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Fam Proc 30:393-406, 1991

Boundaries as Distance Regulators in Personal Relationships ROBERT G. RYDER, Ph.D.a SUZANNE BARTLE, Ph.D.b aDepartment

of Child Development and Family Relations, University of Connecticut, Storrs CT 06269-1117.

bVirginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Falls Church VA.

Received wisdom suggests that boundaries are, or should be, important in intimate relationships. In this essay, we focus primarily upon the beliefs and phenomenology relating to a variety of boundaries, and provide a discussion of some conceptual issues, in order to understand better the development, facilitation, and maintenance of, as well as restraints upon, intimacy. Although we attend mainly to dyadic relationships, we believe that our observations and suggestions have application to larger groups. Fam Proc 30:393-406, 1991 Boundaries do, or should, foster1 the growth of relationships, maintain relationships, facilitate desireable and desired functioning, and forestall objectionable relationships. Boundaries may also do the opposite of all these. They may obstruct growth or lead to the termination of relationships. They may prevent relationships from functioning well and may even facilitate objectionable relationships. We will offer some thoughts about boundaries to closeness and boundaries to distance (compare 7), consider the development of relationships in which boundaries are crossed, and consider changes over time in attributions made about boundaries. As a brief overview of the text that follows, we introduce here an assortment of observations on several aspects of boundaries: 1. Boundaries may have paradoxical effects, which sometimes seem to be opposite to those apparently intended. 2. The sense of self can be thought of as a boundary that restrains growth in intimacy and, paradoxically, facilitates intimacy. 3. Boundary violations are a normal part of relationship development. 4. The hypothetical absence of boundaries either defines extreme intimacy or a transcendental state in which the concept of intimacy no longer applies. 5. Ideas about boundaries suggest possibilities either for strategic intervention or for the noninstrumental understanding of interpersonal process. 6. Honored boundary conditions of therapy facilitate therapy but may also mark limits to the potential accomplishments of therapy.

KINDS OF BOUNDARIES A social boundary is a metaphorical wall or fence. We will use "boundary" as synonymous with "believed boundary." People believe there is something that will prevent acts, thoughts, or feelings from occurring, or from ceasing to occur. "Prevention" implies that there is something to prevent. It must be believed that there is an inclination for the acts, thoughts, or feelings to occur, and that occurrence would be more likely if it were not for the boundary. Suppose people believe that certain conduct should be proscribed. They believe then that a boundary (against that conduct) should exist. Whether the boundary really does exist depends on whether they believe that the conduct really will be prevented. The belief that a boundary has causal consequences seems usually to have a rational or experiential basis. Such a belief can be true or false, given a sufficiently linear conceptual position. There is usually no possibility of demonstrating that a causal effect exists. The belief that events will be prevented can, of course, be proved wrong, if the events still occur.2

Boundaries to Closeness Relationships sometimes develop and become serious "because of" (see footnote 1) obstacles to greater intimacy. According to this view, people can play comfortably with each other because they anticipate only a casual relationship. Perhaps they are both committed to other people: perhaps he or she is in an excluded category (wrong marital status, ethnicity, age, or attractiveness). Perhaps it is just that the relationship has been defined as casual. The two parties are comfortable because they feel safe. They then discover "too late" that the feeling of safety has permitted them to slip unaware into a serious relationship. Ryder, Kafka and Olson (34) suggest that courtships leading to marriage often begin in this way.

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Obstacles may also inspire efforts to surmount them. They might provide an opportunity to thwart the wishes of parents, or to demonstrate seductive prowess. The obstacles might be a challenge to one's sense of autonomy. There are, thus, two contrasting ways that an apparent obstacle to intimacy might facilitate intimacy. First, it might be like a Maginot Line.3 It makes "conquest" easier by creating a misleading sense of security. Second, it might create a "Romeo and Juliet" effect (11). The obstacle becomes a challenge that inspires efforts to overcome it. In some casesfor instance, in Shakespeareobstacles are followed by the end of the relationship. Inquiry into interethnic courtships suggested some time ago that relationships usually do not survive serious parental objections (22). Obviously, apparent obstacles often hold.

Boundaries to Distance Close relationships may exist surrounded by boundaries intended to maintain closeness, and protect it from outside interference. Such boundaries are then obstacles to lesser intimacy, rather than obstacles to greater intimacy. Common sense suggests that marriages sometimes stay together because there are serious obstacles to divorce. Here too, boundaries often hold. Still, clinical work suggests that some couples, perhaps more than a few, remain content with each other until reaching marriage or some marriage-like state. Boundaries are then experienced as prison bars. There is a Romeo and Juliet effect but in reverseone struggles against the bars and escapes. We might call this a "Papillon" effect. Finally, what are prison bars for some may be experienced as safety by others. In Flaubert's tale, Madame Bovary was confident that the security of her dull marriage would permit her adventures to flourish without cost to her. What clinician has not encountered individuals who also held this view? Many such persons have erred (apparently) as did Bovary, with serious outcomes for the marriages involved.

