REPORT

China’s Family Planning Policies: Recent Reforms and Future Prospects Stuart Basten and Quanbao Jiang

In November 2013, China announced reforms to its family planning policies whereby couples would be allowed to have a second child if either parent is an only child. The announcement garnered worldwide media coverage, and stimulated academic and popular discussion. We explore the context of the 2013 reforms, including the economic, demographic, and political motivations behind them, and speculate on their likely effect. Noting that the impact of the reforms on China’s long-term demographic future is likely to be relatively slight, we consider why more radical reform may have been difficult to implement. We offer observations about possible future directions for Chinese family planning policies and explore the notion of “local pronatalism within nationally prescribed antinatalist limits” and how this suggests that an ideological shift within China’s family planning apparatus may be plausible. (Studies in Family Planning 2014; 45[4]: 493–509)

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n the popular view, Chinese family planning restrictions are a nationwide policy established at the beginning of the 1980s that is enforced by the “one-child policy.” Yet the history of Chinese family planning regulations has long been characterized by exceptions to the one-child restrictions for certain couples and minority groups. A comprehensive history of Chinese family planning policies from the 1970s to the early 2000s can be found in earlier literature (Attané 2002; Greenhalgh 2003; Scharping 2003; Greenhalgh and Winckler 2005). China’s population grew rapidly in the 1950s and 1960s, and by the 1970s it had increased by some 250 million since the founding of the People’s Republic. As Kane and Choi (1999: 992) observe, this early period of demographic expansion was considered part of China’s new strength, especially after “a century of rebellions, wars, epidemics, and the collapse of imperial authority, during which the annual population growth rate was probably no more than 0.3%.” By the early 1970s, however, China’s population growth was already starting to test resources, and the Fourth Five-Year-Plan for 1971–75 for the first time included targets for population growth (Tian 1991). From the early 1970s, the country pursued a new family planning campaign embodied by the slogan wan, xi, shao, referring to later marriage, longer spacing between births, and fewer births (Banister 1987; Peng 1991; Basten, Sobotka, and Zeman 2014). In the

Stuart Basten is Associate Professor, Oxford Centre for Population Research, Department of Social Policy and Intervention, University of Oxford, 32 Wellington Square, Oxford OX1 2ER, United Kingdom. Email: [email protected]. Quanbao Jiang is Professor, Institute for Population and Development Studies, School of Public Policy and Administration, Xi’an Jiaotong University, China. ©2014 The Population Council, Inc.

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1970s, fertility began to decline sharply and the age at first marriage increased significantly. Even during this period, there were marked differences in policy implementation between rural and urban areas, with more relaxed rules for rural couples (Attané 2002). Following Mao’s death, Deng Xiaoping emphasized the potential contribution of limiting population growth to achieving economic development goals, and advocated the necessity of birth control (Greenhalgh and Winckler 2005). In 1980, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CCCPC) delivered “An Open Letter to All Members of the Communist Party and Communist Youth League on the Issue of Controlling the Population Growth.” The letter stated that couples should have only one child, and the policy that resulted was referred to as the “one-child-per-couple” or “one-child” policy (Croll, Davin, and Kane 1985). In urban areas, violating the new policy meant loss of access to schools, medical care, factory jobs, housing, and social welfare. Furthermore, these urban areas were witnessing rapid development and economic growth, with many labor force opportunities imposing a higher opportunity cost to childbearing (Wang, Cai, and Gu 2013). As a result, the policy was implemented without great resistance (Kane and Choi 1999). Rural parents, meanwhile, retained a greater reliance on children, and sons in particular, for both labor and old-age security. As Kane and Choi (1999: 993) observe, “Years of political upheaval had left many peasants cynical about government policies and their likely duration; it also left them adept at avoiding unpopular prescriptions.” In part as a response to greater levels of resistance, from as early as 1984 couples in rural China were allowed to have a second child (with a spacing requirement) upon meeting certain criteria regarding the level of wealth in the area and/or whether their first child was a girl. In many urban areas, couples in which both parents were only children became eligible to apply for a certificate allowing them to have a second child under certain conditions. By 2002, all provinces with the exception of Henan had adopted this policy alteration, with Henan following in 2011 (Tian, Zheng, and Wang 2011). In some provinces, particular conditions had to be met before permission to have a second child was granted—for example, that the mother must be older than 28 years of age and the second birth should take place at least four years after the first (Hou, Ma, and Huang 2008; Tian, Zheng, and Wang 2011). There have thus been a number of exceptions to the broad policy of population control under the general principle of “slowing down population growth and encouraging only one child per couple” (Gu et al. 2007: 131). Numerous studies have shown that the implementation of birth policy restrictions differed widely from province to province and even from village to village (Scharping 2003; Gu et al. 2007). Decentralization is an important feature of the Chinese political process and is a recurring strategy of central government (Lieberthal 1995). In recognition of the economic, social, and demographic heterogeneity of China and the need of locales to respond to particular demographic and political pressures, most provinces were permitted to draft their own birth-control regulations from the mid-1980s onward. These local differences are critical to understanding the prospects for future reform.

