the new bioethics, Vol. 20 No. 2, 2014, 141–152
Developing Theological Tools for a Strategic Engagement with Human Enhancement Justin Tomkins SML Church, Poole, UK The literature on Human Enhancement may indeed have reached a critical mass yet theological engagement with the subject is still thin. Human Enhancement has already been established as a key topic within research and captivating visions of the future have been allied with a depth of philosophical analysis. Some Transhumanists have pointed to a theological dimension to their position and some who have warned against enhancement might be seen as having done so from a perspective shaped by a JudeoChristian worldview. Nonetheless, in neither of these cases has theology been central to engagement with the enhancement quest. Christian theologians who have begun to open up such an engagement with Human Enhancement include Brent Waters, Robert Song and Celia Deane-Drummond. The work they have already carried out is insightful and important yet due to the scale of the possible engagement, the wealth of Christian theology which might be applied to Human Enhancement remains largely untapped. This paper explores how three key aspects of Christian theology, eschatology, love of God and love of neighbour, provide valuable tools for a theological engagement with Human Enhancement. It is proposed that such theological tools need to be applied to Human Enhancement if the debate is to be resourced with the Christian theological perspective of what it means to be human in our contemporary technological context and if society is to have the choice of maintaining its Christian foundations. keywords human enhancement, theology, technology, science and religion, transhumanism
Introduction Even back in 2009 the literature on Human Enhancement was described as having reached a ‘critical mass’ (Selgelid quoted in European Parliament STOA report 2009: 10), ‘qualifying it as a major topic of ethical research’(European Parliament ß W. S. Maney & Son Ltd 2014
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STOA report 2009: 10). That Human Enhancement has been established as an important research topic is indicated by events such as the formation of the World Transhumanist Association in 1998 (later renamed Humanityz), the birth of the Future of Humanity Institute in 2005, and the publication, particularly in the last decade, of a wealth of material exploring Human Enhancement. Ray Kurzweil (2005), Aubrey de Grey (2007) and Lee Silver (1999) are amongst those who have offered visions of the future which have captured the popular imagination. These visions have been allied with heavyweight philosophy through the work of academics such as Nick Bostrom (2003), John Harris (2007) and Julian Savulescu (Savulescu and Bostrom 2009). Some Transhumanists have pointed to a religious dimension of their position, in an attempt to avoid what they perceived as a hostile polarization between ‘religious and Transhumanist visions of humanity’s existence and future’ (Campbell and Walker 2005: vii). Some of those who have warned against enhancement, such as Leon Kass (2002; President’s Council on Bioethics 2003), might be seen as having done so from a perspective shaped by a Judeo-Christian worldview. Nonetheless, in neither of these cases has theology been central to engagement with the enhancement quest. Christian theologians who have begun to open up such an engagement with Human Enhancement include Brent Waters, Robert Song and Celia DeaneDrummond. Having touched upon aspects of the context in his theological exploration of reproductive technology (Waters 2001), Brent Waters has gone on to offer a rigorous theological exploration of the subject as one aspect of a postmodern world (Waters 2006). Robert Song (2002) has explored enhancement as a dimension of the human quest to fabricate the future using genetic science. Celia Deane-Drummond (2003: 225–52; Deane-Drummond and Scott 2010: 168– 82) points to the virtues as a means of enabling a deeper theological engagement with the field and she has made a further substantial contribution by her efforts to prompt others too, to engage theologically with this critical area of ethical and philosophical research (Deane-Drummond 2003; Deane-Drummond and Scott 2010). The insights which have been generated by their work demonstrate the possibility of further engagement. Nonetheless, the Christian theology which might be applied to Human Enhancement remains largely untapped. I propose that this lack of engagement and application is a problem not only for the Church itself but also for our wider society. Christian theology has been profoundly influential in shaping contemporary views of what it means to be human and helping establish such underlying values and principles as care for all people. There is no doubt that these views are changing and will change further, with divergence and contention. Nonetheless, however they change, it will be important to understand and to reflect upon these views of what it means to be human if we are to be able to make wise decisions in relation to issues of Human Enhancement. Without the means to explore how Human Enhancement relates to a Christian understanding of what it means to be human, we risk discarding building blocks of our society without either examination of their nature or consideration of the consequences of their absence.
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The lack of Christian theological engagement with Human Enhancement is not due to an absence of material upon which to draw. There is a wealth of Christian theology relating to issues of being human which might be applied to the subject. Vast fields of Christian writing contain the potential to illuminate the enhancement quest with Christian theological insights. This paper will draw upon three aspects of Christian theology: eschatology, love of God and love of neighbour, in order to illustrate the identification and the use of tools for a theological engagement with Human Enhancement. A more thorough engagement with each of these areas can be found elsewhere (Tomkins 2013). Engaging with Human Enhancement through these aspects of theology and the tools developed from them is intended to model how further engagement is possible through the use of other aspects of Christian theology in a similar way.
Human Enhancement and eschatology Eschatology involves the study of all that comes next, of the future, of the ‘last things’. Human Enhancement is based upon the use of science, medicine and technology to enable humankind to shape its own future. For example, Transhumanist visionaries such as Ray Kurzweil (2005) describe a future which is shaped by the vision and the action of human beings and their descendants. From this perspective the future is as yet fundamentally unformed and malleable, and human beings are the masters of their own destiny. Christian eschatology, in contrast, describes the biblical vision of a new heaven and a new earth brought about through the activity of God (Revelation 21). Whilst this perspective on the future envisages human actions having a role within the outworking of God’s own plans and purposes for creation, such human action is limited in impact and is just one of several factors which influence the detail of the future. Christian theology asserts that the ultimate nature of that future has already been established by Jesus’ own death and resurrection and that what comes next is primarily determined by those two events which have already taken place and have already secured the final shape of human history. This Christian vision of the future not only challenges future visions which point to a different fulfilment and conclusion of history but also raises questions about the influence of human activity in shaping the future. Christian eschatology thus provides the means of engaging with each aspect of the enhancement quest which relates to hope for the future. An illustration of how one specific area of this Christian theology might offer an engagement with enhancement can be provided through the application of Dietrich Bonhoeffer’s (2005: 146–70) concepts of the ultimate and the penultimate. (This paper follows the lead that Neil Messer (2011: 38–40) has offered in using these concepts to reframe bioethical questions.) Eschatology leads to the identification of a theological tool taking the form of the question: ‘Is this technology, or the vision behind it, inconsistent with Christian eschatology?’ In the same way, Bonhoeffer’s concepts provide a sub-tool which might be framed in terms of the question: ‘Is this technology, or the vision behind it, inconsistent with Bonhoeffer’s concepts of the ultimate and the penultimate?’
