British Journal of Psychology (1992), 83, 305-321

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Printed in Great Britain

0 1992 The British Psychological Society

Dimensions of everyday memory in young adulthood Leslee K. Pollha*, A. L. Greenet, Ruth H. Tunick and James M. Puckett West Virginia University This paper reports the findings of two studies on everyday memory in young adulthood. In Study 1, 387 male and female college students (18-22 years old) completed the 25-item Cognitive Failures Questionnaire (CFQ ;Broadbent, Cooper, Fitzgerald & Parkes, 1982). Principal components analysis yielded five internally consistent factors : distractibility ; misdirected actions ; spatial/kinaesthetic memory; interpersonal intelligence; and memory for names. Further, each of these dimensions was interpretable within an information-processing framework. Study 2 examined the relation of the five everyday memory dimensions obtained in Study 1 to measures of working memory and traditional intelligence in a separate sample of 32 college students. Findings obtained in Study 2 suggest that attentional processes may be important components of the everyday memory construct.

The everyday memory construct offers promise for assessing cognitive processes beyond the laboratory setting (Baddeley, 1988 ; Hermann, 1982; Neisser, 1978). Individuals’ self-reports of memory functioning are convergent with the observations of significant others and good predictors of memory performance in real-life situations (Broadbent e t al., 1982;Hermann, 1982; McMillan, 1984). Although some researchers have questioned the utility of the everyday memory construct (Banaji & Crowder, 1989), others have argued that laboratory performance measures lack ecological validity (Neisser, 1978; Sunderland, Harris & Baddeley, 1983). Consequently, research on everyday memory has grown rapidly in recent years, in large part, to determine whether the construct is indeed ‘bankrupt’ (Banaji & Crowder, 1989) or differs on some non-trivial dimensions from laboratory assessments of cognitive processes (Hermann & Neisser, 1982; Sinnott, 1989). As Poon (1990) noted, coherent theories of everyday cognition and memory are few ; however, grappling with everyday problems that do not have obvious theoretical answers is a necessary first step (Baddeley, 1981). Examination of the cognitive problems which individuals encounter in everyday life may be the basis for the development of a useful conceptual framework (Martin, 1986). Such an approach also may lead to the design of effective interventions for cognitive difficulties, particularly among elderly adults (Bergquist, Duke & Davis, 1989). A number of techniques have been developed to assess everyday memory, including simulations of work activities (Frederiksen, 1986), natural observations * Requests for reprints should be addressed to Leslee K. Pollina at the Department of Psychology, Southeast Missouri State University, University Plaza, Cape Girardeau, MO 63701, USA. t A. L. Greene is now at the Pacific Graduate School of Psychology, Palo Alto, CA. 13

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(Scribner, 1986), and self-report questionnaires (Bennett-Levy & Powell, 1980; Broadbent e t al., 1982; Hermann & Neisser, 1984). Although subject to a variety of criticisms, self-report measures do have the dual advantage of assessing covert events (Sunderland e t al., 1983) and of being based on respondents’ knowledge of past performance on everyday tasks (Garfinkel & Landau, 1981; Prescott, 1990; Zarit, 1980). Of the self-report measures developed thus far, the Cognitive Failures Questionnaire (CFQ; Broadbent e t al., 1982) appears to be the most promising for assessing the frequency of memory and cognitive failures in everyday life (Hermann, 1984). The CFQ has been found to correlate well with laboratory measures of incidental learning, attention, vigilance, and distributed attention, as well as with memory phenomena relevant to normal daily activities (Broadbent e t al., 1982; Hermann, 1982; Martin, 1986; Martin & Jones, 1983a). In contrast, other self-report instruments have correlated only moderately with laboratory performance measures, such as divided attention (Hermann, 1982, 1984). The CFQ was designed to assess departws from normal, smoothly executed sequences of cognitive processing, including failures in perception, memory, and action. Several studies have found that the CFQ has good psychometric properties. Freeman, Weeks & Kendell (1980), for example, found that electro-convulsive therapy patients reported more cognitive failures than ‘normal ’ controls. Moreover, Weeks (cited in Broadbent e t af., 1992) found that CFQ scores were stable at 21 (r = 32) and 65 weeks (r = 30). Finally, CFQ scores failed to correlate significantly with intelligence tests, such as the Mill Hill Vocabulary Scales (r = - .16) and Raven’s Progressive Matrices (r = - .15) or with educational level (Broadbent e t ai., 1982; Weeks, cited in Broadbent e f al., 1982). The latter findings are of particular importance as they can be interpreted to represent further evidence of the measure’s criterion validity. T o the extent that conceptual distinctions can be drawn between traditional and everyday intelligence measures (Sternberg & Wagner, 1989;Wagner & Sternberg, 1986), correlations between (traditional) intelligence and everyday memory would be neither predicted nor desired. Hermann (1982) has suggested that self-report measures of everyday memory actually may have higher predictive validity than previously thought because many studies show poor scale to task isomorphism. That is, prior investigations (e.g. Broadbent e t af., 1982; Wilkins & Baddeley, 1978) typically incorporated laboratory performance measures which tapped different processes than those assessed by the everyday memory questionnaires used. Thus, it is not surprising that Broadbent e t af. (1982) found no relation between total CFQ scores and the laboratory performance measures used (i.e. long-term recall of categorized words and memory for visually presented items). This lack of scale to task isomorphism (Hermann, 1982) in the corresponding literature has been further complicated by the use of total CFQ scores as dependent measures rather than individual item scores. To the extent that individual CFQ items and laboratory performance measures may tap common processes (e.g. attention), the use of total CFQ scores may mask such isomorphism as actually exists. What these considerations suggest is that future research would do well to examine the relation between individual CFQ items and performance measures or, perhaps