Tranquil and Troubled Boundaries The metaphors of Romeo and Juliet, and the Maginot Line, are for boundaries intended to obstruct closeness but do not. The metaphors of Madame Bovary and Papillon are for boundaries intended to prevent separation but do not. These four metaphors also suggest a grouping according to affect. The "tranquil" boundary states are Maginot and Bovary. Feelings of freedom and a (false) sense of security accompany these. The "troubled" boundary states are Romeo and Juliet, and Papillon, involving as they do feelings of struggle and conflict. We are aware, of course, that any real situation might be well described by more than one of these metaphors, or none of them, or all of them. Furthermore, today's tranquility is potentially explosive tomorrow.

"Pruning" Boundaries When a person prunes a shrub, the intention is not to stop the shrub from growing. One wants the plant to grow in some different way that will make the plant healthier or more attractive. A "pruning" boundary to intimacy works in the same way. Its intended purpose is not simply to thwart greater intimacy; the purpose is to obstruct some aspects of intimacy in order to facilitate others. Traditional boundaries to intimacy in psychotherapy are "pruning" boundaries in this sense. That is, the boundaries are to prevent some forms of intimacy (sexual contact, social relationship), and to enhance others (emotional closeness, self-disclosure). Boundaries that protect existing intimacy may also "prune," if only inadvertently. That is, some aspects of intimacy are maintained within the boundary while others diminish. The classic example is that of the couple whose marriage lasts, while the aspects of intimacy that once gave it life and intensity dwindle and vanish.

Expected Boundaries Most therapists believe that having any outside contact with a client is either an unfortunate complication or unethical (compare 2, 33). Even learning facts about the therapist's outside life may be thought a damaging boundary failure. "Protection" from the possibility of acting on positive or negative feelings, and the therapist's determined refusal to respond in kind, are held essential. Imagine restrictions such as these in a nontherapy relationship. A person might tolerate them for a while, but probably not after it becomes clear that boundary conditions are going to remain unchanged. People often give up eventually on relationships that "obviously are going nowhere." Relationships, that is, are structured in the present partly on the basis of expected, future boundaries. Let us turn this example around, and consider a therapy relationship without anticipated future restrictions. A client (or 2

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therapist) comes to believe that sex between client and therapist is impossible now, but will be possible after the therapy ends. The nature of the therapeutic relationship changes, and does so immediately.

Sense of Self as a Boundary It goes against tradition to question the importance of a clear and firm sense of the self for the achievement of intimacy. The connotative, and sometimes the direct implications of the literature are fairly clear. Individuals need connections to others (1, 3, 4, 19, 20). Neither Freud nor his immediate followers provide a clear definition of love, but many authors discuss this concept (1). Love is the highest developmental achievement (1, 4). Kernberg (19) suggests that love is possible only after achieving a stable and secure distinction between self and other. Without separation-individuation"the loosening of infantile object ties, in order to become a member of society at large" (5, p. 163)an individual cannot experience "mature love." Erikson (12) says that intimacy cannot be experienced without having a clear sense of individual identity. Others, for example, Buber (8, 9), have posited that one must be individuated, or at a distance, before one can be in relation (see also 14, 16, 35). Karpel (17) suggests that a "mature" relationship requires individuated partners. He calls this type of relationship a "dialogue": Individuation (the differentiated "I") and dialogue (the differentiated "We") are complementary parts of the overall process of both partners' simultaneous self-delineation in relationship. The more highly individuated the partners, the better prepared they are for a dialogic relationship. [p. 78] Karpel also says that dialogue represents a way of relating that fosters continuing individuation. The literature, in general, suggests that boundaries around one's own self should be clear and secure. The idea is that individuals function most "effectively" in intimate relationships if they have a clear sense of self. Let us nibble a bit at this idea. We might suggest that the importance of a clear sense of self is partly a matter of timing. A clear sense of self could play the role of a protection (a boundary) that provides a feeling of safety. It therefore could help a relationship begin. Later, the same sense of self might be less important, or might even limit closeness. Wynne and Wynne (40) describe intimacy as a subjective relational experience in which there is trusting self-disclosure and communicated empathy. The key component in this experience is the willingness to share, verbally or nonverbally, personal feelings, fantasies, and emotionally meaningful experiences and actions, positive or negative, with the expectation and trust that the other person will emotionally comprehend, accept what has been revealed, and will not betray or exploit this trust. [p. 384] There must be some shift in the boundaries around the self, if intimate experience is to increase. The same is true if the individuals in the relationship are to grow. Suppose we agree that a relationship might begin more readily if the participants feel personally safe and secure. Their clear sense of self makes them difficult to threaten. Later, however, personal safety becomes more difficult to square with this particular view of intimacy. If one is absolutely safe, gambling that the other will not exploit or betray one is no gamble at all. There are no chips on the table. Trusting another person is meaningful only if there is something to trust. It is meaningful precisely to the extent that risk is being taken (15, 28). Thus, boundaries around an individual at the start must eventually be breached, if relationships continue to become more intimate. There are two reasons for this. First, the boundaries set limits to closeness. They must give way for closeness to develop beyond those limits. Second, the boundaries provide safety. Personal safety must be sacrificed if risk is to be taken. The extent of sacrifice equals the extent of risk. The extent of risk, in turn, determines the extent to which the other person's trust-worthiness can be confirmed (or disconfirmed). How much one bets, how much one entrusts oneself to another person (32), determines the amount that one can win (or lose).4 Some aspects of the literature are congenial to the view that risk and vulnerability are important in intimacy. Some time ago, Fromm (13) suggested that intimacy occurs with a sudden break in a boundary. Karpel (17) suggests that what Boszormenyi-Nagy (6) calls trust is necessary in a dialogic relationship. There must be a willingness on the part of each partner to offer himself or herself temporarily as an object for the self-delineation of the other. Flexibility of self-boundaries occurs in the service of the relationship.