THE 2013 REFORMS In 2012, the China Development Research Foundation, a think tank working closely with central leadership, recommended the immediate implementation of a two-child policy in some Studies in Family Planning 45(4)

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provinces, followed by a national two-child policy by 2015 and the removal of all birth limits by 2020, stating that “China has paid a huge political and social cost for the policy, as it has resulted in social conflict and high administrative costs, and led indirectly to a long-term gender imbalance at birth” (Waldmeir 2013). A two-child policy has been advocated by numerous organizations and scholars. As Greenhalgh (2008: 327) suggested, for example, a shift to a two-child policy “would help slow the growing social crises of masculinization and agingwithout-social-security and would alleviate a host of other social problems.” The merging in early 2013 of China’s Population and Family Planning Commission with the new National Health and Family Planning Commission (NHFPC) led to further debate about China’s fertility policy and was regarded as a sign of possible reform of the strict birth-control policy (Jiang, Li, and Feldman 2013). From 9–12 November 2013, the Third Plenary Session of the 18th CCCPC was held in Beijing. At the meeting, Party General Secretary Xi Jinping delivered a report entitled “Decisions on Major Issues Concerning Comprehensively Deepening Reforms.” Although the report reiterated that family planning is a basic national policy, it initiated a policy shift whereby couples would be allowed to have a second child if either parent is an only child (NHFPC 2013a). After this meeting, provinces implemented the new policy and began to modify their birth-planning regulations. As of August 2014, almost all municipalities have implemented this policy change, allowing such couples to apply for certification to have a second child (Gu 2014). This policy shift generated much international interest, with media reports addressing a number of issues that have been associated with family planning restrictions. These issues include skewed sex ratios at birth (e.g., Jiang, Li, and Feldman 2011; Poston, Conde, and DeSalvo 2011); the large number of couples left childless through the death of their only child (e.g., ­Jiang, Li, and Sánchez-Barricarte 2014); instances of coercion (which had been reported by observers beginning in the early 1980s) (e.g., Aird 1982; Greenhalgh 2008: 37); and evasion and selective enforcement of fines for unauthorized births (e.g., Basten and Verropoulou 2013). In 2013, Liu Daoping, vice chairman of the ­People’s Congress Standing Committee of Sichuan Province, admitted that family planning restrictions were, in reality, only strictly imposed on the middle class, because the poor could not afford to pay the large fines while the rich could easily pay them (163.com 2013). Finally, the moral framework of the family planning policies and the curtailment of reproductive freedoms were again discussed (UNFPA 2004; Beech 2013), as they have been for four decades (Banister 1987: 218). While the pronouncement accounted for just one sentence in the 60 directives presented in the “Decisions on Major Issues” report mentioned above (Xinhua 2013a), Wang Peian, deputy director of the National Health and Family Planning Commission, gave a full statement on the reforms to the press revealing the official motivations behind them (NHFPC 2013b). This statement set out four reasons for the policy change. First, in relation to the country’s “low birth rate,” if the “current fertility policy remain[s] unchanged … the total fertility rate will continue to decline” and the “rapid decrease of the population” will “influence the longterm balanced development” of the population and economy. The second reason concerned “structural problems” in the country’s population. These relate to the projected decline of the “working-age population,” the projected rapid increase of the “older population,” and recognition of the “long-term high sex ratio at birth,” with a national figure of 117.7 male births per December 2014