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better still, between the underlying dimensions of everyday memory (as might be identified through factor analysis) and laboratory-based performance measures. For example, Hermann (1979 ; cited in Hermann, 1982) obtained a moderate negative correlation between accuracy of recall for object location (that is, where one placed one’s coat outside the laboratory) and retrieval failure, a component obtained in factor analysis of Short Inventory of Memory Experiences items. The implications of Hermann’s findings are twofold. First, such findings suggest that the pattern of association between laboratory tasks and factors derived from questionnaire items may be a fruitful area of inquiry. Second, such findings suggest that factor-analytic studies may help to establish the pattern of cognitive failures characteristic of normal adult populations (McMillan, 1984). Previous factor analytic investigations of everyday memory and cognition have proved less than wholly successful, however. Broadbent e t al. (1982) found few meaningful factors underlying CFQ items and were unable to replicate the same factor structure across different occupational groups. As well, Bennett-Levy & Powell (1980) were unable to obtain ‘psychologically meaningful ’ factors using the Subjective Memory Questionnaire (SMQ). Although the inability to detect or define meaningful factors is a common problem in psychological research, factor analytic investigations of everyday memory also have been compromised by small and/or highly heterogeneous samples (e.g. Bennett-Levy & Powell, 1980; Broadbent e t al., 1982; Hermann & Neisser, 1982). As a first step in pursuing Hermann’s (1982) suggestions for research on everyday memory, two studies were conducted. Study 1 was conducted to determine whether robust, interpretable factors could be obtained using the Cognitive Failures Questionnaire (CFQ; Broadbent et al., 1982) with an adequate sample of college students. Because several investigators have suggested that cognition is affected by gender, health status, and socio-economic status (SES) or social class (Elias, 1980; Hertzog, Schaie & Gribbon, 1978; Siegler, Nowlin & Blumenthal, 1980), measures of these variables also were included. Study 2 was conducted to examine correlations between the dimensions of everyday memory obtained in Study 1, laboratory measures of working memory, and measures of ‘traditional ’ intelligence.

STUDY 1 Method Sample The sample consisted of 180 male ( M = 21.02 years) and 207 female ( M = 19.89 years) college students. Participants were recruited from undergraduate psychology courses at a local university and reimbursed through bonus credits. The predominant majority of participants were Caucasian and came from middle- (45 per cent) and working-class (36 per cent) families, as determined by the father’s educational level and occupational status (Reiff, 1961); the remainder came from upper-middle-class (10 per cent) and impoverished (9 per cent) families.

Instrgments The Cognitive Failures Questionnaire (CFQ; Broadbent e t al., 1982) was used to examine the incidence and pattern of cognitive failure. The CFQ consisted of 25 items that tapped different aspects of cognitive 13-2

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Leslee K . Pollina and others

