A CRITIQUE OF PSYCHIC ENERGY

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AS AN EXPLANATORY CONCEPT

DONR.

SWANSON, PH.D.

:

HE ENERGY CONCEPT IN FREUD'S THEORIES has been subjected to searching criticism by many authors' during the past thirty years or so. These critics suggest that there is a compelling need for major revision of psychoanalytic theory; for the most part they urge abandonment of psychic energy and related .concepts comprising the economic point of view. A panel discussion in 1970 (Panel, 1970), however, reflected a strong, almost unanimous, consensus that the economic point of view has great value for clinical psychoanalysis. Energy concepts were described as essential to explaining and crucial to understanding certain behavioral phenomena. Greenson, Loewenstein, Lustman, Rubinfine, and others explained how and why they found the economic point of view useful. Papers by Lustman (1968) and by Hyman (1975) also defend psychic energy. Other discussions (Panel, 1963, 1968, 1976; Deutsch, 1959) have shown that differences of opinion on these questions are profound and wide ranging. A major difficulty in the way of understanding the energy controversy is the absence of any commonly accepted defi1 The principal arguments can be found in works by Kubie (1947, 1975). Colby (1955), Nuttin (1956), Peters (1960), Nagel (1959), Holt (1965, 1967), Apfelbaum (1965). Rubinstein (1965, 1967). Gardner (1969). Rosenblatt and Thickstun (1970), Applegarth (1971), Peterfreund (1971), Basch (1973, 1975a, 1975b), Klein (1976). and Gill (1976).

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nition or even any general definitional framework for psychic energy. My purpose in this paper is to make explicit five possible frames of reference for defining psychic energy, and to examine critically, within each such framework, Freud’s use of energy concepts. Not all published criticisms of psychic energy are defensible, as both Shope (1971) and Hyman (1975) have noted. I shall confine my criticisms to those that seem to me clear and compelling. The issues involved in seeking a definitional basis for psychic energy will be illuminated if we first examine the energy concept in Freud’s “Project” (1895).

A Critique of Freud’s Theory of Energy Discharge in the “Project” In his “Project for a Scientific Psychology” (1895) Freud laid the foundations of psychoanalytic theory with the aid of a neurophysiological model of the brain, and a theory of its functioning based on the discharge of excitations. The extraordinary importance of this document has been underscored by many authors, including particularly Basch (1975a), Hartmann (1956), Kanzer (1973), Peters (1960), Pribram (1965, 1969), and Pribram and Gill (1976), all of whom emphasize the continuity and close relation of the Project to Freud’s later theoretical works. The precursor of psychic energy is clearly in evidence within the Project in the form of the “quantity of excitation,” Q, which refers to physical energy, even though Freud is not explicit as to the form it takes. Freud begins the Project by considering a system which represents or models a living organism. The system is essentially a network of neurons, but includes sensory receptors, internal secretory organs, and a motor apparatus. The neurons connect with each other through “contact barriers,” or synapses. The organism interacts with its environment. Energies from the external world impinge on the sensory Downloaded from apa.sagepub.com at UNIVERSITE DE MONTREAL on August 1, 2015

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neurons, thus filling them with a quantity of excitation, Q, which is proportional to the impinging energy. It is the fundamental nature of each neuron, and so of the organism, to attempt to rid itself of excitation through a process of discharge. The direction of discharge is always from the sensory end of the organism to the motor end. The resulting motor activity is an organized response that serves as a flight from the stimulus. Freud thus first of all pictures the environment as essentially a source of excitations from which the organism endeavors to escape. The effort required for the escape is assumed proportional to the impinging excitation. The organism also receives stimulation from within, by chemical secretion. These stimuli represent the primary needs of the organism, such as hunger and sexuality, and, like external energies, give rise to excitations that must be discharged. In this case the resulting motor activity cannot lead to escape since the excitations are from within. The stimulation persists until ultimately the activity thereby evoked calls forth from the environment the gratification necessary for cessation of the internal stimulus. The prototype for such activity is the hungry baby crying and thus summoning the mother, who provides nourishment. Now in this case, there is no direct relationship between the energy of the endogenous stimulation and the action required to secure gratification from the external world. Freud accordingly modifies his initial postulate that the nervous system tries to rid itself completely of excitations; he assumes, instead, that enough energy must be stored up to meet the demand for action that arises from endogenous stimulation. Thus, discharge still of necessity takes place, but down to some minimal constant value of Q rather than to zero. Freud's point of departure as outlined above attempts a causal explanatory theory of behavior, at least as applied to simple organisms. In principle, such a theory is testable because Freud took Q to be a physical quantity and so presumably measurable. Downloaded from apa.sagepub.com at UNIVERSITE DE MONTREAL on August 1, 2015

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Throughout his discussion of the model organism and its behavior, Freud implicitly applies a law of conservation to the excitation either stored or flowing within the neuron network, and takes for granted that the excitation is physical energy. He makes clear his central concern with the ebb and flow of energy, and with accounting for what happens to it. It should be noted that such concern is not required by the physics of the situation. As an alternative to Freud’s approach, one could say that neural impulses serve only as signals to release whatever energy may be necessary at a particular point within the organism, and that the ebb and flow of energy per se is incidental and essentially irrelevant to the explanation of behavior. This point is elaborated in the final section of Swanson (1977). Freud’s notion of cathexis, Q, is that of a physical substance, more or less equivalent to electric charge. Pribram (1965, 1969) and Holt .(1965) have drawn attention to its “static” quality. It can “fill” a neuron; it is thus to be distinguished from excitation in a state of flow, which occurs when the neuron discharges its excitation through the axon. Pribram (1965, 1969) has emphasized the harmony of Freud’s Project with present-day neurophysiological concepts. He points out the similarity of Freud’s principle of neuronal inertia to the concept of homeostasis-i.e., the return to a stable condition-and equates “quantities of excitation” to neuroelectric potentials. He particularly notes the similarity between Freud’s idea of cathexis and modern interest in graded potentials in dendritic networks. There seems to me to be an important difference, however, between Freud’s static cathexis and graded potentials in dendritic networks. In Freud’s model it is the same stored energy that then flows out of the neuron in what corresponds to a neural impulse. That is, his quantity Q c a n either be in a state of rest (cathexis) or in a state of flow (current). This quantity is conserved. Graded potentials in dendritic networks may well affect the excitability of the neuron, but the trigDownloaded from apa.sagepub.com at UNIVERSITE DE MONTREAL on August 1, 2015

