What can man believe in?

What Can Man Believe In?

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CHARLES

A. C U R R A N

T o a n s w e r the q u e s t i o n s i m p l y , I w o u l d p r o p o s e t h a t m a n c a n b e l i e v e in three t h i n g s : h i m s e l f , o t h e r s , a n d G o d . T o d e l i n e a t e t h e m e a n i n g of s u c h a n a n s w e r , h o w e v e r , i n v o l v e s u s i n a d i s c u s s i o n , first o f all, o f w h a t w e m e a n by " b e l i e f . " H o w is f a i t h d i f f e r e n t f r o m a p r o c e s s o f k n o w i n g o r o f r e a s o n i n g or p r o v i n g ? T h e a n s w e r a l s o i n v o l v e s u s in d e f i n i n g h o w o n e believes in oneself, h o w o n e believes in o t h e r s , a n d h o w , t h r o u g h the self a n d others, o n e c a n believe i n G o d . F a i t h as u n c o n d i t i o n a l c o m m i t m e n t W e n e e d to b e g i n w i t h w h a t is m e a n t by " b e l i e f . " H e r e , as a r e s u l t o[ a c o m m o n c o n f u s i o n p e r h a p s a t t r i b u t a b l e to t h e r e l i g i o u s b i b l i c a l e m p h a sis of the s i x t e e n t h c e n t u r y , the e x t e n u a t i o n o f p r i n t i n g , a n d the r e s u l tant focus o n the w r i t t e n a n d p r i n t e d w o r d , b e l i e f h a s c o m e to m e a n f o r m a n y a n e x p r e s s i o n of S o m e k i n d of c r e e d or d o c u m e n t o r s o m e list o f THE REV. CHARLESA. CURRAN, PH.D., Professor of Psychology at Loyola University, Chicago, has devoted years of research and study to counseling, psychotherapy, and learning and has written articles and books on these subjects. He was a peritus at Vatican Council II. He is a charter member of the Academy and a member of its Advisory Committee. Copyright 9 by Charles A. Curran, 1971. All rights reserved. This paper is the tmrd in the series in which thoughtful people answer our inquiry about the principles of ethical value they have found to be trustworthy guides in their lives.--The Editor

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Journal of Religion and Health

propositions. We cannot, of course, disregard the i m p o r t a n c e of a list of p r o p o s i t i o n s or creedal statements, because these in some measure structure p r o p o s i t i o n a l l y the nature of belief. Yet this view of belief is, in itself, also misleading. W h a t we m e a n by faith is rather that w h i c h is b o t h a prelude and a c o n c o m i t a n t of hope a n d love. Faith, in this sense, has to do with persons, n o t with verbal, creedal statements or documents. Faith is an a b a n d o n m e n t of the self and a c o m m i t m e n t of the self. T h i s has been expressed in a m o d e r n w a y as an u n c o n d i t i o n a l , positive regard both of the ego toward the self and of the ego-self toward others. For faith to be operational and real, it m u s t be positive a n d u n c o n d i t i o n a l . O n e has no faith in another person if one is negative toward that person; nor does one have faith in another person if one sets u p a series of restrictive conditions d e t e r m i n i n g w h e t h e r one trusts a n d hopes in the other person. These kinds of restrictions, conditions, a n d negations vitiate at its inception the nature of a g e n u i n e personal c o m m i t m e n t , a true faith and trust in another. W h a t could be said of the c o m m i t m e n t toward others in unconditioned positive regard can also be said of the self. T h e ego must in some very real way have an u n c o n d i t i o n e d positive regard toward its o w n self. A m a n w h o gives in to negativism toward himself and sets u p a series of hypothetical p r o p o s i t i o n s a r o u n d any kind of positive regard toward himself is a m a n caught in his o w n masochistic death-wish instinct. Perhaps this helps explain the constant recurrence of the naive n o t i o n of a positive self-attitude, such as Dr. C o u C s f a m o u s " D a y by day I a m getting better and better" of fifty years a g o a n d m a n y m o r e recent positive motivation concepts. Simple as they m a y appear, they have in them this need for a conscious positive self-attitude, a n d so such ideas keep recurring. T h e y help a person, giving h i m a simple m o t i v a t i o n a l f o r m u l a that aids h i m to hold a positive regard toward himself. T h i s is the essence of faith in oneself. T h e n o t i o n of self-confidence is made u p of the Latin n o t i o n of faith in oneself. T h e confident man, believing in himself, is characterized by this u n c o n d i t i o n e d , positive attitude toward himself.


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Proof as the exclusion of love

It is in this sense that we are talking a b o u t faith. W h i l e p r o p o s i t i o n a l statements and, in a religious context, creedal statements m u s t be made, they are secondary to the personal leap that Kierkegaard m a d e famous. Such a c o m m i t m e n t is necessary if there is to be any g e n u i n e h o p e a n d love of the self and others and, t h r o u g h others, of God. We c a n n o t approach ourselves negatively, h e m m e d in w i t h a series of c o n d i t i o n s a r o u n d w h i c h we accept ourselves; n o r can we a p p r o a c h others or G o d in this way. T h e mystics always u n d e r s t o o d this in their c o n c e p t of the a b a n d o n m e n t of the self to God. T h e m o s t f u n d a m e n t a l aspect of faith is a c o m m i t m e n t w i t h o u t restriction. In this w a y it leads to h o p e and, in a very special way, tO love. We can see the negative attitude i m p l i e d in restrictions a n d conditions, or even in an excessive reasonableness in d e m a n d i n g " p r o o f , " if we consider two scenes with w h i c h a m o d e r n play, television episode, or m o v i e m i g h t begin. In a given scene the clues q u i c k l y indicate that the wife wants proof of her h u s b a n d ' s w h e r e a b o u t s w h e n he was two h o u r s late for dinner, as well as exact evidence that he is telling the truth. F r o m one p o i n t of view, this could be called a scientific or reasonable attitude. T h e h u s b a n d s h o u l d be w i l l i n g to offer p r o o f of w h e r e he was a n d w h y he was late. Yet intuitively a n d w i t h o u t e x p l a n a t i o n the audience, even the least sophisticated a m o n g them, i m m e d i a t e l y sense that there is comparatively little love existing between these two people. If so m u c h p r o o f is d e m a n d e d w h e n any element of mystery occurs in their relationship, they cannot really trust or love one another. Conversely, if the o p e n i n g scene has the w o m a n dismissing the husband's being late as u n d e r s t a n d a b l e w i t h o u t e x p l a n a t i o n , in a trusting and secure acceptance of his h a v i n g g o o d reasons w i t h o u t his n e e d i n g to give them, the same audience q u i c k l y understands that love exists between the two. T h e more one d e m a n d s reasons a n d e x p l a n a t i o n s , the less the atmosphere of trust and love is conveyed. T h e m o r e c o n d i t i o n s seem to d e m a n d proof, the less will love be evident. Contrariwise, love is re-

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vealed w h e n o p e n and s i m p l e acceptance occurs with no p r o o f demanded. Love, with its c o n c o m i t a n t trust, is a g e n u i n e affirmation in the face of the u n k n o w n and the mysterious.

Faith as the finding of the self Faith is itself, therefore, an act of giving oneself to oneself, to others, and a m o n g those others, religious faith implies a special leap a n d gift of oneself to God. T h e act of faith must proceed from a willingness both to possess the self and at the same time to give the self. Here we are in a strange paradox, s o m e t h i n g of w h i c h p o p u l a r l a n g u a g e expresses. We talk a b o u t "finding" oneself, " b e i n g " oneself, and "believing in oneself." H o w can I, if I a m lost, find myself? A n d w h o is lost a n d w h o is found? Or h o w can I, being myself, n o t believe in myself? H o w can I, in a sense, cut myself off from myself and n o t believe in myself? W h a t we are a t t e m p t i n g to discuss here is made difficult because language, especially p o p u l a r language, while very rich in subtle if confused awarenesses, is also c o n f u s i n g in the various ways it phrases these observed divisions in the self. T h e place of the "ego," the "self," the " w h o l e person" often gets quite m i x e d u p in this confused terminology. We say, for example, t h a t a person is " g o i n g to pieces," that he s h o u l d "take hold of himself" a n d " p u l l himself together," a n d everyone k n o w s or feels, in general and in feeling-tone, w h a t we mean. But what, precisely, does this mean? T h i s we will a t t e m p t to discuss without, h o w ever, entirely resolving the c o n f u s i o n in these p o p u l a r expressions. This act of the ego m a k i n g the self the object of its belief or disbelief, while it appears to be contradictory, is, at the same time, a h u m a n experience. Such an a p p a r e n t p a r a d o x is possible. We k n o w from personal awareness and experience of belief in the self that one can have confidence in oneself, and so make a far better use of himself by such aband o n i n g of the self or his ego to himself. Failure to do this negates and divides the self. Prior to this belief in oneself is the p l a c i n g of value o n the self. I can


