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Dangers associated with civil nuclear power programmes: weaponization and nuclear waste a
Frank Boulton a
Medact, London, UK Published online: 24 Jul 2015.
Click for updates To cite this article: Frank Boulton (2015): Dangers associated with civil nuclear power programmes: weaponization and nuclear waste, Medicine, Conflict and Survival, DOI: 10.1080/13623699.2015.1062336 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13623699.2015.1062336
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Medicine, Conflict and Survival, 2015 http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13623699.2015.1062336
Dangers associated with civil nuclear power programmes: weaponization and nuclear waste Frank Boulton* Medact, London, UK
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(Accepted 9 June 2015) The number of nuclear power plants in the world rose exponentially to 420 by 1990 and peaked at 438 in 2002; but by 2014, as closed plants were not replaced, there were just 388. In spite of using more renewable energy, the world still relies on fossil fuels, but some countries plan to develop new nuclear programmes. Spent nuclear fuel, one of the most dangerous and toxic materials known, can be reprocessed into fresh fuel or into weapons-grade materials, and generates large amounts of highly active waste. This article reviews available literature on government and industry websites and from independent analysts on world energy production, the aspirations of the ‘new nuclear build’ programmes in China and the UK, and the difficulties in keeping the environment safe over an immense timescale while minimizing adverse health impacts and production of greenhouse gases, and preventing weaponization by non-nuclear-weapons states acquiring civil nuclear technology. Keywords: atomic assistance; energy consumption; spent nuclear fuel; health
Introduction During the Age of Nuclear Innocence, which ended with the astonishing work of Roentgen, the Curies, Becquerel, Rutherford and Neils Bohr, the dangers of radiation lay literally underground. Its effects on human health were real but undetected, expressed mainly as radon-linked lung cancers in miners. Since the Manhattan Project, the nuclear industries have been unearthing low-grade largely subterranean inaccessible radioactive ores and turning them into ‘one of the most hazardous materials made by man’ (Hedin 1997; Rachow 2012; US GAO 2012). The results have been a significant contamination of land, sea and air with unnaturally destructive biologically penetrating ionizing radiations; the manufacture of over 70,000 of the most physically destructive weapons ever; and a modicum of electricity from about 500 nuclear power plants (NPPs) and naval engines. Even though the global nuclear arsenal has fallen to about 16,300, detonation over cities of even a few per cent of these could lead to *Email: offi[email protected] © 2015 Taylor & Francis
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years of major humanitarian catastrophe and the starvation of many millions to death (Mills et al. 2014). If any fell into the hands of extremists, a new and highly dangerous security paradigm would result. Apart from passing references to anthropogenic climate change – fully acknowledged to be of major significance and an outstanding cause for concern (IPCC Working Group II 2014) – this article seeks to provide a summary of contemporary issues and developments reflected in the dual (civil and military) character of nuclear technology. Although there is an occasional historical setting, it concentrates on the world’s expanding nuclear energy programmes, with emphasis on the Chinese dimension (China has the most ambitious ‘new-nuclear’ programme), and how this ‘dual use’ threatens human health and security. It draws on academic research, published government policy documents and reports from industry and NGOs. After summarizing the nuclear contribution to the overall expansion of energy demands, and comparing it with other sectors, the article describes the unique problems arising from nuclear waste and the need for its (very) long-term safe disposal; the impact of ‘atomic assistance’ on the workings of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and on the IAEA; and ends with a brief summary of the health impact of low-level ionizing radiation and a call for energy responsibility based on low-carbon renewable forms of energy generation. Methodology Information was sourced from several websites and academic publications, including REN21 (the Renewable Energy Policy network for the twenty-first century); the International Energy Association and the Shift Project Data Portal, as well as various government and industry websites, such as the UK DECC, the US DOE, the IAEA and the World Nuclear Association, and from the websites of various NGOs. Academic sources were traced through the internet, but the original reports were always checked. These and all press and media reports are cited in the reference list. Energy and electricity consumption – the nuclear dimension In 2012, the people of the world consumed 21,016 TWh of civil electricity (equivalent to 1,807 MTOE – million tonnes of oil equivalent), of which 11.1% (2,344 TWh or 201 MTOE) was produced from nuclear power plants (NPPs) (Shift Project Data Portal 2015). After allowing for the uncertainties of biofuels for unrecorded local use (open-fire stoves, etc.), a mean estimate from various sources gives an overall global use of about 13,000 MTOE of energy that year, a per capita (pc) rate of 1.7 TOE. (An average UK family car uses up to 1 TOE or 11,630 KWh each year.) Year on year, world population rises by 1.2% and pc energy use by about 0.6%, a compound increase in global consumption of 3% each year.
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The four top energy-consuming nations in 2012 were China, the US, Russia and India (Table 1). Although the rate of Chinese expansion has declined since 2012, its energy consumption nationally and per capita is still growing, the pc use in 2012 having reached the global average. American pc use that year was 7.1 TOE (slightly down), Russian 5.0 and Indian 0.43. The French and UK pc values were 3.8 and 3.2 TOE, respectively. The sector contributions contrast starkly, China and India being much more dependent on coal and less on gas and oil. Up to 2012, the world had generated a total of almost 69,000 TWh of civil nuclear electricity (67,539 since 1980) (Shift Project Data Portal 2015), of which the UK produced about 2,600 (2,212 since 1980). But the contribution of civil nuclear programmes to energy production – principally through the generation of electricity fed into large distribution grids – has been somewhat sporadic as it has depended on economic circumstances such as oil prices, and the impact of disasters such as those at Chernobyl (1986) and Fukushima (2011). The true cost of producing nuclear energy has often been significantly underestimated and for many years ignored decommissioning and nuclear waste disposal. Costs have nevertheless generally compared unfavourably with those of fossil fuels, even after oil crises such as those of the 1970s. The impact of the current relatively low oil prices on new nuclear build programmes has aroused little comment apart from speculation on the Iranian nuclear programme and on oil suppliers, such as Russia. Nevertheless, the WNA (2015c) describes new nuclear build programmes in twenty one countries, although at present only 8 involve actual reactor construction – mostly on modest scales – while elsewhere, ‘life-extension’ programmes are being applied to current reactors. The most active nation is China, whose programme is discussed below. Russia, the second most active country, is reported to be building nine new plants – a third of China’s planned expansion – but recent cutbacks have been announced (Slivyak 2015). India, South Korea and the US are reported to be building five new NPPs each. The UK has the most ambitious new nuclear-build programme in Europe, although none are actually under construction: activities are restricted to site preparation at the yet-to-be approved reactor C at Hinkley Point, Somerset. The UK programme illustrates the dilemma of an established power confronted by a powerful industrial lobby and facing possible ‘outages’ because of questionable past planning policies and over-reliance on North Sea oil. Tables 1 and 2 include data from India, whose unique position is described later. Steam turbines using fossil fuels, biomass and nuclear energy to produce electricity are mechanically inefficient, so about 45% of global energy is used to generate electricity which contributes only 15% to the total energy use (details in Table 2). Transport depends much more on oil than electricity. Electric vehicles may alleviate local urban air pollution, but until a substantial additional amount of
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Table 1.