failure, including: perceptual failures (e.g. ‘Do you fail to notice signposts on the road?’), misdirected actions (e.g. ‘Do you find you accidentally throw away the thing you want and keep what you meant to throw away - as in the example of throwing away the matchbox and putting the used match in your pocket?), and failures of memory (e.g. ‘Do you find you can’t remember something although it’s on the tip of your tongue?’) (Broadbent et ul., 1982). For each item, subjects were asked to describe the frequency of difficulties experienced in the last six months, using a five-point scale (where 0 = ‘never’, and 4 = ‘very often’). Total CFQ scores were calculated by summing across item ratings (0 to 4) for each subject; total possible CFQ score ranged from 0 to 100. Good internal consistency reliability was obtained for total CFQ scores (a= .88). Subjects also completed three health status items (e.g. Siegler et uL, 1980). For the first item, subjects rated their overall health, using a four-point scale (where 1 = ‘excellent’, and 4 = ‘poor’). For the second item, subjects described the extent to which their daily activities were limited by the then current state of their health, using a four-point scale (where 1 = ‘not at aIl limited’, and 4 = ‘very much limited’). For the final item, subjects indicated how concerned they were about their health, using a four-point scale (where 1 = ‘not at all concerned’, and ‘4 = very concerned’). Subjects also completed a modified version of the Self-Evaluation of Life Function Scale (SELF; Linn & Linn, 1984). The SELF listed 20 possible illnesses or medical conditions (e.g. allergies, diabetes, emphysema/bronchitis) and 20 frequently prescribed medications (e.g. cortisone, insulin, painkillers). For each item, subjects indicated whether (a) they had been diagnosed as having the condition (yes/no) or (b) had taken the medication described within the previous six months (yes/no). Total number of illnesses was derived from the modified SELF questionnaire and calculated by summing the number of illnesses indicated by each subject. Total number of medications was derived from the modified SELF questionnaire and calculated by summing the number of medications indicated by each subject. Finally, each subject completed a brief demographic questionnaire describing family background, age, and gender.

Procedure Subjects completed questionnaires in group sessions, conducted by a single (female) examiner. At the beginning of the session, each student was given a packet which contained (a) the three health items, (b) the modified SELF questionnaire, (c) the demographic questionnaire, and (d) the Cognitive Failures Questionnaire. Examiners read instructions aloud to each group; each packet also contained written instructions.

Results Health status On average, students reported: (a) that their health was ‘good’ to ‘excellent’ ( M = 1.74, SD = .71); (b) that they were ‘a little’ to ‘somewhat’ concerned about their health ( M = 2.81, SD = 1.05); and (c) that daily activities were ‘not at all limited’ by their health ( M = 1.19, SD = .51). Although males reported a higher number of illnesses and medications than females (F(1,385) = 3 2 . 3 3 , ~< .001, and F(1,385) = 29.90, p < .001, respectively), the average number of illnesses and medications reported in both groups was quite low ( M = 3.16 and M = 3.17 for males, and M = 0.75 and M = 0.85 for females, respectively).

Incidence of cognitive failure Overall, students reported relatively few cognitive failures ( M = 19.12). However, females ( M = 19.74) reported more cognitive failures than males ( M = 18.42), (F(1,381) = 5 . 6 0 , ~< .02). As shown in Table 1, females reported more cognitive failures than males on such items as: (1) ‘Do you read something and find you

309

Dimensions of euerydq memory Table 1. Mean CFQ item scores and standard deviations by gender CFQ items 1. Must reread things 2. Forget why you moved from one part of the house to another 3. Fail to notice signposts on the road 4. Confuse right and left when giving directions 5. Bump into people 6. Forget whether you’ve turned off lights or locked the door 7. Don’t listen to people’s names 8. Say something and realize afterwards that it might be insulting 9. Fail to hear people speaking to you when you’re doing something else 10. Lose your temper and regret it 11. Leave important letters unanswered for days 12. Forget which way to turn on a road you know well but rarely use 13. Fail to see what you want in a supermarket (although it’s there) 14. Suddenly wonder whether you’ve used a word correctly 15. Have difficulty making up your mind 16. Forget appointments 17. Forget where you put something like a newspaper or a book 18. Accidentally throw away things that you need 19. Daydream when you should be listening 20. Forget people’s names

F

Males

Females

2.29 (.71) 1.43 (.95)

2.47 (33) 1.63 (1.O)

5.38* 3.95*

1.16 (.85)

1.23 (.75)

.66

.83 (38)

1.20 (1.08)

13.75***

.96 (.70) 1.31 (.83)

1.28 (.78) 1.46 (.86)

17.43*** 3.15

2.33 (1.00)

1.89 (1.03)

17.85***

1.64 (.78)

1.77 (.80)

2.99

1.67 (.78)

1.86 (.98)

4.30*

1.46 (.89)

1.55 (.87)

0.90

1.52(1.10)

1.36 (.98)

2.27

.74 (.77)

.90 (.80)

3.68

1.56 (.85)

1.52 (.80)

0.21

1.38 (.79)

1.44 (.87)

0.51

1.72 (38)

2.20 (.94)

.96 (.77) 1.58 (.83)

.89 (.78) 1.57 (.83)

.71 (.74)

.99 (.77)

12.80***

2.10 (.89)

2.34 (.92)

6.99**

2.36 (1.10)

1.91 (.99)

18.24***

27.38*** 0.62 0.02

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Table 1. (cont.) CFQ items 21. Get distracted when doing

something 22. Can’t quite remember something although it’s on the tip of your tongue 23. Forget what you came to buy at the shops 24. Drop things 25. Can’t think of things to say Total CFQ Score

