497021

research-article2013

PSSXXX10.1177/0956797613497021Pratto et al.Support for Arab Ascendance

Psychological Science OnlineFirst, published on December 5, 2013 as doi:10.1177/0956797613497021

Research Article

Attitudes Toward Arab Ascendance: Israeli and Global Perspectives

Psychological Science XX(X) 1­–10 © The Author(s) 2013 Reprints and permissions: sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav DOI: 10.1177/0956797613497021 pss.sagepub.com

Felicia Pratto1, Tamar Saguy2, Andrew L. Stewart1, Davide Morselli3, Rob Foels1, Antonio Aiello4, María Aranda5, Atilla Cidam1, Xenia Chryssochoou6, Kevin Durrheim7, Veronique Eicher3, Laurent Licata8, James H. Liu9, Li Liu10, Ines Meyer11, Orla Muldoon12, Stamos Papastamou6, Nebojsa Petrovic13, Francesca Prati14, Gerasimos Prodomitis6, and Joseph Sweetman15 1

University of Connecticut; 2Herzaliya University; 3University of Lausanne; 4University of Pisa; 5University of Jaen; 6Panteion University; 7University of Kwa-Zulu Natal; 8Université Libre de Bruxelles; 9University of Victoria, Wellington; 10Beijing Normal University; 11University of Cape Town; 12University of Limerick; 13 University of Belgrade; 14University of Bologna; and 15Cardiff University

Abstract Arab nations are decades behind many other previously colonized nations in developing stronger economies, more democratic institutions, and more autonomy and self-government, in part as a result of external interference. The year 2011 brought the potential for greater Arab autonomy through popular uprisings against autocratic governments in Tunisia, Egypt, and Yemen, and through the Palestinian request for state recognition by the United Nations. We examined the psychology of support for Arab ascendancy among adults in 14 nations in the Balkans, the Middle East, Asia, Oceania, Europe, and North America. We predicted and found that people low on social dominance orientation endorsed forming an independent Palestinian state and desired that the Arab uprisings succeed. Rejection of ideologies that legitimize outside interference with Arabs mediated this support. Measures and model results were robust across world regions. We discuss theoretical implications regarding the advent of new ideologies and extending social dominance theory to address international relations. Keywords political attitudes, counterdominance, ideologies, social dominance orientation Received 12/24/12; Revision accepted 6/17/13

Arab nations are among the last to decolonize and develop ( Jreisat, 2006; United Nations Development Programme, 2011). Their internal political situations range from repressive elite rule (e.g., Syria) to divisive democracies (e.g., Lebanon) to foreign-backed dictatorships (e.g., Saudi Arabia) to failed states beset with violence (e.g., Somalia). Economic opportunities and freedoms for Arab citizens are moderate at best; some have nearly none (Fund for Peace, 2011). Arab nations have among the highest rates in the world of interference from external actors, including foreign governments, international militaries, financial institutions, trade organizations, and nongovernmental agencies (e.g., Fund for

Peace, 2011). In short, the economic and security threats faced by most Arab peoples at the hands of their repressive or ineffective rulers are backed or tolerated by global powers (e.g., Richman, 1991; United Nations Development Programme, 2011). Against this backdrop of multilayered subordination, the recent Arab popular uprisings that captured worldwide attention, beginning with Mohamed Bouazizi’s Corresponding Author: Felicia Pratto, University of Connecticut, Department of Psychology, 406 Babbidge Rd., Storrs, CT 06269-1020 E-mail: [email protected]

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Pratto et al.

2 self-immolation in Tunisia in December 2010, and the 2011 Palestinian request for recognition at the United Nations represent important steps in Arab ascendance (Lynch, 2012). Moreover, given the substantial external interference in Arab affairs (Fund for Peace, 2011), support for or opposition to Arab autonomy among people outside Arab nations may be crucial to the success of the movements (e.g., Passini & Morselli, 2012). Our research examined support for Arab ascendancy among adults in 14 nations in the Balkans, the Middle East, Asia, Oceania, Europe, and North America.

