Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 1979, Vol. 37, No. 10, 1822-1834

Emergencies: What Are They and Do They Influence Bystanders to Intervene? R. Lance Shetland and Ted L. Huston Pennsylvania State University Social psychological research on helping has, in part, been concerned with the intervention of bystanders into emergencies. Pertinent empirical literature does not seem to be available on what factors bystanders use to define an emergency nor the effect of such a decision on the rate of helping. A series of four studies was conducted to answer these questions. We found that (a) Emergencies are a subclass of problem situation that usually result from accidents; (b) there is a high degree of agreement concerning what problem situations are definitely an emergency; (c) emergency situations are differentiated from other problem situations by threat of harm or actual harm worsening with time, unavailability of an easy solution to the problem, and necessity of obtaining outside help to solve the problem; (d) disagreement on whether a problem situation is an emergency or not results from differing perceptions of the degree to which threat of harm or actual harm worsens with time; (e) bystanders are more likely to help in emergency than in nonemergency problem situations. The results were interpreted as indicating that the need of the victim is a salient feature used by bystanders in determining whether or not to help.

Social psychological research on helping has, in part, been concerned with the intervention of bystanders into emergencies. Surprisingly, the question of whether onlookers are more apt to help in emergencies than in nonemergencies has not been investigated, nor does there seem to be any firm theoretical basis for predicting the effect of whether or not a given situation is seen as an emergency on the rate of helping. Moreover, no evidence is available concerning the considerations bystanders use in labeling a situation as an emergency. These are the problems we wish to investigate. This research was supported by a grant from the Central Fund for Research, College of Liberal Arts, Pennsylvania State University. We thank Steven Marks, Carolyn Edwards, and Mark Peterson for their work on various phases of the project. We also thank Jerald Barnett, Craig Bowman, Kenneth Falkenbach, Gary Foley, Christine Pogue, Alice Pope, Adrienne Ratella, and Lisa Tate for serving as confederates in Study 4. Requests for reprints should be sent to R. Lance Shetland, Department of Psychology, Pennsylvania State University, University Park, Pennsylvania 16802.

Latane and Barley (1970), in their monograph on the unresponsive bystander, come to an equivocal position on whether a person is more or less likely to respond to an emergency situation. In laying out the reasons why bystanders may fail to help in emergencies, these writers make the following observation about emergencies: "The picture is a grim one. Faced with a situation in which he (the bystander) can gain no benefit, unable to rely on past experience, on the experience of others, or on forethought and planning, denied the opportunity to carefully consider his course of action, the bystander to an emergency is in an unenviable position. It is perhaps surprising that anyone should intervene at all" (p. 31). Latane and Barley, in proposing their decision-making model, however, suggest that perceiving an event as an emergency is a critical determinant of whether a bystander will provide help. "If an individual is to intervene in an emergency," according to Latane and Barley (1970), "he must make not just one, but a series of decisions. Only one particular set of choices will lead him to

Copyright 1979 by the American Psychological Association, Inc. 0022-3S14/79/3710-1822$00.7S

1822

EMERGENCIES AND BYSTANDER HELPING

take action in the situation" (p. 31). In order to intervene the onlooker must (a) notice that something is happening, (b) interpret the event as an emergency, (c) assume responsibility for taking action, (d) decide on the appropriate form of assistance, and (e) decide how to implement the assistance. Piliavin, Piliavin, and Rodin (1975) take a somewhat different stance concerning the impact of emergencies on helping. According to their model, emergencies produce arousal that becomes more unpleasant as it increases. In order to reduce the unpleasant arousal, bystanders take action, the form of which depends on the line of action they perceive to be most likely to reduce their arousal quickly and effectively. Emergencies ought to intensify the actions of bystanders, but whether the onlookers run toward or away from the scene is predictable from elements in the situation other than its emergency character. Since we are interested in determining whether emergencies stimulate helping, our first task was to identify such events and to differentiate them from other situations where help is not a matter of urgency or necessity. The emergency intervention literature has confronted onlookers with a variety of incidents, including a collapsed subways rider (Piliavin, Rodin, & Piliavin, 1969), a physical assault (Shotland & Straw, 1976), and a victim of stomach cramps (Staub, 1974). No systematic attempt has been mounted to identify the range of events perceived to be of an emergency nature. This article reports data from four studies. The first three studies were concerned with identifying emergencies and defining their properties. The fourth study examined whether the emergency character of an event influences helping. Study 1 The first study had two phases. In the first phase (Part A) participants were asked to identify the kinds of events that come to mind when they think of an emergency. The events identified by these respondents, as well as a sample of the kinds of events simulated by researchers studying bystander interven-

1823

tion, were rated as to their degree of emergency by a new set of respondents during the second phase (Part B) of the study. Part A Method Subjects. The subjects were 39 men and 16 women enrolled in a social psychology course, winter term 1976, at The Pennsylvania State University. Procedure. Subjects were asked to list events they considered an emergency that they had witnessed, imagined, or knew about. The term emergency was left undefined, given our interest in determining the subject's own definition.