Males

Females

F

1.87 (.86)

2.05 (.88)

4.42*

2.02 (.67)

2.01 (.79)

0.03

.87 (.64)

1.17 (.79)

10.83***

1.03 (.68) 1.40 (.89) 19.74 (5.24)

1.45 (.86) 1.51 (1.17) 18.42 (5.56)

28.57*** 1.oo 5.60*

* p < .05; * * p < .01; ***p < .001. Note. Table 1 shows only abbreviated wording for CFQ items; Table 2 shows CFQ items in the full, correct wording. CFQ items rated on a five-point scale (where 0 = never, 1 = very, 2 = rarely or occasionally, 3 = quite often, 4 = very often). Standard deviations shown in parentheses.

haven’t been thinking about it and must read it again?’; (2) ‘Do you find you forget why you went from one part of the house to the other?’; (4) ‘Do you find you confuse right and left when giving directions? ’ ; (5) ‘Do you bump into people? ’ ;(9) ‘Do you fail to hear people speaking to you when you’re doing something else?’; (15) ‘Do you have trouble making up your mind?’; (18) ‘Do you find you accidentally throw away the thing you want and keep what you meant to throw away - as in the example of throwing away the matchbox and putting the used match in your pocket?’; (19) ‘Do you daydream when you ought to be listening to something?’; (21) ‘Do you start doing one thing at home and get distracted into doing something else [unintentionally]?’; (23) ‘Do you find you forget what you came to the shops to buy?’; and (24) ‘Do you drop things?’. Only for items (7) ‘Do you fail to listen to people’s names when you are meeting them?’, and (20) ‘Do you find you forget people’s names?’ did males report more cognitive failures than females. However, the effect sizes associated with these gender differences were generally small (7’ ranged between .OO and .06).

Predictors of cognitive failure Separate regression analyses of individual and total CFQ scores were performed, with age, gender, overall health, number of medications, number of illnesses, parents’ educational level, and SES entered as predictors in each. However, only between 0 and 14 per cent of the variance in total CFQ scores was accounted for in any of the analyses performed. Given the restricted age range and generally good health status characteristic of the present sample, these results were not surprising. In this respect, the present results also were consistent with findings reported by Broadbent e t al. (1982)’ who found no association between educational level and total CFQ scores with several samples.

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Table 2. Principal components analysis of Cognitive Failure Questionnaire (CFQ) items CFQ items

19. Do you daydream when you ought to be listening to something? 22. Do you find you can’t quite remember something although it’s on the tip of your tongue? 15. Do you have trouble making up your mind? 1. Do you read something and find you haven’t been thinking about it and must read it again? 25. Do you find you can’t think of anything to say? 21. Do you start doing one thing at home and get distracted into doing something else (unintentionally) ? 2. Do you find you forget why you went from one part of the house to the other? 14. Do you find yourself suddenly wondering whether you’ve used a word correctly ? 12. Do you find you forget which way to turn on a road you know well but rarely use? 16. Do you find you forget appointments? 23. Do you find you forget what you came to the shops to buy? 18. Do you find you accidentally throw away the thing you want and keep what you meant to throw away - as in the example of throwing away the matchbox and putting the used match in your pocket? 13. Do you fail to see what you want in a supermarket (although it’s there)? 17. Do you forget where you put something like a newspaper or a book? 9. Do you fail to hear people speaking to you when you are doing something else? 3. Do you fail to notice signposts on the road? 6. Do you find you forget whether you’ve turned off a light or a fire or locked the door?

1

2

3

4

5

h2 .52

.67 -

.61

.59

.60

.45

.58

.43

.57

.45

.52

.48

.51

.43

.45

.40

.41

.65

.54

.62 .60

.48 .49

.57

.41

.53

.51

.47

.46

.45

.40

.40 .68

.57

.57

.46

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Table 2. (cont.) CFQ items

1

2

5. Do you bump into people? 24. Do you drop things? 4. Do you find you confuse left and right when giving directions? 20. Do you find you forget people’s names 7. Do you fail to listen to people’s names when you are meeting them? 10. Do you lose your temper and regret it? 8. Do you say something and realize afterwards that it might be taken as in-

3

4

.48 .43 .43

% variance

.41 .30 .76 .76

Internal consistency (coefficient alpha) Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) sampling adequacy

6.6 26.6 .88

1.67 6.7 .80

1.58 6.3 .25

h2 SO

sulting ? 11. Do you leave important letters unanswered for days ? Eigenvalues

5

1.27 5.1 .70

.65 .66 .70 .58

.55 .45

.55

.58

1.09 4.4 49.0 .54 .89

Note. Dimension labels are as follows: 1 = distractibility; 2 = misdirected actions; 3 = spatial/ kinesthetic memory ; 4 = memory for names ; 5 = interpersonal intelligence.