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100 female births recorded in 2012. The third reason was the shrinking of the average household size and the increasing number of older people living alone. The result, according to Wang, is that “the traditional functions of the family [have] been weakened.” Finally, Wang recognized that the “fertility wishes of the residents of urban and rural areas have undergone great changes,” with people desiring “fewer and healthier births” in the context of “economic and social development” and improvements in living standards. Wang explicitly referred to the aforementioned 1980 “Open Letter” which stated that “thirty years later [the] particularly intense problems [of] current population growth would be eased” and that a “different population policy” could be developed. All of these features of the current and projected demographic profile of China are borne out in the scholarly literature. As a consequence of very low fertility rates, increasing life expectancy, and negligible international immigration, China is clearly aging very rapidly (see, for example, Wang 2011; Cai 2012; Mai, Peng, and Chen 2013). The latest UN World Population Prospects projects an increase in the population aged 65 and above from 9 percent in 2010 (or 114 million) to 16 percent by 2030 (235 million) and 24 percent by 2050 (331 million). Conversely, the population aged 20–34—a crucial age group in terms of childbearing and labor force participation—is projected to decrease from 25 percent of the total population in 2010 (333 million) to 17 percent by 2030 (242 million) and 16 percent by 2050 (228 million). Clearly, this transition will present numerous economic, social, and political challenges related to adequate care for the elderly and a shrinking workforce (see, for example, Li, Chen, and Jiang 2011; Zhang, Yang, and Wang 2011; Chen and Powell 2012). Similarly, the highly skewed sex ratio is perceived as a problem for social stability and the marriage market (Zhu, Lu, and Hesketh 2009; Tucker and Van Hook 2013).

POTENTIAL IMPACT OF THE REFORMS While the 2013 reforms have been generally welcomed in China and internationally, their potential future impact has been highly contested. On 28 February 2014, a correspondent for the People’s Daily interviewed Zhai Zhenwu, deputy president of the China Population Association and a demographer at Renmin University, about the impact of implementing the new policy. Zhai estimated that there are about 15–20 million couples in which at least one spouse is an only child (Bai 2014). According to the latest UN estimates, approximately 310 million women in China are currently aged 18–45 (UNPD 2013). Calculating a national percentage of couples who will be affected by the policy is complicated by the need to take into account such factors as urban/rural residence, migrant status, infertility, children already born, fertility policy in the location, and whether the province has implemented the change (Gu et al. 2007). However, it would be reasonable to suggest a rough estimate of well below 10 percent—if not below 5 percent—of all Chinese couples being affected by these changes. Demographer Wang Guangzhou of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences produced a simulation model that suggested a net increase of about 1 million extra births per year as a result of the policy change (Liu 2013); another exercise estimated an increase of 1 to 2 million births per year (Bai 2014). Indeed, official estimates of as many as 10 million extra births over the next five years were widely quoted (Wetzstein 2014). Studies in Family Planning 45(4)

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If we accept these forecasts and assume that 1 million more births are added annually to the Chinese population, what difference might this make to the expected population age structure? When performing such a calculation, one must keep in mind that the policy impact on the rapidly aging population (whether traditionally measured using the old-age dependency ratio [OADR] or by an alternative prospective measurement of aging that takes into account improvements in life expectancy) (Sanderson and Scherbov 2010, 2013) would not be apparent for at least 16–18 years when these births start to enter the labor force. By this time, projected further improvements in life expectancy (and possibly in length of time spent in education), likely changes in old-age provision, and shifts in the definition of “old” and “working-age population” mean that simply adding a million births per year for the next 18 years to gauge the effect of the 2013 reforms on the OADR in 2031 is inadequate. However, even the assumption of 10 million births by 2024, all entering the labor market by 2045, would only decrease the OADR from 39.5 persons aged 65 or over for every 100 aged 18–64 to 39.0 (using forecast data from UNPD 2013). Indeed, Wang Guangzhou himself considered that the reform would have only a “limited effect” on population size and age structure (Liu 2013). Even so, this figure of 1 million extra births per year rests upon rather optimistic assumptions regarding the likelihood of all eligible couples having a second child. A number of previous forecasts assume that couples in China will tend to have the number of children they are permitted to bear (Zeng 2007). Here the notion of the “perceived demographic pressure valve” as applied to the relationship between Chinese fertility and family planning policies seems appropriate. In this view, policy restrictions are perceived to be holding back a pent-up demand for children. Yet a significant body of evidence suggests that this may not be the case. In Shanghai in 2012, for example, only about 8 percent of couples who were eligible to have a second child by virtue of both being singletons actually did so (Wang 2012), with similarly low figures reported for Beijing (Hou and Ma 2008; Hou, Ma, and Huang 2008). Two recent meta-reviews of studies on voluntarily stated fertility preferences (i.e., net of policy restrictions) have found a growing desire among parents in urban areas to have just one child and, critically, have identified subreplacement ideals in rural areas (Basten and Gu 2013; Basten, Lutz, and Scherbov 2013; Hou et al. 2014). According to a survey by the NHFPC in October 2013, of the couples who would become eligible under the reform, only 50 to 60 percent intended to bear a second child (CECC 2013). Although it is too soon to evaluate the immediate impact of the 2013 reform, fragmentary evidence concerning the number of “extra” births occurring since the policy took effect are starting to emerge. In Zhejiang, the first province to relax the regulations, the Provincial Health and Family Planning Commission had initially predicted an extra 80,000 births. Wang Guojing, deputy director of the Commission, has stated that it now expects just onefourth of that number (Zhuang 2014). In Xuanwei Prefecture (Yunnan Province, population 1.3 million), just 36 eligible couples applied for permission to bear a second child within the first three months after the reforms went into effect, with local family planning officials blaming the economic pressures facing young couples for such a low response (Zhang and Yuan 2014). In Nanjing City (Jiangsu Province), it was projected that around 9,000 second births would occur in 2014; however, the maximum projection has now been halved (Liu, Jun, and Su 2014). Indeed, a number of studies have investigated why Chinese couples who are eligible December 2014