Comparison of sources of fuel in 2012; China, US, Russia, India, Global.
Country MTOE % world total
China* 2450 20.5
US 2279 19.1
5.6 69.3 20.4 1.0 3.0 0.8 100
29.0 18.0 41.1 8.8 1.0 2.1 100
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Gas Coal Oil Nuclear thermal** Hydro Remainder Total %
Russia 739 6.2
India* 527 4.4
% national total MTOE 53.9 11.0 16.4 52.7 22.0 33.0 5.8 1.4 1.9 1.8 0.04 0.1 100 100
World* 11,941 100 26.3 26.9 37.8 5.1 2.4 1.5 100
Note: Derived from http://www.ren21.net/ren21activities/globalstatusreport.aspx; http://www.iea.org/ Sankey/index.html; and Shift Project Data Portal http://www.tsp-data-portal.org/all-datasets. * Biomass data not available but there was probably significant use in local village communities, maybe adding 10% to the global total recorded. ** Only 33% of nuclear thermal produces nuclear electricity – see Table 2.
Table 2.
2012
Nuclear electricity use as proportions of overall energy and all electricity. Total energy
World 11,941 China 2450 US 2279 Russia 739 India 527
Approximate for generating electricity (%) 5400 1400 1160 29 c 300
(45) (57) (50) (33) (57)
All generated electricity (% of col 2) 1807 407 348 86 80
(15.1) (16.6) (15.2) (11.6) (15.0)
As nuclear thermala 610 24 200 43 c8
Nuclear electric (% of col 2)a 201 (17) 8b (0.33) 68 (2.9) 14 (1.9) 2.6 (0.5)
Nuclear electric (as % of col 4) (11.1) (2.0) (19.5) (5.6) (3.3)
Notes: All units expressed as MTOE (1 MTOE = 11.63 TWh) except where entered as %. Calculated from Shift Project Data Portal http://www.tsp-data-portal.org/all-datasets. a Nuclear thermal is the energy driving the steam turbine at c33% efficiency to produce nuclear electricity. b In 2012 China produced 97 TWh or 8.3 MTOE of nuclear electricity; and in 2014, 123.8 TWh (10.64 MTOE), 2.4% of total production (WNA 2015a).
electricity comes from low-carbon sources, greenhouse gases will continue to be emitted from the generation plants. Nuclear seems to offer a contribution to low-GHG electricity generation, although advocates consistently underestimate nuclear’s carbon footprint, from mining, concrete building materials, decommissioning, etc. Nevertheless, nuclear is much less carbogenic than gas (the least carbogenic fossil fuel), although somewhat more than wind or solar power (Moomaw et al. 2011; Soovacool 2008). The concern, therefore, is how much low-carbon electricity can be produced sustainably enough to replace the bulk of fossil fuel electricity. Newer coal and gas plants may achieve over 40% efficiency and are better for carbon capture and storage (CCS), an important potential but still uncertain strategy for reducing carbon emissions.
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Although renewable technologies in China are expanding, (China Greentech Report 2014; Myllyvirta 2014) the demand for coal, by far the most carbogenic fuel, continues to rise, although its rate of increase is declining, and, according to Green and Stern (2015) may have peaked already. In India, coal provided 53% of the 527 MTOE of general fuel use: almost half the coal went to generate 58 MTOE of India’s 80 MTOE of electricity, while nuclear made only 2.6 MTOE. Power plant electricity ‘capacity’, usually quoted in ‘GigaWatts’ (GW or GWe – 109 watts), is the amount of power capable of being produced at any one moment. Supply over a period of time is expressed as TeraWatt hours (TWh or watt-hours × 1012) convertible to MTOE by a factor of 86,000. An electricity generating plant operating at 1 GW throughout the year could in theory generate 8.766 TWh in that year (there are 8766 h in a year), but no plants work flat out all the time. Current NPPs do well to work at 85% capacity. New nuclear build programmes China China has 20% of the world’s people and uses 20% of the world’s energy supply. If they double their per capita energy use, in emulation of British living standards, China would use more than 30% of the world’s still-expanding available energy and be dependent on coal for several decades in spite of their planned vigorous expansion into low-carbon energy generation, and possible CCS technology. Although self-sufficient in coal reserves, Chinese coalfields are far from their coastal industrial cities, so it can be cheaper to import coal by sea. Much of their oil and gas reserves are offshore, some in disputed waters. As BBC News Asia reported on 10 November 2014, and on 1 June 2015, Chinese expansion in the Diaoyu/Senkaku and Spratly islands are of great concern to Japan, Korea, Philippines, Taiwan, Vietnam and Malaysia. Although the Chinese view their nuclear expansion as an essential contribution to mitigating climate change (and urban air pollution), their neighbours also wish to industrialize and may well aspire to develop or expand their own civil nuclear energy programmes. Some Japanese opinion-formers are still keen to revive their nuclear industry post Fukushima. Chinese policies will have a major impact on the mitigation of global climate change. As competition for resources increases, societies may face increasing climate-induced political instability and tension, and nuclear’s dual-use potential could become realized in programmes diverting nuclear technology into weaponization. Some analysts predict a ‘peak coal’ production and use around 2020 for China, while others feel it is long overdue. If their use of coal is to decline significantly in spite of ever-increasing energy demands, major expansion in ‘low-carbon energy’ must follow (Alvarez 2014). The Chinese plan to instal
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hydro, wind and solar power to reach 350, 200 and 100 GW capacity, respectively, by 2020, making the non-fossil fuel contribution 15% in 2020, while shrinking coal’s share from 67 to 62%. But coal use will continue to be significant beyond 2020, with a ‘new build’ of more efficient coal plants. There will also be more use of gas, and a vigorous ‘new-nuclear build’. In July 2010, a 22-strong IAEA team from 15 countries conducted ‘a two-week Integrated Regulatory Review Service mission’ to review China’s framework and expressed confidence in the regulatory system and the future safety of the ‘vast expanding nuclear industry’ (WNA 2015a). China has doubled its nuclear capacity since 2010 with 23 NPPs in operation and a generating capacity of about 20 GW, producing just over 100 TWh of electricity. Plans approved in 2012 (after Fukushima) are to increase to 58 GW by 2020 and construct, with added safety measures, 30 GW, to reach 150 GW by 2030, and much more by 2050. Although these planning concepts include some of the world’s most advanced reactors, there are serious questions about the future fuel