Transcending Boundaries Individuals with a clear sense of self are protected against the merging of the self with another. If the protection ends and the selves merge, there is fusion. Fusion is then a relationship with almost total closeness. It might feel like a kind of death of the ego. It is an experience that clinicians have regarded poorly. 3

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What would such an experience be like in a nonpsychotic adult (if a fusion experience can be imagined for such a person)? Would there be total disaster? Would there be the rebirth experience that we all have seen on occasion in clinical work? Is the lack of self-definition an alternative, less standard way to define intimacy? Alternatively, we might say that the very question of intimacy vanishes as the two selves become undefined. The structure in which intimacy is an issue has been transcended by some other kind of structure. Suppose it is possible that a relationship state exists in which self-boundaries are transcended. From a phenomenological point of view, a new organization of the relationship has occurred. Boundaries either cease to exist, or are invisible, or are irrelevant, including self-boundaries. Putting clues from the literature together with anecdotal, clinical, and other experience, what would such a state be like? Again, Karpel (17) touches on the possibility of this form of relationship with his concept of trust. One is willing to become an object for the other's self-delineation. Kernberg (20) considers transcendence within the context of (mature) sexual love. He describes transcendence as the crossing of the boundaries of the self, which can occur within a passionate relationship: There is a basic, intrinsic contradiction in the combination of these two crucial features of sexual love: the precondition of firm boundaries of the self with the constant awareness of the indissoluble separateness of individuals, and the sense of transcendence, of becoming one with the loved person. [pp. 95-96] Buber (9) creates a dichotomy between the worlds of I-It and I-Thou. Buber says that one cannot say "Thou" unless it is said with one's whole being. This may be as close as he gets to transcendence. He writes: The basic word I-You can be spoken only with one's whole being. The concentration and fusion into a whole being can never be accomplished by me, can never be accomplished without me. I require You to become; becoming I, I say You. All actual life is encounter. [p. 62] Buber regards individuation as both a developmental and a logical precondition for being in relation. However, Buber (9) also suggests that once a person can concentrate the entire being in Thou, the person will find freedom. Losing self-boundaries in the service of relationship may seem reminiscent of regression in the service of the ego. In the latter formulation, a sufficiently sophisticated ego structure might "choose" to disable some of its own functioning. The present idea, however, refers primarily to phenomenology and belief systems, not necessarily to changes in structure (as psychoanalysis understands that term), or to disabled functioning. The present formulation has an intrinsically nonindividual component. Apparent ego functioning of a couple, in dealing with the world beyond their relationship, may be reduced, unchanged, or even enhanced as energy is freed from intimacy concerns. There is not likely to be an experience of choice. Feeling "swept away" is more likely. Exceptionally clear self-boundaries may, paradoxically, be more likely to feel swept away in a transcendent relationship state. This would be true if, in fact, a sense of secure personal boundaries helps permit a state in which these same boundaries fade from view.

NORMATIVE RELATIONSHIP DEVELOPMENT Boundary Changes There are numerous normative stage theories that suggest how relationships develop, for example, Murstein (26), Kelley and Thibaut (18). The theory outlined some time ago by Ryder et al. (34), however, is amenable to restatement in boundary terms. Their stages are as follows: Latency is the period of relationship beginnings in which participants are likely to feel free. They are not worried by the prospect of serious consequences. Any boundaries to intimacy provide either a sense of safety or a challenge. Boundaries facilitate the beginnings of intimacy, or at least do not thwart them (in those cases in which an intimate relationship actually does begin). The second stage is Precommitment. There is a struggle over whether the relationship will cross boundaries to greater intimacy. Ryder et al. (34) suggest that this is the principal time for various third parties (friends or relatives) to object to the increased intimacy. Normatively, if relationship development continues, the relationship is redefined. Former boundaries are gone. The partners find themselves once again within acceptable (new) boundaries. The third stage is Commitment. The partners are in a redefined relationship in which closeness that was improper earlier is now acceptable. More than that, closeness that was once proscribed may now be obligatory. The main aspect of commitment in this stage is, in effect, to greater commitment. There is an implied promise to go through the Transition