Results In order of frequency, the following events were identified: auto accident, fire, heart attack, drowning, flood, poisoning, airplane crash, hurricane/tornado, earthquake, rape, and war. The events can be classified into the following categories, listed in order of the number of events identified: (a) accidents; (b) illness, disease, and death due to natural causes; (c) natural disasters; (d) acts of violence and crime; (e) psychological and emotional problems (e.g., attempted suicide, nervous breakdown); ( f ) political problems and crises (e.g., overpopulation, oil shortage); (g) everyday problems and crises (e.g., late for an appointment, studying all night for an exam, and (h) miscellaneous (e.g., electrical power failure, financial emergency). Part B Method The emergency situations generated by the subjects in Part A were augmented by a list of emergencies simulated in previous research (Huston & Korte, 1976), as well as by situations generated by the investigators. Subjects. The subjects were 69 females and 21 males enrolled in a social psychology course, spring term 1976, at the Pennsylvania State University. Procedure. The final pool of items consisted of 96 descriptions of events. Half of the items were put into Form A, the other half into Form B. This was done to prevent respondents from becoming fatigued. Participants rated each event in terms of whether it is an emergency on the following S-point scale: (1) definitely an emergency, (2) probably an

R. LANCE SHOTLAND AND TED L. HUSTON

1824 Table 1 Classification of Events Event

Definite emergency Cut artery, profuse bleeding House ablaze, people screaming for help Child poisoned Child swallowed razor blade Person in shock, lying on ground Heart attack Airplane crash, some passengers still alive Rape in progress Car accident, driver motionless on ground Drug overdose Not sure" Terminal cancer, 3 mos. to live Lost person in woods shouting for help Car broken down on side of road Emergency landing by airplane, passengers shaken but unhurt Burning leaves, no one attending, windy day

Rock stars in danger of being trampled by fans Mildly intoxicated friend wants to drive home Blackout in neighborhood Man on first date with woman he likes, no money Friend states he is miserable and depressed Probably not an emergency Car door chips other car's paint Telethon wants to get $20 million for muscular dystrophy Car parked by fire hydrant Scraped knee Tramp panhandling Tray of hors d'oeuvres drops at party Child holds breath in protest Person loses dime in pay phone Cat is stuck in a tree Someone has cigar, no match 1

M

SD

1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.07 1.02 1.02 1.09 1.09 1.09

.00 .00 .00 .00 .25 .15 .15 .36 .29 .46

2.60 2.64 2.72

1.35 1.03 .98

Illness, disease Miscellaneous Everyday problem

2.78

1.08

Accident

2.81

.95

Accident

2.84

1.18

Miscellaneous

2.84 2.98

1.18 1.03

Everyday problem Miscellaneous

3.07

1.08

Everyday problem

3.18

.92

3.75

1.06

Everyday problem

3.75 3.98 4.05 4.05 4.09 4.18 4.23 4.23 4.87

1.17 .98 .84 .99 .91 .97 .94 .73 .54

Miscellaneous Everyday problem Everyday problem Everyday problem Everyday problem Everyday problem Everyday problem Everyday problem Everyday problem

Category Accident Accident Accident Accident Accident Illness, disease Accident Act of violence Accident Accident

Psychological and emotional problems

Ms closest to 3.

emergency, (3) not sure, (4) probably not an emergency, (5) definitely not an emergency.

Results The most striking finding is that our participants agree considerably concerning what events are emergencies. In fact, four items were seen as definitely an emergency by all respondents; several other events were seen as definite emergencies by all but a jew of the respondents. As can be seen in Table 1, the

events seen as emergencies were primarily accidents. At the other end, problems seen as probably not an emergency were categorized, for the most part, as everyday problems. Situations that elicited uncertainty concerning their emergency nature fit a number of categories, including everyday problems, psychological and emotional problems, and other miscellaneous occurrences. From Table 1 it is apparent that emergencies appear to be a special class of problem situations.

EMERGENCIES AND BYSTANDER HELPING

As noted earlier, a sampling of events simulated in the laboratory in previous research was rated by our respondents in terms of their degree of emergency. These events tended to be rated as probably an emergency. Representative events are as follows: a collapsed subway rider (M =1.50; SD - .73), a person lying on the floor having fallen from a ladder (M = 1.61; SD - .64), an individual suffering from an asthmatic attack (M = 2.00; SD = 1.10), a person groaning and lying in a doorway (M = 2.02; SD = .77), and an individual complaining of severe stomach cramps (M = 2.38; SD - .86). Study 2 The next step is to identify the denning qualities of emergencies that distinguish them from other problem situations. Latane and Barley (1970) have drawn a portrait of emergencies. We shall draw heavily from their observations, elaborating them in terms of insights gleaned from Table 1. First, as can be seen in Table 1, events seen as definite emergencies all happen suddenly and unexpectedly. Victims and bystanders alike find themselves unprepared. Eight of the 10 events most consistently seen as definite emergencies were accidents; the remaining 2—heart attack and rape—also catch their victims by surprise. The fact that something happens without warning, however, does not necessarily indicate an emergency. Dropping a tray of hors d'oeuvres at a party may be embarrassing, but according to our respondents, it is probably not an emergency. A second important feature of emergencies is that they involve threat oj harm or actual harm to the victim. Events seen by our respondents as definite emergencies all threaten the life of the victim. A cut artery, poisoning, and drug overdose are unambiguous with regard to their life-threatening potential. In each case, in addition, immediate, urgent action is required if the victim is to be saved. Too much loss of blood or the failure to find an antidote quickly to counteract the poison or the drug would be fatal. In contrast, events that were seen as nonemergency problems or that our respondents were unsure how to classify pose little or no threat of harm to the