Legitimizing Inequality and Oppression Addressing the phenomena of counterdominant movements and their international support or opposition requires extending theories of intergroup relations. One reason is that such theories usually consider only relations between two groups, and usually within nations or between two nations. This approach does not address the intersection of international and intranational relations, such as transnational support for counterdominance movements. Another reason is that theories often focus on how dominant ideologies legitimize established practices, rather than on what counterdominant ideologies accomplish. A third reason is that theories focus on how elites persuade publics to tolerate or support such practices by promulgating dominant ideologies (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). For example, doctrines such as the domino theory and hegemonic stability theory have influenced U.S. foreign policy toward the Middle East since World War II (e.g., Jreisat, 2006; Little, 2002, pp. 118–155; Lynch, 2012). Stereotypic images of nations influence political leaders’ policies toward those nations and public support of their policies (e.g., Alexander, Levin, & Henry, 2005; Herrmann, 1985; Little, 2002, pp. 9–42). Scholars who advise U.S. presidents have asserted that Arabs are incompetent at self-governance (e.g., Patai, 1973) and that Arab empowerment poses a threat to Israeli, U.S., and global security (e.g., Huntington, 1993; Lewis, 2002). These scholars’ views lend legitimacy to those of political, military, and media elites (e.g., DeAtkine, 2009; Friedman, 2006; Parker & Opell, 2012) and are disseminated in mass media (e.g., Little, 2002, pp. 9–42) such that sizable numbers of the general public view Arabs as incompetent and as security threats (e.g., Tessler, 2003). This account does not explain how popular movements against dominance become more normative.

Rejectionist Ideologies Many subordinated peoples have developed ideologies, such as liberalism, national liberation, Black Power,

feminism, and anticolonialism, that reject the legitimacy of subordination (e.g., Alquwaizani, 2011; Bulhan, 1985). The global spread of egalitarian values (e.g., Inglehart & Norris, 2004) may contribute to the popularity of such rejectionist ideologies because when people believe that greater equality is possible, they are more likely to reject intergroup inequality and the ideologies that legitimize dominance (e.g., Lee, Pratto, & Johnson, 2011). We argue that just as dominant ideologies are widely accepted because they are consonant with certain publicized events or facts (e.g., Sidanius & Pratto, 1999), rejectionist ideologies may gain legitimacy when they are consonant with events or facts. Regarding Arab ascendancy, the fact that U.S. Middle Eastern policy is provoking rather than suppressing Arab and Muslim hostility to Israel and the West (e.g., Kohut, 2005; Pew Research Global Attitudes Project, 2011) has led some political, military, and business elites to argue against the view that Arab empowerment poses a threat to global, U.S., and Israeli security (e.g., Carter, 2006; Petraeus, 2010; Robert, 2011). Also, the rise of China, Brazil, and other developing nations, and the initial successes of the Arab uprisings (removal of heads of state in Egypt, Tunisia, and Yemen) may suggest that Arabs, like other people in the developing world, could govern themselves. These global conditions of egalitarian aspirations and facts that contradict stereotypes that Arabs are incompetent and pose security threats catalyze acceptance of counterdominant and rejectionist ideologies. Social dominance theory (SDT; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999) predicts that supporters of such ideologies should endorse compatible policies. The psychological orientation to accept or reject intergroup domination in general (i.e., social dominance orientation, or SDO; Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994) underlies support for dominant, rejectionist, and counterdominant ideologies. SDT hypothesizes that support for relevant ideologies mediates the influence of SDO on attitudes toward policies that would sustain or change intergroup inequality (e.g., see Sidanius & Pratto, 1999, p. 105). Experimental evidence (e.g., Pratto, Tatar, & Conway-Lanz, 1999), as well as findings from crosssectional and longitudinal samples concerning national policies in many countries, confirms this model and rules out alternative models (e.g., Pratto, Stallworth, & ConwayLanz, 1998). For example, Pratto et al. (1998) showed that SDO measured in 1990 predicted U.S. Americans’ attitudes toward invading Iraq measured in 1991, and that this relationship was mediated by conservative ideology and nationalism. The present research extended previous findings by examining Israelis’ attitudes toward Arabs to test whether SDT’s model of policy support holds for rejectionist ideologies that legitimize not only domestic and foreign policy, but also other nations’ outcomes (Study 1). This research also tested whether the model applies across

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Support for Arab Ascendance 3 global regions (Study 2). Specifically, in Study 2, we expected people lower on SDO to be more likely to reject the ideas that Arabs threaten world security and are incompetent, compared with people higher on SDO. Further, we expected that rejection of such ideologies would mediate the influence of SDO on support for changes toward Arab empowerment that grew in 2011, namely, the popular Arab uprisings and bid for Palestinian statehood. It should be noted that the data for both Studies 1 and 2 were collected when the uprisings were popular movements and had not become sectarian nor contaminated by international interference.

