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COMMENTARY
Commentary on Nakamura et al. (2014): Alcohol policy appraisal and evaluation—to understand what is happening and why, we need better data on alcohol as a commodity
In October 2011, the Scottish Government implemented a ban on multi-buy promotion of alcoholic beverages in the off-licensed trade. The ban was the main component of a package of policies regulating the sale of alcohol, referred to here as the ‘Alcohol Act’ [1]. Multi-buy promotions are a form of price-based marketing in which a bundle of alcoholic beverages can be purchased for a price that is lower than the sum of the individual beverage prices. The rationale for banning multi-buy promotions is that they are thought to encourage people to purchase, and then consume, more alcohol than they would in the absence of such promotions. In their paper, Nakamura and colleagues [2] set out to evaluate whether or not the multi-buy ban has been effective in reducing alcohol purchasing. While a substantial body of evidence exists on the theory and practice of price promotions in general, there is only a very small body of evidence relating to alcohol price promotions in particular [3]. This is unfortunate, because the potential of price promotions to increase consumption vary depending on the commodity being promoted [4] and the type of promotion involved [5]. Given the high levels of interest by policymakers internationally in regulating the price and promotion of alcohol [6], Nakamura et al.’s work will therefore make essential reading for the alcohol policy research community. By applying the difference-in-differences method to household panel market research data for Scotland and England & Wales, Nakamura et al. find that introduction of the Alcohol Act was not associated with a reduction in the volume of off-trade alcoholic beverages purchased over the following 9 months. The authors attribute the apparent ineffectiveness of the multi-buy ban to the ability of retailers to replace multi-buy promotions with other promotions that are not prohibited by the policy (e.g. a time-limited discount from normal retail price for individual beverages). Nakamura et al.’s findings can be compared to a separate evaluation, applying time–series methods to aggregate market research data on alcohol sales from a different company. This latter study by NHS Health Scotland found that the Alcohol Act was associated with a 2.6% decrease in consumption of off-trade alcohol over the next 12 months (P-value 0.07) when controlling for on-trade substitution effects [7]. The balance of support between the two contradictory conclusions depends ultimately upon which of two © 2014 Society for the Study of Addiction
less-than-perfect market research data sets is regarded as superior and which of a top-down or bottom-up analysis is likely to be the more robust approach. The choice is not an easy one. Nakamura et al. rightly draw attention to the need for improved consideration of supply-side responses during the policy design process. Improving our understanding of the potentially complex interaction between consumers, retailers and producers, during both debate and implementation of policy, is crucial for supporting robust appraisals of policy options. Nakamura et al. achieve some valuable insights here, identifying that frequency of purchasing occasions by consumers increased post-ban for some types of alcohol, with an accompanying fall in the number of items purchased per occasion. While NHS Health Scotland identified an 11.3% fall in promotional activity post-ban (P = 0.02), sales of promoted alcohol remain substantial. Taken together, this evidence suggests that Scottish consumers did take advantage of multi-buy promotions pre-ban, that retailers switched from multi-buy promotions to other promotional types post-ban, that consumers acted, at least in part, rationally in taking advantage of these promotions (if we accept the premise that the high availability of alcohol in Scotland presents a low cost in terms of effort of purchasing) and ultimately that multibuy promotions for alcohol may not have been leading to over-purchasing to a greater degree than other types of price promotion. Was this result predicted by an earlier appraisal of the multi-buy ban? In this instance, the closest policy for which an appraisal was undertaken was of a complete ban of off-trade price promotions. This analysis by the Sheffield Alcohol Research Group suggested that a total ban might result in a 3% reduction in overall consumption [8]. Nakamura et al.’s assertion that such appraisals tend to ignore supply-side responses has some validity, but in this instance the modelling work did not consider the effect of limiting the restriction to multi-buys owing to a lack of evidence on the prevalence of different types of promotion, and this limitation was communicated to policymakers. Regardless, to move such supply-side modelling beyond the speculative and add real value to policy analysis, substantially more research is needed on the interplay between consumers, producers, retailers and policy. Ultimately, to improve the quality of appraisal and evaluation of alcohol pricing and promotion policies Addiction, 109, 568–569
Commentary
we need a data set that integrates detailed longitudinal information on individuals’ purchasing occasions and subsequent drinking occasions. Unfortunately, rather than making progress in this direction, in the United Kingdom the opposite is happening. In 2010, under costcutting measures, the UK Department of Health withdrew funding for the alcohol-related questions in the General Lifestyle Survey, which has recorded alcohol consumption since 1978, and this survey’s longitudinal capability, which commenced in 2005, will not be made available to researchers. Experiences such as the multibuy ban show that we cannot rely on ‘big data’, such as proprietary data of market research companies, to fill important gaps in the evidence base. As well as concerns about the availability of these data to the wider research community, the data are collected for purposes unrelated to alcohol policy analysis and decision-making. At present, there appears insufficient incentive for market research companies to collect data on crucial factors such as the different types of price promotion. To better support evidence-based alcohol policy, investment in a research-informed major longitudinal survey remains an urgent priority. Declaration of interests None. Keywords Alcohol, appraisal, policy, sales promotion.
