Differentiation of 13 positive emotions by appraisals.

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Differentiation of 13 positive emotions by appraisals ab

Eddie M. W. Tong a

Department of Psychology, National University of Singapore, Singapore

b

Department of Psychology, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI, USA Published online: 09 Jun 2014.

Click for updates To cite this article: Eddie M. W. Tong (2015) Differentiation of 13 positive emotions by appraisals, Cognition and Emotion, 29:3, 484-503, DOI: 10.1080/02699931.2014.922056 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02699931.2014.922056

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COGNITION AND EMOTION, 2015 Vol. 29, No. 3, 484–503, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02699931.2014.922056

Differentiation of 13 positive emotions by appraisals Eddie M. W. Tong1,2 1

Downloaded by [New York University] at 23:31 31 May 2015

2

Department of Psychology, National University of Singapore, Singapore Department of Psychology, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI, USA

This research examined how strongly appraisals can differentiate positive emotions and how they differentiate positive emotions. Thirteen positive emotions were examined, namely, amusement, awe, challenge, compassion, contentment, gratitude, hope, interest, joy, pride, relief, romantic love and serenity. Participants from Singapore and the USA recalled an experience of each emotion and thereafter rated their appraisals of the experience. In general, the appraisals accurately classified the positive emotions at rates above chance levels, and the appraisal–emotion relationships conformed to predictions. Also, the appraisals were largely judged by participants as relevant to their positive emotion experiences, and the appraisal–emotion relationships were largely consistent across the two countries. Keywords: Positive emotion; Appraisal; Differentiation accuracy.

Our experience tells us that positive emotions are different from each other, but few studies have clarified how they are different. This problem has been compounded by findings that reported positive emotions correlate highly (Barrett, Gross, Christensen, & Benvenuto, 2001) and that they correlate more highly than reported negative emotions (Ellsworth & Smith, 1988a, 1988b). Neither has it been resolved by theories that focus more on negative emotions (e.g., Ekman & Friesen, 1986; Izard, 1977; Tomkins, 1962) or those that describe positive emotions broadly rather than the fine differences between them (e.g., Fredrickson, 1998).

Other theorists have advocated more research that would reveal the diversity among positive emotions. Lazarus, Kanner, and Folkman (1980) proposed that positive emotions motivate mastery and exploration. Plutchik (1980) posited that different positive emotions serve different survival objectives, namely, reproduction, affiliation and exploration. Frijda (1986) proposed that positive emotions differ in terms of whether they facilitate mastery, human bonding or learning. Reinforcing these theories are recent theoretical analyses which ascribe unique attributes in positive emotions such as awe (Keltner & Haidt, 2003), gratitude (McCullough, Kilpatrick, Emmons, &

Correspondence should be addressed to: Eddie M. W. Tong, Department of Psychology, National University of Singapore, 9 Arts Link, AS4, Room 02-09, Singapore 117570, Singapore. E-mail: [email protected] I thank Phoebe Ellsworth, Barbara Fredrickson, Norbert Schwarz and Stephen Taylor and many others who have read previous versions of this paper. © 2014 Taylor & Francis

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Larson, 2001) and compassion (Goetz, Keltner, & Simon-Thomas, 2010). This research aimed to examine whether positive emotions could be differentiated by cognitive appraisals. To this end, the known adaptation function of each positive emotion, if any, is taken into consideration. Functional perspectives argue that emotions are adaptive responses towards environmental challenges (e.g., Lazarus et al., 1980; Plutchik, 1980; Roseman, 1984; Scherer, 1984). When the environment puts one’s goal or well-being at stake, an emotional system with a specialised evolved function is activated to facilitate effective adaptation. For instance, losses activate sadness, in which the adaptation function could be to reduce further losses by making the person withdraw or seek help, and injustice activates anger, which motivates the person to correct the injustice and remove the obstacles impeding his/her goals. Appraisals are activated as part of the emotion system. They are evaluations of eliciting events made on dimensions such as pleasantness, control and certainty, in relation to one’s needs, goals and beliefs (see Appendix; Arnold, 1960; Lazarus, 1991; Roseman, 1984; Scherer, 1984; Smith & Lazarus, 1993). Because they (with other components of the system) support the adaptation objective of the emotion, each emotion should be associated with a specific set of appraisals. This implies the postulate that emotions can be strongly and systematically differentiated by appraisals. For instance, sadness is associated with the appraisal that impersonal forces are controlling the situation (control-circumstances), which might discourage the sad person from pursuing an out-of-reach goal. Anger is associated with a stronger sense of personal control (control-self), which presumably encourages the angry person to deal with the provocative situation. As numerous studies have testified, anger and sadness can be strongly and systematically differentiated by controlcircumstances and control-self, and other appraisals. More generally, support for this postulate is also good for other negative emotions (e.g., Frijda, Kuipers, & ter Schure, 1989; Ellsworth & Smith, 1988b; Roseman, Antoniou, & Jose, 1996; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985).

However, few studies have tested how well appraisals can differentiate positive emotions and how specific appraisals are related to individual positive emotions. Also, there is a need to take into account the latest findings on positive emotions, including those that appraisal research has largely ignored (e.g., gratitude, awe and compassion), in updating the appraisal profiles of positive emotions. I now discuss the two main objectives of this study: how strongly do appraisals differentiate positive emotions and how exactly do positive emotions differ on appraisals.

Differentiating strength of appraisals over positive emotions A standard method in appraisal research is to instruct participants to recall personal experiences of certain emotions and rate their appraisals of the experiences. To test the differentiation strength of appraisals, the accuracy rate in which the appraisals classified the emotions, obtained using discriminant analysis, should be reported. Also, a greater number of emotions analysed would provide a stricter test of the differentiating strength. However, most studies provided insufficient classification information or examined only few positive emotions. In Frijda et al. (1989), 19 appraisals classified 32 emotions (11 positive and 21 negative) with overall accuracy rates of 32.3% (Study 1) and 43.2% (Study 2), but the rates for positive emotions were not available. In Scherer (1997), seven appraisals classified seven emotions with an overall 39.2% accuracy rate, but only one positive emotion (joy) was examined. In Smith and Ellsworth (1985), six appraisal factors classified positive emotions with an overall rate of 52.1%. However, only six positive emotions were examined. Reisenzein and Hofmann (1990, 1993) found overall classification rates of 73% over six positive emotions (excluding surprise). Reisenzein and Spielhofer (1994, Study 3) provided the best information to date on the current issue. Twentytwo appraisals classified eight positive emotions with an overall rate of 57%. This study reports the classification accuracy of appraisals over 13 positive emotions—amusement, COGNITION AND EMOTION, 2015, 29 (3)

