Development and psychometric properties of a new measure for memory phenomenology: The Autobiographical Memory Characteristics Questionnaire.

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Development and psychometric properties of a new measure for memory phenomenology: The Autobiographical Memory Characteristics Questionnaire a

Inci Boyacioglu & Serap Akfirat

a

a

Department of Psychology, Faculty of Literature, Dokuz Eylul University, Izmir, Turkey Published online: 09 Sep 2014.

Click for updates To cite this article: Inci Boyacioglu & Serap Akfirat (2014): Development and psychometric properties of a new measure for memory phenomenology: The Autobiographical Memory Characteristics Questionnaire, Memory, DOI: 10.1080/09658211.2014.953960 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09658211.2014.953960

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Memory, 2014 http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09658211.2014.953960

Development and psychometric properties of a new measure for memory phenomenology: The Autobiographical Memory Characteristics Questionnaire Inci Boyacioglu and Serap Akfirat

Downloaded by [New York University] at 09:11 02 August 2015

Department of Psychology, Faculty of Literature, Dokuz Eylul University, Izmir, Turkey

(Received 17 April 2014; accepted 7 August 2014)

The purpose of this study is to develop a valid and reliable measure for the phenomenology of autobiographical memories. The psychometric properties of the Autobiographical Memory Characteristics Questionnaire (AMCQ) were tested in three studies: the factor structure of the AMCQ was examined for childhood memories in Study 1 (N = 305); for autobiographical memories related to romantic relationships in Study 2 (N = 197); and for self-defining memories in Study 3 (N = 262). The explanatory factor analyses performed for each memory type demonstrated the consistency of the AMCQ factor structure across all memory types; while a confirmatory factor analysis on the data garnered from all three studies supported the constructs for the autobiographical memory characteristics defined by the researchers. The AMCQ consists of 63 items and 14 factors, and the internal consistency values of all 14 scales were ranged between .66 and .97. The relationships between the AMCQ scales related to gender and individual emotions, as well as the intercorrelations among the scales, were consistent with both theoretical expectations and previous findings. The results of all the three studies indicated that this new instrument is a reliable and robust measure for memory phenomenology.

Keywords: Autobiographical memory; Phenomenology; Scale development; Validity; Reliability.

Autobiographical memory refers to recollection of personal experiences from an individual’s own life (Conway & Rubin, 1994; Robinson, 1989). Over the past 20 years, the purely cognitive views of memory in researches on autobiographical memory have been supplemented by the role of social, emotional and motivational aspects (Bluck & Habermas, 2000). The characteristics of autobiographical memories play an important role in this new line of research, providing the basic concepts required by studies of the individual differences of memory experiences. However, existing measures of memory phenomenology

have not been well developed, and their psychometric properties have to date not been tested adequately, meaning that many measurement issues have yet to be fully addressed. The present study aims to make both a conceptual and a methodological contribution to the field by recognising the dimensions of memory phenomenology. Phenomenology has long been a focus of research and can be traced back to Husserl (Giorgi & Giorgi, 2003), and later to William Wundt, who advocated introspectionism as a way of investigating psychological processes (Sutin & Robins, 2007). In a broad sense, phenomenology

Address correspondence to: Inci Boyacioglu, Department of Psychology, Faculty of Literature, Dokuz Eylul University, Tinaztepe Campus, 35260 Buca, Izmir, Turkey. E-mail: [email protected] We recognize that this research would not have been possible without the financial assistance of the Scientific Research Center of Dokuz Eylul University [grant number 2012.KB.SOS.010], and we express our gratitude to this agency.

© 2014 Taylor & Francis


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BOYACIOGLU AND AKFIRAT

refers to the study of what people experience consciously, or what they are aware of (Stevens, 2000). The large volume of research on autobiographical memory has dealt with questions of content, emotional valence, personal importance and so forth, whereas there has been relatively little interest in the experiences during the retrieval of autobiographical memories (Gulgoz & Rubin, 2001). In more recent years, there has been a growing body of studies focusing on memory phenomenology (Rubin, Burt, & Fifield, 2003; Sutin & Robins, 2007). In cognitive psychology, the phenomenological characteristics of memories have been investigated to provide an understanding of the differences in memory processes, such as true/false memories (e.g., Brainerd, Reyna, Ceci, & Holliday, 2008; Burt, Kemp, & Conway, 2004; Destun & Kuiper, 1999; Heaps & Nash, 2001; Holmes, Waters, & Rajaram, 1998; Johnson, Foley, Suengas, & Raye, 1988) and remember/know judgements (e.g., Arbuthnott, Kealy, & Ylioja, 2008; Daniels, Toth, & Hertzog, 2009; Rubin, Schrauf, & Greenberg, 2003). Furthermore, there is also a considerable body of evidence that memory dimensions, especially recollection, memory perspective, vividness and specificity, are associated closely with the particular concepts and processes of social and clinical psychology, such as self-concept (Libby & Eibach, 2002), self-enhancement (D’Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2008), personal change (Libby, Eibach, & Gilovich, 2005), personality (e.g., Rubin & Siegler, 2004; Sutin & Robins, 2010), attachment (e.g., Boyacioglu, 2012; Boyacioglu & Sumer, 2011) and psychological disorder (e.g., D’Argembeau, Van der Linden, d’Acremont, & Mayers, 2006; Rottenberg, Joormann, Brozovich, & Gotlib, 2005; Sutin, 2008).

Existing measurements of memory phenomenology Despite the long history of literature related to memory phenomenology, and the many recent studies in different areas of psychology, the primary dimensions of phenomenology that underlie autobiographical memories have so far remained unexplained (Sutin & Robins, 2007). In this regard, the majority of researches into the memory characteristics have been based on single-item ratings created by the researcher in line with the specific aim of a given study, although there are only a limited number of measures that

have been used widely in memory research. For instance, Johnson et al. (1988) examined the phenomenal characteristics of memories for a perceived and imagined autobiographical event using a Memory Characteristics Questionnaire (MCQ), which consists of 39 items, and is aimed at assessing a wide range of memory characteristics, such as sensory details (visual, smell, taste), complexity of storyline, spatial and temporal information and belief in accuracy and feelings. The Autobiographical Memory Questionnaire (AMQ; Talarico, Labar, & Rubin, 2004), which contains a set of rating scales for the assessment of different aspects of the retrieval experience, is another measure widely used in memory research. The items of the AMQ were derived from the earlier works of Rubin and his colleagues (e.g., Rubin, Groth, & Goldsmith, 1984; Sheen, Kemp, & Rubin, 2001; Talarico & Rubin, 2003) and share the same basic domains as the 39 items of the MCQ (Rubin, Burt, et al., 2003). The AMQ and MCQ share a common but significant limitation in that the phenomenal characteristics are generally assessed by single-item ratings, which results in potential problems in reliability and validity; and in fact, the psychometric properties of these questionnaires have not been tested or reported in any studies that use these measures. In response to need for a robust and psychometrically valid measure of the phenomenological properties of autobiographical memory, Sutin and Robins (2007) developed the Memory Experiences Questionnaire (MEQ), consisting of 63 items and 10 dimensions of autobiographical memory: Vividness, Coherence, Accessibility, Time Perspective, Sensory Details, Visual Perspective, Emotional Intensity, Sharing, Distancing and Valence. In spite of its obvious value, the MEQ does not cover some of the phenomenological properties that have been investigated widely in literature, such as recollection, belief in accuracy and place details. The results of the explanatory factor analyses for the MEQ were not reported, due presumably to the variations in factor loadings across memory types; Sutin and Robins also noted that the subscales of the MEQ might not measure distinct constructs, since some dimensions were highly intercorrelated. Measurement is a fundamental activity in science, given its ability to generate and support broader scientific questions, and thus make more than a mere methodological contribution (DeVellis, 2012). Each attempt to provide a psychometrically sound assessment of memory