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Bonhoeffer uses the term ultimate to refer to God’s last word and the final outworking of his plans and purposes. It relates to all that is not yet but which will come about in the future as God brings about the fulfilment of history. The penultimate refers to all which precedes that, to the now and to what follows before those last days of the completion of God’s work in and through creation. Thus in writing of the ultimate and the penultimate Bonhoeffer brings to mind today and tomorrow, the now and the not yet. He describes both the penultimate and the ultimate as precious (2005: 159–60), the ultimate in its own right and the penultimate in relation to the ultimate, precisely because it is penultimate. He argues that Christian eschatology demands that both the penultimate and the ultimate are held in appropriately high regard. Three authors who describe dreams of an enhanced future are Ray Kurzweil, Aubrey de Grey and Lee Silver. Kurzweil (2005: 324–25) imagines the possibility of so uploading one’s identity as to enable the adoption of real and virtual bodies at will. De Grey (2007: 44–45) envisages the hope of repairing and maintaining human bodies much as vintage cars can be kept on the road through similar efforts. Silver presents a vision within which parents select desirable characteristics for their children, such as disease resistance, but then go further and contribute to a future in which types and subtypes of genetically enriched children have been developed, designed to succeed in such fields as sport or business, and subfields such as athletics or football (Silver 1999: 4–8). Bonhoeffer’s concepts offer a means of engaging with these and other such dreams. Ray Kurzweil’s vision of an uploaded future reveals a lack of regard for the significance of the physical embodied reality of our current experience in the penultimate. It therefore devalues the penultimate, the now, and so, as Bonhoeffer warns will always be the case, also devalues the ultimate, the not yet, by attempting to separate it from the penultimate to which it is fundamentally connected. Kurzweil fails to take account of the significance of human embodiment and by assuming that human identity is so disconnected from that embodiment that it might survive uploading into some disembodied form he devalues both the present and the future. He thus assumes a pale imitation of the future hope of Christian theology, which hopes not for less physicality but rather for a deeper and richer embodied future of resurrection bodies in a new earth and a new heaven. The centrality of the resurrection within Christian eschatology draws attention to a future in which embodiment and the physical world are not simply unfortunate consequences of today, to be cast off as soon as is possible, but rather important indicators of what will be yet more significant in what is yet to come. Kurzweil’s vision of the future, by contrast, assumes a world in which our physicality and our embodiment are superficial aspects of our true nature and which, through technological tools, will be able to be discarded for the purposes of achieving liberation from our physical constraints. Christian theology warns that such a perspective is both futile and unnecessary for the freedom of the future lies not in disembodiment but in the hope of resurrection bodies. Aubrey de Grey’s dream of ongoing maintenance and repair of the human body affirms the goodness of physicality and embodiment but, by regarding human life
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as ‘no more than’ physical, it devalues the ultimate. In doing so, it also devalues the penultimate by taking what is only of significance by the fact that it comes before the ultimate and attempting to give it meaning in and of itself. Christian eschatology describes a world in which the physical universe is one aspect of a creation in which spiritual forces are also an important reality. From this perspective, to understand the human body as ‘no more than’ physical is to disregard fundamental components of our very nature and identity. Christian theology reveals the reality that the human body is more than simply the sum of its constituent physical parts and so any hope of maintaining the body on that basis will fail to take account of key aspects of its very nature. Furthermore, the future hope of Christian eschatology lies not in maintenance of this, albeit incredible form, but in the hope of the embodiment of resurrection life. Bonhoeffer’s perspective thus reveals de Grey’s dream both to fail to appreciate the full beauty of the human body in the present and to seek to maintain it in a form which is but a shadow of a richer form yet to come. Lee Silver’s vision of genetically engineering future generations of children represents a desire to subject the physical world to our wills, using whatever means are necessary to do so. As such it reveals the same disregard for the material world as is shown by Kurzweil’s visions, just expressed in a different way. Instead of a desire to escape from the material, Silver presents a vision in which the material world is dominated in order to force it to conform to human will. In this way Silver too devalues the significance of the physical world. His vision of a world in which physicality is fully malleable to human ideas and the human will is one in which the physical and the material hold less significance than they do within the world in which we live. Whatever else we may think of Silver’s vision, it is challenged by Bonhoeffer’s concepts of the ultimate and the penultimate for it represents an unhealthy disregard for the value of the penultimate and the present nature of the physical world. Silver’s future, like Kurzweil’s, grows out of an unhealthy focus upon the ultimate. As Bonhoeffer argues will always be the case, rather than affirming the value of the ultimate, such disconnection between the ultimate and the penultimate devalues both. We might expect that it is particularly important to see the goodness of the future. If such a perspective is balanced by recognizing the goodness of the present too, such a view is certainly healthy. The problem appears if we start to get so excited by the future that we lose touch with the value of today. It is this distorted perspective which Bonhoeffer warned against. He argued that it is only when we think about the present and the future in relation to one another that we can fully appreciate each of them for what they are. By disregarding the significance of the material world of today, Silver and Kurzweil devalue both the ultimate and the penultimate. By his exclusive focus upon an ultimate goal, Silver misses the possibility of ultimate hope growing out of the penultimate. In other words, he fails to see how the promise of resurrection bodies expresses both how good the physical world is now, and also points to an even more wonderful physical reality in the future.
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Bonhoeffer’s concepts thus offer a practical tool for critiquing enhancement quests in relation to one aspect of Christian theology. Their use also raises questions in relation to contemporary practices which relate to the visions of Kurzweil and de Grey. For example, if I upload my thoughts, feelings and images onto blogs and social-networking sites, how might I contribute to life now in the penultimate without denying the ultimate value of what lies ahead? In what ways might our care for our bodies today express their value both for now and as a means of enabling our growth and flourishing in relation to hope of life beyond death? However we might answer such questions, and no matter whether or not we accept Bonhoeffer’s assumptions, Christian eschatology provides a means of engaging with Human Enhancement quests and of critiquing their values and perspectives.
Human Enhancement and love of God Jesus described the command to love God with all one’s heart, mind, soul and strength, together with that to love one’s neighbour as oneself, as the greatest commandments (Matthew 22: 37–40; Mark 12: 29–31; Luke 10: 27–28). They therefore occupy a prominent place within Christian theology. One aspect of loving God can be understood to be recognizing and valuing his role as Creator, a role which includes his creation of people. Loving God therefore involves acknowledging the biblical claim that this creation is good (Genesis 1: 4, 10, 12, 18, 21, 25, 31) and that people are therefore no flawed prototype in need of redesign but rather works of art formed by the master craftsman. The inherent limits of human bodies can then be understood as deliberate features of design rather than mistakes in need of correction. In this way, loving God can be related, through worship of God as Creator, to a positive attitude to one’s embodiment and its inherent limits and finitude. It identifies a tool which might be expressed in the form of the question: ‘Is this technology, or the vision behind it, inconsistent with love of God, by attempting to transcend intrinsic human limits rather than to recognize and to value them?’ This acceptance and even embrace of inherent human limitations contrasts with Transhumanist visions which seek to overcome these limits for the purposes of human liberation and greater control of one’s context. Whereas Transhumanists seek to become ‘beings with vastly greater capacities than present human beings have’ (Bostrom 2003: 1), Christian theology points to appreciation of human life as it is experienced now and the hope of resurrection life to come. One basis for the acceptance of inherent human limits within Christian theology is the understanding of humans as being embodied creatures. From this perspective, humans do not just happen to have bodies, rather our very identities are inherently connected to them. Our bodies, together with our mind and our emotions, contribute to who we are and help to make up our very self. Appreciating human embodiment involves a recognition of inherent human limits for without an acceptance of such limits it is not possible to celebrate the fact that we are defined, at least in part, by our bodies.
