduced by Coke et al. (1978), even though in this procedure the validity of the self-report indexes of empathy and distress was questionable; self-reports of empathy appeared to be contaminated by self-presentation concerns, and self-reports of distress appeared to reflect distress for the victim and, hence, empathy (Batson et al., 1989; Batson etal., 1988). In this broadcast procedure, subjects learn about the need of a young woman, Katie Banks, by listening to a (bogus) pilot radio newscast and are then given an unexpected chance to help her. Previous studies using this need situation assessed helping by having subjects volunteer to spend time sitting with Katie's younger brother and sister while she attended her night classes, fixing things around the house, providing transportation, or making telephone calls and stuffing envelopes for a fund-raising project. Because these responses involved personal contact with Katie and, therefore, the possibility of feedback on the effect of one's helping efforts, it was necessary to create a new helping opportunity that eliminated direct personal contact, permitting us to manipulate feedback. Second, in addition to feedback and no-feedback conditions, in which subjects were explicitly told that they either would or would not learn the results of their efforts should they choose to help, we included a condition in which subjects received no information about feedback. This condition served two functions. It provided a replication condition in which to test the empathy-helping relationship in the absence of explicit information about feedback, and it provided a check on the Smith et al. (1989) assumption that in the absence of explicit information about feedback, subjects assume they will receive feedback on the positive effects of their helping efforts. Smith et al. used this assumption to explain why in previous research an empathyhelping relationship had frequently been observed when no explicit information about feedback was provided. Both the empathic-joy hypothesis and the empathy-altruism hypothesis predicted more helping in the high-empathy cell than in the low-empathy cell when no information about feedback was provided (no-information condition) and when subjects were explicitly led to expect feedback (feedback condition). The two hypotheses differed, however, in their predictions for the effect of the empathy manipulation when subjects were explicitly led to expect no feedback (no-feedback condition): The empathic-joy hypothesis predicted equally low helping in both empathy cells, whereas the empathy-altruism hypothesis predicted more helping in the high-empathy cell than in the low-empathy cell.
Method Subjects. Subjects for Experiment 1 were 72 female students in an introductory psychology course at the University of Kansas; participa-
tion earned credit toward a course requirement. Using a randomized block procedure, we assigned 12 subjects to each cell of the 2 (low empathy, high empathy) X 3 (no information, no feedback, feedback) design. We excluded 4 additional students from the sample because they expressed suspicion. Restricting the sample to women was not considered a problem because previous studies testing the empathyaltruism hypothesis had often used only women subjects (e.g., Batson, Duncan, Ackerman, Buckley, & Birch, 1981, Studies 1 & 2; Batson et al., 1988, Studies 4 & 5; Fultz et al., 1986, Studies 1 & 2), and studies using both men and women had not found sex differences (e.g., Batson et al., 1989; Batson et al., 1988, Studies 1, 2, & 3; Batson et al., 1983, Studies 1, 2, & 3; Coke et al., 1978). Procedure. Except for the new helping measure and feedback manipulation, the procedure was much like that used by Coke et al. (1978) and described in detail by them. Only key elements are described here. Manipulation ofempathy. Paralleling Smith et al. (1989), we manipulated empathy by listening-perspective instructions that subjects read before hearing the broadcast tape that presented Katie's need. Subjects in the low-empathy condition were instructed to try to take an objective perspective, being as objective as possible about what has happened to this student and how it has affected her life. Try not to let yourself get caught up in imagining what this student has been through and how she feels as a result. Just listen objectively to the information presented in the broadcast. Subjects in the high-empathy condition were instructed to try to take the perspective of the student being interviewed, imagining how she is feeling about what has happened and how it has affected her life. Try not to concern yourself with attending to all the information presented. Just imagine how this student feels about her situation. Listening-perspective instructions were presented on a typed sheet given to subjects in a folder, so the experimenter could remain blind to the empathy condition. Subjects were left alone to read the instructions and listen to the broadcast tape. Learning of Katies need. On the tape, a male announcer interviewed Katie, who was a senior at the university. Katie's parents and a sister had recently been killed in an automobile crash. Her parents did not have life insurance, and Katie was desperately struggling to take care of her surviving younger brother and sister while shefinishedher last year of college. If she did notfinish,she would not be able to earn enough money to support her brother and sister and would have to put them up for adoption. Self-reported emotional reaction to learning of Katies need. After listening to the tape, subjects completed an emotional response questionnaire. For each of 24 emotion adjectives, they indicated how much, on a scale ranging from not at all (1) to extremely (7), they had experienced that emotion while listening to the tape. The list included 18 adjectives that had been used in previous research to assess feelings of empathy (6), distress (8), and sadness (4) (Batson, 1987a; Fultz, Schaller, & Cialdini, 1988) but that in previous studies using this broadcast paradigm had all seemed to reflect empathic feelings (Batson et al., 1989; Batson et al., 1988). An opportunity to help Katie. When subjects completed this questionnaire, the experimenter returned and presented them with an envelope containing two letters. The experimenter left subjects alone to read these letters. Thefirstwas from the professor. He thanked subjects for participating in the study and explained that it had occurred to him that some participants might wish to help Katie, so he had checked with the radio station and found that this was indeed possible. The radio station had provided Katie with a list of people in the area who might be willing to make financial contributions to help her in her time of need. Katie had prepared a letter to send to these potential
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EMPATHIC JOY AND EMPATHY-ALTRUISM donors, but she was having troublefindingtime to get the letters in the mail. Students could help Katie by spending several hours in the next week or so stuffing and addressing envelopes. The radio station would provide all necessary materials, including postage; the job could be done at home at the student's convenience. Manipulation of anticipated feedback. For those subjects receiving explicit information about feedback, the professor's letter went on to explain that the disadvantage of helping at home was, of course, "that you won't meet Katie personally . . ." The statement after this comment introduced the feedback manipulation. Subjects in the no-feedback condition read, "and it will not be possible for you to learn the results of your efforts on Katie's behalf." Subjects in the feedback condition read, "but she has said she will be sure to provide anyone who helps with follow-up information on results of your efforts on her behalf." Subjects in the no-information condition read nothing either about meeting Katie personally or about learning the results of their helping efforts. These subjects were simply told that they could stuff and address the envelopes at home at their own convenience. The second letter was from Katie. It was handwritten and explained the helping opportunity again in her own words. She also reiterated the information about feedback, or the lack thereof, that appeared in the professor's letter. The experimenter was blind to which set of letters were in the envelope and so was unaware of the feedback condition for each subject. Dependent measure: Volunteering to help Katie. Included with the letters was a response form that asked subjects to indicate whether they wished to help Katie and, if so, to check the number of hours they wished to volunteer: 3-5, 6-8, or 9-10. The form explained that because of staff time involved in distributing the necessary materials, the radio station had requested that only students wishing to contribute a minimum of 3 hr sign up to help. (In reality, the 1-2 hr option used in previous studies was omitted because working at home made helping less costly than in previous studies, and we wished to avoid a ceiling effect on our dependent measure.) Also enclosed was an envelope in which to seal the response form to ensure anonymity. Ancillary measures. After placing the response form in the envelope, subjects completed a broadcast evaluation form. In addition to asking how interesting, informative, and worthwhile the broadcast was, this form included two items to check the effectiveness of the empathy manipulation: "While listening to the broadcast, to what extent did you try to be as objective as possible about the person being interviewed?" and "to what extent did you concentrate on the feelings of the person being interviewed?" Subjects were also given a reaction questionnaire about the opportunity to help, ostensibly because the professor in charge was interested in assessing research participants' feelings about being given such an opportunity. Included on this questionnaire was an item designed to check the effectiveness of the feedback manipulation: "Will students who help Katie Banks be informed of how she and her family are doing as a result of the students' helping efforts?" Debriefing. Finally, subjects were fully and carefully debriefed, were thanked for their participation, and were excused. They did not hear a second broadcast tape.