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to have a second child frequently do not. The overwhelming message appears to be that factors related to the cost of living, price of education, and lack of childcare facilities are responsible for such low fertility—as is the case elsewhere in East Asia as well (see, for example, Zheng et al. 2009; Wang 2012; Basten and Gu 2013). A widely publicized large-scale online survey of “netizens” on the Chinese micro-blogging site Weibo (2013) after the 2013 reforms and a survey conducted by the Guangzhou newspaper Southern Metropolis Daily (qq.com 2013) both cited “economic pressure” as the key reason preventing newly eligible couples from having a second child (Carter 2013). Given the demographic pressures cited by Wang Peian in justifying the 2013 reforms and the relatively minor impact that the policy changes are projected to have on population age structure, one might wonder why the reforms did not go further. Indeed, as prominent demographer and advocate for reform Gu Baochang of Renmin University stated, “We don’t need adjustments to the family planning policy.… What we need is a phase out of the whole system” (Beech 2013). In this vein, it is perhaps worth considering whether China might have followed the lead of most of its low-fertility Asian neighbors by introducing policies that, in fact, explicitly support childbearing (Jones, Straughan, and Chan 2009).

WHY ONLY PARTIAL REFORM? In responding to a reporter’s question about why a universal two-child policy could not be adopted, NHFPC Deputy Director Wang Peian said, “The commission had organized a number of studies demonstrating that if, at this stage, a universal two-child policy was implemented, this would cause volatility in the short-term [number of] births [leading to] the accumulation of great pressure on basic public services.” He added that such a move, in the long term, would cause a “cyclical fluctuation of births” that would “impact the vision of population development.” Wang concluded that the National Bureau of Statistics, the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, the China Development Research Foundation, Renmin University of China, and other institutions had conducted “independent research” that proved this point (NHFPC 2013b). Indeed, Zhai Zhenwu stated, “A universal two-children policy will introduce a serious baby boom in a short period of time and put a lot of pressure on public services such as health and education” (Zhuang 2014). Again, this official explanation sets great store by the notion of a large “unmet need” for children. Given China’s recent demographic history, it is not surprising that this narrative forms part of the evidence used to restrict further reforms of family planning policy. We should not lose sight of the fact that demographic momentum has meant that even though the country has seen below-replacement fertility for more than 20 years, total population has still grown by approximately 200 million over the same period and is forecast to continue growing (as projected by the UN’s medium fertility variant) for around another 15 years (UNPD 2013). This momentum has been cited by Jones, Straughan, and Chan (2009: 6) as a key factor behind the continuation of a strongly antinatalist policy in China. One should also note in this context that China’s population has urbanized rapidly over this period and is projected to be more than 70 percent urban by the time population growth is expected to taper off in the 2030s (UNPD 2012). Thus, much of this growth has occurred in high-density urban areas, where its contribution to environmental pollution is substantial. Studies in Family Planning 45(4)

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As we noted above, while many couples would like to have a second child, this desire is tempered, among other reasons, by the economic pressures of parenthood. From a purely policy perspective, the provinces where the one-child restrictions are most strongly enforced (e.g., the coastal provinces from Zhejiang north to Heilongjiang) might be expected to be most susceptible to a “baby boom” if the restrictions were lifted. Yet these same provinces have higher-than-average levels of development and, as such, couples are more likely to experience greater economic pressures discouraging childbearing. Zheng et al.’s (2009) influential study of fertility in one such province—Jiangsu—reached the same conclusion. Furthermore, even in rural areas, reported family-size preferences are only marginally above actual fertility rates (Hou et al. 2014). Finally, if we look at fertility rates across Pacific Asia and the similarities of underlying determinants of low fertility in China and elsewhere, the prospects of a prolonged baby boom seem quite remote (Frejka, Jones, and Sardon 2010). Are there other possible reasons for the apparent aversion to a more radical reform of family planning policy? While other studies have discussed some of the reasons for delays in reform (see, for example, Wang, Cai, and Gu 2013), in the following section we explore some of the structural aspects of enforcing the family planning restrictions and their role in the Chinese policymaking process, and describe how these could play a significant role in maintaining policy inertia. In particular, we identify two interrelated factors as potentially important: the role of the fines, or “social maintenance fees,” and the ideology and structure of Chinese local government. We then discuss how these factors might interact with the process of policy construction and change in China.