Study 1: Israeli Jews’ Attitudes Toward Palestinian Israelis’ Rights, Palestinian Statehood, and the Arab Uprisings Study 1 tested SDT’s model of policy legitimization in Israel. Specifically, we examined attitudes toward treatment of Palestinian Israeli citizens (domestic policy), formation of an independent Palestinian state (foreign policy), and success of the Arab uprisings (policies of non-Israelis). Because we surveyed adults in public, we used brief measures. In Israel, self-identification as a “hawk” or a “dove” connotes one’s ideological orientation about Israeli-Arab relations (Maoz & Eidelson, 2007), so we used this measure as a proxy for support of counterdominant ideology. The hawk-dove dimension encompasses stereotypes, attributions of responsibility, assertions about rights, and beliefs about the appropriateness of intergroup actions and policies. A pilot survey of 161 Jewish Israeli adults (train passengers) is illustrative. We asked participants to rate themselves on a scale from 1 (definitely dove) to 7 (definitely hawk). Controlling for demographic variables, the more dovish participants were, the more trust they had in Arabs, r = .58, p < .001; the less they believed Arabs are bad by nature, r = −.60, p < .001; the more empathic they were toward Arabs, r = .47, p < .001; and the more they viewed Israel as responsible for the failure of the peace process, r = .55, p < .001.

Method Participants and procedure.  Questions from an SDO scale in English (Pratto, Cidam, et al., 2013) were translated into Hebrew (and then back-translated into English to check the accuracy of the translations). Participants were 123 Israeli Jews, ages 17 to 65 years, surveyed on a train during August 2011 (respondents with no or other religions were excluded from analyses). The sample was approximately equally divided between men (n = 61) and women (n = 60); 2 participants did not report their  gender. It was diverse in ethnicity (50 Ashkenazi Jews, 27

Mizrachi Jews, 34 mixed [i.e., Ashkenazi and Mizrachi], 10 individuals of other ethnicities, and 2 who did not report their ethnicity) and education level (elementary through graduate school; 60% had gone beyond high school). Half the participants were 24 years of age or older. Measures.  Intermixed with unrelated items were three survey items about Arab autonomy. Specifically, participants rated how much they agreed or disagreed (from 1, strongly disagree, to 7, strongly agree) with “protecting the rights of Arabs in Israel,” “forming an independent Palestinian state,” and “I want the Arab uprisings to succeed.” Participants also rated the four SDO items shown in Table 1, on a scale from 1 (strongly oppose) to 7 (strongly favor; α = .76; M = 4.22, SD = 1.88). The mediating ideological indicator was self-identification on a dove-hawk scale (1 = dove, 7 = hawk); ratings were reverse-coded.

Results Policy opinions were distributed across the entire range, but on average, participants were neutral about the rights of Arabs in Israel (M = 3.45, SD = 1.86), disagreed slightly with forming an independent Palestinian state (M = 2.57, SD = 1.86), and agreed slightly with the Arab uprisings (M = 4.50, SD = 1.76). Our hypothesis was that people lower on SDO would express greater support for structural changes indicating Arab ascendancy, and that this relationship would be mediated by the dove-hawk indicator. The model, tested using Mplus 7.0 (Muthén & Muthén, 2011) with maximum likelihood estimation, fit the data, χ2(19, N = 121) = 25.35, n.s.; comparative-fit index (CFI) = .97; root-meansquare error of approximation (RMSEA) = .05 (see Fig. 1). As predicted, participants with lower SDO reported greater Table 1.  Items From the Short Social Dominance Orientation Scale in Two of the Languages Used English (Study 2: United States, Ireland, New Zealand,   United Kingdom)   1. In setting priorities, we must consider all groups. (R)   2. We should push for equality between groups. ʺʥʶʥʡʷʤnot ʬʫʬʲ ʡʹʧʬ ʥʰʩʬʲ ʺʥʩʥʴʩʣʲ ʭʩʲʡʥʷʹʫ    3. Group equality should be our ideal. (R) ʺʥʶʥʡʷʤʬʫʬʲʡʹʧʬʥʰʩʬʲʺʥʩʥʴʩʣʲʭʩʲʡʥʷʹʫ   4. Superior groups should dominate inferior groups. ʺʥʶʥʡʷʤʬʫʬʯʥʩʥʥʹʳʠʹʬʭʩʫʩʸʶʠʬ Hebrew (Study 1: Israel) ʺʥʶʥʡʷʤʬʫʬʲʡʹʧʬʥʰʩʬʲʺʥʩʥʴʩʣʲʭʩʲʡʥʷʹʫ ʺʥʶʥʡʷʤ ʬʫʬʯʥʩʥʥʹ ʳʠʹʬʭʩʫʩʸʶ ʥʰʩʬʲʺʥʩʥʴʩʣʲ ʭʩʲʡʥʷʹʫ  ʠʬ . ʺʥʶʥʡʷʤʬʫʬʲʡʹʧʬ ʬʠʩʣʩʠʤʺʠʦʺʥʶʥʡʷʬ  ʯʥʩʥʥʹ  . ʺʥʶʥʡʷʤʬʫʬʯʥʩʥʥʹʳʠʹʬʭʩʫʩʸʶʠʬ ʺʠʦʺʥʶʥʡʷʬ ʯʥʩʥʥʹ ʺʥʶʥʡʷʤʬʫʬ. ʬʠʩʣʩʠʤ ʯʥʩʥʥʹʳʠʹʬ ʭʩʫʩʸʶʠʬ   . ʭʩʫʥʮʰʸʺʥʩʹʺʥʶʥʡʷ  ʬʲ  ʨʥʬʹʬ  ʭʩʫʩʸʶ  ʺʥʰʥʩʬʲ  ʺʥʶʥʡʷ  ʬʠʩʣʩʠʤʺʠʦʺʥʶʥʡʷʬʯʥʩʥʥʹ