Results and Discussion Effectiveness of the feedback manipulation. To learn whether feedback was anticipated in the no-information condition and to provide a check on the effectiveness of the feedback manipulation, subjects were asked on the final reaction questionnaire to rate on a scale ranging from no (1) to yes (9) whether they believed that students who helped Katie would be informed of the effect of their helping efforts. Subjects in the no-information condition scored close to the midpoint on this
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question (M = 5.88), subjects in the no-feedback condition were more likely to say no (M = 1.96), and subjects in the feedback condition were more likely to say yes {M = 8.33). Difference between each pair of conditions was highly reliable, all ts (66) > 4.00, all ps < .001, with no reliable effects attributable to the empathy manipulation or the Empathy X Feedback interaction. We concluded that the feedback manipulation was effective.1 Effectiveness of the empathy manipulation. On the evaluation questionnaire, subjects indicated (on a scale ranging from not at all [1] to very much [9] for each question) the extent to which, while listening to the broadcast, they (a) tried to be as objective as possible and (b) concentrated on the feelings of the person being interviewed. As expected, subjects in the low-empathy condition reported more attempt to be objective (M = 7.81) than did subjects in the high-empathy condition (M = 7.06), F(l, 66) = 5.16, p < .03. Subjects in the high-empathy condition reported more concentration on feelings (M= 7.97) than did subjects in the low-empathy condition (M = 3.94), F(l, 66) = 116.62, p< .0001. For neither measure was there a significant main effect for the feedback manipulation, but for each there was a significant Empathy X Feedback interaction, Fs(2, 66) =5.11 and 3.20, ps < .01 and .05, respectively. This interaction occurred because the effect of the empathy manipulation was much stronger in the no-information and no-feedback conditions than in the feedback condition, in which there was a significant difference in the expected direction on the feelings item (p < .001) but a nonsignificant reversal on the objective item. As a second check on the effectiveness of the perspective-taking manipulation in inducing empathic feelings for Katie, we turned to subjects' self-reports of empathy on the emotional response questionnaire. Paralleling past research (e.g., Batson, 1987a; Batson et al, 1988), we created an empathy index by averaging responses to six adjectives: sympathetic, softhearted, compassionate, warm, tender, and moved (Cronbach's a = .93). As had Batson et al. (1989) and Batson et al. (1988), we found relatively high reports of empathy for Katie even among subjects asked to adopt an objective perspective, presumably reflecting positive self-presentation. Again as had Batson et al. (1989) and Batson et al. (1988), we also found that the empathy manipulation had a significant effect on self-reported empathy that was not readily attributable to self-presentation (which would presumably operate as strongly in the low-empathy condition as in the high-empathy condition). Scores on the 7-point empathy index, which ranged from not at all (1) to extremely (7), were higher for subjects in the high-empathy condition (M = 5.30) than in the low-empathy condition (M= 3.56), F(l, 66) = 41.82, p < .0001 (Fs < 1.0 for the feedback manipulation and the interaction). Differences between the low- and high-empathy conditions were highly reliable in each feedback condition, all three ts > 3.00, ps < .005. On the basis of the combined evi1 Also on this final reaction questionnaire, subjects were asked to rate how beneficial to Katie the help that students could provide was likely to be. There were no reliable effects of the experimental manipulations on this measure, either main effects or interaction (all Fs < 1.50), reassuring us that any observed effects of the manipulations on helping were not a result of differences in perceived efficacy of the helping effort.
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Table 1 dence from these two checks, we concluded that the empathy Proportion of Subjects Agreeing to Help Katie manipulation was successful. Relationship of self-reports of empathy, distress, and sadness. in Each Cell of Experiment 1 In keeping with the measurement issues raised earlier and the Information about feedback previous observations of the relative indistinguishability of selfEmpathy No information reports of empathy and distress in response to the need situacondition about feedback No feedback Feedback tion used in this study (Batson et al., 1989; Batson et al, 1988), a Low principal-components analysis of responses to the six empathy .42 .33 .67 adjectives, eight distress adjectives {alarmed, grieved, troubled, Proportion M 0.67 0.33 0.92 distressed, upset, disturbed, worried, and perturbed), and four High sadness adjectives {low-spirited, feeling low, heavyhearted, and Proportion .75 .83 .58 sad) revealed that with the exception of perturbed, all of these M 1.00 1.17 0.75 adjectives loaded on a single component. Omitting perturbed Note, n = 12 per cell. The means are those for the scaled measure of from the list produced a one-component solution (eigenvalue = helping, ranging from no help (0), 3-5 hr (1), 6-8 hr (2), to 9-10 hr (3). 11.13). All 17 adjectives loaded .60 or higher on this component. This one-component solution suggested that in response to the present need situation, the so-called empathy, distress, and sadness adjectives actually measured a single underlying dimenby the empathy-altruism hypothesis in both the no-informasion. tion (replication) condition (z = 1.69, p < .05, one-tailed) and the no-feedback condition (z = 2.62, p < .005, one-tailed). The One interpretation of this dimension was, as Batson et al. significant difference in the no-feedback condition was con(1989) and Batson et al. (1988) suggested, that the distress and trary to the prediction of the empathic-joy hypothesis. sadness adjectives were at least as good an index of empathic Unexpected by both the empathic-joy hypothesis and the emfeelings for Katie as were the empathy adjectives. This interprepathy-altruism hypothesis, there was no evidence of an emtation seemed even more plausible in light of the highly signifipathy-helping relationship in the feedback condition. We concant main effect of the empathy manipulation on an index creducted further analyses to determine why. Although the rate of ated by averaging responses to all 17 adjectives (Ms = 3.14 and helping in the high-empathy/feedback cell was somewhat lower 4.92 for the low- and high-empathy conditions, respectively), than the rate in the other two high-empathy cells, neither of F{\, 66) = 51.41, p< .0001 (Fs < 1.0 for the feedback manipulathese differences approached statistical significance (both zs < tion and the interaction). Other interpretations were that the 1.40). Instead, the lack of an empathy-helping relationship in single dimension reflected general arousal or either distress or the feedback condition seemed to be due primarily to the relasadness. In any case, the lack of clear differentiation between tively high helping among the low-empathy subjects led to anticempathy and distress responses called into question the approipate feedback; there was a marginally significant increase in priateness of creating an empathy-minus-distress index in rethe proportion of low-empathy subjects helping in the feedback sponse to this need situation. Effect of anticipated feedback on the empathy-helping rela- condition (.67) compared to the no-feedback condition (.33; z = 1.66, p < .10, two-tailed). Rather than the helping of high-emtionship. Helping responses were coded in two ways. First, the pathy subjects dropping to the level of low-empathy subjects in proportion of subjects who volunteered any amount of time served as a dichotomous measure of helping (0 = no help, 1 = the no-feedback condition, as had been predicted by the emhelp); second, scores on the 4-point scale of number of hours pathic-joy hypothesis, the helping of low-empathy subjects rose volunteered {0 = 0hr,l = 3-5 hr, 2 = 6-8 hr, and 3 = 9-10 hr) to the level of high-empathy subjects in the feedback condition. Low-empathy subjects, not high-empathy subjects, were the served as a continuous measure. Scores on the continuous meaones whose helping increased with anticipation of feedback. sure were badly skewed (29 subjects did not help, 33 subjects volunteered 3-5 hr, 5 subjects volunteered 6-8 hr, and 5 subjects In retrospect, this unexpected increase seemed entirely reavolunteered 9-10 hr) and indicated an underlying dichotomy of sonable. Empathic emotion is, of course, not the only source of responses. Therefore, we adopted the dichotomous measure as motivation to help, and it seemed reasonable that low-empathy our major index of helping. As a check, we also analyzed the subjects, less focused on Katie's welfare than high-empathy subscaled measure. jects, would be more focused on the potential social and self-reTable 1 contains the proportion of subjects volunteering to wards for helping, including the vicarious pleasure of knowing help Katie in each cell of the 2 (low empathy, high empathy) X 3 Katie was better. Perhaps they, rather than high-empathy subjects, had, in Smith et al.'s (1989) words, "enhanced sensitivity to (no information, no feedback, feedback) design. Means on the vicarious joy" (p. 642), and so helped "in order to be happy" scaled measure are also reported. (p. 641). An analysis of variance on the proportion of subjects volunteering to help Katie in each cell (normal approximation using Finally, note that contrary to the assumption of Smith et al. the arcsine transformation; see Langer & Abelson, 1972; Winer, (1989), subjects' responses in the no-information condition par1971) revealed a reliable empathy main effect, x2(l, N=12) = alleled those of subjects explicitly told that they would not re5.04, p < .025. This main effect was, however, qualified by a ceive feedback more than those of subjects told that they would marginally significant interaction, x2(2, N= 72) = 4.87, p .50, nor the interaction, X2(2, N = 72) = 1.66, p > .40, approached significance. There was no evidence of the linear increase in the high-empathy
1.00 .70 .60Proportion of Participants Choosing to Hear Second Interview with Person in Need
s
High Empathy
nJ
40
.30
N= 72) = 5.13, p < .025, and accounted for 75% of the between-cells variance. A planned comparison that incorporated (a) the empathy main effect, (b) a curvilinear pattern in the high-empathy condition, and (c) a linear increase in the low-empathy condition—using contrast coefficients .5,2, .5 in the high-empathy condition and —2, — 1, 0 in the low-empathy condition—was highly significant, x 2 0, N = 72) = 6.51, p< .015, and accounted for 92% of the between-cell variance. Although this second planned comparison fit the data very well, neither of these planned comparisons accounted for a significant amount of between-cell variance over and above that accounted for by the empathy main effect alone. Each of these planned-comparison patterns, as well as the main-effect pattern, was consistent with the empathy-altruism hypothesis. Internal analyses. As in Experiment 1, an internal analysis in which low- and high-empathy conditions were created by performing a median split on an empathy-minus-distress difference measure produced no reliable effects (main effects or interactions, all Fs < 1.10). There was again no evidence that scores on this difference measure were affected by the empathy manipulation or other experimental treatments (all Fs < 1.80). And, as in Experiment 1, none of the three self-report indexes—the six empathy adjectives, the eight distress adjectives, or the four sadness adjectives—correlated reliably with subjects' choices in either the low- or high-empathy conditions, indicating no reliable association between these self-reports and choices independent of that induced by the experimental manipulation of empathy.