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say, in a kind of d i c h o t o m o u s l a n g u a g e that is yet u n d e r s t o o d by a n y o n e hearing me, because he shares the same awareness, that "I a m disgusted with myself," or even that "I hate myself." In this situation w h e r e the ego is in a negative, resistant attitude toward the self, one can see that no genuine faith or trust in the self is possible. Insofar as I give myself genuinely to myself, I do so first of all by v a l u i n g myself, by h a v i n g a deep sense of m y worth as a self. So, p r i o r to any gift of myself to myself or prior to any confidence in myself or faith in myself, there m u s t be the statement that "I respect myself," that "I have positive regard for myself," that "I think myself to have g e n u i n e significance a n d w o r t h . " I must, in a word, assume a " r e d e m p t i v e " attitude toward myself in order to believe in myself. By " r e d e m p t i v e " here we m e a n that I m u s t convey w o r t h and value o n myself so that I feel myself w o r t h y to be the recipient of the gift of the ' T ' believing in a n d giving myself over to myself. If I believe a gift to be of no value, then its reception is valueless. In answering the question of w h a t m a n can believe in, then, an imp o r t a n t issue is to define w h a t belief is. "By "belief" we d o n o t m e a n some list of documents or some intellectually c o n v i n c i n g p r o p o s i t i o n s . It is a c o m m i t m e n t a n d a belief in s o m e o n e . B u t before we can even talk a b o u t the "other," we first have to consider the self: do I believe in myself and am I in possession of myself sufficiently to give myself to myself? If I have this positive, r e d e e m i n g attitude t o w a r d myself, I a m in a position to give myself to others. In this sense, faith is intimately related to h o p e and love. N e c e s s i t y of an i n t e g r a t e d s e l f

O n e m i g h t raise the further issue a b o u t the o b v i o u s d i c h o t o m y in the self contained in phrases like " o n e m u s t possess the self," or even that "one hates'oneself and o n e m u s t love oneself." T h e s e s e g m e n t e d phrases of the self seem to leave the ego incomplete. O n e reason for this tendency of self-segmentation is inherited t h r o u g h o u r culture, w h i c h has given us a Cartesian-Kantian idea of the psyche or the self, n a m e l y , that it is

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highly intellectual and f u n d a m e n t a l l y voluntarist. If we focus o n the Kantian sense of duty, w h i c h p r i m a r i l y determined the will a n d the categorical imperative that directed it, we recognize that Kant, like Descartes, saw no place for the emotions, the instincts, a n d the s o m a as related to the psyche and, therefore, as part of the h u m a n person. T h e body was cut off and removed, and this separation justified the current mechanistic notions of the time at w h i c h b o t h Kant a n d Descartes lived. If we look now, however, at the u n i t y of the self, we recognize that we are perhaps more comfortable with the Aristotelian n o t i o n of the psyche or the self as " i n f o r m i n g " the soma a n d being its basic life principle. T h e p o i n t here w o u l d be that the acts of b o t h k n o w i n g a n d w i l l i n g in the self w o u l d seek to penetrate into the emotions, instincts, a n d soma. T h i s involves the struggle to gain self-insight and greater integrated control of the self in m u c h the m a n n e r that m o d e r n p s y c h o t h e r a p y a n d counseling have worked o u t a n d described. L o o k e d at this way, the process of possessing the self, of loving the self, or of finding the self w o u l d be a process of taking counsel with the self. It w o u l d involve a p e n e t r a t i n g into the significance and m e a n i n g b e h i n d the segmented urges of the emotions, instincts, a n d soma a n d a recognizing of the particular segmented p u r p o s e of each of these actions. In this way, one w o u l d slowly pull them together into some kind of organismic w i s d o m . In a particular evaluation and decision, such w i s d o m integrates w h a t is best in the soma, emotions, and instincts in the direction of w h a t seems, in terms of personal insight and past and present self-awareness, to be best for the total integrated self. In other words, before faith in the self can really occur and, therefore, before h o p e and love in self can really occur, one m u s t avoid, in Plato's term, the "tragedy of the u n e x a m i n e d life." O n e m u s t u n d e r g o constant taking counsel with the self in order that, in a particular experience, evaluation, or choice, he can take the best elements of his awareness of the self, somatically, emotionally, and instinctively, a n d co-ordinate them with w h a t seems best to the intellectualized and v o l u n t a r y aspects of the self. In this sense, there is a kind of o w n i n g u p to the self.


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Usually in children and often in adults, there is an u n w i l l i n g n e s s to accept the body as being part of the self, as in the expression " m y feet are killing me." Here one gives a negative intent to parts of the body as being against the self. T h e same can be true of the instincts a n d the emotions. T h e y can be seen as inimical to the self. In " o w n i n g u p to the self" or the self possessing its total self, we have a self-insightful process that seeks the integrity of all aspects of the self--soma, instincts, emotions, intellect, a n d v o l u n t a r y functions. T h i s process believes in an integrated w i s d o m that, with the soma, instincts, and emotions co-ordinated in the best sense of self-realization, w o r k together toward the good of the w h o l e person. It is this kind of u n c o n ditioned, positive belief in the self that the c o u n s e l i n g - t h e r a p e u t i c process brings a b o u t w h e n it is successful. "Belief in the self" becomes clearer w h e n we get a w a y from the Cartesian-Kantian dichotomized n o t i o n of the separation of the psyche a n d soma. W h a t we see is rather a process of integration b r o u g h t a b o u t t h r o u g h taking counsel w i t h the self from w h i c h follows p e r s o n a l evaluation of what is best for the w h o l e person a n d choices that integrate soma, instincts, and emotions to intellect and will. Belief in oneself w o u l d mean that one can integrate the psyche a n d the s o m a in such a way that they interact h a r m o n i o u s l y w i t h o n e a n o t h e r rather than necessarily being at odds w i t h one a n o t h e r in the Cartesian sense.

Counsel: the informing of the self There m u s t be a period, then, in w h i c h the person takes c o u n s e l w i t h himself, and this taking counsel is a k i n d of " i n f o r m i n g " the self. It is a real " i n f o r m a t i o n a l " relation with the self in the basic sense of informing the w h o l e self and e n c a p s u l a t i n g or i n t e g r a t i n g it w i t h the insightful awarenesses of the cognitive self as it strives to u n d e r s t a n d a n d penetrate and " i n - f o r m " the emotions, instincts, a n d soma. In this sense, we w o u l d be talking in a q u i t e different c o n t e x t a b o u t the n o t i o n of "believing that I m a y u n d e r s t a n d . " By this idea of belief

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we m e a n the positive regard one has toward the w h o l e self; that one respectfully approaches the soma, instincts, a n d e m o t i o n s to seek the reasons mysteriously hidden in their a p p a r e n t l y segmented motivation; that by a p p r o a c h i n g them in this w a y one begins to u n d e r s t a n d and then can integrate them with the awarenesses of the ego in the conscious intellectual and voluntarist aspects of the self. T h i s concept of " i n - f o r m i n g " or integrating the w h o l e person is often difficult for us because, as we said, o u r culture is still so c a u g h t u p in a dichotomized inheritance from b o t h the Cartesianism a n d K a n t i a n i s m of an intellectual and voluntary process completely removed from, or at least separated from, the rather a u t o m a t i c mechanistic soma. Even while we use words that speak of a unified person, we are p e r h a p s still culturally h a n d i c a p p e d and impaired. T h i s is because it is hard for us to feel a respectful regard for the possible u n i t y of the soma, instincts, and emotions as having reasons that could be integrated a n d co-ordinated with the conscious, cognitive will.