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awe, challenge, compassion, contentment, gratitude, hope, interest, joy, pride, relief, romantic love and serenity. These emotions are classified as positive by some authors, albeit with different classification criteria. This set is not exhaustive but is fairly representative of the spectrum of positive emotions. They not only include the positive emotions featured in classic emotion theories, but also cover as many forms of positive emotions as possible. Ekman and Friesen (1986) discussed only joy; Tomkins (1962) and Izard (1977) mentioned just joy and interest. Plutchik (1980) posited several based on the three categories of reproduction (e.g., romantic love), affiliation (e.g., gratitude) and exploration (e.g., interest). Berenbaum (2002) found that self-directed positive emotions can be grouped into the happiness, contentment and absorption/interest clusters. Other researchers found two clusters: interpersonal (e.g., compassion and love) and intrapersonal (e.g., contentment, pride; De Rivera & Grinkis, 1986; Shaver, Schwartz, Kirson, & O’Connor, 1987; Storm & Storm, 1987). Beyond these, the current study also included moral emotions (e.g., gratitude and compassion) and knowledge-based emotions (awe and interest). Challenge, hope, interest, joy, pride, romantic love and relief were frequently examined in appraisal research (e.g., Ellsworth & Smith, 1988a; Frijda et al. 1989; Reisenzein & Spielhofer, 1994; Roseman et al., 1996; Silvia, 2005; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985, 1987); amusement, awe, compassion, contentment, gratitude and serenity received far less attention (except for Ellsworth & Smith, 1988a; Reisenzein & Spielhofer, 1994; Shiota, Keltner, & Mossman, 2007). Thirteen appraisals were examined (Appendix). They cover most of the appraisals important for differentiating emotions (Ellsworth & Scherer, 2003; Smith, Tong, & Ellsworth, 2014). This study examined whether they are effective at differentiating specifically positive emotions. They include a motive relevance appraisal (relevance), motive congruence appraisals (pleasantness and goal attainment), agency appraisals (agency-self, agency-others and agency-circumstances), control appraisals (control-self, control-others and controlcircumstances), difficulty appraisals (problems and

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effort) and certainty appraisals (certainty and predictability).

Differences in appraisals among positive emotions Table 1 presents the predictions regarding differences among certain emotions for each appraisal. The predictions are informed not only by appraisal research but also by other lines of research that are largely not based on appraisal theories. Also, if possible, the predictions were developed with consideration of the emotion’s adaptation function, but note that the adaptation functions of some of these emotions have yet to be clarified in research. A few clarifications regarding Table 1 are in order. The predictions describe how certain emotions should differ on each appraisal. For ease of communication, emotions that were assigned a prediction (those marked with “+” or “−”) are called predicted emotions; those not assigned a prediction (unmarked ones) are called nonpredicted emotions. The prediction “+” indicates that the predicted emotion was hypothesised to be higher than another marked with “–” on the appraisal. The predictions concern relative differences between the emotions; they do not necessarily imply how high or low an emotion is with regard to an appraisal in the absolute sense. Predicted emotions expected to differ from each other (“+” vs. “−”) are called incongruent predicted emotions; predicted emotions not expected to differ from each other (e.g., “+” and “+”) are called congruent predicted emotions. No predictions were made on whether congruent predicted emotions might differ from one another; for example, joy and serenity were both positively marked on pleasantness, but this does not mean that they were predicted to be equally pleasant. The literature is too thin to predict that fine a differentiation. Further, some appraisal–emotion combinations were non-predicted because existing evidence and theories were too mixed or scant to generate predictions for them. Two examples might illustrate the point. Smith and Ellsworth (1985) found that pride was associated with high certainty, but

–

+

+

+

+

+

–

– + + +

AMS, Amusement; AWE, Awe; CHL, Challenge; CPS, Compassion; COT, Contentment; GRT, Gratitude; HOP, Hope; INT, Interest; JOY, Joy; PRD, Pride; RLF, Relief; ROL, Romantic Love; SRN, Serenity. **p < .01; ***p < .001.

+ –

– +

+ – + + –

–

+ – – +

+

+

+ + – – + – –

+ + + + + + +

+ + – + + –

– + + + –

Pleasantness Relevance Problems Goal attainment Agency-self Agency-others Agency-circumstances Control-self Control-others Control-circumstances Certainty Predictability Effort

+

+

+ –

+

–

–

+ + –

21.75*** 8.37*** 13.40*** 12.01*** 11.81*** 4.56*** 6.18*** 10.71*** 4.96*** 7.51*** 3.52*** 2.62** 16.65*** +

+ + + +

+ + – + +

+ + + +

PRD JOY INT HOP GRT COT CPS CHL AWE AMS

Table 1. Predictions concerning differences between positive emotions on individual appraisals


RLF

ROL

SRN

tcontrast


Reisenzein and Spielhofer (1994) did not replicate this finding. Amusement is not only a response to light-hearted elicitors (e.g., jokes), with little relevance to important goals, but it can also take the form of a humorous approach to an important event. Given the contrasting data or views, no predictions were made for pride and certainty, and amusement and relevance. Hence, this study took both confirmatory and exploratory analytical approaches, to test predicted differences and to explore non-predicted differences. Also, this study examined whether the many differences could be understood using a smaller set of higher-order appraisal factors. A brief review is now made for each emotion that outlines the basis for the predictions. Amusement. Amusement is a coping strategy that can enhance well-being and resilience (e.g., Thorson, Powell, Sarmany-Schuller, & Hampes, 1997). It is largely elicited by benign events that violate expectations (McGraw & Warren, 2010), many of which are due to the actions of others. Appraisal research on amusement is very thin. One study (Scherer & Ceshi, 1997) found that amusement (labelled as good humour) was predicted by low goal obstructiveness and high external causation. In the current study, amusement was predicted to be high on pleasantness and agencyothers, but low on problems and effort. Awe. According to one perspective, awe motivates perceivers to revise and update their understanding of the awe-inspiring object (Keltner & Haidt, 2003). It is most commonly elicited by information-rich, external elicitors (e.g., artistic works, scientific discovery, natural wonders and religious experiences) and hardly if ever by the self (Keltner & Haidt, 2003; Shiota et al., 2007). Although some awe elicitors seem fearsome (e.g., black holes), research suggests that awe is largely subjectively pleasant (Shiota et al., 2007). Personal goals matter a lot less when one is confronted with the awed object. Instead, perceivers are more cognizant that they are just a small part of something larger (Shiota et al., 2007). The available literature, although thin, affords the following COGNITION AND EMOTION, 2015, 29 (3)

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predictions: awe should be high on pleasantness, agency-others and agency-circumstances, but low on relevance and agency-self. Challenge. Challenge motivates perseverance over setbacks and mastery over problems (Smith & Kirby, 2010). It drives personal growth in personal abilities, social skills and moral integrity (Lazarus et al., 1980). Challenge may not be pleasant to experience (Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). It is elicited in situations where important goals are at stake and impeded by obstacles, and where much effort is needed to achieve them (Ellsworth & Smith, 1988a; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985; Smith & Lazarus, 1990). However, people experiencing challenge tend to feel able to handle the situation and achieve their goals (Blascovich & Mendes, 2000; Frijda et al. 1989; Smith & Kirby, 2009; Smith & Lazarus, 1990). Challenge was predicted to be high on relevance, problems, effort and control-self, and low on pleasantness.

motive-congruent, pleasant state associated with a sense of control and personal responsibility over situations (Fredrickson & Branigan, 2005; Reisenzein & Spielhofer, 1994; Rothermund & Brandtstadter, 2003). Contentment was predicted to be high on pleasantness, relevance, goal attainment, agency-self and control-self, and low on problems and effort. Gratitude. Gratitude results from a desired positive outcome that is due to the kind actions of someone else. It not only motivates reciprocal response to the benefactor, but also inspires one to do good to people in general (Bartlett & DeSteno, 2006; McCullough et al., 2001). Consistently, research has shown that gratitude elicits prosocial responses and strengthens social relationships (Algoe, Haidt, & Gable, 2008; Tsang, 2006). Consistent with the findings of Reisenzein and Spielhofer (1994), gratitude was predicted to be high on pleasantness, relevance, goal attainment and agency-others.