supply. The new build in China will rely on two types of reactor. One, based on the Westinghouse 1000 GW capacity ‘AP1000’ reactor, is a development of the French AP 600 Pressurized Water Reactors (PWR – the Chinese are working on a 1400 GW version). The other is based on the French-origin ‘EPR’ reactor. China is becoming largely self-sufficient in reactor design, construction and fuel cycle management, and states ‘that radioactive releases should never cause unacceptable effects on the environment or the public’, and that ‘advanced nuclear technology from 2016 should practically eliminate the possible release of significant quantities of radioactive substances’. Although this report (WNA 2015a) is very detailed, the terms ‘unacceptable radioactivity’, ‘practically eliminate’ and ‘significant quantities’ are left undefined. However, delays of more than a year have been announced for China’s AP1000 ‘flagship’ (Yap and Spegele 2015) and also for the EPR reactor at Taishan (“Taishan Nuclear Reactor” 2015). These may well be the first of a series of delays and China may encounter more difficulties in the world market for NPPs than anticipated (Zhu and Stanway 2015). There have also been serious issues around high-level radioactive waste and disposal, especially when using ‘MOX fuel’, in which plutonium processed from SNF is added to uranium (IAEA 2011). It is claimed that these will be alleviated with Generation III reactors such as EPR designed to use fuel reprocessed from Generation IIa reactors such as AP1000, giving the impression of solving the disposal of radioactive waste and the ability to fuel reactors without importing fuel, especially foreign uranium. These claims assume an ever-recycling of reprocessed plutonium, at each stage of which vast amounts of shorter lived (only for a 1000 years or so), highly radioactive isotopes will be released. Current Chinese waste disposal plans are, however, vague (WNA 2014).
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United Kingdom (Nuclear Industry Association 2015) UK policy on civil power generation acknowledges possible unprecedented ‘outages’ from 2015 in spite of a succession of life extensions for most current nuclear plants. The preferred solutions include expanding renewable energy sources; hoping for viable ways of sequestering carbon emissions from fossil and bio-fuels; and a new nuclear build. In 2012, UK NPPs worked at 73% of their nominal capacity of 9.9 Gw – while fossil-fuel plants, whose output varies in response to fluctuating demand, worked at 27% (DUKES 2014). In 2014, UK nuclear electricity capacity was 9.23 GW which supplied about 60 TWh, nearly 18% of all the electricity supply and 6% of total energy. As well as the oldest plant at Wylfa (extended to December 2015), there are 15 ‘Generation II’ reactors at seven other sites. Fourteen are Advanced Gas-cooled Reactors (AGRs) developed from older UK ‘Magnox’ designs: half of them are due to close by 2020 and all by 2024 when nuclear capacity would be restricted to the Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) at Sizewell B with 1.19 GW, due to close in 2035. To mitigate this looming reduction in generation capacity, the UK conducted a ‘Generic Design Assessment’ of the AP1000 and EPR reactors in 2010, mainly on whether the nuclear waste could be disposed of safely (UK Environment Agency 2010). The disposal plans were provisionally approved pending further reports, some of which would be after gaining operational experience. However, as discussed below, the UK still has the fundamental problem of no identified site for a geological disposal facility (GDF). Two EPR prototype reactors (in Finland and France) have been beset almost from their outset by cost overruns and delays. China is expected to contribute to the consortium for the first plant, at Hinkley Point, which will have two EPRs, each of 1.6 GW capacity, at an estimated cost of £16 bn (2012 value – Probert 2014). Its start-up was expected in 2022, but this is receding as final approval is still pending due to a complex series of legal actions from German companies and the Austrian Government, who allege that the UK Government’s plans for subsidies are illegal. A ‘contracts for difference’ scheme would allow the operators, EDF, to get a ‘strike price’ of £92.5 per MWh from its customers, and would be the first contract ever to cover decommissioning, with costs between £1.8 and £2.7 bn (GOV.UK, DECC 2013). Whether such forecasting is reliable can only be revealed by time, but signs are not propitious following the announcement in February 2015, confirmed in March, that Areva, part of the Hinkley EDF consortium, announced losses of over €4.8 billion Expanding EPRs to four more UK sites by 2021 (Sizewell, Wylfa, Oldbury and Moorside) could increase UK capacity to 16.4 GW (and slightly lower the prices from Hinkley); extensions to three more sites (Hartlepool, Heysham and Bradwell) may enable a capacity of over 20 GWe, fulfilling up to 40% of the UK’s expected electricity requirement (12% of total energy demand). However,
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where the fuel will come from or where the spent fuel will go is disregarded (Fetter 2009). Except for ill-defined plans for burning spent fuel in Generation IV reactors (possibly ‘PRISM’ reactors using liquid sodium coolant, yet to be developed and of very uncertain technology when scaled up), the UK DECC plans to burn small quantities of already-processed plutonium as Mixed Oxide fuel (‘MOX’, usually a mix of 93% UO2 and 7% PuO2) contributing about a third of the total EPR fuel: but this will scarcely touch the stocks of UK civil plutonium stored at Sellafield (Sellafield Ltd 2015), of which there is over 100 tonnes, enough for 20,000 Nagasaki-type bombs. The uncertain future of the UK’s new nuclear build programme has global significance. Global proliferation of nuclear power plants and of nuclear weapons, to 2000 Global civil nuclear power capacity increased from 20 GW in 1970 to 300 GW in 1987. The number of operating NPPs peaked at 438 in 2002 when total capacity was 360 GW, the peak of 380 GW being reached in 2006. By 2014, there were 388 reactors and capacity was 332.5 GW (Schneider and Froggatt 2014). New builds virtually stopped after Chernobyl (1986) and a nascent restart was thwarted by the Fukushima tragedy (Fischer 1997; US EIA 2013). The 50 years after 1945 also saw a proliferation of States with nuclear weapons (NWs). The US acquired them in 1945; the USSR in 1950; the UK (1953); France (1961); China (1965); Israel (around 1968); India (1974); South Africa (around 1982); and Pakistan (around 1995). Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan returned their ‘inherited’ weapons (several hundred each) to Russia in 1995 in accordance with the ‘Lisbon Protocol’. South Africa disarmed in 1990 (De Klerk 2014) and remains the only state to have completely disarmed and dismantled its nuclear arsenal. The proliferation ‘curves’ of nations with NPPs and of nations with NWs diverge after 1960 as more non-nuclear weapons-possessing states (NNWS) received ‘Atomic Assistance’ in developing ‘peaceful’ nuclear technology for civil power programmes (see below). This sometimes came from other NNWS, such as Canada and Germany. Unfavourable but wrong concern about future supplies of uranium ore led to a lull in new nuclear power plants even before the disaster at Fukushima in 2011, which accelerated the trend to stall or abandon nuclear programmes, although limited research continued. Refuelling and decommissioning NPPs The global nuclear power industries consume around 25 million tonnes of uranium each year. The primary LWR fuel is Low-Enriched Uranium (LEU). After three years or so, increasing absorption of neutrons by accumulating
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fissile products brings LWR ‘burn-up’ to a stop. Part of the ‘spent nuclear fuel’ (SNF), of which only a small amount has been converted to energy, has to be replaced by fresh LEU each year. Procedures are lengthy, complex and require constant monitoring as SNF, although still dominated by uranium, has over 100 unstable isotopes of dozens of chemical elements . When a NPP is decommissioned, all remaining SNF is removed and the whole site decontaminated. This may be carried out in the years following shutdown, but more often the site is mothballed for many decades, allowing the initial high radioactivity to decline. Most of the NPPs being or approaching shut-down were built with little consideration for decommissioning, so this process can be particularly hazardous. Nuclear waste – a global problem Nuclear programmes convert low-radioactive mostly subterranean uranium ore, which takes billennia to decay, to fission products decaying much more than a million-fold more quickly. Each tonne of SNF has about 3.4 × 1017 Bq (World Information Service on Energy (WISE) Uranium Project 2014). (Becquerels are the numbers of spontaneous radioactive disintegrations per second in a defined mass.) So the Bq increase in SNF is more than a million-fold. SNF is thermally very hot. Safe disposal of nuclear waste is therefore problematic. Even uranium mining produces waste. This is often discounted by nuclear industrialists, but unearthed processed ore (‘tailings’) contain about 2 × 1011 Bq a tonne and has Th230, half-life 76,000 years and progenitor of Radon Rn222 (half-life 3.8 days). Too often, careless disposal of the debris (usually around the mining area) produces enough Rn222 daughters (products of nuclear disintegration) to harm local health. Up to 1021 Bq of waste has been released during the nuclear industry’s first 50 years. Some has decayed – wastes released 40 years ago by about 20-fold, those released one year ago by fivefold. Secrecy makes it more difficult to calculate the waste from world-wide nuclear weapons production, testing and decommissioning, but Hu and Makhijani (1995) quote about 100 million TBq (1020 Bq) from HLW associated with weapons-grade Plutonium production alone – up to 1018 coming from the world’s third greatest nuclear accident at Chelyabinsk in 1957 – and 1018 Bq from the fallout of global nuclear weapons testing. Overall, the activity released from the world’s military and civil nuclear industries may be comparable with each other, and combine to within an order of magnitude of 1022 Bq. Nuclear waste management Nuclear waste is generally classed into three categories, ‘High Level’ (HLW), intermediate (ILW) and low (LLW): A fourth category, very low (VLLW) may be listed separately or incorporated into LLW. HLW and some ILWs pose the
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greatest problem, but the LLW deposits also need careful attention not least because of their large volumes (see Table 3). The activity of ‘fresh’ spent fuel is so high that, unless diverted for reprocessing and recovery of plutonium, a ‘cooling-off’ for several decades is required before it can be stored properly. Although reprocessing is advocated as a convenient way of reducing the bulk of materials for storage, the recovered plutonium profoundly increases the risk of weapons proliferation while the plutonium-poor supernatant remains very hot. In the UK, waste from reprocessing contributes to most of the HLW. Although the UK began supplying commercial nuclear electricity to the National Grid in 1956 (two years after the USSR’s much smaller scale worldfirst), less than 16% came before 1980 (calculated from Bolton 2013); but the UK’s early research, inefficient NPPs and military programmes produced relatively large amounts of waste before 1980. The UK’s 2013 waste inventory, yet to be affected by DECC’s nuclear build plans, is only slightly different from that of 2010, but states ‘… much contaminated ground has yet to be well characterized, and so the quantity of radioactive waste resulting from its remediation is uncertain. The total volume … could add significantly to the figure of 4.5 million cubic metres’. This data includes military and medical waste, but not the 100 tonnes or so of plutonium at Sellafield. After cooling, HLW is ready to be transferred to dry storage in specially constructed containers of concrete and metallic copper; some material is encased in vitrified silicates (glass). The international gold standard for longterm storage would be to bury these containers in ‘geological disposal facilities’ (GDF) with prepared chambers in geologically stable rock. The timescale is extraordinarily long (millennia to hundreds of millennia), and the boldness beyond human imagination and experience. Even the most carefully stacked and packed containers, with the best ‘infill’ (bentonite clay, etc.), will eventually leak their still highly radioactive materials (but as far as can be told, only
Table 3. Inventories of UK nuclear waste, by activity (Bq), volume (cubic metres – m3) and mass (tonnes). Waste characteristics (year of inventory)
HLW
ILW
LLW + VLLW
Total
Activity, Bq (2010) % Volume, m3 (2013)a % Mass, Tonnes (2010) %
8 × 1019 95 1100 0.02 2700 0.05
3.9 × 1018 5 290,000 6.5 300,000 6
40 × 1013
Medicine, Conflict and Survival Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fmcs20
Dangers associated with civil nuclear power programmes: weaponization and nuclear waste a
Frank Boulton a
Medact, London, UK Published online: 24 Jul 2015.