Experiment 3 Experiment 3 was a generalized replication of Experiment 2, using the same 2 (low empathy, high empathy) X 3 (20%, 50%, 80% likelihood of improvement) factorial design but a different need situation. In Experiment 3, the person in need was the same as in Experiment 1: Katie Banks. In Experiment 3, subjects were not presented with an opportunity to help Katie. Instead, paralleling the procedure of Experiment 2, they were given a choice of which second pilot broadcast they would hear: an update interview with Katie or something entirely different. Empathy and the likelihood of Katie's situation improving by the time of the update interview were manipulated as in Experiment 2, and competing predictions made by the empathic-joy hypothesis and the empathy-altruism hypothesis were the same as for Experiment 2. To assess the generality of the effects observed in Experiments 1 and 2, men as well as women were included in the sample for Experiment 3.
Method Subjects. Subjects for Experiment 3 were 108 students (54 women, 54 men) in an introductory psychology course at the University of
Kansas; participation earned credit toward a course requirement. Using a randomized block procedure, we assigned 18 subjects (9 women, 9 men) to each cell of the 2X3 design. One additional male student was excluded from the sample because he expressed suspicion. Procedure. The procedure was essentially the same as for Experiment 1, except for the omission of the feedback manipulation and helping measure and the inclusion of the likelihood-of-improvement manipulation and choice measure. Therefore, only the new manipulation and measure are described in any detail. To provide a plausible rationale for the new manipulation and measure, subjects were informed by written introduction that one issue of interest in evaluating pilot broadcasts was whether people wish to hear about a different person in each broadcast or to hear more than one broadcast about the same person: To help us answer this question, you will be given a chance to choose whether for your second broadcast you wish to hear a follow-up interview with the same person you heard on the first broadcast or whether you wish to hear a different person. The introduction also explained that the professor in charge of the research thought that expectations about improvement in a person's situation might be important in whether listeners want to hear about that person again. So he had the situation of each individual interviewed for the initial pilot broadcasts reviewed by a panel of experts (including a doctor, lawyer, psychiatrist, and a social worker) to determine the likelihood of significant improvement between the time of the first and second interviews. Subjects were to be provided with this information before deciding which second broadcast they wished to hear. Manipulation of empathy and assessment of emotional response to Katie's need. Perspective-taking instructions like those in Experiments 1 and 2 were used to manipulate empathic reaction to Katie's plight. After reading their perspective-taking instructions and listening to the tape, subjects completed the same 24-item emotional response questionnaire used in Experiment 1, including the empathy (6), distress (8), and sadness (4) adjectives. Manipulation of likelihood of improvement. Before choosing which second broadcast to hear, subjects read an information sheet containing assessment by the panel of experts on the likelihood of improvement in Katie's situation by the time of her second interview. Subjects in the 20% condition read the following: There is only a 20% likelihood of marked improvement in Katie's situation by the second broadcast. It is quite possible but unlikely that she will feel much better about her situation by the time of the second interview. Subjects in the 50% condition read the following: There is a 50% likelihood of marked improvement in Katie's situation by the time of the second broadcast. It is quite unclear whether Katie will feel better about her situation by the time of the second interview; there may or may not be any improvement. Subjects in the 80% condition read the following: There is an 80% likelihood of marked improvement in Katie's situation by the second broadcast. It is quite likely but not certain that she will feel much better about her situation by the time of the second interview. The experimenter remained blind to subjects* conditions on both manipulations. Dependent measure: Choosing to hear the update interview with Katie. Subjects indicated their choice for the second broadcast on a brief
EMPATHIC JOY AND EMPATHY-ALTRUISM
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form: "I wish to hear: _ - a second interview with the same person on the first broadcast. - an interview with a different person." Ancillary measures. After making their choice, subjects completed a broadcast evaluation questionnaire. In addition to asking about perceptions of the first broadcast and the person interviewed, this questionnaire included the same two items used in Experiment 1 to check the effectiveness of the empathy manipulation. The questionnaire also included an item to check the effectiveness of the likelihood-ofimprovement manipulation. Debriefing. Finally, subjects were fully and carefully debriefed, were thanked for their participation, and were excused. They did not hear a second broadcast.
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44.21, p < .0001 (Fs < 1.40 for the likelihood-of-improvement main effect and the interaction). On the basis of the combined evidence from these two checks, we concluded that the empathy manipulation was effective. Relationship of self-reports of empathy, distress, and sadness. Principal-components analysis (with varimax rotation) of responses to the six empathy, eight distress, and four sadness adjectives produced a three-component solution, using the criterion of eigenvalues greater than 1.0. Four empathy adjectives—sympathetic, softhearted, compassionate, and moved—as well as grieved and sad loaded above .60 on one component. A mixture of distress and sadness adjectives—distressed, upset, disturbed, worried, lowspirited, feel low, and Results and Discussion heavyhearted—loaded above .60 on a second component. Effectiveness of the likelihood-of- improvement manipulation. Warm, alarmed, and perturbed loaded above .60 on a third component. A scree test, however, indicated that a one-component Although we were concerned that responses might be affected solution (eigenvalue = 9.89) was most appropriate; from the by subjects' choices, we included on the final evaluation quessecond component (eigenvalue = 1.45) on, the drop in eigentionnaire an item designed to check the effectiveness of the value was never more than .40 from one component to the next. likelihood-of-improvement manipulation: "How likely is it that In the one-component solution, all of the empathy, distress, and the person who was interviewed will show marked improvement by the time of the second broadcast?" (1 = not at all, 9 = sadness adjectives loaded above .60, except for warm (.53), extremely). Fortunately, responses to this question were not sig- alarmed (.55), and perturbed (.53). As in Experiment 1 (and in the studies of Batson et al, 1989; Batson et al., 1988), then, we nificantly influenced by subjects' choices (p > .20), reassuring found no clear differentiation of subjects' reports of empathy, us that responses were sufficiently uncontaminated to be used distress, and sadness after learning of Katie's plight. And as as a manipulation check. before, one interpretation of this finding was that subjects reMeans for this item in the three likelihood-of-improvement sponded to at least some of the distress and sadness adjectives conditions indicated that the manipulation was effective. Subempathically, reporting how much they were distressed and jects in the 80% condition indicated that improvement was saddened for Katie rather than distressed and saddened by her. more likely (M = 6.81) than did subjects in the 50% condition (M= 5.42), who in turn indicated that improvement was more Effect of empathy and likelihood of improvement on choosing likely than did subjects in the 20% condition (M = 3.28), F(2, to hear the second interview with Katie. Figure 2 contains the 102) = 68.49, p < .0001 (Fs < 1.20 for the empathy main effect proportion of subjects in each cell of the 2 x 3 design in Experiand the interaction). We concluded that, once again, the likeliment 3 who chose to hear the second interview with Katie. hood-of-improvement manipulation was effective. Closely paralleling the results of Experiment 2, analysis of variEffectiveness of the empathy manipulation. As before, we ance (normal approximation using the arcsine transformation) checked the effectiveness of the empathy manipulation in two revealed a significant main effect for the empathy manipulaways. First, we examined subjects' ratings on the broadcast tion, x2(l, N = 108) = 4.84, p < .04. As predicted by the emevaluation questionnaire of the extent to which, while listening to the broadcast, they (a) tried to be as objective as possible and (b) concentrated on the feelings of the person being interviewed 1.00-1 (1 = not at all, 9 = very much, for each question). As expected, subjects in the low-empathy condition reported more attempt .70to be objective (M= 7.52) than did subjects in the high-empathy High Empathy condition (M= 5.80), F(l, 102) = 18.88, p
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 1991, Vol. 61, No. 3, 413-426
Empathic Joy and the Empathy-Altruism Hypothesis C. Daniel Batson, Judy G. Batson, Jacqueline K. Slingsby, Kevin L. Harrell, Heli M. Peekna, and R. Matthew Todd
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University of Kansas Three experiments tested whether empathy evokes egoistic motivation to share vicariously in the victim's joy at improvement (the empathic-joy hypothesis) instead of altruistic motivation to increase the victim's welfare (the empathy-altruism hypothesis). In Experiment 1, Ss induced to feel either low or high empathy for a young woman in need were given a chance to help her. Some believed that if they helped they would receive feedback about her improvement; others did not. In Experiments 2 and 3, Ss induced to feel either low or high empathy were given a choice of getting update information about a needy person's condition. Before choosing, they were told the likelihood of the person's condition having improved—and of their experiencing empathic joy—was 20%, was 50%, or was 80%. Results of none of the experiments patterned as predicted by the empathic-joy hypothesis; instead, results of each were consistent with the empathy-altruism hypothesis.