1825

victim. A child holding his breadth in protest may put a scare into his parents, but our respondents did not think of it as much of an emergency. Similarly, a person who scrapes a knee or loses a dime in a pay phone may feel distressed, but others are unlikely to see this situation as an emergency. Another important feature of an emergency is that outside help is necessary. Without the intervention of an onlooker, the victim is unable to keep the situation from worsening. A helpless victim is characteristic of all situations classified as definite emergencies in Table 1. The fact that a victim is helpless, however, does not necessarily indicate that an emergency is at hand. Victims of terminal cancer are helpless, but our respondents were uncertain whether to classify their circumstances as an emergency. This suggests, perhaps, that in order for an event to be seen as an emergency, it must be possible for onlookers to do something to help the victim. The above analysis suggests that emergencies involve several essential features: 1. They occur suddenly and unexpectedly. 2. They involve threat of harm or actual harm to the victim. 3. The threat increases with time. 4. The victim is helpless. 5. Potentially effective intervention must be possible. According to the data in Study 1, it appears that events that involve one of the above features but not others are unlikely to be seen as definite emergencies. We expect to see "threat of harm" (2) and "threat of harm increasing with time" (3) to be moderately to highly correlated. A moderate correlation is predicted between "something can be done to correct the situation" (4) and "outside help is necessary" (5). Method Brief scales comprised of both positively and negatively worded Likert-type items were constructed to measure each of the factors that were hypothesized to define an event as an emergency. The scale designed to measure the degree to which an event occurred suddenly and unexpectedly consists of 10 items such as "the incident occurred without warning" and "the situation could have been anticipated." Guttman's lamda-3 index of reliability was measured

R. LANCE SHOTLAND AND TED L. HUSTON

1826

as .88 and .80 on two data sets using different clusters of situations. The scale measuring threat of harm or actual harm consisted of 13 items yielding a Guttman lambda-3 index of reliability of .83 and .88. A representative item from this scale is "individuals or property involved will only benefit from this situation." The scale indexing threat of harm or actual harm increasing with time had reliabilities of .79 and .79 with a total of 8 items. An example from this scale is "the probability of threat or harm to the person or property increases with time." The scale designed to tap whether something can be done to correct the situation consisted of 9 items yielding a Guttman Iambda-3 of .83 and .79. An example of an item from this scale is: "help will be effective in solving the problem." The scale designed to ascertain whether outside help is necessary contained 10 items and had Guttman reliabilities of .75 and .79. "Others are needed to help change the situation" is an item taken from this scale. The items from the five scales were randomized along with an additional S-point Likert-type item designed to measure subjects' perceptions of a problem situation as an emergency. The anchor points of the latter measure were (1) definitely an emergency and (5) definitely not an emergency, with (3) being not sure. To increase the generalizability of the results, we decided to investigate the defining features of three problem situations. Two situations that were rated as "probably an emergency" by subjects in Study 1 were randomly chosen. We used situations rated as "probably an emergency" for two reasons. First, situations rated as "definitely an emergency" had either no or very little variance. Second, as we pointed out previously, this is the category that most of the situations used by previous researchers investigating emergency intervention phenomena had used in their research. The first emergency situation was "you see a driver weaving from one side of the road to the other, He is apparently drunk" (M = 2.07; 5D = 1.04). The second situation was: "you see the classmate next to you have an asthmatic attack" (M = 2.00, SZ> = 1.10). We also wished to

investigate crimes as emergencies, as one might expect that crimes might be emergencies with different defining characteristics. However, the crimes on our list were all rated as "definitely an emergency" and had little or no variance. So a crime was chosen from Rossi, Waite, Bose, and Berk's (1974) list of crimes ordered in terms of seriousness. We chose a crime that was not seen as extremely serious. This problem situation was: "you see a young man grab the purse from an elderly woman and run away." Subjects. The subjects were 279 undergraduates from an introductory psychology course at The Pennsylvania State University during the spring term of 1977. Subjects were randomly assigned a given emergency situation: 57 males and 43 females were assigned to the drunk driver situation; 50 males and 38 females were assigned to rate the asthmatic attack; and 45 males and 45 females, plus one respondent whose sex was not ascertained, rated the purse-snatching incident. Procedure. The subjects were given the questionnaire described above. The questionnaire contained a front page that listed one of the three problem situations and provided instructions to the subject to rate the situation on each of the items listed on the following pages. A sample of the Likert scale format was included on the front page of the questionnaire as well as on each succeeding page.