Click for updates To cite this article: Frank Boulton (2015): Dangers associated with civil nuclear power programmes: weaponization and nuclear waste, Medicine, Conflict and Survival, DOI: 10.1080/13623699.2015.1062336 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13623699.2015.1062336
PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the “Content”) contained in the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensors make no representations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinions and views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors, and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content should not be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sources of information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to or arising out of the use of the Content.
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This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sublicensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http:// www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions
Medicine, Conflict and Survival, 2015 http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13623699.2015.1062336
Dangers associated with civil nuclear power programmes: weaponization and nuclear waste Frank Boulton* Medact, London, UK
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(Accepted 9 June 2015) The number of nuclear power plants in the world rose exponentially to 420 by 1990 and peaked at 438 in 2002; but by 2014, as closed plants were not replaced, there were just 388. In spite of using more renewable energy, the world still relies on fossil fuels, but some countries plan to develop new nuclear programmes. Spent nuclear fuel, one of the most dangerous and toxic materials known, can be reprocessed into fresh fuel or into weapons-grade materials, and generates large amounts of highly active waste. This article reviews available literature on government and industry websites and from independent analysts on world energy production, the aspirations of the ‘new nuclear build’ programmes in China and the UK, and the difficulties in keeping the environment safe over an immense timescale while minimizing adverse health impacts and production of greenhouse gases, and preventing weaponization by non-nuclear-weapons states acquiring civil nuclear technology. Keywords: atomic assistance; energy consumption; spent nuclear fuel; health
Introduction During the Age of Nuclear Innocence, which ended with the astonishing work of Roentgen, the Curies, Becquerel, Rutherford and Neils Bohr, the dangers of radiation lay literally underground. Its effects on human health were real but undetected, expressed mainly as radon-linked lung cancers in miners. Since the Manhattan Project, the nuclear industries have been unearthing low-grade largely subterranean inaccessible radioactive ores and turning them into ‘one of the most hazardous materials made by man’ (Hedin 1997; Rachow 2012; US GAO 2012). The results have been a significant contamination of land, sea and air with unnaturally destructive biologically penetrating ionizing radiations; the manufacture of over 70,000 of the most physically destructive weapons ever; and a modicum of electricity from about 500 nuclear power plants (NPPs) and naval engines. Even though the global nuclear arsenal has fallen to about 16,300, detonation over cities of even a few per cent of these could lead to *Email: offi[email protected] © 2015 Taylor & Francis
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years of major humanitarian catastrophe and the starvation of many millions to death (Mills et al. 2014). If any fell into the hands of extremists, a new and highly dangerous security paradigm would result. Apart from passing references to anthropogenic climate change – fully acknowledged to be of major significance and an outstanding cause for concern (IPCC Working Group II 2014) – this article seeks to provide a summary of contemporary issues and developments reflected in the dual (civil and military) character of nuclear technology. Although there is an occasional historical setting, it concentrates on the world’s expanding nuclear energy programmes, with emphasis on the Chinese dimension (China has the most ambitious ‘new-nuclear’ programme), and how this ‘dual use’ threatens human health and security. It draws on academic research, published government policy documents and reports from industry and NGOs. After summarizing the nuclear contribution to the overall expansion of energy demands, and comparing it with other sectors, the article describes the unique problems arising from nuclear waste and the need for its (very) long-term safe disposal; the impact of ‘atomic assistance’ on the workings of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and on the IAEA; and ends with a brief summary of the health impact of low-level ionizing radiation and a call for energy responsibility based on low-carbon renewable forms of energy generation. Methodology Information was sourced from several websites and academic publications, including REN21 (the Renewable Energy Policy network for the twenty-first century); the International Energy Association and the Shift Project Data Portal, as well as various government and industry websites, such as the UK DECC, the US DOE, the IAEA and the World Nuclear Association, and from the websites of various NGOs. Academic sources were traced through the internet, but the original reports were always checked. These and all press and media reports are cited in the reference list. Energy and electricity consumption – the nuclear dimension In 2012, the people of the world consumed 21,016 TWh of civil electricity (equivalent to 1,807 MTOE – million tonnes of oil equivalent), of which 11.1% (2,344 TWh or 201 MTOE) was produced from nuclear power plants (NPPs) (Shift Project Data Portal 2015). After allowing for the uncertainties of biofuels for unrecorded local use (open-fire stoves, etc.), a mean estimate from various sources gives an overall global use of about 13,000 MTOE of energy that year, a per capita (pc) rate of 1.7 TOE. (An average UK family car uses up to 1 TOE or 11,630 KWh each year.) Year on year, world population rises by 1.2% and pc energy use by about 0.6%, a compound increase in global consumption of 3% each year.
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The four top energy-consuming nations in 2012 were China, the US, Russia and India (Table 1). Although the rate of Chinese expansion has declined since 2012, its energy consumption nationally and per capita is still growing, the pc use in 2012 having reached the global average. American pc use that year was 7.1 TOE (slightly down), Russian 5.0 and Indian 0.43. The French and UK pc values were 3.8 and 3.2 TOE, respectively. The sector contributions contrast starkly, China and India being much more dependent on coal and less on gas and oil. Up to 2012, the world had generated a total of almost 69,000 TWh of civil nuclear electricity (67,539 since 1980) (Shift Project Data Portal 2015), of which the UK produced about 2,600 (2,212 since 1980). But the contribution of civil nuclear programmes to energy production – principally through the generation of electricity fed into large distribution grids – has been somewhat sporadic as it has depended on economic circumstances such as oil prices, and the impact of disasters such as those at Chernobyl (1986) and Fukushima (2011). The true cost of producing nuclear energy has often been significantly underestimated and for many years ignored decommissioning and nuclear waste disposal. Costs have nevertheless generally compared unfavourably with those of fossil fuels, even after oil crises such as those of the 1970s. The impact of the current relatively low oil prices on new nuclear build programmes has aroused little comment apart from speculation on the Iranian nuclear programme and on oil suppliers, such as Russia. Nevertheless, the WNA (2015c) describes new nuclear build programmes in twenty one countries, although at present only 8 involve actual reactor construction – mostly on modest scales – while elsewhere, ‘life-extension’ programmes are being applied to current reactors. The most active nation is China, whose programme is discussed below. Russia, the second most active country, is reported to be building nine new plants – a third of China’s planned expansion – but recent cutbacks have been announced (Slivyak 2015). India, South Korea and the US are reported to be building five new NPPs each. The UK has the most ambitious new nuclear-build programme in Europe, although none are actually under construction: activities are restricted to site preparation at the yet-to-be approved reactor C at Hinkley Point, Somerset. The UK programme illustrates the dilemma of an established power confronted by a powerful industrial lobby and facing possible ‘outages’ because of questionable past planning policies and over-reliance on North Sea oil. Tables 1 and 2 include data from India, whose unique position is described later. Steam turbines using fossil fuels, biomass and nuclear energy to produce electricity are mechanically inefficient, so about 45% of global energy is used to generate electricity which contributes only 15% to the total energy use (details in Table 2). Transport depends much more on oil than electricity. Electric vehicles may alleviate local urban air pollution, but until a substantial additional amount of
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Table 1.