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The celebration of human embodiment which is found within Christian theology involves an acceptance that with that gift of embodiment come concomitant limits. The same body which gives strength and enables movement comes with a particular scale and at any one time can only be present in a single location. It contains within it inherent limits. To reject the value of those inherent limits is to deny the goodness of the particular gift of human physical embodiment. That is not to say that accepting inherent human limitations involves rejecting all technological means for addressing those limits but it is likely to involve a discerning approach to the use of such technologies. Unless we are able to distinguish between those technologies which provide further freedom for inherently limited human beings and those which seek to overcome all such limits, we may be in danger of rejecting the goodness of human embodiment. Kurzweil’s dream of uploading oneself into a computer system does involve such a rejection of the nature of our human embodiment. As well as celebrating human embodiment because it is in that form that humans have been created, Christian theology has additional cause to value our embodied nature. The fact that the Christian faith is centred around the belief that God himself, in the form of Jesus, became human and took upon himself the same embodied nature as that of the humanity he had created, leads to a further acceptance of inherent human limits within Christian theology. After all, if this human form has already been chosen as fit for his own purposes by God himself, it is difficult to make a case for that same form being fundamentally inadequate. Christian theology does point to the even greater goodness of resurrection bodies yet to come but without denying the inherent goodness of the present human form for present purposes. The hope of future resurrection bodies means that Christians can empathize with all who dream of something more. Like Transhumanist visions, Christian theology points to a future hope which involves the transformation of our bodies. Christians too sense that we were made for more than this and may speak of a sense of eternity within. Yet, pointing to that transformation to come, Christian theology is able to embrace inherent human limitations in the present, even whilst waiting for their future transformation. The idea of inherent human limitations raises the issue of attempting to distinguish between therapy and enhancement. Difficult as it may be to pin down a distinction between therapy and enhancement, we may note the difference between those limits which are inherent to all humans and those faced only by certain people. Embracing inherent human limits will involve recognizing that all humans face fundamental limits in relation to lifespan and unaided running speed, yet that does not require an acceptance of particular personal limits. Both healing and growth are deeply valued and affirmed within Christian theology and will often involve seeking to overcome those limits which are due to personal difficulties due to disease, injury, birth defects or lack of skill, experience or development. The need to distinguish between inherent human limits and particular personal limits is one aspect of the need to distinguish between therapy and enhancement. Challenging as it may be to make such distinctions, they are vital if we are to be able to engage with the realities of living in a world in which
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each person faces both inherent limits shared with all other people and also particular limits due to their own unique circumstances and situation. Thus, the acceptance and the embrace of inherent human limits within Christian theology present a challenge to Transhumanism. Not only does the attempt to overcome these limits represent a denial of the goodness of the human form as we have been created but it also involves an unnecessary attempt to carry out a task of transformation which Christians argue has already been achieved through the gift of resurrection. Embracing inherent human limits can grow out of both an appreciation of the goodness of creation and also from a trust in God’s faithfulness to fulfil his purposes for creation, two expressions of the biblical concept of love of God. Genetic engineering offers one specific area within which to explore how this Christian theological tool of a focus upon loving God might be used to illuminate one element of the enhancement quest. A focus upon intrinsic human limits offers a means of distinguishing between genetic engineering to correct an illness, injury or disease, and the use of the same technology to attempt to overcome inherent human limits. It makes it possible to affirm the one whilst challenging the other. For example, the use of genetic engineering to prevent disease might be understood as one more aspect of the therapeutic task to which the Church has made such significant contributions towards over the last two thousand years. In contrast, the idea of using genetic engineering to select the characteristics of children so as to work towards future generations with vastly greater capacities, as described by writers such as Lee Silver (1999), involves a seeking to overcome rather than to accept inherent human limits and might be challenged on that basis. There is a powerful correlation between Christian theology and one’s perspective on the significance of inherent human limits and finitude. Those who advocate enhancement include both those who fundamentally seek to overcome inherent human limits and also people such as N. Katherine Hayles (1999: 5) who affirm at least some such limits. Those who write about Human Enhancement from the basis of Christian theology however, all affirm at least some aspects of inherent human limits. Thus Christian theologians are not unique but they are distinctive in their acceptance and affirmation of inherent human limits.
Human Enhancement and love of neighbour As noted above, the biblical command to love one’s neighbour as oneself holds a key place within Christian theology. This focus upon loving one’s neighbour as oneself draws attention to all those issues of Human Enhancement which raise questions about how the actions of one person or one group relate to consequences for others. It therefore provides a tool with which to engage with issues of justice, community and relationships within Human Enhancement. This tool might be expressed in terms of the question: ‘Is this technology, or the vision behind it, inconsistent with the biblical command to love one’s neighbour as oneself?’ Issues of justice are common within ethical questions relating to medicine. As in other contexts, Human Enhancement raises issues of how a particular technology will impact all peoples, not just myself, my family and my friends. It may be
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technically possible to develop resources to extend life, improve memory and increase strength but whether or not such tools will be available to all will involve politics and economics. The biblical concept of loving one’s neighbour adds weight to all those calls that enhancements are considered, not just in relation to one person, but in relation to society as a whole, and in particular to the weak and the poor. Discovering foods, medicines and other means of significantly extending the human lifespan might be understood differently depending upon whether or not such resources can be made available to all or will only ever be accessible by a privileged few. If certain enhancements are dependent upon access to scarce resources they run the risk of further widening the gap between those who have and those who do not. If Human Enhancement leads to any further increase in inequality between the rich and poor, the biblical command to love one’s neighbour as oneself raises a cry for justice on behalf of the poor, the needy and the oppressed. The biblical focus on love of neighbour also raises issues including the collective effects of enhancements. Love of neighbour quickly reveals the futility of projects such as equally increasing everyone’s height if such ‘positional goods’ are only of benefit when achieved relative to others (Sandel 2007: 18). Even if it is true that it may be economically and socially advantageous for a man to increase his height by two inches relative to the average height of other men, it is far less beneficial to him to increase his height by the same amount if all other men do the same. A focus upon loving one’s neighbour raises the challenge of justifying selfdefeating enhancements. This is because the good of each neighbour cannot be understood alone and is inevitably connected to the good of others. The biblical concept of loving one’s neighbour involves being aware of the needs of the whole community and the recognition that it will be impossible to meet those needs if each person seeks only their own good. Furthermore, the focus upon love of neighbour within Christian theology goes beyond pointing out the futility of collectively self-defeating enhancements and offers a glimpse of a world within which some such enhancements become unnecessary, even if only available to a privileged few. Equal access to the means of increasing one’s height may open up the possibility of a world in which all are taller by the same amount but in which no one benefits as a result. A world characterized by love of neighbour opens up the possibility that selfishness and competition are so replaced by compassion and cooperation that there is no fundamental disadvantage of being below average height in the first place. A consideration of love of neighbour raises further issues in relation to one’s ability to serve and to relate to other people. It might be used to advocate enhancement as a means of increasing one’s ability to serve the needs of others. Certainly, an enhanced brain might enable physicians to identify better diagnoses and treatments for patients. Enhanced physical capabilities might enable parents and carers to carry on serving beyond the point at which exhaustion would previously have prevented further active service. However, counter-arguments include the fact that physical enhancement of carers might suggest their activity is more significant than their being, and so devalue them as people. Furthermore, if