THE AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL MEMORY CHARACTERISTICS QUESTIONNAIRE

characteristics is also beneficial in defining concepts and in understanding the functions and relationships of the different dimensions of memory. With this in mind, for the present study we defined the basic memory characteristics following an intense review of the previous literature, which will be summarised below, and tested the psychometric properties of this new measure— the Autobiographical Memory Characteristics Questionnaire (AMCQ). A study of previous literature on memory phenomenology resulted in 17 dimensions being defined: vividness, belief in accuracy, time details, place details, sensory details, accessibility, sharing, memory perspective, narrative coherence, recollection, personal im‐ plication of the event, emotional valence, emotional intensity, emotional persistence, visceral reactions, preoccupation with emotions and emotional distancing. Vividness Vividness is most commonly conceptualised as the amount of perceptual or sensory details (Talarico et al., 2004), but can also be defined as visual clarity (Sutin & Robins, 2007) if the sensory details are conceptualised as a distinct dimension of autobiographical memory. In the present study, different items were generated for vividness and sensory details to test whether they were different constructs. As an important characteristic of memory, vividness has been linked to both emotional dimensions (e.g., Conway & Bekerian, 1988; Destun & Kuiper, 1999; Rubin & Kozin, 1984) and traumatic events (e.g., Berntsen, 2001; Tromp, Koss, Figueredo, & Tharan, 1995). Belief in accuracy The belief that memories are accurate is one of the central phenomenal properties (Rubin, 2005). Individuals rarely doubt the accuracy of their memories and tend to believe that an event occurred precisely in the way they remember it. Nevertheless, there are some factors influencing the level of belief in accuracy, such as emotional valence (e.g., Brown & Kulik, 1977; Neisser & Harsch, 1992; Talarico & Rubin, 2003), clarity of the spatial context and narrative coherence (Rubin, 2005). Time and place details Tulving (1972) first defined episodic memory as a memory system for information of the form, “I did such and such, in such and such a place, at

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such and such a time” (p. 389), and details of the time and place of an event are still accepted as the defining features of autobiographical memory. In literature, the clarity of the time and place of an event in the memory has been evaluated through content analyses (e.g., Levine, Svoboda, Hay, Winocur, & Moscovitch, 2002) and through self-reported measures (e.g., Sutin & Robins, 2007). Sensory details The dimension of sensory details can be defined as whether one’s memory of an event involves visual, auditory, tactile, olfactory and gustatory details, as well as body position. Episodic information in memories refers mostly to sensory perceptual knowledge, which supports the recollective experience during the retrieval of the event (Conway, 2001). Most attempts to measure autobiographical memory have assessed to what extent these sensory details are remembered. For instance, both the MCQ (Johnson et al., 1988) and the MEQ (Sutin & Robins, 2007) contain items for the assessment of hearing, touch and smell. Perceptual episodic information has an important role to play in the construction of autobiographical memories, given its close link to self-knowledge structures (Conway & PleydellPearce, 2000). Rehearsal Rehearsal refers to the frequency at which an event is recalled, either personally, such as thinking about it, or interpersonally, such as talking to others about it (Fitzgerald & Broadbridge, 2013). On the other hand, the conceptualisation of rehearsal as two different constructs in terms of both cognitive and behavioural aspects may be more appropriate due to the obvious difference in the nature of thinking and talking. For instance, the studies of Rubin and his colleagues (Rubin, Boals, & Berntsen, 2008; Rubin, Dennis, & Beckham, 2011), using a single-item measure of autobiographical memory phenomenology, revealed consistent results in both the voluntary and the involuntary memory retrievals of participants with and without symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder with the traditional view, except for in the rehearsal dimension. These results related to rehearsal may be interpreted in different ways if thinking about and sharing the event are examined separately, rather than together as a single item. In measuring rehearsal,

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the MEQ also offered two distinct subscales, being accessibility and sharing (Sutin & Robins, 2007). Similarly, two sets of items are used in the measure of rehearsal in the present study.

(Rubin, Schrauf, et al., 2003); and the recollection of emotional memories has also been studied in association with psychological disorders (e.g., Berntsen, Willert, & Rubin, 2003; Brown & Kulik, 1977; Rubin, Feldman, & Beckham, 2004).


Memory perspective The influential study of Nigro and Neisser (1983) opened a path for “field” versus “observer” memories to be studied in different areas of psychology. Nigro and Neisser found that the perspective of memory is influenced by emotional content, which spurred a growing body of research with focus on the memory perspective and its relationships with emotional regulation and content (e.g., D’argembeau, Comblain, & Van Der Linden, 2003; Libby & Eibach, 2002; Robinson & Swanson, 1993; Strongman & Kemp, 1991; Sutin & Robins, 2010), memory types (e.g., Heaps & Nash, 2001; Talarico & Rubin, 2003) and individual differences (e.g., Coles, Turk, Heimberg, & Fresco, 2001; D’Argembea et al., 2006). Some of these studies imply that the perspectives of the field and observer are at the opposite ends of the same scale, which results in retrieval either from a first- or third-person perspective (e.g., Brewer & Pani, 1996; Libby, 2003), although another line of thought that proposes that the perspectives of the field and the observer, rather than being at the two ends of the same dimension, can change during the same retrieval attempt (Rice & Rubin, 2009). Narrative coherence In memory research, whether a memory is recalled as a coherent storyline or as disjointed pieces has been an attractive subject in understanding individual differences in memory experiences (e.g., Conway, Singer, & Tagini, 2004). In these studies, different methodologies have been used to assess narrative coherence, including content analyses (e.g., Reese et al., 2011) as well as self-reporting (e.g., Talarico et al., 2004). Recollection Recollection, or the sense of reliving the original experience (Rubin, Schrauf, et al., 2003), is a defining feature of autobiographical memory, helping to distinguish it from other cognitive processes, such as imagining or dreaming, and from the retrieval of facts related to self (Rubin & Siegler, 2004). There is some evidence that vividness, emotional dimensions and narrative coherence can predict the level of recollection

Personal implication of the event The personal implication of the event dimension can be defined as whether it makes an important difference in the person’s life or in his or her self-conception. In some of the previous measures of memory, this dimension has been covered, although with variations in its conceptualisation. For example, the MCQ put forward two items related to the implication of the event, one of which assesses personal thought on the importance of the event at the time at which it occurred, while the other assesses its importance at the time of retrieval. A scale developed by Berntsen and Rubin (2006) measures specifically the centrality of the event for the self, in which the personal importance of the event is described in terms of whether it is evaluated as a turning point or a central component of self-definition by the person. In a study that aims to develop a comprehensive means of measurement of the characteristics of autobiographical memory, we thought that the personal implication dimension of the event should be included. Emotional valence and emotional intensity Emotional valence refers to the positivity and negativity of a memory, as perceived by the person, while emotional intensity refers to the strength of the emotions experienced by the person. Although the effect of emotional valence and intensity is a central concern in memory research, in which they are viewed as two separate but closely related dimensions, previous literature is divided on the role of emotional dimensions in memory processes (Talarico et al., 2004). In general, there is evidence for the superiority of positively valenced memories over negatively valenced memories in encoding and retrieval (e.g., Berntsen, 1996; Linton, 1975; Schaefer & Philippot, 2005; Wagenaar, 1986). Comparing the effect of emotional valence and intensity, Talarico et al. (2004) found that the predictive power of emotional intensity is stronger than that of emotional valence on autobiographical memory characteristics for all specific emotions.



Emotional persistence Emotional persistence is conceptualised as the consistency between the feelings and emotional intensity experienced by the person at the time of an event and at retrieval, similar to the “same emotion/intensity” subscale of the AMQ (Talarico et al., 2004). The stability of the emotional tone of autobiographical memories has been studied in different contexts. For example, Levine (1997) assessed the stability of people’s memories related their past emotions over time to detect whether a systematic bias emerged from the prevailing emotional states; while Anderson, Cohen, and Taylor (2000) compared older and younger adults for an emotional persistence of memories. Visceral reactions Similar to the AMQ (Talarico et al., 2004), physical reactions during the recall of an event, such as a pounding heartbeat, sweat, cramps or butterflies in the stomach, are considered a separate dimension in the present study. Prior research has shown that visceral reactions to recalled memories are associated closely with psychological disorders, especially post-traumatic stress disorder (e.g., Rubin et al., 2004; Talarico & Rubin, 2003). Preoccupation with emotions This is a new dimension that has to date, to the best of our knowledge, not been defined as a part of memory phenomenology, although there is strong evidence for individual differences in the spread activation in affective system in response to the recollection of emotional memories. For instance, people with anxiety disorders (e.g., Anderson, Goldin, Kurita, & Gross, 2008; Mogg & Bradley, 1998; Wenzel, Pinna, & Rubin, 2004) and anxious attachment orientations (e.g., Conway et al., 2004; Mikulincer & Orbach, 1995) experience high levels of emotional arousal when recalling emotional memories. In this regard, the overwhelming emotions that rise during the retrieval of a memory can be conceptualised as components of the memory experience.