Results As Table 2 illustrates, if we view across all three emergency situations and look at the half of the matrix corrected for attenuation, the scale measuring the degree to which an event is seen as sudden and unexpected bears little relationship to the other scales. The remaining four scales are moderately related with one another and share between IS.2% of the variance (threats of harm with outside help necessary) and 38.4% of the variance

Table 2 Attenuated and Unattenuated Pearson Correlation Matrix Indicating the Interrelationships Between the Variables Hypothesized to be Components of an Emergency Across the Three Emergency Situations Variable 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

Sudden and unexpected Threat of harm Harm increases with time Something can be done Outside help necessary Emergency

— -.23 -.09 .10 .17 -.06

-.19 — .43 .40 .39 .26

-.07 .35 — .56 .62 .57

.08 .30 .41 — .50 .30

.14 .31 .48 .36 — .35

-.06 .24 .51 .25 .30

Note. Below the diagonal are correlations corrected for reliability, above it are the attenuated correlations. To test for significance use the attenuated matrix. Correlations equal to or above .14 are significant at the .05 level.

EMERGENCIES AND BYSTANDER HELPING

1827

Table 3 Regression Analyses of the Variables That Lead to a Decision That a Problem Situation Is an Emergency (Corrected for Attenuation) Variable in order of insertion into regression equation

Multiple R

R2

Problem Situation 1 :Asthmatic attack .613 .376 Harm increases with time .458 .677 Something can be done .484 .695 Sudden and unexpected .704 Threat of harm .496 .70S .496 Outside help necessary

0

F

1.060 -.568 -.158 .140 -.040

41.17* 13.22* 3.54 2.13 .11

Harm increases with time Outside help necessary Sudden and unexpected Something can be done Threat of harm

Problem Situation 2 : Drunk driver .514 .717 .552 .743 .756 .572 .758 .574 .759 .576

.984 -.283 .141 .093 -.080

38.75* 4.94 3.44 .85 .34

Harm increases with time Something can be done Threat of harm Sudden and unexpected Outside help necessary

Problem Situation 3: Purse snatching .360 .130 .369 .136 .382 .146 .392 .154 .395 .156

.344 .148 -.150 -.103 .070

7.24* 1.25 1.20 1.00 .25

*p < .01.

(harm increases with time with outside help necessary). Regression was employed to determine the impact of various perceptual elements in our subjects' definitions of events as emergencies. In Table 3, R and R2 are ordered as they were produced by a forward stepwise regression. The beta weights and F ratios are the product of the summary analysis in which the final regression equation, which had all the variables entered, was used. Thus, the F ratios and beta weights reflect the contributions of each of the variables by holding constant all of the other variables. Since differences in the reliabilities of the scales can cause disparities due to measurement error rather than to the variables themselves, we decided to conduct the analyses on matrices corrected for attenuation due to imperfect reliability. However, one must be cautious in interpreting tests of significance based upon data corrected for attenuation, in that the test statistic, as well as other coefficients, is inflated as a result of increased sampling error

(Cohen & Cohen, 1975). Therefore, we have set alpha at the .01 level, and we will report differences in conclusions regarding each study that are reached by doing the regression analysis on attenuated data using the standard confidence interval. Since no sex differences were found for either the emergency question or with regard to any of the scales, the samples were combined for the regression analysis. The results are shown in Table 3. The asthmatic attack was generally seen as probably an emergency (M = 2.10, SD — .87). There were two statistically significant predictors of the degree to which the asthmatic attack was viewed as an emergency. As shown in Table 3, the most important predictor was harm increasing with time, which was entered first and accounted for approximately 38% of the variance. Whether the incident was seen as one in which something could be done to help the victim was the second statistically significant variable and accounted for another 6.4% of the variance.

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R. LANCE SHOTLAND AND TED L. HUSTON

Table 4 Regression Analysis Across 96 Problem Situations of the Variables That Lead to a Decision That a Problem Situation Is an Emergency (Corrected for Attenuation) Variable in order of insertion into regression equation Harm increases with time Something can be done Outside help is necessary Threat of harm Sudden and unexpected

Multiple R

.856 .908 .916 .917 .917

.733 .824 .838 .840 .842

.654 -.255 .222 .130 .039

11.78* 13.54* 7.34* .84 .80

Note. Reliabilities were calculated across emergencies rather than subjects and these reliabilities were used to correct for attenuation. *p < .01.