aroused individuals will feel empathic joy at learning the other's need has been relieved, the empathy-altruism hypothesis claims that this joy is a consequence, not the goal, of relieving the need.
The empathy-altruism hypothesis, which claims that the prosocial motivation evoked by empathy is directed toward the ultimate goal of increasing the welfare of the person in need, has received considerable empirical support (see Batson, 1987a, 1991, for reviews). Smith, Keating, and Stotland (1989) recently proposed an intriguing new egoistic explanation of the apparent support for the empathy-altruism hypothesis. They suggested that empathically aroused individuals help to gain the good feeling of sharing vicariously in the needy person's joy at improvement: "It is proposed that the prospect of empathic joy, conveyed by feedback from the help recipient, is essential to the special tendency of empathic witnesses to help.. . . The empathically concerned witness to the distress of others helps in order to be happy" (Smith et al, 1989, p. 641). Individuals experiencing empathy for a person in need are especially motivated to gain the rewards of vicarious joy because "empathic concern reflects a broad-based sensitivity to the emotional state of the victim, which includes an enhanced sensitivity to vicarious joy and relief at the resolution of the help recipient's needs" (p. 642). As a result, "empathically concerned witnesses may find empathic joy more accessible and more satisfying than do their self-focused counterparts, helping more frequently for that reason" (p. 642). According to this empathic-joy hypothesis, the ultimate goal of the motivation to help evoked by empathy is to gain the rewarding experience of empathic joy; relief of the victim's need is simply instrumental to this end. In contrast, although the empathy-altruism hypothesis also predicts that empathically
Effect of Feedback on the Empathy-Helping Relationship To test their empathic-joy hypothesis against the empathyaltruism hypothesis, Smith et al. (1989) manipulated both empathy and expectation of feedback concerning the effect of one's helping efforts. They reasoned that if the empathic-joy hypothesis is correct, then the empathy-helping relationship should be found only when prospective helpers anticipate receiving feedback about the needy person's improvement: "When feedback is assured, the empathic person can expect to move from a state of empathic concern to empathic joy by helping, and we would expect the familiar positive relation between empathic concern and helping" (Smith et al, 1989, pp. 642-643). When prospective helpers do not anticipate receiving feedback, "helping is a goal-irrelevant response, and we would expect empathic witnesses to refuse to help as often as their nonempathic counterparts" (p. 643). If, on the other hand, the empathy-altruism hypothesis is correct, then the empathy-helping relationship should be found even in the no-feedback condition; helping can still relieve the other's need. In a 2 (low vs. high empathy) X 2 (no feedback vs. feedback) experimental design, Smith et al. (1989) had undergraduate subjects watch a videotape of a young woman having difficulty adjusting to college life. To manipulate empathy, some subjects were asked to adopt an objective perspective while watching (low-empathy condition), and others were asked to imagine how the young woman felt (high-empathy condition). These perspective-taking instructions were adapted from Stotland (1969), who had used both physiological and self-report measures to validate the effectiveness of such instructions in manipulating empathic feelings. (In subsequent studies of the em-
The reported research was supported by National Science Foundation Grants BNS-8507110 and BNS-8906723 for C. Daniel Batson as principal investigator. We thank Staci Kemerling for assistance making the videotape used in Experiment 2 and Jack Brehm for helpful comments on a draft. Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to C. Daniel Batson, Department of Psychology, University of Kansas, 426 Fraser Hall, Lawrence, Kansas 66045-2160. 413
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pathy-helping relationship, similar instructions were used successfully to manipulate empathy by Batson et al, 1989; Batson et al., 1988; Coke, Batson, & McDavis, 1978; Fultz, Batson, Fortenbach, McCarthy, & Varney, 1986; and Toi & Batson, 1982. In each of these studies, subjects in the high-empathy condition were more likely to help than subjects in the low-empathy condition.) After watching the videotape, subjects were given a chance to help the young woman by writing answers to questions she had about her problems. Feedback was manipulated by leading some subjects to believe that if they chose to help they would, at a second session, see another videotape of the young woman. This second video, made after she had read their answers to her questions and tried out their advice in her life, would report on the difference that their advice had made in her adjustment (feedback condition). Other subjects would also come back for a second session, but they were given no expectation of seeing another videotape of the young woman (no feedback condition). Conflicting Results Contrary to their predictions, Smith et al. (1989) found an empathy-helping relationship in both the feedback and nofeedback conditions of their experiment. This was the pattern predicted by the empathy-altruism hypothesis, not the empathic-joy hypothesis. Smith et al. chose to disregard these results and focused instead on an internal analysis in which lowand high-empathy conditions were created by a median split on a measure of self-reported empathy minus self-reported distress. They justified this decision on the grounds that even though their perspective-taking manipulation of empathy had the expected significant effect on helping, it did not have a significant effect on self-reported empathy. In their internal analysis, using the self-report difference measure, Smith et al. found more helping in the high-relative-empathy condition than in the low-relative-empathy condition among subjects anticipating feedback, but not among subjects not anticipating feedback. This was the pattern predicted by the empathic-joy hypothesis, not the empathy-altruism hypothesis. To summarize the Smith et al. results, then, manipulated empathy produced the pattern predicted by the empathy-altruism hypothesis; a self-report difference measure produced the pattern predicted by the empathic-joy hypothesis. Which way of operationalizing empathy is to be preferred? In addition to the well-known reasons for preferring experimental manipulation over internal analysis when operationalizing an independent variable (Campbell & Stanley, 1963), we believe there are several specific reasons to doubt the appropriateness of a self-report difference measure for assessing empathy in the particular research procedure used by Smith et al. (1989). Concerns About the Smith et al. (1989) Self-Report Difference Measure of Empathy Smith et al. (1989) justified their use of the empathy-minusdistress difference measure by noting that such a measure had been used to operationalize empathy in several studies testing the empathy-altruism hypothesis (Batson, O'Quin, Fultz, Van-
derplas, & Isen, 1983; Toi & Batson, 1982). Smith et al. failed to note, however, that in both of these previous instances the selfreport difference measure was used to supplement information provided by experimental manipulation; self-reports and the manipulation produced parallel rather than contradictory results. Smith et al. (1989) also failed to note that there were two important differences between the need situation they used and the need situation used in the previous studies in which manipulated empathy and a self-report difference measure produced parallel results. First, in the previous studies, the victim's need was not one that participants shared; in the Smith et al. study, a number of the participants—who were university freshmen and sophomores—may have been experiencing at least some of the same problems adjusting to college as the young woman. It is easy to imagine that reports of empathy would be higher among participants who were themselves having similar problems and that these participants would be especially interested in learning whether their advice produced beneficial effects. After all, such information might be useful in their own coping efforts. Participants could get this information only in the feedback condition. Thus, at least some of the helping by high-relativeempathy/feedback subjects may actually have been directed toward self-help. Second, the previous studies involved situations in which the person in need was experiencing (Batson et al., 1983) or had experienced (Toi & Batson, 1982) physical discomfort or injury; the need situation used by Smith et al. involved a problem of personal adjustment. Contextual Variation in Self-Reports of Empathy and Distress Batson (1987a) and Batson et al. (1988) noted that self-report measures of vicarious emotion seem to be influenced by the context in which the measures are taken. Observing over closed-circuit TV as another undergraduate ostensibly reacts with discomfort to a series of electric shocks has produced the clearest factor-analytic differentiation between self-reports of empathy and personal distress; it has also produced the clearest evidence that these vicarious emotions evoke altruistic and egoistic motivation, respectively (Batson, 1987a; Batson et al., 1983). In contrast, hearing a pilot radio broadcast in which a college senior talks about her struggle to support her younger brother and sister after her parents were killed in an automobile accident has produced a far less clear factor-analytic differentiation and no evidence that reports of empathy and distress are associated with different forms of prosocial motivation; in response to this situation, reports of distress have been at least as strongly associated with a pattern of helping suggesting altruistic motivation as have reports of empathy (Batson et al., 1989; Batson etal, 1988). What are we to make of this contextual variation? Perhaps the nature of the prosocial motivation associated with the vicarious emotions of empathy and personal distress varies across situations; perhaps each sometimes evokes altruistic motivation and sometimes does not. Alternatively, and we think more likely, perhaps there is a measurement problem. Self-report ratings of emotion adjectives may be the best available measurements for assessing different vicarious emotions, but they are