Comparison of sources of fuel in 2012; China, US, Russia, India, Global.
Country MTOE % world total
China* 2450 20.5
US 2279 19.1
5.6 69.3 20.4 1.0 3.0 0.8 100
29.0 18.0 41.1 8.8 1.0 2.1 100
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Gas Coal Oil Nuclear thermal** Hydro Remainder Total %
Russia 739 6.2
India* 527 4.4
% national total MTOE 53.9 11.0 16.4 52.7 22.0 33.0 5.8 1.4 1.9 1.8 0.04 0.1 100 100
World* 11,941 100 26.3 26.9 37.8 5.1 2.4 1.5 100
Note: Derived from http://www.ren21.net/ren21activities/globalstatusreport.aspx; http://www.iea.org/ Sankey/index.html; and Shift Project Data Portal http://www.tsp-data-portal.org/all-datasets. * Biomass data not available but there was probably significant use in local village communities, maybe adding 10% to the global total recorded. ** Only 33% of nuclear thermal produces nuclear electricity – see Table 2.
Table 2.
2012
Nuclear electricity use as proportions of overall energy and all electricity. Total energy
World 11,941 China 2450 US 2279 Russia 739 India 527
Approximate for generating electricity (%) 5400 1400 1160 29 c 300
(45) (57) (50) (33) (57)
All generated electricity (% of col 2) 1807 407 348 86 80
(15.1) (16.6) (15.2) (11.6) (15.0)
As nuclear thermala 610 24 200 43 c8
Nuclear electric (% of col 2)a 201 (17) 8b (0.33) 68 (2.9) 14 (1.9) 2.6 (0.5)
Nuclear electric (as % of col 4) (11.1) (2.0) (19.5) (5.6) (3.3)
Notes: All units expressed as MTOE (1 MTOE = 11.63 TWh) except where entered as %. Calculated from Shift Project Data Portal http://www.tsp-data-portal.org/all-datasets. a Nuclear thermal is the energy driving the steam turbine at c33% efficiency to produce nuclear electricity. b In 2012 China produced 97 TWh or 8.3 MTOE of nuclear electricity; and in 2014, 123.8 TWh (10.64 MTOE), 2.4% of total production (WNA 2015a).
electricity comes from low-carbon sources, greenhouse gases will continue to be emitted from the generation plants. Nuclear seems to offer a contribution to low-GHG electricity generation, although advocates consistently underestimate nuclear’s carbon footprint, from mining, concrete building materials, decommissioning, etc. Nevertheless, nuclear is much less carbogenic than gas (the least carbogenic fossil fuel), although somewhat more than wind or solar power (Moomaw et al. 2011; Soovacool 2008). The concern, therefore, is how much low-carbon electricity can be produced sustainably enough to replace the bulk of fossil fuel electricity. Newer coal and gas plants may achieve over 40% efficiency and are better for carbon capture and storage (CCS), an important potential but still uncertain strategy for reducing carbon emissions.
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Although renewable technologies in China are expanding, (China Greentech Report 2014; Myllyvirta 2014) the demand for coal, by far the most carbogenic fuel, continues to rise, although its rate of increase is declining, and, according to Green and Stern (2015) may have peaked already. In India, coal provided 53% of the 527 MTOE of general fuel use: almost half the coal went to generate 58 MTOE of India’s 80 MTOE of electricity, while nuclear made only 2.6 MTOE. Power plant electricity ‘capacity’, usually quoted in ‘GigaWatts’ (GW or GWe – 109 watts), is the amount of power capable of being produced at any one moment. Supply over a period of time is expressed as TeraWatt hours (TWh or watt-hours × 1012) convertible to MTOE by a factor of 86,000. An electricity generating plant operating at 1 GW throughout the year could in theory generate 8.766 TWh in that year (there are 8766 h in a year), but no plants work flat out all the time. Current NPPs do well to work at 85% capacity. New nuclear build programmes China China has 20% of the world’s people and uses 20% of the world’s energy supply. If they double their per capita energy use, in emulation of British living standards, China would use more than 30% of the world’s still-expanding available energy and be dependent on coal for several decades in spite of their planned vigorous expansion into low-carbon energy generation, and possible CCS technology. Although self-sufficient in coal reserves, Chinese coalfields are far from their coastal industrial cities, so it can be cheaper to import coal by sea. Much of their oil and gas reserves are offshore, some in disputed waters. As BBC News Asia reported on 10 November 2014, and on 1 June 2015, Chinese expansion in the Diaoyu/Senkaku and Spratly islands are of great concern to Japan, Korea, Philippines, Taiwan, Vietnam and Malaysia. Although the Chinese view their nuclear expansion as an essential contribution to mitigating climate change (and urban air pollution), their neighbours also wish to industrialize and may well aspire to develop or expand their own civil nuclear energy programmes. Some Japanese opinion-formers are still keen to revive their nuclear industry post Fukushima. Chinese policies will have a major impact on the mitigation of global climate change. As competition for resources increases, societies may face increasing climate-induced political instability and tension, and nuclear’s dual-use potential could become realized in programmes diverting nuclear technology into weaponization. Some analysts predict a ‘peak coal’ production and use around 2020 for China, while others feel it is long overdue. If their use of coal is to decline significantly in spite of ever-increasing energy demands, major expansion in ‘low-carbon energy’ must follow (Alvarez 2014). The Chinese plan to instal
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hydro, wind and solar power to reach 350, 200 and 100 GW capacity, respectively, by 2020, making the non-fossil fuel contribution 15% in 2020, while shrinking coal’s share from 67 to 62%. But coal use will continue to be significant beyond 2020, with a ‘new build’ of more efficient coal plants. There will also be more use of gas, and a vigorous ‘new-nuclear build’. In July 2010, a 22-strong IAEA team from 15 countries conducted ‘a two-week Integrated Regulatory Review Service mission’ to review China’s framework and expressed confidence in the regulatory system and the future safety of the ‘vast expanding nuclear industry’ (WNA 2015a). China has doubled its nuclear capacity since 2010 with 23 NPPs in operation and a generating capacity of about 20 GW, producing just over 100 TWh of electricity. Plans approved in 2012 (after Fukushima) are to increase to 58 GW by 2020 and construct, with added safety measures, 30 GW, to reach 150 GW by 2030, and much more by 2050. Although these planning concepts include some of the