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Point (marriage, for example). After the transition point, partners are in the Readjustment stage. Boundaries here are primarily to keep the partners together, rather than to keep them separate. That is, boundaries to greater closeness are gone, and boundaries to lesser closeness have emerged. Gates in a wall have opened; the couple has passed through them and then the gates have closed again. Ryder et al. (34) suggest that Readjustment is like Latency, but in the opposite direction. The partners may move toward separation without attending to possible consequences. In present terms, the boundaries to separation can have the paradoxical effect of facilitating separation, as with Papillon or Madame Bovary. Boundaries to separation can also function simultaneously as boundaries against joining in alternative, competitive relationships. These boundaries against competitive relationships could then have a paradoxical, facilitating effect (Maginot or Romeo and Juliet) on interests and activities that threaten the present relationship.5 Obviously, not all relationships follow the normative pattern of stages described above. This pattern originally derived from a considerable series of nonclinic, young married couples. It may, therefore, be common in relationships that lead to marriage. One or another aspect of it may fit other relationships as well. What is most pertinent in the present discussion is what it suggests about boundaries. Quite normative, socially acceptable relationships may involve, or may even require, unanticipated boundary violations as part of their development.

Attribution of Responsibility Who or what is held to be responsible for boundary conditions? In a dyadic relationship, responsibility can be attributed to "me or us," "you," or "her/him/them/it." There is a grammatical distinction among first-person, second-person and third-person attributions. These three possibilities for boundaries to closeness also exist for boundaries to distance. Thus, there are six possibilities for attributions of responsibilitytwo kinds of boundaries times three kinds of attribution (see Figure 1).

Figure 1. Attribution of responsibility for boundaries to closeness and distance. All of these attributions are in the present tense. First-person choice is "I choose" or "we choose." Second-person choice is "you choose." Third-person choice is "she/he/they/it is/are responsible." Past-tense choices become third person when put in the present tense: "I am now prevented from being with you by my own previous commitment to someone else" is the same as presently being prevented by "it." Anticipated future choices can be modifiers of present boundaries. For example, a boundary may be thought of as either unmovable or movable. Sometimes the anticipated future is the same as present-tense choice: "We are going to be romantically involved with each other" may be tantamount to announcing that "we" already are. There is, thus, the phenomenology of a causal construction in which "I" hold "myself," "us," "you," or other entities responsible for preventing something from happening. Cause is thus used in this context in the sense of responsibility or blame. At one level or another (compare 31), the relationship partners construe responsibility or blame in one of the ways suggested here. An outsider (or one of the partners at another time) might have a different understanding. Suppose Sue Smith finds it attractive that Joe Jones is a true gentleman. He never presses her for sexual favors. After marriage, it develops that Joe still does not approach her often or strongly for sexual contact. Formerly, she thought he found her desirable, but kept his distance because he respected her. Now she believes that Joe is just not interested. An observer who perceives that sexual reticence has changed less than its causal interpretation may believe there has been no "real" change in causation. In Figure 1, the six possible cells are collapsed into four. The first row refers to limits that restrict closeness; the second row refers to limits that restrict distance or separation. Cell A refers to self or selves, or partner; Cell B refers to "other"; Cell C refers to self or selves; and Cell D refers to partner or other. The vertical dividing line between cells is different for 5