The self related to others We m i g h t go into a further analysis of w h y "faith in the self" or total positive c o m m i t m e n t to the w h o l e person is so difficult. B u t we can move on n o w to consider the aspect of the self that relates us to others and in the capital sense to the final Other, God. We are restating in another [orm a contention of Aristotle that friendly relations with others or, in o u r terms, u n c o n d i t i o n a l , positive regard toward others begins with a genuine friendship toward the self. T h i s positive regard or "faith in the self" initiates the subtle process of integration of the self in contrast to the dichotomized aspects of the self. T h i s makes possible the faith, hope, a n d love that emerge between ego a n d t h e w h o l e self. T h r o u g h this process, too, the integrated self can begin b o t h to give itself in faith tO others and to trust, h o p e in, a n d love others. Consequently, the focus on our relationship to others is rather p r e d e t e r m i n e d by h o w we w o r k o u t o u r relationship to ourselves: Stated another way, a


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m a n must be a true friend to himself before he can be a friend to others. S o m e w h a t like dark glasses, o u r attitude toward ourselves colors o u r regard for and view of others. Aquinas extends this n o t i o n further by m a k i n g the interpretation of the text, so well k n o w n in Christian tradition, that one m u s t love one's neighbor as oneself, and then in a n d t h r o u g h love of n e i g h b o r a n d oneSelf, one m u s t love God. A q u i n a s c o m m e n t s that in this text the love of self is the model of w h i c h the love of n e i g h b o r is the copy, a n d that the copy will only be as valid, sound, a n d o p e r a t i o n a l l y effective as the model. In other words, as we love or hate ourselves, so o u r relation to others will be a copy of this. He proposes that we m u s t learn to "love ourselves loving" rather than "love ourselves h a t i n g . " These awarenesses all lead to the realization that o u r r e l a t i o n s h i p to others, and as a basic other, o u r r e l a t i o n s h i p to God, is in some w a y fundamentally determined by the way we believe, h o p e in, a n d love ourselves. This is the reason w h y we have p u t so m u c h e m p h a s i s on the subtlety of the ego related to the w h o l e self as being f u n d a m e n t a l to h o w the self relates to others and to God. T h e focal p o i n t here is that the self relates to others and to G o d in great measure as it relates to its total self. T h e nature of one's "belief" in others, therefore, follows from one's "belief," or lack of it, in o n e s e l f - - t h a t is, one's whole, unified, psychosomatic person. T h e ability to believe in others is d e t e r m i n e d by h o w well one relates to himself, to w h a t extent he believes in himself, loves himself, a n d has confidence in himself. The ambiguit~ in "insight"

Here a w o r d should be said of the a m b i g u i t y that is i m p l i e d in the use of the word "insight" itself. In the intellectual Cartesian focus that, in large measure, o u r scientific c u l t u r e a n d its m o d e l of m a t h e m a t i c s also inherit, insight w o u l d mean the gestalt configuration of c o m i n g together, not unlike the pieces of the jigsaw puzzle c o m i n g together at a moment to represent the face of Lincoln, or, m o r e exactly, the m a t h e m a t i c a l

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model of the w a y n u m b e r s or e q u a t i o n s are calculated or factored out. T h i s kind of abstractive, ideational configuration has an intellectualized existence that removes us from any e n g a g e m e n t w i t h the complexities of the w h o l e self; that is, the m u c h less ordered and co-ordinated soma, instincts, and emotions as they influence the self. C o n s e q u e n t l y this kind of abstractive and reflective h a r m o n y and integration of ideas, while valid as an orderly schema of life and the universe in its abstractive configurations, can in fact represent an escape a n d even a false clarity for the kind of insightful k n o w i n g that leads to the ego m a k i n g a positive comm i t m e n t to the w h o l e integrated person. If, for example, in the Cartesian model (the first rule of the "'Discours de la mOthode,'" according to w h i c h truth must be so "clear and distinct that it can no wise be d o u b t e d " - drawn from the clarity and conviction of mathematics) we were to look at the kind of struggle of insightful awareness of the self, then certainly we w o u l d never emerge with a n y t h i n g so clear and so distinct as to be even remotely c o m p a r a b l e to the precision a n d integration of a mathematical configuration. W h a t we mean, therefore, by " i n s i g h t " is n o t this kind of abstractive, gestahist configuration on the m a t h e m a t i c a l model. We m e a n rather the painful struggle necessary in the mystery of the self in order to come u p with those awarenesses, confused as they m a y be, that are yet filled with subtle significance to the self. " I n s i g h t " m e a n s the slow integration of particular somatic, instinctive, or e m o t i o n a l elements with the broader cognitive awarenesses of the self. W h a t we are focused on here is this more difficult, personal, a n d painful insight into oneself, rather than an abstractive p u l l i n g the pieces together " o u t there." T h i s kind of insight into one's w h o l e self is w h a t is essential for the regard, respect, a n d love of the self. T h e insight that we are talking a b o u t w o u l d be creative with regard to the w h o l e self. In other words, this kind of insight w o u l d gradually b r i n g a b o u t a new self. T h i s self has all sorts of parallels and resonances with the Christian birth of new self, particularly in its P a u l i n e emphasis. Carl Rogers has s p o k e n of the f u n d a m e n t a l reasonableness he finds in


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his clients when he genuinely strives to understand them. What I think he means here is that soma, instincts, and emotions have a basic reasonableness in what they d o - - a kind of reason for being and acting. Unfortunately, this reasonableness is narrow and restricted to the immediate somatic, instinctive, or emotional need--like the swelling of the nose in vasomotor rhinitis or the defensive eye blink. It sometimes corresponds to the need of the whole person. Most often, however, it can impede or even frustrate the whole person's fulfillment. It is the whole self's struggle for "insight" into the self that pulls these conflicting, narrow reasons together and integrates with the needs of the whole person. In carrying further, then, the issue of the self and why we must struggle for this kind of insight into the mystery of the whole self, one comes to a prior concept of some "disintegration" in man. Many traditions have attempted to explain these apparent divisions in the self by proposing that, because of some primal fault or fundamental error in the human condition, man has no longer the kind of integration that he might normally have had, or that he might be thought ideally to have. According to some traditions, this disintegrated state is a less natural, in the sense of less ideal, state of the h u m a n condition and so might be conceived of as a punishment. There are, however, other ways of looking at this same situation. They do not disregard the concept of disintegration, but rather suggest other aspects that could help to extend and clarify it.

The anxiety of existence Any discussion of the dichotomy, conflict, partitions, segmentations, or divisions within the self tends to focus, as a result of influences from Kierkegaard through Freud to modern Existentialism, on the angst of the h u m a n condition. Somehow man experiences from the first m o m e n t of existence--Freud proposes that anxiety seems to be a given and cannot be explained by anything prior to the infant or child's existence--a state of anxious concern and threat a r o u n d both his own existence and the meaning and ultimate value of that existence. However we explain this

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angst of man, it follows that it leaves h i m w i t h a great fear of any k i n d of risk or any sort of engaging himself in the u n k n o w n . In this sense, the Scriptural text that "perfect love casts o u t fear" w o u l d give the d i c h o t o m y here. W h a t faith, hope, and love have to w o r k against is the basic fear in m a n that causes h i m to shrivel u p in his o w n ego and so renders h i m u n w i l l i n g to trust or to give himself in any k i n d of openness, even to those other aspects of himself that w o u l d c o m p l e t e his integration. So the m a n w h o "hates himself" or is negative toward himself is also a m a n w h o is afraid of himself and afraid to trust himself. It becomes evident that this s a m e k i n d of fear of the self a n d fear to trust the self will be radiated to others, and in a religious context, to the Supreme Other, thus resulting in the same kind of a n x i o u s u n w i l l i n g ness to c o m m i t oneself. In this context it is i n t r i g u i n g that this is really the issue in the Parable of the Talents. W h i l e we p o p u l a r l y interpret the parable as an intellectualist search for talents and the o b l i g a t i o n of the more talented one, the core of the parable was this very shriveling, self-inverting, narcissistic fear. T h i s caused the m a n w i t h the one talent to bury it and n o t to risk, in fear and anxiety of the master, any comm i t m e n t of himself or the talent, b u t rather only to encrust himself, protect himself, and h o l d on. Here, as in the text, "He that w o u l d save his life shall lose it," such self-invested a n x i o u s protection of the ego against a total c o m m i t m e n t to the self a n d others is the very o p p o s i t e of the act that w o u l d cast o u t fear and move in the direction of love, and, therefore, also of h o p e a n d faith. We are speaking, then, of m a n ' s faith in himself, others, a n d G o d and of his attempt to overcome the primal angst that seems to characterize the h u m a n condition. T h i s involves a m a n ' s confidence in himself and his capacity to w o r k against the primitive defense of the self a n d so to arrive at some kind of leap, a b a n d o n m e n t , or g o i n g o u t that a c c o m p a n i e s the gift of the self to others. This struggle is c o m m o n to the h u m a n c o n d i t i o n a n d n o t peculiar to any of us. It is a struggle against a narrowness a n d a closing-in o n ourselves that w o u l d be the o p p o s i t e of g o i n g out, of b r o a d e n i n g ourselves,


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and so o p e n i n g u p to others. T h e f u n d a m e n t a l angst of the h u m a n condition militates against man's being able to go o u t a n d take the risk of giving himself to another person in love a n d faith. T h e r e is s o m e t h i n g self-defeating in this, as we observe in the illustration of the m a n w h o had the one talent. T h e thing that he needs m o s t he has the least chance of getting. This is a characteristic result of the angst of the h u m a n condition. It cannot be described in any other w a y than as an a l m o s t blind fear, a fear of losing existence a n d the n a r r o w a n d often self-defeating need to h a n g on to it primitively. T h e d r o w n i n g m a n ' s g r a b b i n g at the rescuer's throat may suggest s o m e t h i n g of this primitive, blind, selfdefeating panic.