Compassion. Compassion might not be pleasant to experience, but some researchers see it as a positive emotion. Even lay judges classified compassion as a positive emotion in a similaritysorting study (Shaver et al., 1987). Compassion motivates assistance for those experiencing a misfortune (Goetz et al., 2010; Mikulincer & Shaver, 2005; Nesse, 2007). When experiencing compassion, one wishes that the victim does not have to suffer any longer and hopes for the impediments to the victim’s well-being to be removed. Also, compassion is more keenly felt when the victim is seen as subjected to circumstances they did not create and could not control (Goetz et al., 2010). Compassion was predicted to be high on problems, agency-circumstances and control-circumstances, and low on pleasantness and goal attainment.

Hope. Hope keeps a person focused on an unattained goal (Lazarus, 1991). People can remain hopeful even when they feel helpless because of insurmountable obstacles, sustained only by the sense that somehow things will work out in their favour (Bruininks & Malle, 2005; Roseman, Spindel, & Jose, 1990; Tong, Fredrickson, Chang, & Lim, 2010). Hope was found to be positively associated with pleasantness, relevance, goal obstacles and effort, and negatively associated with certainty about the present and future (Ellsworth & Smith, 1988a; Frijda et al. 1989; Reisenzein & Spielhofer, 1994; Roseman et al., 1990; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). Hope was predicted to be high on pleasantness, relevance, problems, control-circumstances and effort, and low on control-self, certainty and predictability.

Contentment. To be contented is to accept and be satisfied with the situation. It can not only result from the situation matching expectations (Deci & Ryan, 2000), but it can also result from expectations accommodating the situation. Available research suggests that contentment is a

Interest. Interest is seen by some psychologists as a “knowledge” or “epistemology-based” emotion, evolved for exploration, discovery and learning (Ellsworth & Smith, 1988a; Silvia, 2001). People are more likely to be interested in things that concern them (Connelly, 2011; Ellsworth &

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Smith, 1988a). While it can arise in unpleasant situations, interest in its pure form seems pleasant (Ellsworth & Smith, 1988a; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). It is stronger to the extent that the person feels able to understand the object (Silvia, 2005). Based on this literature, I predicted interest to be high on pleasantness, relevance and control-self. Joy. Joy might motivate one to savour the joyful event and seek similar events in the future (Roseman et al., 1996; Smith & Kirby, 2010). There is no doubt that joy is highly pleasant. In addition, joyful people tend to feel in control, take credit for positive events and think that things require little effort to handle (e.g., Ellsworth & Smith, 1988a; Frijda et al., 1989; Reisenzein & Spielhofer, 1994; Roseman et al., 1996; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). Hence, joy was predicted to be high on pleasantness, relevance, goal attainment, agency-self and control-self, and low on problems and effort. The appraisals predicted of joy were the same as those of contentment. Whether these two emotions are so similar in appraisals was tested. Pride. Pride encourages positive self-perceptions and motivates goal pursuits (Lazarus, 1991; Tracy & Robins, 2004; Williams & DeSteno, 2008). Individuals experiencing pride tend to think that they, not external factors, are controlling and responsible for the positive outcomes in their lives (Smith & Ellsworth, 1985; Tracy & Robins, 2004; Weiner, 1985). Other appraisals include positive valence and self-relevance (Frijda et al. 1989; Reisenzein & Spielhofer, 1994; Roseman et al., 1996; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). Pride was predicted to be high on pleasantness, relevance, goal attainment, agency-self and control-self, but low on agency-others, agency-circumstances, controlothers and control-circumstances. Relief. Relief signals the aversion of an undesired outcome (Roseman et al., 1990, 1996). It could possibly motivate people to learn to avoid the circumstances that led to their predicaments. The predicaments could be so daunting that people would question their ability to cope, suggesting appraisals of impersonal external agency and control

(Roseman et al., 1990, 1996). However, it was rated as pleasant in prior studies, presumably because a desired outcome was, after all, achieved (Frijda et al., 1989; Reisenzein & Spielhofer, 1994). Relief was predicted to be associated with high pleasantness, relevance, problems, goal attainment, agencycircumstances, control-circumstances and exert, and low control-self. Romantic Love. The different forms of love share a similar function which is social bonding (Shiota, Campos, Keltner, & Hertenstein, 2004). Likewise, romantic love should motivate approach towards a romantic target. Few appraisal studies examined specifically romantic love; most examined the generic “love”. Taken together, these studies suggest that people see romantic feelings as highly pleasant and desired, even if their affection might not be reciprocated, and low in effort, even if romantic relationships require significant investment (Ellsworth & Smith, 1988a; Frijda et al., 1989; Roseman et al., 1996). Romantic love was predicted to be high on pleasantness, relevance and agency-others, and low on effort. Serenity. Lazarus et al. (1980) posited that serenity might function as a “breather”, motivating one to take a break and recuperate. Little is known about the appraisals of serenity, but in one study, serenity (labelled as “tranquility”) was associated with the appraisals that obstacles are absent, the present and future are certain and less effort is needed (Ellsworth & Smith, 1988a). I expected serenity to be high on pleasantness, certainty and predictability, and low on problems and exert.

Secondary objectives Two other objectives, secondary but no less important, were also pursued. First, data from Singapore and the USA were collected. Hence, the robustness of the findings across the two independent samples could be tested. Second, participants in most appraisal studies rated each appraisal item without first being asked whether they had even appraised the emotional experience in that manner. To illustrate, suppose the eliciting COGNITION AND EMOTION, 2015, 29 (3)

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event was never appraised in terms of whether a goal was attained, participants should find it strange to have to report whether their goals were attained. If they were not given the option to indicate that the appraisal was as such not relevant (NR), and had to rate it as if it was, the data could be questioned. But few studies examined the relevance of appraisals in specific emotion experiences. One exception was by Scherer (1997) in which participants could indicate NR for each appraisal item, after which, the item would not be rated. A low proportion of NR responses (16.3%) were found, showing that participants generally perceived the appraisals as relevant to their emotional experiences. However, only one positive emotion was examined. Reisenzein and Spielhofer (1994) provided a similar NR option, but the quantity of NRs was not reported. In this study, the proportion of NR responses for each appraisal was first evaluated before appraisal–emotion relationships were examined.

METHODS Participants Fifty Singaporean undergraduates (34 females; Mage = 21.80, SDage = .89) from the National University of Singapore and 40 American undergraduates (31 females; Mage = 20.10, SDage = 1.52) from the University of Michigan were recruited by email advertisements which promised monetary incentives for participation. Ethnic composition within each sample was too uneven for analysis: Singapore (Chinese Singaporean, 87.0%; Indian Singaporean, 6.0%; Malay Singaporean, 6.0%; and Others, 1.0%) and the USA (African-American, 10.0%; Asian American, 30.0%; and Caucasian American, 60.0%). Participants from both samples were subjected to the same procedure and completed the same materials.