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phenomenology, there is a growing body of literature examining the cognitive control of emotions in memory processes through the manipulation of attention and the avoidance of emotional information (e.g., Levine, Schmidt, Kang, & Tinti, 2012; Ochsner & Gross, 2005; Richards & Gross, 2000; Van Dillen & Koole, 2007). In sum, the present study seeks to fill a gap in literature by proposing a valid and reliable means of measurement of the memory phenomenology. While the relationship between the memory characteristics and the different constructs and processes in psychology has been studied for many decades, the measurement of memory phenomenology is still in flux. This study aims to provide a robust means of measuring memory characteristics and delineating the dimensional structure of memory. In accordance with the purpose of this study, we tested the psychometric properties of the AMCQ for childhood memories, romantic relationship memories and self-defining memories, since these three types of memories are probably the most frequently addressed in the autobiographical memory literature.

STUDY 1 After defining 17 phenomenological dimensions, a large item pool was developed to cover all dimensions comprehensively, including several items that have been used widely in memory research (e.g., Johnson et al, 1988; Rubin, Schrauf, et al., 2003; Sutin & Robins, 2007). In addition, unique to the AMCQ, we generated items for the preoccupation with emotions and emotional distancing dimensions in order to explore new possible constructs in emotional experiences during the recall of autobiographical memories. A pilot study was conducted to identify any potential problems in the linguistics and the format of the AMCQ, in which 10 undergraduate students participated. The respondents were asked to evaluate the questionnaire on the basis of clarity and simplicity, and taking into account the results of the pilot study, some items were modified before determining the final form.

Emotional distancing Emotional distancing, as a newly defined dimension, refers to the degree to which a person tries to distance himself/herself psychologically from emotions in the memory. Although emotional distancing has not been studied as a part of memory

Method Participants Participating in Study 1 were 305 undergraduate students (101 male and 204 female) from the

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Faculty of Education, Dokuz Eylul University, Turkey, all of whom were aged between 18 and 29 (M = 20.67, SD = 1.93).


Measures AMCQ. After a review of literature on memory phenomenology, from which the most widely used means of measurement of phenomenological experiences were examined, a 105-item questionnaire was produced to assess the 17 defined memory characteristics, with each dimension addressed with a specific number of items, as shown in brackets: vividness (8), belief in accuracy (5), place details (5), time details (4), sensory details (6), accessibility (7), sharing (5), memory perspective (6), narrative coherence (7), recollection (6), personal implication of the event (6), emotional valence (6), emotional intensity (6), emotional persistence (6), visceral reactions (6), emotional distancing (8) and preoccupation with emotions (8) (see Appendix). The respondents were asked to address each item using a seven-point Likert-type scale (1 = completely disagree, 7 = completely agree). A high score indicated a high level of the given memory characteristic. Procedure The participants were informed that participation was completely voluntary, and that all responses would be confidential. After reading a printed copy of the instructions for autobiographical memories, adapted from Talarico et al. (2004), the participants were asked to recall a memory from their childhood, to provide a brief description of the memory they had recalled and to complete the AMCQ. The instructions and items in the questionnaire were in Turkish. After completing the task, the participants were then fully debriefed and thanked for their participation. The autobiographical memory instruction is given below: Autobiographical memories refer to important events you were personally involved in. Autobiographical memories can be related to many subjects, including your school or professional life, or your experiences in your romantic relationships or family life. Autobiographical memories have mostly emotional content, and may be positively or negatively valenced. Positive autobiographical memories make you feel happy, safe, loved, etc.; while negative autobiographical memories make you feel sad,

anxious, angry, etc. You can usually recall or trace the date of an autobiographical memory. Now, please describe a memory from your childhood that you consider personally important.

Results and discussion Before the factor and reliability analyses, itemtotal correlations were examined, leading to 23 items being eliminated from the analyses as a result of multicollinearity, low item-total correlation coefficients and inconsistent inter-item correlation patterns. For instance, the correlation coefficients of two items in the persistence dimension and three items in the visceral reaction dimension were found to be above .85. Additionally, some items showed item-total correlations ranging from .10 to .30 in the recollection, narrative coherence, preoccupation with emotions and sensory details dimensions. A number of items in the narrative coherence and emotional distancing dimensions showed either positive, negative or non-significant inter-item correlations within their own dimensions, suggesting inconsistent correlation patterns. To assess the construct validity and to determine the factor structure of the AMCQ, a principal axis-factoring analysis with a direct oblimin rotation was performed. The Kaiser– Meyer–Olkin Measure (KMO) and Bartlett’s test reported a sampling adequacy of .84, indicating a very satisfactory factorability of R assumption. After it was decided that the data were good enough for a factor analysis, Kaiser Criterion and scree plot techniques were used to determine the number of factors (Field, 2005, p. 632). There were 15 factors with eigenvalues greater than 1, explaining 74% of the total variance (see Table 1). Several factor solutions were tested, revealing some problems related to particular items in the AMCQ. Following the application of an explanatory factor analysis procedure, 19 items were eliminated from the analysis due to either nonloading or cross-loading to the factors (leaving 63 items in total). This resulted in a more reliable factor structure and a higher internal consistency. Most of the eliminated items addressed the dimensions of time details, personal implication of the event, visceral reactions and emotional persistence. Specifically, some of the items addressing time details loaded on the factor of


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TABLE 1 Results of explanatory factor analysis for studies 1, 2 and 3 Loadings


Items Vividness Eigenvalue Explained variance α (1) I remember the event vividly (2) I remember the event very clearly (3) The things I experienced during the event are so vivid that I feel as though it just happened yesterday (4) I can remember the situation in which the event occurred vividly, as though I were there (5) If I asked, I could make a film about the event that would depict exactly what happened, because I remember it so clearly Preoccupied with emotions Eigenvalue Explained variance α (1) This event is still difficult to think about because of the feelings that the memory evokes (2) As I remember the event, my feelings are so intense that I cannot focus on any activity after that (3) As I remember the event, I feel lost in my thoughts because of my feelings (4) While talking about this event, I feel such intense need to share my feelings that I cannot tell the event as a coherent story (5) As I remember the event, I cannot focus on anything except my feelings (6) As I remember the event, my feelings confuse me Emotional valence Eigenvalue Explained variance α (1) The experience I recalled is quite negative (R) (2) The experience I recalled is quite positive (3) My feelings at the time of the event were quite negative (R) (4) My overall feeling about the event is quite negative (R) (5) My feelings at the time of the event were quite positive (6) My overall feeling about the event is quite positive Accessibility Eigenvalue Explained variance α (1) I had to search my memory to recall this event (R) (2) I had to think for a while to recall this event (R) (3) I do not recall this event very often (R) Field perspective Eigenvalue Explained variance α (1) As I remember the event, I imagine it again through my own eyes (2) I view this memory through my own eyes, from my own perspective (3) As I remember the event, I feel as though I see the event out of my own eyes rather than that of an outside observer Place details Eigenvalue Explained variance α (1) I can remember the city in which the event took place (2) I can remember the district in which the event took place (3) I can remember the country in which the event took place

STUDY 1

STUDY 2

STUDY 3

11.24 17.84% .92 .92 .92 .89

11.98 19.02% .92 .86 .90 .77

1.50 23.75% .87 −.86 −.79 −.60

.79 .78

.78 .72

6.34 10.06% . 90 .85 .82

6.90 10.96% . 87 .64 .85

5.93 9.41% .85 .75 .73

.81 .77

.78 .72

.78 .65

.71 .69

.76 .70

.71 .73

5.32 8.50% .95 .91 .90 .90 .87 .86 .86

4.67 7.41% .96 .90 .93 .90 .92 .90 .87

4.21 6.69% .97 −.93 −.93 −.95 −.94 −.90 −.90

3.98 6.32% .79 −.84 −.83 −.42

1.29 2.05% .74 .80 .80 .46

1.43 2.27% .80 −.85 −.89 −.46

3.16 5.02% .92 −.85 −.80 −.77

1.05 1.67% .91 .76 .74 .65

.97 1.38% .93 .73 .66 .75

2.78 4.41% .90 .95 .91 .89

2.55 4.05% .87 −.95 −.76 −.89

2.51 3.99% .85 .85 .89 .86

−.50 −.41

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TABLE 1 (Continued ) Loadings