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gered impulse does not consist of the accumulated charge responsible for the graded electrotonic potential, nor is its “strength” or “quantity” necessarily related to the graded potential. The impulse is fueled by local electrochemical events in the axon and surrounding fluids as the impulse travels down the axon. In short, there is no conservation law in the sense implied by Freud. I do not think that this is a minor difference-conservation of Qseems to be crucial to the logic of Freud’s model, and carries over into his later theorizing on a purely psychological level. Pribram and Gill (1976) have published a detailed, scholarly analysis of Freud’s Project, which, among other things, expands considerably on the theme of harmony with current neurophysiology that Pribram (1965, 1969) had earlier argued. I agree with these authors that energy, excitation, or Q in the Project was electrical in nature and that Freud was developing at least some theoretical propositions that, in principle, could be tested. There are, however, certain difficulties with Freud’s model that I believe to be important for his later theorizing, and which Pribram and Gill do not bring out. These difficulties are closely related to the question of charge conservation. Freud’s model was essentially that of an electrical network with condensers and variable resistors. Pribram and Gill (1976, p. 34)have noted that Freud was attempting an Ohm’s law model: I agree. Let us consider a simple branching network consisting of two resistors wired in parallel. If a potential difference is applied across the resistors, then, according to Ohm’s law, the current will divide itself between the two paths in inverse ratio to the resistances. Clearly this represents the model Freud was using: “. . . the Qh current will divide up in the direction of the various contact-barriers in inverse ratio to their resistance . . .” (1895, p. 323). If we let the resistance in one arm of the path become infinite-i.e., if we block the path of discharge-then of course the current would drop to zero in that branch of the Downloaded from apa.sagepub.com at UNIVERSITE DE MONTREAL on August 1, 2015

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path. If some fixed total amount of charge, as though from a condenser (i.e., a “filled neuron”), were discharging across the resistors, then the entire amount would have to go through the path not blocked. Blocking one path of discharge forces a fixed total amount of charge to find an alternate path of discharge. This notion is pervasive in all of Freud’s theoretical work, and accurately describes the behavior of an electrical network consisting of wires, resistors, and condensers. Such a network behaves in accord with the general principles of charge conservation and Ohm’s law. Let us examine now the question of whether a neural network must behave in accord with the same principle. Clearly it need not. Consider the same circuit, but with neurons replacing the resistors. A neural impulse, upon reaching the point at which the circuit branches (let us say an axon branches) will not divide itself up according to the resistances encountered in the respective branches, Rather, a full-strength impulse (there being no other kind) will be triggered in both branches. (An analogy of an axon to a train of gunpowder is sometimes drawn.) Furthermore, if a synaptic resistance in one arm of the path is infinite, thus blocking that path of discharge, the excitation is not thereby forced to take the other path, as it would in the case of our resistive circuit. A pulse arriving at a blocked synapse could just dissipate; no laws of physics preclude its electrical energy from being transformed into thermal or chemical form irrelevant to the subsequent functioning of the neural net or to the behavior of the organism. This is not to say that one couldn’t design a neural net that would, by means of suitable inhibitory or facilitating feedback channels, simulate just the behavior of a resistive net; but that begs the question. The point is that no general principles operate to require a neural net to exhibit such properties. Yet, Freud postulated a model in which the behavior of the network, and so the organism, was explained as foIIowing from the operation of certain fundamental and quite general principles. In this he was mistaken. Downloaded from apa.sagepub.com at UNIVERSITE DE MONTREAL on August 1, 2015

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Insofar as Freud’s later ideas on psychic energy discharge in the mental apparatus have their origin in these neurophysiological ideas, as seems likely, there is no justification for the notion that if an impulse is blocked in ane channel of discharge it will find its way out in another, nor for the idea that it divides its strength among the available paths of discharge. The law of conservation provides a guiding beacon throughout Freud’s sometimes intricate web of reasoning. His neural network is very like a set of interconnecting pipes carrying an incompressible fluid, which represents and behaves like excitation in a state of either rest or flow. Conservation is crucial to Freud’s explanations of pleasure, pain, affects, wishes, dreams, binding and inhibitory processes of the ego, and primary- and secondary-thought processes, as set forth in the Project. Its role in Freud’s conception of repression and displacement in psychopathological phenomena is just as important. This law of conservation, as it operates in the Project, does not, however, express principles necessarily operative in neural networks as presently understood. Freud was not alone in positing some kind of energy that flows within the nervous system and obeys a conservation law. Ellenberger (1956, p. 210; 1970, pp. 218, 287) has called attention to the fact that many of Freud’s basic ideas originated in some form with Fechner. These ideas include the concept of mental energy, the principle of constancy and its connection with the pleasure principle, the topographical concept of mind, and the principle of repetition. Nervous energy flowing in a network from sensory end to motor end, obeying a conservation law, discharging in the direction of least resistance, and which leaves behind facilitated paths, are all ideas to be found in the chapter on Will in William James’ Princz$Zes of Psychology (1890, pp. 580-592). Amacher (1965) and Bernfeld (1944) also illuminate the early influence on Freud of Briicke, Exner, Meynert, and other scientists with whom Freud worked, all of whom postulated nervous energy flowing in a network. Portions of an article by McDougall (1903) bear a strong resemblance to Freud’s Project, and Downloaded from apa.sagepub.com at UNIVERSITE DE MONTREAL on August 1, 2015

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appropriately acknowledge the influence of James. McDougall has a concept of nervous energy which can be in either a state of rest (like cathexis) or a state of flow, which finds a path of least resistance for its flow, in which inhibition takes place by a draining off of one cell by an adjacent one (compare Freud’s notion of a side cathexis by the ego [1895, p. 323]), and which facilitates future discharge in the same path. In 1923, E. D. Adrian (who, with Sherrington, won the Nobel Prize in 1932 for discoveries regarding the nerve cell), wrote a critique of the energy concept, which to K. S. Lashley, writing in 1929, “seemed conclusive” (p. 166). The early critics of the nervous energy concept pointed out, among other things, that the “all or none” nature of the nervous impulse was inconsistent with the idea of a reservoir of energy that could flow through nerves like a fluid. They observed that a neuron responds to excitation with a brief impulse and then returns to its resting state. Though the force of that argument may be thrown into question by Pribram’s comments on graded potentials (which imply that “resting state” is an oversimplification), it still seems to me that these early criticisms are substantially correct if placed in the context of conservation laws as argued here. I do not agree that the work of Freud in the 1890’s was based on some now obsolete principles of physics or on any failure to recognize that living organisms are open systems, as has sometimes been suggested (see, for example, Holt, 1965, 1967; Nuttin, 1956; Rosenblatt and Thickstun, 1970). Ohm’s law was formulated in 1827; Faraday experimentally demonstrated charge conservation at about the same time. The first law of thermodynamics (energy conservation in a closed system) and the second law (that entropy in a closed system cannot decrease) had been formulated by 1850 through the work of Helmholtz, Joule, Clausius, and others. Boltzman in the 1870’s supplied connecting links between entropy and probability. All of these formulations still stand as essentially correct within the domain of classical physics, which includes Downloaded from apa.sagepub.com at UNIVERSITE DE MONTREAL on August 1, 2015

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models like that of the Project. Fechner, Freud, Helmholtz, and others of the physicalistic school of physiologists made some assumptions about the storage and flow of nervous energy in living organisms that now can be-seen as incorrect. This, however, was a matter of questionable physiology rather than questionable physics. With hindsight, it would seem that their assumptions might have been called into question by the time of Sherrington’s work on the nature of the neural impulse (Foster and Sherrington; 1897; Sherrington, 1906).