Procedure and materials Participants attended seven 1-hour sessions, all on a different day. Data for one or two positive emotions were collected in each session. Completing each of the first six sessions earned the participants $10 (local currency), and completing the final session earned them $50. The participants could withdraw from the study at any point and would be compensated accordingly, but all completed seven sessions. In each session, participants first recalled and described in writing a personal experience of one randomly selected emotion. Next, they rated their appraisals of that event, followed by their current emotions. All items were randomised. A 10-minute break followed before the same procedure was applied to the next emotion. No time limit was imposed but each emotion condition took 15–30 minutes to complete. The recall procedure was adapted from Smith and Ellsworth (1985). Using amusement as example, participants were instructed to recall a situation where they felt amusement and to describe it vividly, as if to someone who had never felt amusement, so that this person would know how amusement feels like, and such that anyone reading their description would also feel amusement. They were told to recall as many details of the situation as possible and to hold the memory in their mind. Question prompts (e.g., “What happened in this situation to make you feel amusement?” and “What did it feel like to be feeling amusement?”) were given to facilitate the recall. After describing their experiences, they rated several measures which included the appraisal items shown in Appendix, on nine-point scales that ranged from 1 (not at all) to 9 (extremely).1 They were instructed to rate the items with regard to the event they recalled. These items are similar

1 This study is part of a larger study in which other measures (e.g., self-regard and social comparison) were also rated. Participants also described a humble experience and rated the same items. Complete data on this larger study and all measures are available on request

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to those used in appraisal research and seem suitable for the current purpose. Consistent with some appraisal studies, single items were used, but this could imply some psychometric limitation. Each item came with an option labelled NR. Participants were told to check the NR option if the appraisal was not relevant to the event they experienced, in which case they should skip the item. Participants also rated how they felt during the recalled event on items representing all 13 emotions (e.g., awe and joy) on nine-point scales that ranged from 1 (not at all) to 9 (extremely). Responding to these items might to a certain degree be influenced by memory bias, but the data could still be useful for manipulation checks. For a different research purpose, they were also given a similar NR option to indicate their views of whether each emotion was relevant to their experience. These emotion NR scores are not discussed further and were treated as missing values in the current analyses.2

are presented in Online Supplementary Material: Table 1), all tcontrast > 20.53, ps < .001. However, these analyses do not reveal pairwise differences between the targeted emotion and the other emotions. Addressing this concern in a parsimonious way, in each condition (e.g., awe condition), the targeted emotion (i.e., reported awe) was compared with the next highest scoring emotion (reported interest). Paired-sample t-tests showed that this difference was significant in all 13 emotion conditions, all ts > 2.80, ps < .006. Also, the same contrast analysis showed that all targeted emotions (e.g., reported awe) were rated more highly in the eliciting condition (i.e., awe condition; coded as 12) than in all other conditions (coded as −1), all tcontrast > 14.83, ps < .001. Pair-sampled t-tests showed that for all emotions, the difference between the eliciting condition and the next highest scoring condition was significant, t > 3.75, ps < .001.3,4

NR responses RESULTS Manipulation check First, a repeated-measure contrast procedure (Furr & Rosenthal, 2003) showed that in all emotion conditions, the targeted emotion (e.g., reported awe in the awe condition; coded as 12) was rated more highly than the other 12 emotions (i.e., all other reported emotions in the awe condition; coded as −1; means and SDs of the emotions

A total of 15,210 appraisal scores (90 participants × 13 emotions × 13 appraisals) were collected. Of these, 10.01% were NR responses, lower than the overall average of 16.3% obtained by Scherer (1997) over nine appraisals, six negative emotions and one positive emotion. NR was subsequently analysed as a nominal variable with two categories (NR vs. no NR). Next, 169 chi-square tests (13 emotions × 13 appraisals) were conducted, comparing the proportion of NRs between the two cultures. A

2 These NR responses could be useful for examining issues regarding the perceived relevance of certain emotions in particular emotional experiences (e.g., do people think that contentment is something they would feel when they feel pride). Across all emotions, the percentage of emotion NR responses was 20.95%, which meant that only about 80% of the emotion scores could be analysed. Despite this concern, the manipulation check results support expectations of which emotion should be most strongly reported within each emotion condition. These results also present a potentially important implication that respondents generally find a sizeable number of items in an emotion measure not relevant or meaningful to their experiences. This possibility requires further scrutiny but in a different paper. 3 Further support was found in the NR data. There were generally fewer NR responses for the targeted emotion compared to other emotions in each condition, and fewer NR responses for the targeted emotion in the manipulating condition compared to other conditions. 4 In other analyses, two or more emotions were reported in 97.9% of the 1170 emotion episodes (90 participants × 13 emotion conditions); 71.1% of the episodes comprised between 5 and 11 emotions. Hence, a large number of positive emotion blends were found. However, the targeted emotion remained the most strongly reported in these blends.


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stringent Bonferroni correction was applied within each appraisal, with p at .003. No significant difference was found across 169 analyses. Nine significant differences were found without Bonferroni correction. Given the general lack of crosscultural differences, subsequent NR analyses were conducted across both samples.5 The Aveemotion column in Table 2 presents the proportion of NRs for individual appraisals computed across all emotions. Most appraisals elicited less than 10% NR responses across emotions. Across emotions, pleasantness elicited the least number of NRs, followed by control-self and certainty. Problems and goal attainment elicited the most number of NRs. Next, Cochran’s Q tests were applied to examine variability in NR on each appraisal between emotions. As shown in Table 2, all appraisals but pleasantness and certainty differed significantly in NR across the 13 emotions. The average proportion of NRs across all appraisals for each emotion was also computed (Table 2, see Aveappraisal). Challenge, contentment, hope, joy, pride, relief and romantic love elicited few NRs across appraisals (less than 10%), indicating that the traditional appraisals in appraisal research were deemed by participants as highly relevant for these positive emotional experiences. Amusement, awe, compassion and serenity attracted the highest number of NRs. As mentioned, these were among the least studied positive emotions in appraisal research. The data thus suggest that the current appraisals might be somewhat less pertinent for capturing these emotions than challenge, contentment, hope, joy, pride, relief and romantic love. However, putting the findings in perspective, the NR rates even for these emotions are comparable to that obtained by Scherer (1997). In sum, although there was variability in the perceived relevance of appraisals, the overall proportion of NRs, across all appraisals and emotions,

and across the two samples, was fairly low at 10.59%, suggesting that by and large, the appraisals examined in appraisal research are not dispensable for examining positive emotions. All appraisals were examined in subsequent analyses, and the NR responses were treated as missing data.

Discriminant power of appraisals over positive emotions Combining data across samples, all appraisals were standardised within-participant and submitted to discriminant analysis as predictors of the 13 emotions. 42.4% of the 1170 emotion cases (90 participants × 13 emotions) were correctly classified by the appraisals. Leave-one-out classification rate was 36.4%. Both rates were higher than the overall chance classification rate (i.e., prior probability) of 7.7%. Table 3 (Across Cultures columns) indicates the classification rates for individual emotions and the prior probability specific to each emotion. Most emotions were classified above chance except for interest, joy and relief. Repeating the same analysis within individual cultures, the original and leave-one-out classification rates for the Singaporean sample were 46.7% and 35.2%, respectively, and those for the American sample were 42.4% and 31.4%, respectively. Overall chance prior probability rate for both samples was 7.7%. As shown in Table 3, in both cultures, interest, joy and relief were the least accurately classified. In Singapore, the most reliably classified emotions were challenge, pride and compassion, followed by amusement and hope. In the American sample, the most reliably classified emotions were challenge and compassion, followed by amusement and pride. In sum, there were comparable discriminant rates across both cultures.6

5 No method has been developed for testing the interaction effect between a between-participant variable (culture) and a within-participant variable (emotion) on a nominal dependent variable. 6 The accuracy rate could be inflated by compassion because of its negative valance. However, when the same analyses (across cultures) were repeated but minus compassion, the overall classification rate increased but by a mere 0.9%; leave-oneout classification rate increased by only 0.2%. Accuracy rates within individual cultures also changed little (data can be obtained from the author).

