Psychological Reports, 1990, 66, 1112-1114.
63 Psychological Reports 1990
AN ECONOMIC THEORY O F CHOICE AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR SUICIDE DAVID LESTER' Richard Stockton State College Summary.-An economic model of decision making was examined for its implications for suicide. The model would focus on what permits the su~cldalimpulse to become manifest rather than what motivates a person to commit s u ~ c ~ d e
McCain (1988, in press) has proposed a model of freely-willed economic choice that has implications for understanding suicide. McCain started with the assumption that, after impulses have been generated in the mind, perhaps randomly and unpredictably on occasions, they encounter a variety of filters which determine whether the impulse is acted upon, suppressed, or transformed. Filters are unique to the individual, are dependent upon his experiences, and change as he gets older. McCain presented a formal impulse-filtering model in which the impulses were random experimental revisions of the consumer behavior and there was one filter only, based on maximizing utiliry. McCain recognized that not d needs are measurable on the same scale as most economists would assume and as standard modern economic theory requires. However, the choice between pursuit of family life activities and work activities may not reveal a preference ordering of the alternatives. A filter model, with the possibility of many filters, can lead to the prediction that d impulses may be blocked during an indecisive period by one or another filter. Such indecision is impossible in the economic model of man, though it does occur in real men. McCain added a cognitive filter to the array of possible filters to introduce the influence of cognitive processes. The cognitive filter has special properties, including the ability to modify the action of other filters. In the case of indecision mentioned above, in which the person does not make a decision because the several filters in operation together filter out all possible actions, the cognitive filter can suppress the action of some filters so that at least one impulse passes through and the individual acts. The cognitive filter changes as a result of experiences and reorganizes itself to increase internal consistency.
An Example In the utility-filter model, impulses are passed if they lead to a higher 'Department of Psychologv, Richard Stockton State College, Pomona, NJ 08240
THEORY OF CHOICE: IMPLICATIONS FOR SUICIDE
1113
utility and suppressed if they do not. With a stable utility function, choices converge to those which maximize util~ty.McCain explored the effects of introducing another filter incorporating income constraints. Then, if higher utility can be achieved within the income constraint, the impulse w d be permitted to pass and result in action. There is an asymmetry here. A reduction in prices will permit more impulses to pass the income constraint filter, resulting in a slow process of change. However, a rise in price will result in the filter rejecting all impulses and a sharp change in behavior. McCain examined the phenomenon of highway shootings. The impulse to kill other drivers has probably been pervasive and frequent. The impulse is almost always suppressed. I t fails to pass ethical filters ( W n g is wrong), cognitive filters (I may get caught and punished), or social conformity filters (People like me don't behave in that fashion). What happens once one individual shoots another driver, and the murder is publicized? Then the social conformity filter has met inconsistent evidence and most likely wiIl be modified. It may pass impulses hitherto blocked, and so an epidemic of other murders may occur.
IMPLICATIONS FOR SUICIDE The common theory of choice is based upon the notion that we list various alternatives and rank them in order of preference in the current situation. We then choose the most preferred alternative. In impulse-filtering theory, on the other hand, several competing impulses start out on the process toward shaping action. Some impulses are permitted through the filters while others are blocked. The result is that one impulse determines behavior and, had it not done so, no alternative impulse would have done so (without the mediation of the cognitive filter). For suicide, therefore, the choice of suicide may be blocked by any one of many filters (ethical, cognitive, social conformity, etc.). The impulse may be allowed through only if one or more of the blocking filters is modified. Interestingly, the suicidal act may appear "impulsive" but not always be due to the sudden appearance of an impulse. The impulse may have been present for a long time but blocked by a filter. I t is the sudden removal of the filter that leads to the sudden appearance of the behavior. Some types of filters may be easily modified. For example, depression has important cognitive concomitants (such as hopelessness and a distorted world view). These cognitive components may change the cognitive filter such that it overrides the ethical filter, say, permitting the suicidal impulse through. Linehan, et al. (1983) have discussed the possible reasons people have for living, reasons which inhibit the suicidal impulse, and they suggest working with these reasons in counseling suicidal people. Reasons for living may be easily modified by the cognitive filter, in the same way that Jacobs
1114
D. LESTER
(1982) has documented how religious people who have hitherto viewed suicide as a sin change their religious views when suicidal to convince themselves that God will forgive them. Some filters may not be easily modified. Clarke and Lester (1989) have argued that many people will not choose another method for suicide if their preferred method is not available. This reluctance to consider alternative methods for suicide suggests that this filter may be resistant to change from pressures from the cognitive filter. McCain's theory, then, changes our focus from asking what motivates a person to commit suicide to what factors permit the suicidal impulse to become manifest in observable behavior. REFERENCES CLARKE,R. V., & LESTER,D. Preventing suicide by design. New York: Springer-Verlag, 1989. JACOBS,J. The moral justification of suicide. Springfield, IL: Thomas, 1982. L I N ~ I A M., N , GOODSTEIN, J., NIELSEN,S., & CHILES,J. Reasons for staying alive when you're thmking of killing yourself. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 1983, 5 1 , 276-286. MCCAIN, R. A. Groping toward a behavioral metatheory of choice. Conference of the Society for the Advancement of Behavioral Economics, San Diego, 1988. M c C m , R. A. Impulse-filtering: a new model of freely willed economic choice. Review of Social Economy, in press. Accepted May 1 7 , 1990.