THE ROLE OF SOCIAL MAINTENANCE FEES In 1982, the State Family Planning Commission and the Ministry of Finance issued “Interim Provisions on Regulating the Fines for Excess Births” (Dong 2008). On 5 March 1992, these two bodies jointly issued a new set of regulations that changed the designation of “fines for excess births” to “out-of-quota birth fees” (Dong 2008). On 1 September 2000, meanwhile, the Ministry of Finance, the National Development and Reform Commission, and the State Family Planning Commission jointly issued a notice that “out-of-quota birth fees” should be renamed “social maintenance fees” (Wang 2013). Finally, on 24 April 2001, Zhang Weiqing, the then director of the State Family Planning Commission, asserted that “those who bear excess births in violation of law add more burden to the society, and they ought to make appropriate compensations for society and pay social maintenance fees to make up for increased social public investments” (Tan 2001). On an individual level, the fines and fees can lead to a strong temptation for corruption and/or zealous enforcement. Many cases of corruption cited in both popular and scholarly discourse have involved the assignment of birth quotas and the concealment of “illegal births” (Cao 2013: 627). To take just one report of many published in state media, a primary school teacher in Xiping County, Henan Province, stated that a family planning official informed her she would be “informally fined” 20,000 RMB (US$3,258) and not given a receipt rather than pay the “official” calculated fee of 86,736 RMB ($14,130) (Xinhua 2013b). However, it is on an institutional level that we see more tangible evidence of the role played by social maintenance fees in enforcing family planning restrictions. December 2014

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To understand the structural aspects of enforcing the family planning restrictions, we examine the mechanisms of local-level government in China.1 One of the most basic levels of local administration is the “village committee” in rural areas and the “neighborhood committee” in urban areas. These generally form the fifth tier of local government in China.2 During the 1980s and 1990s, the main task of village committees was to collect state taxes and grain requisitions and to implement birth planning policies (Cao 2013: 61). Revenues for villages and townships during this period were allocated from the central government and were also generated locally. Cao (2013) observes that for many inland villages, towns, and counties in the 1980s and 1990s the fines derived from not heeding family planning restrictions became the predominant source of out-of-budget revenue, while White (2006) suggests that the family planning bureaucracy came to rely on the extraction of the fees to cover ordinary operating costs. In this context, a series of mixed motivations developed at both the institutional and individual levels. First, counties that were successful in policing the family planning restrictions were, naturally, unsuccessful in securing social maintenance fees. In response, some counties made a deliberate effort to become less efficient in preventing breaches of the restrictions (Chen 1990). As Ren (2012) observes, many workers in local family planning offices do not work for the national administrative system; instead, they are employed informally through revenue generated within the township. Thus, without social maintenance fees there would be no such employment. The Chinese government’s 2001 reform of much of the agricultural tax system resulted in a sharp decline in commercial taxes for local government, which exacerbated an existing liquidity problem in many areas. According to Tian (2008), this restructuring had the important effect of redirecting efforts toward extracting social maintenance fees to supplement the income of local administrative organs. Tian has identified instances in some towns where more than half of the local administration is employed by the family planning program, and has noted a sharp upward trend in both the scale and size of the fees. In 2011, to gauge the scale of China’s social maintenance fees in shaping local administrative budgets, Wu Youshui, a lawyer from Zhejiang Province, asked 31 provinces to report their income from breaches of family planning restrictions. Seventeen provinces reported a combined income from social maintenance fees of 16.5 billion RMB ($2.7 billion) (Wei 2013), with Sichuan Province levying the largest amount (2.4 billion RMB) ($390 million) (Huang 2013). Elsewhere, Liu and Wang (2014) estimated that 27.9 billion RMB ($4.6 billion) was collected nationwide—a figure that seems to be a reasonable extrapolation from Wu’s findings. To put this in context, this figure is roughly 15 percent of the entire country’s local government expenditure on science and technology (gov.cn 2012). A widely publicized but unverified alternative estimate by He Yafu (a vocal critic of the family planning restrictions) of fines accrued since 1980 is more than 2 trillion yuan ($314 billion) (The Economist 2012). In his request to the provinces, Wu offered respondents the opportunity to provide evidence that the social maintenance fees they collected went toward compensating the government for resources and public services that the extra child would use. As of September 2013, not one local administration had provided such evidence, leading Wu to state that, “As far as I 1 For a detailed examination of China’s local government system, see Chung and Lam (2009). 2 Tiers can be characterized as provincial (subprovincial), prefectural (subprefectural), county, township, and village.