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the purpose of medicine involves recognition of human limitation and finitude, better diagnosis and treatment might be achieved at less human cost, through other technological means rather than through human enhancement of physicians. The desire to express love for one’s neighbour might also lead to a decision to enhance oneself in order to participate in community with enhanced neighbours. (The concept of an enhanced neighbour assumes a future in which it might be possible to distinguish between those whose enhancements set them apart from those who remained unenhanced. It would be a step towards the two separate species of the naturals and the genetically-enriched imagined by Silver (1999: 290)). Such a decision might be built upon a belief that one’s ability to participate in community with others is dependent upon sharing their enhancements but this is a highly questionable assumption. Firstly, the Church’s nature as a body in the world but not of it (John 17: 15–18; Romans 2: 2), demonstrates the possibility of participation whilst remaining distinct. Secondly, the success of individual church communities at embracing those of all abilities and enabling them to truly belong gives evidence of the possibility of participation in community being possible regardless of ability. Therefore, whilst a focus upon love of neighbour rightly leads one to question whether one needs to enhance oneself in order to participate in community with others, there is good evidence to indicate not needing to do so. Consideration of love of neighbour also challenges any vision of the future in which technology is used to diminish the connections between one person and another. Both Aubrey de Grey and Susan Greenfield envisage such scenarios. In his consideration of a future in which it is common for people to live to be a thousand years old de Grey (2007: 308) imagines, quite plausibly, that such people will be less motivated than those of today to have children. If so, such a future will be a diminished one in which a reduction in key relationships between one generation and another will be one price of increased longevity. Drawing upon her professional expertise as a neuroscientist, Greenfield (2003: 38–44) imagines a future in which the development of cyber-companions will lead to a dramatic reduction in interactions between people. Greenfield’s imagined future involves human beings becoming increasingly selfish and disconnected through having their whims and desires pandered to by appropriately programmed electronic companions. She envisaged such a lifestyle leading to the disintegration of the family unit and the breakdown of social interactions. Greenfield asks: ‘Able to access any information we wish, and capable of choosing from a variety of cyber-companions, what would be the worth in seeking out real-life human individuals? If you were to find them, why would they be interested or interesting?’ (Greenfield 2003: 43). If as Greenfield suggests, the combination of technologies would lead to a reduction in the quality of relationships between people, they might appropriately be challenged on the basis of the value of loving one’s neighbour. A particularly disturbing aspect of Greenfield’s vision is that her imagined future appears to be the inevitable outworking of an increasing dependence upon technology within a world in which selfishness is not held in check. Such a vision challenges any who aspire to love one’s neighbour to demonstrate the possibility of an alternative future within which love for one’s neighbour protects against such a
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breakdown of real-life relationships. Loving one’s neighbour as oneself is by definition a means of holding selfishness in check. In this way, the biblical command to love one’s neighbour as oneself not only calls for care for others but also offers a protection against the selfishness which might otherwise threaten our very identity and that of our society.
Summary Brent Waters, Robert Song and Celia Deane-Drummond have already demonstrated the value of drawing upon a Christian theological understanding of postmodernism, genetic science and the virtues within the context of Human Enhancement. This paper has attempted to show the value of engaging with Human Enhancement using eschatology, love of God and love of neighbour as a means of developing theological tools. As previously noted, a more thorough engagement with each of these areas can be found within Better People or Enhanced Humans? (Tomkins 2013). That book, like this paper, has been written in the hope that others will work to mine other Christian theology in order to provide further theological tools with which to illuminate the field of Human Enhancement. Whilst the amount of Christian theological engagement with this subject of Human Enhancement is still small, that is not through any lack of theological raw material. There is a weight of Christian theology from which further theological tools might be made available. It is proposed that such theological tools need to be applied to Human Enhancement if the debate is to be resourced with a Christian theological perspective of what it means to be human in our contemporary technological context. This will be carried out most effectively if it involves academic theological engagement, the lived out human engagement of local churches grappling with these issues in their own contexts and communities, and also discussions taking into account the call of the Church to care for those in need around the world. Such perspectives will draw attention to the present in relation to future hope, the value and significance of the human body, and the importance of considering enhancement quests in relation to all humans rather than simply a privileged few. Giving careful attention to these Christian theological perspectives will also help ensure that building blocks of our society which have resulted from our Christian cultural heritage will not be discarded without appropriate examination and consideration.
References Bonhoeffer, D. 2005. Dietrich Bonhoeffer Works, Volume 6: Ethics. Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press. Bostrom, N. 2003. Transhumanist Values. [online] Available at: ,www.nickbostrom.com. [Accessed 2 September 2013]. Campbell, H. and Walker, M. 2005. Religion and Transhumanism: Introducing a Conversation. Journal of Evolution and Technology, 14(2) Available at: ,http://jetpress.org/volume14/specialissueintro.html. [Accessed 2 September 2013].
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de Grey, A. with Rae, M. 2007. Ending Aging: The Rejuvenation Breakthroughs that could reverse Human Aging in our lifetime. New York: St Martin’s Press. Deane-Drummond, C. ed. 2003. Brave New World?: Theology, Ethics and the Human Genome. London: T & T Clark. Deane-Drummond, C. and Scott, P. M. eds. 2010. Future Perfect? God, Medicine and Human Identity. London: T & T Clark. European Parliament STOA Report. 2009. Human Enhancement Study. [online] Available at: ,http://www. itas.fzk.de/deu/lit/2009/coua09a.pdf. [Accessed 2 September 2013]. Greenfield, S. 2003. Tomorrow’s People: How 21st-Century Technology is Changing the Way We Think and Feel. London: Allen Lane. Hayles, N. K. 1999. How we became Posthuman: Virtual Bodies in Cybernetics, Literature and Informatics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Kass, L. R. 2002. Life, Liberty and the Defense of Dignity: The Challenge for Bioethics. San Fransisco, CA: Encounter Books. Kurzweil, R. 2005. The Singularity is Near. New York: Penguin. Messer, N. 2011. Respecting Life: Theology and Bioethics. London: SCM Press. President’s Council on Bioethics. 2003. Beyond Therapy: Biotechnology and the Pursuit of Happiness. New York: Regan Books. Sandel, M. J. 2007. The Case against Perfection. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press. Savulescu, J. and Bostrom, N. 2009. Human Enhancement. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Silver, L. M. 1999. Remaking Eden – Cloning, Genetic Engineering and the Future of Humankind? London: Phoenix Giant. Song, R. 2002. Human Genetics: Fabricating the Future. London: Darton, Longman & Todd. Tomkins, J. 2013. Better People or Enhanced Humans?: What it might mean to be fully alive in the context of Human Enhancement. Poole: Sunnyside Books. Waters, B. 2001. Reproductive Technology – Towards a Theology of Procreative Stewardship. London: Darton, Longman & Todd. Waters, B. 2006. From Human to Posthuman: Christian Theology and Technology in a Postmodern World. Aldershot, Hants: Ashgate Publishing Co.