Items Recollection Eigenvalue Explained variance α (1) As I remember the event, I feel as though I am travelling to the time the event happened (2) As I remember the event, I feel as though I travelled back and became the same person in the event (3) As I remember the event, I feel as though I am reliving it (4) As I remember the event, I feel as I am thinking same things or feeling same emotions with those I did during the event (5) As I think about the event, I actually remember it rather than just knowing that it happened Sharing Eigenvalue Explained variance α (1) I often share this memory with others (2) I often talk about this event with my friends or family (3) Since it happened, I have talked about this event with others many times (4) I have not talk about the event with others (R) (5) I do not share this memory with others (R) Emotional distancing Eigenvalue Explained variance α (1) As I remember the event, I bottle up my feelings (2) While talking about this event, I relate what happened rather than what I felt or thought (3) As I remember the event, I smother my feelings (4) As I remember the event, although my feelings are important to me, I prefer to ignore them Sensory details Eigenvalue Explained variance α (1) I can remember my body position or my posture or how I acted during the event (2) As I remember this event, I can see the details or the colours of the things related to the event (such as the furniture or the wallpaper) (3) I can remember tactile details (such as temperature or pain) about the event (4) As I remember this event, I can sense the odour (such as damp or the perfume of someone close to you) surrounding the event (5) As I remember this event, I can hear the sounds that I heard during the event in my mind Emotional intensity Eigenvalue Explained variance α (1) While remembering the event now, my feelings are quite weak (R) (2) While remembering the event now, my feelings are quite intense (3) The memory of this event evokes very weak emotions in me (R) (4) When I focus the event, I feel very intense emotions (5) The memory of this event evokes very strong emotions in me Narrative coherence Eigenvalue Explained variance α (1) This memory comes to me in disjointed pieces (R) (2) This memory comes to me in disjointed flashbacks (R)

STUDY 1

STUDY 2

STUDY 3

2.26 3.58% .90 −.68 −.67

1.13 1.79% .86 .71 .69

16.18 25.69% .91 .74 .73

−.62 −.57

.61 .44

.53 .44

−.46

.33

.48

1.96 3.12% .83 −.87 −.84 −.82 −.39 −.36

3.69 5.86% .89 .84 .84 .78 .82 .83

3.90 6.19% .92 .79 .82 .91 .90 .86

2.84 1.79% .74 .79 .75 .71 .47

2.17 3.44% .82 .79 .86 .73 .75

2.00 3.17% .82 .76 .78 .72 .62

1.55 2.46% .81 .89 .78

1.96 3.11% .79 −.70 −.57

1.30 2.07% .85 .54 .84

.73 .54

−.71 −.73

.42 .76

.48

−.54

.48

1.38 2.18% .87 .78 .71 .71 .69 .68

2.32 3.68% .92 .87 .81 .84 .74 .79

1.25 1.99% .95 .78 .76 .78 .82 .78

1.35 2.14% .86 .86 .85

1.81 2.87% .88 .77 .75

1.78 2.83% .90 .78 .80


9

TABLE 1 (Continued ) Loadings


Items (3) As I remember the event, there are gaps, some things I cannot remember in story line (R) (4) The order of events in the memory is incoherent and confusing (R) (5) I remember the event in a chronological order (before, during and after) Observer perspective Eigenvalue Explained variance α (1) As I remember the event, I feel as though I see the event as an outside observer (2) As I remember the event, I feel as though I am watching a short-film about someone else (3) As I remember the event, I feel as though I am looking at the past me and others around me from above or far away Belief in accuracy Eigenvalue Explained variance α (1) I think that the event may have occurred differently to how I remember it (R) (2) I am seriously doubtful that the event occurred in the way I remember it (R) (3) The event occurred exactly the way I remember it (4) As I remember the event, I have not imagined or fabricated anything that did not occur (5) I am sure that the event occurred in the way I remember it

STUDY 1

STUDY 2

STUDY 3

.81 .70 .59

.67 .67 .55

.69 .70 .59

1.16 1.84% .82 −.86 −.79 −.72

3.06 4.86% .78 .81 .79 .72

3.48 5.52% .84 .81 .74 .83

1.26 1.79% .77 .70 .67 .60 .59 .58

1.35 2.14% .66 .50 .33 .62 .37 .75

1.11 1.77% .77 .39 .60 .67 .82 .49

(R) Reversed items.

sensory details, while some had factor loading values of less than .30. Furthermore, items addressing emotional persistence and emotional intensity loaded onto the same factor, and most of the items related to the personal implication of an event loaded also onto the same factors as emotional intensity. All items addressing visceral reactions loaded onto the same factor as preoccupation with emotions. After the elimination of the problematic items, which were assumed to be loaded onto the above factors, a principal axis-factoring analysis was once again run for the AMCQ. A 14-factor solution with a direct oblimin rotation yielded the best interpretable solution. The items loaded onto the expected factors with high factor loadings ranged from .36 to .93, with 14 factors accounting for 72% of the total variance. In particular, the items of accessibility and sharing loaded onto two separate factors, as expected. As seen from Table 1, the items related to the field and observer perspectives, which were conceptualised as a unique factor in the memory perspective, also loaded onto two separate factors. In the reliability analysis, Cronbach’s alpha values ranged from .74 to .96 (see Table 1), corresponding to a very satisfactory level of reliability. The per-item total correlations ranged from .76 to .91 for vividness; from .43 to .72 for

belief in accuracy; from .77 to .90 for place details; from .56 to .63 for sensory details; from .45 to .75 for accessibility; from .54 to .69 for sharing; from .59 to .77 for observer perspective; from .80 to .90 for field perspective; from .52 to .79 for narrative coherence; from .65 to .83 for recollection; from .79 to .86 for emotional valence; from .61 to .78 for emotional intensity; from .47 to .69 for emotional distancing; and from .65 to .78 for preoccupation with emotions. Table 2 presents the mean, standard deviation and correlation coefficients of the subscales.

STUDY 2 Method Participants Participating in Study 2 were 197 undergraduate students from the Faculty of Economy, Dokuz Eylul University, Turkey (82 male and 115 female), aged between 17 and 27 (M = 21.43, SD = 1.87). Procedure After reading the printed instruction for autobiographical memories, the participants were asked

1 .04 .38*** 1 .12* −.24*** −.09

to recall a memory related to their romantic relationship experiences, to provide a brief description of the memory and to complete the AMCQ. All instructions and items in the questionnaire were in Turkish.

Results and discussion The items that were found to be problematic and were consequently eliminated from the analysis in Study 1 were omitted also from the present analysis. To assess the construct validity and to determine the factor structure of the 63-itemed AMCQ for the assessment of memories of romantic relationships in the present sample, a principal axis-factoring analysis with a direct oblimin rotation was performed. The KMO and Bartlett’s test indicated a sampling adequacy of .81. There were 14 factors with eigenvalues higher than 1, as in Study 1, which explained 73% of the total variance (see Table 1). It was found that the internal consistency values of the dimensions ranged from .66 to .96. Item-total correlations ranged from .69 to .87 for vividness; from .31 to .55 for belief in accuracy; from .70 to .84 for place details; from .50 to .62 for sensory details; from .41 to .70 for accessibility; from .70 to .79 for sharing; from .48 to .73 for observer perspective; from .77 to .86 for field perspective; from .64 to .77 for narrative coherence; from .60 to .82 for recollection; from .81 to .91 for emotional valence; from .72 to .87 for emotional intensity; from .60 to .70 for emotional distancing; and from .61 to .76 for preoccupation with emotions. The means, standard deviations and correlation coefficients of the subscales are presented in Table 3. As in Study 1 on childhood memories, the present findings related to memories of romantic relationships confirmed that the AMCQ had a healthy factor structure with reliable subscales. *p < .05, **p < .01 and ***p < .001.