(in ʸʺʥʩʹ ʨʥʬʹʬʭʩʫʩʸʶʺʥʰʥʩ ʬʠʩʣʩʠʤare ʺʠʦ ʭʩʫʥʮʰ ʺʥʶʥʡʷʬ ʯʥʩʥʥʹ  ʬʲ Note: Items that were reverse-coded marked theʺʥʶʥʡʷ English list only) with “(R).” The scale in additional languages is available from ʭʩʫʥʮʰʸʺʥʩʹʺʥʶʥʡʷʬʲʨʥʬʹʬʭʩʫʩʸʶʺʥʰʥʩʬʲʺʥʶʥʡ the first author and in Pratto, Cidam, et al. (2013). 





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ʭʩʫʥʮʰʸʺʥʩʹʺʥʶʥʡʷʬʲʨʥʬʹʬʭʩʫʩʸʶʺʥʰʥʩʬʲʺʥʶʥʡʷ

Pratto et al.

4

SDO1 SDO2

0.75* –0.88***

SDO3 SDO4

0.42***

–0.50**

Social Dominance Orientation

–0.34***

Dove-Hawk (dove high)

Protecting the rights of Arabs in Israel

0.49*** 0.26***

Forming an independent Palestinian state

I want the Arab uprisings to succeed

0.54**

Fig. 1.  Results from Study 1: structural equation model of Israeli Jews’ support for three Arab-ascendancy policies. Variables in the theoretical model are in boldface. Rectangles represent directly measured variables, and the oval represents a latent variable. Standardized coefficients are shown (*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001). SDO1, SDO2, SDO3, and SDO4 refer to the four items measuring social dominance orientation (see Table 1). Errors between protecting the rights of Arabs in Israel and forming a Palestinian state correlated .34.

support for Arab rights within Israel, r = .27; a Palestinian state, r = .29; and the Arab uprisings, r = .15, ps < .05. The standardized regression coefficients in Figure 1 show that these effects were mediated by participants’ dove-hawk stance. Adding direct paths from SDO to the policy measures did not improve model fit or substantially reduce the coefficients for the paths from the dovehawk mediator. Mediation was tested using the indirect-effect test implemented in Mplus 7.0, bootstrapping with 100,000 runs. The tests were reliable; the indirect effects of SDO on support for rights of Palestinians within Israel, for a Palestinian state, and for the Arab uprisings were −.15, −.18, and −.10, respectively, ps < .001. The dove-hawk indicator fully mediated the effects of SDO on support for these Arab-ascendancy policies. An alternative model reversing the positions of SDO and the dove-hawk indicator showed that the latter was the better mediator: All three direct paths from the dovehawk indicator to policy support were reliable, and all fit indicators were poor (e.g., RMSEA = .12).

potential political changes in countries other than the participants’. Study 2 extended this model of rejectionist ideologies to several world regions.

Study 2: Support for Arab Ascendance Around the World Study 2 was a survey of adults in several world regions, who were asked about their support for Arab ascendance. Our measures of ideology related to policy justifications based on two common stereotypes about Arabs: that they are untrustworthy (dangerous) and incompetent (e.g., Zogby, 2010). The policy attitudes we examined concerned two contemporary political movements: popular Arab uprisings and the bid for Palestinian statehood. Following SDT, we expected SDO to predict endorsement of rejectionist ideologies, which would mediate the influence of SDO on support for changes toward Arab autonomy.