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can tell, no county in China uses the fines [for social and public services].… A lot of the money is given back to the local family planning commission and rewarded to officials who collected it” (Li and Wee 2013). The concept of these “vested interests” acting as a hindrance to reform was the subject of an editorial in Guangzhou’s Southern Metropolis Daily (2013). In August 2013, Xinhua, the state news agency, published an article suggesting that a county in Henan Province had carried out a widespread clampdown on collection of social maintenance fees intended to replenish a budget deficit (Xinhua 2013b). Although local officials denied the deficit, they did admit to having raised 70 million RMB ($11.3 million) in the campaign to pay “extra salaries” to employees “based on their work performance.” Judging the validity of these claims is impossible, but the fact that this theme has entered the public discourse is indicative of the view that the fees are deeply embedded in the raising of local finances.

THE FAMILY PLANNING BUREAUCRACY AND POLICY INERTIA A second major factor that could add to policy inertia in China is the explicit family planning machinery, determined both through the state’s unwillingness to relinquish its claim of authority over childbearing (White 2006) and through the maintenance of a bureaucratic network. Indeed, the function of family planning as a “basic state policy” was emphasized by Wang Peian in the rationale for the 2013 reforms, where he states that “adjusting and improving family planning policy is not equal to relaxing family planning work” (NHFPC 2013b). As has been observed elsewhere (Scharping 2003; Nie 2005), the organizational framework of the Chinese family planning restrictions is vast, ranging from the newly merged NHFPC to administrative organs in townships, villages, factories, and other workplaces.3 In addition, there are associated bodies concerned with family planning technology, centers of “public education,” institutions for training family planning cadres, and national and local family planning societies. A 2005 report by the then National Population and Family Planning Commission stated that the total number of staff involved in family planning policy at the township level and above was 509,000, with an additional 1.2 million village administrators and 6 million “group leaders.” To give an example, Xuzhou Prefecture in Jiangsu Province, with a total population of 9.3 million (2008), has 218 family planning organizations at various levels that, in total, employ 2,658 administrative staff at the township level and above (Fu 2011). Huangshan Prefecture in Anhui Province has 745 administrative family planning staff to oversee a total population of just 1.6 million (HSSJSW 2009). Jones, Straughan, and Chan (2009: 6) observe for other low-fertility settings in Pacific Asia that a major reason for the delay in shifting from an antinatalist to a pronatalist policy is “inertia and the entrenched bureaucratic interests and mindsets of agencies entrusted with antinatalist policies and leaders who had been promoting antinatalist policies.” Given the 3 In March 2013, the National Population and Family Planning Commission merged with the newly established National Health and Family Planning Commission. Indeed, at each administrative level described above, the institutions merged. As a result of merging, the staffing and function of the family planning divisions were strengthened rather than weakened.

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power and scope of the family planning apparatus in China, these entrenched interests could be a source of inertia in that country as well. A further complicating factor is the extent to which an antinatalist ideology has been effectively “transferred” to the general public through propaganda, with the scientific discourse of population control being interwoven with a public message that has embedded the doctrine of the family planning program within the national consciousness (Greenhalgh 2008). Indeed, the disputed claim that the family planning restrictions “averted 400 million births” (see Wang, Cai, and Gu 2013) is one of the few demographic “facts” known around the world. As such, the strength of the message regarding the threat of uncontrolled fertility in the context of continued population growth can be seen as a possible source of inertia. Popular attitudes may, however, be more adaptable than we might think. As the demographer Wang Feng observes, while five years ago only three out of ten Chinese were adamant that the policy should be discarded, today “it may not be an exaggeration to see a shift to the other way around. Maybe nine out of ten would say it’s about time to get rid of this” (Kaiman 2014). If true, this turnaround would clearly reflect a broader popular shift in views concerning the family planning restrictions.