Principal components analysis of cognitive failure Principal components analysis of individual CFQ items was conducted to examine the underlying dimensions of cognitive failure in young adults. Principal components were orthogonally rotated to the normalized varimax criterion (Tabachnick & Fidell, 1988). Five factors emerged with eigenvalues greater than one (6.6, 1.7, 1.6, 1.3 and 1.2), accounting for 49 per cent of the total variance. Table 2 shows the rotated factor matrix and communalities obtained in that analysis. The five factors were labelled distractibility ; misdirected actions ; spatial/ kinaesthetic memory ; memory for names ; and interpersonal intelligence. Because no one theoretical model of everyday cognition (e.g. Reason, 1 9 8 4 ~ )adequately accounted for the range of attentional failure which these factors appeared to represent, the following interpretation systematically integrates several lines of contemporary thought and research on attentional processes (Anderson, 1983; Norman, 1981 ; Norman & Bobrow, 1975; Schoenfeld, 1981). Factor 1, distractibility, accounted for 27 per cent of the variance in self-reported cognitive failure and received high loadings from items (19) ‘Do you daydream when you ought to be listening to something ? ’ ;(22) ‘Do you find you can’t quite remember something although it’s on the tip of your tongue?’; (15) ‘Do you have trouble making up your mind?’; (1) ‘Do you read something and find you haven’t been

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thinking about it and must read it again?’; (25) ‘Do you find you can’t think of anything to say? ’ ; (21) ‘Do you start doing one thing at home and get distracted into doing something else [unintentionally] ?’; (2) ‘Do you find you forget why you went from one part of the house to the other?’; and (14) ‘Do you find yourself suddenly wondering whether you’ve used a word correctly?’. Items loading on factor 1 appeared to reflect disruptions of internalized attentional processes, as would most likely result in inappropriate attentional focus. Correspondingly, items 22 and 14, which tapped verbal processing, were interpreted to reflect interruptions in the retrieval of information from long-term memory. Although somewhat less straightforward, item (25) ‘Do you find you can’t think of anything to say?’ was interpreted to reflect failures in attentional focus, as well. That is, (successful) conversation requires that one track the listener’s comments and goals, track one’s own comments and goals, and make decisions about what comments to make and how to frame them. In this respect, factor 1 arguably paralleled the departures from smooth sequences of memory processing previously discussed by Broadbent e t a/. (1982). Factor 2, misdirected actions, accounted for 7 per cent of the variance and received high loadings from items (14) ‘Do you find yourself suddenly wondering why you went from one part of the house to the other?’; (12) ‘Do you find you forget which way to turn on a road you know well but rarely use?’; (16) ‘Do you find you forget appointments?’; (23) ‘Do you find you forget what you came to the shops to buy?’; (18) ‘Do you find you accidentally throw away the thing you want and keep what you meant to throw away - as in the example of throwing away the matchbox and putting the used match in your pocket?’; (13) ‘Do you fail to see what you want in a supermarket (although it’s there) ? ’ ; (17) ‘Do you forget where you put something like a newspaper or a book?’; and (9) ‘Do you fail to hear people speaking to you when you are doing something else?’. In contrast to the internally focused attentional processes thought to be tapped by factor 1, factor 2 was interpreted to reflect disruption of externally focused attentional processes (e.g. forgetting what one has come to the shops to buy). Such processes parallel the types of ‘control mode ’ failure described by Reason (19846) ; that is, attentional focus is thought to shift from the initial goal either to an internal preoccupation (e.g. worry about a personal problem) or an unexpected external event (e.g. a sudden heavy rainstorm). Factor 3, spatial/kinaesthetic memory, accounted for 6 per cent of the variance in self-reported cognitive failure and received high loadings from items (18) ‘Do you find you accidentally throw away the thing you want and keep what you meant to throw away - as in the example of throwing away the matchbox and putting the used match in your pocket?’; (3) ‘Do you fail to notice signposts on the road?’; (6) ‘Do you find you forget whether you’ve turned off a light or a fire or locked the door?’; (5) ‘Do you bump into people ? ’; (24) ‘Do you drop things ? ’ ;and (4)‘Do you find you confuse left and right when giving directions ? ’. Failure to notice signposts on the road (item 3), bumping into people (item 5), and confusing left and right when giving directions (item 4) are obvious instances of inattention to one’s own spatial location vis ri vis that of another person or object. Forgetting whether one has turned off a light, or throwing away needed items unintentionally may be instances of interrupted processing of sequences of cognitive