1 .39*** .24*** .17** .14* .06 .25*** .33*** .33*** −.00 .11 −.03 −.05 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)

Vividness Belief Place Sensory Accessibility Sharing Observer Field Coherence Recollection Valence Intensity Distancing Preoccupied

5.47 6.08 6.56 4.22 4.55 4.32 4.12 4.85 4.69 4.79 3.85 3.99 2.96 2.40

(1.28) (.93) (.91) (1.46) (1.68) (1.42) (1.76) (1.72) (1.43) (1.48) (1.91) (1.55) (1.37) (1.30)

1 .46*** .27*** .46*** .25*** .14* .19*** .19*** .42*** .45*** .04 .22*** .06 .03

1 .14* −.04 .02 .14* .17** .04 .27*** −.09 −.02 .05 .02

1 .16** .20*** .18** .26*** .30*** .52*** .04 .35*** .17** .24***

1 .44*** −.00 .15** .34*** .32*** .06 .38*** .02 .01

1 .00 .15** .10 .31*** .07 .35*** −.03 .18**

1 −.30*** −.05 .18** .04 .17** .07 .13*

1 .16** .42*** −.00 .17** .03 .09

1 .32*** −.04 .15** −.01 −.21***

1 .03 .48*** .12* .21***

12 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 M (SD)

TABLE 2 Means, standard deviations and correlation coefficients of the AMCQ scales in Study 1


1 .37***

BOYACIOGLU AND AKFIRAT 13

10

STUDY 3 Method Participants Participating in Study 3 were 262 undergraduate students from the Faculty of Literature, Dokuz Eylul University, Turkey (67 male and 195 female), aged between 19 and 27 (M = 22.36, SD = 1.60).

Self-Defining Memory is a memory of an event from your personal past. These memories generally help you in understanding yourself and realizing your personality, or show other people who you are or what kind of a person you are. Self-defining memories have mostly strong emotional content, and may be positively or negatively valenced. Positive autobiographical memories make you feel happy, safe, loved, etc.; while negative autobiographical memories make you feel sad, anxious, angry, etc. You can usually recall or trace the date of an autobiographical memory. They can be from any time in your life. You frequently recall these memories. Now, please describe an important self-defining memory from your life that helps you understand yourself as a person.

1 .20** 1 −.02 .23*** 1 −.06 .62*** −.00 .08 1 .34*** .08 .31*** −.11 −.34*** 1 .30*** .49*** −.00 .33*** .07 −.02 1 −.38*** −.16* .04 −.11 .04 .15* .15* 1 .09 .07 .07 .23*** .05 .29*** −.23*** .02

Results and discussion

1 .26*** .24*** .07 .08 .20** .16* .25*** .03 .13 −.11 −.09

1 .27*** .17* .11 .27*** .32*** .45*** −.07 .43*** −.02 .11

1 .29*** −.05 .19** .40*** .41*** .07 .37*** −.17* −.10

The participants were then asked to recall a selfdefining memory from their life, to report a brief description of the memory they recalled and to complete the AMCQ. The instructions and the items of the questionnaire were all in Turkish.

*p < .05, **p < .01 and ***p < .001.

1 .36*** .09 .22** .04 −.10 .21** .42*** .21** −.06 .13 −.08 −.25*** 1 .33*** .27*** .40*** .43*** .15* .04 .37*** .48*** .56*** .00 .32*** −.03 −.13 (1.07) (.77) (.74) (1.36) (1.51) (1.56) (1.79) (1.64) (1.49) (1.27) (2.17) (1.60) (1.68) (1.56) 6.24 6.44 6.70 5.20 5.38 4.65 3.85 5.33 5.38 5.61 3.74 5.16 3.28 3.02 Vividness Belief Place Sensory Accessibility Sharing Observer Field Coherence Recollection Valence Intensity Distancing Preoccupied (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)

11

Procedure Printed instructions for self-defining memories, adapted from Singer and Moffitt (1991–1992), were given to participants:

1 −.06 −.20** −.27***

13 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 M (SD)



10

11

12


Regarding self-defining memories, to assess the construct validity and to determine the factor structure of the 63-itemed AMCQ, a principal axis-factoring analysis with a direct oblimin rotation was performed. The KMO and Bartlett’s test indicated a sampling adequacy of .88. There were 14 factors with eigenvalues greater than 1, as in Studies 1 and 2, which accounted for 75% of the total variance. The analysis showed that the factor structure of the AMCQ was consistent across all three studies. For the reliability analysis, Cronbach’s alpha values ranged from .77 to .97, which were very satisfactory. Item-total correlations ranged from .62 to .82 for vividness; from .52 to .61 for belief in accuracy; from .72 to .75 for place details; from .62 to .67 for sensory details; from .51 to .73 for accessibility; from .78 to .83 for sharing; from .62 to .80 for observer perspective; from .80 to .91 for field perspective; from .66 to .83 for narrative coherence; from .71 to .84 for recollection; from .83 to .92 for emotional valence; from .82 to .90 for emotional intensity; from .58 to .71 for

1 −.29*** .26*** 1 .23*** −.27*** −.21*** 1 .22*** .67*** −.24*** .11 1 .56*** .18** .48*** −.31*** −.06 1 .18** .40*** .12 .31*** −.07 .12 1 −.63*** −.19** −.22*** −.08 −.19** .15** .02 1 −.04 .10 .21*** .27*** .11 .26*** −.36*** .05

9 8 7 6 5

1 .31*** −.14* .23*** .47*** .48*** .11 .53*** −.20*** .19** 1 .42*** .20*** −.12 .32*** .60*** .65*** .19** .57*** −.21*** .05 1 .19** .16** .04 −.09 .08 .36*** .26*** .11 .24*** −.13* −.09 1 .50*** .33*** .24*** .12 −.11 .13* .48*** .35*** .21*** .27*** −.19** −.19** 1 .53*** .37*** .56*** .37*** .25*** −.10 .19** .60*** .63*** .26*** .57*** −.24*** .04

*p < .05, **p < .01 and ***p < .001.

A maximum likelihood CFA was used to test the factorability of the 63-itemed AMCQ on the combined data. The goodness of fit statistics of the analysis showed that χ2(1799) = 5856; p =.000, χ2/df = 3.26; Standardized Root Mean Square Residual (SRMR) = .06; Adjusted Goodness of Fit statistic (AGFI) = .76; Goodness of Fit statistic (GFI) = .79; Comparative Fit Index (CFI) = .88; Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) = 6996.32; and Root Mean Square Error of Approximation

(.94) (.69) (.50) (1.38) (1.47) (1.80) (1.76) (1.59) (1.32) (1.33) (1.94) (1.70) (1.62) (1.29)

Results and discussion

6.27 6.56 6.80 5.31 5.49 4.30 3.43 5.56 5.68 5.64 5.29 5.16 3.15 2.65

Intensity of individual emotions. Participants were asked to rate the intensity of individual emotions during the recall of the given memory. The intensities of feelings of anger, sadness, anxiety, happiness, pride and satisfaction were assessed with a seven-point scale (1 = No emotion to 7 = Very intense).

4

Measures

3

This study was based upon the data collected from the samples of Studies 1, 2 and 3 (N = 764).

2

Participants

1

Method

M (SD)

In Study 4, a Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) was performed on the combined data in order to confirm the factor structure of the AMCQ that emerged from the previous explanatory factor analyses in the three previous studies. Combining data allows the results to be based on a larger sample size and also provides a unified view of the data collected from different resources. We also examined the relationships of the AMCQ scales with gender and various emotions, with the intention being to provide an initial validation of the conceptual meaning of the scales.



10

STUDY 4


11

12

13

emotional distancing; and from .54 to .70 for preoccupation with emotions. The factor loadings of the items, the eigenvalues of each factor and their explained variances, and the Cronbach’s alpha coefficients yielded from three studies are presented in Table 1. The means, standard deviations and correlation coefficients of the subscales are summarised in Table 4.