The drunk driver situation was again seen by most of our respondents as "probably an emergency" (M = 2.05, SL> = .97). Again, harm increasing with time was entered into the equation first. It accounted for approximately 51.4% of the variance. No other scale was a significant predictor of perceiving the event as an emergency. The purse-snatching situation was rated as probably an emergency by most of our subjects ( M = 1 . 9 6 , S D = . 9 1 ) . As Table 3 shows, harm increasing with time was the only scale that was significantly tied to the perception of the event as an emergency accounting for 13% of the variance in the emergency ratings. Discussion Only one of the variables, threat of harm increasing with time, was a significant predictor of perceiving the event as an emergency across all three situations. No other variable was significant across any two of the situations. The same conclusion is reached if the attenuated matrix is used. We find these results surprising. Perhaps the discrepancy between our expectations and the results reflects differences in our conceptualization and our test of the model. In formulating the model we were attempting to identify the critical dimensions that differentiate emergency situations from other problem situations. The test provided in this study asked the question: What are the considerations that cause different people to see the same situation differ-

ently? This is an important question, particularly if individual differences in perceiving an event as an emergency relate to the likelihood that onlookers respond. We would now like to focus our attention on answering the question: What features do people use to differentiate emergency situations from other nonemergency problems? Study 3 Method The same questionnaire used in Study 2 was used in Study 3. Instead of selecting 3 problem situations, all of which were about equal in the degrees to which they were likely to be seen as an emergency, all 96 problem situations used in Study 1 were again employed. Each situation was rated by a minimum of four subjects (Af = 5.44), who were randomly assigned to the emergency situations. The responses of subjects who rated a given emergency were averaged, thereby producing average scale scores and an average rating of the situation as an emergency. The correlational analysis, then, is across 96 problem situations rather than subjects. The variance generated with this procedure is basically due to differences in situations rather than to individual differences in the perceptions of the subjects. Subjects. The subjects were 522 male and female undergraduates at The Pennsylvania State University. The students participated during the fall term of 1977 and winter term of 1978 and earned supplemental credit for their introductory psychology

Results The regression procedures used in Study 2 were also employed in Study 3. As Table 4 indicates, and as found in Study 2, "harm

EMERGENCIES AND BYSTANDER HELPING

increases with time" was an important predictor accounting for 73.3% °f tne variance. The second statistically significant variable was "something can be done," which accounted for another 9.1% of the variance and yielded a negative beta weight. The last statistically significant variable was "outside help is necessary," accounting for another 1.4% of the variance. The zero-order (Pearson) correlation matrix illustrating the interrelationships among the variables shown in Table 5 provides additional information. This correlation matrix, although similar to the one presented in Table 2 in some respects, differs in others. Again, it appears that the sudden and unexpected variable bears a small relationship to the other variables. In general, however, the relationships among the other variables are much higher. Of particular note is the corrected correlation between "harm increases with time" and "threat of harm." The correlation between those two scales was .89, indicating that "threat of harm" and "harm increases with time" are basically the same variable. The correlation between "harm increases with time" and "outside help is necessary" (r = .80) indicates that these two variables also show a great deal of common variance. The negative beta weight of "something can be done" along with its zero-order correlation of .05 with the emergency question and its zero-order correlation of .38 with "harm increases with time" and .22 with "outside help is necessary" indicates that "something can be done" is working as a suppressor variable in the multiple regression equation (see Nunally, 1967). This is consistent with the negative beta weight associated with the "something can be done" variable found in the asthmatic attack situation in Study 2. The regression analysis based upon the attenuated correlation matrix leads to the same general conclusion. In this analysis, threat of harm proved to be a significant predictor of perceiving events as emergencies. Discussion It appears that a major determinant of whether or not a problem situation is seen as

1829

Table S Attenuated and Unattenuated Correlation Matrix Indicating the Interrelationships Between the Variables Hypothesized to be Components of an Emergency Across the 96 Emergency Situations Variable

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

Sudden and unexpected Threat of harm Harm increases with time Something can be done Outside help necessary Emergency

1

2

—

.16

.13 .04 .20

.19

—

.74

.03

.15

.89

—

.30 .65 .78

-.05

3

.04 .38

.24 .65 .23 .85

4

—

.80 .22 .86 .05

5

6 .21

.53 .78

.17

.04

— .70 .78 —

Note, To test for significance use the attenuated matrix (i.e., the correlations above the diagonal). Correlations equal to or above .17 are significant at the .10 level, correlations equal to or above .20 are significant at the .05 level.

an emergency is the presence of harm or threat of harm. If there is a sufficient amount of harm, then almost by definition it becomes worse with time. In addition, if the amount of harm is sufficiently grave, then outside help is necessary. The negative beta weight associated with "something can be done" indicates that if there is an easy solution to the problem, it is less likely to be viewed as an emergency. For example, Table 1 illustrated that a scraped knee was generally not seen as an emergency (M = 4.05). Harm is minimal, providing that infection doesn't set in. It does not get worse with time, and no outside help is required in that the victim generally can take care of the problem of cleaning the abrasion and putting a Band-Aid on it. On the other hand, Table 1 indicates that all of our subjects saw a cut artery with profuse bleeding as a definite emergency (M = 1.00). In this incident, there is a greater degree of harm than with a scraped knee—at the least the cut is deeper. The situation is worsening with time, in that if nothing is done the person may well bleed to death. With this type of injury an outside source of help with medical expertise is usually required to solve the