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Pleasantness Relevance Problems Goal attainment Agency-self Agency-others Agency-circumstances Control-self Control-others Control-circumstances Certainty Predictability Effort Aveappraisal

Aveemotion

AMS

AWE

CHL

CPS

COT

GRT

HOP

INT

JOY

PRD

RLF

ROL

SRN

0.80 8.46 22.14 23.08 8.46 9.66 10.00 5.90 8.29 12.22 5.21 8.12 7.78

2.22 23.33 42.22 43.33 13.33 10.00 17.78 12.22 11.11 27.78 4.44 5.56 12.22 17.35

0.00 1.11 1.11 11.11 1.11 16.67 42.22 2.22 42.22 34.44 4.44 41.11 20.00 11.11 8.89 16.67 10.00 15.56 11.11 12.22 1.11 14.44 1.11 4.44 11.11 5.56 3.33 21.11 6.67 3.33 7.78 4.44 5.56 18.89 2.22 14.44 11.11 1.11 6.67 16.92 4.87 12.65

0.00 6.67 11.11 12.22 6.67 8.89 7.78 5.56 11.11 12.22 5.56 8.89 7.78 8.04

2.22 1.11 1.11 0.00 0.00 0.00 8.89 4.44 6.67 3.33 3.33 8.89 30.00 13.33 16.67 16.67 12.22 18.89 25.56 25.56 15.56 12.22 3.33 24.44 5.56 6.67 12.22 5.56 0.00 4.44 5.56 8.89 10.00 6.67 4.44 8.89 14.44 8.89 12.22 8.89 5.56 8.89 11.11 1.11 8.89 7.78 1.11 0.00 10.00 4.44 12.22 8.89 5.56 5.56 10.00 6.67 16.67 13.33 6.67 5.56 6.67 3.33 7.78 4.44 3.33 2.22 7.78 1.11 13.33 8.89 3.33 5.56 11.11 3.33 8.89 7.78 5.56 1.11 11.45 6.84 10.94 8.03 4.19 7.27

0.00 3.33 14.44 23.33 6.67 3.33 10.00 4.44 6.67 8.89 1.11 3.33 11.11 7.43

1.11 12.22 25.56 34.44 8.89 16.67 11.11 4.44 12.22 20.00 11.11 12.22 13.33 14.10

Cochran’s Q 12.00 61.66*** 133.54*** 126.45*** 42.12*** 27.88** 29.46** 49.69*** 21.03* 71.47*** 19.30 47.27*** 32.32**

AMS, Amusement; AWE, Awe; CHL, Challenge; CPS, Compassion; COT, Contentment; GRT, Gratitude; HOP, Hope; INT, Interest; JOY, Joy; PRD, Pride; RLF, Relief; ROL, Romantic Love; SRN, Serenity. Aveemotion, Average taken across emotions on each appraisal. Aveappraisal, Average taken across appraisals on each emotion. *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.

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Table 2. NR proportion (in percentage) across emotions and appraisals

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Table 3. Classification rates (in percentage) of 13 positive emotions by 13 appraisals


Across Cultures

Amusement Awe Challenge Compassion Contentment Gratitude Hope Interest Joy Pride Relief Romantic Love Serenity

Singapore

USA

Prior

Original

Leaveone-out

Prior

Original

Leaveone-out

Prior

Original

Leaveone-out

5.76 5.76 10.15 5.00 8.64 7.12 8.18 7.42 8.94 10.61 7.58 8.33

55.26 34.21 80.60 63.64 28.07 34.04 44.44 14.29 20.34 70.00 14.00 41.82

52.63 23.68 79.10 60.61 19.30 23.40 38.89 10.20 11.86 67.14 12.00 29.09

5.12 5.42 9.64 4.82 8.73 8.13 8.13 7.83 8.73 11.75 7.23 8.13

64.71 38.89 87.50 68.75 24.14 40.74 66.67 19.23 20.69 74.36 16.67 37.04

52.94 16.67 81.25 62.50 13.79 29.63 51.85 7.69 3.45 64.10 4.17 25.93

6.40 6.10 10.67 5.18 8.54 6.10 8.23 7.01 9.15 9.45 7.93 8.54

66.67 35.00 77.14 58.82 28.57 35.00 40.74 8.70 23.33 64.52 19.23 42.86

42.86 15.00 71.43 58.82 17.86 30.00 37.04 4.35 13.33 41.94 7.69 25.00

6.52

39.63

32.56

6.33

38.10

33.33

6.71

40.91

36.36

Prior, prior probabilities; original, original classification rates; leave-one-out, Leave-one-out classification rates.

Differences in appraisals among positive emotions A 13 (emotion) × 2 (culture) × 13 (appraisal) mixed analysis of variance (ANOVA) with culture as the only between-participant variable was conducted. There were a significant main effect of emotion, F(12, 72) = 2.33, p = .014, η2 = .28, and a significant main effect of appraisal, F(12, 72) = 4.31, p < .001, η2 = .42. Importantly, there was a significant interaction effect between emotion and appraisal, F(144, 864) = 2.22, p < .001, η2 = .27, implying differences in appraisal profiles among the 13 positive emotions. There was no main effect of culture, F(1, 5) < .001, p = .99, η2 < .001. All interaction effects involving culture were not significant, all Fs < 1.18, all ps > .32, all η2 < .16. Next, differences among the emotions on individual appraisals were examined. The 13 (emotion) × 2 (culture) mixed ANOVAs, one for each appraisal, were conducted. Culture was again analysed to confirm the lack of cultural effects at the level of individual appraisals. All main effects of emotion were significant (see Table 4). No effects associated with culture were significant. The data were combined across cultures in subsequent analyses.

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Next, I examined whether the variations conformed to the predictions stated in Table 1. The repeated-measure contrast procedure employed above was applied within each appraisal using weights that reflected the predicted differences. In keeping with the logic of contrast analysis, only predicted emotions were analysed. To illustrate, for control-self, challenge, contentment, interest, joy and pride were coded as 2, whereas hope and relief were coded as –5. Non-predicted emotions were assigned 0, which effectively dropped them from the analysis. As shown in Table 1 (last column), all contrasts were significant. However, these results only indicate that the predicted emotions fell into patterns that were generally consistent with predictions. The results do not demonstrate pairwise differences between the predicted emotions. They also do not show how the non-predicted emotions differed from one another and from the predicted emotions. To address these issues, paired-sample t-tests were conducted between every pair of emotions. Because 78 t-tests were conducted for each appraisal, a highly stringent Bonferronicorrected p of .00064 was applied. The results are shown in Table 4.

PSN RLV PRB GOA AGS AGO AGC CTS CTO CTC CTY PDT EFF

Amusement

Awe

Challenge

Compassion

Contentment

Gratitude

Hope

Interest

Joy

7.91adf (1.15) 3.77a (2.68) 1.94a (1.97) 4.78afI (2.98) 3.51acf (2.57) 6.44af (2.40) 2.45a (2.20) 4.28adi (2.52) 4.31ab (2.92) 2.58a (2.25) 6.93a (2.06) 4.06abcg(2.54) 2.59af (2.16)

7.50ade (1.76) 4.23ad (3.01) 3.35adc (2.83) 4.86afi (3.04) 2.40afh (2.37) 4.67bc (3.32) 4.60bcde(3.03) 3.09ch (2.46) 4.48abd (3.17) 5.34bcf (3.05) 6.39ac (2.25) 3.67abce(2.57) 2.68af (2.45)

3.90bg (2.15) 7.65be (1.62) 7.78b (1.74) 6.71bdh (2.49) 5.53bdeg(2.69) 4.05bcd (2.78) 3.32ach (2.55) 5.87begj (2.25) 3.45ae (2.72) 4.06cde (2.71) 6.01ab (2.33) 4.35ac (2.30) 8.00b (1.22)

3.67g (2.53) 3.07a (2.40) 5.19ghf (2.94) 3.74f (2.47) 2.15h (2.01) 4.95ceg(3.00) 5.18bd (2.82) 2.59c (2.10) 5.14bcd(2.85) 5.56bf (2.73) 6.08ad (1.87) 3.21bef(2.25) 4.83cgh(2.57)