Integration from change in perception If we follow this self-defeating c o n d i t i o n a n d fear of c o m m i t m e n t or of going out, this angst, we notice in the G e r m a n i t s e l f - - w h i c h suggests being " c o r n e r e d " - - t h a t such a c o n d i t i o n is n a r r o w a n d constrictive, that fear and anxiety create n a r r o w a n d constrictive feelings. We find this if we p u r s u e the t h o u g h t further in the w a y it is revealed in the process of taking counsel w i t h the self a n d g a i n i n g i n s i g h t into the mysterious aspects of man. If we look at the m e a n i n g of such angst, or such narrowed constriction in the self, we find that in the e m o t i o n of fear, in the instinct of defense, a n d in the primitive somatic r e a c t i o n s - - f o r exa m p l e such as v a s o m o t o r rhinitis where the areas swell u p to protect from a threatening agent entering the nasal p a s s a g e s - - w e see that there is a w i s d o m in this kind of defensive fear a n d protectiveness that keeps the other out. O n e m i g h t see this also in reference to the body's resistance to infection. T h e r e appears to be then a primitive w i s d o m , as we said earlier, in the isolated action of v a s o m o t o r rhinitis, or the t i g h t e n i n g of the s t o m a c h areas in defense, anger, a n d fear. T h e focus is on some n a r r o w perception in terms of the w a y the e m o t i o n s r e s p o n d to w h a t appears to the organism as threatening. But we realize that, by a broader insight-aware-

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ness, t h i s threatening object can assume a totally different perceptual field. This change in perception can relax the fear, anxiety, and the instinctive defenses. At the same time, the soma itself often responds to this with a relaxed biochemical and physical change. One can see this illustrated by taking a person by surprise and waving one's hand in front of his eyes. T h e subject's first reaction, because he is responding simply to a threatening object at a primitive subcortical level, is to pull his head back, to blink, and often to experience other primitive threat reactions, such as perspiration in the palms and increased heart beat. However, if one continues to do this for eight to ten waves of the hand, the subject indicates, often by a slight smile, a relaxed feeling of security. He openly trusts the experimenter. In this experiment n o t h i n g is said. What happens is that the subject changes his perception of the field of what is going on and broadens his realization of the whole self, so that he no longer sees himself threatened, but recognizes that he is the object of an illustration in a simple experiment of defense reflex. Seeing the positive value in what he is doing, he is now somatically, instinctively, and emotionally integrated around his more comprehensive cognitive awareness of the total situation. In this simple illustration we see how the process of taking counsel with the self involves the ego's cognitive working through the whole self and so bringing about a different perception. Consequently, the narrowed angst-segmented view that caused the instincts, soma, and emotions to have their own narrowed and segmented reaction gives way, through a total self-awareness, to a different gestalt, configuration, or conceptualization. This results in a changed response in the soma, instincts, and emotions, which are now integrated through the ego's cognitive struggle to grasp the total situation. This corresponds to the process that brings about greater integrated insight into the mystery of the total self. While this is not the clear and distinct awareness that, according to a mathematical model, our scientific Cartesian culture might demand as prerequisite for a real conviction or proof, yet it has the cognitive ability to bring about a more integrated response of the whole


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self as a result of a changed and broader self-configuration. T h e cognitive aspects of the self somehow penetrate the soma, instincts, and emotions with this new view and so relieve them of their narrow defenses and cornered sense of angst. The person's struggle to gain broader self-awareness and control in the "eye reflex" experiment illustrates what he needs to experience in the freeing of himself from the bind that his feelings have put h i m in. T h e change in the configuration or the perception is the response of the integrated self rather than the response of the segmented self. If a person sees himself as the object of an experiment intended as a respectful illustration, he is in a positive relationship both to himself and to the other person. Therefore, contrary to the primitive defense that only saw an object coming at the eye, there is a re-reading by the cognitive self of the moving hand and a re-interpretation of it. T h e instincts, soma, and emotions now accept this as not being threatening to the self b u t as being positive and redemptive, giving the self worth and trusting the self to handle this threat constructively. T h e whole self then responds by doing just this and no longer defensively blinking and withdrawing. T h e r e is genuine, open trust. Handling the threat constructively by an integrated self would be the redeeming act. The ego gives value to the self through the realization that this is not going to be an act that hurts the self. When the self is abandoned in openness--the eye is not blinked, the head not pulled back--it is enhanced and redeemed. T h e self is now seen as a h u m a n person who controls cognitively the instincts, soma, and emotions and is no longer the victim of them. This is the same path, in a more complex way, that any processs of counsel-integration must follow, whether by the person himself or with the aid of counseling. The organism's quest for death We migh t now explore how there might be purpose or m e a n i n g behind the h u m a n organism's resistance to trusting both the self and others. We

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are led here to Freud's conception, expressed in his Beyond the Pleasure Principle, of the n o t i o n of death wish a n d death instinct as being fundamental to man. According to this concept, the o r g a n i s m recognizes the one irrevocable a n d certain truth a b o u t itself: that it is g o i n g to die. T h e o r g a n i s m recognizes this from the m o m e n t of birth, a n d so is always p r e p a r i n g itself to emerge into death. T h e r e is thus a p u r p o s i v e intent in the o r g a n i s m by w h i c h it tries to m a i n t a i n itself as close to death as possible t h r o u g h o u t its life. If the goal of the o r g a n i s m is death, as it obviously is, then it is to the o r g a n i s m ' s basic advantage n o t to allow life forces to take too strong a h o l d lest they lead the o r g a n i s m falsely away from this o b v i o u s goal. T o o m u c h c o m m i t m e n t to life w o u l d seem to make it all the harder for the o r g a n i s m to accept a n d reconcile itself to death w h e n that inevitable and predictable end is realized. If one sees the primitive intent of preserving the o r g a n i s m for death as its direct end, one recognizes a n a r r o w b u t p r o f o u n d validity to this kind of death instinct. T o be sure, if a m a n is to die, a n d of course he is, then it m a y appear safe to stay close to that goal t h r o u g h o u t his life. Contrary to this w o u l d be any urges to life that, by definition, w o u l d seem to be leading h i m away from a d m i t t i n g his real i m m e d i a t e goal, w h i c h is death; the life urges c o u l d even seem to lead to the most tragic of selfdeceptions, namely, that he is g o i n g to c o n t i n u e to live i n t e r m i n a b l y and that he need not face or prepare himself for death. O n e needs only to look at oneself to realize that m a n does consciously have this unwillingness to face the inevitable end of his organism. Consequently, he can tend to set himself u p for this tragic self-deception. Seen this way, the counterbalance of the o r g a n i s m h o l d i n g o u t for a death instinct and a death wish a n d always c o u n t e r a c t i n g every life drive of the organism by the reminder of the necessity of its being w i l l i n g to die offers great, if narrowed, w i s d o m to the h u m a n person. It also offers an understandable counterbalance to the e u p h o r i a of a s s u m i n g that one will live forever, g r a n t i n g that others die. T h e death instinct a n d death wish, as Freud called them, then, keep m a n close to the end of the organism even t h r o u g h he is always trying to v a u l t over that inevitable p u r p o s e a n d goal.


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Michelangelo caught s o m e t h i n g of this h u m a n a m b i g u i t y a n d ambivalence toward life and death in two statues, b o t h called " C a p t i v e . " Clark comments: "one of them struggling to be f r e e - - f r o m m o r t a l i t y ? and the other sensuously resigned, 'half in love w i t h easeful death.' "* O n e figure seems almost literally to be fighting his w a y o u t of the stone that surrounds him; the other appears passively, a l m o s t narcotically, submissive to his linen bind.

Emergence of life out of death It is said that of all the acts in the circus, the o n e that most attracts circus p e o p l e themselves and that they never tire of w a t c h i n g is the high trapeze act. T h e reason m a y be that this act catches the h u m a n c o n d i t i o n in two of its basic conflicts: the self-preservation polarity, w h i c h is to h o l d on tightly to the swing where one is safe; a n d the life polarity, w h i c h involves letting go and leaping in the trust that the other will be there to catch h i m when he has made this great risk of the self. T h e trapeze act catches the life-and-death struggle that seems to engage us all. O n the one hand, the organism wisely cautions us against life impulses a n d life urges lest they lead us too far into the illusion that we will n o t die; and on the other, the m o r e cognitive a n d broader aspects of that same self seem always to be reaching o u t in self-a~irmation b e y o n d the self. There is a leap first from the ego to the self and a trusting of the w h o l e self against all the segmented urges of angst, death, a n d fear. T h e n from the trust of the self there is a letting go of oneself a n d a l e a p i n g o u t in faith to others and, religiously, to the S u p r e m e O t h e r - - G o d . B u t o n e must counteract one's death instinct a n d death w i s h before a n y significant life action is possible. T h e r e is a certain validity in the protective, inverted tendency of the organism. Since its goal is death, the m o r e the o r g a n i s m becomes involved in life, the further a w a y from this goal it moves. F r o m a n a r r o w instinctive p o i n t of view, it makes limited sense for the o r g a n i s m to cling to death. But an urge in m a n m o r e representative of the m e a n i n g a n d *Clark, Kenneth, Civilisation. New York, Harper and Row, !969, p. 126.