Five Frames of Reference f o r Defining Psychic Energy The Project was a study of psychology in a neurophysiological frame of reference. It is widely assumed that Freud subsequently made a decisive change to a “psychological” frame of reference. Hartmann refers to this step as “probably the most important turning point in the history of psychoanalysis” (1959, p. 322). It may have been more of a turning point in the way Freud was interpreted than a genuine change in Freud’s own frame of reference. A new view of energy was, in any event, adopted thereafter by most psychoanalysts. The physical quantity, energy, or excitation-“Q”-in the Project became later a “hypothetical ‘cathexis’ of psychical energy” (Strachey, 1900, p. xviii). Freud continued to refer to such energy in terms very similar to those he used in the Project: excitation, cathexis, energy, quantity of affect, sensory current, and impulse. Cathexes of energy were considered as attachable to ideas and wishes. What, precisely, “energy” as a psychological concept was supposed to mean has never been made clear; such definitions as have been attempted have been based on little more than analogy. A property of psychic energy closely connected with conservation and repeatedly noted by Freud throughout a 40-year period is that it can discharge into the motor apparatus. Among other things, his explanation of conversion and of laughter at jokes rests on this supposition. This Downloaded from apa.sagepub.com at UNIVERSITE DE MONTREAL on August 1, 2015

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property of psychic energy will be of especial value in critically examining our various frames of reference. T o have a theory that is supposed to explain observable events of any kind, one must be able to state the conditions for its refutation. If those who believe in a theory (for example, that neuroses are caused by evil spirits) are unable to conceive of or imagine any evidence that they would accept as counting against the theory, then such a theory does not qualify as empirical science (Popper, 1934). It is, rather, a belief or set of beliefs not subject to challenge or question; there is no way to put it to a test. This issue of refutability, or testability, will be cogent within certain of the framework5 to be considered.

Frame of Reference 1: Interactionism Interactionism refers to the interaction of mind and body, and the postulate that human beings have a “mind” that is nonmaterial, but exists, and inhabits the skull. This mind is activated by a transcendental, nonphysical “fluid” called psychic energy, which flows in psychic pathways and obeys a conservation law. Freud’s assumptions that psychic energy can discharge through the motor apparatus, and that it can undergo “conversion,” clearly imply the possibility that it can be transformed into physical energy. Since psychic energy is nonphysical, one must describe the physics of the situation in terms of the spontaneous and unaccountable creation of some amount of physical energy as the psychic energy finds its outlet. Such a process violates the energy conservation laws of physics and thus is untenable. Holt (1967, p. 19) specifically calls attention to this violation. Rubinstein (1965, p. 38) takes a more general stand against interactionism, one based on the untenability of intervening in the causal sequence of physical events. It seems to me that the energy conservation issue is in itself decisive. I think it unnecessary to burden the argument with a challenge to all forms of interactionism. The perils of bogging down in Downloaded from apa.sagepub.com at UNIVERSITE DE MONTREAL on August 1, 2015

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possibly undecidable issues such as, for example, strict physical determinism, are not inconsiderable. Frame of reference 1 is untenable because it postulates energy discharge from the mind into the body. Yet, Freud made literally hundreds of statements that seem to have just this connotation. Even so, for the following reasons I think it unlikely that he would have accepted this framework had he been confronted with it. In the first place Freud, in his book on Aphasia, published in 1891, explicitly rejected a causal interaction of psychical and physical events. Secondly, Freud greatly admired Fechner and acknowledged him as a source of some of his early basic ideas, as I mentioned earlier. The first chapter of Fechner’s “Elements of Psychophysics” (1860) gives a sensible and clear exposition of the monistic thesis that body and mind are two viewpoints of one thing. Immediately following an acknowledgment to “the great Fechner” as the source of an idea on dream theory, Freud unmistakably implies that he considers the mind and brain to be in essence the same thing. This he does in a passage that, incidentally, exemplifies the historical turning point to which Hartmann referred. “I shall entirely disregard the fact that the mental apparatus with which we are here concerned is also known to us in the form of an anatomical preparation ..” (1900, p. 536). Thirdly, Helmholtz did not and, almost surely, could not have accepted any theory implying a break with energyconservation laws. He was a leading physicist of that period on whom Freud, as well as Brucke and others of Freud’s mentors, relied. Articles by Helmholtz, including one on energy conservation in living organisms (1861), are correct and explicit in their treatment of energy conservation, even in terms of today’s physics. (This is not to say, of course, that Helmholtz’s ideas on physiology would still be regarded as correct.) The antivitalist commitments of the Helmholtz school of physicalistic physiologists have been described by Bernfeld (1944), as

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well as by Amacher (1965), and would seem to preclude any sympathy for interactionism. What Freud actually thought is of course a matter of conjecture. In any event, because this frame-of reference is untenable, it does not provide a useful perspective for studying Freud’s writings, for it implies that we must dismiss as impossible most of what he said concerning psychic-energy discharge or conversion processes. Perhaps we must, but I think there is a preferable alternative.

Frame of Reference 2: Subjective Just as we may define “mind” as the subjective aspects of brain (and body) functioning (as it is plausible to suppose Freud did), so we might define “psychic energy,” “discharge,” and conversion” in terms of the purely subjective aspects of unknown somatic or neural events. In so doing, ‘we add psychic energy, discharge, conversion, and related concepts to the language of subjective experience. Our language of sensations, memories, feelings, ideas, images, and perceptions is already very rich, and it is difficult to see what would be gained by adding physicalistic terms if in fact they are definable in terms of more familiar concepts. Perhaps, for example, psychic energy is implicated when one feels excited or energetic; possibly “discharge” is related to relief from a feeling of tension. (But to feel tense is not the same as to feel energetic.) Hyman (1975, p. 31) takes “interest” as a synonym for psychic energy, and interprets Freud as doing so. In this frame of reference, the central claims that Freud advanced for energy theory do not fit at all. Freud was trying to explain subjective experiences (and behavior) in terms of a causal agent, not simply rename them. Taken alone, therefore, this frame of reference reduces the problem to a matter of terminology; physicalistic terms such as energy or cathexis take on the character of jargon and have no explanatory power. If one does wish to retain Freud’s theoretical claims, I S

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something more is required than the definition here proposed; these claims will be discussed in frame of reference 4. In rejecting frame of reference 2 as a basis for energy concepts I do not mean to discount the importance of subjective, “energy-like” feelings so far as clinical work is concerned. Holt (1976, pp. 159-161)describes clearly the kinds of observational data that must be saved, as drive theory is dismantled. People do often feel as though they were seized with impulses, suffused with excitement, paralyzed by fear, or otherwise overcome with emotion. Furthermore; these feelings all must have physiological correlates. But to hypostatize feelings as psychic substances is to play games with words, not build a theory. Otto Marx’s term “cryptopsychology” (1967, p. 823) seems especially appropriate to describe psychic energy concepts in this frame of reference.

Frame of Reference 3: Class@atory In this framework, psychic energy is defined as an abstract concept, having no referent that actually exists, merely useful or convenient for organizing or classifying clinical (introspective) data collected in the analytic setting. It belongs in the category of theory Basch (1973) identifies as classificatory rather than explanatory. In this approach, too, we redefine ‘(discharge into the motor apparatus” as simply a name, or abstraction, under which certain behavioral or introspective data are collected. We similarly treat conversion and related concepts. There is no issue of verification, refutation, or testability of statements, nor, of course, of violating energy conservation, for this framework admits of no theoreticalexplanatory claims. Within this framework psychic energy cannot be a useful concept in the sense of explaining anything about the mind or about behavior. Some of the same objections can be raised here as in the case of frame of reference 2. The natural language of behavioral phenomena is already hierarchically organized, and Downloaded from apa.sagepub.com at UNIVERSITE DE MONTREAL on August 1, 2015

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it is difficult to see how its potential for illumination can be enhanced through superimposing energy concepts for classificatory purposes. Furthermore, this frame of reference clearly is not in accord with Freud’s use of energy concepts.