7.91adef (1.38) 6.62bcgf (2.29) 3.76di (2.98) 6.19adg (2.57) 5.13bdg (2.51) 3.78bdeh(2.73) 2.94ahI (2.43) 5.45dei (2.51) 3.26ae (2.70) 3.30ad (2.66) 6.85ac (2.06) 4.29abc (2.51) 3.42adf (2.72)

7.15deh (2.22) 6.77bcgf (2.28) 4.92cgfi (2.88) 6.51bdgh(2.25) 3.96bf (2.53) 6.60f (2.85) 3.79bhf (2.77) 3.61ac (2.19) 5.19bcd (2.98) 4.02abd (2.81) 6.49ac (2.21) 3.60abce (2.22) 3.99adeg (2.74)

5.66c (2.53) 7.23bf (2.22) 6.90be (2.37) 5.85adg (2.78) 4.48bcg (2.96) 4.87bcg (3.09) 4.90be (3.01) 3.04ac (2.31) 5.77d (3.03) 5.54f (2.90) 5.00b (2.34) 2.87e (2.16) 5.52c (2.77)

7.31e (1.19) 5.93gi (2.59) 4.87cfi (2.70) 5.32ahj (2.79) 4.71bcg (2.74) 4.72bc (2.91) 3.10ahi (2.51) 5.27ij (2.64) 3.27ae (2.54) 3.36ac (2.67) 6.33ab (2.09) 4.22abc (2.37) 4.49degh(2.70)

8.33f (1.03) 6.09cghI (2.67) 4.25cfgij (3.01) 6.92bd (2.52) 5.79gei (6.54) 5.24achi (2.88) 3.54acfg (2.58) 5.01dfgi (2.43) 4.06ace (2.90) 3.72ade (2.78) 6.87a (2.02) 4.05abcg (2.47) 4.16deh (2.92)

Emotion

PSN RLV PRB GOA AGS AGO AGC CTS CTO CTC CTY PDT EFF

Country

Pride

Relief

Romantic Love

Serenity

F

η

8.29f (1.01) 7.29ef (1.84) 5.42f (2.83) 7.98c (1.48) 7.01i (1.81) 3.84bdgi (2.68) 2.82ahf (2.33) 6.43e (2.14) 3.04e (2.42) 3.24ad (2.30) 6.80ac (2.06) 4.51c (2.4) 5.14ce (3.04)

6.14ch (2.85) 6.87cefg (2.40) 6.64eh (2.51) 6.87bdj (2.34) 4.79bcg (3.19) 3.99bcdg(2.87) 4.80bcg (2.97) 3.56ac (2.73) 4.22ac (3.15) 5.05bef (2.93) 5.74bcd (2.53) 2.91eg (2.19) 5.42ch (2.83)

8.10af (1.37) 6.48cfgh (2.21) 4.40cfgij (3.05) 5.74adi (2.62) 4.98g (2.30) 5.39acf (2.77) 3.94bcfh (2.67) 3.91afh (2.16) 4.51ab (2.94) 4.76bcf (2.87) 5.98ab (2.29) 3.34abe (2.18) 4.14deh (3.00)

8.09adf (1.32) 5.30di (2.68) 3.31aij (2.89) 5.31ahi (2.87) 4.29bcg (2.77) 3.07d (2.42) 4.19bci (2.85) 5.19dei (2.81) 3.27ae (2.74) 4.21bcd (2.96) 6.76ad (1.98) 4.32acf (2.56) 2.38f (2.41)

69.33* 21.44* 9.87* 7.45* 13.40* 7.13* 8.74* 15.45* 6.99* 4.96* 6.27* 3.60* 27.43*

.46 .33 .34 .27 .22 .15 .09 .22 .11 .09 .10 .07 .34

2

F .01 2.34 2.55 .02 .15 .02 2.49 .04 1.24 1.68 .01 .18 .20

Emotion × Country

η

2

>.001 .05 .12 .001 .003 .001 .002 .001 .02 .04 >.001 .004 .004

F .63 1.72 1.47 1.11 .52 .79 .79 .67 1.25 .61 .96 .99 1.29

η2 .01 .04 .07 .05 .01 .02 .01 .01 .02 .01 .02 .02 .02

In parentheses are SDs. PSN, Pleasantness; RLV, Relevance; PRB, Problems; GOA, Goal attainment; AGS, Agency-self; AGO, Agency-others; AGC, Agency-circumstances; CTS, Control-self; CTO, Control-others; CTC, Control-circumstances; CTY, Certainty; PDT, Predictability; EFF, Effort. In bold are predicted emotions predicted to be high with regard to the appraisal; in italics are predicted emotions predicted to be low with regard to the appraisal (see Table 1). Means sharing the same superscripts did not differ significantly at p < .05; *p < .001.

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Table 4. Appraisals (means) as a function of emotion conditions


TONG

The extent of support for the predictions can be indicated by the number of significant differences between pairs of incongruent predicted emotions; for example, pride (“+”) should be higher than hope (“−”) on control-self. Out of 95 incongruent predicted emotion pairs, 91 differed significantly. Hence, by and large, a positive emotion that was predicted to be higher (or lower) on a particular appraisal than another positive emotion was indeed significantly higher (lower) than that other positive emotion. The exceptions were: compassion did not differ from joy on problems; contentment did not differ from gratitude on agency-self; awe did not differ from pride on agency-others; and joy did not differ from relief on effort. But given the vast majority of significant pairwise differences between incongruent predicted emotions at a highly stringent p cut-off of .00064, support for the predictions in Table 1 seems strong. There were notable (post hoc) findings regarding the non-predicted emotions. A non-predicted emotion was considered high (low) on an appraisal to the extent that it (1) was significantly higher (lower) than the negatively (positively) marked predicted emotions on the appraisal; (2) did not differ from the positively (negatively) marked predicted emotions; and (3) was scored close to the high (low) end of the appraisal. Using these guidelines, amusement and compassion were found to be low in relevance; challenge, hope, interest and romantic love were high on goal attainment; amusement and compassion were low on agency-self; serenity was low on agency-others; amusement and contentment were low on agencycircumstances; awe and compassion were low on control-self; serenity was high on control-self, whereas gratitude was low on control-self; challenge, contentment, interest and serenity were low on control-others; compassion and hope were high on control-others; amusement, contentment and interest were low on control-circumstances; awe was high on control-circumstances; amusement, awe, compassion, contentment, gratitude, joy and pride were high on certainty; challenge and

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interest were high on predictability; and awe was rated low on effort. Note that these findings were non-theoretical and should be treated as tentative. Lastly, I examined whether the differences among the emotions could be more simply described using a few higher-order appraisal factors. A principal component analysis with varimax rotation was applied over the within-participant standardised appraisal scores. Four factors, accounting for 59.89% of the variance, were identified based on: (1) eigenvalues (all above 1), (2) variance (ranging between 8.82% and 23.39%) and (3) interpretability considerations. Plots of the emotions on the four factors are shown in Figure 1. The first factor (Achievement) comprised goal attainment (factor loading = .77), relevance (.74), agency-self (.67) and control-self (.46), possibly reflecting the appraisal that an important goal has been achieved through personal means. Consistently, high scoring emotions on this factor include pride, challenge, contentment and joy. Compassion, awe and amusement scored on the opposite end, presumably because personal goals are less at stake with these emotions. The second factor (External Influence) comprised control-others (.78), agency-others (.66), control-circumstances (.61) and agency-circumstances (.61), reflecting the perception that events are subjected to external forces. Compassion, hope and gratitude occupied the positive extreme end of this factor, showing that these emotions involve a stronger awareness of external influences. Not surprisingly, pride was the lowest ranking emotion on this factor. The third factor (Difficulty) comprised effort (.78), problems (.77) and pleasantness (-.77). High scores on this factor indicate less pleasant, effortful and problematic experiences, such as challenge, compassion, hope and relief. Amusement, serenity, awe and contentment, which are frequently felt in problemfree or relaxing situations, scored at the opposite end. The fourth factor (Clarity) comprised certainty (.66) and predictability (.64). It reflects a sense of clarity or sureness about what is going on now and what may happen later. Hope was associated with a low degree of Clarity, whereas contentment, pride,