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far from perfect (Batson, 1987b). Self-presentation and response-set problems exist (Batson et al, 1988; Batson et al, 1983; Cialdini et al., 1987). Moreover, at least some emotion adjectives are likely to be interpreted differently depending on context. For example, when people observe another's physical discomfort, reports of distress are likely to reflect the degree to which they are distressed by this spectacle; when people hear about someone's struggles adjusting to a difficult situation, reports of distress are likely to reflect the degree to which they are distressed for this person. This latter form of distress reflects empathy rather than personal distress, as these terms have been defined in the empathy-altruism literature (see Batson, 1987a, 1991). In keeping with the proposed contextual distinction, it has been found that when people observe another's physical suffering, responses to the adjectives concerned and grieved are strongly associated with responses to adjectives such as alarmed, disturbed, and perturbed and not with adjectives such as sympathetic, compassionate, and tender (Batson, 1987a; Batson et al., 1983). When hearing about adjustment and coping problems, however, associations with the latter adjectives are strong (Batson, 1987b; Batson et al, 1989; Batson et al, 1988). These observations caution against reifying the empathy and distress indexes used in past research, assuming that they measure the same psychological state in response to every need situation. These observations also underscore the importance of having converging evidence from experimental manipulations of empathy when interpreting results that are based on self-reports, especially self-reports of empathy relative to distress.
Reevaluating the Smith et al. (1989) Results Reflecting on the Smith et al. (1989) procedure in light of these measurement issues, we would suggest that in need situations such as the one they used, in which participants are led to anticipate hearing about someone in need and are then presented with a rather stereotypic, not physically disturbing, need situation, reports of empathic concern are apt to be contaminated by the desire to present oneself as empathic. Moreover, reports of distress are apt to reflect distress for the person in need (as opposed to being distressed by the need) and may be as appropriate, if not more appropriate, indicators of true empathic feeling than the self-presentation-contaminated reports of empathy. In such situations, using self-reported empathy minus distress to assess empathy may be quite inappropriate. If, as seems likely, the distress adjectives are less contaminated with selfpresentation than the empathy adjectives, then it may remove the empathy from the empathy index, leaving a relatively pure index of desire for positive self-presentation (Jones & Pittman, 1982). Such a desire could easily evoke an egoistic motive to look good, a motive that would lead to increased helping especially in the presence of feedback (when one could anticipate social rewards for one's goodness in the form of thanks from the young woman), producing precisely the pattern of helping that Smith et al. (1989) found using their difference measure. Interestingly, when self-reported empathy alone was used to create
low- and high-empathy conditions in the Smith et al. study (rather than the difference measure subtracting distress), helping responses showed the empathy main effect predicted by the empathy-altruism hypothesis, although the effect was considerably weaker than for the experimental manipulation of empathy. Given these problems with interpretation of the Smith et al. (1989) self-report difference measure, we believe the experimental manipulation was the better operationalization of empathy in their study. And if it was, then their results support the empathy-altruism hypothesis, not the empathic-joy hypothesis. But, because of the interpretational ambiguities, we do not place much confidence in this conclusion. A more appropriate conclusion seems to be that the empathic-joy hypothesis needs further testing.
Present Research To test the empathic-joy hypothesis further, we conducted three experiments. In the first, we used an Empathy X Feedback design much like the one Smith et al. (1989) used. In Experiments 2 and 3, we used a quite different procedure; subjects were presented with a person in need and given no chance to help. Instead, they were given a choice of whether to hear a second, update interview with this person or an interview with someone else. Before making this choice, subjects received information on the likelihood that the needy person's situation would be substantially improved by the time of the second interview. We reasoned that if empathically aroused individuals are egoistically motivated to gain empathic joy, then their desire to hear from the needy person again should be a direct function of the likelihood of obtaining empathic joy, which should in turn be a direct function of the likelihood that the needy person would be better. If, on the other hand, empathically aroused individuals are altruistically concerned for the needy person's welfare, then, analogous to the reasoning and research of Clark, Mills, and Powell (1986) indicating that people in a communal relationship keep track of one another's needs even when no opportunity to help exists, we reasoned that high-empathy individuals would be more interested than low-empathy individuals to hear how the needy person was doing. Moreover, because altruistically motivated individuals are concerned for the needy person's welfare and not their own, the interest of highempathy individuals should not be a direct function of the likelihood that the person would be better. Like a mother who anxiously awaits news about her injured child even though the prognosis is poor, altruistically motivated individuals should want to hear how the needy person is doing even when the chances of improvement are not great. Experiment 1 Experiment 1 was a conceptual replication of Smith et al.'s (1989) Empathy X Feedback design, with two major modifications. First, the victim's need was one that our undergraduate subjects were not likely to have themselves and one that had been used in previous studies to provide evidence for the empathy-altruism hypothesis. The need situation we would have
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preferred to use was the shock procedure employed by Batson et al. (1983) because it was in response to this situation that self-report indexes of empathy and personal distress had been found to be most valid, and a difference measure such as the one Smith et al. used had been found to be most appropriate. Unfortunately, we could not think of a plausible way to vary feedback in a situation in which helping involved agreeing to take shocks in another person's place. Therefore, we turned instead to the broadcast procedure introduced by Coke et al. (1978), even though in this procedure the validity of the self-report indexes of empathy and distress was questionable; self-reports of empathy appeared to be contaminated by self-presentation concerns, and self-reports of distress appeared to reflect distress for the victim and, hence, empathy (Batson et al., 1989; Batson etal., 1988). In this broadcast procedure, subjects learn about the need of a young woman, Katie Banks, by listening to a (bogus) pilot radio newscast and are then given an unexpected chance to help her. Previous studies using this need situation assessed helping by having subjects volunteer to spend time sitting with Katie's younger brother and sister while she attended her night classes, fixing things around the house, providing transportation, or making telephone calls and stuffing envelopes for a fund-raising project. Because these responses involved personal contact with Katie and, therefore, the possibility of feedback on the effect of one's helping efforts, it was necessary to create a new helping opportunity that eliminated direct personal contact, permitting us to manipulate feedback. Second, in addition to feedback and no-feedback conditions, in which subjects were explicitly told that they either would or would not learn the results of their efforts should they choose to help, we included a condition in which subjects received no information about feedback. This condition served two functions. It provided a replication condition in which to test the empathy-helping relationship in the absence of explicit information about feedback, and it provided a check on the Smith et al. (1989) assumption that in the absence of explicit information about feedback, subjects assume they will receive feedback on the positive effects of their helping efforts. Smith et al. used this assumption to explain why in previous research an empathyhelping relationship had frequently been observed when no explicit information about feedback was provided. Both the empathic-joy hypothesis and the empathy-altruism hypothesis predicted more helping in the high-empathy cell than in the low-empathy cell when no information about feedback was provided (no-information condition) and when subjects were explicitly led to expect feedback (feedback condition). The two hypotheses differed, however, in their predictions for the effect of the empathy manipulation when subjects were explicitly led to expect no feedback (no-feedback condition): The empathic-joy hypothesis predicted equally low helping in both empathy cells, whereas the empathy-altruism hypothesis predicted more helping in the high-empathy cell than in the low-empathy cell.