Frame of Reference 4: A bstract-Theory or Model Psychic energy is here defined as an abstract concept, having no existing referent, which appears in certain theoretical statements. These statements or theories are intended to explain or account for behavioral data, including data introspectively collected by the analyst. “Discharge” and “conversion” must not be taken literally, but also are to be taken as abstract concepts. There is here no problem of violating energy conservation. I mean to include in this category all abstract (and perhaps vague) definitions of psychic energy that can be inferred from use or that someone might devise. What is of crucial interest are the theoretical claims involving such energy concepts, for here (unlike frameworks 2 and 3) it is more than a matter of terminology. These theoretical statements are intended to qualify as explanations of human behavior both in and outside of the clinical setting. When we say that energy concepts are useful for explaining clinical and behavioral phenomena, what, then, are we to infer more specifically about the relationship between psychic energy and human behavior? That is, what criterion should an explanation fulfill if it is to count as an explanation or contribute to the understanding of behavior? I shall assume it to be essentially this: If we knew enough about the tendencies for the ebb and flow of psychic energy of a particular patient, we could then draw useful inferences concerning the expected behavioral dispositions of that patient. We might also hope in this way to resolve certain puzzling aspects or incongruities of the patient’s behavior. I think this interpretation accords with a common-sense view of the question I posed. It is not reasonable, of course, to expect any theory to predict a specific Downloaded from apa.sagepub.com at UNIVERSITE DE MONTREAL on August 1, 2015

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instance of behavior at a particular time and place, but it is reasonable to ask that a theory be able to predict behavioral tendencies or dispositions. An analyst is certainly able to do just that, and it is in fact a common occurrence when people exercise judgment about other people. If we have any theories at all concerning the flow of psychic energy, then such theories, to be useful in a clinical situation, should lead to some kind of inferences about how the patient might tend to behave. So long as a theory leads to inferences about behavioral phenomena that otherwise would not have come to light, we need not distinguish, in this connection, between prediction and “retrodiction,” or reconstruction of past behavior. I shall illustrate Freud’s theory of psychic-energy discharge with a somewhat oversimplified account, but one which I believe reflects the essential features of the theory. I wish to emphasize that my illustration is not meant to exemplify all of Freud’s theories, but only the central claims of the energy or drive-discharge theory. It is particularly useful in this connection to recognize Klein’s (1976, Chap. 3) distinction between Freud’s two theories- the drive-discharge theory vs. the clinical theory. It is only the former to which I refer. Suppose it is inferred from transference manifestations that a patient has intense unconscious hostility. Let us try to use psychic-energy theory to deduce behavioral dispositions. The claims of the theory are in essence that there is dammedup psychic energy associated with the hostility and that this energy presses for discharge via some pathway, either motoric or ideational or both. Different paths of discharge give rise to different known types of behavior. (Essentially the same claims apply whether we consider a libidinal or a hostile impulse.) We almost seem to have now the elements of an explanation which meets the criterion I specified. Our theory is able to predict that the patient will tend to develop neurotic symptoms, or obsessive ideas, or compulsive acts, or feel anxiety, or laugh at a joke, or engage in normal activity, or express Downloaded from apa.sagepub.com at UNIVERSITE DE MONTREAL on August 1, 2015

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emotions. Unfortunately, however, we are not able to be much more specific, since energy theory, alas, has nothing to say about which paths of discharge are likely to be taken, other than that they will tend to be the same paths as taken in the past. NOW,if we know that the patient had obsessional ideas, we would then say that the energy normally destined for motoric discharge tends to attach itself to certain inappropriate ideas, thereby giving them a peculiar intensity. We could then predict that the patient would suffer from obsessional ideas. If the patient has certain neurotic symptoms, we would know that the energy tends to find a way out through paths determined by “somatic compliance,” and we can then predict that the patient will develop just those symptoms we know he has. If the patient tends to engage for the most part in ego-syntonic activities, we would know that he has good capacity for neutralization. Knowing that the energy can be readily neutralized, we predict that the patient will tend to engage in ego-syntonic activity. And so on. We are able to predict just those behavioral tendencies we already know about, and no more. In short, the reasoning is circular and does not qualify as explanation or contribute to understanding the patient. Even inferences about past behavioral dispositions (“retrodictions” or reconstructions) do not escape being circular. Let us say we have observed an obsessional idea or a neurotic symptom. Energy theory then tells us that there is a pathological discharge process, and so there must be dammed-up energy somewhere that failed to find adequate normal discharge. The analyst can then begin to look for unconscious ideas or affects corresponding to the dammed-up energy and, in so doing, presumably hit upon the repressed hostility or the repudiated libidinal wish originating in childhood that gave rise to the obsession or symptom. On that basis he might then reconstruct some portion of the patient’s past that might otherwise have remained unknown. If the reconstruction is accurate, or at least convincing, can we not infer Downloaded from apa.sagepub.com at UNIVERSITE DE MONTREAL on August 1, 2015

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that the analyst was usefully guided by energy theory? Such a notion does not bear scrutiny, for the theory itself gave no clue regarding the nature or meaning of the repressed material. To say only that there is dammed-up energy somewhere is to tell the analyst no more than to look for something unconscious behind the obsession or symptom. But that much was already known; the discovery of pathogenic unconscious ideas was in fact the basis for the original postulate that energy was dammed up-again the reasoning is circular. Nagel (1959) and Basch (1973, p. 49) have also pointed out the circularity of certain psychoanalytic theorizing. It is my thesis here that all use of psychic-energy-discharge concepts in the writings of Freud, and in the bulk of the psychoanalytic literature, entails a process of reasoning “backward” from clinical observation to conjectures about the vicissitudes and disposition of psychic energy in the mental apparatus and that there is not a single instance (except in Freud’s Project) of “forward“ reasoning, which uses energy theory as a basis for predicting in a particular patient either the presence or absence of specified behavioral tendencies not known beforehand. In short, theories based on psychic-energy or drivedischarge concepts cannot be verified by any subsequent appeal to observation of behavior either in or out of the clinical setting, for all such verifications employ circular arguments. Similarly, no kind of behavior is ruled out by the theory; it is inconceivable that a patient could behave in any manner that could be counted as evidence against the theory. Psychic energy theories are neither verifiable, nor testable, nor falsifiable. In accord with my aforementioned criterion for explanation, a somewhat stronger statement can be made. In this framework (4), psychic energy concepts are useless; they are irrelevant to the explanation and understanding of human behavior. I believe that the circularity I illustrated tends to go unnoticed because the full circle is never completed when Downloaded from apa.sagepub.com at UNIVERSITE DE MONTREAL on August 1, 2015

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giving metapsychological descriptions; it is only implied. If the “mental apparatus” is postulated as an actually existing, but nonphysical, entity (i.e., frame of reference l), questions about what we can infer from behavior about the functioning of the psychic apparatus (what I referred to earlier as “backward” reasoning) become of interest in and of themselves. Then the issue of using such functioning to predict behavior fades away. The circular reasoning is therefore left incomplete, so the circularity is probably not noticed. Such a view of the mental apparatus as “real” but nonphysical, as pointed out earlier (frame of reference l), entails issues of converting psychic energy to physical energy and so is untenable. Perhaps reification of the psychic apparatus defends against the awareness of circularity. If the psychic apparatus is perceived as “real” or concrete, then its functioning is logically seen as being of interest for its own sake, and so it seems justified to explain that functioning in terms of observable behavior. If the psychic apparatus is only a helpful abstraction, then all that can possibly be of interest is its role in predicting behavioral dispositions. The theory is too weak to play any such role, aside from predicting the very behavior on the basis of which its own functioning was described; thus our circularity.