Figure 1. Dimensional maps of 13 positive emotions on four appraisal factors.

amusement, joy and serenity were associated with a high degree of Clarity.7

DISCUSSION This study has two main objectives. First, how strongly can appraisals differentiate positive emotions? Second, how do positive emotions differ on these appraisals? The secondary objectives are to examine cross-cultural differences in appraisal– emotion relationships and perceived relevance of the traditional appraisals for positive emotions. As I discuss each objective, I also highlight concerns and limitations that should be noted.

1997). As noted, Reisenzein and Spielhofer (1994; Study 3) offer the closest data for comparison. They obtained an accuracy rate of 57% across eight positive emotions, which, however, could be due to the fact that 22 appraisals were examined (compared to 13 here). Despite the generally high classification rates found in this study, the appraisals were less effective at classifying interest, relief and joy. This implies that the appraisals are not apt at predicting all positive emotions. It is difficult at this juncture to explain these weaker findings. Perhaps, other appraisals, or other emotion components, are important for these emotions.

Differentiating strength of appraisals over positive emotions

Differences in appraisals among positive emotions

Across both cultures, the appraisals correctly classified the current 13 positive emotions at accuracy rates well above chance. Overall classification rate was 42.4%, similar to or higher than those for classifying emotions in general found in past studies (e.g., Frijda et al. 1989; Scherer,

Several predicted differences between certain positive emotions on specific appraisals were supported (see Tables 1 and 4). The appraisal structures of some positive emotions which to date remain sparsely studied (e.g., amusement and serenity) were documented. I now describe the

7

Similar factor structures were found separately in the two cultures. COGNITION AND EMOTION, 2015, 29 (3)

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appraisal profile of each emotion. Whenever possible, each profile is discussed in relation to the emotion’s theorised or possible adaptation function, not to prove the association between the appraisals and the function, but only to highlight the coherence (however tentative) between them. Amusement was rated as pleasant and low in problems. It also was rated highly on agencyothers and low on agency-self and agency-circumstances, suggesting that amusing events are more likely actions of others than one’s own behaviours or impersonal events. Lazarus (1991) posited that awe could be subjectively positive or negative, but the current participants found awe pleasant to experience. Awe is evoked by external stimuli and hardly by the self (Keltner & Haidt, 2003; Shiota et al., 2007). Consistently, awe was associated with perceptions of events as being caused by impersonal forces and less by the self. Participants were more likely to see impersonal forces, not they, as in control. Indeed, people who feel awed are highly cognizant that they are a small part of something bigger (Shiota et al., 2007). Participants reported that their challenge experiences were personally relevant, problematic, effortful and not highly pleasant. Challenge has been theorised to motivate mastery over such trying situations (Lazarus et al., 1980; Smith & Kirby, 2010, 2011), and consistently, it was found here to be associated with a strong sense of personal control. Participants also felt more able to anticipate the future, possibly associated with their higher sense of control. Together, these findings support Smith’s (1991) conceptualisation of challenge as “effortful optimism”. Compassion was rated low on pleasantness, and as inconsistent with one’s wishes. It was associated with appraisals of situational agency and control, in line with the fact that we are more likely to feel compassion for someone who is subjected to uncontrollable forces (Goetz et al., 2010). Participants reported a low sense of personal control, and future research can examine whether this implies a sense of helplessness in helping the victim. Compassion was rated low on relevance, which does

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not seat well with a prediction that compassion is stronger when the victim or his/her plight is related to the self (Goetz et al., 2010). The results suggest that contentment occurs in highly pleasant, self-relevant, low-problem and low-effort situations. Participants also reported a high sense of personal control and certainty about the current situation. No difference in appraisal was found between contentment and joy, and hence, how contentment and joy differ in appraisals remains unclear. One possibility is that a critical appraisal has been left out of this investigation, but another possibility is that these two emotions differ not qualitatively but quantitatively (i.e., they are characterised by the same appraisals but differ in intensity on these appraisals). We feel grateful when someone else has done us a needed favour (McCullough et al. 2001). Reflecting this, gratitude was rated highly on pleasantness, goal attainment, relevance and agency-others. Although one can also feel grateful for impersonal factors (e.g., good weather), agency-circumstances was not strongly reported by the participants. Hope can occur in spite of debilitating setbacks (Lazarus, 1991). Consistently, the appraisals found on hope include perception of problems, low personal control and high situational control. It was low on predictability but was not low on certainty, suggesting that hopeful people understand what is going on now but feel uncertain about the future. What remains puzzling is why, given the many negative appraisals, did the participants still rate hope as (moderately) pleasant and not as unpleasant? Interest was rated as pleasant, supporting the idea that interest is inherently enjoyable (Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). It was also deemed high on relevance, suggesting that we tend to be interested in things that matter to us (Connelly, 2011). In line with Silvia’s (2005) view, interest was associated with high personal control, which could support the functions of exploration, discovery and learning posited of it. Not surprisingly, joy was rated high on pleasantness. Joy could be evolved for savouring successes and further pursuit of similar



achievements (Roseman et al., 1996; Smith & Kirby, 2010). The appraisals found on joy appear consistent with these functions: high relevance, goal attainment and control-self, and low effort. Even in Singapore, pride was judged to be highly pleasant. It was rated high on goal attainment, agency-self and control-self, and low on agency-circumstances and control-circumstances, reinforcing perceptions of proud people as quick to assume personal credit for achievements, deny external influences and feel in control. These appraisals seem consistent with the posited functions of pride to enhance self-perception and motivate goal pursuits (Lazarus, 1991; Tracy & Robins, 2004). Differences between authentic pride and hubristic pride (Tracy & Robins, 2004), and between one’s achievement pride and other’s achievement pride were not examined. One issue is whether the traditional appraisals are sufficient to differentiate these forms of pride. Relief is often experienced when an important goal almost escaped one’s grasp because of strong and uncontrollable odds. Consistently, while participants reported attaining important goals in their relief experiences, they also reported having to deal with problems, feeling fairly inadequate to control their situations and perceiving their situations as subjected to impersonal forces. The close call might explain why relief was rated as pleasant. Romantic love was deemed highly pleasant by the undergraduate participants, who also reported a sense of achievement, suggesting that few, if any, unrequited love and breakup experiences were brought to mind during the recall. Not surprisingly, it was rated as caused by someone else. Further studies could examine other forms of love (e.g., parental love and platonic love) and the common affect shared by these different forms, affection. Serenity was rated as high in pleasantness and certainty, but low in problems and effort, indicative of the peaceful state associated with it. Participants also reported feeling able to influence events. As posited by Lazarus et al. (1980), serenity draws the person to take a break from the grind of daily life, a consequence of which might be to boost self-efficacy.