data,
evaluation,
569
References 1. Scottish Parliament. Alcohol etc. (Scotland) Act [as passed]. Edinburgh: Scottish Parliament; 2010. 2. Nakamura R., Suhrcke M., Pechey R., Morciano M., Roland M., Marteau T. Impact on alcohol purchasing of a ban on multi-buy promotions: a quasi-experimental evaluation comparing Scotland with England and Wales. Addiction 2014; 109: 558–67. 3. Booth A., Meier P., Stockwell T., Sutton A., Wilkinson A., Wong R. Independent review of the effects of alcohol pricing and promotion part A: systematic reviews. Sheffield: University of Sheffield; 2008. Available at: http://www.sheffield.ac.uk/ polopoly_fs/1.95617!/file/PartA.pdf (accessed 17 February 2014) (Archived at http://www.webcitation.org/6NS2BDrQq on 17 February 2014). 4. Blattberg R. C., Briesch R., Fox E. J. How promotions work. Mark Sci 1995; 14: G122–32. 5. Foubert B., Gijsbrechts E. Response to bundle promotions for packaged goods. J Mark Res 2007; 44: 647–62. 6. World Health Organization (WHO). Global Strategy to Reduce the Harmful Use of Alcohol. Switzerland: WHO Press; 2010. 7. Robinson M., Geue C., Lewsey J., Mackay D., McCartney G., Curnock E. et al. Monitoring and evaluating Scotland’s Alcohol Strategy: the impact of the Alcohol Act on off-trade alcohol sales in Scotland. Edinburgh: NHS Health Scotland; 2013. 8. Meng Y., Hill-McManus D., Brennan A., Meier P. Modelbased appraisal of alcohol minimum pricing and off-licensed trade discount bans in Scotland using the Sheffield Alcohol Policy Model (v2): second update based on newly available data. Sheffield: University of Sheffield; 2012. Available at: http://www.sheffield.ac.uk/polopoly_fs/1.150021!/file/ scotlandupdatejan2012.pdf (accessed 17 February 2014) (Archived at http://www.webcitation.org/6NS2LWSGC on 17 February 2014).
ROBIN C. PURSHOUSE1, JOHN HOLMES2 & PETRA S. MEIER2
Department of Automatic Control and Systems Engineering, University of Sheffield, Mappin Street, Sheffield S1 3JD, UK1 and School of Health and Related Research, University of Sheffield, Sheffield, UK.2 E-mail: [email protected]
© 2014 Society for the Study of Addiction
Addiction, 109, 568–569
This document is a scanned copy of a printed document. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material.
COMMENTARY
Commentary on Nakamura et al. (2014): Alcohol policy appraisal and evaluation—to understand what is happening and why, we need better data on alcohol as a commodity
In October 2011, the Scottish Government implemented a ban on multi-buy promotion of alcoholic beverages in the off-licensed trade. The ban was the main component of a package of policies regulating the sale of alcohol, referred to here as the ‘Alcohol Act’ [1]. Multi-buy promotions are a form of price-based marketing in which a bundle of alcoholic beverages can be purchased for a price that is lower than the sum of the individual beverage prices. The rationale for banning multi-buy promotions is that they are thought to encourage people to purchase, and then consume, more alcohol than they would in the absence of such promotions. In their paper, Nakamura and colleagues [2] set out to evaluate whether or not the multi-buy ban has been effective in reducing alcohol purchasing. While a substantial body of evidence exists on the theory and practice of price promotions in general, there is only a very small body of evidence relating to alcohol price promotions in particular [3]. This is unfortunate, because the potential of price promotions to increase consumption vary depending on the commodity being promoted [4] and the type of promotion involved [5]. Given the high levels of interest by policymakers internationally in regulating the price and promotion of alcohol [6], Nakamura et al.’s work will therefore make essential reading for the alcohol policy research community. By applying the difference-in-differences method to household panel market research data for Scotland and England & Wales, Nakamura et al. find that introduction of the Alcohol Act was not associated with a reduction in the volume of off-trade alcoholic beverages purchased over the following 9 months. The authors attribute the apparent ineffectiveness of the multi-buy ban to the ability of retailers to replace multi-buy promotions with other promotions that are not prohibited by the policy (e.g. a time-limited discount from normal retail price for individual beverages). Nakamura et al.’s findings can be compared to a separate evaluation, applying time–series methods to aggregate market research data on alcohol sales from a different company. This latter study by NHS Health Scotland found that the Alcohol Act was associated with a 2.6% decrease in consumption of off-trade alcohol over the next 12 months (P-value 0.07) when controlling for on-trade substitution effects [7]. The balance of support between the two contradictory conclusions depends ultimately upon which of two © 2014 Society for the Study of Addiction