Notes on contributor Justin Tomkins is ordained in the Church of England and is the curate at SML Church in Poole, UK. He trained in theology at Trinity College, Bristol and has a doctorate in chemistry from the University of Cambridge. Correspondence to: Justin Tomkins, email: [email protected]
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Developing Theological Tools for a Strategic Engagement with Human Enhancement Justin Tomkins SML Church, Poole, UK The literature on Human Enhancement may indeed have reached a critical mass yet theological engagement with the subject is still thin. Human Enhancement has already been established as a key topic within research and captivating visions of the future have been allied with a depth of philosophical analysis. Some Transhumanists have pointed to a theological dimension to their position and some who have warned against enhancement might be seen as having done so from a perspective shaped by a JudeoChristian worldview. Nonetheless, in neither of these cases has theology been central to engagement with the enhancement quest. Christian theologians who have begun to open up such an engagement with Human Enhancement include Brent Waters, Robert Song and Celia Deane-Drummond. The work they have already carried out is insightful and important yet due to the scale of the possible engagement, the wealth of Christian theology which might be applied to Human Enhancement remains largely untapped. This paper explores how three key aspects of Christian theology, eschatology, love of God and love of neighbour, provide valuable tools for a theological engagement with Human Enhancement. It is proposed that such theological tools need to be applied to Human Enhancement if the debate is to be resourced with the Christian theological perspective of what it means to be human in our contemporary technological context and if society is to have the choice of maintaining its Christian foundations. keywords human enhancement, theology, technology, science and religion, transhumanism
Introduction Even back in 2009 the literature on Human Enhancement was described as having reached a ‘critical mass’ (Selgelid quoted in European Parliament STOA report 2009: 10), ‘qualifying it as a major topic of ethical research’(European Parliament ß W. S. Maney & Son Ltd 2014
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STOA report 2009: 10). That Human Enhancement has been established as an important research topic is indicated by events such as the formation of the World Transhumanist Association in 1998 (later renamed Humanityz), the birth of the Future of Humanity Institute in 2005, and the publication, particularly in the last decade, of a wealth of material exploring Human Enhancement. Ray Kurzweil (2005), Aubrey de Grey (2007) and Lee Silver (1999) are amongst those who have offered visions of the future which have captured the popular imagination. These visions have been allied with heavyweight philosophy through the work of academics such as Nick Bostrom (2003), John Harris (2007) and Julian Savulescu (Savulescu and Bostrom 2009). Some Transhumanists have pointed to a religious dimension of their position, in an attempt to avoid what they perceived as a hostile polarization between ‘religious and Transhumanist visions of humanity’s existence and future’ (Campbell and Walker 2005: vii). Some of those who have warned against enhancement, such as Leon Kass (2002; President’s Council on Bioethics 2003), might be seen as having done so from a perspective shaped by a Judeo-Christian worldview. Nonetheless, in neither of these cases has theology been central to engagement with the enhancement quest. Christian theologians who have begun to open up such an engagement with Human Enhancement include Brent Waters, Robert Song and Celia DeaneDrummond. Having touched upon aspects of the context in his theological exploration of reproductive technology (Waters 2001), Brent Waters has gone on to offer a rigorous theological exploration of the subject as one aspect of a postmodern world (Waters 2006). Robert Song (2002) has explored enhancement as a dimension of the human quest to fabricate the future using genetic science. Celia Deane-Drummond (2003: 225–52; Deane-Drummond and Scott 2010: 168– 82) points to the virtues as a means of enabling a deeper theological engagement with the field and she has made a further substantial contribution by her efforts to prompt others too, to engage theologically with this critical area of ethical and philosophical research (Deane-Drummond 2003; Deane-Drummond and Scott 2010). The insights which have been generated by their work demonstrate the possibility of further engagement. Nonetheless, the Christian theology which might be applied to Human Enhancement remains largely untapped. I propose that this lack of engagement and application is a problem not only for the Church itself but also for our wider society. Christian theology has been profoundly influential in shaping contemporary views of what it means to be human and helping establish such underlying values and principles as care for all people. There is no doubt that these views are changing and will change further, with divergence and contention. Nonetheless, however they change, it will be important to understand and to reflect upon these views of what it means to be human if we are to be able to make wise decisions in relation to issues of Human Enhancement. Without the means to explore how Human Enhancement relates to a Christian understanding of what it means to be human, we risk discarding building blocks of our society without either examination of their nature or consideration of the consequences of their absence.
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The lack of Christian theological engagement with Human Enhancement is not due to an absence of material upon which to draw. There is a wealth of Christian theology relating to issues of being human which might be applied to the subject. Vast fields of Christian writing contain the potential to illuminate the enhancement quest with Christian theological insights. This paper will draw upon three aspects of Christian theology: eschatology, love of God and love of neighbour, in order to illustrate the identification and the use of tools for a theological engagement with Human Enhancement. A more thorough engagement with each of these areas can be found elsewhere (Tomkins 2013). Engaging with Human Enhancement through these aspects of theology and the tools developed from them is intended to model how further engagement is possible through the use of other aspects of Christian theology in a similar way.
Human Enhancement and eschatology Eschatology involves the study of all that comes next, of the future, of the ‘last things’. Human Enhancement is based upon the use of science, medicine and technology to enable humankind to shape its own future. For example, Transhumanist visionaries such as Ray Kurzweil (2005) describe a future which is shaped by the vision and the action of human beings and their descendants. From this perspective the future is as yet fundamentally unformed and malleable, and human beings are the masters of their own destiny. Christian eschatology, in contrast, describes the biblical vision of a new heaven and a new earth brought about through the activity of God (Revelation 21). Whilst this perspective on the future envisages human actions having a role within the outworking of God’s own plans and purposes for creation, such human action is limited in impact and is just one of several factors which influence the detail of the future. Christian theology asserts that the ultimate nature of that future has already been established by Jesus’ own death and resurrection and that what comes next is primarily determined by those two events which have already taken place and have already secured the final shape of human history. This Christian vision of the future not only challenges future visions which point to a different fulfilment and conclusion of history but also raises questions about the influence of human activity in shaping the future. Christian eschatology thus provides the means of engaging with each aspect of the enhancement quest which relates to hope for the future. An illustration of how one specific area of this Christian theology might offer an engagement with enhancement can be provided through the application of Dietrich Bonhoeffer’s (2005: 146–70) concepts of the ultimate and the penultimate. (This paper follows the lead that Neil Messer (2011: 38–40) has offered in using these concepts to reframe bioethical questions.) Eschatology leads to the identification of a theological tool taking the form of the question: ‘Is this technology, or the vision behind it, inconsistent with Christian eschatology?’ In the same way, Bonhoeffer’s concepts provide a sub-tool which might be framed in terms of the question: ‘Is this technology, or the vision behind it, inconsistent with Bonhoeffer’s concepts of the ultimate and the penultimate?’