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p u r p o s e of the w h o l e person is the thrust to l i v e - - t o m o v e o u t of oneself into life a n d into relationships w i t h others. Like the skilled trapeze artist, a skillfully integrated self lets go of the ego a n d leaps into the w h o l e self and, b e y o n d this, in faith a n d trust, to others.

The option for openness In their n a r r o w n e s s - - w h i l e they m a y fulfill a death w i s h - - t h e instincts, soma, a n d emotions can also, for the same reason, deceive a person a n d cause h i m to be afraid to l i v e - - a f r a i d of trusting himself a n d others. Such fear and mistrust can result in bitter rejection of the self. T h e s e aspects lead away from integration and self-approval to self-disgust a n d even to a greater state of disintegration and escape. T h e character of J u d a s c o u l d symbolize this destructive aspect of the death wish in his u n w i l l i n g n e s s to forgive himself. These same characteristics can be a p p l i e d to the other. T h e other is capable of betrayal, of m i s u s i n g one's trust. In o u r earlier illustration, the experimenter c o u l d actually slap the subject; w h a t the person w o u l d feel after this illustrates a f u n d a m e n t a l h u m a n situation. O n e s o l u t i o n is expressed in the p o p u l a r phrase, " F o o l me once, shame on you; fool me twice, shame on me." But an alternative w o u l d be for the subject to trust the experimenter the third time. H e w o u l d do this t h r o u g h a b r o a d cognitive realization that the slap was a d e m o n s t r a t i o n that the instincts and emotions are n o t always wrong, a n d therefore the slap was n o t an insult, b u t the same as b e f o r e - - s i m p l y an illustration for everyone's benefit. This w o u l d p u t the subject in a self-attitude t h a t is dignified and redemptive, and n o t rejecting. H e m a y then willingly trust a n d be o p e n on the third trial, neither b l i n k i n g nor p u l l i n g his head back. Contrariwise, if he feels that he has been shamed a n d h u m i l i a t e d and if he c a n n o t see that he was in the same dignified p o s i t i o n in the second trial as in the first, he will remain the victim of his o w n defensive encapsulation. H e will not only blink a n d throw his head back, b u t p r o b a b l y t h r o w his hands u p in defense as well. Or he m a y refuse to participate further.


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It is this third situation a n d o p t i o n that seem to be the h u m a n condition: what does one do after one has been hurt? In this sense, the text that we should love o u r enemies suggests that we m u s t love that w h i c h first appears inimical to us, as the deceptive self m a y a p p e a r inimical to the ego w h e n it is in a state of hatred or disgust t o w a r d itself. Similarly, another person m a y a p p e a r inimical to o n e w h e n it seems to h i m that the other has betrayed a n d m i s u s e d his faith. Yet everyone at some time experiences betrayal or abuse. If the h u m a n c o n d i t i o n is n o t to settle for the path of "saving one's life" t h r o u g h a n a r r o w protective death wish and so losing the broader a n d m o r e c o m p r e h e n s i v e m e a n i n g of life; if one is n o t simply to give u p really living by staying as close to death as possible, living, so to speak, in a cemetery; then o n e takes this risk of repeatedly letting come forth all the life instincts that are in him. H e does this in the realization that he c o u l d be betrayed, that he c o u l d be misused, that in a particular instance, this is possibly a s i t u a t i o n "inimical" to him. Yet he still o p e n s himself in love, faith, a n d trust in the face of that possible option. We do not mean here, of course, that this initial u n c o n d i t i o n e d regard must always continue w i t h o u t limits. A due consideration a n d love of self demands that, at some point, o n e invoke l i m i t s - - i n a h a r m f u l or foolish situation, for example, after repeated efforts. We m e a n , t h o u g h , that no genuine relationship seems possible unless o n e or b o t h persons involved begin w i t h a truly o p e n c o m m i t m e n t a n d engagement. Like Michelangelo's "Captives," o n e either passively accepts threat a n d resigns to defensive death w i t h d r a w a l urges, or, in the alternate statue, one struggles toward life, t o w a r d fuller b e i n g beyond. T h e very struggle to change the perception of w h a t appears to be an inimical r e l a t i o n s h i p is in itself a dignifying a n d life-centered act. T h e n g o i n g b e y o n d that struggle w o u l d be the conscious c o m m i t m e n t to the o p e n i n g of oneself. O n e m a y and usually does k n o w that o n e c o u l d lose in the relationship; b u t it is the intentional, p u r p o s i v e act of o p e n i n g oneself, even in the light of this possible betrayal, that is u n i q u e l y for the other a n d a w a y from protective narcissism.

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For this act to be possible, as we have seen, it m u s t flow o u t of the previous c o m m i t m e n t a n d acceptance of oneself. T h e ego has in fact been deceived and betrayed m a n y times in the past by the self, a n d so it will tend not to w a n t to take the risk. Yet this is precisely one aspect of the Christian message of loving w h a t m a y seem " i n i m i c a l " or an " e n e m y , " namely, that one does go o u t to w h a t may a p p e a r to betray. T h i s also characterizes the h u m a n c o n d i t i o n - - t h e ego has been betrayed by the self. Unless one can b r i n g these two into some kind of trusting h a r m o n y within himself, he c a n n o t go o u t in love to another, a n d particularly if the other h a p p e n s at first to seem to be an "enemy."

Life-or-death response A p p l i e d to others, then, this life-death conflict explains m a n y of the most p a i n f u l and c o n f u s i n g as well as most glorious a n d e n h a n c i n g of hum a n experiences. For in any h u m a n r e l a t i o n s h i p in a n d t h r o u g h oneself, the person must first trust himself and his life impulses e n o u g h to give himself over in some kind of insightful taking counsel w i t h the self. T h e resultant cognitive integration then allows h i m to give a gift of his w h o l e self. This, of course, is a far different t h i n g from talking a b o u t simply " l o v i n g " others in an intellectual sense. T h i s is a gift of s e l f - - i n c l u d i n g emotions, instincts, and s o m a - - o p e n l y to a n o t h e r in an act of trust that is a prelude to a n d necessary part of an act of love. In the process of this, one's life impulses emerge. O n e m i g h t even say that, at first, these emergent life impulses can startle the other person, m u c h as the h a n d suddenly waved before the eyes startles the other person, so c a u s i n g s p o n t a n e o u s defense, negation, and arousal of his death instinct. Because this negative response from the other person is u n e x p e c t e d a n d even illogical, it is one of the most difficult of h u m a n experiences to accept. Stated another way, it is understandable that where one has struggled to b r i n g to life some c o m m i t m e n t between his ego a n d his self, a n d has succeeded in expressing the results of this struggle to a n o t h e r person or to a group, he can, in fact, logically expect their redemptive u n d e r s t a n d i n g and shar-


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ing. He may logically expect a sharing of his life impulses and of his integrated cognitions and deep and even painful self-investments. T h a t is, the person can normally expect what m i g h t be called an incarnate-redemptive response on the part of others in which they open themselves emotionally, instinctively, somatically, and cognitively to a g e n u i n e effort to understand what he is trying to communicate. In fact, however, we know from repeated personal experience in this situation, this kind of response seems only rarely to occur. It most often occurs only when one has made this personal revelation to skilled therapists and counselors, because they themselves have undergone a long and rigorous training. One result of this training enables them to control their self-oriented impulses and really to "understand," These people, by virtue of their skill and self-control, are able to give the kind of understanding, integrative response that seems so profoundly helpful and gives such a sense of worth and redemptive value to the other person. Why such a skill and art are necessary is evident in the process that the training of people in skilled counseling and psychotherapy reveals. When a person tries to make some kind of life expression about himself, apparently the first impulse aroused in another is an expression of his own death urges. These will segment, distort, and divide what the person has said. "He didn't understand." "He cut me to pieces," he may say afterwards, as he painfully tells others what happened to him. He is describing a divided and segmented feeling that he was n o t understood at all, that he was fragmented. In trying to c o m m u n i c a t e himself, he in fact came away wounded, perhaps almost w o u n d e d unto death. It will then be very difficult for h i m to have sufficient trust and hope ever again to struggle to project these personal life urges to anyone else. We may say that this is the description of himself that the client often gives in the beginning stages of counseling or psychotherapy. If a person is talking about a relationship in marriage, it is a painful description of how he has tried to communicate with his wife, or she with her husband, and death effects have followed to the point where he or she has become protectively encrusted and unwilling ever to trust again. T h e same thing