PROVINCIAL PRONATALISM WITHIN AN ANTINATALIST CONTEXT Despite a strong family planning apparatus combined with an ideological basis for restrictions on family size, some local administrations have already made the switch toward a particular type of pronatalism. In Shanghai, for example, at least as early as 2009 the local Family Planning Commission began encouraging eligible couples to have a second child (Branigan 2009). As Xie Lingli, director of the Shanghai Population and Family Planning Commission, stated at the time, “We encourage eligible couples to have two kids because it can help reduce the proportion of elderly people” (Waldmeir 2009). An article in The Washington Post reported, “Almost overnight, posters directing families to have only one child were replaced by copies of regulations detailing who would be eligible to have a second child and how to apply for a permit” (Cha 2009). Elsewhere it was reported that “Family planning officials and volunteers will make home visits and slip leaflets under doorways to encourage couples to have a second child if both grew up as only children…. Emotional and financial counseling will also be provided, officials said” (Wang 2009). Similarly, as early as 2006, the Population and Family Planning Commission in Guangzhou (Guangdong Province) began encouraging eligible couples to have a second child. At the time, the deputy director of the Guangzhou commission stated, “This is not a local policy; the encouragement we are giving conforms with the national family planning system” (PTI News Agency 2006). In 2011, Guangdong Province officials were at the forefront of calling for precisely the change that occurred in 2013. As Zhang Feng, director of the Provincial Family Planning and Population Commission, observed in a 2011 interview with the Southern Metropolis Daily, “The increase in population is still a big problem affecting our social and economic development … but in the long-term, aging will also be a problem” (BBC News 2011). Other provinces such as Hubei (Li 2014), meanwhile, are seeking to simplify the process of applying for certification to have a second child. It is, perhaps, no surprise that the two locales that are Studies in Family Planning 45(4)

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most actively calling for further reform are Shanghai and Guangdong, which at present must rely on very high levels of in-migration to maintain their position as China’s “factory floor,” owing to their extremely low fertility rates. These observations clearly imply that the ideological and institutional shift from enforcing antinatalist policies toward encouraging childbearing may not, after all, be so difficult. Furthermore, the sheer size of the family planning apparatus is such that a wholesale shift in ideology toward encouraging childbearing would yield an enormous number of local advocates and stakeholders. We know from developments in China’s pension system that provinces can play a very active role as policy actors in reforming and managing pension systems that can attract and retain in-migrants (Dorfman et al. 2013). In this context, and in light of possible future reforms, more and more provincial and local family planning commissions might well pursue the kind of “pronatalism within prescribed limits” currently seen in Shanghai and Guangzhou.

CHINESE POLICYMAKING AND THE ROLE OF AGENCIES AND PROVINCES So far, we have illustrated some of the structural and ideological characteristics of the Chinese family planning apparatus and how these are being used (and abused) in pursuit of various goals within local governments. To understand the significance of these issues in the context of speculating about the future of Chinese family planning policy, we must locate them in the broader context of policymaking in China. Lieberthal and Oksenberg (1988: 3) identified two distinct forms of policymaking processes in China: “(1) Policy X was adopted pragmatically to solve new policy problems pressing upon leaders; (2) Policy X was promulgated to keep alive the ideological vision of its proponents.” When they were introduced, China’s family planning restrictions were clearly designed to “solve” the policy problem of rapid population growth “diluting” GDP per capita (Greenhalgh 2008). It could easily be suggested, furthermore, that the reforms of the past two decades, not least those of 2013, related to the second of these policy processes. The fact that family planning was restated as a basic state policy confirms that the “ideological vision” of the proponents of the policies is being maintained. Within this simple framework, however, we are starting to see a gradual transition toward the recognition of low fertility and rapid population aging as being “new policy problems” that will require that a new “Policy X” be implemented to deal with them. While the switch from antinatalist to pronatalist policies may seem anathema to many who work within China’s family planning apparatus, such a shift is, of course, common to low-fertility settings in East Asia. This simplified view of Chinese policymaking overlooks both the structural complexities and the multiple stakeholders involved in decisionmaking related to family planning. Indeed, Lieberthal and Oksenberg (1988: 8–9) identify a further policy process whereby “Policy X” results from “a bargain between Ministries A, B, and C and Province D,” which is either “(a) brokered by one or more top leaders,” “(b) arranged by coordinating staffs acting in the name of one or more top leaders,” or “(c) negotiated by the supra-ministry coordinating agency, and ratified through routine procedures by the top leaders.” In the recent history of family planning reforms in China, we have seen key elements of each of these changes. Clearly, multiple ministries have a stake in the future size and structure of China’s population, particularly the December 2014