Frame of Reference 5: Neurophysiological Model In this frame of reference, we create a hypothetical model of a living organism, as Freud did in the Project. Psychic energy is physical in nature, but the particular form it takes may be left unspecified. It is a fluid, chemical, or electric charge (in the form of ions) which follows neural pathways and obeys the laws of physics and chemistry. In this framework we must of course face up to the (perhaps insoluble) problem of how to connect psychological or subjective experiences with energy phenomena. Yet, it seems clear that Freud was in fact attempting to do so Downloaded from apa.sagepub.com at UNIVERSITE DE MONTREAL on August 1, 2015

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throughout 40 years of his writings. I arrive at this view in part by a process of elimination. The four preceding frames of reference are either impossible or useless, and so not helpful in trying to understand Freud’s energy concepts. Yet Freud, in a number of instances, seems to have specifically disclaimed that psychic energy and the psychic apparatus had neurophysiological referents. In a carefully reasoned and welldocumented paper, Gill (1976) has examined these disclaimers and persuasively argued that Freud invariably used the term metapsychology in direct connection with neurological and biological assumptions. That is, metapsychology is neuropsychology. (Energy is of course central to Freud’s metapsychological theorizing.) Gill goes on to argue, in effect, that it is futile to try to connect neurophysiological events with their psychological.?significance or meaning. Evidently he and Pribram, if I correctly understand the last two sentences in their book (Pribram and Gill, 1976, pp. 168-169), disagree with each other on essentially that issue. I see no reason for’me to mix in, but only wish to argue that, to understand Freud, we must assume that, in his use of energy and other metapsychological concepts, he was indeed attempting to connect neurophysiology with psychology. I believe that the foregoing five definitional frames of reference can account for all reasonable interpretations of psychic energy that have been implicitly used, though I have no way of being sure of this. It is incidentally of interest to compare three of these five (2, 5, 4,respectively), with Holt’s (1965, p. 1lo), “phenomenological,” “physiological,” and “abstract” categories of meaning for the term “tension” in the context of a theory of motivation.

Energy as a n Explanatory Concept in Freud3 Case History of Paul Lorenz Our understanding of the energy concept may be enhanced if we examine in some detail the role Freud assigned to it in the Downloaded from apa.sagepub.com at UNIVERSITE DE MONTREAL on August 1, 2015

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case history of a patient. Did Freud offer energy-discharge phenomena as a basis for explaining or illuminating aspects of the patient’s behavior? If so, where do such phenomena fit in the logic of the explanatory process? If not, then for what purpose was energy theory invoked in the case report? I n his study of the logic of explanation in psychoanalysis, Sherwood (1969) selected the case history of Paul Lorenz, the Rat Man, as best suited for his purposes, and used it as a basis for his entire study. He had sought a published case report of a successful analysis carried out by Freud that included a widely accepted psychoanalytic explanation of an individual’s behavior. Sherwood’s objective was to answer the question: “What does a Freudian explanation of an individual’s behavior look like ‘through logical spectacles?’” (1969, p. 76). His focus of interest was the explanatory process itself and not necessarily the “true explanation’’ of the patient’s obsessional disturbances. What first commands our interest here is the almost complete absence in Sherwood’s study of any substantial reference to energy theory. Has Shenvood omitted something of importance, or are these concepts also missing from Freud’s report itself? Rubinstein (1973, p. 338) notes that Sherwood intentionally ignores such questionable concepts as psychic energy and agrees with Sherwood’s assumption that the logical features of explanation in psychoanalysis are not affected by such omission. Freud, in the case report, makes very few references to energy concepts, and Sherwood’s neglect of those few that do appear does not seem to represent a serious or particularly significant omission in the context of Sherwood’s own objectives. Nevertheless, Freud does make several specific explanatory cIaims which do shed light on the role he assigned to energy-discharge phenomena, and these claims, neglected by Shenvood, are of interest here. Energy-discharge concepts play a substantial role only in the last part of the final section of the Lorenz case report. That section bears the title, “The Instinctual Life of ObsesDownloaded from apa.sagepub.com at UNIVERSITE DE MONTREAL on August 1, 2015

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sional Neurotics, and the Origins of Compulsion and Doubt” (1909, p. 237). If we take the perspective (of frames of reference 2, 3, or 4) that psychic energy, and psychical forces, -are abstractions or subjective experiences without any neurophysiological base and invented in order to illuminate or explain clinical data, then we must find Freud’s opening sentence somewhat puzzling: “If we wish to obtain a grasp of the psychical forces whose interplay built up this neurosis, we must turn back to what we have learnt from the patient on the subject of the precipitating causes of his falling ill as a grown-up man and as a child” (1909, p. 237). Freud is suggesting that it is clinical evidence that gives us a grasp of psychical forces, and that these forces have causal explanatory value; that is, it is the forces whose interplay built up the neurosis. Here are the seeds of circularity, unless these psychical forces can predict more than went into their own formulation. It will not do to dismiss the sentence as carelessly written, for, as we shall see, the entire section is consistent with this opening statement. I shall show that none of the references to energy concepts in this section can be understood on the assumption that psychic energy is purely an abstraction invented in order to explain and understand clinical data. That is, the statements having to do with energy have no power to explain any clinical data not already used in formulating the same statements. Thus, they are nontrivial only on the assumption that the psychic apparatus actually exists and is a worthy target of interest by itself. Following the opening sentence, Freud goes on to explain the obsessive and compulsive behavior of the patient, and offers a number of generalizations concerning such behavior and its origins. Except for a very few flights into energic metaphors, the explanation is experience-near; it is kept close to clinically observable behavioral phenomena that can be appreciated in common-sense terms. For example, Freud explains the origin of obsessive doubting in terms of a loveDownloaded from apa.sagepub.com at UNIVERSITE DE MONTREAL on August 1, 2015