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R. LANCE SHOTLAND AND TED L. HUSTON

problem directly. One might expect that a person that knows that "something can be done" and precisely what to do, for example, a doctor with a cut artery and proper equipment, may regard the incident as much less of an emergency. Of the three considerations used by respondents in Study 3 to discriminate between emergency situations and nonemergency problems, only one differentiated respondents in Study 2 in terms of the degree to which they saw events as emergencies. This factor was the degree to which they saw harm to the victim increasing with time. Study 4 Our original intention was to unravel the concept of an emergency and, once we understood its important features, to design a factorial experiment assessing the relative importance of the elements in accounting for helping. The findings of the third study, however, clearly indicate that the denning ingredients of an emergency are tightly intertwined (see Table 5 ) , thereby making it impossible to separate them factorially. Study 3 demonstrated that the perceptions of threat of harm or actual harm, harm increasing with time, and outside help as necessary were highly intercorrelated. Furthermore, the perception that "something can be done" acted as a suppressor variable, meaning that taken alone it did not correlate with people's ratings of events as emergencies. Although we now know what people mean by an emergency, we could not experimentally isolate its component parts. The key question remains, however, as to how people behave in emergency versus nonemergency situations, and that is what the next study was designed to answer. Method Given the high intercorrelations between two of the three factors used to predict an emergency and the indirect effect of the third factor, it did not seem reasonable to use a factorial design to try to decipher the relative importance of the three factors in providing help. We decided simply to examine emergencies versus nonemergencies. The major difficulty is to construct problem situations of an emergency and nonemergency nature that require the same kinds

of help, so that the two types of situations are comparable. We decided that the most reasonable procedure was for the persons who needed help always to ask for a ride to a given location following their explanations of why the ride was necessary. The setting was the student parking lot at The Pennsylvania State University. Four male and four female undergraduate and graduate students served as the help solicitors. The solicitors varied in age (from 19 to 30 years) and in physical characteristics, although none was extreme as to size, weight, or attractiveness. Males varied on length of hair and amount of facial hair. The solicitors were stationed at various points in a parking lot capable of holding 1,340 automobiles. When a subject approached an automobile in the solicitor's area, or when a car was being parked in the solicitor's area, the solicitor would approach the potential subject and explain his or her predicament following a script and keeping to a standardized, moderate level of affect. The solicitor would then ask for a ride to his or her home in a small town approximately 5 miles away. Seven emergency and nonemergency situations were used. Some examples of emergency and nonemergency situations are: 1. "Excuse me. I need some help. I'm a diabetic and I forgot to take my insulin this morning. I'm long overdue. Can you give me a ride home to Boalsburg?" (emergency). 2. "Excuse me. I need some help. I forgot to take my allergy medicine this morning and it's starting to bother me. Can you give me a ride home to Boalsburg?" (nonemergency). 3. "Excuse me. I need some help. My roommate called and she took an overdose of sleeping pills. Can you give me a ride home to Boalsburg?" (emergency). 4. "Excuse me. I need some help. My roommate called and sounded very depressed. Can you give me a ride home to Boalsburg?" (nonemergency). Once the subject's response was ascertained he or she was immediately debriefed. A response was counted as helping if the subject offered to take the solicitor to the appointed destination. Subjects. The subjects were 286 male and female students (208 males and 78 females) who were alone and were either entering or exiting from their automobile in a student parking lot on The Pennsylvania State University campus during spring term of 1978.

Hypotheses The key hypothesis concerns whether people are more inclined to help in emergencies or in nonemergencies. As we indicated in the introduction to the paper, there is no theoretical basis for making a prediction. Nonetheless, we expect people to help more frequently in emergencies compared to nonemergencies because bystanders should perceive a greater

EMERGENCIES AND BYSTANDER HELPING

need for their assistance. In order to generalize, we employed a number of different emergency and nonemergency situations and used both male and female solicitors. Given that the subjects were of both sexes and were either arriving at or leaving the lot, we recorded this information as well. Since we collected this information, the following additional hypotheses were formulated. 1. Based upon previous research (e.g., Borofsky, Stollak, & Messe, 1971; Piliavin & Piliavin, 1972), we hypothesized that males will help more than females. 2. Latane and Dabbs' (1975) research suggests that females should receive more help than males. 3. We expect subjects who are arriving at the parking lot to be less helpful than subjects who are leaving the lot. Commuters who are arriving should be, on average, going to class, whereas those who are leaving should have greater time flexibility. Barley and Batson (1973) found that subjects in a hurry help less frequently than subjects with more time. Results Manipulation check. The first step is to determine whether our emergency events are seen as emergencies in comparison to our nonemergency events. To accomplish this, 168 subjects rated the situations. Each of our 14 situations was described to separate groups of 6 males and 6 females earning extra credit in an introductory psychology class. They were asked to imagine themselves walking near their car in a parking lot and having a person approach them who then made one of the 14 statements used in the study. The subjects were then asked to fill out a short questionnaire concerning the situation. The emergency question used in each of the earlier studies was again used here. The results showed that our emergency situations were indeed seen as emergencies (M = 1.94) in comparison to our nonemergency situations (M = 3.14),F(1, 164) = 74.35, p < .001. The degree to which an event was seen as an emergency was strongly correlated (.75) with judgments concerning the severity of the situation. There