Method

Discussion Considering Israeli policy might lead one to underestimate the diversity within Israeli public opinion. The results of Study 1 belie a stereotype of Israelis as monolithically opposed to Arab ascendance. Rather, Israelis’ attitudes varied and demonstrated the utility of the SDT model of policy support within Israel. Study 1 also extended the SDT model because the opinions examined concerned not only domestic policy (rights of Arabs within Israel) and a potential Israeli foreign policy (forming an independent Palestinian state), but also political changes among neighbors (support for the Arab uprisings). These results show that our theoretical model can be extended to understand popular attitudes toward

Samples and procedure.  Study 2 was conducted in the last 5 months of 2011 and included participants from 13 countries in seven regions. Four countries were in northern Europe (Belgium: n = 113; Ireland: n = 60; United Kingdom: n = 102; Switzerland: n = 50), 3 were in southern Europe (Italy: n = 115; Spain: n = 112; Greece: n = 150), 2 were in the Balkans (Bosnia-Herzegovina: n = 60; Serbia: n = 60), 1 was in the Middle East (Turkey: n = 124), 1 was in North America (United States: n = 153), 1 was in Asia (China: n = 90), and 1 was in Oceania (New Zealand: n = 140). Participants completed questions online (49%) or on paper (51%); when it was possible to compare results for the two methods of survey administration, we found no differences between them (Morselli,

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Support for Arab Ascendance 5 2012). Sampling was designed to provide diversity of age, gender, income level, and political outlook in each nation. Respondents’ ages ranged from 18 to 78 years; half were over 30. Fifty-four percent rated their economic situation as “wealthy,” “better than most people in your society,” or “good,” and 46% rated their economic situation as “so-so,” “poor,” or “destitute.” Translations into 15 languages allowed every participant to complete the questions in his or her mother tongue; translations were verified with back-translations (see Pratto, Cidam, et al., 2013). Measures.  All items in this study were rated on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 10 (strongly agree). Support for Arab ascendance.  Our outcome measures, which were treated separately, were ratings of agreement with “forming an independent Palestinian state” and “I want the Arab uprisings to succeed.” Social dominance orientation.  The same four-item measure of SDO as in Study 1 was used (see Pratto, Cidam, et al., 2013, for translations, means, and standard deviations for each country). These items constituted a latent variable with four indicators. Testing a theoretical multigroup latent model properly requires first confirming measurement invariance of the latent constructs (Reise, Widaman, & Pugh, 1993). To test that the four items measured SDO equivalently and in all regions, we used multigroup confirmatory factor analysis. In this kind of analysis, measurement invariance is conventionally assessed in three ways (Reise et al., 1993). Metric invariance is tested by constraining factor loadings to be equal across regions, scalar invariance is tested by constraining intercepts to be equal across regions, and configural invariance is tested by including the same items for all regions. We estimated models with both factor loadings and intercepts constrained to be equal, via maximum likelihood with robust standard errors. Variables

were centered on the grand mean. The fit indices of the most constrained (scalar) model were good, χ2(50, N = 1,233) = 54.08, n.s.; CFI = .99, RMSEA = .02; thus, the latent construct of SDO conformed to configural, metric, and scalar invariance. Legitimizing ideologies regarding Arab ascendancy.   Our ideology items addressed policy justifications based on stereotypes about Arabs endorsed by Western elites (e.g., Huntington, 1993; Lewis, 2002; Patai, 1973) since the 1920s: “Outside control over Arabs is necessary for the world’s security,” and “The Arab people are competent enough to govern themselves.”

Results On average, people in all regions endorsed an independent Palestinian state; the only exception was North Americans, who were neutral. Participants in three regions on average wanted the Arab uprisings to succeed; the samples in Asia, Oceania, and the Balkans, however, slightly disagreed with this policy (see Table 2). North Americans were neutral. People in all regions rejected the ideologies that Arabs should be externally controlled and are incompetent (i.e., they agreed with the statement that Arabs are competent; see Table 2). SDT predicts that participants should support the two Arab-ascendancy policies to the extent that they are low on SDO, and that these negative relationships between SDO and policy support should be at least partially mediated by endorsement of rejectionist ideologies. To test this conceptual model while accounting for regional variance required testing the direct and indirect influences of SDO in several steps. All models were estimated with Mplus 7.0 via maximum likelihood with robust standard errors. The first step used a structural equation model to test the direct path between SDO and the two policy variables. This model (Model 1) was acceptable, χ2(95,

Table 2.  Means for Policy Support, Ideological Endorsement, and Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) in Study 2 Policy support Region Northern Europe Southern Europe Balkans Middle East North America Asia Oceania

Arab uprisings 6.96 6.54 4.94 6.55 5.48 4.79 4.97

(2.84) (2.59) (3.27) (3.24) (3.04) (2.98) (2.58)

Ideological endorsement

Palestinian state 6.83 7.13 6.82 7.38 5.49 6.10 6.10

(2.60) (2.72) (3.44) (2.93) (2.76) (2.26) (2.17)

Arabs are competent 7.21 6.59 6.93 7.51 6.81 6.71 5.82

(2.55) (2.86) (2.82) (2.96) (2.65) (1.99) (2.36)

Control over Arabs is needed 4.10 3.69 4.70 2.23 3.75 4.40 4.27

(2.70) (2.69) (3.38) (2.29) (2.69) (2.40) (2.36)

SDO 3.11 2.80 3.37 3.12 3.80 3.41 3.21

Note: Standard deviations are given in parentheses. Participants rated all items from 1 (strongly disagree) to 10 (strongly agree).