world’s most advanced reactors, there are serious questions about the future fuel supply. The new build in China will rely on two types of reactor. One, based on the Westinghouse 1000 GW capacity ‘AP1000’ reactor, is a development of the French AP 600 Pressurized Water Reactors (PWR – the Chinese are working on a 1400 GW version). The other is based on the French-origin ‘EPR’ reactor. China is becoming largely self-sufficient in reactor design, construction and fuel cycle management, and states ‘that radioactive releases should never cause unacceptable effects on the environment or the public’, and that ‘advanced nuclear technology from 2016 should practically eliminate the possible release of significant quantities of radioactive substances’. Although this report (WNA 2015a) is very detailed, the terms ‘unacceptable radioactivity’, ‘practically eliminate’ and ‘significant quantities’ are left undefined. However, delays of more than a year have been announced for China’s AP1000 ‘flagship’ (Yap and Spegele 2015) and also for the EPR reactor at Taishan (“Taishan Nuclear Reactor” 2015). These may well be the first of a series of delays and China may encounter more difficulties in the world market for NPPs than anticipated (Zhu and Stanway 2015). There have also been serious issues around high-level radioactive waste and disposal, especially when using ‘MOX fuel’, in which plutonium processed from SNF is added to uranium (IAEA 2011). It is claimed that these will be alleviated with Generation III reactors such as EPR designed to use fuel reprocessed from Generation IIa reactors such as AP1000, giving the impression of solving the disposal of radioactive waste and the ability to fuel reactors without importing fuel, especially foreign uranium. These claims assume an ever-recycling of reprocessed plutonium, at each stage of which vast amounts of shorter lived (only for a 1000 years or so), highly radioactive isotopes will be released. Current Chinese waste disposal plans are, however, vague (WNA 2014).
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United Kingdom (Nuclear Industry Association 2015) UK policy on civil power generation acknowledges possible unprecedented ‘outages’ from 2015 in spite of a succession of life extensions for most current nuclear plants. The preferred solutions include expanding renewable energy sources; hoping for viable ways of sequestering carbon emissions from fossil and bio-fuels; and a new nuclear build. In 2012, UK NPPs worked at 73% of their nominal capacity of 9.9 Gw – while fossil-fuel plants, whose output varies in response to fluctuating demand, worked at 27% (DUKES 2014). In 2014, UK nuclear electricity capacity was 9.23 GW which supplied about 60 TWh, nearly 18% of all the electricity supply and 6% of total energy. As well as the oldest plant at Wylfa (extended to December 2015), there are 15 ‘Generation II’ reactors at seven other sites. Fourteen are Advanced Gas-cooled Reactors (AGRs) developed from older UK ‘Magnox’ designs: half of them are due to close by 2020 and all by 2024 when nuclear capacity would be restricted to the Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) at Sizewell B with 1.19 GW, due to close in 2035. To mitigate this looming reduction in generation capacity, the UK conducted a ‘Generic Design Assessment’ of the AP1000 and EPR reactors in 2010, mainly on whether the nuclear waste could be disposed of safely (UK Environment Agency 2010). The disposal plans were provisionally approved pending further reports, some of which would be after gaining operational experience. However, as discussed below, the UK still has the fundamental problem of no identified site for a geological disposal facility (GDF). Two EPR prototype reactors (in Finland and France) have been beset almost from their outset by cost overruns and delays. China is expected to contribute to the consortium for the first plant, at Hinkley Point, which will have two EPRs, each of 1.6 GW capacity, at an estimated cost of £16 bn (2012 value – Probert 2014). Its start-up was expected in 2022, but this is receding as final approval is still pending due to a complex series of legal actions from German companies and the Austrian Government, who allege that the UK Government’s plans for subsidies are illegal. A ‘contracts for difference’ scheme would allow the operators, EDF, to get a ‘strike price’ of £92.5 per MWh from its customers, and would be the first contract ever to cover decommissioning, with costs between £1.8 and £2.7 bn (GOV.UK, DECC 2013). Whether such forecasting is reliable can only be revealed by time, but signs are not propitious following the announcement in February 2015, confirmed in March, that Areva, part of the Hinkley EDF consortium, announced losses of over €4.8 billion Expanding EPRs to four more UK sites by 2021 (Sizewell, Wylfa, Oldbury and Moorside) could increase UK capacity to 16.4 GW (and slightly lower the prices from Hinkley); extensions to three more sites (Hartlepool, Heysham and Bradwell) may enable a capacity of over 20 GWe, fulfilling up to 40% of the UK’s expected electricity requirement (12% of total energy demand). However,
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where the fuel will come from or where the spent fuel will go is disregarded (Fetter 2009). Except for ill-defined plans for burning spent fuel in Generation IV reactors (possibly ‘PRISM’ reactors using liquid sodium coolant, yet to be developed and of very uncertain technology when scaled up), the UK DECC plans to burn small quantities of already-processed plutonium as Mixed Oxide fuel (‘MOX’, usually a mix of 93% UO2 and 7% PuO2) contributing about a third of the total EPR fuel: but this will scarcely touch the stocks of UK civil plutonium stored at Sellafield (Sellafield Ltd 2015), of which there is over 100 tonnes, enough for 20,000 Nagasaki-type bombs. The uncertain future of the UK’s new nuclear build programme has global significance. Global proliferation of nuclear power plants and of nuclear weapons, to 2000 Global civil nuclear power capacity increased from 20 GW in 1970 to 300 GW in 1987. The number of operating NPPs peaked at 438 in 2002 when total capacity was 360 GW, the peak of 380 GW being reached in 2006. By 2014, there were 388 reactors and capacity was 332.5 GW (Schneider and Froggatt 2014). New builds virtually stopped after Chernobyl (1986) and a nascent restart was thwarted by the Fukushima tragedy (Fischer 1997; US EIA 2013). The 50 years after 1945 also saw a proliferation of States with nuclear weapons (NWs). The US acquired them in 1945; the USSR in 1950; the UK (1953); France (1961); China (1965); Israel (around 1968); India (1974); South Africa (around 1982); and Pakistan (around 1995). Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan returned their ‘inherited’ weapons (several hundred each) to Russia in 1995 in accordance with the ‘Lisbon Protocol’. South Africa disarmed in 1990 (De Klerk 2014) and remains the only state to have completely disarmed and dismantled its nuclear arsenal. The proliferation ‘curves’ of nations with NPPs and of nations with NWs diverge after 1960 as more non-nuclear weapons-possessing states (NNWS) received ‘Atomic Assistance’ in developing ‘peaceful’ nuclear technology for civil power programmes (see below). This sometimes came from other NNWS, such as Canada and Germany. Unfavourable but wrong concern about future supplies of uranium ore led to a lull in new nuclear power plants even before the disaster at Fukushima in 2011, which accelerated the trend to stall or abandon nuclear programmes, although limited research continued. Refuelling and decommissioning NPPs The global nuclear power industries consume around 25 million tonnes of uranium each year. The primary LWR fuel is Low-Enriched Uranium (LEU). After three years or so, increasing absorption of neutrons by accumulating
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fissile products brings LWR ‘burn-up’ to a stop. Part of the ‘spent nuclear fuel’ (SNF), of which only a small amount has been converted to energy, has to be replaced by fresh LEU each year. Procedures are lengthy, complex and require constant monitoring as SNF, although still dominated by uranium, has over 100 unstable isotopes of dozens of chemical elements . When a NPP is decommissioned, all remaining SNF is removed and the whole site decontaminated. This may be carried out in the years following shutdown, but more often the site is mothballed for many decades, allowing the initial high radioactivity to decline. Most of the NPPs being or approaching shut-down were built with little consideration for decommissioning, so this process can be particularly hazardous. Nuclear waste – a global problem Nuclear programmes convert low-radioactive mostly subterranean uranium ore, which takes billennia to decay, to fission products decaying much more than a million-fold more quickly. Each tonne of SNF has about 3.4 × 1017 Bq (World Information Service on Energy (WISE) Uranium Project 2014). (Becquerels are the numbers of spontaneous radioactive disintegrations per second in a defined mass.) So the Bq increase in SNF is more than a million-fold. SNF is thermally very hot. Safe disposal of nuclear waste is therefore problematic. Even uranium mining produces waste. This is often discounted by nuclear industrialists, but unearthed processed ore (‘tailings’) contain about 2 × 1011 Bq a tonne and has Th230, half-life 76,000 years and progenitor of Radon Rn222 (half-life 3.8 days). Too often, careless disposal of the debris (usually around the mining area) produces enough Rn222 daughters (products of nuclear disintegration) to harm local health. Up to 1021 Bq of waste has been released during the nuclear industry’s first 50 years. Some has decayed – wastes released 40 years ago by about 20-fold, those released one year ago by fivefold. Secrecy makes it more difficult to calculate the waste from world-wide nuclear weapons production, testing and decommissioning, but Hu and Makhijani (1995) quote about 100 million TBq (1020 Bq) from HLW associated with weapons-grade Plutonium production alone – up to 1018 coming from the world’s third greatest nuclear accident at Chelyabinsk in 1957 – and 1018 Bq from the fallout of global nuclear weapons testing. Overall, the activity released from the world’s military and civil nuclear industries may be comparable with each other, and combine to within an order of magnitude of 1022 Bq. Nuclear waste management Nuclear waste is generally classed into three categories, ‘High Level’ (HLW), intermediate (ILW) and low (LLW): A fourth category, very low (VLLW) may be listed separately or incorporated into LLW. HLW and some ILWs pose the
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greatest problem, but the LLW deposits also need careful attention not least because of their large volumes (see Table 3). The activity of ‘fresh’ spent fuel is so high that, unless diverted for reprocessing and recovery of plutonium, a ‘cooling-off’ for several decades is required before it can be stored properly. Although reprocessing is advocated as a convenient way of reducing the bulk of materials for storage, the recovered plutonium profoundly increases the risk of weapons proliferation while the plutonium-poor supernatant remains very hot. In the UK, waste from reprocessing contributes to most of the HLW. Although the UK began supplying commercial nuclear electricity to the National Grid in 1956 (two years after the USSR’s much smaller scale worldfirst), less than 16% came before 1980 (calculated from Bolton 2013); but the UK’s early research, inefficient NPPs and military programmes produced relatively large amounts of waste before 1980. The UK’s 2013 waste inventory, yet to be affected by DECC’s nuclear build plans, is only slightly different from that of 2010, but states ‘… much contaminated ground has yet to be well characterized, and so the quantity of radioactive waste resulting from its remediation is uncertain. The total volume … could add significantly to the figure of 4.5 million cubic metres’. This data includes military and medical waste, but not the 100 tonnes or so of plutonium at Sellafield. After cooling, HLW is ready to be transferred to dry storage in specially constructed containers of concrete and metallic copper; some material is encased in vitrified silicates (glass). The international gold standard for longterm storage would be to bury these containers in ‘geological disposal facilities’ (GDF) with prepared chambers in geologically stable rock. The timescale is extraordinarily long (millennia to hundreds of millennia), and the boldness beyond human imagination and experience. Even the most carefully stacked and packed containers, with the best ‘infill’ (bentonite clay, etc.), will eventually leak their still highly radioactive materials (but as far as can be told, only
Table 3. Inventories of UK nuclear waste, by activity (Bq), volume (cubic metres – m3) and mass (tonnes). Waste characteristics (year of inventory)
HLW
ILW
LLW + VLLW
Total
Activity, Bq (2010) % Volume, m3 (2013)a % Mass, Tonnes (2010) %
8 × 1019 95 1100 0.02 2700 0.05
3.9 × 1018 5 290,000 6.5 300,000 6
40 × 1013