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the two rows. Second-person attributions are grouped to the left in the top row (with first-person attributions). They are grouped to the right (with third-person attributions) in the second row. Each of these four cells contains a one-word reference to a kind of relationship process likely to be found there. Thus, Cell A includes Limitation; Cell B includes Attraction; Cell C includes Commitment; and Cell D includes Obligation. These four terms are to be understood as mnemonic devices. They refer only to some of what might be found in the different cells. The metaphors suggested earlier for various boundary conditions refer to situations in which boundaries are experienced as external. So, in Figure 1, Romeo and Juliet, and Maginot, are in Cell B. Cell D is the location for Papillon and Bovary. Although there are few instances that fall entirely in one cell, each cell includes a variety of processes. Processes in the various cells include the following: 1. Cell A, Limitation: One holds back, or sees the other person as holding back. Ambivalence or annoyance is likely, and there is the potential for an adversarial relationship between the two partners, or perhaps only a comfortable coolness. 2. Cell B, Attraction: Both partners struggle for greater closeness, or do not worry about it. They may be united by a common struggle against outside obstacles, yet they may feel safely protected from being swept away by their relationship. 3. Cell C, Commitment: Consciously choosing a close relationship, or commiting oneself to it, is a present-tense reality. The phenomenology may be that of feelings strong enough to offer a promise of permanence. 4. Cell D, Obligation: One (or both) may feel imprisoned, or complacent. A person could believe that it would be difficult to leave the present, obligatory closeness of the relationship. Alternatively, a person could believe that flirting with boundary violations is without danger. In Cell D then, as in Cell A, there is the potential for an adversarial relationship between the two partners. Relationships change over time. Our impression of general tendencies is that in the top row of Figure 1, relationships move to the left (from B to A). In the bottom row, they move to the right (from C to D). The perceived responsibility for barriers to closeness becomes closer. The perceived responsibility for barriers to distance becomes more distant. An alternative way to characterize this process is that responsibility often becomes attributed to the second person. Barriers to closeness, once attributed to third persons ("Society keeps us from being together more") may become attributed to first persons ("I really do not want to share absolutely everything with you"), or to second persons ("You do not seem very interested in being with me"). Barriers to distance, once attributed to oneself ("I am absolutely committed to you"), may become attributed to third persons ("The Church will not let me divorce"), or to second persons ("You keep me from having enough space"). The classical definition of romance (10), as a struggle against obstacles, falls in Cell B. Getting married might be an example in Cell C. Being married, however, is more likely to be in Cells A or D. Relationships can remain in Cell A indefinitely. When they end, it may be with a sense of accumulated frustration or fatigue. Relationships mostly in Cell D may also stay there indefinitely. If boundaries in Cell D eventually yield, collapse of the relationship is likely to be dramatic. Elaboration of Cells Cell C: Several authors (10, 35, 40) have suggested, in effect, that Cell C (Commitment) is optimal. The half-life of couples remaining there, however, can be quite brief. Phenomenology of choice often turns rapidly into phenomenology of obligation. Even present-tense, first-person choice is not necessarily as attractive to participants as our cultural values may lead us to believe. There is choice and then there is choice: "I am a bit infatuated with Jane, but since I think it best for all of us, I choose to stay with you," is not the same as "I give you every ounce of my beingI need you even to breathe." Cell B.: The salad days of a romance are likely to be in Cell B (Attraction). It might appeal to those of us attracted by classically defined romance, or by youth and inexperience. The blooming of romance must, after all, have some attraction to almost everyone. On the other hand, there is De Rougement's (10) thought that romance is a disaster in progress. Passion according to Benedek (4) is suffering. Note too that Cell B also includes boredom. Beginning relationships thought likely to go nowhere are in Cell B, including relationships that indeed go nowhere. Even Cell-B relationships that boundaries successfully restrain, if they continue, are likely to move to Cell A. The lover who "cannot" leave his or her spouse is eventually seen as the lover who does not want to do so. Cell A: Cell A (Limitation) is the dreary location of openly mixed feelings about a relationship. There is projection between the partners, mutual blame, disappointment, and bitterness. However, this cell also includes attractive relationships (depending, of course, on what one finds attractive). The successful film, "Same Time Next Year,"6 is surely about a relationship in Cell A. External factors help to keep the partners from seeing more of each other. However, the film makes it clear that they want the relationship they have. There may be many friendships, or even romances of a sort, that by conscious choice maintain themselves at some limit

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to personal intimacy. The limit may be defined concretely (as by avoiding sexual contact), or in more subtle ways (as by avoiding shared secrets, or never talking about the relationship). Obviously, a relationship such as this can still end in catastrophe, if it competes with important other relationships. The partners of "Same Time Next Year" had spouses. If a spouse had learned what was happening, the fun would have been over.7 On the other hand, if such a relationship is not a source, nor an aspect of complications in other relationships, it might be exceptionally enduring and conflict free. It might be an example of "less" being "more." It might be an example of self-imposed and successful "pruning" boundaries. Cell A is, in a sense, lauded by traditional thought. Participants choose limits to closeness, as when two individuated people go into a relationship and strive to continue their own self-delineation (17); there is a clear sense of self-boundaries (1, 3, 4). Bak (3) goes as far as to say that any merging of self-boundaries in a relationship is pathological, or at least immature. Presumably, analytically oriented authors would imagine consciousness of choice to enhance such relationships even further. Cell D: Cell D (Obligation) can also be regarded as a mixed bag. It includes some very desperate people, even some suicidal people. It also includes some who have turned (as the old poster said) lemons into lemonade. There may be many people in Cell D who have made their peace with being in a permanent relationship. With this a settled matter, they turn their attention to other issues, and are content to do so. Probably, most of these people lead quite respectable lives. Some, however, may lead a more successful version of Madame Bovary's life. Perhaps there are instances of couples where both spouses lead such a life, and get along well. If such couples exist, they may not be so clearly distinguishable from those in Cell A. Presumably, this arrangement requires that spouses renounce the wish for a closeness that requires monogamy. It is a variation of "Open Marriage" (27) that may depend, paradoxically, on the boundaries around a marriage being firm and reliable, and, in this sense, closed. The issue of monogamy illustrates how conduct does not determine location in the various cells. A relationship may be thought to be so rock-solid that no imaginable activity by either partner could touch it (Cell D). Exclusivity may be renounced as part of an effort to avoid too close a relationship (Cell A). A person may tolerate someone else's disliked activity "so that" the relationship can be preserved (Cell C). All of these are different from believing that competing relationships are an external fact of life that will keep partners from getting closer (Cell B). Thus, monogamy versus nonmonogamy does not distinguish among the cells, and the same is true of most other aspects of conduct. What is pertinent is how the conduct is understood by the partners.