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Bonhoeffer uses the term ultimate to refer to God’s last word and the final outworking of his plans and purposes. It relates to all that is not yet but which will come about in the future as God brings about the fulfilment of history. The penultimate refers to all which precedes that, to the now and to what follows before those last days of the completion of God’s work in and through creation. Thus in writing of the ultimate and the penultimate Bonhoeffer brings to mind today and tomorrow, the now and the not yet. He describes both the penultimate and the ultimate as precious (2005: 159–60), the ultimate in its own right and the penultimate in relation to the ultimate, precisely because it is penultimate. He argues that Christian eschatology demands that both the penultimate and the ultimate are held in appropriately high regard. Three authors who describe dreams of an enhanced future are Ray Kurzweil, Aubrey de Grey and Lee Silver. Kurzweil (2005: 324–25) imagines the possibility of so uploading one’s identity as to enable the adoption of real and virtual bodies at will. De Grey (2007: 44–45) envisages the hope of repairing and maintaining human bodies much as vintage cars can be kept on the road through similar efforts. Silver presents a vision within which parents select desirable characteristics for their children, such as disease resistance, but then go further and contribute to a future in which types and subtypes of genetically enriched children have been developed, designed to succeed in such fields as sport or business, and subfields such as athletics or football (Silver 1999: 4–8). Bonhoeffer’s concepts offer a means of engaging with these and other such dreams. Ray Kurzweil’s vision of an uploaded future reveals a lack of regard for the significance of the physical embodied reality of our current experience in the penultimate. It therefore devalues the penultimate, the now, and so, as Bonhoeffer warns will always be the case, also devalues the ultimate, the not yet, by attempting to separate it from the penultimate to which it is fundamentally connected. Kurzweil fails to take account of the significance of human embodiment and by assuming that human identity is so disconnected from that embodiment that it might survive uploading into some disembodied form he devalues both the present and the future. He thus assumes a pale imitation of the future hope of Christian theology, which hopes not for less physicality but rather for a deeper and richer embodied future of resurrection bodies in a new earth and a new heaven. The centrality of the resurrection within Christian eschatology draws attention to a future in which embodiment and the physical world are not simply unfortunate consequences of today, to be cast off as soon as is possible, but rather important indicators of what will be yet more significant in what is yet to come. Kurzweil’s vision of the future, by contrast, assumes a world in which our physicality and our embodiment are superficial aspects of our true nature and which, through technological tools, will be able to be discarded for the purposes of achieving liberation from our physical constraints. Christian theology warns that such a perspective is both futile and unnecessary for the freedom of the future lies not in disembodiment but in the hope of resurrection bodies. Aubrey de Grey’s dream of ongoing maintenance and repair of the human body affirms the goodness of physicality and embodiment but, by regarding human life
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as ‘no more than’ physical, it devalues the ultimate. In doing so, it also devalues the penultimate by taking what is only of significance by the fact that it comes before the ultimate and attempting to give it meaning in and of itself. Christian eschatology describes a world in which the physical universe is one aspect of a creation in which spiritual forces are also an important reality. From this perspective, to understand the human body as ‘no more than’ physical is to disregard fundamental components of our very nature and identity. Christian theology reveals the reality that the human body is more than simply the sum of its constituent physical parts and so any hope of maintaining the body on that basis will fail to take account of key aspects of its very nature. Furthermore, the future hope of Christian eschatology lies not in maintenance of this, albeit incredible form, but in the hope of the embodiment of resurrection life. Bonhoeffer’s perspective thus reveals de Grey’s dream both to fail to appreciate the full beauty of the human body in the present and to seek to maintain it in a form which is but a shadow of a richer form yet to come. Lee Silver’s vision of genetically engineering future generations of children represents a desire to subject the physical world to our wills, using whatever means are necessary to do so. As such it reveals the same disregard for the material world as is shown by Kurzweil’s visions, just expressed in a different way. Instead of a desire to escape from the material, Silver presents a vision in which the material world is dominated in order to force it to conform to human will. In this way Silver too devalues the significance of the physical world. His vision of a world in which physicality is fully malleable to human ideas and the human will is one in which the physical and the material hold less significance than they do within the world in which we live. Whatever else we may think of Silver’s vision, it is challenged by Bonhoeffer’s concepts of the ultimate and the penultimate for it represents an unhealthy disregard for the value of the penultimate and the present nature of the physical world. Silver’s future, like Kurzweil’s, grows out of an unhealthy focus upon the ultimate. As Bonhoeffer argues will always be the case, rather than affirming the value of the ultimate, such disconnection between the ultimate and the penultimate devalues both. We might expect that it is particularly important to see the goodness of the future. If such a perspective is balanced by recognizing the goodness of the present too, such a view is certainly healthy. The problem appears if we start to get so excited by the future that we lose touch with the value of today. It is this distorted perspective which Bonhoeffer warned against. He argued that it is only when we think about the present and the future in relation to one another that we can fully appreciate each of them for what they are. By disregarding the significance of the material world of today, Silver and Kurzweil devalue both the ultimate and the penultimate. By his exclusive focus upon an ultimate goal, Silver misses the possibility of ultimate hope growing out of the penultimate. In other words, he fails to see how the promise of resurrection bodies expresses both how good the physical world is now, and also points to an even more wonderful physical reality in the future.
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Bonhoeffer’s concepts thus offer a practical tool for critiquing enhancement quests in relation to one aspect of Christian theology. Their use also raises questions in relation to contemporary practices which relate to the visions of Kurzweil and de Grey. For example, if I upload my thoughts, feelings and images onto blogs and social-networking sites, how might I contribute to life now in the penultimate without denying the ultimate value of what lies ahead? In what ways might our care for our bodies today express their value both for now and as a means of enabling our growth and flourishing in relation to hope of life beyond death? However we might answer such questions, and no matter whether or not we accept Bonhoeffer’s assumptions, Christian eschatology provides a means of engaging with Human Enhancement quests and of critiquing their values and perspectives.
Human Enhancement and love of God Jesus described the command to love God with all one’s heart, mind, soul and strength, together with that to love one’s neighbour as oneself, as the greatest commandments (Matthew 22: 37–40; Mark 12: 29–31; Luke 10: 27–28). They therefore occupy a prominent place within Christian theology. One aspect of loving God can be understood to be recognizing and valuing his role as Creator, a role which includes his creation of people. Loving God therefore involves acknowledging the biblical claim that this creation is good (Genesis 1: 4, 10, 12, 18, 21, 25, 31) and that people are therefore no flawed prototype in need of redesign but rather works of art formed by the master craftsman. The inherent limits of human bodies can then be understood as deliberate features of design rather than mistakes in need of correction. In this way, loving God can be related, through worship of God as Creator, to a positive attitude to one’s embodiment and its inherent limits and finitude. It identifies a tool which might be expressed in the form of the question: ‘Is this technology, or the vision behind it, inconsistent with love of God, by attempting to transcend intrinsic human limits rather than to recognize and to value them?’ This acceptance and even embrace of inherent human limitations contrasts with Transhumanist visions which seek to overcome these limits for the purposes of human liberation and greater control of one’s context. Whereas Transhumanists seek to become ‘beings with vastly greater capacities than present human beings have’ (Bostrom 2003: 1), Christian theology points to appreciation of human life as it is experienced now and the hope of resurrection life to come. One basis for the acceptance of inherent human limits within Christian theology is the understanding of humans as being embodied creatures. From this perspective, humans do not just happen to have bodies, rather our very identities are inherently connected to them. Our bodies, together with our mind and our emotions, contribute to who we are and help to make up our very self. Appreciating human embodiment involves a recognition of inherent human limits for without an acceptance of such limits it is not possible to celebrate the fact that we are defined, at least in part, by our bodies.