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ministries of Education, Housing and Urban-Rural Development, Civil Affairs and Human Resources, and Social Security. Individual provinces have become increasingly active in seeking to mitigate the effects of population aging and wage inflation through policies to attract and retain workers using instruments such as minimum wages (Jacob 2011) and pension reform (Dorfman et al. 2013) and through the more direct means of “regional constrained pronatalism” noted above. We also see the reform of the “supra-ministry coordinating agency” in the shape of the newly merged NHFPC and the high-profile inclusion of the 2013 reforms in the “Decisions on Major Issues Concerning Comprehensively Deepening Reforms,” implying backing from the highest authorities. Lieberthal and Oksenberg (1988: 4) continue by saying that “disgruntled Ministers D and E,” as losers in the deal, may pursue “strategies to erode the agreement.” In response, further bargains are sought to “reconcile the conflicting organizational missions, ethos, structure, and resource allocation of the ministries involved.” Thus, they conclude that “policies are not necessarily either coherent and integrated responses to perceived problems or part of a logical strategy of a leader or faction to advance power and principle.” While this is by no means a guarantee of the future shape of the process of reforming Chinese family planning policy, it is important to realize that a fractious, possibly suboptimal policy outcome could develop over the coming years given the multiplicity of stakeholders at all levels of government.

CONCLUSION In this report, we place the 2013 reform of China’s family planning restrictions in the context of the broader development of the country’s family planning and population policies during the past four decades. We suggest that, even if the official estimates of an “extra million births a year” as a result of the reforms prove to be accurate, this increase will have only a minimal impact on the demographic problems cited as a reason for the changes—namely an aging population and a declining labor force—particularly given the evidence on fertility preferences and on the likelihood of these births actually materializing. Yet, while the demographic impact of the 2013 reforms might be small in scope, one should not underestimate the significance of the changes themselves on both the macro-­and micro-level. First, the changes indicate a recognition of the macro-level demographic situation in China and the need to “reform and improve” the present family planning policy. Second, the reforms will undoubtedly have a substantial micro-level impact on those couples who wish to have a second child but were previously barred from doing so. Having suggested that the 2013 reforms were weak in relation to their stated aim, we sought to understand why this might be the case. In addition to fears about a destabilizing baby boom, we suggested that a more in-depth understanding of the sources of Chinese local government revenue and of the Chinese policy process was key to understanding why simply “sweeping away” the policy may not be possible in the short term. This understanding helps explain why one of the world’s most rapidly aging countries continues to follow a broadly antinatalist policy. Nevertheless, provincial examples suggest that the antinatalist ideologies held by family planning bureaucrats may be more amenable to change than previously thought when specific needs Studies in Family Planning 45(4)

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arise. Indeed, such a shift from antinatalism to pronatalism is being seen across Pacific Asia. In each case, a substantial period of time elapsed between reaching replacement fertility and making the switch toward pronatalism. As Jones, Straughan, and Chan (2009: 7) observe, antinatalist policies were still in place in Japan, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan for up to 20 years after fertility fell below replacement level. Given that China has had below-replacement fertility for around 22 years, might it also switch to a pronatalist regime—or at least to a set of family policies that might encourage childbearing? We have observed that, within a limited context and prescribed upper bounds, family planning officials in Shanghai and Guangdong have demonstrated a capacity to shift from an ideologically motivated antinatalist agenda to an essentially pronatalist one. It is not, perhaps, implausible to envisage their current rather limited suite of activities being expanded to cover a broader remit relating to family-friendly policies. Yet as governments across East Asia (and elsewhere) are finding, raising fertility rates through policy is far from a straightforward activity. It appears to be easier to encourage people to have fewer children than to have more. This seems to suggest that further relaxation of the family planning restrictions—or even an ideological shift toward encouraging childbearing—may not achieve a sustained and significant increase in childbearing (Peng 2007). Rather, if the Chinese government is serious about the aims set out in the rationale for the 2013 reforms, it may be necessary for the state and other stakeholders to tackle some of the real and perceived structural impediments to childbearing by instituting “broad social change supportive of children and parenting” (Jones, Straughan, and Chan 2009: 8). Doing so will not only require the development of a holistic population and family policy, but may also necessitate a wide-ranging review of the functions and financing of local government. China’s experience with family policy has focused on regulating “the rights and responsibilities of the family” and “the welfare of children, women, the elderly, the vulnerable, and the disabled” (Xia et al. 2014: 270), with only limited consideration of broader issues related to reconciliation of work and family life (Guo and Xiao 2013). As a result, in the context of the often conflictual, decentralized nature of policymaking in China and the potential psychological impact of four decades of proscriptive antinatalism, the process of constructing such a set of policies could be very challenging indeed.

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Funding for this report was received from the UK Economic and Social Research Council, grant number ES/ J015032/1 (Basten) and the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities in China (Jiang). Thanks to Rachel Woodlee for her assistance in the final stages of manuscript preparation. December 2014

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