IMPLICATIONS There is an implicit pessimism in much of what has been said here, and in some of the literature. Much of the framework presented implies that people usually fear closeness. Perhaps this is pessimistic, but it is also true. Superficially, people worry about getting "caught." People worry about stepping inadvertently into a situation that they then cannot readily leave. Finding oneself on a conveyor belt to marriage is a prime example. People worry about starting conduct that they then cannot readily stop. Sex is one obvious example. Another is that people fear evincing too much closeness or caring. They may feel obligated to continue doing so, whether they want to or not. Perhaps some of these concerns are more true of men than of women (23), but we believe they are not the exclusive property of either gender. More profoundly, people appear frightened of losing themselves in intimacy. The fear is that ego boundaries, and not merely the phenomenology of ego boundaries, might dissolve. The person one has labored so hard to be (or to seem?) may be changed, or lost, or exposed as false. If my defenses go, the implicit argument runs, what will I have left? People do find ways to deal with fears of closeness. They do enter relationships that may become intimate, and that may endure more than briefly. However, one way people do this may be by having belief systems (concerning barriers to intimacy) that turn out to be false. Is it true that, for close relationships to develop, people regularly do, or must, or should fool themselves? Some deception is easy to condemn. What, however, about the mutual and self-deceptions of lovers? Is intimacy intrinsically flawed if it flows partly from falseness?

Relationship Entropy Is it possible for people to remain in a committed relationship and become ever more close, or at least not become gradually less close? Is it inevitable that people in relationships will drift apart? That is, are we all subject to a kind of relationship entropy? Closeness has within it the seeds of ensuing distance, as described by Ryder et al. (34). De Rougement's (10) far more severe view is that romance is intrinsically a quest for death. There is a certain tradition among marital therapists, for instance, Lederer and Jackson (21), that implies statements such as: "Of course romance will fade. Grow up and be satisfied with what is left." The traditional view in family sociology is that marriage satisfaction declines for about two decades after marriage (29, 30, 36). The decline is said to be due to childrearing. After the children leave home, satisfaction returns. The evidence for

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all this is slight, but particularly so for the later return of satisfaction. None of the above views is very optimistic. If they are correct, relationship entropy is common. It is an open question whether we are permitted to regard this as regrettable, or whether we should simply take a sour-grapes view: intense, romantic intimacy is adolescent stuff, beneath the regard of mature individuals. It is also an open question whether what is common is what is essential. The existence of a general trend says little about the possibility of exceptions. Failing to find much enduring, emotionally intense intimacy (to be distinguished from familiarity), does not prove that it is impossible. It does not prove that everyone is equally unlucky.

Pollyanna Expressions of pessimism and optimism have a political reality, in that they shape events as well as describe them. It is possible, for example, that pessimistic individuals therefore have relationships more likely to justify pessimism. On the other hand, a positive (Pollyanna) view that exceeds reality misleads people, and it is to be avoided if possible. Expressing an ideal is one thing. Suggesting that "healthy" couples or our clients regularly achieve that ideal is another. Clinical writing often emphasizes the ways relationships can become better, or can be made to become better. It is relatively silent about the possibility that "better" relationships become worse again. By what we do not say, we may then engage in our own version of "happy ever after" statements that do not describe reality. If relationship entropy is not inevitable, it is certainly widespread. Perhaps this essay itself has a Pollyanna aspect in even considering the existence of transcendental relationship states. However, we claim no knowledge about the probability of such states arising and having an enduring life. Our view is merely that their hypothetical existence raises interesting possibilities. If regarded not as enduring conditions, but as brief interludes, transcendental relationship states actually may be a fairly common experience. Probably many of us have had moments of exceptional intimacy with a friend or loved one, perhaps enduring for no more than a few minutes. Self-awareness (including awareness of boundaries) almost stops. Most likely we cannot remember the details of who said or did what in these interludes. We do recall that they existed, and that they were special.