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and motor actions, as perhaps intended by Broadbent e t al. (1982). A similar type of spatial egocentrism in adulthood has been described previously by Bielby & Papalia (1975). Factor 4, memory for names, accounted for 5.1 per cent of the variance and received high loadings from items (20) ‘Do you find you forget people’s names?’ and (7) ‘Do you fail to listen to people’s names when you are meeting them?’. Factor 4 closely resembled the names factor obtained by Hermann & Neisser (1982) using a similar everyday memory questionnaire. If one fails to direct attention to an individual’s name when hearing it for the first time, it is unlikely either to be encoded or available for later retrieval. Factor 5, interpersonal intelligence, accounted for 4 per cent of the variance in cognitive failure and received high loadings from items (10) ‘Do you lose your temper and regret it?’, (8) ‘Do you say something and realize afterwards that it might be taken as insulting?’, and (11) ‘Do you leave important letters unanswered for days?’. Because each of these items reflects disruption in some aspect of the respondents’ social skills, factor 4 was interpreted to parallel the construct of interpersonal intelligence described by Gardner (1983).

Gender dzfferences

To examine gender differences in the underlying dimensions of cognitive failure, scores on each of the five factors were calculated, using the regression technique, and standardized to M = 50 and SD = 10 (Tabachnick & Fidell, 1988). MANOVA analysis revealed significant gender differences for Factor 1, distractibility (F(1,379) = 12.71,p < .OOl), Factor 3, spatial/kinaesthetic memory (F(1,379) = 21.02, p < .OOl) and Factor 6 , memory for names (F(1,379) = 4 5 . 3 7 , ~< .OOl). Females reported a higher incidence of cognitive failure than males in distractibility ( M = 52.02, SD = 10.28 and M = 48.48, SD = 8.94) and spatial/kinaesthetic memory ( M = 52.21, SD = 9.98 and M = 50.03, SD = 10.11). In contrast, males reported a higher incidence of cognitive failure than females in memory for names ( M = 54.03, SD = 9.53 and M = 47.52, SD = 9.29). As before, the effect sizes associated with these ranged between .OO and .lo). gender differences were quite small

(v2

Discussion Principal components analysis of individual CFQ items yielded five theoretically consistent and interpretable factors : distractibility, misdirected actions, spatial/ kinaesthetic memory, memory for names, and interpersonal intelligence. Although 49 per cent of the variance in cognitive failure was accounted for by the factors obtained, the first factor to emerge, distractibility, captured the lion’s share (27 per cent). The remaining factors only accounted for an average 6 per cent of the variance each. Nonetheless, moderate to good internal consistencies were obtained for the six factors (aranged between .47 and .77) and each was found to be ‘psychologically meaningful (cf. Bennett-Levy & Powell, 1980) within an information-processing framework. Consistent with Hermann’s (1982) suggestion, the results obtained in Study 1 indicated that use of estimated CFQ factor scores, rather than individual item or total

Dimensions of everyday memory

31 5

CFQ scores, proved to be a fruitful approach to understanding everyday memory. Such an approach also has implications for future research in that it would facilitate more systematic links between experimental research on cognition (e.g. McDowd & Birren, 1990) and the study of naturally occurring cognitive behaviour, by identifying processes common to both. Study 2, therefore, was conducted to examine the relation between everyday memory dimensions (as defined by estimated regression scores on the five factors obtained in Study l), traditional measures of intelligence, and experimental measures of working memory.

STUDY 2 Method Sample A separate sample of 32 female college students ( M = 19.36 years, SD = 1.2) was chosen randomly from the same volunteer pool used in Study 1.

Procedure As in Study 1, the CFQ (Broadbent et aL, 1982) was used to measure the incidence of self-reported cognitive failures. Internal consistency reliability (coefficient alpha) for total CFQ score was .84 for the Study 2 sample. Following completion of the CFQ, subjects were individually administered a battery of traditional intelligence and experimentally derived working memory tasks, as described below. The WAIS-R Vocabulary subtest (Wechsler, 1981) was used to measure crystallized intelligence and administered in accordance with standardized procedures. As well, both the Forward and Backward WAIS-R Digit Span subtests were administered in the standard manner. Following Hayslip & Kennelly (1982), the WAIS-R Digit Span Forward subtest was used to assess short-term memory and the WAIDS-R Digit Span Backward subtest was used to assess working memory. Separate scores were retained for each subtest. The Eckstrom, French, Harman & Derman (1976) Letter Sets test was used to assess inductive reasoning and fluid intelligence. The task consisted of 15 problems; each problem contained five sets of letters with four letters in each set. Four of the letter sets in each problem were arranged in a common sequence (e.g. QQPP, SSRR, DDCC, GGFF); the fifth letter set was arranged in a different sequence (e.g. AHAH); subjects were required to identify the deviant sequence. For each problem, subjects received 1 point for each correct response and a -0.2 point for each incorrect response. Total possible score on the Letter Sets test ranged from -3 to 15. The Case, Kurland & Goldberg (1982) Counting Span task was used to assess working memory. The task consisted of five sets of white 3 x 5 in cards, with each set containing between three and seven cards. Each card presented between five and nine green dots, randomly dispersed among three to nine yellow dots. Subjects were presented three trials of each card set size (three to seven cards). For each trial, subjects were instructed to count the number of green dots on the cards presented. When the cards in a given set had been presented, subjects were asked to give the number of green dots shown on each card in the set, in correct serial order. Trial presentation continued until the subject made errors on two out of three trials in any given set size. Counting span was defined as the last set size in which the subject achieved two out of three correct trials. Total possible scores for counting span ranged between 0 and 7.