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m a y h a p p e n with children in relation to parents, or parents to children. It can h a p p e n to groups of p e o p l e living or w o r k i n g together. T h e end effect has been that w h e n one struggled to express some aspect of life, some elements of hope, value, a n d m e a n i n g that were of deep significance to himself, he met with death. T h e negative, destructive, segmented, divisive responses of others left h i m nearly dead. In this w o u n d e d condition he understandably comes to the therapist for some kind of skilled healing or therapy. We can say, then, that, rather than understanding, most p e o p l e respon d to another's deep revelation a n d c o m m i t m e n t with responses that are divisive a n d segmented because such o p e n statements are a threat in that they represent a life force. It is an a t t e m p t to segment whatever integration the person has acquired and so reduce h i m to the same condition as their own. Therefore, a person w h o attempts to communicate any creative aspects of himself has most often to seek o u t someone w h o is skilled in u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d listening to him, if he is n o t to stir u p death urges. H e w o u l d have to go to others w h o have overcome their o w n death impulses, even if only e n o u g h to listen to h i m a n d hear h i m out. This alone helps. But it takes more than this to further his creativity. W h e n such creative u n d e r s t a n d i n g occurs, he leaves healed and feeling genuinely fulfilled as a result of such c o m m u n i c a t i o n . T h i s sensitive understanding, like a successful trapeze act, leaves the o n e w h o took the leap positively and constructively e n c o u r a g e d to c o n t i n u e the creative thinking process and, in expressing himself, to be able to h o p e for and trust in the c o n t i n u a t i o n of such redemptive c o m m u n i c a t i o n .

Model of communication We c o u l d say, then, that w h a t the skilled c o u n s e l i n g therapist does, o u t of learned self-control a n d self-possession demonstrated by his delicate h o l d i n g to cognitive-feeling life responses, could be the m o d e l for w h a t we m u s t all struggle to do w i t h one a n o t h e r in any k i n d of creative comm u n i c a t i o n . This c o u l d be the m o d e l of a n y kind of effort at c o m m u n i cation and c o m m u n i t y . O n e person w o u l d struggle cognitively a n d personally to preserve life by h o l d i n g himself open to the other a n d to the


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mysterious struggle for w h a t is valuable a n d s o u n d in the other's effort to understand himself a n d to take counsel w i t h himself or to c o m m u n i cate some plan, project, or series of ideas. H e w o u l d be able, in a lifegiving atmosphere, to present himself w i t h o u t defenses. H e c o u l d confidently expect u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d the c o n v a l i d a t i o n of the w o r t h of his c o m m u n i c a t i o n . This "consensual validation," to use H a r r y Stack Sullivan's term, or convalidation, w o u l d carry with it the confirmation of his value as a p e r s o n - - i n his o w n uniqueness. In a word, such convalidation w o u l d be "redemptive." T h e other Until now, while we have considered belief in the other, it has been related to the self and self needs. We have p r i m a r i l y interrelated the conflict of the ego in its m o v i n g o u t from angst a n d death to trust the self. This demands some elements of integration that relate soma, instincts, and emotions to the broader aspects of the self. T h i s process also involves m o v i n g o u t to the other. T h e r e is, however, o n e special element that encounter with the other offers the self. T h e r e is s o m e t h i n g u n i q u e in the other, as other, that the self c a n n o t give itself. O n l y t h r o u g h the other can the limits of the self be defined and g r a d u a l l y recognized. C h i l d h o o d begins not only in angst, b u t also in a narcissistic inversion and self-preservation. T h e d e v e l o p m e n t a l process is a slow a n d sometimes painful restricting of the self in the process of g o i n g o u t to the other. A person defines the limits of the self as it comes into conflict w i t h the limits of the other. One sees that there is, in the experience of the other, a kind of limiting of the s e w s will. T h i s is also a definition, in the m o s t exact sense of that term, a defining a n d d r a w i n g forth f r o m the self, a gradual recognition of its o w n dimensions. Internalization of will to p o w e r Alfred Adler's concept of the "will to p o w e r , " as b e i n g in conflict w i t h "will to c o m m u n i t y , " expresses this well. N o t only is the self c a u g h t u p

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in narcissistic inversion in early childhood, but its need for identification a n d m e a n i n g comes from a sense of power that others first convey on the self. T h e n the self gradually conveys this to the self. T h e will to power flows at first from the child's struggle for i n d e p e n d e n t self-affirmation and self-identity. In other words, the early process of consensual validation, or convalidation, from the other consists p r i m a r i l y in attributing to the small and g r o w i n g c h i l d his awareness of and confidence in his o w n i n d e p e n d e n t p o w e r over m a n y conditions a r o u n d him. Independence itself involves the dignity that goes w i t h one's o w n selfidentity and one's right to guiltless expression of one's will, in certain conditions. H a v i n g one's will dignifiedly recognized by the other's approval and acquiescence is itself a convalidation of the will to power. One might, therefore, propose that the first redemptive state in the child occurs as his will to power is validated a n d internalized. Increasingly, his sense of identity and self-worth is in some measure determ i n e d by the degree to w h i c h this p o w e r is recognized by others as coming from h i m and h a v i n g its o w n rights in h i m . In the struggle, for example, over the fetish object that m a n y children undergo, a struggle sometimes expressed, too, in their anxieties over n i g h t m a r e fears, one often sees this. No matter h o w the therapy proceeds, it reveals a gradual internalizing of the child's power over this fearful object. T h e child begins to assert himself as being more powerful than the fearful object. T h e power of this security-giving or fearful o b j e c t - - b e it doll or horrendous n i g h t m a r e i m a g e - - i s in some m a n n e r the creation of the child himself. He grows to u n d e r s t a n d that he has given to the fetish the power to give h i m security or the n i g h t m a r e to scare h i m . He can then take it away and so be i n d e p e n d e n t and freed. In a particular therapeutic series, for example, the child at first has repeatedly drawn his n i g h t m a r e image, is afraid of it, a n d is e n c o u r a g i n g the therapist to appear to share h i s great fear of this object. As the sessions continue, he slowly works t h r o u g h to the fact that he is n o t afraid of the image because, after all, he m a d e it and he can tear it up. He then asserts his power over the previously fearful image by h a v i n g the courage


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to tear it up. After d o i n g this over a certain period, he is free of the anxieties of the n i g h t m a r e fears. We have here an a c t i n g - o u t of the internalized fears as an extrinsic assertion of p o w e r over the drawn, or handpainted, fear object and the extrinsic act of tearing it up. T h e assertion of p o w e r over that object seems to be c o n c o m i t a n t w i t h an internal selfassertion of p o w e r over the n i g h t m a r e fear and, therefore, the g r a d u a l acquisition of more peaceful sleep.

The sacrifice of self-assertion Seen this way, then, power, as the m e a n s of worth, dignity, r e d e m p t i o n , and self-identity is basic to a person's sense of value a n d his o w n sense of worth. This must, therefore, be conveyed to the child a n d repeatedly convalidated by all those a r o u n d h i m so that he g r o w s confident in his o w n power, worth, and identity. These are related terms in this sense. It is in a n d t h r o u g h this sense of p o w e r that his sense of w o r t h grows. T h e r e is, however, another phase that seems to be the exact o p p o s i t e of this. It is usually expressed in the fear that the child m a y b e c o m e too superior in his p u r s u i t of p o w e r a n d self-excellence. T h i s can h a p p e n and can result in a tendency to r u n over others a n d to use them. Sometimes in this m a n i p u l a t i o n there m a y be the a p p e a r a n c e of caring for them, but only as a deception. T h e real intent is w h a t others can do for the person himself. Such m a n i p u l a t i o n , control, a n d m a n e u v e r i n g of others can assume the self-deceptive disguise f u n d a m e n t a l to narcissism. Narcissus, in love with his o w n image in the p o o l , never k n e w that this was not the image of another; w h e n it d i s a p p e a r e d as he tried to embrace it, he felt cursed by the gods. One of the deceptive aspects of a p p a r e n t g i v i n g of the self and h a v i n g faith and trust in others is that it c o u l d finally be a self-centered maneuver. In fact, one has never really given oneself to the other at all. H e has always given himself only in those aspects that further represent and enhance himself t h r o u g h the other. This, indeed, w o u l d be a Sartrean world of " n o exit" from the captivity of the self.