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was no difference between males (M = 2.64) and females (M = 2.44), F(l, 164) = 2.11, ns, nor were differences found due to the specific incidents or to interactions between and among the nature of the event, the sex of the respondent, and the specific events. Tests of hypotheses. The data from the factorial study were analyzed by means of Goodman's techniques for the assessment of interaction effects in multivariate contingency tables (Bishop, Fienberg, & Holland, 1975). Using analysis of variance terminology, the model of the four-way interaction was significant, x 2 ( l ) = 8 . 0 4 , p < .005. In nonemergency situations when female subjects were arriving and a male solicitor asked for a ride, none of the 12 subjects in that cell helped in comparison to the average helping rate of 55% across all cells. This is precisely the cell one would predict the lowest rate of help from. The models of the three-way and twoway interactions were not significant. In fact, if one lumps all four-, three-, and two-way interactions together and drops them from the model, leaving main effects, one loses a nonsignificant chi-square, \2(ll) = 15.47. Since the four variables only interact if all the variables are present and do not interact in any form with a subset of these variables, it is not useful to consider this model except in the unlikely possibility that another researcher is going to combine those four variables. Three of the main effects were also statistically significant. More help was produced in emergency conditions (64%) than in nonemergency conditions (45%), x 2 0) = H-17, p < .001. Female solicitors received more help (64%) than male solicitors (47%), X 2 ( l ) 9.04, p < .01. Males helped (61%) more than females (40%), x 2 ( l ) = 11.48, p < .01. In addition, subjects who were arriving on campus (50%) were marginally less likely to help than subjects who were leaving (63%), x 2 (l) = 3.84, p < .10. If we drop the data from the cell that caused the four-way interaction where no one helped, and use a chi-square procedure to recalculate the main effects to determine if the main effect is independent of the interaction, we find that the main effect due to the presence or absence of an emer-

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gency is independent of the four-way interaction, X 2 ( l ) = 5.76, p < .02. The sex of the solicitor is marginally significant, x 2 U ) = 3.74, p < .10, as is the sex of the subject, X 2 ( l ) = 3.76, p < .10. The main effect due to whether the subject is coming or going, however, is dependent on the interaction, x 2 0) = 2.37, ns. Discussion The data from Study 4, when considered together with the findings of Study 3, indicate that a prime concern motivating potential helpers is the degree to which the victim is in need of help. From Study 3 it was determined that our subjects denned an emergency primarily in terms of the presence of a sufficient amount of harm or threat of harm such that the situation was both worsening with time and that outside help was necessary. The results of Study 4 indicate that people are more inclined to help in an emergency as compared to nonemergency situation. This research is not the only line of research that indicates that the bystander's perceptions of the need of the victim are an important determinant of whether or not help is offered. Weiss, Boyer, Lombardo, and Stitch (1973) found that the more pain a person is in, the more rapidly people will provide help. In another study, Staub and Baer (1974) investigated the severity of an incident by having a confederate feign either a heart attack or a twisted knee. Although the results were not entirely consistent, they concluded that the greater the severity, the more the helping. West and Brown (1975) used blood as a sign of severity and found more help when blood was used; in contrast, Piliavin and Piliavin (1972) found less help with the use of blood. A recent study by Clark (1975) found that the less a person is able to help himself, the more inclined people are to provide help. His data showed that a man on crutches who had dropped a book was much more likely to be helped than a man walking normally. Finally, Shetland and Johnson (1978) varied the severity of a fall and found that onlookers were more apt to help the victim after a bad fall than after a mild one. As a group, these

studies document the importance of severity of need as a determinant of bystander intervention. General Discussion The data reported in the four studies bears on both Latane and Barley's (1970) decision-making model and the arousal reduction model of bystander intervention set forth by the Piliavins and their colleagues (Piliavin et al., 1969; Piliavin et al., 1975; Walster & Piliavin, 1972; Piliavin & Piliavin, Note 1). It will be recalled that Latane and Barley (1970) suggested that the decision to intervene is based on a series of decisions: (a) notice that something is happening, (b) interpret the event as an emergency, (c) assume responsibility for taking action, (d) decide on the appropriate form of assistance, and (e) decide how to implement the assistance. Our data suggest that the decisions are not conceptually distinct. Latane and Barley's (1970) second decision in the series—that an event is an emergency—is affected by the conclusions onlookers come to regarding the third and fourth decisions—that is, the degree to which onlookers believe they are in a position to help and take responsibility for providing help in one form or another. If the victim is able to extricate himself without the aid of a bystander, or if no form of assistance is likely to help correct the situation, then there is no action to take and therefore no reason to take responsibility for the situation. The interpretation that a problem situation is an emergency is not only based on harm or threat of harm to the victim increasing with time but also on the degree to which outside help is both necessary and feasible. Thus, the decision that an event is an emergency is colored by the judgments onlookers make concerning the importance and feasibility of taking action to correct the situation. The work of the Piliavins has emphasized the idea that onlookers confronted with an emergency choose a course of action based on their assessment of the rewards and costs that they believe flow from various lines of behavior. Their research (Piliavin et al., 1969; Piliavin et al., 1975) has focused particularly