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hate opposition which paralyzes the will. Such paralysis spreads into all areas .of the patient’s life because sexual attitudes have the force of a model for other attitudes and behavior. The argument is framed in terms-of human experience, not metapsychological abstractions. Freud gives other illustrations of specific mechanisms of doubt-displacement or doubt-diffusion, including ellipsis, generalization, the questioning of memories, and the intrusion of unconscious fantasies into actions which then must be checked or repeated. He goes on to explain compulsion as an attempt to compensate for doubt. Actions paralyzed by conflict may find substitute expression, which then take on a peremptory character in order to overcome the doubt with which they are suffused. The intimate relation between thought and action suggests that thoughts preparatory to a paralyzed action may take on a compulsive or obsessive quality. In effect, there is a regression from acting to thinking. After presenting this logical and well-organized account of the instinctual life of obsessional neurotics and the origins of compulsion and doubt, Freud then invokes energy theory; our purpose is to ascertain whether the following two passages contribute anything substantial to, or are even logically connected with, his previous explanation. If the patient, by the help of displacement, succeeds at last in bringing one of his inhibited intentions to a decision, then the intention mwt be carried out. It is true that this intention is not his original one, but the energy dammed up in the latter cannot let slip the opportunity of finding an outlet for its discharge in the substitutive act. Thus this energy makes itself felt now in commands and now in prohibitions, according as the affectionate impulse or the hostile one snatches control of the pathway leading to discharge [1909, pp. 243-2441. I may now venture, upon the basis of the preceding discussion, to determine the psychological characteristic, Downloaded from apa.sagepub.com at UNIVERSITE DE MONTREAL on August 1, 2015

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so long sought after, which lends to the products of an obsessional neurosis their ‘obsessive’ or compulsive quality. A thought-process is obsessive or compulsive when, in consequence of an inhibition (due to a conflict of opposing impulses) at the motor end of the psychical system, it is undertaken with an expenditure of energy which (as regards both quality and quantity) is normally reserved for actions alone; or, in other words, an obsessive or compulsive thought is one whose function it is to represent an act regressively. No one, I think, will question my assumption that processes of thought are ordinarily conducted (on grounds of economy) with smaller displacements of energy, probably at a higher level [of cathexis], than are acts intended to bring about discharge or to modify the external world [pp. 244-2451. Let us try to understand what problem Freud was trying to solve, i.e., what was puzzling him, just at the point where he introduced these passages on energy theory. His own statement, in the first sentence of the second passage, gives us a clue. He wondered what gives obsessions and compulsions their obsessive and compulsive qualities. We may reasonably assume that he is referring in some sense to certain compelling, repetitive, irrational, persistent, peremptory, and invulnerable qualities of obsessions and compulsions. At one level we might explain it by saying that, because the patient is unaware of the true meaning or purpose of his obsessive thought or compulsive act, it can never come to any satisfying closure by fulfilling its purpose and so must be repeated ad infinitum. But Freud apparently thought that the intensity of obsessions and compulsions had to be accounted for in energic terms. He already had postulated that human beings are driven by some kind of “mental energy,” an originally biological idea apparently traceable to the Project. Thus, in these passages, Freud seems to be giving us a special instance of his more general theory, one in which there is a clear reference to Downloaded from apa.sagepub.com at UNIVERSITE DE MONTREAL on August 1, 2015

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a process in which mental energy can be used for actions. Frame of reference 1 (Interactionism) is one possible interpretation here for Freud’s concept of energy, but it would require us to dismiss all of Freud’s ideas relating to energy-discharge theory as impossible and incorrigible. It is of more interest to explore the other frames of reference. Let us first more clearly identify the theoretical propositions Freud seems to be making. He postulates that in any inhibited intention there is dammed-up psychic energy which presses for discharge. Now, it is not fair to say that this proposition was manufactured on an ad hoc basis to explain the obsessional neurosis of Paul Lorenz. It in fact originated in Freud’s studies of hysteria wherein dammed-up psychic energy found expression in a somatic symptom. There is thus a certain theoretical appeal here because it is conceivable that, by speculating on other vicissitudes of the discharging energy, Freud might have predicted the existence of obsessional neuroses before ever observing them clinically. Actually he did not of course; but let’s speculate further along this line. He might have surmised that the dammed-up energy could find a pathway to action or attach itself to some idea, thus imparting to the action or to the idea a peculiarly intense quality that is suggested by the word “energy.” This would seem to be an impressive prediction. However, the difficulty is that it explains both too little and too much. One cannot deduce from the theory anything about which of the possible means of discharge will take effect for any patient. Freud admitted that he could say little about the “choice of neurosis,” other than to name the conversion choice as due to “somatic compliance.” At the same time that the theory explains nothing in particular, it also explains everything in general. For a moment’s reflection shows that no conceivable behavior on the part of any patient could possibly count against the theory. Conversion symptoms, obsessive ideas, laughter, and compulsive acts can all be explained-but only after the fact-as evidencing a particular choice of discharge mode. If an apparently healthy Downloaded from apa.sagepub.com at UNIVERSITE DE MONTREAL on August 1, 2015

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patient were analyzed, any inhibited intention that came to light would be regarded as evidence for an incipient neurosis rather than a refutation of the theory that there was dammedup energy striving for discharge. Taking psychic energy as an abstraction, then (i.e., Frame of Reference 4), we may not consider the quoted passages as playing any significant role in the explanatory process. We may note, too, that the passages in question are not followed by claims that they explain anything at all about the behavior and psychopathology of Paul Lorenz. One gets the impression at this point in Freud’s narrative that he had almost forgotten about Lorenz; his interest obviously lay in the psychic apparatus for its own sake. But this is just what he promised at the beginning of the section; he wanted to “obtain a grasp of the psychical forces.” T o Freud, the psychic apparatus was an entity, not a n abstraction. One cannot logically object to imposing Frames of Reference 2 (subjective) or 3 (classificatory) on Freud’s energic ideas, since in these frameworks no theoretical claims are made. Nor do they have explanatory value. But to do so clearly is to take Freud less seriously than he meant to be taken, for certainly he was trying to build a theory and to explain something. Let us go on, then, to framework 5 (biological). Frame of Reference 5 , neurological model building, permits at least an attempt to answer the refutability questions raised in connection with framework 4.Psychic energy is taken here to refer to some unknown but, in principle, knowable physical or chemical quantity. The possibility is, then, at least conceivable that one might determine its presence or absence, in connection with an inhibition or an obsessive idea (I here gloss over the difficulty of establishing the connection), by physical instruments. It may be a very long time before instrumentation techniques permit such measurements, but that alone is no reason to argue that attempts to build neurophysiological models are necessarily futile. This surely is what Downloaded from apa.sagepub.com at UNIVERSITE DE MONTREAL on August 1, 2015

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Freud was doing. But, regrettably, he encouraged the belief that his models were immune from criticism on physiological grounds by claiming that they stood solely on psychological ground, a claim that Gill (1976) has effectively dissected and challenged. In this connection it is incidentally of interest to note that Strachey identifies the idea expressed in the last sentence of the preceding quotation from the Rat Man analysis as originating in the Project. Only within Frame of Reference 5 do the two quoted energy passages from the Rat Man bear any logical or explanatory relationship to the rest of Freud’s narrative. In that context they are clearly meant to describe what might be happening within the human organism that correlates with the subjective experience of obsessive ideas and compulsive acts. This is what Freud was trying to explain. If we took seriously the idea that the energy concepts in these passages have abstract, psychological (i.e., nonphysiological) referents, then the passages explain nothing.