less-than-perfect market research data sets is regarded as superior and which of a top-down or bottom-up analysis is likely to be the more robust approach. The choice is not an easy one. Nakamura et al. rightly draw attention to the need for improved consideration of supply-side responses during the policy design process. Improving our understanding of the potentially complex interaction between consumers, retailers and producers, during both debate and implementation of policy, is crucial for supporting robust appraisals of policy options. Nakamura et al. achieve some valuable insights here, identifying that frequency of purchasing occasions by consumers increased post-ban for some types of alcohol, with an accompanying fall in the number of items purchased per occasion. While NHS Health Scotland identified an 11.3% fall in promotional activity post-ban (P = 0.02), sales of promoted alcohol remain substantial. Taken together, this evidence suggests that Scottish consumers did take advantage of multi-buy promotions pre-ban, that retailers switched from multi-buy promotions to other promotional types post-ban, that consumers acted, at least in part, rationally in taking advantage of these promotions (if we accept the premise that the high availability of alcohol in Scotland presents a low cost in terms of effort of purchasing) and ultimately that multibuy promotions for alcohol may not have been leading to over-purchasing to a greater degree than other types of price promotion. Was this result predicted by an earlier appraisal of the multi-buy ban? In this instance, the closest policy for which an appraisal was undertaken was of a complete ban of off-trade price promotions. This analysis by the Sheffield Alcohol Research Group suggested that a total ban might result in a 3% reduction in overall consumption [8]. Nakamura et al.’s assertion that such appraisals tend to ignore supply-side responses has some validity, but in this instance the modelling work did not consider the effect of limiting the restriction to multi-buys owing to a lack of evidence on the prevalence of different types of promotion, and this limitation was communicated to policymakers. Regardless, to move such supply-side modelling beyond the speculative and add real value to policy analysis, substantially more research is needed on the interplay between consumers, producers, retailers and policy. Ultimately, to improve the quality of appraisal and evaluation of alcohol pricing and promotion policies Addiction, 109, 568–569
Commentary
we need a data set that integrates detailed longitudinal information on individuals’ purchasing occasions and subsequent drinking occasions. Unfortunately, rather than making progress in this direction, in the United Kingdom the opposite is happening. In 2010, under costcutting measures, the UK Department of Health withdrew funding for the alcohol-related questions in the General Lifestyle Survey, which has recorded alcohol consumption since 1978, and this survey’s longitudinal capability, which commenced in 2005, will not be made available to researchers. Experiences such as the multibuy ban show that we cannot rely on ‘big data’, such as proprietary data of market research companies, to fill important gaps in the evidence base. As well as concerns about the availability of these data to the wider research community, the data are collected for purposes unrelated to alcohol policy analysis and decision-making. At present, there appears insufficient incentive for market research companies to collect data on crucial factors such as the different types of price promotion. To better support evidence-based alcohol policy, investment in a research-informed major longitudinal survey remains an urgent priority. Declaration of interests None. Keywords Alcohol, appraisal, policy, sales promotion.
data,
evaluation,
569
References 1. Scottish Parliament. Alcohol etc. (Scotland) Act [as passed]. Edinburgh: Scottish Parliament; 2010. 2. Nakamura R., Suhrcke M., Pechey R., Morciano M., Roland M., Marteau T. Impact on alcohol purchasing of a ban on multi-buy promotions: a quasi-experimental evaluation comparing Scotland with England and Wales. Addiction 2014; 109: 558–67. 3. Booth A., Meier P., Stockwell T., Sutton A., Wilkinson A., Wong R. Independent review of the effects of alcohol pricing and promotion part A: systematic reviews. Sheffield: University of Sheffield; 2008. Available at: http://www.sheffield.ac.uk/ polopoly_fs/1.95617!/file/PartA.pdf (accessed 17 February 2014) (Archived at http://www.webcitation.org/6NS2BDrQq on 17 February 2014). 4. Blattberg R. C., Briesch R., Fox E. J. How promotions work. Mark Sci 1995; 14: G122–32. 5. Foubert B., Gijsbrechts E. Response to bundle promotions for packaged goods. J Mark Res 2007; 44: 647–62. 6. World Health Organization (WHO). Global Strategy to Reduce the Harmful Use of Alcohol. Switzerland: WHO Press; 2010. 7. Robinson M., Geue C., Lewsey J., Mackay D., McCartney G., Curnock E. et al. Monitoring and evaluating Scotland’s Alcohol Strategy: the impact of the Alcohol Act on off-trade alcohol sales in Scotland. Edinburgh: NHS Health Scotland; 2013. 8. Meng Y., Hill-McManus D., Brennan A., Meier P. Modelbased appraisal of alcohol minimum pricing and off-licensed trade discount bans in Scotland using the Sheffield Alcohol Policy Model (v2): second update based on newly available data. Sheffield: University of Sheffield; 2012. Available at: http://www.sheffield.ac.uk/polopoly_fs/1.150021!/file/ scotlandupdatejan2012.pdf (accessed 17 February 2014) (Archived at http://www.webcitation.org/6NS2LWSGC on 17 February 2014).
ROBIN C. PURSHOUSE1, JOHN HOLMES2 & PETRA S. MEIER2
Department of Automatic Control and Systems Engineering, University of Sheffield, Mappin Street, Sheffield S1 3JD, UK1 and School of Health and Related Research, University of Sheffield, Sheffield, UK.2 E-mail: [email protected]
© 2014 Society for the Study of Addiction
Addiction, 109, 568–569
This document is a scanned copy of a printed document. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material.