1 .25***


(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)

12



(RMSEA) = .59. The modification indices suggested that the error terms between Vividness 1 and Vividness 2, Valence 6 and Valence 2, Intensity 1 and Intensity 3 and lastly Sharing 4 and Sharing 5 were correlated. As these four pairs were the items of the same factors, the suggested error terms were allowed to be correlated. The analysis was repeated. The correlation coefficient between the error terms Vividness 1and Vividness 2 (r = .22), Valence 6 and Valence 2 (r = .20), Intensity 1 and Intensity 3 (r = .29), and Sharing 4 and Sharing 5 (r = .49) was not so strong. Besides, the parameter estimates of the before and after correlating the error terms were almost the same. The modified model fitted the data much better with χ2(1765) = 4395, χ2/df = 2.44; SRMR = .59; AGFI = .82; GFI = .84; CFI = .93; AIC = 5116.07; and RMSEA = .046. The results of the CFA of the combined data supported the psychometric soundness of the AMCQ and its 14 theoretically derived scales (see Figure 1). The Cronbach’s alpha values of the subscales were found to be very high, scoring .92 for vividness; .76 for belief in accuracy; .86 for place details; .84 for sensory details; .80 for accessibility; .88 for sharing; .82 for field perspective; .92 for observer perspective; .98 for narrative coherence; .90 for recollection; .96 for emotional valence; .92 for emotional intensity; .79 for emotional distancing; and .88 for preoccupation with emotions. The results indicated that the subscales of the AMCQ are highly valid and thus can be considered as reliable measures of autobiographical memories. In order to examine the gender differences in the AMCQ scales, a one-way ANOVA was performed, and the results revealed significant differences in vividness (F(1, 763) = 4.647, p < .05); belief in accuracy (F(1, 763) = 8.713, p < .01); accessibility (F(1, 763) = 5.349, p < .05); sharing (F(1, 763) = 19.347, p < .001); narrative coherence (F(1, 763) = 11.468, p < .001); recollection (F(1, 763) = 7.466, p < .01); emotional intensity (F(1, 763) = 9.114, p < .01); and emotional distancing (F(1, 763) = 6.686, p < .01). As can be seen in Table 5, women scored higher in all these dimensions, aside from emotional distancing. In concurrence with our findings, Sutin and Robins (2007) also reported that women tended to score high in coherence and emotional intensity, while men tended to score higher in personal distancing. Consistent with previous findings, it is apparent that women generally outperform men in the majority of memory dimensions (Pillemer, Wink, DiDonato, & Sanborn, 2003).

13

To examine the relationships between emotions and the autobiographical memory dimensions, a partial correlation analysis was carried out in which gender was controlled. As can be seen in Table 6, positive emotions, including happiness, pride and satisfaction, were significantly correlated with all of the autobiographical memory dimensions, apart from place details and observer perspective. In contrast, negative emotions, including anger, sadness and anxiety, showed fewer significant correlations. Previous studies have shown consistently the advantages of positive valence over negative valence (Talarico et al., 2004). In the present study, positive emotions were found to be positively correlated with sharing, vividness, belief in accuracy, accessibility, narrative coherence, recollection, general emotional valence and intensity; while negative emotions were found to be negatively correlated with belief in accuracy, sensory details and general emotional valence. These findings related to emotions implied that negative emotions are generally related to more defensive memory mechanisms, such as viewing the event from the perspective of an observer or avoiding emotional content by creating emotional distance from the memory. On the other hand, positive emotions are found to be associated with field perspective that may allow the person to benefit from the event themselves.

GENERAL DISCUSSION The current study set out to develop a means of assessment of the characteristics of autobiographical memory—the AMCQ. An explanatory factor analysis was carried out to uncover the structure of autobiographical memory for different memory types, along with a CFA using the combined data to replicate the results of the explanatory factor analyses. The results confirm the AMCQ as a psychometrically sound scale with meaningful and reliable subscales. The AMCQ consists of 63 items related to 14 reliable scales, including vividness, belief in accuracy, place details, sensory details, accessibility, sharing, field perspective, observer perspective, narrative coherence, recollection, emotional valence, emotional intensity, emotional distancing and preoccupation with emotions. The present studies tested the psychometric properties of the AMCQ for self-defining memories, autobiographical memories of childhood and romantic relationships. In addition to the excellent fit of the 14-factor solution to the data related to three different memory types, the results of

14

BOYACIOGLU AND AKFIRAT .38 .31 .18

Vividness 1 .50

.79 Vividness 2 Vividness 3

.83

Vividness

.65

.91 .28

Belief 5 .71 Belief 4 Belief 3

.39

Vividness 4 .78 Vividness 1

.31

Place 3

.10

Place 1

.36

Place 2

.42

Perception 5

.83 .95

Place details

.73

Belief 1

.76

Belief 2

.71

Accessibility 3

.24

Accessibility 2

.18

Accessibility 1

.80

.20


.50

Perception 1

.54

Perception 2

.70

.40

Sensory details

.61

Observer 3

.19 .30

.56 .28

.62

Observer 1

.90

Observer 2

.84

.77 Sharing 1

.66

Sharing 4

.67

Sharing 5

.22

Field 3

.07

Field 1

Observer perspective

.31

.66 .85

.36

Coherence 3

.80

.23

Coherence 2

.88

.46

Coherence 4

.34

Valence 6

.28

Valence 2

Narrative coherence

Valence 4

.11

Valence 1

.12

Valence 3

Field 2

.88 .96

Field perspective

.83

.24

Recollection 2

.20

Recollection 3

.33

Recollection 1

.82

.47

Recollection 5

.73

.44

Recollection 4

.23

Intensity 2

.15

Intensity 4

.13

Intensity 5

.51

Intensity 1

.54

Intensity 3

.42

Preoccupied 6

.31

Preoccupied 3

.52

Preoccupied 5

.46

Preoccupied 1

.58

Preoccupied 4

.39

Preoccupied 2

.87 .89

.85 Valence 5

.58

Recollection

.88 .81

.12

Sharing

.75

.74

.33

.89

.57

Coherence 5 Coherence 1

Accessibility

.87

Sharing 3

.68 Perception 4

.54

Sharing 2

.21

.68

.54

.49

.90

Perception 3 .73

Belief In accuracy

.91

.76 .46

.85 .52

.85 .28

.59

.82 .94

Emotional valence

.92 .93

Emotinal intensity

.70 .68

.95 .94

.76 .62

.62 .57 .28 .54

.83

Distancing 4 Distancing 2 Distancing 1 Distancing 3

.65

Emotional distancing

.85 .68

.69 .74

Preoccupation with emotions

.65 .78

Figure 1. Standardised solutions in CFA for combined data.

CFA on the combined data confirmed all of the hypothesised constructs. In short, the factor structure of the AMCQ was found to be consistent with the originally defined constructs by the researchers. The adequate Cronbach’s alpha coefficients of

the subscales across the three studies and the combined data (ranging from .66 to .98) confirmed the AMCQ further as a reliable and robust measure of memory phenomenology. Finally, the findings from Study 4 related to gender and individual



TABLE 5 Means and standard deviations of the AMCQ scales for men and women in Study 4

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)


Men

Women

Mean (SD) 5.81 (1.26) 6.21 (.90) 6.66 (.82) 4.69 (1.50) 4.89 (1.60) 4.03 (1.61) 3.89 (1.71) 5.15 (1.54) 4.95 (1.52) 5.09 (1.40) 4.41 (1.92) 4.43 (1.67) 3.32 (1.58) 2.64 (1.41)

Mean (SD) 6.01 (1.14) 6.40 (.81) 6.69 (.72) 4.92 (1.48) 5.18 (1.63) 4.58 (1.65) 3.78 (1.83) 5.25 (1.75) 5.33 (1.43) 5.39 (1.44) 4.27 (2.20) 4.82 (1.72) 3.01 (1.52) 2.65 (1.38)

emotions were in theoretically expected directions, providing additional evidence for the validity of the AMCQ scales. Obviously, standardised and psychometrically tested scales with multiple items would allow researchers to obtain more reliable results on a firmer methodological base, although studies using single-item scales have provided valuable insights into the structures and processes of autobiographical memory. The AMCQ is a comprehensive instrument that takes into account most of the dimensions that have been widely investigated in memory literature. A few important dimensions, including personal implication of the event, emotional persistence, visceral reactions and time details,

15

however, had to be eliminated due to the presence of multicollinearity, low item-total correlation and factor loading problems for the items of these subscales. For instance, items related to personal implications of an event, emotional persistence and visceral reactions demonstrated very high associations with each other, as well as the items of emotional intensity and preoccupation with emotions. As a consistent finding in literature, particular memory dimensions appear to be highly correlated (Fitzgerald & Broadbridge, 2013; Sutin & Robins, 2007; Talarico et al., 2004), such as the strong link between highly emotional memories and visceral reactions (e.g., Berntsen, 2001; Rubin et al., 2004; Talarico & Rubin, 2003). As a principle, we preferred to retain a scale that had more important theoretical implications and stronger statistical values so as to develop a more robust measure of memory phenomenology. Accordingly, the subscales of personal implications of the event, emotional persistence and visceral reactions were excluded from the AMCQ, rather than excluding emotional intensity. Furthermore, although visceral reactions and personal implications of the event showed healthier factor-loading patterns in Studies 2 and 3 in several factor solution attempts, different from Study 1, in order to develop a standard measure that could be used for all memory types, we looked for a consistent pattern in the factor structure across memory types. That said the memory dimensions that were eliminated from the AMCQ can be re-added to the scale for future studies by generating new items or improving the wording of existing items. Since visceral

TABLE 6 Correlation coefficients between the AMCQ scales and emotions when gender controlled in Study 4


Anger

Sadness

Anxiety

Happiness

Satisfied

Proud

.02 −.09** −.10** −.08* .06 .00 .09** −.04 .03 .10** −.49*** .14*** .23*** .27***

.03 −.06 −.01 .10** .10** .03 .08* .07 .04 .15*** −.57*** .18*** .27*** .31***

−.01 −.17*** −.07 .09** .06 .01 .03 .03 −.03 .07* −.33*** .13*** .18*** .29***

.17*** .11** .05 .17*** .18*** .11** −.06 .11** .13*** .18*** .74*** .25*** −.20*** −.10**

.16*** .10** .01 .18*** .14*** .12** −.05 .13*** .15*** .19*** .66*** .22*** −.21*** −.09*

.18*** .08* .01 .19*** .15*** .09** −.03 .14*** .16*** .22*** .53*** .28*** −.14*** −03

*p < .05, **p < .01 and ***p < .001.