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The celebration of human embodiment which is found within Christian theology involves an acceptance that with that gift of embodiment come concomitant limits. The same body which gives strength and enables movement comes with a particular scale and at any one time can only be present in a single location. It contains within it inherent limits. To reject the value of those inherent limits is to deny the goodness of the particular gift of human physical embodiment. That is not to say that accepting inherent human limitations involves rejecting all technological means for addressing those limits but it is likely to involve a discerning approach to the use of such technologies. Unless we are able to distinguish between those technologies which provide further freedom for inherently limited human beings and those which seek to overcome all such limits, we may be in danger of rejecting the goodness of human embodiment. Kurzweil’s dream of uploading oneself into a computer system does involve such a rejection of the nature of our human embodiment. As well as celebrating human embodiment because it is in that form that humans have been created, Christian theology has additional cause to value our embodied nature. The fact that the Christian faith is centred around the belief that God himself, in the form of Jesus, became human and took upon himself the same embodied nature as that of the humanity he had created, leads to a further acceptance of inherent human limits within Christian theology. After all, if this human form has already been chosen as fit for his own purposes by God himself, it is difficult to make a case for that same form being fundamentally inadequate. Christian theology does point to the even greater goodness of resurrection bodies yet to come but without denying the inherent goodness of the present human form for present purposes. The hope of future resurrection bodies means that Christians can empathize with all who dream of something more. Like Transhumanist visions, Christian theology points to a future hope which involves the transformation of our bodies. Christians too sense that we were made for more than this and may speak of a sense of eternity within. Yet, pointing to that transformation to come, Christian theology is able to embrace inherent human limitations in the present, even whilst waiting for their future transformation. The idea of inherent human limitations raises the issue of attempting to distinguish between therapy and enhancement. Difficult as it may be to pin down a distinction between therapy and enhancement, we may note the difference between those limits which are inherent to all humans and those faced only by certain people. Embracing inherent human limits will involve recognizing that all humans face fundamental limits in relation to lifespan and unaided running speed, yet that does not require an acceptance of particular personal limits. Both healing and growth are deeply valued and affirmed within Christian theology and will often involve seeking to overcome those limits which are due to personal difficulties due to disease, injury, birth defects or lack of skill, experience or development. The need to distinguish between inherent human limits and particular personal limits is one aspect of the need to distinguish between therapy and enhancement. Challenging as it may be to make such distinctions, they are vital if we are to be able to engage with the realities of living in a world in which
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each person faces both inherent limits shared with all other people and also particular limits due to their own unique circumstances and situation. Thus, the acceptance and the embrace of inherent human limits within Christian theology present a challenge to Transhumanism. Not only does the attempt to overcome these limits represent a denial of the goodness of the human form as we have been created but it also involves an unnecessary attempt to carry out a task of transformation which Christians argue has already been achieved through the gift of resurrection. Embracing inherent human limits can grow out of both an appreciation of the goodness of creation and also from a trust in God’s faithfulness to fulfil his purposes for creation, two expressions of the biblical concept of love of God. Genetic engineering offers one specific area within which to explore how this Christian theological tool of a focus upon loving God might be used to illuminate one element of the enhancement quest. A focus upon intrinsic human limits offers a means of distinguishing between genetic engineering to correct an illness, injury or disease, and the use of the same technology to attempt to overcome inherent human limits. It makes it possible to affirm the one whilst challenging the other. For example, the use of genetic engineering to prevent disease might be understood as one more aspect of the therapeutic task to which the Church has made such significant contributions towards over the last two thousand years. In contrast, the idea of using genetic engineering to select the characteristics of children so as to work towards future generations with vastly greater capacities, as described by writers such as Lee Silver (1999), involves a seeking to overcome rather than to accept inherent human limits and might be challenged on that basis. There is a powerful correlation between Christian theology and one’s perspective on the significance of inherent human limits and finitude. Those who advocate enhancement include both those who fundamentally seek to overcome inherent human limits and also people such as N. Katherine Hayles (1999: 5) who affirm at least some such limits. Those who write about Human Enhancement from the basis of Christian theology however, all affirm at least some aspects of inherent human limits. Thus Christian theologians are not unique but they are distinctive in their acceptance and affirmation of inherent human limits.
Human Enhancement and love of neighbour As noted above, the biblical command to love one’s neighbour as oneself holds a key place within Christian theology. This focus upon loving one’s neighbour as oneself draws attention to all those issues of Human Enhancement which raise questions about how the actions of one person or one group relate to consequences for others. It therefore provides a tool with which to engage with issues of justice, community and relationships within Human Enhancement. This tool might be expressed in terms of the question: ‘Is this technology, or the vision behind it, inconsistent with the biblical command to love one’s neighbour as oneself?’ Issues of justice are common within ethical questions relating to medicine. As in other contexts, Human Enhancement raises issues of how a particular technology will impact all peoples, not just myself, my family and my friends. It may be
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technically possible to develop resources to extend life, improve memory and increase strength but whether or not such tools will be available to all will involve politics and economics. The biblical concept of loving one’s neighbour adds weight to all those calls that enhancements are considered, not just in relation to one person, but in relation to society as a whole, and in particular to the weak and the poor. Discovering foods, medicines and other means of significantly extending the human lifespan might be understood differently depending upon whether or not such resources can be made available to all or will only ever be accessible by a privileged few. If certain enhancements are dependent upon access to scarce resources they run the risk of further widening the gap between those who have and those who do not. If Human Enhancement leads to any further increase in inequality between the rich and poor, the biblical command to love one’s neighbour as oneself raises a cry for justice on behalf of the poor, the needy and the oppressed. The biblical focus on love of neighbour also raises issues including the collective effects of enhancements. Love of neighbour quickly reveals the futility of projects such as equally increasing everyone’s height if such ‘positional goods’ are only of benefit when achieved relative to others (Sandel 2007: 18). Even if it is true that it may be economically and socially advantageous for a man to increase his height by two inches relative to the average height of other men, it is far less beneficial to him to increase his height by the same amount if all other men do the same. A focus upon loving one’s neighbour raises the challenge of justifying selfdefeating enhancements. This is because the good of each neighbour cannot be understood alone and is inevitably connected to the good of others. The biblical concept of loving one’s neighbour involves being aware of the needs of the whole community and the recognition that it will be impossible to meet those needs if each person seeks only their own good. Furthermore, the focus upon love of neighbour within Christian theology goes beyond pointing out the futility of collectively self-defeating enhancements and offers a glimpse of a world within which some such enhancements become unnecessary, even if only available to a privileged few. Equal access to the means of increasing one’s height may open up the possibility of a world in which all are taller by the same amount but in which no one benefits as a result. A world characterized by love of neighbour opens up the possibility that selfishness and competition are so replaced by compassion and cooperation that there is no fundamental disadvantage of being below average height in the first place. A consideration of love of neighbour raises further issues in relation to one’s ability to serve and to relate to other people. It might be used to advocate enhancement as a means of increasing one’s ability to serve the needs of others. Certainly, an enhanced brain might enable physicians to identify better diagnoses and treatments for patients. Enhanced physical capabilities might enable parents and carers to carry on serving beyond the point at which exhaustion would previously have prevented further active service. However, counter-arguments include the fact that physical enhancement of carers might suggest their activity is more significant than their being, and so devalue them as people. Furthermore, if