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(1.62) (1.44) (1.99) (1.56) (2.06) (1.53) (1.44)

Pratto et al.

6 N = 1,242) = 147.30, p < .001; CFI = .93; RMSEA = .06. As expected, the regression coefficients for the paths from SDO to the two dependent variables were negative in all regions (see Table 3). The magnitude of the coefficients was larger for support of the Palestinian state than for support of the Arab uprisings, except in Turkey and the United States (both coefficients were unreliable for New Zealand). The inverse link between support for the Arab uprisings and SDO was significant in four of the seven regions, though not in the Balkan, Chinese, and New Zealander samples. We wanted to test whether pro-Arab-autonomy ideology mediated the relationship between SDO and endorsement of the two policies of Arab ascendancy. To do this, in the second step we had to model a latent factor specified by four indicators: endorsement of the two legitimizing ideologies (responses to the item regarding outside control were reverse-coded) and the two policies. In the model testing measurement invariance of this latent factor (Model 2), factor loadings and intercepts were constrained to be equal across regions. Model 2 fit the data well, χ2(41, N = 1,242) = 54.96, n.s.; CFI = .96; RMSEA = .04. Configural, metric, and scalar invariance confirmed the comparability of the latent construct across regions. In the third step, we inserted the latent construct of pro-Arab-autonomy ideology (Model 2) into Model 1, and also added the theorized direct path from SDO to pro-Arab-autonomy ideology, to test whether ideology mediated the effect of SDO on endorsement of the two policies. This model (Model 3) fit the data well, χ2(187, N = 1,242) = 215.03, n.s.; CFI = .98; RMSEA = .03. As Table 4 shows, in all regions except the Balkans, low SDO was reliably associated with the latent factor of rejectionist ideology. Endorsement of rejectionist ideology reliably predicted support for each policy in every

Table 3.  Standardized Regression Coefficients From Model 1 in Study 2 Outcome Region Northern Europe Southern Europe Balkans Middle East North America Asia Oceania

Support for Arab uprisings

Support for Palestinian state

–0.24*** –0.18** –0.15 –0.34** –0.33*** –0.15 –0.17

–0.28*** –0.25*** –0.49*** –0.26** –0.27** –0.24* –0.04

Note: Model 1 regressed support for the two policies on social dominance orientation simultaneously in the seven regions. The table presents standardized coefficients. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

region, ps < .001. With two exceptions, direct paths from SDO to policy endorsement were not reliable. On the whole, the SDT theoretical model was supported in the seven regions. Finally, Model 4 tested whether the SDT model fit across regions. In this model, we constrained the paths from SDO to the latent ideology variable and from the latent ideology variable to each policy measure to be equal across regions, except for the Balkans. The constrained model fit the data, χ2(204, N = 1,242) = 234.42, n.s.; CFI = .97; RMSEA = .03, and the χ2 difference test, indicated that Model 4 was an improvement over the unconstrained Model 3, Δχ2(17, N = 1,242) = 19.40, n.s. The standardized coefficients in Model 4 (Fig. 2) indicated that people low on SDO rejected ideologies legitimizing Arab subordination, and that this ideological stance in turn predicted support for the Arab uprisings and for forming an independent Palestinian state. Mediation was tested by calculating the indirect effects in Mplus 7.0, bootstrapping with 100,000 resamples. All indirect effects from SDO to policy endorsement were reliable (see Table 4), and direct paths from the latent SDO factor to both outcome measures were unreliable (i.e., ps > .09) when we controlled for pro-Arab-autonomy ideology. Hence, rejectionist ideology fully mediated the influence of SDO on endorsement of both Arab-ascendancy policies.

Discussion The high level of external influence on Arab nations (e.g., Fund for Peace, 2011) makes the support for or opposition to Arab ascendance among non-Arabs a potentially important influence on whether popular Arab demands for greater autonomy and equality will be realized. Study 2 showed strong support for the SDT model in accounting for attitudes regarding two contemporary potential changes toward Arab ascendancy: the popular uprisings and the bid for an independent Palestinian state. The results show robust support across regions for the hypothesis that rejectionist ideologies can legitimize change toward greater equality in subordinated regions. Despite the limits on making causal claims on the basis of survey data, Study 2 constitutes robust international evidence that SDT can be extended to transnational intergroup relations. It also shows that there is widespread rejection of Western ideologies—which have been promoted by scholars and other elites—that have served to legitimize subordination of Arabs (e.g., Little, 2002).