16


reactions and personal implications of the event are accepted as central memory dimensions in some research areas, such as post-traumatic stress disorder (e.g., Berntsen & Rubin, 2006; Rubin et al., 2011; Talarico & Rubin, 2003), the refinement of the AMCQ would be an important contribution to memory literature. On the other hand, the items of time details would seem to have strong associations with vividness and sensory details, regardless of the memory type. Accordingly, using such open-ended questions as “Please write the date when the event happened in as much detail as possible” can provide a healthy and more economical solution to the problem, as well as a more objective measurement. As the length of the AMCQ may be considered too long for some researches, it should be noted that, where necessary, only the specific subscales that are relevant to the research subject can be administered. One of the most important results of present study is that the field perspective and observer perspective appeared as two distinct dimensions, although the AMCQ was designed with the assumption that the memory perspective would be measured along a single dimension. In fact, the nature of the memory perspective has emerged as a continuing source of debate in memory literature, and there is empirical evidence for both the unidimensional and the multidimensional views of the memory perspective. Our findings support the notion that the experience of the visual perspective during a single retrieval is from the perspective of neither the field nor the observer, but it can be both. Consistent with our findings, Rice and Rubin (2009) found that people rated their memories as high from both field and observer perspectives and reported experiencing more than one perspective when retrieving a single memory. Similarly, Robinson and Swanson (1993) demonstrated that individuals were able to shift their memory perspective from field to observer or vice versa for most types of memories. Rice and Rubin (2011) also provided evidence of flexibility in the visual perspective regarding memory content. Moreover, the present study showed that the most of memory dimensions were related to field perspective but not to observer perspective. Previous research has also pointed to the fact that the two perspectives are associated differentially with various psychological constructs and processes. For instance, Seguchi and Nonaka (2014) found a reduction in the emotional intensity of recalled events when the perspective was changed from

field to observer; while Libby et al. (2005) found that remembering from the observer perspective produces judgements of greater self-change when people seek evidence of change, but lesser selfchange when they are inclined to look for evidence of continuity. These results propose that taking the observer perspective can result in a plastic change in the autobiographical memory system. In parallel with all these results, our findings showed that the field and observer perspectives are two separate constructs, rather than being a single dimension. In addition to the more intensely studied memory characteristics, the AMCQ offers also two new dimensions: preoccupation with emotions and emotional distancing. In fact, there is a large body of research into the emotional arousal that is produced with the recall of autobiographical memories in various contexts, such as traumatic memories (e.g., Byrne, Hyman, & Scott, 2001; Porter & Birt, 2001); flashbulb memories (e.g., Berntsen & Rubin, 2006; Berntsen et al., 2003; Bohn & Berntsen, 2007; Talarico & Rubin, 2003, 2007); eye-witness memories (e.g., Christianson, 1992); and attachment-related memories (e.g., Conway et al., 2004); as well as researches into the cognitive control of emotions (Robinson, 2005), as mentioned earlier. However, to the knowledge of the authors, these emotional experiences have to date not been identified as a part of the memory phenomenology. In the present study, we questioned whether these experiences can be evaluated as an affective component of memory phenomenology. The findings demonstrated that these constructs are statistically viable, since both the explanatory factor analyses in three separate samples across memory types and the CFA using the combined data yielded the same factor structure, with satisfactory values, in addition to high internal consistency coefficients for the subscales. Future research may focus on their associations with the numerous psychological concepts related to the self, individual differences, psychological disorders and regulation of emotions, which have potential implications for clinical and social psychology. Regarding the relationships between the constructs of the AMCQ, each memory characteristic tended to display a distinct pattern of correlations across the memory types, in spite of consistent correlations among vividness, belief in accuracy, accessibility and recollection, as could be exp‐ ected (e.g., Berntsen et al., 2003; Fitzgerald &



Broadbridge, 2013; Rubin, Schrauf, et al., 2003). Another consistent pattern across different types of memories was the correlation of emotional intensity with most of the memory characteristics, while emotional valence was associated with only a few memory characteristics. Supporting our findings, Talarico et al. (2004) also reported emotional intensity as a stronger predictor of memory phenomenology when compared to emotional valence. The correlation patterns of preoccupation with emotions and emotional distancing are subject to considerable variations according to memory type, except the consistent relationship of preoccupation with emotions with emotional distancing and emotional intensity. It would appear that the higher the emotional arousal, the greater the effort to control emotions during memory retrieval, most probably due to the person’s need to diminish the spread activation of emotions in order to maintain the given memory task. Despite the particular differences among the three studies, preoccupation with emotions, in general, was associated with incoherent, negatively valenced memory retrieval and high levels of rehearsal and/or recollection. The intensity of events may strengthen particular memory characteristics, such as rehearsal and recollection (Talarico et al., 2004), while excessively strong emotional associations with a memory may result in difficulties in processing and organising the memory during retrieval (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). For autobiographical memories related to romantic relationships, emotional distancing showed significant correlations with accessibility, sharing, observer perspective and emotional valence; while for self-defining memories it showed significant correlations with all memory characteristics, aside from the field perspective. People who tried to control emotional information in the recalled memories appeared to remember the event from an observer perspective and reported low accessibility and sharing, but high negative valence ratings. Different from the memories related to romantic relationships, self-defining memories are central for the self-system, are linked strongly to developmental goals and are frequently rehearsed (Thorne, McLean, & Lawrence, 2004). Accordingly, the negative correlations between emotional distancing and the scales of vividness, place details, sensory details, recollection and belief in accuracy in self-defined memories suggest that emotional distancing is going with impaired, overgeneral retrieval, which

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implies a common well-developed strategy towards self-consistency (for an extensive review see Conway et al., 2004). Following a very different pattern, emotional distancing was associated with negatively valenced childhood memories, featuring rich sensory details and high recollection levels. It is possible that the length of time between the event and the time of retrieval influences the relationship between emotional distancing and other memory characteristics. Before closing this discussion, it should be reminded that in the course of the analyses, a few important items were lost, such as “As I remember the event, if what I felt at the time of the event comes to my mind, I try to think about something else” and “As I think or talk about the event, I can be open about my feelings”. Further research may enrich our understanding of the affective aspect of memory experiences. The final point that should be mentioned is that the data presented here were collected from a non-Western culture. Although the items of the AMCQ are in Turkish and the study sample comprised only young Turkish people, the study of Rubin, Schrauf, Gulgoz, and Naka (2007), comparing the autobiographical remembering among Japanese, Turkish and American samples, revealed that the underlying structure of autobiographical memory in different cultures is identical, although there may be some variations in the mean scores in particular dimensions. Our findings address the universality of memory experiences, which have been investigated widely in literature; however, future researches using different samples from other cultures would be appropriate. The AMCQ items were translated into English and back-translated into Turkish by the authors and also checked by a native English speaker. The final English version of the AMCQ, containing all items, including those that were eliminated, is provided in the Appendix. Researchers are thus free to test the AMCQ with all of its items or may modify the wording of the measures to suit their own studies. In addition to cultural issues, the AMCQ can be tested across other memory types, such as traumatic memories, flashbulb memories or non-personally meaningful memories. In the present study, the underlying structure of the AMCQ was investigated through an assessment of autobiographical memories only for childhood experiences, romantic relationships and self-defining memories. Despite the noted limitations, this study makes a meaningful contribution to the body of literature

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on memory phenomenology. The factor structure of the AMCQ and the adequate internal consistency coefficients of the subscales across the three studies and the combined data demonstrate that this new instrument is a reliable and robust means of measurement of memory phenomenology. In addition, the AMCQ scales reveal theoretically meaningful relations with gender and individual emotions, as well as intercorrelations among the scales. We believe that measuring the dimensions of autobiographical memory with a more robust and comprehensive instrument will lead to more interpretable and richer results.