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the purpose of medicine involves recognition of human limitation and finitude, better diagnosis and treatment might be achieved at less human cost, through other technological means rather than through human enhancement of physicians. The desire to express love for one’s neighbour might also lead to a decision to enhance oneself in order to participate in community with enhanced neighbours. (The concept of an enhanced neighbour assumes a future in which it might be possible to distinguish between those whose enhancements set them apart from those who remained unenhanced. It would be a step towards the two separate species of the naturals and the genetically-enriched imagined by Silver (1999: 290)). Such a decision might be built upon a belief that one’s ability to participate in community with others is dependent upon sharing their enhancements but this is a highly questionable assumption. Firstly, the Church’s nature as a body in the world but not of it (John 17: 15–18; Romans 2: 2), demonstrates the possibility of participation whilst remaining distinct. Secondly, the success of individual church communities at embracing those of all abilities and enabling them to truly belong gives evidence of the possibility of participation in community being possible regardless of ability. Therefore, whilst a focus upon love of neighbour rightly leads one to question whether one needs to enhance oneself in order to participate in community with others, there is good evidence to indicate not needing to do so. Consideration of love of neighbour also challenges any vision of the future in which technology is used to diminish the connections between one person and another. Both Aubrey de Grey and Susan Greenfield envisage such scenarios. In his consideration of a future in which it is common for people to live to be a thousand years old de Grey (2007: 308) imagines, quite plausibly, that such people will be less motivated than those of today to have children. If so, such a future will be a diminished one in which a reduction in key relationships between one generation and another will be one price of increased longevity. Drawing upon her professional expertise as a neuroscientist, Greenfield (2003: 38–44) imagines a future in which the development of cyber-companions will lead to a dramatic reduction in interactions between people. Greenfield’s imagined future involves human beings becoming increasingly selfish and disconnected through having their whims and desires pandered to by appropriately programmed electronic companions. She envisaged such a lifestyle leading to the disintegration of the family unit and the breakdown of social interactions. Greenfield asks: ‘Able to access any information we wish, and capable of choosing from a variety of cyber-companions, what would be the worth in seeking out real-life human individuals? If you were to find them, why would they be interested or interesting?’ (Greenfield 2003: 43). If as Greenfield suggests, the combination of technologies would lead to a reduction in the quality of relationships between people, they might appropriately be challenged on the basis of the value of loving one’s neighbour. A particularly disturbing aspect of Greenfield’s vision is that her imagined future appears to be the inevitable outworking of an increasing dependence upon technology within a world in which selfishness is not held in check. Such a vision challenges any who aspire to love one’s neighbour to demonstrate the possibility of an alternative future within which love for one’s neighbour protects against such a
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breakdown of real-life relationships. Loving one’s neighbour as oneself is by definition a means of holding selfishness in check. In this way, the biblical command to love one’s neighbour as oneself not only calls for care for others but also offers a protection against the selfishness which might otherwise threaten our very identity and that of our society.
Summary Brent Waters, Robert Song and Celia Deane-Drummond have already demonstrated the value of drawing upon a Christian theological understanding of postmodernism, genetic science and the virtues within the context of Human Enhancement. This paper has attempted to show the value of engaging with Human Enhancement using eschatology, love of God and love of neighbour as a means of developing theological tools. As previously noted, a more thorough engagement with each of these areas can be found within Better People or Enhanced Humans? (Tomkins 2013). That book, like this paper, has been written in the hope that others will work to mine other Christian theology in order to provide further theological tools with which to illuminate the field of Human Enhancement. Whilst the amount of Christian theological engagement with this subject of Human Enhancement is still small, that is not through any lack of theological raw material. There is a weight of Christian theology from which further theological tools might be made available. It is proposed that such theological tools need to be applied to Human Enhancement if the debate is to be resourced with a Christian theological perspective of what it means to be human in our contemporary technological context. This will be carried out most effectively if it involves academic theological engagement, the lived out human engagement of local churches grappling with these issues in their own contexts and communities, and also discussions taking into account the call of the Church to care for those in need around the world. Such perspectives will draw attention to the present in relation to future hope, the value and significance of the human body, and the importance of considering enhancement quests in relation to all humans rather than simply a privileged few. Giving careful attention to these Christian theological perspectives will also help ensure that building blocks of our society which have resulted from our Christian cultural heritage will not be discarded without appropriate examination and consideration.
References Bonhoeffer, D. 2005. Dietrich Bonhoeffer Works, Volume 6: Ethics. Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press. Bostrom, N. 2003. Transhumanist Values. [online] Available at: ,www.nickbostrom.com. [Accessed 2 September 2013]. Campbell, H. and Walker, M. 2005. Religion and Transhumanism: Introducing a Conversation. Journal of Evolution and Technology, 14(2) Available at: ,http://jetpress.org/volume14/specialissueintro.html. [Accessed 2 September 2013].
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de Grey, A. with Rae, M. 2007. Ending Aging: The Rejuvenation Breakthroughs that could reverse Human Aging in our lifetime. New York: St Martin’s Press. Deane-Drummond, C. ed. 2003. Brave New World?: Theology, Ethics and the Human Genome. London: T & T Clark. Deane-Drummond, C. and Scott, P. M. eds. 2010. Future Perfect? God, Medicine and Human Identity. London: T & T Clark. European Parliament STOA Report. 2009. Human Enhancement Study. [online] Available at: ,http://www. itas.fzk.de/deu/lit/2009/coua09a.pdf. [Accessed 2 September 2013]. Greenfield, S. 2003. Tomorrow’s People: How 21st-Century Technology is Changing the Way We Think and Feel. London: Allen Lane. Hayles, N. K. 1999. How we became Posthuman: Virtual Bodies in Cybernetics, Literature and Informatics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Kass, L. R. 2002. Life, Liberty and the Defense of Dignity: The Challenge for Bioethics. San Fransisco, CA: Encounter Books. Kurzweil, R. 2005. The Singularity is Near. New York: Penguin. Messer, N. 2011. Respecting Life: Theology and Bioethics. London: SCM Press. President’s Council on Bioethics. 2003. Beyond Therapy: Biotechnology and the Pursuit of Happiness. New York: Regan Books. Sandel, M. J. 2007. The Case against Perfection. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press. Savulescu, J. and Bostrom, N. 2009. Human Enhancement. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Silver, L. M. 1999. Remaking Eden – Cloning, Genetic Engineering and the Future of Humankind? London: Phoenix Giant. Song, R. 2002. Human Genetics: Fabricating the Future. London: Darton, Longman & Todd. Tomkins, J. 2013. Better People or Enhanced Humans?: What it might mean to be fully alive in the context of Human Enhancement. Poole: Sunnyside Books. Waters, B. 2001. Reproductive Technology – Towards a Theology of Procreative Stewardship. London: Darton, Longman & Todd. Waters, B. 2006. From Human to Posthuman: Christian Theology and Technology in a Postmodern World. Aldershot, Hants: Ashgate Publishing Co.
Notes on contributor Justin Tomkins is ordained in the Church of England and is the curate at SML Church in Poole, UK. He trained in theology at Trinity College, Bristol and has a doctorate in chemistry from the University of Cambridge. Correspondence to: Justin Tomkins, email: [email protected]
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