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Real encounter w i t h the other aids this development. In any k i n d of c o m m u n i t y relationship, in marriage, a n d in a special w a y in g r o u p counseling or psychotherapy, the b o u n d a r y lines between selves begin to emerge a n d assert themselves. Wills to p o w e r clash, a n d as they clash they also define limits of individual selves. It is here that some kind of gift of the self is required. For a g o i n g o u t to the other to occur, one must first possess himself a n d so have a strong sense of his o w n identity, power, and worth. O n e sacrifices this self-power in giving oneself o p e n l y to the other. As Adler suggested, will to c o m m u n i t y , in the sense of g e n u i n e comm u n i o n and c o m m u n i c a t i o n with the other, does involve the giving u p of the p o w e r of the self. T h e urge to h o l d on to self-power here m i g h t come from that aspect of the self that holds us close to death. In giving u p the p o w e r of self-affirmation, o n e gives up, too, the possible self-aggrandizement that this m a y represent. W h e n one has given u p this power, one trusts that a greater enlarging of the self will occur. But this occurs in and t h r o u g h the other, once the a b a n d o n m e n t to c o m m u n i o n a n d u n i o n with the other has been made. Prior to any gift of the self or belief in h o p e a n d love of the other must be the ancient awareness of "to each his o w n . " T h i s includes both the recognition of one's o w n limits a n d of the place where the frontier and dimensions of the other begin. W h e n one has clearly separated himself from the other, he can then give himself to the other as distinct from a narcissistic projection of himself on the other in self-deception. O n e must be ready to a l l o w the other to f u n c t i o n i n d e p e n d e n t l y in his o w n self-assertion within the boundaries of his o w n self-dimension. T h e other is then seen as a person u n i q u e l y different from h i m and u n i q u e l y b e y o n d him. Precisely because of b o t h this u n i q u e difference and u n i q u e beyondness of the other, a person m u s t genuinely leap o u t of himself to reach that other. T h e relationship of the ego to the self, or any other aspects of the self, cannot provide the self-limits that the one's r e l a t i o n s h i p to a n o t h e r demands. W h e n two people, for example, have internalized the will to


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p o w e r in themselves and have had it sufficiently convalidated, this will to p o w e r can give way to will to c o m m u n i t y . C o m m u n i c a t i o n between them is then possible. O n e m u s t give u p the will to p o w e r in behalf of the other before c o m m u n i t y a n d c o m m u n i o n can take place. T h e y c o u l d do this for one a n o t h e r - - e a c h giving u p his o w n self-affirmation as he recognizes the other's prior need to be u n d e r s t o o d a n d affirmed. Need to love the other first

In order for two wills to power, facing o n e another, to c o m e to some c o m m u n i o n , resolution, and realization, o n e m u s t give over to the other. T o prevent an eyeball-to eyeball death-rejection c o n f r o n t a t i o n a n d static state, one of them must love first. By loving first we m e a n that o n e m u s t openly foreswear his need for self-assertion a n d o p e n himself to be used by the other. In the model of c o u n s e l i n g a n d therapy, it is the counselor or therapist w h o first wills to o p e n himself to be used by the other; he makes a love relationship possible by o p e n l y l o v i n g first. In a theological context, we note, as St. J o h n says, "It is n o t that we first loved God, b u t G o d first loved us." T h i s suggests the necessity of one person giving himself first so that the other m a y feel convalidation. T h i s gives h i m worth and validity. W h e n he has arrived at a conviction of his valid selfidentity, he can begin to o p e n himself to b e i n g a kind of i n s t r u m e n t a l i t y for another. T h e will to c o m m u n i t y can then o p e r a t e in their relationship together. T h i s comes from a conscious choice toward c o m m u n i t y and away from p o w e r by one in order that the other m a y be convalidated and g r o w in his o w n identity, self-affirmation, a n d worth. W h e n two p e o p l e are experiencing the limits of one another, o n e or both necessarily must give in to the will to c o m m u n i t y so that the relationship remains one of c o m m u n i o n a n d c o m m u n i c a t i o n . T h i s k i n d of conscious, willful giving u p of the self to the other can p e r p e t u a t e itself. O n e can learn to do this, a n d will to do it, for another. T h i s w o u l d k e e p alive, constructive, and creative a threefold personal fulfillment in communication, c o m m u n i o n , a n d c o m m u n i t y .

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Religion as a bind

A final concept w o u l d be c o n t a i n e d in the w o r d "religion." By "religion" here we mean, first of all, its c o m m o n literal interpretation as being related to the idea of a bind, or bond. Any g e n u i n e relationship with the other is, in this sense, religious because it binds two or m o r e people. As we have said, one can m a n i p u l a t e and m a n e u v e r the other for oneself narcissistically, a n d one can even go so far as to suppress any confused self-awareness that o n e is d o i n g this. O n e can consciously deceive himself into thinking that he is g e n u i n e l y concerned for, has faith in, and is g o i n g o u t to the other when, in fact, he has never left the safe protection of the trapeze swing. H e is only enticing and m a n e u v e r i n g the other to trust him, b u t he will m a n i p u l a t e and control h i m as he pleases. T o break into this protective b i n d one m u s t establish, by w a y of a faith c o m m i t m e n t a n d a b a n d o n m e n t , a different kind of b i n d or bond. T h i s is a c o m m u n i o n with the other that is open, unprotective, a n d expressive of life. T h e o p p o s i t e is a closed and protective death w i s h of selfinversion and narcissistic encapsulation. T h i s kind of b i n d has to be willed. It is free because the o p p o s i t e is always possible. Such a concept of "religion," then, is b o t h free a n d an act of h o p e a n d love as well as of faith. Were it not in some measure a g e n u i n e option, it w o u l d have no m e a n i n g as a true c o m m i t m e n t .

A b a n d o n m e n t to a total Other

If we a p p l y this concept of "religion" to others, it constitutes a b i n d or b o n d freely willed. In a very special sense, however, this c o n c e p t of religion is, as generally understood, particularly a p p l i c a b l e to that Other w h o is u n i q u e and for w h o m we use the n a m e God. A person's a p p r o a c h to that Other, w h o is God, can take a variety of forms. H e may, in the classical, reasonable Prearnbula Fidei, p r o p o s e to himself that behind m a n y of the confusions and conflicts of nature there is yet an orderliness and design. T h i s implies a kind of force that is intelligent a n d that de-


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termines life and life's p u r p o s e a n d so leads o n e to the r e c o g n i t i o n of the existence of God. From such a r e c o g n i t i o n o n e can m a k e the same kind of c o m m i t m e n t and bind, in the sense of religion, that he makes toward another. But the conditions of this b o n d are that he is b i n d i n g himself to the Other usually according to one of the various traditional meanings that we attribute to the w o r d " G o d . " Alternately, a person can arrive at a need for a n d c o m m i t m e n t to G o d through an awareness of his o w n restlessness a n d the i n a d e q u a c y of all possible life goals. This w o u l d be an i n t u i t i o n of the O t h e r in a basic A u g u s t i n i a n sense. T h a t is, one's w h o l e b e i n g cries o u t in restlessness for some kind of total fulfillment a n d projection. A person can s i m p l y accept and admit the existence of such a Being a n d a b a n d o n himself. T h e experience of the friendship a n d love of that Being w o u l d f o l l o w from a kind of mystical awareness of prayer and divine c o m m u n i c a t i o n . H o w e v e r one does this, and by whatever creedal codes a n d delineations, whether J u d a e o or Christian or otherwise, he binds a n d encapsulates himself t h r o u g h his faith c o m m i t m e n t . O n e has b o u n d himself in a c o m m i t m e n t similar to his faith c o m m i t m e n t b o t h to himself and to others. But he has n o w c o m m i t t e d himself in a very special w a y to that Being behind all beings, that u n k n o w n God. T h i s is a relationship with the most mysterious of all the u n f a t h o m a b l e mysteries of life. It can, therefore, represent the m o s t total a n d m o s t c o m p l e t e gift of oneself that is possible. O n e m i g h t see the religious b i n d to G o d as the ultimate fulfillment a n d zenith of all a b a n d o n m e n t s that o n e makes of oneself to others. Insofar as o n e a b a n d o n s himself to a n o t h e r h u m a n being, there is always some kind of reflection of himself in that being, offering h i m some kind of narcissistic reassurance. H e can say this b e i n g has existence similar to his own. W h i l e all r e l i g i o n s , in a special way, have some .anthropomorphic elements in their i m a g e of God, the J u d a e o and Christian religions have a h i g h l y personalized God. T h e y have given us a belief in a G o d w h o is deeply sharing of the h u m a n c o n d i t i o n and deeply u n d e r s t a n d i n g of all aspects of man. Yet even here the n a t u r e of the a b a n d o n m e n t to God, as God, is totally b e y o n d any i m a g e in man.