Clinical Implications Therapists take varying degrees of a "substrate" view of clients, and varying degrees of a view more focused on client intentions (32). Consider automobile performance as an analogy. We might try to improve performance by working on the car (substrate), and/or by dealing with what the driver is trying to do (intentions). In substrate terms, clients and client systems are complicated devices that therapists set out to change. If they imagine that boundaries really cause or shape events, substrate-oriented therapists can use boundary manipulation as a therapeutic technique. They already do. Partners who squabble about not being cared for sufficiently might be prohibited from being too close to each other. People are told that they "should not" change. A slightly less crass alternative might be to avoid some therapist actions. A visible therapeutic commitment to preserving marriages at all costs, for example, might have unanticipated consequences. Instrumental, substrate use of boundaries involves, of course, the unproven assumption that boundaries actually cause things. Probably, some do and some do not. Considering intentions rather than substrate, it is entirely possible for boundaries to reflect intentions (or system directions) other than those voiced openly. Paradoxical consequences may not be paradoxical if unverbalized intentions are taken into account. If boundary patterns change for some external reason, relationship partners might pursue the same intentions or directions by other means. For this view, as well, there is no hard evidence. It is just an intentional, less instrumentally oriented alternative to the more concrete view of boundaries as linear, causal agents. Along the same lines, people may endow boundaries with the mythical power to protect them from acting on denied or feared wishes. The power of boundaries to prevent actions may be specious, while the ability of people to hide feelings is real. Attributing boundaries to second- or third-person sources can obscure and distance one from personal concerns. Emphasizing externally enforced boundaries may be a symptom in the classical sense of simultaneously obstructing and serving denied wishes. Some apparently see this in the current movement to disallow client "consent" as a defense in litigation pertaining to sexual relations with clients. According to Standish (37), laws to "protect" women have served historically to deny them adult status. She fears that this movement may have a similar outcome. Primarily, we regard a focus on boundaries as a slightly different way of seeing. It changes observations and reactions in subtle ways not easy to specify. We hope that attention to boundaries highlights aspects of relationship life that might be helpful to therapists of various orientations. One last point concerns the so-called "pruning" boundaries of therapy. Reasonable people may disagree about the details of boundaries, or about the conditions under which they apply, but, to our knowledge, no one advocates a therapy without boundaries. Boundaries in therapy are to be maintained, and are to have real effects.

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On the other hand, the time may come in therapeutic relationships, as in other relationships, when boundaries not only "prune" but thwart significant developments. Idiosyncrasies that were once facilitators, might become obtrusive factors that contribute more to strangeness than to growth. How is one to learn about the fuller possibilities of intimacy in a situation hemmed in with artificial restraints? How is one to learn about possibly enduring intimacy in a situation defined as temporary? This is only a problem if limitations of therapy are thought to be a problem. Therapy is intrinsically a second-best relationship for learning about intimacy. The advanced learning is elsewhere, in places where boundaries can be less important. Imagine a therapeutic relationship in which issues of intimacy have been not only discussed but also experienced. Hidden fears of closeness have been faced. The asymmetrical relationship between clients and therapists has become less so. A relationship in which only one party takes risks has become less one-sided. The therapeutic relationship then bumps up against several inflexible limits to intimacy. The therapy is then over. It is time to move on to better things.

REFERENCES 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28.

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Altman, L. L., Some vicissitudes of love, Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 25, 35-52, 1977. American Association for Marriage and Family Therapy (AAMFT). Code of ethical principles for marriage and family therapists. Washington DC: AAMFT, 1988. Bak, R. C., Being in love and object loss, International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 54, 1-8, 1973. Benedek, T., Ambivalence, passion and love, Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 25, 53-79, 1977. Blos, P., The second individuation process of adolescence, The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, 22, 162-186, 1967. Boszormenyi-Nagy, I., A theory of relationships: Experience and transaction. In I. Boszormenyi-Nagy & J.L. Framo (eds.), Intensive family therapy: Theoretical and practical aspects. New York: Harper & Row, 1965. Byng-Hall, J., Symptom bearer as marital distance regulator: Clinical implications, Family Process, 19, 355-365, 1980. Buber, M., Distance and relation, Psychiatry, 20, 97-129, 1957. Burber, M., I and thou. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1970. De Rougement, D., Love in the western world. New York: Pantheon Books, 1956. Driscoll, R., Davis, K. E. and Lipetz, M. E., Parental interference and romantic love: The Romeo and Juliet effect, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 24, 1-10, 1972. Erikson, E. H., (1968) Identity: Youth and crisis. New York: W.W. Norton, 1968. Fromm, E., The art of loving. New York: Harper & Row, 1965. Fogarty, T. F., On emptiness and closeness. In The family: The best of the family. New Rochelle NY: The Center for Family Learning, 1975/1976. Holmes, J. G. and Rempel, J. K., Trust in close relationships. In C. Hendrik (ed.), Close relationships (Vol. 10). Newbury Park CA: Sage Publications, 1989. Jessee, E. and L'Abate, L., Intimacy and marital depression: Interactional partners, International Journal of Family Therapy, 5, 39-53, 1983. Karpel, M., Individuation: From fusion to dialogue, Family Process, 15, 65-82, 1976. Kelley, H. H. and Thibaut, J. W., Interpersonal relations. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1978. Kernberg, O. F., Mature love: Prerequisites and characteristics, Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 22, 743-768, 1974. Kernberg, O. F., Boundaries and structure in love relations, Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 25, 81-114, 1977. Lederer, W. J. and Jackson, D. D., The mirages of marriage. New York: W.W. Norton, 1968. Mayer, J. E., Jewish-Gentile courtships. Glencoe NY: Free Press of Glencoe, 1961. Meth, R. L. and Pasick, R. S., Men in therapy: The challenge of change. New York: Guilford Press, 1990. Minuchin, S., Montalvo, B., Guerney, B. G., Rosman, B. L. and Schumer, F., Families of the slums: An exploration of their structure and treatment. New York: Basic Books, 1967. Rosman, B. L. and Baker, L., Psychosomatic families: Anorexia nervosa in context. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978. Murstein, B. L., Mate selection in the seventies, Journal of Marriage and the Family, 42, 51-66, 1980. O'Neill, N. and O'Neill, G., Open marriage: A new lifestyle for couples. New York: M. Evans & Co., 1972. Rempel, J. K., Holmes, J. G. and Zanna, M. P., Trust in close relationships, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 49, 95-112, 1985.