General Discussion The world is alive with counterdominance protests, from the students’ movements in Chile and Quebec, through

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Support for Arab Ascendance 7 Table 4.  Standardized Direct and Indirect Effects From Model 3 in Study 2 Outcome

 

Ideology (predicted by SDO)

Support for Arab uprisings (predicted by ideology)

Support for Palestinian state (predicted by ideology)

β

β

β

β

IE

–0.27** –0.52*** –0.17 –0.43* –0.53** –0.64*** –0.30*

0.68*** 0.71*** 0.48*** 0.58*** 0.65*** 0.39*** 0.58***

0.56*** 0.51*** 0.37*** 0.46*** 0.54*** 0.40*** 0.55***

–0.02 –0.23* –0.02 –0.07 0.04 0.14 0.15

–0.26*** –0.24*** –0.24*** –0.22*** –0.31*** –0.20*** –0.21***

Region Northern Europe Southern Europe Balkans Middle East North America Asia Oceania

Support for Arab uprisings (predicted by SDO)

Support for Palestinian state (predicted by SDO) β –0.10 –0.03 –0.43*** –0.02 0.03 –0.01 –0.01

IE –0.22*** –0.17*** –0.18*** –0.17*** –0.26*** –0.22*** –0.21***

Note: In Model 3, the latent ideology variable was regressed on social dominance orientation (SDO), and support for each policy was regressed on the latent ideology variable. To test for mediation by the ideology variable, we added the direct effects from SDO to the policy items. The table presents standardized coefficients: β = direct effect; IE = indirect effect. Indirect effects were estimated by bootstrapping with 100,000 runs using the delta method. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

the numerous counterausterity demonstrations in Greece, Spain, the United States, and elsewhere, to the ongoing Arab uprisings and political changes in sub-Saharan

Arabs Are Competent 0.65***

Africa. Indeed, such protests and potential changes may be at their highest worldwide level since 1989. Although understanding how domination and oppression are

Control Over Arabs Is Needed –0.54***

Pro-Arab Autonomy SDO1 SDO2

–0.81** 0.32* –0.63***

SDO3 SDO4

–0.38***

Social Dominance Orientation

0.58***

I want the Arab uprisings to succeed

0.45*** –0.06 [–0.19***]

Forming an independent Palestinian state

–0.02 [–0.22***]

0.52**

Fig. 2.  Results from Study 2: multiregional structural equation model of support for Arab-ascendancy policies. Variables in the theoretical model are in boldface. Rectangles represent directly measured variables, and ovals represent latent variables. Standardized coefficients are shown (*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001). SDO1, SDO2, SDO3, and SDO4 refer to the four items measuring social dominance orientation (see Table 1). In this path diagram, paths to the ideological measures are shown above the latent ideology variable, and paths to the policy measures (outcome measures) are shown to the right. Coefficients for direct paths from social dominance orientation to policy endorsement—as in Model 1, but constrained to be equivalent across regions—are in square brackets.

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Pratto et al.

8 sustained is an important subject of considerable research, resistance and opposition do occur and deserve equal theoretical attention (e.g., Haslam & Reicher, 2012; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). Further, cross-national movements are increasingly influential (e.g., Passini & Morselli, 2012). Extending SDT into the international realm and to Arab ascendancy, the present research shows that people in many nations—and especially people who are low on SDO—reject ideologies that suppress Arabs. This finding is important for three reasons. First, Arabs and other subordinated peoples may find allies among people who do not share their situations or identity. Broad values, not just identity politics (e.g., Haslam & Reicher, 2012), may be significant in international relations. Second, this finding suggests that rejectionist ideologies may become as widespread as dominant ideologies. How this may happens warrants more research attention. Third, this finding demonstrates that elites are not necessarily in control of popular social and political rhetoric. Thus, research such as the present studies may inform leaders about ordinary people’s political ideas (see also Pew Research Global Attitudes Project, 2011; Pratto, Sidanius, Bou Zeineddine, Kteily, & Levin, 2013; Zogby, 2010). The present results highlight the need for theoretical and empirical attention to some new questions. Both studies revealed an organized diversity of opinions among adult publics. Thus, national policies and averages from opinion polls can be misleading indices of people’s attitudes. Rather, it is important to understand the role of psychological factors within the contexts of national and international power. For example, how does popular opinion influence elites’ acceptance of rejectionist ideologies? Does the effectiveness of a method of collective organization vary with people’s political orientation? How can new rejectionist ideologies draw upon existing cultural ideas or narratives? Such questions position psychology at the intersection of cognition, motivation, social organization, and culture. Study 1 and Study 2 both demonstrate that theories of prejudice, ideology, and stereotype content that are commonly applied to intergroup relations within nations may be fruitfully applied to relations between nations. Given that Western stereotypes are well known to Arabs (e.g., Zogby, 2010), it is all the more important to theorize about and research how domestic intergroup relationships are nested in international relationships of power (e.g., see Pratto, Sidanius, et al., 2013). Remarkably, Study 2 showed the same model fit across global regions. This result demonstrates the utility of the theoretical model and shows that the rejectionist ideologies we studied (that Arabs are competent and not a security threat) are widespread around the globe. That fact warrants further research attention. Most approaches to ideology assume