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The unconditioned c o m m i t m e n t O n e might, then, from this p o i n t of view, p r o p o s e that Religion, in the capital sense of that w o r d as a p p l i e d to God, is a very special b i n d of the self to the Other. It must, at its final level, be a total k i n d of faith in mystery because, by definition, the a b a n d o n m e n t to this Other is Another totally b e y o n d man. W h i l e in m o s t religious traditions the God-figure has, in some form, become incarnate or at least c o m m u n i c a t e d w i t h m a n in a h u m a n way, yet the h u m a n c o m m u n i c a t i o n itself is only God's means of loving m a n and o p e n i n g himself to m a n ' s needs a n d limits. By definition, God, in his o w n being, is a totally nonnarcissistic object of man's faith, hope, a n d love. T h i s is w h y one m u s t make a c o m p l e t e act of faith in God, despite whatever rational evidences and proofs m a y lead one to some kind of conviction of the existence a n d significance of God. In the act of faith one m u s t a b a n d o n oneself to another totally beyond the self and others. T h i s is the u n i q u e quality of a religious bind. Any n o t i o n of faith then involves the experience of " b i n d i n g , " a n d so is closely associated w i t h religion. A person w h o has in some w a y freely b o u n d himself to another has made an act of faith and, therefore, in a general sense, could be considered a "religious" person. But in the formal religious sense, the ultimate act of faith entails a bind to w h a t is most mysterious and u n k n o w a b l e . O n e has the most to lose in establishing a bind w i t h this kind of Being. C o n s e q u e n t l y , the risk of self and the faith c o m m i t m e n t involved is the greatest p o s s i b l e - - g r e a t e r than a belief in and c o m m i t m e n t to any other person. If the risk of love is the n o r m of man's highest h u m a n i t y , then in a certain sense the love of G o d w o u l d be the most effulgent expression of this h u m a n i t y . T h i s is the most complete act of faith that one can make because it is the ultimate risk and ultimate bind. In this context one m i g h t even say that the extent to w h i c h one can relate nonnarcissistically to others c o u l d determine the extent to w h i c h he can relate to and establish this b o n d with the Ultimate Other.


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Man: both being and becoming

T o s u m up, we have p r o p o s e d that m a n can have faith in himself, in others, and in God. We have defined faith by saying that, w h i l e secondarily it involves creedal statements a n d p r o p o s i t i o n s , it is p r i m a r i l y the expression of a m a n ' s o w n life force as he moves o u t of himself in o p e n ness to others. But he does this, first of all, by b e i n g o p e n to all aspects of himself, particularly the mysterious areas of his somatic, instinctive, and e m o t i o n a l world. In trusting himself to these, he grows to see that even in their narrowed and segmented aspects, there is some p u r p o s i v e meaning. These still have their significance a n d value. By cognitive persuasiveness, m a n brings an integrated awareness in his action a r o u n d the insightful taking counsel with himself. T h e resultant self-decision secures the integrated co-operation of his w h o l e p s y c h o s o m a t i c person. H e does this first with himself. As a result of the life forces that emerge, he then opens himself to o p e n c o m m u n i c a t i o n w i t h and g e n u i n e faith in and trust of others. T h r o u g h conscious control of his o w n will to power, a m a n can o p e n ly a b a n d o n himself to others' use of him, either according to the m o d e l of the skilled counselor or therapist or in the personal c o m m u n i o n a n d c o m m u n i t y sense of a faith, hope, a n d love e n g a g e m e n t w i t h others. O u t of the binds between himself and others a n d b e t w e e n the ego a n d the somatic, instinctive, and emotive aspects of the self, the m o s t fundamental b o n d or c o m m i t m e n t of all, that of p r o f o u n d R e l i g i o u s faith, can emerge. This is the leap to a n d the a b a n d o n m e n t of oneself in a life experience in believing in, h o p i n g in, a n d striving to love a n d so c o m m u n e with the Divine Being w h o m we call God. We have p r o p o s e d that the same elements enter into all three c o m m i t ments. T h e difference, we submit, is that they m o u n t in the degree to w h i c h they d e m a n d a total a b a n d o n m e n t of the self. O n e a b a n d o n s oneself first to one's w h o l e self, rather than merely to the i m m e d i a t e l y conscious aspects of the self. O n e then limits oneself in recognizing the

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limits of the other who, in large measure, reflects a n d resembles the self. A third kind of possible c o m m i t m e n t is that to a total Other w h o m we call G o d and w h o is totally b e y o n d the self. By its nature, this d e m a n d s the most complete faith and c o m m i t m e n t of ourselves. We have proposed that the answer to the q u e s t i o n of " W h a t can m a n believe in?" is that m a n can believe in all three and, in p r o p o r t i o n as he acts out, integrates, a n d c o m m i t s himself to the life forces of this belief, he can k n o w and experience a life b e y o n d himself. This can also be a faith involvement in a life b e y o n d the death e n c a p s u l a t i o n that is the m o s t evident goal he sees. Freud, in discussing his concept of " B e y o n d the Pleasure Principle," was delighted w h e n Jones suggested to h i m that a g o o d translation of his G e r m a n term jenseits w o u l d be "hereafter." Freud was pleased by this w o r d because he heard it freshly, as p e o p l e often do in a l a n g u a g e they do not k n o w well. He saw it n o t as a "here," followed by an "after," b u t as a word that is s i m u l t a n e o u s l y "here," fusing into "after." If we look carefully, the w o r d " b e y o n d " also expresses this because it is being that is m o v i n g toward the "yonder." In this sense, we w o u l d p r o p o s e that w h a t m a n can believe in is not only his h u m a n i t y , in a static sense, b u t his h u m a n i t y b e c o m i n g beyond. In the c o m b i n a t i o n of the "here" fusing into the "after," he is s i m u l t a n e o u s l y "be-ing," " b e - c o m i n g , " "be-yond," as he fuses from the "here" into the "after." An ancient Greek idea of the h u m a n transient c o n d i t i o n was that of an arrow flying through the air. At no p o i n t is it "here." W h e n one tries to locate it at a given point, it is already "after" and m o v i n g further into the "after" a n d " b e y o n d . " S o m e t h i n g of this image catches m a n as he moves from the ego toward the integrated self and then o u t to others, a n d from this, o u t to God. T h i s is the h u m a n being in the here-after that m a n can believein. O n e can say, then, that the basis of all faith is c o n t a i n e d in the bind between the ego and the self. T h e same elements that are there are also between the self and others, a n d between the self and God. T h i s represents a process of constant m o v i n g o u t of the ego and the self toward the


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beyond. This c o u l d be expressed in the definition of m a n as a "being-bec o m i n g - b e y o n d . " Man starts w i t h the r e l a t i o n s h i p of the ego to the self and moves to c o m m i t m e n t to others a n d to God. T h i s is the b e i n g in process of b e c o m i n g beyond. But a person does not have to d o any of these things. O n e never has to leave the ego; he can stay in a narcissistic w o m b as l o n g as he chooses, never having to go o u t to the other; nor does he need to go b e y o n d the other to any final Other. T h e s e things are in one's p o w e r to d o or n o t to do. A basic dynamic, then, is the element of freedom that marks belief. A person is n o t forced into m a k i n g this kind of b i n d or c o m m i t m e n t , b u t if he does make the c o m m i t m e n t he can experience a greater integration of himself and an enlarging of himself as he goes o u t to others and through others to God. T h i s gift of the self to G o d w o u l d be m a d e in the faith conviction that this experience w o u l d go b e y o n d death into life. It m a y seem strange, b u t for the h u m a n c o n d i t i o n it is faith a n d trust in t h e u n k n o w n in oneself and others, rather than the predictable, the studied-out, the carefully analyzed that leads to the really fulfilling hum a n experiences. T h e carefully figured-out situation is often characteristic of the purely self-protective, whereas it is the mysterious, u n k n o w n , and unclear that seems to p r o v i d e the o p p o r t u n i t y for this leap, the trapezelike letting oneself go in a faith c o m m i t m e n t to others and, in a religious sense, to a final Other. T h i s is o u r m e a n i n g w h e n we say that a m a n can believe in himself, others, and God.

What can man believe in?

What can man believe in?

What can we believe in?

What can we believe in?

[HPV vaccine: what are we to believe?].

Lifestyle and in vitro fertilization: what do patients believe?

Morbidity and mortality conferences: change you can believe in?

Coverage effect on reactivity can be more complicated than what you believe: H2 dissociation on H-precovered Pd(111).

Continued Dispensing: what medications do patients believe should be available?

Coeliac artery compression syndrome: can we believe our ears?

What the "man in the moon" can tell us about the future of our brains.

The limits of excellence: what one man can do. First annual Niels Bjorn Jorgensen Memorial Lecture.

Larrey - what manner of man?

Sex determination. What makes a man a man?

What anyone can do.

Something to believe in.

What can nano do?

Trust and doubt: An examination of children's decision to believe what they are told about food.

Do you believe in miracles?

The measure of a physician, the measure of our practices: what we measure reflects what we believe.

A better way to know what patients believe and value about health.

What scientists funded by the tobacco industry believe about the hazards of cigarette smoking.

Do You Believe in Presentiment?

Perspective: I believe what I remember, but it may not be true.