However, while the appraisal–emotion patterns obtained in this study are generally consistent with predictions, they do not fully convey the essence of some of the emotions. For instance, awe and interest should also involve the sense that the object is beyond current frame of understanding, compassion the perception regarding the harm being inflicted on the victim and romantic love the desirability one sees only in the romantic target and not in anyone else. Researchers could propose new appraisals to capture these emotions more thoroughly (e.g., an appraisal concerning complexity of the object for interest). However, it is also critical to develop clear definitions of what appraisals are so as to prevent a proliferation in which any evaluative construct is considered an appraisal. Also, any new appraisal should not simply be a variant of the traditional appraisals. Further analyses showed that the results could be organised under four higher-order appraisals factors: Achievement, External Influence, Difficulty and Clarity. External Influence and Difficulty resemble the factors found by Smith and Ellsworth (1985). Of note is that Accomplishment emerged as the most important factor, suggesting that the sense of accomplishment could be critical for differentiating positive emotions (Lazarus et al., 1980).

Secondary objectives No significant differences in appraisal–emotion relationships were found between the two cultures. Prior work found largely consistent appraisal– emotion relationships across cultures, but mostly on negative emotions (Scherer, 1997). The current research provides similar findings but on positive emotions. However, it is premature to conclude that the results support universalist positions because only two cultures were examined. Further, although largely collectivistic, Singapore is similar to the USA in being largely English-speaking. The appraisals were generally deemed by participants as relevant to the 13 positive emotions. Pleasantness elicited the least number of NRs, suggesting that valance is viewed by laypersons (in agreement with experts) as fundamental to emotional experiences. Control-self and certainty COGNITION AND EMOTION, 2015, 29 (3)

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attracted the next lowest NR rates. That participants saw control-self as highly relevant for positive emotions is reminiscent of Lazarus et al.’s (1980) view that mastery could be a basic property of positive emotions. The low NR rate for certainty could be consistent with Lazarus et al.’s view too assuming that people are more likely to feel certain about the present when they feel in control. Problems and goal attainment elicited more NRs than other appraisals. It is possible that people are less likely to associate problems with positive experiences, but it remains unclear why sense of achievement attained fairly high NR rates. There is considerable variability in the NR responses across appraisals and emotions. Future studies could examine why specific appraisals are relevant for some positive emotions and not others. Another concern is that appraisal processes are often non-conscious. Not all appraisals are available to awareness and not all that are made conscious are remembered. Participants might have misreported their NR responses. The NR rates here are similar to that obtained by Scherer (1997) across 37 countries. But whether this attests to the accuracy of NR responses or simply shows cross-cultural deficit in memory remains to be examined.

Other issues Given the within-participant design, participants might have overemphasised the differences between the emotions. That the study was conducted over different days with the appraisal items randomised should mitigate this problem. Future studies could examine other appraisals; for example, some positive emotions could be associated with high novelty (e.g., interest) and unexpectedness (e.g., amusement). The same recall method used in past studies was employed here. This allows comparability but carries the concern of whether the results reflect actual experience or culturalised conceptual knowledge. Similar appraisal-emotion relationships were found in two cultures, which could imply that culturally driven schematic knowledge is not the sole reason for the findings (but, as alluded to

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above, there could also be cross-cultural similarity in schematic responses). Further, conceptual knowledge has to be learnt from actual experience, and even if appraisal processes are non-conscious, the outputs can be accessible to some degree. There is nothing in the current data to resolve these concerns conclusively. Future studies can employ online assessments of emotions and appraisals to test the current issues. Some of the emotions have appraisals that seem undesirable but are not necessarily maladaptive; for example, hope is associated with low perceived control, but low control-self could induce the person not to engage an impossible situation. Also, a seemingly desirable appraisal might not be adaptive; for example, high pleasantness might blind an overjoyed person to threats in the environment. More work is needed to elucidate how the individual appraisals of each emotion contribute (or perhaps, disrupt) its adaptation significance. I conclude by discussing the issue of what makes an emotion “positive”. Valance is a useful criterion, but that would disqualify challenge and compassion which were rated low in pleasantness. Note that an experientially unpleasant emotion may also be “positive” because of its eudaimonic value in widening human potential, cultivating wisdom or driving self-sacrificing altruistic acts (Ryan & Deci, 2001). Adaptation significance is a poor criterion because negative emotions were also evolved for adaptation reasons. Another criteri‐ on is to link positive and negative emotions to approach and avoidance motives, respectively, but this runs into problems with the exceptions in relief, serenity and anger. Positive emotions might also be unique for their propensity to cultivate mastery (Lazarus et al., 1980), but as the present study suggests, not all positive emotions engender a high sense of mastery. It could be that positive emotions are “positive” simply because they are judged desirable for the self, others and society to experience, but that would beg questions of how such judgments are made.


Supplementary material Supplementary Table 1 is available via the “Supplementary” tab on the article’s online page http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02699931.2014.922056. Manuscript received 29 January Revised manuscript received 28 April Manuscript accepted 3 May First published online 9 June

2013 2014 2014 2014


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APPENDIX Appraisals and items Pleasantness: “How pleasant was this situation?” Relevance: “How important in this situation was your needs/ goals/desires?” Problems: “Did you feel that there were problems that had to be solved before you can get what you want?” Goal attainment: “Did you achieve important goals/wishes that you aspire to achieve?” Agency-self: “Did you cause what happened?” Agency-others: “Did someone else cause what happened?” Agency-circumstances: “Did circumstances or forces beyond anyone's control cause what happened?” Control-self: “Did you feel that you were in control of what was happening?” Control-others: “Did you feel that someone else was controlling what was happening?” Control-circumstances: “Did you feel that circumstances or forces beyond anyone's control were controlling what was happening?” Certainty: “How certain were you about what was happening?” Predictability: “How well could you predict what was going to happen next?” Effort: “Did you feel that you needed to exert yourself to deal with this situation?”


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Precompetitive achievement goals, stress appraisals, emotions, and coping among athletes.

Cardiovascular differentiation of emotions.

When are emotions related to group-based appraisals? A comparison between group-based emotions and general group emotions.

Intensity and duration of negative emotions: comparing the role of appraisals and regulation strategies.

Relating specific emotions to intrinsic motivation: on the moderating role of positive and negative emotion differentiation.

Person-centred positive emotions, object-centred negative emotions: 2-year-olds generalize negative but not positive emotions across individuals.

A field study of discrete emotions: athletes' cognitive appraisals during competition.

EEG Correlates of Ten Positive Emotions.

The positive emotions that facilitate the fulfillment of needs may not be positive emotions at all: the role of ambivalence.

The sociocultural appraisals, values, and emotions (SAVE) framework of prosociality: core processes from gene to meme.

positive home-based caregiving appraisals by informal carers of the elderly in Japan.

The Costs of Suppressing Negative Emotions and Amplifying Positive Emotions During Parental Caregiving.

The Nonverbal Communication of Positive Emotions: An Emotion Family Approach.

Chronic pain and the adaptive significance of positive emotions.

Corrigendum: How Positive Emotions Build Physical Health: Perceived Positive Social Connections Account for the Upward Spiral Between Positive Emotions and Vagal Tone.

Positive affect and markers of inflammation: discrete positive emotions predict lower levels of inflammatory cytokines.

Positive Emotions Associated with "Counter-Strike" Game Playing.

Positive emotions and brain reward circuits in chronic pain.

The bright side of brooding: State orientation increases positive emotions about positive outcomes.

Relationships Among Positive Emotions, Coping, Resilience and Mental Health.

You are such a bad child! Appraisals as mechanisms of parental negative and positive affect.

[Managing emotions--emotions under control].

Appraisals can build resilience.

Krüppel-like Factor 4 Promotes Esophageal Squamous Cell Carcinoma Differentiation by Up-regulating Keratin 13 Expression.