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APPENDIX Vividness (1) I remember the event vividly (2) I remember the event very clearly (3) The things I experienced during the event are so vivid that I feel as though it just happened yesterday (4) I can remember the situation in which the event occurred vividly, as though I were there (5) If I asked, I could make a film about the event that would depict exactly what happened, because I remember it so clearly (E) My memory of this event is very detailed (E) My memory of this event is very vague (R) (E) I have a dim recollection of this event (R) Belief in accuracy (1) I think that the event may have occurred differently to how I remember it (R) (2) I am seriously doubtful that the event occurred in the way I remember it (R) (3) The event occurred exactly the way I remember it (4) As I remember the event, I have not imagined or fabricated anything that did not occur (5) I am sure that the event occurred in the way I remember it Place details (1) I can remember the city in which the event took place (2) I can remember the district in which the event took place (3) I can remember the country in which the event took place (E) I can remember the room (if the event took place inside) or to within a few meters (if the event took place outside) (E) I can remember details of the place (such as the location or name of the place) where the event took place Sensory details (1) I can remember my body position or my posture or how I acted during the event (2) As I remember this event, I can see the details or the colours of the things related to the event (such as the furniture or the wallpaper) (3) I can remember tactile details (such as temperature or pain) about the event. (4) As I remember this event, I can sense the odour (such as damp or perfume of someone close to you) surrounding the event (5) As I remember this event, I can hear the sounds that I heard during the event in my mind (E) My memory of this event does not involve any sensory information (sound, smell, taste, etc.) (R) Accessibility (1) I had to search my memory to recall this event (R) (2) I had to think for a while to recall this event (R) (3) I do not recall this event very often (R) (E) Since this event took place, I have thought or talked about it (E) This memory came spontaneously to my mind while I was reading the instructions (E) It is easy for me to recall this memory (E) I find myself remembering this event while I am thinking about something else Sharing (1) I often share this memory with others (2) I often talk about this event with my friends or family (3) Since it happened, I have talked about this event with others many times (4) I have not talked about the event with others (R) (5) I do not share this memory with others (R)

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Observer perspective (1) As I remember the event, I feel as though I am seeing the event as an outside observer (2) As I remember the event, I feel as though I am watching a short film about someone else (3) As I remember the event, I feel as though I am looking at the past me and others around me from above or far away Field perspective (1) As I remember the event, I imagine it again through my own eyes (2) I view this memory through my own eyes, from my own perspective (3) As I remember the event, I feel as though I am seeing the event out of my own eyes rather than as an outside observer


Narrative coherence (1) This memory comes back to me in disjointed pieces (R) (2) This memory comes back to me in disjointed flashbacks (R) (3) As I remember the event, there are gaps and some things I cannot remember in the storyline (R) (4) The order of events in the memory is incoherent and confusing (R) (5) I remember the event in chronological order (before, during and after) (E) As I remember the event, the memory comes to my mind in words or pictures as a complete and coherent story (E) As I remember the event, a number of things that are unrelated to the event also come to mind (R) Recollection (1) As I remember the event, I feel as though I am travelling to the time it happened (2) As I remember the event, I feel as though I travelled back and become the same person in the event (3) As I remember the event, I feel as though I am reliving it (4) As I remember the event, I feel as if I am thinking the same things or feeling the same emotions as I did during the event (5) As I think about the event, I actually remember it rather than just knowing that it happened (E) I feel as though this memory is of an event that was experienced by a person other than me (R) Emotional valence (1) The experience I recall is quite negative (R) (2) The experience I recall is quite positive (3) My feelings at the time of the event were quite negative (R) (4) My overall feeling about the event is quite negative (R) (5) My feelings at the time of the event were quite positive (6) My overall feeling about the event is quite positive Emotional intensity (1) While remembering the event now, my feelings are quite weak (R) (2) While remembering the event now, my feelings are quite intense (3) My memory of this event evokes very weak emotions in me (R) (4) When I focus the event, I feel very intense emotions (5) My memory of this event evokes very strong emotions in me (E) When I focus on the event, I don’t feel much of anything (R). Emotional distancing (1) As I remember the event, I bottle up my feelings (2) While talking about this event, I relate what happened rather than what I felt or thought. (3) As I remember the event, I smother my feelings (4) As I remember the event, although my feelings are important to me, I prefer to ignore them (E) As I remember the event, if what I felt at the time of the event comes to my mind, I try to think about something else (E) As I think or talk about the event, I can be open about my feelings (R) (E) As I think or talk about the event, I feel comfortable (R) (E) As I talk about the event, I let others understand my feelings (R) Preoccupation with emotions (1) This event is still difficult to think about because of the feelings that the memory evokes (2) As I remember the event, my feelings are so intense that I cannot focus on any activity after that (3) As I remember the event, I feel lost in my thoughts because of my feelings. (4) While talking about this event, I feel such an intense need to share my feelings that I cannot tell the event as a coherent story (5) As I remember the event, I cannot focus on anything except my feelings (6) As I remember the event, my feelings confuse me (E) I feel comfortable going through my feelings about this event (R) (E) As I remember the event, focusing on my feelings never influences me (R)

THE AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL MEMORY CHARACTERISTICS QUESTIONNAIRE Time details (E) I can remember (E) I can remember (E) I can remember (E) I can remember

the the the the

date as day/month/year in which the event took place period (such as during university times or in my 20s) in which the event took place season in which the event took place time of day (such as morning) when the event took place


Emotional persistence (E) As I remember the event, I feel the emotions as strongly as I did at the time of the event (E) As I remember the event, I feel the same emotions as I did at the time of the event (E) My feelings at the time of the event never change over time (E) My feelings at the time of the event become weaker over time (R) (E) I no longer feel the same emotions as I did at the time of the event (R) (E) My feelings at the time of the event have changed over time (R) Visceral reactions (E) As I remember (E) As I remember (E) As I remember (E) As I remember (E) As I remember (E) As I remember

the the the the the the

event, event, event, event, event, event,

I I I I I I

feel feel feel feel feel feel

my heart pounds or races my hands shaking sweaty cramps or butterflies in my stomach my knees shaking headaches or giddiness

Personal implication of the event (E) This event is very important to me (E) This event has serious implications in my life (E) I learned a lot from this event, which makes me a different person (E) This event was a turning point in my life; I can divide my life story into before and after the event happened (E) This event is not personally important to me (R) (E) This event has not changed anything in my life (R) (E) Eliminated items and (R) Reversed items.

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Measuring the phenomenology of autobiographical memory: A short form of the Memory Experiences Questionnaire.

Involuntary autobiographical memory chains: implications for autobiographical memory organization.

The relation between verbal and visuospatial memory and autobiographical memory.

Autobiographical memory: a clinical perspective.

Imaging autobiographical memory.

Health Literacy Measure for Adolescents (HELMA): Development and Psychometric Properties.

The Wechsler Memory Scale-Revised: psychometric characteristics and clinical application.

[Nostalgia and the functions of autobiographical memory].

Oscillatory correlates of autobiographical memory.

Autobiographical fluency: a method for the study of personal memory.

Development and psychometric properties of the Smoking Restraint Questionnaire.

A Cocaine High-Risk Situations Questionnaire: development and psychometric properties.

The development and psychometric properties of a measure of clinicians' attitudes to depression: the revised Depression Attitude Questionnaire (R-DAQ).

The Family Fat Talk Questionnaire: development and psychometric properties of a measure of fat talk behaviors within the family context.

Event memory: A theory of memory for laboratory, autobiographical, and fictional events.

The Metacognitions about Smoking Questionnaire: development and psychometric properties.

Autobiographical Memory in the Angry Self.

Empathy and autobiographical memory: are they linked?

A psychometric measure of working memory capacity for configured body movement.

A new measure of fear of falling: psychometric properties of the fear of falling questionnaire revised (FFQ-R).

Psychometric properties of an innovative self-report measure: The Social Anxiety Questionnaire for adults.

Interpersonal Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (IERQ): Scale Development and Psychometric Characteristics.

Medication health literacy measure: development and psychometric properties.

Mental health self-management questionnaire: Development and psychometric properties.