Results

Because the Study 2 sample was too small to permit confirmatory factor analysis, comparability in the incidence of cognitive failure between the Study 1 and Study 2

Leslee K. Pollina and ofhers

316

participants was examined through comparisons of group means (i.e. individual item and total CFQ scores). No significant differences were obtained between the Study 2 sample and a randomly selected subgroup of the Study 1 sample (N = 32 females) in total CFQ scores (F(1,bO) = 1.39). MANOVA analyses yielded significant differences between the Study 2 sample and the Study 1 subsample on eight of the 25 CFQ items (p < .05). Because these differences were so small ( T ~ranged between .OO and .09); however, they were interpreted to reflect non-meaningful differences between the two groups. That is, the per cent of variance accounted for by group status (Study 1 subsample vs. Study 2 sample) was infinitesimal. Therefore, the entire sample from Study 1 (N = 387) and the Study 2 sample (N = 32) were combined, and principal components analysis of individual CFQ item scores performed (N = 419). As before, estimated scores were calculated, for each participant, on each of the five dimensions obtained in principal components analysis (distractibility, misdirected actions, spatial/kinaesthetic memory, memory for names, interpersonal intelligence).

Correlates of everyday memory dimensions

To examine the relation between everyday memory dimensions, measures of traditional intelligence and working memory, correlational analyses were performed. Scores on the WAIS-R Vocabulary, WAIS-R Digit Span Forward, WAIS-R Digit Span Backward, Counting Span, and Letter Sets tasks, estimated scores on each of the five everyday memory dimensions, and total CFQ scores were included in that analysis. As shown in Table 3, only the association between factor 5 , interpersonal intelligence, and WAIS-R Vocabulary reached significance (r = - .47, p < .008). Higher incidence of cognitive failure on the dimension of interpersonal intelligence (e.g. ‘Do you say something and realize later that it might be taken as insulting?’) was associated with lower vocabulary scores.

Table 3. Correlations of traditional intelligence and working memory measures with dimensions of everyday memory Total memory

Dimensions of everyday memory ~

~

~~

1

2

3

4

WAIS-R Vocabulary WAIS-R Digit Span

-.11 .26

.20 -.lo

.05 -.23

-.09 .10

- .47**

- .15

- .01

- .02

Forward Letter Sets Counting Span WAIS-R Digit Span Backward

.01 .12 .19

.11 -.06

.05

-.23

.08

- .07

.06

-.06

.09 .09

.04

Measures

-.05

-.05

-.08

5

score

.05

* p < .05; * * p < .01; ***p < .001. Note. Dimension labels are as follows: 1 = distractibility; 2 = misdirected actions; , 3 = spatial/ kinaesthetic; 4 = memory for names; 5 = interpersonal intelligence.

Dimensions of e v e y d q memory

317

Discussion Correlational analyses of everyday memory dimensions, and measures of traditional intelligence and working memory yielded only a single significant association, between interpersonal intelligence and WAIS-R Vocabulary. T o the extent that WAIS-R Vocabulary scores reflect crystallized knowledge, including knowledge of appropriate social behaviours (Horn, 1975), the relation between interpersonal intelligence and WAIS-R Vocabulary arguably tapped respondents’ social egocentrism or difficulties in interpersonal perspective-taking. (Given the composition of the present sample [college students], this association was not altogether surprising.) The relation obtained between interpersonal intelligence and WAIS-R Vocabulary perhaps is best understood to reflect common deficits in the available knowledge base (social or verbal) rather than deficits in memory or attentional processes, per se. The absence of significant results for the remaining dimensions of cognitive failure may be interpreted in one of two ways. First, it is possible that interpersonal intelligence represents the only cognitive dimension common to both experimentally assessed and naturally occurring behaviour. Given the exploratory nature of the present study, however, this seems unlikely. A second, more likely, possibility is that different experimental measures, more focused on attentional processes, for example, would yield clearer results. Obviously, both possibilities can only be determined through further research. It is of final interest to note, however, that, consistent with Hermann’s (1982) earlier commentary, no significant association between total CFQ scores and measures of traditional intelligence or working memory was obtained.