Method Subjects. Subjects for Experiment 1 were 72 female students in an introductory psychology course at the University of Kansas; participa-
tion earned credit toward a course requirement. Using a randomized block procedure, we assigned 12 subjects to each cell of the 2 (low empathy, high empathy) X 3 (no information, no feedback, feedback) design. We excluded 4 additional students from the sample because they expressed suspicion. Restricting the sample to women was not considered a problem because previous studies testing the empathyaltruism hypothesis had often used only women subjects (e.g., Batson, Duncan, Ackerman, Buckley, & Birch, 1981, Studies 1 & 2; Batson et al., 1988, Studies 4 & 5; Fultz et al., 1986, Studies 1 & 2), and studies using both men and women had not found sex differences (e.g., Batson et al., 1989; Batson et al., 1988, Studies 1, 2, & 3; Batson et al., 1983, Studies 1, 2, & 3; Coke et al., 1978). Procedure. Except for the new helping measure and feedback manipulation, the procedure was much like that used by Coke et al. (1978) and described in detail by them. Only key elements are described here. Manipulation ofempathy. Paralleling Smith et al. (1989), we manipulated empathy by listening-perspective instructions that subjects read before hearing the broadcast tape that presented Katie's need. Subjects in the low-empathy condition were instructed to try to take an objective perspective, being as objective as possible about what has happened to this student and how it has affected her life. Try not to let yourself get caught up in imagining what this student has been through and how she feels as a result. Just listen objectively to the information presented in the broadcast. Subjects in the high-empathy condition were instructed to try to take the perspective of the student being interviewed, imagining how she is feeling about what has happened and how it has affected her life. Try not to concern yourself with attending to all the information presented. Just imagine how this student feels about her situation. Listening-perspective instructions were presented on a typed sheet given to subjects in a folder, so the experimenter could remain blind to the empathy condition. Subjects were left alone to read the instructions and listen to the broadcast tape. Learning of Katies need. On the tape, a male announcer interviewed Katie, who was a senior at the university. Katie's parents and a sister had recently been killed in an automobile crash. Her parents did not have life insurance, and Katie was desperately struggling to take care of her surviving younger brother and sister while shefinishedher last year of college. If she did notfinish,she would not be able to earn enough money to support her brother and sister and would have to put them up for adoption. Self-reported emotional reaction to learning of Katies need. After listening to the tape, subjects completed an emotional response questionnaire. For each of 24 emotion adjectives, they indicated how much, on a scale ranging from not at all (1) to extremely (7), they had experienced that emotion while listening to the tape. The list included 18 adjectives that had been used in previous research to assess feelings of empathy (6), distress (8), and sadness (4) (Batson, 1987a; Fultz, Schaller, & Cialdini, 1988) but that in previous studies using this broadcast paradigm had all seemed to reflect empathic feelings (Batson et al., 1989; Batson et al., 1988). An opportunity to help Katie. When subjects completed this questionnaire, the experimenter returned and presented them with an envelope containing two letters. The experimenter left subjects alone to read these letters. Thefirstwas from the professor. He thanked subjects for participating in the study and explained that it had occurred to him that some participants might wish to help Katie, so he had checked with the radio station and found that this was indeed possible. The radio station had provided Katie with a list of people in the area who might be willing to make financial contributions to help her in her time of need. Katie had prepared a letter to send to these potential
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EMPATHIC JOY AND EMPATHY-ALTRUISM donors, but she was having troublefindingtime to get the letters in the mail. Students could help Katie by spending several hours in the next week or so stuffing and addressing envelopes. The radio station would provide all necessary materials, including postage; the job could be done at home at the student's convenience. Manipulation of anticipated feedback. For those subjects receiving explicit information about feedback, the professor's letter went on to explain that the disadvantage of helping at home was, of course, "that you won't meet Katie personally . . ." The statement after this comment introduced the feedback manipulation. Subjects in the no-feedback condition read, "and it will not be possible for you to learn the results of your efforts on Katie's behalf." Subjects in the feedback condition read, "but she has said she will be sure to provide anyone who helps with follow-up information on results of your efforts on her behalf." Subjects in the no-information condition read nothing either about meeting Katie personally or about learning the results of their helping efforts. These subjects were simply told that they could stuff and address the envelopes at home at their own convenience. The second letter was from Katie. It was handwritten and explained the helping opportunity again in her own words. She also reiterated the information about feedback, or the lack thereof, that appeared in the professor's letter. The experimenter was blind to which set of letters were in the envelope and so was unaware of the feedback condition for each subject. Dependent measure: Volunteering to help Katie. Included with the letters was a response form that asked subjects to indicate whether they wished to help Katie and, if so, to check the number of hours they wished to volunteer: 3-5, 6-8, or 9-10. The form explained that because of staff time involved in distributing the necessary materials, the radio station had requested that only students wishing to contribute a minimum of 3 hr sign up to help. (In reality, the 1-2 hr option used in previous studies was omitted because working at home made helping less costly than in previous studies, and we wished to avoid a ceiling effect on our dependent measure.) Also enclosed was an envelope in which to seal the response form to ensure anonymity. Ancillary measures. After placing the response form in the envelope, subjects completed a broadcast evaluation form. In addition to asking how interesting, informative, and worthwhile the broadcast was, this form included two items to check the effectiveness of the empathy manipulation: "While listening to the broadcast, to what extent did you try to be as objective as possible about the person being interviewed?" and "to what extent did you concentrate on the feelings of the person being interviewed?" Subjects were also given a reaction questionnaire about the opportunity to help, ostensibly because the professor in charge was interested in assessing research participants' feelings about being given such an opportunity. Included on this questionnaire was an item designed to check the effectiveness of the feedback manipulation: "Will students who help Katie Banks be informed of how she and her family are doing as a result of the students' helping efforts?" Debriefing. Finally, subjects were fully and carefully debriefed, were thanked for their participation, and were excused. They did not hear a second broadcast tape.