Continuity of Energy-Discharge Concepts Throughout Freud’s Writings Numerous energy-theory statements similar to those appearing in the Rat Man analysis can be found in at least twenty of Freud’s major writings over a 40-year period. Substantially the same inferences may be drawn as in the case of the Rat Man. Of particular interest are the following: (1) The implicit claims of energy theory are these: Psychic energy that fails to find normal discharge becomes dammed up, presses for discharge through the motor apparatus, and, in so doing, gives rise to psychopathology of various kinds. Psychic energy is thus transformed into physical energy. It is also claimed that there are ego structures which oppose, inhibit, and control the discharge of energy. Normal activity and a theory of thinking are based on controlled discharge. (Later claims apply to different specific types of psychic energy, principally libido and aggressive energy.) Downloaded from apa.sagepub.com at UNIVERSITE DE MONTREAL on August 1, 2015

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(2) Most of the basic ideas underlying these energy state-

ments can be found in the Project, and all are in harmony with the model therein proposed. I refer particularly to the idea of energy as a fluid flowing in channels, pressing for discharge, and obeying a conservation law. The blocking of one channel forces flow into alternate channels. (3) Each specific formulation of a statement about the discharge of mental energy is a description partly based on clinical-behavioral data, and can be used to predict nothing more than the same behavioral dispositions on which the energy statement was based. I do not think a single instance can be found in the psychoanalytic literature in which a behavioral tendency can be predicted (or “retrodicted”-i.e., reconstructed) that was not already known and, in fact, a prerequisite to forming the energy statement. As evidence for my claim concerning the consistency and pervasiveness of Freud’s statements on energy theory, a list of relevant publications selected from a 40-year period of Freud’s works appears in the bibliography. The following pages contain passages that particular exemplify the characteristics enumerated above: Breuer and Freud, 1893, p. 86; Freud, 1894, pp. 49-50; 1900, pp. 599-600; 1901, p. 53; 1905a, pp. 147, 149; 1905b, pp. 164, 170, 177, 237; 1910, p. 18; 1911, p. 221; 1914, pp. 84-86; 1915a, p. 120; 1915b, p. 184; 1916-1917, pp. 356,393; 1920, pp. 27, 34; 1923, p. 19; 1926, pp. 140, 141, 162, 163; 1933, pp. 93, 94; 1940, pp. 148, 151. Freud’s ideas on energy-discharge theory are neither casually considered nor confined to some limited, and later modified, area or time period of his theorizing. They represent basic, long-term beliefs. As such, they provide a unique key to understanding Freud’s metapsychological theories.

Summary of Conclusions Psychic-energy, libido, and related concepts in Freud’s drivedischarge theory are either impossible, useless, or mistaken. If they are defined in a mind-body interactionist framework, Downloaded from apa.sagepub.com at UNIVERSITE DE MONTREAL on August 1, 2015

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they are impossible in the sense that they violate energyconservation laws of physics. If they are defined in any abstract framework, they are useless in that explanations of behavior so based are trivially and incorrigibly circular. If they are defined instead as biological concepts, the implied notions of energy flow in neural networks are mistaken; nevertheless, the biological framework seems most reasonable and helpful to understanding what Freud was attempting with his energy-discharge theory. I have not attempted to examine Freud’s clinical theory, as contrasted with his drive-discharge theory; I refer to the distinction drawn by Klein (1976). REFERENCES Adrian, E. D. (1923), The conception of nervous and mental energy. Brit. J. P~jchol.,14:121- 125. Amacher, hl. P. (1965), Freud? Neurological Education and its Influence on Psjchoanaljtic Theory. [Psychol. Issues Afonogr 161. Neiv York: International Universities Press. Apfelbaum, B. (1965), Ego psychology, psychic energy, and the hazards of quantitative explanation in psycho-analytic theory. Internat. J. Psycho-Anal., 46~168-182. Applegarth, A. (1971). Comments on aspects of the theory of psychic energy. This Journal, 19:379-416. Basch, hl. F. (1973), Psychoanalysis and theory formation. The Annual of Psychoanal,si, 1:39-52. Neiv York: Quadrangle. -(1975a), Perception, consciousness, and Freud’s “Project.” The Annual of Psjchoanalyis, 3:3-19. New York: International Universities Press. -(1975b), Theory formation in Chapter VII: A critique. This Journal, 24:61-100. Bernfeld, S . (1944), Freud’s earliest theories and the school of Helmholtz. Psychoanal. Quart., 13:341-362. Breuer, J. & Freud, S. (1893-1895), Studies on hysteria. Standard Edition, 2 . London: Hogarth Press, 1955. Colby, K. hl. (1955), Energy and Structure in PsychoanaZysis. New York: Ronald Press. Deutsch, F., ed (1959), On the Afyterious Leap f r o m the Mind to the Body. New York: International Universities Press. Ellenberger, H. F. (1956), Fechner and Freud. Bull. Menninger Clinic, 20: 201-2 14. -(1970), The Discouery of the Unconscious. New York: Basic Books. Fechner, G. T. (1860), Elements of Psychophysics, vol. I. New York: Holt, Rinehart, & Winston, 1966. Foster, hl. & Sherrington, C. S. (1897), Textbook of Phjsiology; Part III The Central Nervous System. 7th ed. London, Neiv York: hlacmillan. Downloaded from apa.sagepub.com at UNIVERSITE DE MONTREAL on August 1, 2015

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Freud, S. (1891), On the theoryof hysterical attacks. StandardEdition, 1:151-154. London: Hogarth Press, 1966. Freud, S. (1891), O n Aphasia. New York: International Universities Press, 1963. -(1892), On the theory of hysterical attacks. Standard Edition, 1:151-154. London: Hogarth Press, 1966. -(1894). The neuro-psychoses of defence. Standard Edition, 3:43-68. London: Hogarth Press, 1962. -(1895). ‘Project’ for a scientific psychology. Standard Edition, 1283-397. London: Hogarth Press, 1966. -(1900), The interpretation of dreams. Chapter VII. Standard Edition, 5, pp. 509-621.London: Hogarth Press, 1953. -(1901). Fragment of an analysis of a case of hysteria. Standard Edition, 7:3-122.London: Hogarth Press, 1953. -(1905a), Jokes and their relation to the unconscious. Standard Edifion, 8. London: Hogarth Press, 1960. (1903b). Three essays on the theory of sexuality. Standard Edition, 7:125245. London: Hogarth Press, 1953. -(1909), Notes upon a case of obsessional neurosis. Standard Edition, 10:153-320.London: Hogarth Press, 1955. -(1910), Five lectures on psycho-analysis. Standard Edition, 11:3-56. London: Hogarth Press, 1957. -(1911). Formulations on the two principles of mental functioning. Standard Edition, 12:215-226.London: Hogarth Press, 1958. (1914), On narcissism: An introduction. Standard Edition, 1469-102. London: Hogarth Press, 1957. -(1915a), Instincts and their vicissitudes. Standard Edition, 14:111-140. London: Hogarth Press, 1957. (1915b), The unconscious. Standard Edition, 14:161-215. London: Hogarth Press, 1957. (1916-1917), Introductory lectures. Standard Edition, 16. London: Hogarth Press, 1963. -(1920), Beyond the pleasure principle. Standard Edition, 18:3-64. London: Hogarth Press, 1955. -(1923), The ego and the id. Standurd Edition, 19:3-66.London: Hogarth Press, 1961. -(1926). Inhibitions, symptoms and anxiety. Standard Edition, 20:77-175. London: Hogarth Press, 1959. -(1933). Neiv introductory lectures. Standard Edition, 22:3-182.London: Hogarth Press, 1964. -(1940). Outline of psycho-analysis. Standard Edition, 23:141-207.London: Hogarth Press, 1964. Gardner, R. W. (1969). Organismic equilibration and the energy-structure duality in psychoanalytic theory: An attempt at theoretical refinement. ThisJournal, 17:3-40. Gill, hl. M. (1976), hletapsychology is not psychology. In: Psychology vs. MetaPsychology: Psychoanalytic E5says in hfemory of George S. Klein, ed. hl. hl. Gill & P. S. Holzman, [Psychol. Issues, hlonogr. 361. New York: International Universities Press, pp. 71-105. Hartmann, H. (1956). The development of the ego concept in Freud’s work: In: Essays o n Ego Psjchology. Neiv York: International Universities Press, 1964, pp. 268-296.