63 Psychological Reports 1990
AN ECONOMIC THEORY O F CHOICE AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR SUICIDE DAVID LESTER' Richard Stockton State College Summary.-An economic model of decision making was examined for its implications for suicide. The model would focus on what permits the su~cldalimpulse to become manifest rather than what motivates a person to commit s u ~ c ~ d e
McCain (1988, in press) has proposed a model of freely-willed economic choice that has implications for understanding suicide. McCain started with the assumption that, after impulses have been generated in the mind, perhaps randomly and unpredictably on occasions, they encounter a variety of filters which determine whether the impulse is acted upon, suppressed, or transformed. Filters are unique to the individual, are dependent upon his experiences, and change as he gets older. McCain presented a formal impulse-filtering model in which the impulses were random experimental revisions of the consumer behavior and there was one filter only, based on maximizing utiliry. McCain recognized that not d needs are measurable on the same scale as most economists would assume and as standard modern economic theory requires. However, the choice between pursuit of family life activities and work activities may not reveal a preference ordering of the alternatives. A filter model, with the possibility of many filters, can lead to the prediction that d impulses may be blocked during an indecisive period by one or another filter. Such indecision is impossible in the economic model of man, though it does occur in real men. McCain added a cognitive filter to the array of possible filters to introduce the influence of cognitive processes. The cognitive filter has special properties, including the ability to modify the action of other filters. In the case of indecision mentioned above, in which the person does not make a decision because the several filters in operation together filter out all possible actions, the cognitive filter can suppress the action of some filters so that at least one impulse passes through and the individual acts. The cognitive filter changes as a result of experiences and reorganizes itself to increase internal consistency.
An Example In the utility-filter model, impulses are passed if they lead to a higher 'Department of Psychologv, Richard Stockton State College, Pomona, NJ 08240
THEORY OF CHOICE: IMPLICATIONS FOR SUICIDE
1113
utility and suppressed if they do not. With a stable utility function, choices converge to those which maximize util~ty.McCain explored the effects of introducing another filter incorporating income constraints. Then, if higher utility can be achieved within the income constraint, the impulse w d be permitted to pass and result in action. There is an asymmetry here. A reduction in prices will permit more impulses to pass the income constraint filter, resulting in a slow process of change. However, a rise in price will result in the filter rejecting all impulses and a sharp change in behavior. McCain examined the phenomenon of highway shootings. The impulse to kill other drivers has probably been pervasive and frequent. The impulse is almost always suppressed. I t fails to pass ethical filters ( W n g is wrong), cognitive filters (I may get caught and punished), or social conformity filters (People like me don't behave in that fashion). What happens once one individual shoots another driver, and the murder is publicized? Then the social conformity filter has met inconsistent evidence and most likely wiIl be modified. It may pass impulses hitherto blocked, and so an epidemic of other murders may occur.
IMPLICATIONS FOR SUICIDE The common theory of choice is based upon the notion that we list various alternatives and rank them in order of preference in the current situation. We then choose the most preferred alternative. In impulse-filtering theory, on the other hand, several competing impulses start out on the process toward shaping action. Some impulses are permitted through the filters while others are blocked. The result is that one impulse determines behavior and, had it not done so, no alternative impulse would have done so (without the mediation of the cognitive filter). For suicide, therefore, the choice of suicide may be blocked by any one of many filters (ethical, cognitive, social conformity, etc.). The impulse may be allowed through only if one or more of the blocking filters is modified. Interestingly, the suicidal act may appear "impulsive" but not always be due to the sudden appearance of an impulse. The impulse may have been present for a long time but blocked by a filter. I t is the sudden removal of the filter that leads to the sudden appearance of the behavior. Some types of filters may be easily modified. For example, depression has important cognitive concomitants (such as hopelessness and a distorted world view). These cognitive components may change the cognitive filter such that it overrides the ethical filter, say, permitting the suicidal impulse through. Linehan, et al. (1983) have discussed the possible reasons people have for living, reasons which inhibit the suicidal impulse, and they suggest working with these reasons in counseling suicidal people. Reasons for living may be easily modified by the cognitive filter, in the same way that Jacobs
1114
D. LESTER
(1982) has documented how religious people who have hitherto viewed suicide as a sin change their religious views when suicidal to convince themselves that God will forgive them. Some filters may not be easily modified. Clarke and Lester (1989) have argued that many people will not choose another method for suicide if their preferred method is not available. This reluctance to consider alternative methods for suicide suggests that this filter may be resistant to change from pressures from the cognitive filter. McCain's theory, then, changes our focus from asking what motivates a person to commit suicide to what factors permit the suicidal impulse to become manifest in observable behavior. REFERENCES CLARKE,R. V., & LESTER,D. Preventing suicide by design. New York: Springer-Verlag, 1989. JACOBS,J. The moral justification of suicide. Springfield, IL: Thomas, 1982. L I N ~ I A M., N , GOODSTEIN, J., NIELSEN,S., & CHILES,J. Reasons for staying alive when you're thmking of killing yourself. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 1983, 5 1 , 276-286. MCCAIN, R. A. Groping toward a behavioral metatheory of choice. Conference of the Society for the Advancement of Behavioral Economics, San Diego, 1988. M c C m , R. A. Impulse-filtering: a new model of freely willed economic choice. Review of Social Economy, in press. Accepted May 1 7 , 1990.