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29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40.

Rollins, B. C. and Cannon, K. L., Marital satisfaction over the family life cycle: A reevaluation, Journal of Marriage and the Family, 36, 271-282, 1974. Rollins, B. C., Cannon, K. L. and Feldman, H., Marital satisfaction over the family life cycle, Journal of Marriage and the Family, 32, 20-28, 1970. Ryder, R. G., The common dance, Journal of Family Psychology, 1, 66-76, 1978. Ryder, R. G., The realistic therapist: Modesty and relativism in therapy and research. Newbury Park CA: Sage Publications, 1987. Ryder, R. G. and Hepworth, J., AAMFT ethical code: "Dual relationships." Journal of Marital and Family Therapy, 16, 127-132, 1990. Ryder, R. G., Kafka, J. S. and Olson, D. H., Separating and joining influences in courtship and early marriage, American Journal of Orthopsychiatry, 41, 450-64, 1971. Shapiro, J. and Shapiro, D., Self control and relationships: Toward a model of interpersonal health, Journal of Humanistic Psychology, 24(4), 91-116, 1984. Spanier, G. B., Lewis, R. A. and Cole, C. L., Marital adjustment over the family life cycle: The issue of curvilinearity, Journal of Marriage and the Family, 37, 263-275, 1975. Standish, L.D. H., Dubious "protection" (Letter to the Editor), APA Monitor, 22(1), 2, 1991. Weiner-Davis, M., Confessions of an unabashed marriage saver, Family Therapy Networker, 11(1), 53-56, 1987. Wood, B. and Talmon, M., Family boundaries in transition: A search for alternatives, Family Process, 22, 347-357, 1983. Wynne, L. C. and Wynne, A. R., The quest for intimacy, Journal of Marriage and Family Therapy, 12, 383-394, 1986.

Manuscript received April 1, 1991; Revisions submitted July 31, 1991; Accepted August 19, 1991. 1Expressions such as this, which seem to refer to causality, should be read not as "cause" but, rather, as "may appear to cause,"

or as "may be experienced as causing." This is an essay about phenomenology and ways of thinking. It is not intended to imply potential experimental demonstration or conceptual linearity, except where these possibilities are discussed explicitly. 2Note that this usage of boundary is different from that of Minuchin and his colleagues (24,

25), in which "boundary" is used as part of a conceptual system defining role and generational differences, as well as closeness, and ultimately as a tool in characterizing kinds of family structure (compare 39). 3Reference is made here to the system of French fortifications that was thought sure to stop any potential German invasion. When the Germans actually did invade France, in World War II, they went around the Maginot Line. 4In Les

Miserables, Victor Hugo presents a famous, if fictional example in which a priest loses a bet such as this, yet turns the loss into a victory by betting still more. This is the incident in which an escaped convict steals a silver candleholder from the priest, who had trusted the convict in his home. When the thief is apprehended and brought back, the priest chides him for having forgotten the other half of his "gift," the other, matching candleholder. 5There may be a subtle but real difference between competitive activities that are primarily organized around the relationship they compete with, and activities that are organized primarily around the growth of other interests or relationships. In the former case, what is going on may be still a matter of the marriage, say, in the sense that if the marriage changes so as to make it irrelevant, the competitive activities can readily stop. The latter case connotes the development of new interests or relationships, which can then have a life of their own, and cannot so easily be set aside. For instance, one, relatively chaste extramarital relationship that develops a life of its own can be much more difficult to deal with than sexual adventures in which there is no relationship development, and which occur almost entirely for their effect on the spouse. The ultimate or ideal case of the latter may be the case described by Weiner-Davis (38), in which a wife was coached to provide hints of a totally fictional extramarital involvement, to jar her husband into greater interest in her. 6This is a 1978 film directed by Robert Mulligan, in which Ellen Burstyn and Alan Alda, both married to other people, meet as

lovers for a few days, once each year. 7Outside the world of fiction, unpleasantness in one relationship or another seems likely, even without the "secret" of a

competing relationship having been revealed. We do not wish to be associated with the naive, if sometimes convenient, belief that relationships have no effect on each other.

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