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-(1959),Psychoanalysis as a scientific theory. In: Esmys on Ego Psychology. New York: International Universities Press, 1964, pp. 318-350. Helmholtz. H. (1861), The application of the law of the conservation of force to organic nature. In: Selected Writings of Hermann won Helmhohx, ed. Russell Kahl. Connecticut: Wesleyan University Press, 1971. Holt, R. R. (1965). A review of some of Freud’s biological-assumptions and their influence on his theories. In: Psychoanalysis and Current Biological Thought, ed. N. S. Greenfield & 1%’. C. Lewis. hladison: University of Wisconsin Press, pp. 93-124. -(1967), Beyond vitalism and mechanism: Freud’s concept of psychic energy. In: Science and Psychoanalysis, ed. J. H. hlasserman. New York: Grune & Stratton, v. 11, pp. 1-41. -(1976), Drive or wish? A reconsideration of the psychoanalytic theory of motivation. In: Psychology vs. Illetapsychology: Psychoanalytic Essays in Memory of George S. Klein, ed. M. M. Gill & P. S. Holtzman, [Psychol. Issues, hlonogr. 361. New York: International Universities Press, pp. 158-197. Hyman, hl. (1975), In defense of libido theory. The Annual of Psychoanalysis, 321-36.New York: International Universities Press. James, W.(1890), Principles ofPsychology, vol. 11. New York: Holt, 1923. Kanzer, hl. (1973). Two prevalent misconceptions about Freud’s “Project” (1895). The Annual of Psychoanalysis, 1:88-103.New York: Quadrangle. Klein, G. S. (1976), Psychoanalytic Theory: A n fiploration offisentiah. New York: International Universities Press. Kubie, L. S. (1947). The fallacious use of quantitative concepts in dynamic psychology. Psychoanal. Quart., 16:507-518. -(1975). The language tools of psychoanalysis: A search for better tools drawn from better models. Internat. Rev. Psycho-Anal., 211-24. Lashley, K. S. (1929). Brain Mechanisms and Intellz&nce. New York: Dover, 1963. Lustman, S. L. (1968), The economic point of view and defense. The Psychoanalytic Study ofthe Child, 23:189-203.New York: International Universities Press. Marx, 0. M. (1967), Freud and aphasia: An historical analysis. Amer. J. Psychiat., 124:815-825. hlcDougal1, W. (1903), The nature of inhibitory processes within the nervous system. Brain, 26:153-191. Nagel, E. (1959). hlethodological issues in psychoanalytic theory. In: Psychoanalysis: Scientfic Method and Philosophy, ed. Sidney Hook. New York: Grove Press, pp. 38-56. Nuttin, J. (1956). Human motivation and Freud’s theory of energy discharge. Canadian-1. Psychol., 10:1 67-178. Panel (1963). The concept of psychic energy, A. H. hlodell, reporter. ThisJournal, 11 :605-618. -(1968), Psychoanalytic theory of instinctual drives in relation to recent developments. H. Dahl, reporter. ThisJournal, 16:613-637. -(1970), The use of the economic viewpoint in clinical psychoanalysis. K. T.Calder, reporter. Internat. J. Psycho-Anal., 51245. -(1976), Psychic energy reconsidered. A. Applegarth, reporter. This Journal, 24:647-657. Peterfreund, E. (1971), Information, Systems, and Psychoanalysis [Psjchol. Issues, Monogr. 25/26]. New York: International Universities Press. Downloaded from apa.sagepub.com at UNIVERSITE DE MONTREAL on August 1, 2015

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Peters, R. S . (1960), T h e Concept of Motivation, 2nd ed. London, New York: Humanities Press. Popper, K. R. (1934), The Logic ofdcientqic Discovery. New York: Harper, 1968. Pribram, K. H. (1965), Freud's project: An open, biologically based model for psychoanalysis. In: Psychoanalysis and Current Biological Thought, ed. N. S . Greenfield & W. C. Lewis. hladison: University of Wikonsin Press, pp. 81-92. -(1969), The foundation of psychoanalytic theory: Freud's neuropsychological model. In: Brain and Behatiour, 4 (Adaptation), ed. K. H. Pribram. Neiv York/London: Penguin, pp. 395-432. -& Gill, hl. M. (1976), Freud's 'Project' Re-assessed. New York: Basic Books. Rosenblatt, A. D. & Thickstun, J. T. (1970), A study of the concept of psychic energy. Internat. J. Psycho-Anal., 51:265-278. Rubinstein, B. B. (1965), Psychoanalytic theory and the mind-body problem. In: Psjchoanalysis and Current Biological Thought, ed. N. S . Greenfield & W. C. Lewis. hladison: University of Wisconsin Press, pp. 35-56. -(1967), Explanation and mere description: A metascientific examination of certain aspects of the psychoanalytic theory of motivation. In: Motives and Thought, ed. R. R. Holt, [Psychol. Issues, hlonogr. 18/19]. New York: International Universities Press, pp. 18-77. -(1973), On the logic of explanation in psychoanalysis. Psychoanalysis and Contemporary Science, 2:338-358. New York: International UniversitiesPress. Sherrington, C. S. (1906), T h e Integrative Action of the Nervous System. Neiv York: Scribner's. Shenvood, hl. (1969), T h e Logic of Explanation in Psychoanalysis. New York: Academic Press. Shope, R. K. (1971), Psychical and psychic energy. Philosophy of Science, 38, pp. 1-38. Strachey, J. (1900), Editor's introduction. Sfandard Edition, 4:xi-xxii. London: Hogarth Press, 1953. Swanson, D. R. (1977), On force, energy, entropy, and the assumptions of metapsychology. Psychoanalysis and Contemporary Science, 5:137-153, ed. T. Shapiro. New York: International Universities Press.

Acknowledgment I am grateful to Dr. Michael F. Basch for many helpful and stimulating discussions. Draft manuscripts of his own works which he generously made available to me provided a n invaluable perspective on Freud's metapsychological theories. I appreciate, too, helpful criticism and comments from Dr. John E. &do and Dr. Arnold Goldberg. Professor hlerton Gill made available to me a draft manuscript of a n early version of his essay (1976), which I found most valuable and which had a significant influence on this paper.

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