GENERAL DISCUSSION The present findings stand in sharp contrast to previous factor analytic investigations of everyday memory. Five internally consistent factors were obtained (distractibility, misdirected actions, spatial/kinaesthetic memory, memory for names, and interpersonal intelligence) as compared to the two-factor solution commonly reported in this literature (Bennett-Levy & Powell, 1980; Broadbent e t al., 1982; Taylor, McDowd & Birren, 1989). One reason for these seemingly divergent findings may be that the small samples characteristic of earlier, factor-analytic investigations simply constrained the number of factors which could be extracted, independent of their relative ‘meaningfulness ’ (cf. Bennett-Levy & Powell, 1980). For example, the occupational groups examined in Broadbent e t d ’ s (1982) study averaged only 75 participants. Similarly, Taylor e t aL’s (1989) investigation examined eight age groups that averaged only 42 subjects each. In contrast, Hermann & Neisser’s (1982) investigation of 205 college students, using Part F of the Inventory of Memory Experiences (48 items), yielded eight factors. Similarly, McMillan’s (1984) study of 170 subjects obtained 10 factors. Clearly, then, the use of inappropriately small samples in previous investigations may have obscured the underlying dimensions of everyday memory and cognitive failure which may have actually existed. By no means, however, should this criticism be interpreted to represent an

318

Leslee K. Pollina and others

argument for the existence of cognitive processes underlying everyday memory that are uniquely different from the cognitive processes tapped by laboratory performance measures. Rather, as illustrated by the use of information-processing theory to interpret the factors obtained (e.g. McDowd & Birren, 1990), our working hypothesis is that these dimensions reflect application of the same processes, as are tapped by laboratory tasks, to situations in everyday life (Baddeley, 1981 ; Puckett, Reese, Cohen & Pollina, in press). The findings obtained in Study 2 provide limited support for that hypothesis, at least insofar as the available (social or verbal) knowledge base may be involved in such processing. The modesty of findings obtained in Study 2, notwithstanding, Hermann’s (1982) arguments for the importance of scale to task isomorphism warrant further empirical attention. In virtually any conceptual framework, attention is held to be a limited resource (Norman & Bobrow, 1975; Posner & Snyder, 1975; Schneider & Shiffrin, 1975); further, its effects on a wide variety of laboratory tasks are well documented (McDowd & Birren, 1990). The present findings suggest that attention also may be an important factor underlying everyday memory in young adulthood and that such failures may occur in several ways - through the interruption of internal processing sequences (factor l), for example, or through the interruption of motoric sequences (factor 2), or through failures to encode and/or retrieve social information (factor 4). The present results also are consistent with a number of frequently overlooked findings regarding the relation between everyday cognition and laboratory performance measures. Reason (1984b), for example, has suggested that a ‘preoccupation and distraction’ factor may underlie many of the slips of action commonly encountered in everyday life. Similarly, Martin & Jones (1983 b), and Harris & Wilkins (1982; cited in Morris, 1983) found that the CFQ positively correlated with poor performance on divided attention tasks. Both sets of investigators suggest that this relation stems from the individual’s inability to maintain the necessary goals for one or two independently active tasks (cf. Anderson, 1983). Thus, several findings converge in the suggestion that attention and attentional deficits may underlie many of the cognitive failures of everyday life. Although the mechanisms responsible for such difficulties have yet to be identified, factors obtained in the present study suggest that several parameters of attentional processes may be involved (e.g. the ability to divide or switch attention effectively). This is a potentially fruitful direction for future research on everyday cognition. A second and related question for future research is whether age differences exist in the underlying dimensions of everyday memory. To the extent that factors obtained in the present study tapped attention and working memory processes and to the extent that prior research has demonstrated age-related changes in attention and memory (Poon, 1985), it is likely that the underlying dimensions of everyday memory also will show change with age. Although previous studies have examined age differences in total everyday memory scores, with contradictory results (BennettLevy & Powell, 1980; McMillan, 1984), researchers have yet to examine systematically age differences in the underlying dimensions of everyday memory. Consistent with Reese & Rodehaver’s (1985) argument for the development of age-appropriate models of cognitive processes, it would be of interest to determine whether the relation between everyday memory dimensions and laboratory

Dimensions of everyday memory

319

performance measures remains the same across different age groups. Although age differences may not emerge in the underlying dimensions of everyday memory, the relation between these dimensions and laboratory performance measures may change with age.

Acknowledgements This research was supported, in part, by a grant awarded to A. L. Greene by the National Research Council. The authors are grateful to Leslie Slick and Joyce Williams for their able assistance in data collection and manuscript preparation.

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