Results and Discussion Effectiveness of the feedback manipulation. To learn whether feedback was anticipated in the no-information condition and to provide a check on the effectiveness of the feedback manipulation, subjects were asked on the final reaction questionnaire to rate on a scale ranging from no (1) to yes (9) whether they believed that students who helped Katie would be informed of the effect of their helping efforts. Subjects in the no-information condition scored close to the midpoint on this
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question (M = 5.88), subjects in the no-feedback condition were more likely to say no (M = 1.96), and subjects in the feedback condition were more likely to say yes {M = 8.33). Difference between each pair of conditions was highly reliable, all ts (66) > 4.00, all ps < .001, with no reliable effects attributable to the empathy manipulation or the Empathy X Feedback interaction. We concluded that the feedback manipulation was effective.1 Effectiveness of the empathy manipulation. On the evaluation questionnaire, subjects indicated (on a scale ranging from not at all [1] to very much [9] for each question) the extent to which, while listening to the broadcast, they (a) tried to be as objective as possible and (b) concentrated on the feelings of the person being interviewed. As expected, subjects in the low-empathy condition reported more attempt to be objective (M = 7.81) than did subjects in the high-empathy condition (M = 7.06), F(l, 66) = 5.16, p < .03. Subjects in the high-empathy condition reported more concentration on feelings (M= 7.97) than did subjects in the low-empathy condition (M = 3.94), F(l, 66) = 116.62, p< .0001. For neither measure was there a significant main effect for the feedback manipulation, but for each there was a significant Empathy X Feedback interaction, Fs(2, 66) =5.11 and 3.20, ps < .01 and .05, respectively. This interaction occurred because the effect of the empathy manipulation was much stronger in the no-information and no-feedback conditions than in the feedback condition, in which there was a significant difference in the expected direction on the feelings item (p < .001) but a nonsignificant reversal on the objective item. As a second check on the effectiveness of the perspective-taking manipulation in inducing empathic feelings for Katie, we turned to subjects' self-reports of empathy on the emotional response questionnaire. Paralleling past research (e.g., Batson, 1987a; Batson et al, 1988), we created an empathy index by averaging responses to six adjectives: sympathetic, softhearted, compassionate, warm, tender, and moved (Cronbach's a = .93). As had Batson et al. (1989) and Batson et al. (1988), we found relatively high reports of empathy for Katie even among subjects asked to adopt an objective perspective, presumably reflecting positive self-presentation. Again as had Batson et al. (1989) and Batson et al. (1988), we also found that the empathy manipulation had a significant effect on self-reported empathy that was not readily attributable to self-presentation (which would presumably operate as strongly in the low-empathy condition as in the high-empathy condition). Scores on the 7-point empathy index, which ranged from not at all (1) to extremely (7), were higher for subjects in the high-empathy condition (M = 5.30) than in the low-empathy condition (M= 3.56), F(l, 66) = 41.82, p < .0001 (Fs < 1.0 for the feedback manipulation and the interaction). Differences between the low- and high-empathy conditions were highly reliable in each feedback condition, all three ts > 3.00, ps < .005. On the basis of the combined evi1 Also on this final reaction questionnaire, subjects were asked to rate how beneficial to Katie the help that students could provide was likely to be. There were no reliable effects of the experimental manipulations on this measure, either main effects or interaction (all Fs < 1.50), reassuring us that any observed effects of the manipulations on helping were not a result of differences in perceived efficacy of the helping effort.
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BATSON, BATSON, SLINGSBY, HARRELL, PEEKNA, TODD
Table 1 dence from these two checks, we concluded that the empathy Proportion of Subjects Agreeing to Help Katie manipulation was successful. Relationship of self-reports of empathy, distress, and sadness. in Each Cell of Experiment 1 In keeping with the measurement issues raised earlier and the Information about feedback previous observations of the relative indistinguishability of selfEmpathy No information reports of empathy and distress in response to the need situacondition about feedback No feedback Feedback tion used in this study (Batson et al., 1989; Batson et al, 1988), a Low principal-components analysis of responses to the six empathy .42 .33 .67 adjectives, eight distress adjectives {alarmed, grieved, troubled, Proportion M 0.67 0.33 0.92 distressed, upset, disturbed, worried, and perturbed), and four High sadness adjectives {low-spirited, feeling low, heavyhearted, and Proportion .75 .83 .58 sad) revealed that with the exception of perturbed, all of these M 1.00 1.17 0.75 adjectives loaded on a single component. Omitting perturbed Note, n = 12 per cell. The means are those for the scaled measure of from the list produced a one-component solution (eigenvalue = helping, ranging from no help (0), 3-5 hr (1), 6-8 hr (2), to 9-10 hr (3). 11.13). All 17 adjectives loaded .60 or higher on this component. This one-component solution suggested that in response to the present need situation, the so-called empathy, distress, and sadness adjectives actually measured a single underlying dimenby the empathy-altruism hypothesis in both the no-informasion. tion (replication) condition (z = 1.69, p < .05, one-tailed) and the no-feedback condition (z = 2.62, p < .005, one-tailed). The One interpretation of this dimension was, as Batson et al. significant difference in the no-feedback condition was con(1989) and Batson et al. (1988) suggested, that the distress and trary to the prediction of the empathic-joy hypothesis. sadness adjectives were at least as good an index of empathic Unexpected by both the empathic-joy hypothesis and the emfeelings for Katie as were the empathy adjectives. This interprepathy-altruism hypothesis, there was no evidence of an emtation seemed even more plausible in light of the highly signifipathy-helping relationship in the feedback condition. We concant main effect of the empathy manipulation on an index creducted further analyses to determine why. Although the rate of ated by averaging responses to all 17 adjectives (Ms = 3.14 and helping in the high-empathy/feedback cell was somewhat lower 4.92 for the low- and high-empathy conditions, respectively), than the rate in the other two high-empathy cells, neither of F{\, 66) = 51.41, p< .0001 (Fs < 1.0 for the feedback manipulathese differences approached statistical significance (both zs < tion and the interaction). Other interpretations were that the 1.40). Instead, the lack of an empathy-helping relationship in single dimension reflected general arousal or either distress or the feedback condition seemed to be due primarily to the relasadness. In any case, the lack of clear differentiation between tively high helping among the low-empathy subjects led to anticempathy and distress responses called into question the approipate feedback; there was a marginally significant increase in priateness of creating an empathy-minus-distress index in rethe proportion of low-empathy subjects helping in the feedback sponse to this need situation. Effect of anticipated feedback on the empathy-helping rela- condition (.67) compared to the no-feedback condition (.33; z = 1.66, p < .10, two-tailed). Rather than the helping of high-emtionship. Helping responses were coded in two ways. First, the pathy subjects dropping to the level of low-empathy subjects in proportion of subjects who volunteered any amount of time served as a dichotomous measure of helping (0 = no help, 1 = the no-feedback condition, as had been predicted by the emhelp); second, scores on the 4-point scale of number of hours pathic-joy hypothesis, the helping of low-empathy subjects rose volunteered {0 = 0hr,l = 3-5 hr, 2 = 6-8 hr, and 3 = 9-10 hr) to the level of high-empathy subjects in the feedback condition. Low-empathy subjects, not high-empathy subjects, were the served as a continuous measure. Scores on the continuous meaones whose helping increased with anticipation of feedback. sure were badly skewed (29 subjects did not help, 33 subjects volunteered 3-5 hr, 5 subjects volunteered 6-8 hr, and 5 subjects In retrospect, this unexpected increase seemed entirely reavolunteered 9-10 hr) and indicated an underlying dichotomy of sonable. Empathic emotion is, of course, not the only source of responses. Therefore, we adopted the dichotomous measure as motivation to help, and it seemed reasonable that low-empathy our major index of helping. As a check, we also analyzed the subjects, less focused on Katie's welfare than high-empathy subscaled measure. jects, would be more focused on the potential social and self-reTable 1 contains the proportion of subjects volunteering to wards for helping, including the vicarious pleasure of knowing help Katie in each cell of the 2 (low empathy, high empathy) X 3 Katie was better. Perhaps they, rather than high-empathy subjects, had, in Smith et al.'s (1989) words, "enhanced sensitivity to (no information, no feedback, feedback) design. Means on the vicarious joy" (p. 642), and so helped "in order to be happy" scaled measure are also reported. (p. 641). An analysis of variance on the proportion of subjects volunteering to help Katie in each cell (normal approximation using Finally, note that contrary to the assumption of Smith et al. the arcsine transformation; see Langer & Abelson, 1972; Winer, (1989), subjects' responses in the no-information condition par1971) revealed a reliable empathy main effect, x2(l, N=12) = alleled those of subjects explicitly told that they would not re5.04, p < .025. This main effect was, however, qualified by a ceive feedback more than those of subjects told that they would marginally significant interaction, x2(2, N= 72) = 4.87, p .50, nor the interaction, X2(2, N = 72) = 1.66, p > .40, approached significance. There was no evidence of the linear increase in the high-empathy
1.00 .70 .60Proportion of Participants Choosing to Hear Second Interview with Person in Need
s
High Empathy
nJ
40
.30
N= 72) = 5.13, p < .025, and accounted for 75% of the between-cells variance. A planned comparison that incorporated (a) the empathy main effect, (b) a curvilinear pattern in the high-empathy condition, and (c) a linear increase in the low-empathy condition—using contrast coefficients .5,2, .5 in the high-empathy condition and —2, — 1, 0 in the low-empathy condition—was highly significant, x 2 0, N = 72) = 6.51, p< .015, and accounted for 92% of the between-cell variance. Although this second planned comparison fit the data very well, neither of these planned comparisons accounted for a significant amount of between-cell variance over and above that accounted for by the empathy main effect alone. Each of these planned-comparison patterns, as well as the main-effect pattern, was consistent with the empathy-altruism hypothesis. Internal analyses. As in Experiment 1, an internal analysis in which low- and high-empathy conditions were created by performing a median split on an empathy-minus-distress difference measure produced no reliable effects (main effects or interactions, all Fs < 1.10). There was again no evidence that scores on this difference measure were affected by the empathy manipulation or other experimental treatments (all Fs < 1.80). And, as in Experiment 1, none of the three self-report indexes—the six empathy adjectives, the eight distress adjectives, or the four sadness adjectives—correlated reliably with subjects' choices in either the low- or high-empathy conditions, indicating no reliable association between these self-reports and choices independent of that induced by the experimental manipulation of empathy.