that ideologies are cultural creations fitted to a particular sociocultural and historical milieu (e.g., Sibley, 2010) or identity (e.g., Haslam & Reicher, 2012). To understand how ideologies come to be common across societies, researchers need to examine whether there are common sociopolitical conditions that interface with psychological processes to produce common ideological content independently (e.g., LeVine & Campbell, 1972), and whether global communication and shared knowledge lead people to adopt rejectionist ideologies through inspiration from similar social movements (e.g., Alquwaizani, 2011). Our research prompts two important modifications to SDT. Although SDT has always posited that both hierarchy-enhancing ideologies and hierarchy-attenuating ideologies are important, it holds that a balance between them sustains group-based dominance (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999, p. 51). Essentially, hierarchy-attenuating ideologies temper the degree of oppression to tolerable levels and thereby legitimize it. But popular movements and rejectionist ideologies appear to produce new facts and new normative values that in turn provoke change against the tolerance of group-based dominance and change or even obsolescence of the relevant social categories of dominance. SDT needs to address (a) power relationships more complex than those of intrasocietal domination (see also Pratto, Sidanius, et al., 2013; Pratto, Stewart, & Bou Zeineddine, in press) and (b) the spread of ideologies across cultures. Another important question is how rejectionist ideologies might inspire true alternative ideologies, that is, frames that not only negate dominant ideologies but also function in their stead. Psychological research will have to consider that people generally reject ideas as false only with considerable effort (e.g., Gilbert, 1991). If rejectionist ideologies refer to dominant ideologies, then activating rejectionist ideologies may cognitively reinforce the dominant ideologies they negate and weaken the potential of rejectionist ideologies. How people change their worldviews pertains to intergenerational and intercultural socialization and international relations, as well as cognitive processes. As the present research demonstrates, such issues should not be left only to anthropologists, historians, political scientists, and sociologists, many of whom focus on the relation between power and ideology; rather, these issues frame an important theoretical and practical arena for psychological research. The present research contributes to other nascent psychological work on ideology (e.g., Sibley, 2010) in pointing to the need for new theorizing and more research. Most especially, studies of whether new alternative ideologies help to create new sociopolitical arrangements will be informative. More broadly, there is no reason to neglect the psychology of people in subordinated situations. Basic

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Support for Arab Ascendance 9 psychological processes, including reactance, cognitive consistency, self-esteem striving, and collective autonomy striving, appear likely to contribute to individual and collective processes that counter dominance. As SDT theorizes, and as we showed in the introduction, scholars can help legitimize dominance processes. Without research attention on the psychologies of resistance movements, the way they change ideologies, and how social networks and communication processes may spread and modify people’s ideologies, aspirations, and goals, psychological researchers may overestimate the stability of hierarchical social systems and contribute to their perpetuation (Romm, 2013). Scientific research on the questions outlined here may help correct this imbalance. Author Contributions F. Pratto designed the measures. T. Saguy analyzed the data for Study 1. D. Morselli analyzed the data for Study 2. F. Pratto and A. L. Stewart checked both sets of analyses independently. All authors collected data, and also edited and approved the final manuscript for submission.

Acknowledgments We are grateful to our anonymous collaborator for creativity, doggedness, and encouragement.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests The authors declared that they had no conflicts of interest with respect to their authorship or the publication of this article.

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Pratto, F., Saguy, T., Stewart, A. L., Morselli, D., Foels, R., Aiello, A., Aranda, M., Cidam, A., Chryssochoou, X., Durrheim, K., Eicher, V., Licata, L., Liu, J. H., Liu, L., Meyer, I., Muldoon, O., Papastamou, S., Petrovic, N., Prati, F., Prodomitis, G., & Sweetman, J. (2014). Attitudes toward Arab ascendance: Israeli and global perspectives. Psychological Science, 25, 85–94. (Original DOI: 10.1177/0956797613497021) Tamar Saguy’s affiliation was reported incorrectly. Her correct affiliation is Interdisciplinary Center (IDC) Herzliya.