EMERGENCIES AND BYSTANDER HELPING

on the effects on bystander response of variations in the costs to the bystander of direct intervention. The data reported herein, when combined with the material summarized earlier, suggest that another important factor influencing the response of onlookers is their perception of the degree to which the victim is in need of help. Indeed, such a perception lies at the cornerstone of Schwartz's (1977) recent model of the decision processes that precede taking action in a distress situation. According to Schwartz (1977), the following sequential steps are involved in arriving at a decision regarding whether or not to take one or another form of action: (a) awareness of a person in a state of need, (b) perception that there are actions that could relieve the need, (c) recognition of own ability to provide relief, (d) apprehension of some responsibility to become involved, (e) activation of preexisting or situationally constructed personal norms of moral obligation, and (f) assessment of costs and evaluation of probable outcomes of taking action. Depending on the assessment of costs, onlookers are expected either to take action or not, or to reassess and redefine the situation by doing such things as denying the victim's need or by denying their own responsibility to respond. The fourth study in our series varied the potential helper's perception of the degree to which the victim was in need and assessed the degree to which the perception of need influenced the frequency of helping behavior. Models of bystander intervention have emphasized the hedonistic view of onlooker behavior and underplayed the altruistic features of the act. Although a plausible case can be made for assuming -that reducing another's distress is rewarding, a strong argument can be set forth that bystander behavior can be understood more readily by focusing on objective costs to the bystander weighted against the benefits to the victim. If this is, in fact, what bystanders do, then it would appear that a model positing "limited altruism" might be more accurate than the hedonistic model. Reference Note 1. Piliavin, J. A., & Piliavin, I. M. The good samaritan: Why does he help? Unpublished manuscript, University of Wisconsin, 1976.

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References Bishop, V., Fienberg, S., & Holland, P. Discrete multivariate analysis: Theory and Practice. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1975. Borofsky, G., Stollak, G., & Messe, L. Bystander reactions to physical assault: Sex differences in socially responsible behavior. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 1971, 7, 313-318. Clark, R. D. The effects of reinforcement, punishment, and dependency on helping behavior. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 197S, 1, S96-S99. Cohen, J., & Cohen, P. Applied multiple regression/ correlation analysis for the behavioral sciences. Hillsdale, N.J.: Erlbaum, 197S. Darley, J. M., & Batson, C. D. "From Jerusalem to Jericho": A study of situational and dispositional variables in helping behavior. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1973, 27, 100-108. Huston, T. L., & Korte, C. The responsive bystander: Why he helps. In T. Lickona (Ed.), Moral development and behavior. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1976. Latane, B., & Dabbs, J. Sex, group size, and helping in three cities. Sociometry, 1975, 38, 180-194. Latane, B., & Darley, J. M. The unresponsive bystander: Why doesn't he help? New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1970. Nunally, J. C, Psychometric Theory. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967. Piliavin, I. M., Piliavin, J. A., & Rodin, J. A. Costs, diffusion, and the stigmatized victim. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1975, 32, 429438. Piliavin, I. M., Rodin, J., & Piliavin, J. A. Good samaritanism: An underground phenomenon? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1969, 13, 289-299. Piliavin, J., & Piliavin, I. Effects of blood on reactions to a victim. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1972, 23, 353-361. Schwartz, S. H. Normative influences on altruism. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 10). New York: Academic Press, 1977. Shetland, R. L., & Johnson, M. P. Bystander behavior and kinesics. Environmental Psychology and Nonverbal Behavior, 1978, 2, 181-190. Shetland, R. L., & Straw, M. K. Bystander response to an assault: When a man attacks a woman. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1976, 34, 990-999. Staub, E. Helping a distressed person: Social, personality, and stimulus determinants. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 7). New York: Academic Press, 1974. Staub, E., & Baer, R. Stimulus characteristics of a sufferer and difficulty of escape as determinants of helping. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1974, 30, 279-284.

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Rossi, P., Waite, E., Bose, C., & Berk, R. The seriousM. H. Altruistic drive and altruistic reinforcement. ness of crimes: Normative structure and individual Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1973, differences. American Sociological Review, 1974, 25, 390-400. 30, 279-284. West, S., & Brown, T. Physical attractiveness, the Walster, E., & Piliavin, J. Equity and the innocent severity of the emergency and helping. Journal of bystander. Journal of Social Issues, 1972, 28, 165Experimental Social Psychology, 1975, 11, 531-538. 189. Weiss, R. F., Boyer, J. L., Lombardo, J. P., & Stitch, Received November 29, 1978 •