Experiment 3 Experiment 3 was a generalized replication of Experiment 2, using the same 2 (low empathy, high empathy) X 3 (20%, 50%, 80% likelihood of improvement) factorial design but a different need situation. In Experiment 3, the person in need was the same as in Experiment 1: Katie Banks. In Experiment 3, subjects were not presented with an opportunity to help Katie. Instead, paralleling the procedure of Experiment 2, they were given a choice of which second pilot broadcast they would hear: an update interview with Katie or something entirely different. Empathy and the likelihood of Katie's situation improving by the time of the update interview were manipulated as in Experiment 2, and competing predictions made by the empathic-joy hypothesis and the empathy-altruism hypothesis were the same as for Experiment 2. To assess the generality of the effects observed in Experiments 1 and 2, men as well as women were included in the sample for Experiment 3.
Method Subjects. Subjects for Experiment 3 were 108 students (54 women, 54 men) in an introductory psychology course at the University of
Kansas; participation earned credit toward a course requirement. Using a randomized block procedure, we assigned 18 subjects (9 women, 9 men) to each cell of the 2X3 design. One additional male student was excluded from the sample because he expressed suspicion. Procedure. The procedure was essentially the same as for Experiment 1, except for the omission of the feedback manipulation and helping measure and the inclusion of the likelihood-of-improvement manipulation and choice measure. Therefore, only the new manipulation and measure are described in any detail. To provide a plausible rationale for the new manipulation and measure, subjects were informed by written introduction that one issue of interest in evaluating pilot broadcasts was whether people wish to hear about a different person in each broadcast or to hear more than one broadcast about the same person: To help us answer this question, you will be given a chance to choose whether for your second broadcast you wish to hear a follow-up interview with the same person you heard on the first broadcast or whether you wish to hear a different person. The introduction also explained that the professor in charge of the research thought that expectations about improvement in a person's situation might be important in whether listeners want to hear about that person again. So he had the situation of each individual interviewed for the initial pilot broadcasts reviewed by a panel of experts (including a doctor, lawyer, psychiatrist, and a social worker) to determine the likelihood of significant improvement between the time of the first and second interviews. Subjects were to be provided with this information before deciding which second broadcast they wished to hear. Manipulation of empathy and assessment of emotional response to Katie's need. Perspective-taking instructions like those in Experiments 1 and 2 were used to manipulate empathic reaction to Katie's plight. After reading their perspective-taking instructions and listening to the tape, subjects completed the same 24-item emotional response questionnaire used in Experiment 1, including the empathy (6), distress (8), and sadness (4) adjectives. Manipulation of likelihood of improvement. Before choosing which second broadcast to hear, subjects read an information sheet containing assessment by the panel of experts on the likelihood of improvement in Katie's situation by the time of her second interview. Subjects in the 20% condition read the following: There is only a 20% likelihood of marked improvement in Katie's situation by the second broadcast. It is quite possible but unlikely that she will feel much better about her situation by the time of the second interview. Subjects in the 50% condition read the following: There is a 50% likelihood of marked improvement in Katie's situation by the time of the second broadcast. It is quite unclear whether Katie will feel better about her situation by the time of the second interview; there may or may not be any improvement. Subjects in the 80% condition read the following: There is an 80% likelihood of marked improvement in Katie's situation by the second broadcast. It is quite likely but not certain that she will feel much better about her situation by the time of the second interview. The experimenter remained blind to subjects* conditions on both manipulations. Dependent measure: Choosing to hear the update interview with Katie. Subjects indicated their choice for the second broadcast on a brief
EMPATHIC JOY AND EMPATHY-ALTRUISM
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form: "I wish to hear: _ - a second interview with the same person on the first broadcast. - an interview with a different person." Ancillary measures. After making their choice, subjects completed a broadcast evaluation questionnaire. In addition to asking about perceptions of the first broadcast and the person interviewed, this questionnaire included the same two items used in Experiment 1 to check the effectiveness of the empathy manipulation. The questionnaire also included an item to check the effectiveness of the likelihood-ofimprovement manipulation. Debriefing. Finally, subjects were fully and carefully debriefed, were thanked for their participation, and were excused. They did not hear a second broadcast.
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44.21, p < .0001 (Fs < 1.40 for the likelihood-of-improvement main effect and the interaction). On the basis of the combined evidence from these two checks, we concluded that the empathy manipulation was effective. Relationship of self-reports of empathy, distress, and sadness. Principal-components analysis (with varimax rotation) of responses to the six empathy, eight distress, and four sadness adjectives produced a three-component solution, using the criterion of eigenvalues greater than 1.0. Four empathy adjectives—sympathetic, softhearted, compassionate, and moved—as well as grieved and sad loaded above .60 on one component. A mixture of distress and sadness adjectives—distressed, upset, disturbed, worried, lowspirited, feel low, and Results and Discussion heavyhearted—loaded above .60 on a second component. Effectiveness of the likelihood-of- improvement manipulation. Warm, alarmed, and perturbed loaded above .60 on a third component. A scree test, however, indicated that a one-component Although we were concerned that responses might be affected solution (eigenvalue = 9.89) was most appropriate; from the by subjects' choices, we included on the final evaluation quessecond component (eigenvalue = 1.45) on, the drop in eigentionnaire an item designed to check the effectiveness of the value was never more than .40 from one component to the next. likelihood-of-improvement manipulation: "How likely is it that In the one-component solution, all of the empathy, distress, and the person who was interviewed will show marked improvement by the time of the second broadcast?" (1 = not at all, 9 = sadness adjectives loaded above .60, except for warm (.53), extremely). Fortunately, responses to this question were not sig- alarmed (.55), and perturbed (.53). As in Experiment 1 (and in the studies of Batson et al, 1989; Batson et al., 1988), then, we nificantly influenced by subjects' choices (p > .20), reassuring found no clear differentiation of subjects' reports of empathy, us that responses were sufficiently uncontaminated to be used distress, and sadness after learning of Katie's plight. And as as a manipulation check. before, one interpretation of this finding was that subjects reMeans for this item in the three likelihood-of-improvement sponded to at least some of the distress and sadness adjectives conditions indicated that the manipulation was effective. Subempathically, reporting how much they were distressed and jects in the 80% condition indicated that improvement was saddened for Katie rather than distressed and saddened by her. more likely (M = 6.81) than did subjects in the 50% condition (M= 5.42), who in turn indicated that improvement was more Effect of empathy and likelihood of improvement on choosing likely than did subjects in the 20% condition (M = 3.28), F(2, to hear the second interview with Katie. Figure 2 contains the 102) = 68.49, p < .0001 (Fs < 1.20 for the empathy main effect proportion of subjects in each cell of the 2 x 3 design in Experiand the interaction). We concluded that, once again, the likeliment 3 who chose to hear the second interview with Katie. hood-of-improvement manipulation was effective. Closely paralleling the results of Experiment 2, analysis of variEffectiveness of the empathy manipulation. As before, we ance (normal approximation using the arcsine transformation) checked the effectiveness of the empathy manipulation in two revealed a significant main effect for the empathy manipulaways. First, we examined subjects' ratings on the broadcast tion, x2(l, N = 108) = 4.84, p < .04. As predicted by the emevaluation questionnaire of the extent to which, while listening to the broadcast, they (a) tried to be as objective as possible and (b) concentrated on the feelings of the person being interviewed 1.00-1 (1 = not at all, 9 = very much, for each question). As expected, subjects in the low-empathy condition reported more attempt .70to be objective (M= 7.52) than did subjects in the high-empathy High Empathy condition (M= 5.80), F(l, 102) = 18.88, p
